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A Plea For Websites To Stop Blocking Password Managers

An anonymous reader writes: Password managers aren't a security panacea, but experts widely agree that it's better to use one than to have weak (but easy-to-remember) passwords. Just this week, they were listed as a tool non-experts don't use as much as experts do. I use one, and a pet peeve of mine is when a website specifically (or through bad design) interferes with the copying and pasting of a password. Thus, I appreciated this rant about it in Wired: "It's unacceptable that in an age where our lives are increasingly being played out online, and are sometimes only protected by a password, some sites deliberately stop their users from being as secure as possible, for no really justifiable reason."

365 comments

  1. Scripts that interact with passwords fields awsome by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Interesting

    Well some sites don't want scripts interacting with the password fields. This could be a way to stop some malware from scraping user passwords from input fields.

  2. Never seen them blocking CNTRL-C CNTRL-V by drolli · · Score: 1, Interesting

    And that works fine for me. (using keeppass)

    1. Re:Never seen them blocking CNTRL-C CNTRL-V by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      I can think of one website which blocks Ctrl-V off the top of my head, and I'm sure it's not the only one.

    2. Re:Never seen them blocking CNTRL-C CNTRL-V by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I've encountered these. I don't remember which one though, since I decided it wasn't worht my time to work around their stupid password field.

    3. Re:Never seen them blocking CNTRL-C CNTRL-V by Gaygirlie · · Score: 3, Informative

      Blizzard's Battle.net does this. Or at least to, I haven't checked recently. I did contact them about it and they just scoffed it off as a "security measure."

    4. Re:Never seen them blocking CNTRL-C CNTRL-V by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      eBay does this for the password fields when creating or changing passwords

    5. Re:Never seen them blocking CNTRL-C CNTRL-V by Demonoid-Penguin · · Score: 1

      Blizzard's Battle.net does this. Or at least to, I haven't checked recently. I did contact them about it and they just scoffed it off as a "security measure."

      It's a bullshit excuse on their part. See my earlier post earlier in thread for some javascript that may get around that.

    6. Re:Never seen them blocking CNTRL-C CNTRL-V by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Apple's iCloud blocks pasting a password into the password field when you're unlocking your account. Makes it so I can't unlock my account at all on an iPad.

    7. Re:Never seen them blocking CNTRL-C CNTRL-V by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I have. Merril-Lynch started doing that recently. Sadly, my usage of their services was decided by the company I work for, so I can't vote with my feet.

      Sad how the financial sector has the shittiest website security.

    8. Re:Never seen them blocking CNTRL-C CNTRL-V by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      On these websites, I don't think I ever encountered one which blocked my mouse middle button click, to paste the last selection. It doesn't work on Windows though.

      But it won't work if they mess the form even more, with graphical numpads not outputting to HTML input fields (well, if they are disabled, maybe the browser password manager won't fill them in though, I don't remember... it would still easily be available to extensions though...), like on my bank and mobile phone service provider websites...

    9. Re:Never seen them blocking CNTRL-C CNTRL-V by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      One of my idiot banks blocks copy and pasting of account numbers. WTF.

      They also limit password lengths to 8 characters! Double WTF.

      The problem is my employer requires an account with that bank.

    10. Re:Never seen them blocking CNTRL-C CNTRL-V by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Thankfully KeyPass allows you to input your stuff as either key-presses, copy/pastes, or combos of the two (they break the password up to make the job of key capture/clipboard capture more difficult, as you have to do both to get the actual text, they admit its not much, but beats a kick in the crotch).

    11. Re:Never seen them blocking CNTRL-C CNTRL-V by creamy_red · · Score: 1

      I've seen quite a few websites that block me trying to paste in my password. Very frustrating when I let keepass generate my passwords and make them complex.

    12. Re:Never seen them blocking CNTRL-C CNTRL-V by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      For a long time, the Apple Store blocked pasting into the password field. Completely ridiculous for someone claiming to be so security oriented. It was only just fixed recently.

    13. Re:Never seen them blocking CNTRL-C CNTRL-V by tepples · · Score: 1

      The password prompt on Frontier DSL router administration page blocks both the clipboard and usage without JavaScript.

    14. Re:Never seen them blocking CNTRL-C CNTRL-V by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Try an enable right-click plugin.

    15. Re:Never seen them blocking CNTRL-C CNTRL-V by techno-vampire · · Score: 1

      The problem is my employer requires an account with that bank.

      If so, just use it as a transfer account. Let your employer use it for direct deposit of your paychecks, then transfer the funds to a different account at whatever bank you prefer, leaving only enough money behind to keep the account open. There's no reason your employer needs to know, and nothing that they can honestly object to if they do find out.

      --
      Good, inexpensive web hosting
    16. Re:Never seen them blocking CNTRL-C CNTRL-V by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Yes and this speaks to multiple problems. Some websites don't properly recogonize a pasted in password. Amazon usually does for bad or good, same for my school. My cash-card with Kroger (Smith/Safeway) the website is so crappy: it may or may not reconize a legit password, then wants 9999 secuirity questions ranging from: what car did you have as a kid , to what blouse color did your mom where when she gave birth to you.

      That's on top of them wanting the password to be 20 charectors long(ug) be giberish, get changed once ever nanosecod etc.

      While I do apreciate it'd suck to lose what ever money I might put on it.

      When do we get sanity? I'm for rotating passwords so as to minimize risk from someone being a dick.

        On the other hand security questions should be things at least I'm likely to remember. and possibly add some kind of "oops" system. Txt to a googlevoice number (if that works), pick from pictures.

      Why not security questions like favorite beer brand? favorite color? or least favorite color etc?

  3. A plea to fuck off. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Interesting

    No chance. Password managers are a fucking stupid idea.

    One place to attack and get all your passwords. Fucking brilliant!

    1. Re:A plea to fuck off. by Sneeka2 · · Score: 5, Insightful

      The alternative being what? Using the same password everywhere and/or spreading your security thin across a thousand different web services you're using all incompetent at protecting your password to varying degrees?

      --
      Bitten Apples are still better than dirty Windows...
    2. Re:A plea to fuck off. by darkestsoul · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Except that in the year 2015, attackers have realized that it is far easier to just attack companies directly instead. A password manager, or a manually typed 50-character password that is unique to the site isn't going to change poor security one bit. If you don't trust a recognized password manager, I hope you keep your life savings in your mattress as well.

    3. Re:A plea to fuck off. by Whiternoise · · Score: 5, Insightful

      It's risk analysis. Password managers are essentially making a bet that the risk of your hard drive being compromised is far less likely than a website being compromised. Most people can't remember more than 5 (strong) passwords at best and they get lazy and reuse them everywhere. Password managers let you eliminate password reuse so even if your Amazon account gets hacked, the attackers won't suddenly have the keys to the castle.

      It is one place to attack, true, but how likely is it that someone targets your password database? I would argue it's pretty remote, even if your machine was compromised or stolen. Assuming your master password is strong, the attacker either needs to crack it (difficult) or know you well enough to guess it. What's far more likely is that the drive the database is on fails and you lose access to all your randomised passwords. However in that scenario, you might have printed backup keys for your email account (Gmail will let you do this) and no worries.

      For the truly paranoid, good old wetware suffices or a pencil and paper; again, you're weighing the risk of your house (or mind) being broken into vs some script kiddies attacking a website.

    4. Re:A plea to fuck off. by TwentyCharsIsNotEnou · · Score: 2

      As always, it's a trade-off between security and convenience.

      You could keep your passwords engraved on dog-tags and locked in various fire-proof safes in different basements, but that really ruins the convenience part of the trade-off.

      Or you could just use the same password for all sites (if possible), but that really ruins the security part of the trade-off.

      How about: you use a password manager to store your non-critical passwords and store your critical passwords somewhere else - especially the password to your email account from which you can reset all the others if they're stolen. Perhaps a more reasonable trade-off.

    5. Re:A plea to fuck off. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Agreed 100 percent!

    6. Re: A plea to fuck off. by fuzzyfuzzyfungus · · Score: 4, Insightful

      The frustrating thing is that we have better technology available; but we mostly can't use it because sites don't support it. PKCS#11 is older than God, and ICs to suit are nice and cheap because SIMs also use them; but when was the last time you saw a non-state site supporting that? The RSA style auth fobs are also better, as long as you don't let somebody steal the seed data(looking at you RSA) and they don't even need a card reader on the client device. Whatever the 'FIDO' people are messing around with is immature and barely adopted; but also is better than passwords. Aside from a few token "we'll send you a text message and call it two-factor" options, and amusing little pace-of-adoption quirks that make it easier to get a hardware token to protect your WoW account than your bank account, the sites that control the login options haven't done a damn thing in two decades.

    7. Re: A plea to fuck off. by Tomahawk · · Score: 1

      From a previous article, most experts agree that using a password manager is one of the best things to do. Non-experts are three only ones that give arguments against them.

      I tend to trust the experts.

    8. Re:A plea to fuck off. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      I just write all mine down in notebooks. A limited set in the one I keep on me - the ones I need - and the full set, safe at home.

    9. Re:A plea to fuck off. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Duh. Use a password BOOK? You know, a physical notebook? The alternative is to make different passwords, using longer ones (i.e. maybe at least twenty characters long) for important websites - i.e. if you belong to several forums where you never discuss anything personal, and didn't need to post your real details to be a member, then use a simpler password.
      "a thousand different web services"... a slight exaggeration...
      I log into about four or five different 'important' websites every day, all my password phrases are more than twenty characters long, and I've memorised them all. When I go to one of the websites that I don't visit as frequently, I simply look in my password notebook, if I've forgotten the password - due to not having been to the website frequently enough to remember it.

    10. Re:A plea to fuck off. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Insightful

      The problem AC "identified" is that a password manager can be cracked and reveal all your passwords.

      A password BOOK doesn't even need to be cracked, so it's not a solution to that problem - it's got the same problems as before PLUS it's not secured at all.

      Hey, I know, why don't we write all our passwords onto stickers and put them under the keyboard. Nobody ever looks under the keyboard.

    11. Re:A plea to fuck off. by gmack · · Score: 3, Informative

      My server logs disagree with your assumptions. Fail2ban is running constant blocks on botnets trying to guess passwords on SSH, FTP, SASL and webesites and this goes for my day job, my personal server and my evening contracts.

    12. Re:A plea to fuck off. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Informative

      A password BOOK doesn't even need to be cracked, so it's not a solution to that problem - it's got the same problems as before PLUS it's not secured at all.

      It's locked into my house. If someone breaks into my house I worry more about my immediate safety than someone logging into my facebook account.
      If they got access to my physical password book they have already gotten access to my wallet with my credit card and ID.
      Oh, and they probably found my passport too.

      And my passwords aren't written in a way that is legible. I don't write address, login and password together, and the password is usually a reference to a by me well known password with a modifier.

    13. Re:A plea to fuck off. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Seconded, the sibling post scoffing at this suggestion is a fucking idiot.

      If the risk is assessed correctly: in a western country a password book may be threatened or at risk on 1, or at most, 3-5, times in a person's entire life.

      While electronic passwords will be threatened hundreds to thousands, or even millions, of times in that same lifetime.

      Stupid humans, always fucking up the risk assessment...

    14. Re: A plea to fuck off. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      A password book? Really?

      So you don't use password managers which:

      - is secure (keypassx has a master password + optional key file, and passwords are encrypted)
      - is convenient
      - can generate secure passwords
      - can be easily backed up
      - can be easily updated and changes can be propagated (put your password file on the cloud or some other network accessible location that you trust and update as necessary)

      But instead use something which:

      - has your passwords in plaintext
      - can be easily stolen
      - can be easily destroyed, even accidentally (spill coffee, say goodbye to your passwords)
      - can be eavesdropped
      - can't be easily backed up
      - updating one copy of the password book requires manually hunting down and updating all your copies of the book

      I can see the appeal /sarcasm

    15. Re:A plea to fuck off. by umafuckit · · Score: 1

      It's risk analysis. Password managers are essentially making a bet that the risk of your hard drive being compromised is far less likely than a website being compromised. Most people can't remember more than 5 (strong) passwords at best and they get lazy and reuse them everywhere.

      I have one strongish password which I modify in a systematic and easy to remember way based on the website name. For example (and this isn't exactly what I do, obviously), say my core password is ghs78kja: on slashdot I would use as a password /DOTghs78kjaSLASH* on the New Scientist's site I would use /SCIENTISTghs78kjaNEW*. These passwords are all unique, long, very easy to remember, and use all the character classes.

    16. Re: A plea to fuck off. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Cracking the password file is unlikely if you use a strong password along the lines of the classic "horse battery staple" (that is, a passphrase).

      For an extra measure of security, some password managers allow you to generate and use a key file (basically, a gpg private key), which is requird to decrypt the password file, and which you can even keep on an external medium like a pendrive or an sdcard separated from the password file.

      Whenever you need to open the password file, this key will be requested. You just plug in your pendrive, unlock the password file, and unplug the pendrive.

    17. Re:A plea to fuck off. by N1AK · · Score: 2

      I tend to work on the premise that if it's an important password it either doesn't go in my password manager unless it supports 2 factor authentication. I'm yet to hear an argument against password managers that isn't wrong, trivial or blatantly obvious. Yes it'd be stupid to put all the information required to get into your bank account and transfer money out onto a password manager, however none of my financial service providers allow money to be sent to an account it hasn't already been sent to without requiring some form of additional authentication (SMS code etc).

      There's 230 passwords in my lastpass vault, they're all reasonably complex and none of them are the same. You can't get into any email or financial account with just the information in there. Is it perfect? Not even close, but it's vastly better than I could viably manager without it and I've made an informed decision on the trade off.

    18. Re:A plea to fuck off. by dinfinity · · Score: 1

      What's far more likely is that the drive the database is on fails and you lose access to all your randomised passwords.

      LastPass stores your password vault on their servers in encrypted form. So really the only issue is the strength and secrecy of your master password and the encryption used on the vault.

      Having said that, I do not store passwords for banking accounts, Paypal, etc. in my password manager. Terrible shit will still happen if my vault is opened by those with malicious intent, but there is at least a minor barrier preventing them from converting my life savings into Bitcoin.

    19. Re:A plea to fuck off. by Rich0 · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Password managers are essentially making a bet that the risk of your hard drive being compromised is far less likely than a website being compromised.

      If your hard drive is compromised then your keystrokes are being logged and your cookies are being extracted, and any website you log into will be compromised. The password manager isn't really adding that much more risk here.

    20. Re:A plea to fuck off. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Block China, Russia, Brazil and Mexico on your personal servers...

    21. Re: A plea to fuck off. by Overzeetop · · Score: 4, Interesting

      horse battery staple

      Not any more. Words are now characters. You have a 3 character password right there. Unless you're going to munge up the words with misspellings or nonalphanumerics,

      Besides, having to type in your master pass[phrase] that's 30 characters long into something like LastPass from a phone keyboard with ******** as your visual feedback every time you need to re-authorize (which should be frequent if you're being diligent) is a royal pain in the ass. Do that for a couple of days and you'll be back to 12345 out of shear frustration.

      --
      Is it just my observation, or are there way too many stupid people in the world?
    22. Re: A plea to fuck off. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You're also relying upon Last Pass staying in business. And since they're popular, they're a particularly appealing target for advanced attackers.

    23. Re:A plea to fuck off. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I'll go ahead and appear to shill for my password manager. I use Keeper, which stores a copy of the password database locally. What's handy, though, is that after a user-defined number of failed tries (default 5), the database will self-destruct.

      I'm not a security expert, so I have no idea of there is an external way to rip things apart and get at my passwords.

    24. Re: A plea to fuck off. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Authenticating yourself with a certificate is possible, but I've only ever encountered two websites that supported it. The first was for signing SSL certificates, the other hosting virtual private servers.

    25. Re: A plea to fuck off. by blahbooboo · · Score: 1

      Have you used LastPass? LastPass has several options to not re-enter a master password if you choose:
      1) If you have an iPhone you can unlock the vault with TouchID 2) Create a 4 character pin

      Both of these are enabled after x minutes that you set post entering your master password. Between having a passcode/touchID to unlock the iphone, having to enter last pass master password, and then having a secure pin post master password I feel it is secure enough for my needs.

    26. Re:A plea to fuck off. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The issue with this is when some dude dumps the plaintext password db from some dodgy forum it's not much of a step to modify your password to gmail or similar.

      I understand that it's probably more trouble than it's worth since there is other much lower hanging fruit in the db than your even slightly modified password, but if someone is targeting you specifically it's not much of a step to decode this sort of password scheme.

    27. Re:A plea to fuck off. by AthanasiusKircher · · Score: 2

      I have one strongish password which I modify in a systematic and easy to remember way based on the website name. For example (and this isn't exactly what I do, obviously), say my core password is ghs78kja: on slashdot I would use as a password /DOTghs78kjaSLASH* on the New Scientist's site I would use /SCIENTISTghs78kjaNEW*.

      While I understand the appeal of such a system (and tried it briefly years ago), it seems somewhat bizarre to me if you actually want any security. Yes, it will stop some random hacker who obtained a password list from site X from automatically logging into site Y by just applying the old list.

      But if a hacker actually gives a crap about what he's doing and actually wants to get into your accounts, a system like this is well-known enough that he could guess your passwords to other sites once he knows one of them.

      Obviously you said this isn't what you use exactly, but to really make it reasonably secure, you'd need to have a much more sophisticated method of generating password modifications for each site (e.g., disguising the name or manipulating it in a non-obvious way, performing some non-obvious modification on your "core" password based on the site name, etc.). And once you go down that road to generate something non-obvious, then you need to recreate those steps of generation every time you try to remember a password... which could be tedious and annoying unless you design it well.

      Anyhow, for accounts you really don't care about, something like this sounds fine. But GP was talking about strong passwords, which should probably be more individualized for accounts you really want to keep secure.

      These passwords are all unique, long, very easy to remember, and use all the character classes.

      Yeah, except I'm sure they break half of the password policies at various sites anyway. That's the primary reason I started using a password manager -- even if I used a system like yours, I'd still have to remember all the random constraints on passwords for a various sites.

      For example, some sites have length maximums that could be anywhere from 8 characters up. Some sites will accept a longer string when you try to login, but they won't warn you that your password must be shorter, so you keep typing in your 20-character phrase and get rejected because your password is actually the first 12 characters or whatever. And then you have sites that don't accept special characters, or sites that require special characters (but only from a certain list), or sites that don't allow you to begin your password with a number or a special character or whatever, or sites that don't accept strings of more than X letters in a row (yes, those exist, and you have to mix up the letters with numbers or special characters).... or whatever other random constraint applies.

      With a password manager, I can have 30-character passwords or whatever on all the sites that accept them. If they use special characters, I can randomly generate a password with them. If they don't, I can specify a random alphanumeric password. Or whatever. And if the maximum length is 12 characters, I can specify that too without artificially limiting the length of my passwords on other sites or having to remember "Oh yeah, that site only allows a short password and it won't warn me if I try to enter my long one..." etc.

      I'm not saying password managers are the best option for everything. But for remembering random website passwords, they can work pretty well.

    28. Re: A plea to fuck off. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Regarding password strength.

      There are 256 ASCII characters. Brute-forcing a 5 character password takes at most 256^5 attempts (assuming all characters are used, which, in practice, they arent).

      According to some sources, there are over a million English words. Some arent suitable to be used, but let's assume that at least 500000 are usable.

      If you have a 3 word password, without capitalizations, transformations, etc, you need 500000^3 attempts to brute force it, which, if I am not mistaken, is several orders of magnitude larger than 256^5.

      Toss in capitalizations (and, for fun, different separators) and you make that even stronger, while remaining easy to remember.

    29. Re:A plea to fuck off. by Demonoid-Penguin · · Score: 1

      My server logs disagree with your assumptions. Fail2ban is running constant blocks on botnets trying to guess passwords on SSH, FTP, SASL and webesites and this goes for my day job, my personal server and my evening contracts.

      Why do you allow password logins for SSH? Why the hell don't you have port knocking enabled for SSH?

    30. Re:A plea to fuck off. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      That's not how serious cyberattackers go after companies. They have multiple vectors that won't be stopped by "fail2ban". One is spear phishing, which works alarmingly well against corporate America. Another is exploiting vulnerabilities in their outward presences - everything from 0days in OS software, to design flaws in server-side code (i.e. PHP/Ruby/ASP/etc. scripts), SQL injection, XSS, and etc.

      Your server logs are not representative of a large corporation's Internet presence.

    31. Re: A plea to fuck off. by BlacKSacrificE · · Score: 1

      But instead use something which

      ..Is completely, totally, irrevocably air gapped from the network, and not in a format which is easily machine readable? (considering that I type substantially more than I write anymore, my handwriting format is borderline "me" readable).

      I see your point. A list of passwords in a book is are bad. Much better to put them into a globally accessible cloud behind a single point of protection (password). I know if I were in a basement somewhere out to ruin someones life the nondescript notebooks all around my mark's PC would be my first target.

      --
      [Sorry, this signature is unavailable in your country/region]
    32. Re:A plea to fuck off. by RobinH · · Score: 1

      This problem is with both "online" and "offline" password managers. Certainly I wouldn't use an online (i.e. website) password manager because it's a really juicy target sitting there connected to the internet. People can and will attack it, and at least one online password manager has been hacked. Offline password managers, such as KeePass, aren't as bad. It's all in a single encrypted database file, but you can store it on a home PC, a thumb drive, and in some backup location. The program allows very easy sync'ing between those files. Since the file only contains one person's passwords, it isn't as juicy of a target, and since it's not on an internet facing computer, the exposure is lower. An offline password manager is still a really good idea.

      --
      "I have never let my schooling interfere with my education." - Mark Twain
    33. Re:A plea to fuck off. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I hope you keep your life savings in your mattress as well.

      I tried that but it didn't work out so well.

      I have a waterbed.

    34. Re: A plea to fuck off. by Ol+Olsoc · · Score: 1

      horse battery staple

      Not any more. Words are now characters. You have a 3 character password right there.

      Phew! That came awful close to my password of Rock Paper Scissors.

      --
      The shepherds did so well protecting the flock that the sheep no longer believed that wolves existed.
    35. Re: A plea to fuck off. by ripvlan · · Score: 1

      Yes - passwords may be sacred cows...and we all know what makes the best burgers.

      I use a keyfob for my corp VPN. The form factor is a PITA (the retired the software one due to high manageability cost issues) - but it works. Credit cards are hacked, passwords are hacked - time for something new.

      Password managers just help maintain status quo. A "best" solution in an imperfect world. What if those Password "Identity" Managers somehow transferred a secure token - or something radically different?

    36. Re: A plea to fuck off. by tburkhol · · Score: 1

      According to some sources, there are over a million English words. Some arent suitable to be used, but let's assume that at least 500000 are usable.

      Not even great Scrabble players have 500,000 word vocabularies. Fewer than 200,000 of those words are in current use. Most of us live with 20,000 or so words we'll recognize as words and actually use only 1000-2000. 1000^3 is almost exactly 256^5

      It also turns out that humans are bad at random, and will tend to choose nouns when asked for words. So, much like "choose an 8 character password with mixed case and at least one non-letter," "choose three random words" sounds like a lot of randomness until you bring humans into the process. "Sociogenetic earleen shaef" is not nearly as memorable as "correct horse battery."

    37. Re:A plea to fuck off. by Khyber · · Score: 1

      "The alternative being what?"

      Purpose-specific passwords. E-mail gets one long and secure password. Forums/discussion sites get another password that's nowhere related to my e-mail password. Games sites and services get another password. And then my own anime site which uses a picture/caption/password combo for all users (Not captcha, caption, as in you type your caption to match the image you chose for security, hit confirm, and if those match you're prompted to enter your password on the next screen. My bank has this for login as well.)

      No problems.

      --
      Still waiting on Serviscope_minor to wake up to fucking reality and realize that Jessica Price isn't going to fuck him.
    38. Re:A plea to fuck off. by Khyber · · Score: 1

      "Why the hell don't you have port knocking enabled for SSH?"

      Because http://www.giac.org/paper/gsec... maybe.

      --
      Still waiting on Serviscope_minor to wake up to fucking reality and realize that Jessica Price isn't going to fuck him.
    39. Re: A plea to fuck off. by tburkhol · · Score: 1

      A password book or password safe on your home computer is really only vulnerable to a directed, personal attack. You are vulnerable to these, and they're essentially impossible to completely defend against. They're also very low yield for the attacker.

      A corporation/website is (probably) a harder target, but orders of magnitude higher yield. Realistically, you are much more likely to have personal information or passwords compromised by the Anthem, OPM, or Target hacks than by a keylogger or similar attack surreptitiously installed on your computer. (I'm fairly confident betting that you have already received free credit monitoring as the result of a large scale data breach) Hand-written passwords encourage you to use weaker passwords than computer-generated random character strings. Hand written passwords encourage password re-use, so your vulnerability to counterparty failure is greatly magnified.

      A cloud-based password keeper has all the disadvantages of aggregating passwords, and all the disadvantages of trusting a high-yield counterparty to keep your secrets.

    40. Re:A plea to fuck off. by jbengt · · Score: 1

      It's risk analysis.

      Using a password manager sounds like a guarantee that at some time in the future access to all the passwords will be lost simultaneously. Writing them down physically, there is a better chance of recovering them, and very little chance of some random hacker finding them.

    41. Re: A plea to fuck off. by jbolden · · Score: 1

      The recent OED has 171.5k words in it. Native speakers have a vocabulary of about 20k-35k words. Finally at least now you want to use 4 words not 3 and possibly one substitution trick.

      lowest figure: 20k^3 = 8 trillion ~ 2^43 ~ 7 character random password
      highest figure: 171.5k^4 = 8.65^10^20 > 2^69 ~ 11 character random password

      Humans generally don't remember random passwords very well. This ain't bad.

    42. Re:A plea to fuck off. by Applehu+Akbar · · Score: 1

      "It's locked into my house."

      Which will do you a whole lot of good when your mobile or laptop needs a password out in the field. Let me guess - you keep a copy or an excerpt of the password book safe in your wallet for such occasions.

    43. Re:A plea to fuck off. by Jamu · · Score: 1

      A password BOOK doesn't even need to be cracked, so it's not a solution to that problem - it's got the same problems as before PLUS it's not secured at all.

      A password book can't be remotely accessed. That's a considerable security feature. You'll always have a local vunerability.

      --
      Who ordered that?
    44. Re: A plea to fuck off. by Culture20 · · Score: 1

      It's a far sight more memorable than h6FA!j#Aq63K3 which is what developers still think is the golden rule of password formats. I recognize that I'm bad at random, but I can remember made up words just as easily as real ones. Any fan of sci fi or fantasy novels can rattle off a ton of words that aren't standard English. Make a passphrase generator. I've got a script that uses a few *nix dictionaries and finds actual random words. It's like a word of the day calendar except without the definitions. The bad part is that "naughty" words get thrown in the mix, so if I'm ever generating them for other people as a one-use passphrase, I have to vet the list or risk HR.

    45. Re:A plea to fuck off. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Or do as I do and simply backup the damn keyring onto removable storage. Solves much of the problem and it's fucking easy to automate the damn task. Hell I even have things configured to create a backup of the master keyring and place it in a seperate location. Saves me from loosing access to any sites due to accidentaly changing the pw.

      What's annoying is the fucking websites that don't allow Cut - N - Paste when it's not critical that they do so. Places such as /. and other fucking forums. Banks and such, Yes I agree - you don't want to allow copy/paste for PW access due to security otherwise, provide the user a warning that copy/paste is disabled (usually through javascript).

      Appropriate captcha = severe

    46. Re:A plea to fuck off. by Demonoid-Penguin · · Score: 1

      "Why the hell don't you have port knocking enabled for SSH?"

      Because http://www.giac.org/paper/gsec... maybe.

      Have you even read it? Or did you "think" no one else would?.

      Was that the only thing you could find about portknocking in your Google rush?

      It only says three "bad" things about portknocking:-

      • Portknocking is bad because malware might install some form of portknocking
      • portknocking is bad because it's security through obscurity - which is stupid as saying running ssh on a non-standard port is security through obscurity. i.e. obscurity is only bad if it's the only security.
      • . Which is irrelevant because not installing portknocking doesn't affect in any way whether malware might install it's own portknocking.

      • Knowing the knock can open your system. If it's the only system authentication you use. It shouldn't be.

      There are other, more valid risks with port knocking which your "security powerslide presentation for n00bs from 2004 overlooked":-

      • The knock sequence could be captured. Only if you don't enforce sequence rotation. Or better, use SPA
      • It's another piece of software that could go wrong. Maybe, it's pretty well time tested and audited.
      • It's hard to log. Not really. But if you find it hard you can do the same thing with iptables or authpf.

      Portknocking is not a perfect solution - it's a way to lower your profile, just like using a non-standard port, which it very effectively does - which is why it's one way of meeting the mandatory requirements for ASD privileged networks. Keeping the hordes from the gates is just as important as securing the gates.
      Employ it using default settings is not recommended, I'd increased the time outs (port knock fails, the port is locked out for a few minutes).

      There are alternative solutions (I've already mentioned using iptables to achieve the equivalent of kernel level portknocking, and authpf) but there are also others. But you're the expert.

      Allowing ssh passwords is certainly not Best Practise security. TFA is.

      fail2ban? It works with IPv6 does it? (try sshguard it does). With passwords enabled, your ssh port visible and protected from bruteforce attacks only by fail2ban you must chew a shitload of bandwidth and log space. Given that, and your earlier post, you're definitely not in a position to decide whether I'm a security professional. I don't claim to be - that'd be a full-time job in itself, but the people who work for me are, as are the clients. Just about every client here is defence or directly connected, failing an audit would be to costly to rely on the sort of citations you supply to justify using well documented Bad Practice security.

    47. Re:A plea to fuck off. by umafuckit · · Score: 1

      But if a hacker actually gives a crap about what he's doing and actually wants to get into your accounts, a system like this is well-known enough that he could guess your passwords to other sites once he knows one of them.

      I don't think that's such a worry for a few reasons. Firstly, it's easy to not make it very super obvious that this scheme is being used. Secondly, your scenario is only a only a concern if a targeted attack is being performed against me personally. i.e. someone cares enough to look at my password and try to figure out if it means something. The scheme would protect me if my details were harvested amongst thousands of others in a large-scale attack on a site. Thirdly, the attacker needs to know usernames on other sites as well as passwords. Fourthly, I tweak the scheme slightly for more important sites such that I still can remember the password but it can't be inferred should someone have guessed the scheme and are trying to break in.

      Yeah, except I'm sure they break half of the password policies at various sites anyway. That's the primary reason I started using a password manager -- even if I used a system like yours, I'd still have to remember all the random constraints on passwords for a various sites.

      I've never found this to be a problem.

    48. Re:A plea to fuck off. by suutar · · Score: 1

      not a guess; he said he keeps a limited set on him.

    49. Re:A plea to fuck off. by phorm · · Score: 1

      A common base password but a variation that you understand on a per-site basis?

    50. Re:A plea to fuck off. by tepples · · Score: 1

      Why do you allow password logins for SSH?

      I imagine that hosting providers default to password logins because it reduces support costs. Their customers tend to be unfamiliar with SSH public key authentication and especially with synchronizing these keys across multiple devices including mobile ones.

      Why the hell don't you have port knocking enabled for SSH?

      I imagine that hosting providers default to not requiring port knocking because it reduces support costs. Their customers tend to be unfamiliar with port knocking.

    51. Re: A plea to fuck off. by SScorpio · · Score: 2

      SQRL does something like a secure token. It allows a manager on a smartphone or computer.

      The site you are trying to access presents a clickable QR code that contains a session id and some random gibberish. The SQRL manager will sign that message with a private key that you have, and it signifies that you are who you say you are.

      This allows you to sign into a public machine using your smartphone, and once the session is terminated, anything that could have been captured doesn't allow an attacker to login later.

      On your home machine you could have a manager that handles SQRL:// and it takes the smartphone out of the loop.

      https://www.grc.com/sqrl/sqrl.htm

    52. Re: A plea to fuck off. by fuzzyfuzzyfungus · · Score: 1

      It's not hard to understand why using passwords is so popular; basically all software supports it as an authentication method, it requires only hardware that you can safely assume that all your users have; and even an idiot understands it well enough to do it dangerously weakly but more or less correctly.

      What is frustrating is how few even offer the ability to do anything else. There has been some uptake of shitty little cellphone-based systems(either using SMS or some 'authenticator app'); but RSA-type fobs are pretty much exclusively for accessing corporate systems(and, as a fundamental limitation of their design, they can only be securely used to authenticate against one entity; since, unlike asymmetric key systems, the authentication server must know the initialization seed values of the fob in order to validate authentication attempts, so anyone in a position to authenticate you could impersonate you anywhere else the same fob was accepted); and certificate-based auth is either something you do yourself for SSH(often without secure hardware for storing the certs) or something you basically have to do work for the DoD to encounter.

      I'm actually currently in the process of trying to switch banks because, when I inquired about authentication options that weren't pitiful bullshit, they gave me what amounted to "that's adorable; add three or four factors of ten to your account with us and maybe I'll transfer you to somebody who gives a fuck." Blizzard cares more than that. FFS.

    53. Re: A plea to fuck off. by Archangel+Michael · · Score: 2

      horse battery staple

      As a hacker this is all you know
      1) You have a password that is eighteen characters long,

      As a hacker you can make assumptions
      1) Word length
      2) Number of words
      3) Spaces or Not
      4) Fancy Characters or not
      5) Numbers or not

      OR you can target passwords that are eight characters in length.

      I would suggest to you, that if you have a whole database of passwords, encrypted and salted properly, you pick low hanging fruit first.

      If you're a hacker, which password is easier to brute force ? "onetwothreefourabeeceedeeexclamationpound" or "1234abcd!#" (basically the same password) all other things being equal?

      --
      Agent K: A *person* is smart. People are dumb, stupid, panicky animals, and you know it.
    54. Re: A plea to fuck off. by lgw · · Score: 1

      There's commonly-used software to build rainbow tables to do dictionary attacks. Obviously, individual words are there, but so are words with "leet speak" substitutions, words with short non-aplha prefixes and suffixes, and simple word combinations (and dates, of course, since those are still popular).

      Anything beyond that makes you pretty safe from an attacker who has a list of thousands of hashed passwords, and is looking for the low-hanging fruit. However, for an attacker who wants your password specifically, the "correct horse battery staple" approach is well-known now, and the vocabulary of most native speakers isn't that large, it's best to think of a word as having the entropy of 3 random lowercase letters, or 2.5 random characters.

      Still, string 4+ words together, or mix in a foreign word or a proper noun (other than a major city or sports team), and it remains a good approach.

      --
      Socialism: a lie told by totalitarians and believed by fools.
    55. Re:A plea to fuck off. by gmack · · Score: 1

      Because it's hard enough letting people use the servers already if no one can access the server then I'm going to be replaced rather quickly. Having said that. At this point, I see more attacks against SASL than SSH and root usually has password based logins disabled.

    56. Re:A plea to fuck off. by gmack · · Score: 1

      Can't use sshguard if I've never heard of it. However it does look superior, and I'm a fan of anything that doesn't pull in a crapton of python libs on install.

    57. Re: A plea to fuck off. by OutOnARock · · Score: 1

      Rock Paper Scissors Lizard Spock is even more secure....

    58. Re: A plea to fuck off. by Ol+Olsoc · · Score: 1

      Rock Paper Scissors Lizard Spock is even more secure....

      Well done!

      --
      The shepherds did so well protecting the flock that the sheep no longer believed that wolves existed.
    59. Re: A plea to fuck off. by Raenex · · Score: 1

      Aside from a few token "we'll send you a text message and call it two-factor" options

      That actually seems quite reasonable. Just about everybody's got a cell phone. Why send out a fob for every site that needs protection? Sounds like two-factor to me.

    60. Re:A plea to fuck off. by OutOnARock · · Score: 1

      I have one strongish password which I modify in a systematic and easy to remember way based on the website name. For example (and this isn't exactly what I do, obviously), say my core password is ghs78kja: on slashdot I would use as a password /DOTghs78kjaSLASH* on the New Scientist's site I would use /SCIENTISTghs78kjaNEW*.

      A trick I learned from a military friend is to up and left shift each character that is part of a dictionary word, so "NEW" becomes "H32" and "SCIENTIST" becomes "WD83H58W5". Using the up and left shift in addition to the "static part and URL part" creates a secure password easy to remember.

    61. Re:A plea to fuck off. by Demonoid-Penguin · · Score: 1

      At this point, I see more attacks against SASL than SSH and root usually has password based logins disabled.

      All remote logins as root should be disabled whether they require a password or TFA. AFAIK that's the default in all current release Linux and BSD distros - as is enforcing key based authentication instead of passwords. Those things won't reduce the amount of brainless brute-forcing attempts at gaining SSH access - but will reduce the likelihood of any of them succeeding to almost zero.

      Changing the default port that SSH runs on will greatly reduce the traffic you'll see. Using some form of portknocking will reduce the stupid attack attempts even further.

      In no way do any of those measures replace actual security. They do reduce the chances of dumb attacks succeeding. And in many instances I'm familiar with they allow service as normal. i.e. military contractors that get so many attacks per second that no one can login until the SSH port is reassigned. That still leaves logging as a problem - hundreds of port scans a day as slightly more intelligent attacks try and find the SSH port. The addition of some form of portknocking removes most of the noise from logs leaving mostly serious attack attempts - which makes monitoring and responding easier.

      Reducing the number of SASL attacks is much harder. It's relatively easy to change client settings for SSH as it's rarely baked into programs. I don't have any opinions on how to deal with that, it's something we don't deal with.

    62. Re:A plea to fuck off. by thegarbz · · Score: 1

      Why do you allow password logins for SSH? Why the hell don't you have port knocking enabled for SSH?

      Because the odds of cracking a strong password via SSH on a server with root logins disabled and a 3 attempt before a long temporary ban are so infinitesimally small that I'm more worried about the sun not rising tomorrow.

      There's nothing inherently insecure about a password based login providing the passwords are sent over an encrypted channel, the passwords are strong, and neither machine is compromised, and that even before any talk of login limits.

    63. Re:A plea to fuck off. by Demonoid-Penguin · · Score: 1

      Why do you allow password logins for SSH?

      I imagine that hosting providers default to password logins because it reduces support costs. Their customers tend to be unfamiliar with SSH public key authentication and especially with synchronizing these keys across multiple devices including mobile ones.

      Sadly - that's the case with some VPS hosting providers, though I suspect you are being to optimistic about their motivations.

      Most of the ones I'm familiar with do promote keybased ssh logins - e.g. it's the default in the images they provide. In the case of the low-cost VPS hosting company in which I have a proprietary interest, all the images we deploy (Ubuntu, Debian, and CentOS) default to no remote root login, no remote password authentication. Setup with a noVNC web interfaces, and sshkey management in the web management panel (so users can employ their personal ssh keys post-deployment. TFA for the web management console is available - but not the default.
      We don't stop users from weakening their direct access to their VMs (it's the low-end box market sector) - nor does the (bare minimum) SLA cover "shoot-own-foot".
      Where I deal with hosting providers that do high-level SLAs (e.g. obsessive) BP SSH configurations are mandatory.

      Why the hell don't you have port knocking enabled for SSH?

      I imagine that hosting providers default to not requiring port knocking because it reduces support costs. Their customers tend to be unfamiliar with port knocking.

      Again sadly that is the case - they like to keep the bar low to allow drunk toddlers drive Ferraris as long as they enter valid credit card details.

      However I was (redundantly) asking why someone who calls themselves a security professional and system administrator does not follow BP. That's distinct from why some businesses allow their clients to shoot-own-foot, that's just servicing a demand.

    64. Re:A plea to fuck off. by Demonoid-Penguin · · Score: 1

      Why do you allow password logins for SSH? Why the hell don't you have port knocking enabled for SSH?

      Because the odds of cracking a strong password via SSH on a server with root logins disabled and a 3 attempt before a long temporary ban are so infinitesimally small that I'm more worried about the sun not rising tomorrow.

      There's nothing inherently insecure about a password based login providing the passwords are sent over an encrypted channel, the passwords are strong, and neither machine is compromised, and that even before any talk of login limits.

      That belief is common, and incorrect.

      Bear with me and I'll demonstrate why that's the case, and explain why it's a common belief.

      It's complex, and most people won't invest the time to consider and understand the reasons why it's incorrect.

      Many people believe it because many people believe it (a form of circular authority).
      And because they over-invest in an emotionaly based opinion (which they won't test because they worry about where the results will lead - to further testing of their beliefs). It's foolish because they expend more time and energy defending their beliefs than it takes to test them, and change them when they prove wrong.
      Note that those people get very angry when that emotional investment in "gut instinct" is challenged. Hence the title of this thread (it's a form of "la la la I can't hear you")

      If it was correct there wouldn't be so many instances of attackers gaining access to password protected SSH.

      The most common attacks (which your fail2ban logs will be full of) try a list of common passwords. That does have a low probability of success - but there are a lot of boxes allowing password SSH access. Sadly, most of those allow root logins.

      fail2ban does limit attempts - by source. IPv4 only. Unless you enforce strong complex passwords dictionary attacks will succeed in a large number of cases.

      Most admins do not enforce strong passwords. Key based authentication enforces the equivalent of very strong passwords - far stronger than the login buffer allows.
      There's no need to guess - you can test the complexity of user passwords. Or simply enforce it by setting the default to key authentication only.

      The default of encryption for a SSH connection is not relevant - it's the default. It doesn't render password access more secure than key authentication. In short it's a red herring. (there is no "providing" about it)

      tl;dr your belief in the security of fail2ban is misplaced. An attacker can make unlimited attempts by just changing proxy every 3 attempts. There is a high-probability of them doing that. The more desirable access to your box, the higher the probabability.

      The vast majority of unauthorised attempts you'll see in your logs are brain-dead bots looking for low-hanging fruit. Those attacks will only get smarter. Best to stay ahead of that curve.

      Good security is about reducing risk as much as possible. Doing so is not about whether you "feel" it's secure, it's about whether it can be mathematically demonstrated it's safe. The point of the lead summary, and the article it references, is that it's been well demonstrated that poor passwords lead to poor security. The same big-brains that proved that also strongly recommend the banning of remote logins as root, and passwords for SSH access. There's a reason why the default SSH setting for all recent Linux and BSDs does just that - it's not to make your life hard, or the remote clients - it's to make life hard for attackers.

      On the one hand as techs we want (proven) facts, on the other we are human and want to trust our intuitions, and we are lazy. It's that biased hand that is the cause of most security failures.

    65. Re:A plea to fuck off. by thegarbz · · Score: 1

      That was a very long post with very little content and attempted to retort my comments by talking about admins failing to enforce password policy, and missplacing trust in fail2ban.

      So I invite you to re-read my post above. If you don't want to let me highlight the critical parts of my post: ... the passwords are strong ... ... before any talk of login limits ...

      So if we take talk about admins enforcing strong passwords and the use of fail2ban out of your post above explain to me again why I am so very vulnerable? Even bouncing through proxies you're not brute forcing a local file. You can't do millions of attempts per second, and with a simple 8 character with capital and number password you have 220 trillion possible combinations.

      I'm pretty sure even the dumbest and most incompetent system administrator would notice the high bandwidth / CPU utilisation of brute forcing SSH long before it's broken.

      Oh and since we're talking humans and intuitions, what makes you think that someone who can't enforce basic password security is capable of securing their private key?

    66. Re:A plea to fuck off. by Demonoid-Penguin · · Score: 1

      That was a very long post with very little content and attempted to retort my comments by talking about admins failing to enforce password policy, and missplacing trust in fail2ban.

      So I invite you to re-read my post above. If you don't want to let me highlight the critical parts of my post: ... the passwords are strong ... ... before any talk of login limits ...

      So if we take talk about admins enforcing strong passwords and the use of fail2ban out of your post above explain to me again why I am so very vulnerable? Even bouncing through proxies you're not brute forcing a local file. You can't do millions of attempts per second, and with a simple 8 character with capital and number password you have 220 trillion possible combinations.

      I'm pretty sure even the dumbest and most incompetent system administrator would notice the high bandwidth / CPU utilisation of brute forcing SSH long before it's broken.

      Oh and since we're talking humans and intuitions, what makes you think that someone who can't enforce basic password security is capable of securing their private key?

      Logic clearly escapes you. I responded to all your previous points. You ignored them and now resort to leaping from bank to bank astride the horse of desperation.

      I've never wrestled a pig before and I don't intend to start with you. I'd just wind up covered in shit and you'd just enjoy it.

    67. Re: A plea to fuck off. by goose-incarnated · · Score: 1

      According to some sources, there are over a million English words. Some arent suitable to be used, but let's assume that at least 500000 are usable.

      Not even great Scrabble players have 500,000 word vocabularies. Fewer than 200,000 of those words are in current use. Most of us live with 20,000 or so words we'll recognize as words and actually use only 1000-2000.

      Yeah, and all the user has to do is place in *a single non-english phrase* from their favourite fantasy book/dream destination/scifi series/song and they've suddenly broken the attackers ability *as well as* possessing a password that they can easily remember. "correct horse? je t@ime staple" is almost never going to be broken. Nor is "correct horse? luke's lightsabr3 staple", nor "correct horse? fr0do of the shire staple", etc...

      All of those are easy to remember, easy to type in but still orders of magnitude harder to break than "8 printable chars " or whatever nonsense the IT department came up with last week. Go ahead - try your rainbow table dictionary attack against "correct horse? samuel vimes 0f ankh-morpork staple" and let us know how it goes. We'll wait.

      --
      I'm a minority race. Save your vitriol for white people.
    68. Re: A plea to fuck off. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      If you're a hacker, which password is easier to brute force ? "onetwothreefourabeeceedeeexclamationpound" or "1234abcd!#" (basically the same password) all other things being equal?

      Actally, "onetwothreefourabeeceedeeexclamationpound" would probably be broken before "1234abcd!£", because most brute force algorithms don't even attempt pound signs.

    69. Re: A plea to fuck off. by edtice1559 · · Score: 1

      Sending a text message and calling it two-factor authentication is actually pretty good. Probably an order of magnitude better than just a weak password alone. Not sure why you are so dismissive. I realize it may not help against a targeted attack. But it is pretty effective against keyloggers on the client and mitigates damage if the server gets hacked revealing the password hashes (which might as well not be hashed if the passwords are weak). If nothing else, the text message technique adds a certain number (usually six) of random digits to the end of the password, turning a weak password into (effectively) a strong one. Smart cards are better from a technology perspective. The RSA-style tokens as well (costs $10 million to get the seed data which is at least a barrier). But they have the disadvantage that you have to have one card/token per authentication domain. The text message version you can have one phone to rule them all. There's a limit to how many of these authentication devices we can all keep around. For banking, can the smart card readers present in pretty much every laptop these days be used to verify that I'm in possession of the card that they issued me? If so, there's an easy solution for banking. Can probably be extended to other transactions types as well. This is somewhat long-winded but I felt compelled to discuss in a bit more detail when an otherwise deserving +4 is so dismissive of the text messaging layer.

    70. Re: A plea to fuck off. by edtice1559 · · Score: 2

      I wish that I hadn't commented so that I could mod the parent up. The reason we are in this situation is that the uniform application of the same level of security to different targets. There are *two* targets to think about. The web site operator and you. Unless you are a member of a clandestine state organization, a public figure, or wealthy enough to buy Dice and return /. to the glory days, you really aren't a target. If you are, there isn't information here to help you. Most web sites aren't a direct target. AMC isn't so worried about somebody hacking into their web site and using my account to buy a movie ticket. However, they *should* be concerned that their password database is somehow exfiltrated and cracked. Now anybody reusing a password is a potential victim of financial fraud and will be mad at AMC (even though they shouldn't have used the same password somewhere important). So they make you use something ridiculous. I am not enough of a target to be worth a targeted attack. However there are a lot of low-value targets like me. Put us all together and it is worthwhile so we need enough protection that we can't be aggregated. Hence when you look at encryption (and here is a similar case), the important part is that successfully circumventing on person's security doesn't compromise others. Key loggers and such are effective because you can compromise a lot of machines at once via malware. Then script out the money-stealing part. Password managers ( if reasonably well implemented) don't change this. For that you need some sort of challenge/response or OTP mechanism. But the password manager protects you from the situation where the *server* get hacked. Keep your client machines secure and you are safe from that vector. Password managers are an improvement over not having them which was the original thesis of the article. They aren't a complete solution for high-security situations. It's like locking your door. If a web site *thinks* they need to be more secure than can be done with passwords, have them issue smart cards to their users!

    71. Re: A plea to fuck off. by fuzzyfuzzyfungus · · Score: 1

      SMS-based approaches are certainly better than passwords alone; but I have a few areas of dislike for them:

      They require an active cell link and a live phone, so are bad news if you are trying to log in in the bowels of some structure, with a phone that has a dead battery, or while travelling outside your non-ridiculously-priced service area. It also tends not to be a problem in practice; but SMS is 'best-effort', so if the system is being flaky then that's just too bad. Essentially, it isn't a 'second factor' at all; but a secondary channel that is assumed not to be compromised.

      Then there is the matter of the site needing your phone number. For some applications, that doesn't matter: your bank already knows way more than that about you, say. For others, I'm not so enthusiastic about providing a relatively persistent, and spammable, identifier(also fairly robustly tied to me by payment data, unless I get a burner specifically for dealing with auth issues) to any lousy little website that wants it.

      Finally, I'm not terribly confident about the medium-term security of SMS if it becomes a common '2 factor' authentication method. Mobile OSes tend to be a bit more locked down than desktops; but hardly infallible, and the security of SMS gateway providers(who sites using SMS auth presumably employ to interface with the phone network) is an unknown and possibly not comforting factor.

      RSA fobs are ultimately an inferior option because they cannot be safely shared across multiple systems, and carrying a fistful of the things is ridiculous(plus, the pricing is usurious); but smartcard/NFC cryptographic authentication has none of these weaknesses. The hardware is cheap, it doesn't require a secondary channel to be available, certificates are relatively tiny so you can carry an enormous number of them without issue; and you can implement certificate auth with varying levels of connection with user 'identity'. On the relatively anonymous side, the user can just generate a keypair and send the public key when they create an account. Trivially handled on the client end, no interaction with outside entities. At the other extreme, hierarchical PKI systems make it possible to robustly verify the user's affiliation with a given organization if the situation requires it. The trouble, of course, is the lack of card readers/NFC pads on a lot of contemporary computers and mobile devices. A great pity.

    72. Re: A plea to fuck off. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Words are now characters.

      Only if the website specifies that you must use words and not characters, and you can't capitalize any of the words, etc.

      The people that say that they'll just "use a dictionary" are fuggin' idiots.

    73. Re:A plea to fuck off. by thegarbz · · Score: 1

      Thanks for another content free reply.

      You clearly have never made a concise point either.

      Goodday.

  4. OpemERP does that. by Demonoid-Penguin · · Score: 1

    One work-around - that doesn't work with OpenERP, is a little javascript I use as a bookmarklet.

    javascript:(function(){var%20ac,c,f,fa,fe,fea,x,y,z;ac="autocomplete";c=0;f=document.forms;for(x=0;x<f.length;x++){fa=f[x].attributes;for(y=0;y<fa.length;y++){if(fa[y].name.toLowerCase()==ac){fa[y].value="on";c++;}}fe=f[x].elements;for(y=0;y<fe.length;y++){fea=fe[y].attributes;for(z=0;z<fea.length;z++){if(fea[z].name.toLowerCase()==ac){fea[z].value="on";c++;}}}}alert("Enabled%20'"+ac+"'%20on%20"+c+"%20objects.");})();

  5. Re:Lazy and Stupid by Demonoid-Penguin · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Anyone who uses password managers and believes them to be safe and unable to be broken should not be able to use the Internet. All passwords should be maintained separately and typed in manually.

    Do you have a citation for that Mr. Scraps of Bad Security on Paper? or are you just varying your normal MOO trolls.

    I'm sure Bruce Scheirer would appreciate your insights into secure code. KeepPass has so many flaws.

  6. Re:Wait, you have to TYPE the password??? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Instead of copy/paste? Oh the horror!!! Never a tale of more woe, truly.

    When its 256 random chars Yes !

  7. Re:Wait, you have to TYPE the password??? by Sneeka2 · · Score: 4, Funny

    If your password is "OPnuo(I&n hKUYNB68IOnih4wOIB*GBi234t73" as it should be,* then yes...

    * Yes, please use exactly this password; it's super safe, I promise!

    --
    Bitten Apples are still better than dirty Windows...
  8. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by Z00L00K · · Score: 1

    Another factor - do you trust the password manager?

    --
    If builders built buildings the way programmers wrote programs, then the first woodpecker would destroy civilization.
  9. Prioritization vs Managers by invictusvoyd · · Score: 2

    Prioritization of passwords i.e. choosing complex ones for a few critical accounts/services and "easy to remember" ones for non critical things can eliminate the need for managers . As someone pointed out , managers are all eggs in one basket.

    1. Re:Prioritization vs Managers by gmack · · Score: 2

      Or the way I do it: Complex passwords for a few critical accounts and my password manager. Sites that don't hold my personal or financial info get to use the password manager

    2. Re:Prioritization vs Managers by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Pretty much this.
      One password for email.
      One password for password manager.
      One password for phone. (>10 characters)
      The rest goes in my password manager, or gets a shitty throwaway password.

    3. Re:Prioritization vs Managers by Overzeetop · · Score: 5, Interesting

      Managers are like placing all of your eggs in one basket which has been specifically designed for carrying eggs, with proper separation and cushioning against nearly all common shipping contingencies.

      Having a couple of really secure passwords and a couple of throwaways is like putting a couple of small eggs in your back pocket and carrying the big ones in your hands. Much more convenient, and only as secure as you are diligent.

      --
      Is it just my observation, or are there way too many stupid people in the world?
    4. Re:Prioritization vs Managers by AchilleTalon · · Score: 1

      Hard to remember for a human being doesn't mean it is hard to break for a computer program. The real problem is the limit on the number of characters a password can have on some sites. Limiting a password to 6 to 8 characters limits the entropy of a password, hence the requirements for special characters, non-repeating characters (in fact it reduces entropy by some security admins seems to think it is a good idea), numbers and so on.

      --
      Achille Talon
      Hop!
    5. Re:Prioritization vs Managers by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The problem is that some of those eggs were laid by the goose that lays golden eggs. While the proper separation and cushioning may protect it against common shipping contingencies, you also have uncommon and determined thugs doing uncommon things in order to get at those golden eggs.

    6. Re:Prioritization vs Managers by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      That's why you log on to each critical account with a different machine.

      That's what you do, right?

    7. Re:Prioritization vs Managers by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Having a couple of really secure passwords and a couple of throwaways is like putting a couple of small eggs in your back pocket and carrying the big ones in your hands. Much more convenient, and only as secure as you are diligent.

      That and you can't sit down. Well, you can, but you'll wish you hadn't. I mean, unless you're into that sort of thing. I don't know, not here to judge, man. Wait, what was the analogy again?

    8. Re:Prioritization vs Managers by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Managers are like placing all of your eggs in one basket which has been specifically designed for carrying eggs, with proper separation and cushioning against nearly all common shipping contingencies.

      Having a couple of really secure passwords and a couple of throwaways is like putting a couple of small eggs in your back pocket and carrying the big ones in your hands. Much more convenient, and only as secure as you are diligent.

      Except that as the popularity of password manager increases the probability of there existing compromised look alikes designed to steal your credentials approaches one.

      So extending the metaphor, you're carrying your eggs in either a specifically designed egg crate, or a crate designed to break your eggs that looks almost exactly like the good crate.

    9. Re:Prioritization vs Managers by Archangel+Michael · · Score: 1

      Any site uses limited Passwords today gets my default password eight character password, one that any human could probably guess. I figure, that it is already compromised.

      --
      Agent K: A *person* is smart. People are dumb, stupid, panicky animals, and you know it.
    10. Re:Prioritization vs Managers by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      only as secure as you are diligent.

      Uh... in what way does this not also apply to the use of password managers?

    11. Re:Prioritization vs Managers by periodic · · Score: 1

      Agreed,

      I started using a password manager when I realized that their job is to secure passwords. So they are most likely better at it then I ever will be. Even if I have my password file in the the cloud for continence. I sill use two factor authentication and a long strong master password. I have learned to not think that I know everything there is to know about everything. In this case password security. In essence I did my risk analysis and realized that a password manager is the only way I can have a low risk with high convenience. And the risk is low enough that is it is worth the convenience.

    12. Re:Prioritization vs Managers by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Better to come up with a password generation algorithm and just use that. It's like carrying around a picture of an egg and copying it each time you need a password. An algorithm is discoverable through a targeted attack that gets a few of your accounts and can then access all your other accounts, but if you're being personally targeted like that you're likely to lose anyway. A password algorithm is immune to automated data mining.

  10. Hanlon's law by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Most websites are very poorly designed.

    1. Re:Hanlon's law by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I agree that some websites are very badly designed, but others are just badly designed.

      I have one site that, while I don't have to use it, makes my life much easier. It has two problems, it won't take a password more than 8 characters, and it will only accept a-zA-Z0-9

  11. Can I sue? by X10 · · Score: 1

    I mean, can I sue a site for forcing me to use an easy password, which then gets hacked?

    --
    no, I don't have a sig
    1. Re:Can I sue? by bloodhawk · · Score: 1

      I mean, can I sue a site for forcing me to use an easy password, which then gets hacked?

      Can they sue you if you expose your account details? something like 1 in 3 machines have some sort of malware on them (yet if you ask people nearly everyone will say there machine is clean, 1 in 3 of them are wrong), I can't really blame any site for being unwilling to let any additional software apart from your browser interact with credential fields on their site if the site holds anything of value.

    2. Re:Can I sue? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Spoken like a true American.

    3. Re:Can I sue? by AchilleTalon · · Score: 1

      On another hand, there is still websites registration systems which once the process is completed send you your password in plain text in a email for you to easily remember and store in you mailbox.

      --
      Achille Talon
      Hop!
    4. Re:Can I sue? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The problem is that what these websites are doing are realistically feeble barriers to malware.

      Sure, they won't let you copy and paste into the password box, but the malware is already running and can scan your clipboard or log your keystrokes anyway. More advanced malware could read/write directly from memory or use debugging APIs to get into applications such as your web browser to disable any protections.

    5. Re:Can I sue? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I mean, can I sue a site for forcing me to use an easy password, which then gets hacked?

      Yes. You can sue them for breathing air if you want to.
      Winning in a court is another matter that probably has very little to do with what you sue them about.

    6. Re:Can I sue? by jader3rd · · Score: 1

      I mean, can I sue a site for forcing me to use an easy password, which then gets hacked?

      Probably only if the government forced you to use the website. For anything else, it probably wouldn't stick because you could have always not used the website.

    7. Re:Can I sue? by tepples · · Score: 1

      "You could have always not used the website for finding housing." Then you'd run afoul of the city's sit/lie law. My point is that governments forcing people to use a particular private-sector service can be less direct and more subtle than one might initially think.

    8. Re:Can I sue? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I don't disagree, but just because it only stops one type of malware doesn't mean you should just give up. beyond taking full control of the end users machine you can not guarantee its safety, but that doesn't mean you should just give up all barriers. my front door won't stop a determined burglar, nor will my security screens on my windows, that doesn't mean I should just leave it all unlocked.

    9. Re:Can I sue? by RespekMyAthorati · · Score: 1

      Then you're fucked, no matter what you do or don't do.

  12. Why do browsers allow websites to do this? by EmperorArthur · · Score: 4, Insightful

    While it's true the site operators are at fault, I also blame the browser makers.

    Many websites don't allow copy or paste, or even selecting/highlighting text.
    While I can understand the draw of websites, especially ones with games, being able to grab keyboard input, it's a potential security disaster waiting to happen.

    Browser makers should treat these kind of keyboard/mouse hooks the same way they treat websites asking for location data. With a message asking the user if they want to allow the behavior or not. Furthermore, they should do it in such a way that operators can not force users to click allow.

    --
    So lets pretend that we've just completed writing this code, as opposed to having just completed sabotaging it -Altera
    1. Re:Why do browsers allow websites to do this? by Richard_J_N · · Score: 1

      There are a couple of legitimate uses for sites to interfere, with select/copy in certain very restricted cases.
      1. Using the no-select attribute on buttons (or text styled as buttons). Otherwise, it's very easy to accidentally select the button text when you mean to click it - and that's just a UI mistake.
      2. When an image is meant not to be re-shared (e.g, a personal photo on a social or dating network), intercepting right-click with a message asking the viewer not to take a copy.

    2. Re:Why do browsers allow websites to do this? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      2. When an image is meant not to be re-shared (e.g, a personal photo on a social or dating network), intercepting right-click with a message asking the viewer not to take a copy.

      Yeah... because you can't just hit Print Screen and take a screenshot of your screen - including the picture on the site...

    3. Re:Why do browsers allow websites to do this? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You have to remember that webbies have absolutely no clue.

      They can't be expected to understand that once an image is visible in a browser it's no longer under their control. That would require some elementary knowledge of technology and at least one active brain cell.

    4. Re:Why do browsers allow websites to do this? by EmperorArthur · · Score: 1

      While not said in the best way, AC is correct.

      Use case 1 sounds like a problem, but one that should be fixed somewhere else.
      Use case 2 is like popups and the blink tag. The times when users actively want that feature is dwarfed by its abuse. Further, it's easy to work around. Worst case, I've used a cell phone camera because a program I had to use locked down the entire pc.

      --
      So lets pretend that we've just completed writing this code, as opposed to having just completed sabotaging it -Altera
    5. Re:Why do browsers allow websites to do this? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      (1) simply isn't a real issue. Admit it, you just made (1) up so you could say "couple of" legitimate uses, to distract us from the fact that you're doing (2) on a website and trying to fool your clients into thinking it works.

      Meanwhile you probably format all images into the same sized box, and when people try to open them in a new window to see the details they can't, and when they raised that as a bug you closed it "won't fix".

      Maybe you should tell your clients to send their "personal" photos via Snapchat, and stop lying to them about your site's "security features" that makes posting personals on it "like, totally safe".

    6. Re: Why do browsers allow websites to do this? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Or check the page source and get the direct link to the image.

      Or get the image from the browser cache.

      Or the thousands of other ways you can use to retrive an image that is already in you computer.

    7. Re:Why do browsers allow websites to do this? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      2. When an image is meant not to be re-shared (e.g, a personal photo on a social or dating network), intercepting right-click with a message asking the viewer not to take a copy.

      You do realize that this is actually IMPOSSIBLE to stop right?

    8. Re:Why do browsers allow websites to do this? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Tools -> view page info -> media -> save as.
      I'm sure chrome has something similar.
      Better yet, use a DOM browser to get at the image.

    9. Re:Why do browsers allow websites to do this? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You don't even need to do that. Both Chrome and Firefox let you inspect the markup and let you see all of the associated images/media on the page where you can grab them to your harddrive without pesky Javascript nags or HTML/CSS tomfoolery getting in the way.

      I don't know if this is still an option, but in Firefox, you could disable some of these bad behaviors that are available to Javascript. Websites that used to hijack the right mouse button were no longer an issue with that option enabled.

    10. Re:Why do browsers allow websites to do this? by Impy+the+Impiuos+Imp · · Score: 1

      > Many websites don't allow copy or paste, or even selecting/highlighting text.

      It is silly not to allow copy out of a password field while allowing paste in, as hack code that copied it out would be taking advantage of it being in the paste buffer, which is exactly what copying to paste it in leaves you with. So, too the "Oops, I walked away mid-login" manual breach issue.

      I guess it comes down to which way is more likely to lead to more breaches -- brute cracks of simpler passwords or copy buffer hacks.

      Given a hack would have many tools and dangers besides spying on passwords, that leaves just manual walk up to a (perhaps temporarily) abandoned terminal mid-login as the differentiator, and that is very weak to me.

      Just the other day I had a crazy reset-your-password password mailed to me, and the system forbid paste, an it jusrt made me rage. You're damned right I would go back to a simpler pw as soon as possible.

      --
      (-1: Post disagrees with my already-settled worldview) is not a valid mod option.
    11. Re:Why do browsers allow websites to do this? by Impy+the+Impiuos+Imp · · Score: 1

      Note btw that copy paste of a pw saves you from a key logger, a point in its favor.

      --
      (-1: Post disagrees with my already-settled worldview) is not a valid mod option.
    12. Re:Why do browsers allow websites to do this? by ProzacPatient · · Score: 1

      Browser makers should treat these kind of keyboard/mouse hooks the same way they treat websites asking for location data. With a message asking the user if they want to allow the behavior or not. Furthermore, they should do it in such a way that operators can not force users to click allow.

      Firefox used to have a settings dialog that allowed you to choose how much control you wanted JavaScript to have but then Mozilla in all their wisdom decided to remove those options when they removed the settings to disable JavaScript all together. I'm not entirely sure what the rationale for that decision was because making JavaScript and all its hooks absolutely mandatory doesn't seem to benefit the user in any way.

    13. Re:Why do browsers allow websites to do this? by operagost · · Score: 1

      How about asking the user if they want to be punished by having to re-enter their username over and over again as well? Fat-finger your password, and many sites clear your username box.

      --

      Gamingmuseum.com: Give your 3D accelerator a rest.
    14. Re:Why do browsers allow websites to do this? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Any keylogger worth its salt will scrape the copy buffer.

    15. Re:Why do browsers allow websites to do this? by tepples · · Score: 1

      Mozilla in all their wisdom decided to remove those options when they removed the settings to disable JavaScript all together. I'm not entirely sure what the rationale for that decision was

      Possibly to reduce the cost of supporting users in case Firefox extensions and Firefox apps do not work correctly when JavaScript is turned off.

    16. Re:Why do browsers allow websites to do this? by tlhIngan · · Score: 1

      Yeah... because you can't just hit Print Screen and take a screenshot of your screen - including the picture on the site...

      Even easier - Firefox has shift-right-click which doesn't send the right-click event to the javascript. It's handled directly by Firefox and gives you all the regular options. (I use for the Nuke Anything extension which lets you selectively remove stuff from the DOM. Great for those websites that plaster crap over the content - remove that and read it at will).

      And there are many DOM-attribute modifying scripts out there - I have one that removes the password saving attribute from web pages with passwords. Very handy with those sites that prevent saving passwords that you don't care about.

    17. Re:Why do browsers allow websites to do this? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      2. When an image is meant not to be re-shared (e.g, a personal photo on a social or dating network), intercepting right-click with a message asking the viewer not to take a copy.

      Of course the only problem I see with this is that sometimes, on smaller sites especially, some people are still stupid enough to make it affect the entire page - when they can just have it apply to the elements that contain the aforementioned content. OF course, that is not a problem with the idea itself, but the people implementing specific methods, and saying to use them.

    18. Re:Why do browsers allow websites to do this? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The option still exists. See "dom.event.clipboardevents.enabled" in about:config

    19. Re:Why do browsers allow websites to do this? by KGIII · · Score: 1

      I really do not want my browser to interfere with code. That is up to me to decide. It should not even present me with options unless I have specifically asked it to. It should render and send all information I tell it to.

      --
      "So long and thanks for all the fish."
    20. Re:Why do browsers allow websites to do this? by KGIII · · Score: 1

      Alternatively, you could just not copy something and respect the wishes of the site creator. I know... I know... But you *could* do that.

      --
      "So long and thanks for all the fish."
    21. Re:Why do browsers allow websites to do this? by KGIII · · Score: 1

      I like it best when they have a cryptic CAPCHA that is impossible to be certain about and then they wipe the whole form (and all the many data points) and give you a trivial reply as to what *could* have been the problem instead of saying which, of those things, was the problem.

      --
      "So long and thanks for all the fish."
    22. Re:Why do browsers allow websites to do this? by EmperorArthur · · Score: 1

      This hasn't been the case for years. Mainly because users value privacy, and don't like being annoyed.
      Perfect example: popup blockers. Every argument given for why browser makers should not stop annoying/malicious behavior has been made during that debate.
      For a while there, websites could even change window size and position. I know of at least one script that would forkbomb a computer with popups of itself while telling the user they were an idiot.

      --
      So lets pretend that we've just completed writing this code, as opposed to having just completed sabotaging it -Altera
    23. Re:Why do browsers allow websites to do this? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      2 is bullshit. like in '07 "alert('no right click allowed')". And the context menu key on the keyboard helped.

      btw: try whatever you want. I press ctrl+shift+i in firefox and just select the ressource i want to save without bothering with your site, your scripts or your html code.

    24. Re:Why do browsers allow websites to do this? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      this was while introducing the social apis. now think which sites block various menus, keyboard shortcuts and so on.

      Hint: both use shades of blue.

    25. Re:Why do browsers allow websites to do this? by KGIII · · Score: 1

      That is what add-ons and extensions are for. I want to use those (and I do) but I want the choice. I do not want my browser doing crap that I tell it not to do or doing more than it should be default. I still use Opera but they have lost some features and controllability in their new/beta versions now that they are based on WebKit/Chrome. I am seriously thinking about forking it and rolling my own damned browser at this point. I like add-ons. I like choosing them wisely.

      --
      "So long and thanks for all the fish."
  13. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by invictusvoyd · · Score: 5, Funny

    I generally don't trust anything or anyone having the word "manager" in their name.

  14. Re:Lazy and Stupid by MMC+Monster · · Score: 1

    I think the concern is that if your computer gets taken over, the criminal can just automatically scan the password logs for all your browsers and you're toast.

    --
    Help! I'm a slashdot refugee.
  15. Re: Scripts that interact with passwords fields aw by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Definitely less than I would like; but it arguably still stacks up well compared to any alternatives that are compatible with sites that support nothing but username/password. Sure, in an ideal world, we'd be using something that isn't intrinsically doomed(say a CAC/PIV-style system); but both manually entered passwords and password managers are vulnerable to local malware; but the former also encourage weak and re-used passwords, depend on the user to recognize phishing and so on.

  16. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    IMHO, this is a browser problem, not a website problem. Browser shouldn't allow scripts to interact with a password field. Period.

    [Disclaimer: I'm not the GP AC.]

  17. Re:Lazy and Stupid by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    This is only if you allow passwords to be saved in your browser...

  18. Re:Wait, you have to TYPE the password??? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I'm sure your password is safe, but it's nowhere near as safe as my password (hunter2) or my luggage combination (12345).
    Nobody would ever guess that I'd be stupid enough to use those, so they're literally the last things anyone would try! :D

  19. Why RELY on copy/paste? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Seems stupid to me. First, a website cannot know how the password gets entered at all. It just gets something from the browser. So stop blaming websites - blame the browser or the badly implemented password manager.

    You can write a browser with a built-in password manager. No need for "paste" then, and the website can never know how the password was entered. If you don't feel like writing a browser from scratch - just grab firefox sources which are available already. All you need is your password manager bits.

    1. Re:Why RELY on copy/paste? by Gaygirlie · · Score: 2

      You can write a browser with a built-in password manager.

      Why should a password manager be a part of a browser? You do realize that there are plenty of cases even outside of the web where passwords are used.

    2. Re:Why RELY on copy/paste? by Dog-Cow · · Score: 1

      And this is why OS X is great. Keychain is available system-wide, but apps can integrate access to it. Safari does this. It will generate random passwords if you want it to, and store them in your keychain.

    3. Re:Why RELY on copy/paste? by Overzeetop · · Score: 2

      But apps have to integrate it. That's the problem - some don't.

      --
      Is it just my observation, or are there way too many stupid people in the world?
  20. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by jarfil · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Except it doesn't stop shit.
    Any malware would either intercept the keystrokes, or read the in-memory data directly, or even change the web content to inject whatever scripts it wanted... or even read the password from clipboard, because the fact that you can't paste it into the page, does not stop you from copying if from wherever you had it in the first place.

  21. Why stop there? by MikeRT · · Score: 1

    Whenever I see some financial or health care site that has a stupid limit like "8-16 characters, letters and numbers only and only one of these three non-alphanumeric characters" I struggle with free market principles and not saying "there ought to be a law..." In fact, it'd be easier on people to just let them use a phrase that has a meaning only to them. You know, a sentence that has numbers in it and goes on to something like over 128 characters easily.

    1. Re:Why stop there? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Why does it need numbers in it? This does not significantly increase bitwise entropy, but forcing me to think of a phrase that has numbers in it has suddenly reduced my space of possible phrases from hundreds to a handful. In other words, it's one of the same asshat "security" measures that you're referring to in your original point (even my ex-wife now uses numbers in her password but translating an 's' to a '5' in an easily-guessed password is no more secure than the easily-guessed password was, in fact it's worse because it gives you a false sense of security).

    2. Re:Why stop there? by Vokkyt · · Score: 1

      Keep in mind this often has nothing to do with any actual decision by the administrators/managers at the institution and everything to do with the financial/healthcare system provider. Healthcare in particular is plagued with lowest bidders trying to scam money out of the institutions from doctors and upper management that know nothing about technology and security.

      At the end of the day, these decisions are the result of lazy programmers looking for a quick buck, not a conscious decision. The actual HIPPA document on security has no specifications on the passwords themselves, instead just practices about passwords. (i.e., there is no guideline on what a password should be. There are only guidelines about stuff like "reprimand employees who post passwords, require frequent changes, revoke passwords and tokens/keys upon employee termination")

      Honestly, given that the trend is passphrase instead of passwords with length for strength, most people react a lot better and it'd be nice if companies took the time to do this. My last project at my previous work place was to help push through new requirements, and everyone loved it. Give people a strength meter and tell them the few forbidden characters and you end up with some really great passwords.

    3. Re:Why stop there? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      If that requirement bothers you, just add the same digit to all of your passwords. For good measure add punctuation and an uppercase letter too: "barndoor" becomes "barndoor~1P", "itspeople" becomes "itspeople~1P", and so on. I think I'm making your point, but on the other hand, is that really big enough of an issue to complain about?

    4. Re:Why stop there? by jonwil · · Score: 1

      If you are writing software that takes in a password and you are hashing the password to compare it to a stored hash, there is no reason at all to restrict the maximum length of a password or prohibit certain characters from being used in it.

      If you are writing software that takes in a password and you are NOT hashing the password (but instead storing it in the clear or otherwise doing something with it), you shouldn't be writing software involving passwords in the first place (I can't think of a single valid reason to do anything other than store a password hash. Even "lost password" features can easily be done via temporary passwords or email-me-a-password-reset-link features)

      I would love to hear from the people behind software and web pages that limit the length of passwords or restrict what characters you can have in it why they do such a stupid thing.

    5. Re:Why stop there? by BradleyUffner · · Score: 1

      The one that infuriates me the most: "Your password must start with a letter."

    6. Re:Why stop there? by Khyber · · Score: 1

      "Why does it need numbers in it? This does not significantly increase bitwise entropy, but forcing me to think of a phrase that has numbers in it has suddenly reduced my space of possible phrases from hundreds to a handful"

      Y0ur br@1n 0bv10u$ly d0e$n't w0rk.

      --
      Still waiting on Serviscope_minor to wake up to fucking reality and realize that Jessica Price isn't going to fuck him.
    7. Re:Why stop there? by drinkypoo · · Score: 1

      I just had this conversation on a visit with a friend. The worst are the sites that have all the "strong password criteria" and then do something idiotic like limit you to a certain number of characters. Those are mostly going away. The best thing to do would just to be mandate a good minimum length and suggest people make up nonsense phrases, then they would be likely to remember them and they would also be likely to be useful passwords.

      --
      "You're right," Fisheye says. "I should have set it on 'whip' or 'chop.'"
    8. Re:Why stop there? by Khyber · · Score: 1

      BTW, Mr. Anon coward, that password in plain text - 8 nonillion years to crack. Done up with numbers and symbols like I posted, it's 252 undecillion years.

      So, yes, adding numbers DOES significantly increase bitwise entropy. By a few orders of magnitude.

      --
      Still waiting on Serviscope_minor to wake up to fucking reality and realize that Jessica Price isn't going to fuck him.
    9. Re:Why stop there? by ObiWanKenblowme · · Score: 1

      is that really big enough of an issue to complain about?

      You must be new here.

      --
      Obvious exits are NORTH, SOUTH, and DENNIS.
    10. Re:Why stop there? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Require frequent password changes. Yeah, that's stupid.

      Show a strength meter. Another dumb idea.

      Why do you have forbidden characters? Christ.

  22. Re:Lazy and Stupid by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    If your machine is compromised then it doesn't really matter how you store your passwords.

  23. Password manager = piece of paper by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Unless you go analog, you're trading 1 form of opaque security for another. You're trusting blindly in both, and assuming you're safe. Human nature then kicks in and you stop being secure in other areas.

  24. Can we please stop using password? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    If you're going to use a software to keep your passwords, you might as well use a PKCS (public key cryptography system) to sign in. That could even protect your key in a hardware module. Everything has Bluetooth and NFC these days. The time is right to do it right.

  25. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by rvw · · Score: 4, Insightful

    IMHO, this is a browser problem, not a website problem. Browser shouldn't allow scripts to interact with a password field. Period.

    [Disclaimer: I'm not the GP AC.]

    Isn't this exactly what a password manager does? I thought Lastpass (to name one) uses Javascript to change the form fields, including the password field (which suddenly has a clickable * in it). So if you disable that, you have to paste manually.

  26. Re:Wait, you have to TYPE the password??? by jarfil · · Score: 2

    I used to have a "good" combination on my luggage... until the day I forgot it (or set it wrong, who knows). Poking this way and the other, it turned out that it takes about 10-15 seconds to pick my luggage, and about 2 seconds to pry it open with a screwdriver.
    Since then, I just use 12345, because why bother :D

  27. Re:Passwords are for cows. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    access denied

  28. More Annoying by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    What annoys me more is websites that do not allow sufficient complexity, or enforce things like must start with a character, max 8 in length. My passwords all contain uppercase, lowercase, special chars and numbers, are over 10 characters in length and do not contain dictionary words. Sites need to stop having such incorrect and draconian password policies.

  29. Re:Passwords are for cows. by Guy+Harris · · Score: 1

    Correct cow battery staple.

  30. Re:Lazy and Stupid by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    Sound like a troll, but anyway... "password manager" and "online password manager" are two different things.

  31. Re:Lazy and Stupid by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    It's not a difference that I would rely on; but there likely are some differences: it's typically easiest to get some sort of cross-site-scripting malice to work, less easy but far too common to escape from the browser and poke around with the user's permissions, more difficult again to escalate privileges above the user's context; and potentially quite tricky to get a kernel driver in without either compromising some vaguely respectable OEM or mucking with the system's certificate store.

    Mechanisms that touch the browser too closely will probably fall to a good XSS exploit, basic browser-stores-passwords arrangements should fall over with nothing more than your security level; actually getting a keylogger, especially a persistent one, in there should be more demanding.

    In practice, obviously, hoping that they 'just' penetrated the system part of the way is a sucker's bet; and you should nuke and pave; but if you are so lucky there might be a difference.

  32. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Interesting

    IMHO, this is a browser problem, not a website problem. Browser shouldn't allow scripts to interact with a password field. Period.

    Period is not an argument.

    A compromised site or a browser where a malicious script is running could easily place a fake textbox over any password field and mimic the behavior of the now unused password field.
    The browser allowing scripts to interact with a password field is irrelevant, that is not where the security should be.

    See, I knew that you were wrong because people who are right never ends their statement with "Period."

  33. Typing passwords by MMMScott · · Score: 1

    Many SaaS vendors are moving towards new generation of logins. I see many vendors removing OpenID in general and we're seeing an equally high number of companies embracing SSO.

    --
    Helprace: customer service software for best customer support ever
    1. Re:Typing passwords by Rich0 · · Score: 1

      Many SaaS vendors are moving towards new generation of logins. I see many vendors removing OpenID in general and we're seeing an equally high number of companies embracing SSO.

      Ugh, unfortunately the SaaS vendor I'm working with right now isn't one of them.

      OAuth2? Nope. Another password to remember/reset/etc.

      Webservices? Nope. Drop a file onto an FTP site which is polled, and poll the site yourself.

      XML? Sort-of - it is their least-preferred file format which they try to avoid at all costs. Oh yeah, they have failures to parse xml files that W3 validates (for syntax, not semantics). I'm sure that there are issues with their non-xml-file parsers for the majority of the files we're dealing with since they avoid xml, but since you can't just use validators/etc to check the files we just run into them from time to time in production.

      But, hey, our internal IT group is just as brain dead as they seem to also be writing their own XML parsers judging by some of the failures I've seen.

  34. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by TheRaven64 · · Score: 3, Interesting

    JavaScript can also intercept the contents of the clipboard. If you're blocking password managers, then people are going to do one of two things. Either they'll pick a (weak) easy-to-remember password, or they'll use a password manager and paste the password in. If they opt for the latter, then any malicious ad on the page can grab the password while it's in the clipboard...

    --
    I am TheRaven on Soylent News
  35. Gotta agree by Runaway1956 · · Score: 1

    I have some generic passwords that I use for non-critical accounts. For critical accounts, I have some pretty tough password-generated things. I have a list of them encrypted on my hard disk, so that I can throw some away if/when the need arises, and grab another. But - I can't copy paste them everywhere. How the hell am I supposed to EVER memorize those damned passwords? Just let me copy paste them, FFS.

    A real "Password Manager" would be even better - if I find one that I trust, and I'm comfortable using. I haven't found it yet . . .

    --
    "Windows is like the faint smell of piss in a subway: it's there, and there's nothing you can do about it." - Charlie Br
    1. Re:Gotta agree by Khyber · · Score: 1

      "A real "Password Manager" would be even better - if I find one that I trust, and I'm comfortable using. I haven't found it yet . . ."

      Ever try a Rolodex?

      --
      Still waiting on Serviscope_minor to wake up to fucking reality and realize that Jessica Price isn't going to fuck him.
    2. Re:Gotta agree by Runaway1956 · · Score: 1

      LMAO - Rolodex sits on your desk, open to any snoop that happens to walk past while you're not at your desk.

      --
      "Windows is like the faint smell of piss in a subway: it's there, and there's nothing you can do about it." - Charlie Br
    3. Re:Gotta agree by Khyber · · Score: 1

      "Rolodex sits on your desk, open to any snoop that happens to walk past while you're not at your desk."

      Given how socially-inept the majority of you geeks are, that shouldn't be a problem, should it?

      Because nobody would want to interact with your social ignorance in the first place.

      --
      Still waiting on Serviscope_minor to wake up to fucking reality and realize that Jessica Price isn't going to fuck him.
  36. Re: Scripts that interact with passwords fields aw by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    And why not?

    Some script/program having access to a password field is totally irrelevant from a security standpoint. Heck, even browsers most of the times can't even tell that some html field is THE password field (because there's no standard...often they just guess).

    Any way, If attackers already have access to your machine, they can just steal your password with a keylogger. That is a lot easier than trying to guess what is a password field or not.

  37. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    Your argument has one flaw - just because someone uses a password manager doesn't mean he will pick strong passwords...

  38. Yeah, and? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    ...and they get lazy and reuse them everywhere.

    Yeah. I have weak, strong and you're gonna have to work your ass off to break into my account passwords. I can't remember that many.

    And in other cases where I don't have to create some account for some asinine reason (like on Slashdot) I don't.

    My wife OTOH, creates a password for every website that demands one. She is constantly resetting them because she forgets. And she gets really pissed at the websites for demanding such shit. Consumer Reports demands a strong password and for what? If someone breaks in and gets her password, what are they gonna do? And when she needs to get back in, she resets it and the hackers are SOL.

    And most websites demand accounts for advertising purposes anyway - like Slashdot and to drive traffic. People get off on building karma and whatnot because they have no lives. You see Redditors with tens of thousands of karma points and I gotta wonder if they have any life at all outside of the Web or Reddit.

    Anyway, outside of important things, this whole password shit is nonsense.

  39. Re:Lazy and Stupid by Demonoid-Penguin · · Score: 1

    I think the concern is that if your computer gets taken over, the criminal can just automatically scan the password logs for all your browsers and you're toast.

    I agree - that probably is the concern. I don't believe that's a legitimate concern. It definitely is a concern that it's expressed so vehemently with no supporting reasons. It may not be a troll, but it is as ugly as one.

    • Consider that password managers come with a capacity for a passphrase for a reason? (those passwords are not stored in plain text)
    • [citation required] Which computers use a password log? If some computers have a password log - how will keeping your passwords on scraps of paper protect you? i.e. are you talking of a computer where the authentication system is optical and you show the paper with you password on it? If so - what is that computer, it sounds interesting.
    • Consider that if someone has physical access to your computer it's game over?
    • Consider also that if someone has remote access to your computer they can also; elevate their privileges and negate the need for a password theoretically obtainable from a password log; they can install spyware - which will circumnavigate any password storage method (physical or electronic); that they've already breached your security - statistically those that write passwords down make other security mistakes e.g. resusing passwords or using poor passwords due to the difficulties in re-entering sufficiently complex passwords every time they need to enter them; that having just one password is often enough to start a domino effect resulting in capturing all of the important passwords e.g. if I have the password to your email account I can get many of your other passwords if you don't employ dual authentication systems and that account was used to set up an account, by requesting a password reset; that your email may contain enough personal information to be damaging in itself (I could declare your phone stolen, get the number ported, then get passwords reset the require a code that is sent to your phone; that your address book and information about senders and recipients may allow me to create other problems. (Mum, send me money - I my wallet was stolen etc)

    I'm not suggesting you should never write down a password.
    I'm certainly not suggesting password control on it's own is the basis of BP security - backups, risk management, and OpSec are also critical components. All of which must be employed.

    Broad brush approaches to security are doomed to failure. There is no single security practise e.g. writing passwords on paper in code, or using a password safe that solves all security problems. Writing all your passwords down is definitely less secure than using a password manager. If what you are trying to secure is important enough not to trust to a password manager you should entrust is to several password managers and employ OpSec to segregate the risks across several computers - or don't take the risk.

    When it comes to a choice between using passwords or cryptographic keys it's far better to use cryptographic keys.

  40. Re:Lazy and Stupid by Demonoid-Penguin · · Score: 1

    This is only if you allow passwords to be saved in your browser...

    Which browsers does not allow passphrase protection of the password manager?

  41. A variation on this by DrXym · · Score: 2
    Another commonplace annoyance is sites of no consequence that ask for an email address and for some unknown reason require it to be entered twice. And to stop people working around this fuck wittery they block copy & paste. I might understand the need to enter an email twice if it were a tax form or suchlike, but many sites are simply doing it for no meaningful purpose at all.

    Some sites and wifi hotspots double down on this annoyance by inflicting it on their mobile pages too. So you have to enter an email twice from a handset. And just in case that wasn't enough, they fail to specify the field is for email so the phone browser's autocorrect fucks it up as you type it.

    1. Re:A variation on this by Blaskowicz · · Score: 1

      That's nothing. Real obnoxious stuff is you fail the registration for any reason, and then it says "This e-mail address is already taken". Repeat for the next attempt or two. UGGGHH!!!

  42. Re:Lazy and Stupid by Demonoid-Penguin · · Score: 2

    It's not a difference that I would rely on; but there likely are some differences: it's typically easiest to get some sort of cross-site-scripting malice to work,

    In which case your passwords are toast no matter whether you typed them in by hand or they were injected by a password manager.

    less easy but far too common to escape from the browser and poke around with the user's permissions,

    Do you have a citation for this common occurrence?

    I can't seem to find one - though I only did a quick google and a search though the last decade of email from the Full Disclosure mailing list.

    Also could you expand on how such an exploit would not be able to result in key logging that also result in a typed password being captured?

    more difficult again to escalate privileges above the user's context; and potentially quite tricky to get a kernel driver in without either compromising some vaguely respectable OEM or mucking with the system's certificate store.

    I agree with what made sense. You lost me with the "vaguely respectable OEM" bit. Could you expand on that please. I can be a bit thick.

    Mechanisms that touch the browser too closely will probably fall to a good XSS exploit, basic browser-stores-passwords arrangements should fall over with nothing more than your security level

    Sound good - a bit theoretical. How does that get past a passphrase and encrypted password storage?

    ; actually getting a keylogger, especially a persistent one, in there should be more demanding.

    I'd disagree there - if I have that much access I can download what I need - if I'm too lazy to use what's already on the system.

  43. Post-it's are easier by Overzeetop · · Score: 2

    Better to use a single password and write it on a couple of post-its. That way you can tape one to every device you own.

    --
    Is it just my observation, or are there way too many stupid people in the world?
    1. Re:Post-it's are easier by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Thanks. That's certainly more convenient...

  44. Re:Wait, you have to TYPE the password??? by zm · · Score: 2

    If your password is "OPnuo(I&n hKUYNB68IOnih4wOIB*GBi234t73" as it should be,* then yes...

    Now my favorite password is in cleartext on the Interweb, and I can't use it any longer.. Thanks for nothing. :(

    --
    Sig ?
  45. Password protection --- of what? by petes_PoV · · Score: 1

    Using the same password everywhere and/or spreading your security thin across a thousand different web services

    Let's face it. Those "thousands of different web services" don't amount to shit. There are probably only a handful that contain any *valuable* information about the user: such as your online banking, online tax returns, the very few sites that a person of sound mind would trust with storing their credit card details (e.g, PayPal, Amazon). But apart from that, most web sites, like forums - and even Facebook (you don't really give them actual personal information - do you? ) contain nothing of any value. So why not use the same 6 character password that you've been using for 20 or 30 years? Even if someone does crack it, nobody here is important enough for anything of any consequence to happen.

    --
    politicians are like babies' nappies: they should both be changed regularly and for the same reasons
    1. Re:Password protection --- of what? by Applehu+Akbar · · Score: 1

      But in actual fact, every site out there requires some sort of remember-me registration and logon. Instead of remembering innumerable different passwords, what everybody without a PM does is use a single "junk" password for all the sites for which registration security is not important to the user. Then one of those sites gets hacked...

  46. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    IMHO, this is a browser problem, not a website problem. Browser shouldn't allow scripts to interact with a password field. Period.

    [Disclaimer: I'm not the GP AC.]

    Isn't this exactly what a password manager does? I thought Lastpass (to name one) uses Javascript to change the form fields, including the password field (which suddenly has a clickable * in it). So if you disable that, you have to paste manually.

    Nope. Lastpass is an extension, not a script. A script is one type of component, and an extension is another. The fact that the extension is implemented in the Javascript language does not make the extension a script except in a semantically-distinct usage of the word "script". Beware the fallacy of equivocation.

  47. A plea for browsers to stop blocking autocomplete by MightyDrunken · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Websites have disabled autocomplete on password fields to prevent browser bases password managers from working. In response to this many browsers ignore autocomplete=off on password fields. I ran into this behaviour on a user administration screen, the browser was trying to fill in my password into the other users password field. I could not stop the browser from autofilling in the wrong password.

  48. Its 2015 people. by ruir · · Score: 2

    So many talking about securing passwords and not single mention to double factor authentication...

    1. Re:Its 2015 people. by drinkypoo · · Score: 1

      So many talking about securing passwords and not single mention to double factor authentication...

      Something you know, and something that can be stolen or lost, I think that's how the saying goes, right?

      2FA is cool in principle, but I live in the sticks and don't have high-speed internet and I use a prepay plan which charges me daily because it fits my current usage patterns. It would cost me money to use 2FA.

      --
      "You're right," Fisheye says. "I should have set it on 'whip' or 'chop.'"
    2. Re:Its 2015 people. by tepples · · Score: 1

      If it costs you money to both be secure and live in the sticks, then why not move from the sticks, as other Slashdot users have suggested?
      [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]

    3. Re:Its 2015 people. by drinkypoo · · Score: 1

      Because I can't stand living in cities as they are now. When they kick out all the cars, maybe I'll think about moving back. On the other hand, I like having a lot of personal space, and it's a lot cheaper in the sticks. I probably won't ever move back into the cities if I have a choice.

      --
      "You're right," Fisheye says. "I should have set it on 'whip' or 'chop.'"
    4. Re:Its 2015 people. by bill_mcgonigle · · Score: 1

      It would cost me money to use 2FA

      It'll cost you money to not use 2FA too. Pay now or pay later.

      I get 2000 texts a month on my $30 plan - I use maybe 10 2FA messages in that time - hardly worth complaining about. Electricity costs money too!

      But to the GP - password quality is part of good 2FA; one is not a replacement for the other.

      --
      My God, it's Full of Source!
      OUTSIDE_IP=$(dig +short my.ip @outsideip.net)
    5. Re:Its 2015 people. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      So many talking about securing passwords and not single mention to double factor authentication...

      Probably because it is called 2-factor authentication.

    6. Re:Its 2015 people. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      why?

    7. Re:Its 2015 people. by ruir · · Score: 1

      Would it? You just have another page with another box to put another password, it won't make it any difference. Look at authy in iPhone, Android or Chrome. It uses RFC-6238 TOTP, which only synchronises once and from them on all the number generations are done with mathematical operations on your device, and do not need any connection/traffic at all.

    8. Re:Its 2015 people. by ruir · · Score: 1

      Fully agree with you on that, one is not the replacement for the other - however nowadays it is becoming harder to live without the too. Beginning how my page was hijacked in a Saturday night when facebook was stupid enough to let you "recover" the page identifying photos of at least 3 friends, and ending when I when was dealing with a stressful situation in work, "logged in" with my linked.in account and it only dawned on me it was a phishing attack when I already hit enter. The former situation took care of itself when facebook adopted 2FA, the later had I not 2FA in place, a automated script would have hijacked my account as soon as I "logged in" in that phishing page.

  49. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by Demonoid-Penguin · · Score: 1

    IMHO, this is a browser problem, not a website problem. Browser shouldn't allow scripts to interact with a password field. Period.

    [Disclaimer: I'm not the GP AC.]

    I'd have to disagree with that opinion. I would reconsider if someone showed me good reason. Typing password manually lead to password reuse and insufficiently complex password use.

  50. Re: Scripts that interact with passwords fields a by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    That assumes that they're not trying to get a specific password from a site where their already identified the password fields.

  51. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by MrL0G1C · · Score: 5, Interesting

    Since my password manager is a simple piece of software - an encrypted database of my passwords that runs on my computer with the data on my computer, I'd say yes, I have no reason not to trust it. I wouldn't put my bank login details in to it though, because of vulnerabilities + trojans + keystroke-loggers.

    Trust an online password manager - hell no.

    --
    Waterfox - a Firefox fork with legacy extension support, security updates and better privacy by default.
  52. Re: Scripts that interact with passwords fields aw by Demonoid-Penguin · · Score: 1

    And why not?

    Some script/program having access to a password field is totally irrelevant from a security standpoint. Heck, even browsers most of the times can't even tell that some html field is THE password field (because there's no standard...often they just guess).

    That's interesting. Which browsers guess which form field takes a password please? It'd save me some time if you could tell me the function is used to guess it - but I can just dig through the documentation if you don't remember precisely.

    I know how Iceweasel/Firefox finds a password form field - and it's not "guess" work.(it remembers the form field positions from when you hit the Submit button - if you have autologin enabled).
    The password manager I use knows nothing of form fields - it handles password request from applications. When I'm not using Iceweasel I just copy and paste from the password manager (which I use to hold additional information relevant to each password).

    A stock page login form field:-

    <form id="bridgeForm" action="#" target="loginframe" autocomplete="on">
    <input type="text" name="username" id="username" />
    <input type="password" name="password" id="password"/>
    </form>

    <iframe id="loginframe" name="loginframe" src="$foobar.html"></iframe>

    Refs: Firefox password debugging, the login manager

  53. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by MrL0G1C · · Score: 1

    Doesn't make sense, if you have malware it could be keystroke logging - which would make a password manager more, not less secure if it auto-fills the user+password fields the user+password might not get sniffed.

    --
    Waterfox - a Firefox fork with legacy extension support, security updates and better privacy by default.
  54. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by MrL0G1C · · Score: 2

    Which is one of the many reasons why JavaScript clipboard functions should only be allowed for white-listed sites.

    If anyone knows of an extension to fix this I'd like to know.

    --
    Waterfox - a Firefox fork with legacy extension support, security updates and better privacy by default.
  55. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by MrL0G1C · · Score: 1

    Found one, apparently no whitelist though.
    Disable clipboard manipulations

    --
    Waterfox - a Firefox fork with legacy extension support, security updates and better privacy by default.
  56. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    Lastpass is proprietary, so you don't know what they are doing with your passwords. It was also hacked just recently.

    KeePass is much better, open source and no stupid browser integration crap to get in the way. Just run it and manually copy your password to the browser.

  57. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by jbmartin6 · · Score: 1

    Why not NoScript?

    --
    This posting is provided 'AS IS' without warranty of any kind, implied or otherwise.
  58. Re: Scripts that interact with passwords fields a by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    You are forgetting that not all sites are created the same. Some even use editable DIV tags instead of forms and use JavaScript submission. Many pass more inputs on their forms than just the user name and password.

    I think the OP's point was that password managers often have to take their best guess at what is and isn't a login form, because while most sites use standard forms, that doesn't work for ALL sites.

  59. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by TheRaven64 · · Score: 4, Insightful

    True, although most password managers can generate random passwords (of varying strengths, as a recent Oakland paper showed). Using this functionality is generally easier than thinking up a password.

    --
    I am TheRaven on Soylent News
  60. Re:Wait, you have to TYPE the password??? by AchilleTalon · · Score: 1

    The last thing that someone would try as your luggage combination is 9999. I suggest you change your combination for this one, it will take longer to break in.

    --
    Achille Talon
    Hop!
  61. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    the Treasury.gov website? I don't believe they let you interact via keyboard---they force you you to click buttons with the mouse.

  62. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by Demonoid-Penguin · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Your argument has one flaw - just because someone uses a password manager doesn't mean he will pick strong passwords...

    The flaw you see is not where you think it is. The OP never said a password manager requires strong passwords. That would require idiot proofing - that's a whole other subject.

    Using a password manager does not necessarily enforce good passwords - or prohibit the reuse of them.

    Writing passwords down means you have to read them out, and type them in to use them - a practise that also does not necessarily enforce good passwords - or prohibit the reuse of them.

    Writing passwords down means you have to read them out, and type them in to use them - a practise that encourages bad passwords and the reuse of them.

    Using a password manager does not encourage bad passwords and the reuse of them.

    The reason for the difference is in ease of use and amount of effort involved. People cut corners because they are lazy or in a hurry.
    I touch type - most people don't, I make mistakes typing in complex passwords that have been written down. The more I use those passwords, and the more passwords I need to keep, the greater the incentive to practise bad security. Given that most people can't touch type - they have an even stronger incentive than me to practise poor security - the evidence from all the password list dumps and all the security tests on password usage just proves the same thing. People use dumb passwords, people reuse passwords. When they are asked why they do so they say it's because it's too hard to remember them - or to write them all down, keep control of the pieces of paper, and to type them back in each time.

    The other risk with using either method for storing password is loss of the passwords. Passwords managers have to be backed up. Paper records of password needed to be backed up and secured. Password manager use passphrase protection so they are secured. (or should be - see my previous comment about idiot proofing)

  63. Re:Wait, you have to TYPE the password??? by swillden · · Score: 3, Interesting

    If your password is "OPnuo(I&n hKUYNB68IOnih4wOIB*GBi234t73" as it should be,* then yes...

    Parent was modded funny, but this is what your passwords should look like -- long and random, and typing them is a PITA. Any web site that disables pasting or prevents your browser or extensions from auto-filling passwords is broken. The sad thing is that most sites that do this (other than those that do it by accident because the devs are clueless) do it because they think they're increasing the security of their users' accounts. They're not.

    Solutions like LastPass et al are the best, but honestly just using your browser's password database is better than reusing passwords everywhere. And Chrome and Firefox (at least, perhaps others) offer the option of keeping your passwords synced to all of the devices you use, optionally protected with a master password. Browsers need to offer password generation as well. I think some are working on it.

    Of course, the real solution is to get rid of passwords. Web sites should switch to using OpenID authentication. Yes this means that most users will use their Facebook or Google logins, which means that, essentially, the site has outsourced its account security to those other entities. So what? If the developers of random web sites think they can do a better job of account security than Google or Facebook -- they're wrong . I work for Google and previously spent a decade as a security consultant in the financial industry and after seeing how they all work from the inside, I would feel much more secure about my bank account if I could use my Google account (with 2FA, plus all of the analytics and monitoring Google does) to log into it rather than trusting the bank to do a decent job with password-based security. I haven't seen Facebook's infrastructure, but I know people who work there, and they're good. Far better than you'll find at a typical bank, much less J. Random Web Developer.

    --
    Note to ACs: I usually delete AC replies without reading them. If you want to talk to me, log in.
  64. Good password managers... by Shados · · Score: 1

    have a feature that "types" your password in the box instead of having to copy paste it.

    Problem -> solved.

  65. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    So keepass is a glorified speadsheet. Nice to know it's useless. Copying and pasting is idiotic for a password manager.

  66. Re:Wait, you have to TYPE the password??? by serano · · Score: 1

    OPnuo(I&n hKUYNB68IOnih4wOIB*GBi234t73

    What a coincidence. That used to be my exact password until I read somewhere you aren't supposed to use your name as a password.

  67. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    KeePass has an encrypted database. Copying and pasting for passwords is a lot more secure than having automagic fill in crap.

    Enjoy your identity theft, credit card fraud and viruses.

  68. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Yeah but TFS said "secure as possible", what do you mean it might possibly not be!?!?!?

  69. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by stevel · · Score: 5, Interesting

    LastPass is no more proprietary than KeePass. The JavaScript implementation is visible. And while their server was hacked, the thieves got nothing of value since the contents of your "vault" never leave your computer unencrypted and LastPass doesn't have the key.

    I agree with the article - blocking password managers lowers security.

  70. My Favourite by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    The websites that force you to type the password in twice to make sure you got it right. Arggghhh!

  71. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by CrimsonAvenger · · Score: 1

    Your argument has one flaw - just because someone uses a password manager doesn't mean he will pick strong passwords...

    PasswordSafe.

    Generates random passwords for you, using specifications you provide (generally that means "generate a password consistent with the site requirements") as to length and content.

    You never have to even look at your passwords if you don't want to - they're not displayed by default, so someone looking over your shoulder while you use it won't see a password by accident. Right-click, copy password to clipboard, paste to password field for website. Then PasswordSafe overwrites the piece of memory your password used in the clipboard several times with gibberish to make it harder for someone to find it that way.

    So, pick one really good password (or passphrase - it doesn't have a limit on password size for itself) for your PasswordSafe, and let it generate all of your other passwords for you, and remember them and secret questions and whatever else you need to remember.

    And it's not like the functionality I've described is unique to passwordsafe. Pretty much every password manager I've looked at has the same basic functionality....

    --

    "I do not agree with what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it"
  72. Re:Lazy and Stupid by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Indeed.
    We are however talking about webpages so it is reasonable safe to say that the password manager used is running on a computer that is online.

  73. Oh you mean like gov websites? by sims+2 · · Score: 3, Interesting

    The nicsez check website comes to mind.

    You know to one that's used to run background checks for guns in 36 states or so?

    If I recall correctly its forbidden in the terms to use a password manager.

    And you have to change the password every 90 days.

    --
    Minimum threshold fixed. Thanks!
    1. Re:Oh you mean like gov websites? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      This seems to be a government problem, so its probably written in a regulation somewhere. There's a site I use once a year, at tax time, to get information from Uncle Sam. To keep the account active it requires me to change the password every 90 days. To an account i wouldn't log into for the better part of a year. Usually I just let the account lapse and call them to reset the password every year. It's less hassle than logging in for no other purpose than creating a new password i"ll never use (and never remember) every three months.

  74. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    If your website doesn't import scripts from elsewhere, there's no problem.

    It's a website design problem.

  75. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Lastpass is proprietary, closed source software that's been hacked and promotes poor security practices. KeePass is fully open source and has never been hacked.

    Oh and email addresses, password reminders, server per user salts and authentication hashes are extremely valuable. I'm glad I use KeePass so nothing like that can ever happen to me because *I* control it, not some faceless, soulless, proprietary, anti-open source corporation.

    If you use Lastpass, you need to change ALL of your passwords because you can easily be hacked with the information that the hackers got away with.

  76. Re: Scripts that interact with passwords fields aw by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Visible != Open Source
    Keepass is GPL and the full app is open, not just some simple lookup script for a remote API that masks how the important data is stored.

  77. Stop Using "Passwords" by lars5 · · Score: 2

    I stopped using traditional "passwords" years ago and switched to a derivation algorithm instead.
     
    I never have to remember a password because I can derive each one easily. Does anyone else use this strategy?

    --
    Don't Panic.
  78. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by Khyber · · Score: 0

    "I agree with the article - blocking password managers lowers security."

    Password managers suck. You want to know what works better? Image/phrase/password verification like my bank is using (and I've been using on my anime forum for at least a decade.)

    Let's see your password manager work worth a shit when your system hard drive takes a dump and you don't have a backup.

    --
    Still waiting on Serviscope_minor to wake up to fucking reality and realize that Jessica Price isn't going to fuck him.
  79. Re:Here's a haiku to cheer you up! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    That didn't cheer me up at all!

  80. Re:Passwords are for cows. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Actually, I may just use that for a wi-fi key. Spaces included.

    Attackers won't guess it, and if they find out what it is, they'll give up before they type it all in.

  81. Another pet peeve:limited charsets by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    No good reason in this day and age for sites to disallow ANY character on your keyboard as valid password symbols. I really hate that. Usually government sites, but a recent loyalty program for a drug store was doing it... suggests to me they are either failing to sanitize input, storing pws on the clear to their DB or both.

  82. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Wrong. Keep trying though.

  83. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by stevel · · Score: 2, Insightful

    Obviously you have limited experience or familiarity with password managers. LastPass, among others, keeps your encrypted passwords "in the cloud", so that they are accessible even if your local disk "takes a dump". For LastPass, there's also a local copy of the encrypted database, and yes, I do have backups. (If you don't have backups, you have a lot more problems than losing passwords.)

    Image/phrase/password verification is hardly "better" (better than what?). How many of those can you remember? If you can come up with an authentication scheme better than passwords that you can get every online service to use, then please let us know. The reality is that passwords are what we use today and password managers make them easier to use in a more secure fashion, so that one has a different, strong password for every login. Two-factor authentication is also very helpful (and I enable that where supported.)

    Currently the biggest weakness of passwords, other than most people using them poorly, is sites that store passwords insecurely. This, combined with the tendency of those NOT using password managers to reuse passwords, is what leads to the majority of account hacking.

  84. Offline pass managers don't have this problem.. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I use the rings sold here to generate my passwords, there are cards and keychains too. Simple system and no need to rely on cloud storage or worry about having a wallet hacked.

    https://www.tindie.com/search/#q=password generator recall

    1. Re:Offline pass managers don't have this problem.. by Wycliffe · · Score: 1

      I use the rings sold here to generate my passwords, there are cards and keychains too. Simple system and no need to rely on cloud storage or worry about having a wallet hacked.

      https://www.tindie.com/search/#q=password generator recall

      How do you deal with site's arbitrary unstated rules? I've ran into many sites that enforce mutually exclusive rules (must contain a symbol, can't contain a symbol, etc..) which they only tell you when you create the password not when you later try to log in so you're left to try to guess which arbitrary rule the site you're currently trying to log in had.

  85. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by DroolTwist · · Score: 2

    Why would you not have a backup? You can't fix stupid, no matter what you use.

  86. Re: Scripts that interact with passwords fields aw by bazmonkey · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Keepass is also (correct me if I'm wrong: I'd love to hear there is another) the only password manager I know of which is fully cross platform. Combined with Dropbox or some private file sync tool (I host a seafile installation), I have a synced password manager that works on Linux/Win/Mac/iOS/android. And I keep the key separate and move that to devices I use manually, so I'm almost totally unafraid of my vault being intercepted/stolen. Without my master pass phrase AND the encrypted key itself, breaking it is.... way harder than my passwords are worth.

  87. Re:Lazy and Stupid by Khyber · · Score: 1

    "Do you have a citation for that Mr. Scraps of Bad Security on Paper?"

    Every fucking government agency that uses a fucking AIR GAP like a REAL PROFESSIONAL.

    Which you are obviously NOT.

    --
    Still waiting on Serviscope_minor to wake up to fucking reality and realize that Jessica Price isn't going to fuck him.
  88. Re:Lazy and Stupid by Demonoid-Penguin · · Score: 1

    "Do you have a citation for that Mr. Scraps of Bad Security on Paper?"

    Every fucking government agency that uses a fucking AIR GAP like a REAL PROFESSIONAL.

    That's not a citation - that's just stupid. Hint: you can't use an air gapped machine on the internet you moron.

  89. Re: Scripts that interact with passwords fields aw by KingMotley · · Score: 1

    Heck, even browsers most of the times can't even tell that some html field is THE password field (because there's no standard...often they just guess).

    You mean the one with the attribute type=password? That is the standard, and it's been used like, forever. AC, please stop talking about silly things you know absolutely nothing about.

  90. Re: Scripts that interact with passwords fields a by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    It's "cross platform" my foot. It's written in c#... The only reason it runs on other platforms is because someone else other than Microsoft made a compatible product to dotnet. Its called mono. Not to put it down but a compatible product doesn't equal the original product and is only going to add one more attack surface.

  91. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    It hasn't been this way for a very long time, if ever. There has been a few bugs related to this 'protection' over the years, though. Browsers only allow reading content copied from the current page, only through the oncopy/onpaste/oncut events. That is, when you copy something on a page, the site can know that you did, and what you copied from it. (It can always write in it though).

    Same with Flash (see http://www.adobe.com/devnet/flashplayer/articles/fplayer10_security_changes.html#head61 ... they say in Flash 9, in 2007, content couldn't even be read, ever, from the clipboard, and in Flash 10, in 2008, it now could be read, but only when content was copied from an animation, and only for that specific content).

    And even these events can be disabled (e.g., "dom.event.clipboardevents.enabled = false" in Firefox). I think I remember disabling them in IE6 too, after each reinstallation, way back in the days.

    That being said, it's probably good still to avoid leaving a password in the clipboard after use... I generally copy some random text afterward...

  92. How about a standard password manager interface? by Applehu+Akbar · · Score: 2

    The article mes a good point: preventing paste into a password field just encourages people to use crappy passwords that are easier to type. The same applies to that silly convention of asterisk masking in password fields. The inconvenience massively outweighs that one time in a hundred that masking prevents a shoulder-surf attack.

    Can we develop a standard HTML interface for password managers, with built-in safeguards against malware usage? Any compliant PM would connect with any compliant login screen.

  93. There might be a reason by jader3rd · · Score: 1

    some sites deliberately stop their users from being as secure as possible, for no really justifiable reason.

    Perhaps the website has had issues with some sort of script, or bad actor, who just pastes password guesses into the field. Then the site admin found that blocking pastes blocked the software which was trying to attack them.

    1. Re:There might be a reason by sjames · · Score: 1

      Doubtful. People doing password guessing attacks don't use an actual browser to do it.

    2. Re:There might be a reason by Schmorgluck · · Score: 1

      True. And a good solution against guessing attacks is to suspend login for incremental times after each failure. Not too inconvenient for occasional mistakes from the legit user, but quite disruptive of dictionary attacks and such. Heck, even a three seconds delay is disruptive to automated attacks, and is acceptable for the user.

      --
      There's nothing like $HOME
  94. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by Applehu+Akbar · · Score: 1

    " just because someone uses a password manager doesn't mean he will pick strong passwords"

    But because a PM makes it easy to maintain strong passwords, you no longer have inconvenience as an excuse for slacking on password security.

  95. Re: Scripts that interact with passwords fields a by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Ugh silly troll is silly.

    Yes there are standards... But no requirements to FOLLOW the standards... Yes most sites follow the two input fields and one marked as password. Get off the "sanitized" Internet and things can get sketchy quick. The password field could be a string of dropdown boxes with a single letter each for each or not even an input field at any point in time and instead faked by JS code to look and act like one and....... Need I go on? The proliferation of JavaScript makes our "job" of ensuring the legitimacy of a website before or during our visit even harder.

  96. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by Zalbik · · Score: 0

    There was no equivocation here. The original statement was:

    Browser shouldn't allow scripts to interact with a password field. Period.

    I thought Lastpass (to name one) uses Javascript to change the form fields, including the password field

    The response never equated Lastpass to a script. It said Lastpass uses Javascript to change the form fields in contradiction to the statement that scripts should never be allowed to interact with a password field.

  97. No problem with KeepassX by xororand · · Score: 2

    KeepassX does not use the clipboard but instead simulates actual typing, with a configurable delay.
    When you select a password entry and press Ctrl-v in KeepassX, it hides itself, switches the focus to the last active window and types the password.
    This also protects you from accidentally leaking password to remote desktop sessions or virtual machines that synchronize the clipboards.

  98. Re: Scripts that interact with passwords fields aw by The-Ixian · · Score: 1

    I have been using RoboForm for many years and have always loved it. It is about as cross-platform as you could want (it's Windows Mobile support is a little lackluster, but its iPhone and Android support are the best I have seen).

    Before they switched to the cloud sync platform, I had 5 registered copies I was maintaining, it was worth that much to me. Then they switched to the Everywhere product which gives you as many devices as you want for around $25/year.

    I have never had a problem with it other than the usual issues one gets when synching from many different devices. The occasional password will slip through the cracks because your device wasn't online to sync properly and then propagate to your other devices. I would guess this is the same issue you would find with LastPass or any other cloud synching PM.

    --
    My eyes reflect the stars and a smile lights up my face.
  99. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by budgenator · · Score: 1

    Only users use browsers, Hacker/cracker, blackhat low-lifes use perl's LWP modules.

    --
    Apocalypse Cancelled, Sorry, No Ticket Refunds
  100. Re: Scripts that interact with passwords fields by bazmonkey · · Score: 1

    I'm sorry. Most of the time I use keepassx on Lin/Mac, and some other keepass app on my phones. I guess I should have said the keepass format is cross-platform.

  101. Re: Scripts that interact with passwords fields a by Zalbik · · Score: 1

    So run it under mono on Windows.

    If your definition of cross-platform is so narrow that it means the exact same binaries run under different operating systems, then there is virtually no cross-platform software.

  102. Re:A plea for browsers to stop blocking autocomple by jader3rd · · Score: 1

    Would you be kind enough to name the browser?

  103. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by Khyber · · Score: 0

    "Obviously you have limited experience or familiarity with password managers. LastPass, among others, keeps your encrypted passwords "in the cloud", so that they are accessible even if your local disk "takes a dump"."

    That's EXACTLY WHY I don't use it. Keep my passwords on SOMEONE ELSE'S COMPUTER?!?!?! That's FUCKUP NUMBER ONE of security.

    " If you can come up with an authentication scheme better than passwords that you can get every online service to use, then please let us know."

    Same fucking one I got my bank to switch to - same one that I've used on my anime forums for over a decade. Picture/your custom caption/password. Same fucking one I've been telling people on /. about for YEARS. Spammers haven't beaten it, hackers haven't beaten it (because it's actually more than two-factor auth) and even in the case of being hacked, you would still need the matching image file (which resides on another server and is accessed by a constantly-changing encrypted variable for filename so you can't just rip it) to make the phrase and password usable.

    I've been at this game almost 30 years. When are you n00bs ever going to catch up with the basic security of things like Air Gaps and separated content passwords, which have been around since, well, PROHIBITION?

    --
    Still waiting on Serviscope_minor to wake up to fucking reality and realize that Jessica Price isn't going to fuck him.
  104. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by Khyber · · Score: 1

    " You can't fix stupid, no matter what you use."

    That's exactly why many don't have a backup.

    --
    Still waiting on Serviscope_minor to wake up to fucking reality and realize that Jessica Price isn't going to fuck him.
  105. Re:Lazy and Stupid by Khyber · · Score: 1

    " Hint: you can't use an air gapped machine on the internet you moron."

    Yes, you can. Do you even know what PROTOCOL is? Do you even know about SNEAKERNET, n00b?

    --
    Still waiting on Serviscope_minor to wake up to fucking reality and realize that Jessica Price isn't going to fuck him.
  106. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    This is why my mantra is "laziness always wins".

    That is, if I want to change user behavior, I need to make the desired behavior easier than the bad behavior. PW managers do this by generating 'good' passwords with a click of the button.

  107. Horse, correct, battery, FAIL by Applehu+Akbar · · Score: 1

    Some people like phrasal passwords as an alternative to PMs. Random phrases from which you use the first few letters of each word are a lot easier to remember than random strings. But now that passworded sites have taken to using silly password formation rules as a vain attempt to enforce strength, these no longer work. Was this the site that requires one capital and two numbers, or was it the other way around?

  108. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by war4peace · · Score: 2

    Until you go to a random PC which you don't own and try logging in to that whatever website...
    What I did (but is difficult to do in general) is learn an algorithm which allows my own brain to generate a password based on the website I'm logging in to.
    Give me a website name and I can create an unique password for it, all in my head. And whenever I revisit the website I can re-generate the password for reuse.
    The algorithm has evolved during last few years and sometimes I have to enter 2-3 passwords if I rarely visit a certain website, but overall it works great.

    Thinking a password is easy - but only after you spent some time and brain cells learning the algorithm.

    --
    ...gis sdrawkcab (usually not responding to ACs; don't bother posting as AC)
  109. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by stevel · · Score: 1

    n00bs, eh? I've been in the software business for almost 40 years, you young whippersnapper.

    I suggest you study texts on encryption, and maybe read the technical details of how a good cloud-based password manager like LastPass actually works. https://lastpass.com/whylastpa... https://lastpass.com/support.p...

    Your super-whiz-bang method still requires a password, it seems. Without a password manager, users will still need to remember their password and many will either reuse passwords from other sites or choose simple ones. The image/caption thing you talk about is often used as an anti-phishing technique, but that's not authentication. If you're requiring the user to choose from among multiple pictures or captions, then that's effectively another one or two passwords. Yes, it will make it harder to attack YOUR site through the web interface, but doesn't itself strengthen protection of the users' passwords.

    The goal for password managers is not to protect individual sites, it's to protect the users against their own misuse of passwords and reducing the risk when some site (not yours, hopefully) gets hacked and has their password database stolen. (How do you hash the passwords for your sites? Still using MD5?)

  110. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by Zalbik · · Score: 3, Informative

    JavaScript can also intercept the contents of the clipboard.

    Not by default it can't.

    True there are potentially bugs in implementation or bad configurations that allow scripts to read the external clipboard, but the same argument could be made against password managers. Poor security / configuration of the browser could allow scripts to read the password provided by the password manager.

  111. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by MrL0G1C · · Score: 1

    Because turning off JavaScript completely breaks so many sites these days.

    --
    Waterfox - a Firefox fork with legacy extension support, security updates and better privacy by default.
  112. Re:Wait, you have to TYPE the password??? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Copy/paste cache scrapers exist, and are common for browsers with bugs. Training people not to copy/paste passwords is a good idea.

  113. Something IS Wrong by JimSadler · · Score: 2

    Not only password managers but institutions are screwing up online security and it has to be deliberate. Banks have vast restrictions on what one can use for a password. Really only weak passwords are allowed at many banks. Every night on the news we here whining about lack of security in financial transactions over the net. Yet the banks refuse the use of strong passwords. Other people must be noticing this. why is there no outcry?

    1. Re:Something IS Wrong by Opportunist · · Score: 1

      I can dissolve that conspiracy theory: They are more afraid of someone finding a way to bypass their input sanitizers than losing money from hacks. So no characters are allowed that could possibly, remotely, be considered "active" or "command" characters in any language they could probably think of.

      Also, most, if not all, of the hacks happen due to people getting their passwords stolen by trojans and the like rather than someone actually guessing the passwords.

      --
      We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
    2. Re:Something IS Wrong by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Banking in the US is a giant clusterfuck, mostly banks in the US are giant assholes, I personally don't trust anyof them. It's one thing to want passwords to be reasonable by avoiding things like apple or dog or what have you. Then it's everything from a crappy counter-intuitive websites just to double check bills got payed as they said they would. So far the only bank to not fail has been Chuck Schwab. Some add Allied Banking and Eclipse Guild Banking to that very short list.

        It's not exactly a good thing to here or read in the news regular issues of some asshole nabing umpteen credit cards, i'd think that'd be a sign that passwords is just one piece to a vastly vastly bigger bag of problems US banks have. Also, making things more complicated just meens more things are likly to go wrong.

  114. Non-repeating characters lose less than half a bit by tepples · · Score: 1

    non-repeating characters (in fact it reduces entropy by some security admins seems to think it is a good idea), numbers and so on.

    If there are 64 choices for each character, a requirement for non-repeating characters reduces the number of choices for characters after the first to 63, for a total of -log[2]((63/64)^9) = .2 bits of entropy lost in a 10-character password.

  115. Key auth? by Chewbacon · · Score: 1

    I've always wondered why a system similar to ssh keys has never been implemented for website logins and widely used. Even if it were optional, as a lot of people probably wouldn't understand and therefore not use it, a lot of others would probably use it or learn to.

    --
    Chewbacon
    The Bible is like Wikipedia: written by a bunch of people and verifiable by questionable sources.
  116. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by suutar · · Score: 1

    Yep, that use case is a potential weak spot for password managers. (I say potential because I consider it a plus - makes it less likely I'll enter passwords on a system I shouldn't trust - but ymmv.) When I have to do that I use the "forgot password" process, which is typically multi-factor (they send me an email or text, both of which I'll read on my phone), and make a note to reset the password once I get back to a safe system.

  117. Mobile password entry; acting on user's behalf by tepples · · Score: 1

    If you are writing software that takes in a password and you are hashing the password to compare it to a stored hash, there is no reason at all to restrict the maximum length of a password or prohibit certain characters from being used in it.

    Other than that it's far harder to type a 60-character password on a mobile device whose only text input method is a flat sheet of glass. Allowing users to enter a long password discourages users from even trying the mobile site or mobile app.

    If you are writing software that takes in a password and you are NOT hashing the password (but instead storing it in the clear or otherwise doing something with it), you shouldn't be writing software involving passwords in the first place

    Unless you're storing the user's password in order to log on to a service on the user's behalf. A password manager is an example of such an application. With other applications, even if the service supports some form of OAuth, the application still has to somehow store the client ID, client secret, and user token securely.

    1. Re:Mobile password entry; acting on user's behalf by JesseMcDonald · · Score: 1

      Other than that it's far harder to type a 60-character password on a mobile device...

      That should be the user's choice, and anyway, that's what password managers are for. If the system is implemented properly, the user won't need to type in that 60-character password on their mobile device. The user can just unlock the password manager and paste in the saved password.

      Unless you're storing the user's password in order to log on to a service on the user's behalf. A password manager is an example of such an application.

      The password manager should run on the user's own PC, and encrypt the passwords with a master password known only to the user. Plaintext passwords and private keys should never leave the local PC. If an app needs to perform an action on behalf of a user, it should get its own distinct, revocable API key. There is no justifiable reason for anyone but the user to have access to the user's password.

      --
      "The state is that great fiction by which everyone tries to live at the expense of everyone else." - Bastiat
    2. Re:Mobile password entry; acting on user's behalf by tepples · · Score: 1

      the user won't need to type in that 60-character password on their mobile device. The user can just unlock the password manager and paste in the saved password.

      How would the user get the long password into the mobile device's password manager in the first place?

      The password manager should run on the user's own PC

      Provided the user has an own PC. Good luck logging in at a public library or Internet cafe.

      If an app needs to perform an action on behalf of a user, it should get its own distinct, revocable API key.

      And store this "own distinct, revocable API key" in what secure manner? Client applications distributed as free software have already run into problems with how to store an OAuth 1.0a or 2.0 client ID and client secret.

    3. Re:Mobile password entry; acting on user's behalf by JesseMcDonald · · Score: 1

      How would the user get the long password into the mobile device's password manager in the first place?

      They would sync their encrypted password database to the mobile device. Alternatively, the password manager could generate the long password itself on the device if that is where the account is being created.

      Provided the user has an own PC. Good luck logging in at a public library or Internet cafe.

      The fundamental problem with this scenario is that you're proposing to place your trust in a public PC you can't control. At a minimum, that particular login session must be consider potentially compromised no matter what authentication scheme you use. Having said that, there are some options if you're forced into this scenario. An OTP hardware token would be preferred; at least that way an attacker can only hijack the current session, rather than having the means to sign in as you in the future. If you do use a traditional password then it must be considered compromised and should be changed from a secure PC as soon as possible.

      And store this "own distinct, revocable API key" in what secure manner? Client applications distributed as free software have already run into problems with how to store an OAuth 1.0a or 2.0 client ID and client secret.

      The problem you're referring to relates to application-level keys which are meant to identify the developer of the application rather than the user. The only real solution in such cases is to make your app communicate with one of your own servers, which holds the API keys and performs API access on behalf of the app. Any keys distributed with an app (whether open source or proprietary) must be considered compromised.

      In this case the API key is user-specific, not app-specific, so there is no distribution issue. The user logs in and generates an API key, which the application then stores for future use. The API key is the application's password, permitting limited access to the user's account. (For example, it should not be possible for an app to change the account password or generate additional API keys using an API key.)

      --
      "The state is that great fiction by which everyone tries to live at the expense of everyone else." - Bastiat
  118. Re:Lazy by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    All passwords should be maintained separately and typed in manually.

    by Anonymous Coward

    Coming from someone that doesn't even use usernames or passwords, your advice carries less than zero weight :P

  119. Registration confirmation e-mail typo by tepples · · Score: 1

    Another commonplace annoyance is sites of no consequence that ask for an email address and for some unknown reason require it to be entered twice.

    Some site probably tested it and found that it reduces the number of registrations that fail to complete because the user mistyped his e-mail address and thus failed to receive the registration confirmation e-mail message. Then other sites copied it.

  120. Like a credit card by tepples · · Score: 1

    you keep a copy or an excerpt of the password book safe in your wallet

    Likewise, most adults in my country keep a plastic card with their credit card number and CVV2 in their wallets.

  121. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by Immerman · · Score: 1

    >because it's actually more than two-factor authentication
    Kind of, maybe, but you really have to stretch the definition. Two factor authentication is typically a combination two of:
    - something you know
    - something you have (physical object)
    - something that's an inherent characteristic (biometric data)
    specifically so that it's extremely unlikely that an unauthorized user can get access to more than one of them.

    Meanwhile yours (from what I can guess from your under-specified description) involves:
    -Picture (keyfile?) that's stored online where anyone can get it (and how do you access it? a password?)
    -passphrase
    -password

    And yes, that's considerably more challenging to hack than a simple password alone, but it still sounds like it only involves "something you know", and thus offers none of the more concrete protections offered by more traditional two-factor authentication. All it takes is someone filming your keyboard and screen while you log in and your security is completely bypassed. Not appreciably more difficult to hack than a completely random 30-character password that can be conveniently stored in an encrypted password manager on a USB flash drive accessible via passphrase, which provides quasi-twofactor authentication on the front end. You can watch me enter my passphrase, but without also having the file on my USB drive it won't help you log into any of my accounts

    Granted, that's not as convenient on phones/tablets/etc, but given how common spyware of various types is on such devices I'd be *extremely* hesitant to access anything actually important from those unless you completely refused to install any software that has the potential to monitor your activities - a call that's becoming increasingly difficult to make even for the competent.

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    --- Most topics have many sides worth arguing, allow me to take one opposite you.
  122. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by war4peace · · Score: 1

    I'm not talking about unsafe machines, just other machines which you occasionally are an user on (e.g. meeting room presentation machine or something). Yeah, I know, those are considered unsafe but we have security solutions enabled on all our machines and they do a decent job.

    --
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  123. Fuck that by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    If your password is "OPnuo(I&n hKUYNB68IOnih4wOIB*GBi234t73" as it should be,* then yes...

    Parent was modded funny, but this is what your passwords should look like -- long and random, and typing them is a PITA. Any web site that disables pasting or prevents your browser or extensions from auto-filling passwords is broken. The sad thing is that most sites that do this (other than those that do it by accident because the devs are clueless) do it because they think they're increasing the security of their users' accounts. They're not.

    Solutions like LastPass et al are the best, but honestly just using your browser's password database is better than reusing passwords everywhere. And Chrome and Firefox (at least, perhaps others) offer the option of keeping your passwords synced to all of the devices you use, optionally protected with a master password. Browsers need to offer password generation as well. I think some are working on it.

    Of course, the real solution is to get rid of passwords. Web sites should switch to using OpenID authentication. Yes this means that most users will use their Facebook or Google logins, which means that, essentially, the site has outsourced its account security to those other entities. So what? If the developers of random web sites think they can do a better job of account security than Google or Facebook -- they're wrong . I work for Google and previously spent a decade as a security consultant in the financial industry and after seeing how they all work from the inside, I would feel much more secure about my bank account if I could use my Google account (with 2FA, plus all of the analytics and monitoring Google does) to log into it rather than trusting the bank to do a decent job with password-based security. I haven't seen Facebook's infrastructure, but I know people who work there, and they're good. Far better than you'll find at a typical bank, much less J. Random Web Developer.

    The problem with using Google or Fuck-Book for logins is: "I don't have a God Damn Fuck-Book account--nor will I be getting one, (And the same goes for Twatter), and I'm not going to log into your fucking website with my Google ID." When a site insists I log in with one of those IDs, I go elsewhere--Fuck them.

    And No, I don't give a fuck about the security of the OpenID provider, I give a Fuck about keeping my accounts separate.

  124. Re: Scripts that interact with passwords fields aw by Stan92057 · · Score: 1

    So why use a password manager that saves your passwords to a server? Whats the point of trying to be safe when you now have put your safety in their hands?

    --
    Jack of all trades,master of none
  125. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by Stormy+Dragon · · Score: 1

    As the article points out, malware doesn't steal password by copying them out of password fields, it does it by capturing keystrokes. So this does nothing to prevent malware.

  126. Re: Scripts that interact with passwords fields aw by Qzukk · · Score: 1

    Is that like the login form AT&T used for a while to pretend it was all mobile-6-point-oh-like where the password field was a plain text box with a script that turned the letters you typed into dots after you type the next letter?

    There's a reason that all the major browsers don't autofill forms until you tell it to.

    --
    If I have been able to see further than others, it is because I bought a pair of binoculars.
  127. OpenID Connect scales at O(n^2) by tepples · · Score: 1

    Of course, the real solution is to get rid of passwords. Web sites should switch to using OpenID authentication.

    One problem is that a lot of identity providers,* such as Google, have switched from classic OpenID to OpenID Connect. Because of the OAuth 2 underlying OpenID Connect, it has become more common for IDPs to require each relying party* to enter into a contractual relationship with the identity provider. With classic OpenID, if you had an identifier URL from a given IDP, you could use it on any RP. But in OpenID Connect, you can't use your identifier unless the RP has a client ID and client secret pair issued by the same IDP that issued your identifier. There is a Dynamic Client Registration protocol for an RP to automatically obtain a client ID and client secret from an IDP, but no major IDPs appears to support DCR. If there are n RPs and m IDPs, a human has to review and accept a contract m*n times, and managing this becomes O(n^2):

    * In OpenID, an "identity provider" is the website that issues OpenID identifier URLs and takes your password, such as Google, and a "relying party" is the website that takes your OpenID identifier and redirects you to the identity provider to log in.

    1. Re:OpenID Connect scales at O(n^2) by swillden · · Score: 1

      What you describe as a problem is actually part of the solution. The problem with classic OpenID was that it was virtually impossible to get, say 1st Bank of MyButt, to use it, because absolutely anyone could be an identity provider. I personally agree with you that classic OpenID was better in that respect, but 1st Bank of MyButt doesn't. They're hemming and hawing about letting Google manage their user's identities, but they will at least consider it.

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    2. Re:OpenID Connect scales at O(n^2) by tepples · · Score: 1

      So how is an RP's operator supposed to know with which IDPs to register so as not to turn away a user who tries to log in with an OpenID identifier issued by an unsupported IDP?

    3. Re:OpenID Connect scales at O(n^2) by swillden · · Score: 1

      Pick the top several and you'll cover nearly everyone. For the tiny percentage of users that remains, you have to either offer password auth (which means all of the work and risks of maintaining a password system, but at least when you screw it up only a tiny percentage of your users will be affected) or push them to get an account with one of the providers you support.

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    4. Re:OpenID Connect scales at O(n^2) by tepples · · Score: 1

      Then let me reiterate the question I linked above: How should I, as a server administrator or as the developer of an application that will be installed on servers by third parties, go about determining at any moment in time what "the top several" OpenID Connect identity providers are?

    5. Re:OpenID Connect scales at O(n^2) by swillden · · Score: 1

      Trial and error, I expect. Look at what other sites do. I realize that this isn't a very good answer. There isn't a good answer, just bad answers that are still better than passwords. Classic OpenID isn't the answer because users don't know how to use it and many RPs don't trust random providers. But as a practical matter providing login with, say, Google, Facebook, Yahoo and AOL will give better than 95% of your users the ability to log on with better security than the password-based model you'd build, and do it just by clicking a couple of buttons.

      If you find that your user base tends to have an account with some other provider (no, I can't tell you how to find out who your users are or what they use), then add that.

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  128. Re: Scripts that interact with passwords fields aw by The-Ixian · · Score: 1

    By default, everything you save in RF is encrypted into discrete files before being synchronized to the server.

    I have encryption turned off for bookmarks so that I can have a roaming set of bookmarks across all my devices without having to enter a password to decrypt them. Same goes for contacts.

    --
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  129. Re:Wait, you have to TYPE the password??? by The-Ixian · · Score: 1

    Of course, the real solution is to get rid of passwords. Web sites should switch to using OpenID authentication

    Or SQRL!

    --
    My eyes reflect the stars and a smile lights up my face.
  130. Salted your passwords by 0100010001010011 · · Score: 2

    I gave up on trying to remember increasingly complex passwords and just remembered how to make them. Computers are great at doing complex math humans aren't. Humans can remember some things very easily (Correct Horse Battery Staple).

    Then I only have to remember or write down 3 things: The 'password', the length and the mapping.

    echo -n $password+$user+$website | sha256 | cut -c1-$length | [mapping]

    Where mapping maps the hex codes to a-z, a-Z, a-Z0-9, a-Z0-9!-). (You can make up your own charset and just use mod(charset length)).

    For example if my password was 'qwerty' I'd salt it such that my actual slashdot password would be:
    echo -n qwerty+0100010001010011+slashdot.org | sha256 | cut -c1-20
    050e48f9f39d4d481ec3

    It's not that much harder to implement in Python for use on Windows. (I just have a simple GUI).

    If you want to take it a step further just remember a pattern and then a start letter. qwerty, asdfgh and zxcvbn are the same 'password' in my brain. It's "Password 1, start q, a, or z'.

    I have everything written down on how to generate the passwords in a lock box and my wife knows my 'password'. So if I die and everything is locked she could get into any website she wanted just by following the instructions.

    All of our joint accounts do actually use our anniversary. Jan 1, 1980. 01Jan1980, etc are all going to generate different end passwords. You have to know both the date and the formatting, which she does.

    Stop remembering passwords and start remembering how to get to your password.

    1. Re:Salted your passwords by Opportunist · · Score: 2

      Provided that we now know how your passwords are created, finding your password is essentially not harder or easier than before. From a technical point of view of course. Actually, it probably is much easier now considering that, since you probably rely on your creation algorithm to introduce enough entropy, you probably choose simpler passwords.

      --
      We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
  131. That's your problem? by Opportunist · · Score: 1

    Given that most of these webpages are also the ones where you have to answer some "secret" question to recover your password, it's kinda moot to select a secure password.

    What is it you say? "Instead of giving a real answer to the "secret" question, simply use another randomly generated string?"

    That's a good idea. Until the admin of the page locks your account because "you obviously are a robot, because humans don't do this".

    The problem runs far, far deeper, people...

    --
    We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
  132. Re: Scripts that interact with passwords fields aw by Stan92057 · · Score: 1

    Oh i know that i have had Roboform since it was released. No matter what the files type is it can be hacked and storing it on someone elses servers is far less secure. There is no argument anyone can make. The cloud "servers" are as secure as they make them. Taking your security away from you. Look today even Steam it has a huge security hole http://masterherald.com/steam-...

    --
    Jack of all trades,master of none
  133. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by PRMan · · Score: 1

    Then I get on my phone and type in those 36 characters by hand.

    --
    Peter predicted that you would "deliberately forget" creation 2000 years ago...
  134. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by PRMan · · Score: 1

    Exactly this. A programmer that fights "human nature" is doomed, no matter how good the software is.

    --
    Peter predicted that you would "deliberately forget" creation 2000 years ago...
  135. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by PRMan · · Score: 1

    Of course it does. I can pick a random 24-character password for every website just by leaving the defaults on LastPass.

    --
    Peter predicted that you would "deliberately forget" creation 2000 years ago...
  136. Re:Wait, you have to TYPE the password??? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    You're actually very wrong. Long complicated passwords are horrifically impossible to remember causing people to write them down or store them in managers with simpler passwords to open the manager.

    Length is all that matters for passwords. You're better off with "thatswhatshesaid" (26 ^ 16) than "B4c0nL0v3r!" (72 ^ 11). You're 162 times better off, in fact.

    26 ^ 16 = 43,608,742,899,428,874,059,776
    72 ^ 11 = 269,561,249,468,963,094,528

    https://xkcd.com/936/

  137. Simple solution by Mike+Van+Pelt · · Score: 1

    If the web site requires some sort of login, and denies me the ability to use LastPass to manage that login, I do not use that website. No discussion, no arguments, my mind is entirely made up, closed, and locked on this point. I will find someone else to do business with who doesn't think they know better than I do how to secure my access to their site.

  138. But the poster is an expert! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    But the poster worked as a security consultant for 10 years! And now works for Google, he can't possibly be wrong!

    He's probably even written white papers on the subject!

    1. Re:But the poster is an expert! by swillden · · Score: 1

      But the poster worked as a security consultant for 10 years! And now works for Google, he can't possibly be wrong!

      He's probably even written white papers on the subject!

      Heh. Your snark falls rather flat, given how egregiously wrong the parent was.

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  139. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by techno-vampire · · Score: 1

    All it takes is someone filming your keyboard and screen while you log in and your security is completely bypassed.

    And how are they supposed to do that? Magic? I only access secure sites from my PC desktop, at home. It doesn't have a web camera attached and doesn't run Windows.

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  140. Bad experience by gnasher719 · · Score: 1

    Some cases where websites work very badly with a password manager (in my case the one built into Safari):

    One case where the stupid website didn't accept the password that Safari suggested. Because it had some "special character" in it. What's annoying is that Safari remembers the password and suggests it again, BEFORE the site rejects it. Bummer.

    Another case where the password is used in different places, and Safari cannot figure out that the two different places belong to the same site and should use the same password. What happens: On the second site, Safari suggests a different password which obviously doesn't work...

    Apart from not working because of some stupid websites, it seems to be safe. The problem mentioned with password use on some public computer doesn't happen, because the passwords can only be used on my Macs, iPads and iPhones (but on all of them), but not on a random third-party device.

  141. Re: Scripts that interact with passwords fields aw by unrtst · · Score: 1

    Keepass is also (correct me if I'm wrong: I'd love to hear there is another) the only password manager I know of which is fully cross platform.

    I like keepass, especially since there are so many ports of it to so many platforms. However, if someone is looking for something more akin to lastpass, here's a few open source ones:

    https://clipperz.is/ - clipperz seems most similar IMO. It's open source and all in the browser via javascript, thought signup and site desire are a little wonky.

    http://www.fpx.de/fp/Software/... - Password Gorilla (also on github: https://github.com/zdia/gorill...). It's also open source, but it's a TCL/TK application. I'm not sure what their andriod status is (there is some info on their site regarding use of HECL to port the TCL parts to android, but I don't know the status).

      https://www.passpack.com/ - Passpack works on chrome, firefox, ie, and safari. It's similar to lastpass in many ways. It's not fully open source, but they did open source a bunch of the libraries they use/made (aes/rindael, xxtea, json2, sha-256 in js, etc: https://code.google.com/p/pass... ).

    https://www.passlet.com/ - passlet. The SSL cert for that site expired in 2010, so I don't think I'd use this, but it is cross platform and built according to the host-proof-hosting concepts. They open sourced their PBKDF2 methods: http://anandam.name/pbkdf2/

    http://aaronboodman.com/halfno... - halfnote is just a notepad, but it's encrypted in browser, and it's open source (https://code.google.com/p/halfnote/)

    All that said, I'd probably stick with keepass and/or lastpass.

  142. I once got a website to undo blocking paste by Muntzsky · · Score: 1
    I have an account for my student loan and got the website operator to correct their mistake of blocking users' passwords from being pasted. Short story: copy/paste worked, then they killed it, I asked them nicely and with a good rationale to change it back, and they eventually did.

    I had found their accounting methods to be...not necessarily straightforward or well documented...so I decided to log in to their site every single day and download a PDF summary of the loan principle and interest balances. That way, I at least have a record over time of what they've done. Once I've collected enough data, I intend to go back and get a full understanding of how they're accounting for everything. Easy as pie, copy and paste my username/email address and password, click download, save a dated copy of the report and be done for the day.

    Anyways, one day I found that I was unable to paste, so I chalked it up to a bug. A few days went by and I finally contacted their support team notifying them of the bug. They responded that their developers said that “By allowing users to paste a password into Manage My Account, the password is not being subjected to the edits in place to ensure that the password meets security requirements. Although it does not rule out all attacks, it does help to prevent automated attacks.” I found this to not be a satisfactory explanation, so I politely informed them in a detailed manner that passwords meeting security requirements had nothing to do whatsoever with the process of logging in and that their change had made for a very unpleasant user experience. I didn't hear anything back for a couple of weeks, but then they responded saying that they would make the change back to the original functionality within a couple of months...and they did!

  143. Re: Scripts that interact with passwords fields a by One+With+Whisp · · Score: 1

    If it's using editable div tags instead of forms then it isn't a login form.

  144. Re:Wait, you have to TYPE the password??? by swillden · · Score: 1

    You're actually very wrong. Long complicated passwords are horrifically impossible to remember causing people to write them down or store them in managers with simpler passwords to open the manager.

    Putting them in password managers is the right thing to do.

    Length is all that matters for passwords. You're better off with "thatswhatshesaid" (26 ^ 16) than "B4c0nL0v3r!" (72 ^ 11). You're 162 times better off, in fact.

    26 ^ 16 = 43,608,742,899,428,874,059,776 72 ^ 11 = 269,561,249,468,963,094,528

    https://xkcd.com/936/

    You're wrong. Hilariously so.

    The entropy of "thatswhatshesaid" is far lower than 43,608,742,899,428,874,059,776. Randall Munroe calculated correctly in the XKCD comic, of course. He didn't assume that each letter was random, he assumed he was choosing four words at random from a dictionary of a specific size (about 2048 entries == ~11 bits of entropy per word). Your password is clearly not a selection of randomly-chosen words, and even if it were, it would likely have been from a much smaller dictionary.

    This highlights the danger of asking users to pick passwords... even those who think they know what they're doing are likely to screw it up. Munroe's advice in 936 was good... but I think it has mislead more people than it has enlightened.

    No, it's much better to use a password manager and let a computer pick large random passwords for you.

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  145. Re:Wait, you have to TYPE the password??? by swillden · · Score: 1

    Copy/paste cache scrapers exist, and are common for browsers with bugs. Training people not to copy/paste passwords is a good idea.

    You're promoting perpetuating a long-standing, widespread and hugely-damaging user security error in order to avoid a relatively obscure problem which can actually be fixed through purely technical means. Not a win.

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  146. Re: Scripts that interact with passwords fields a by godel_56 · · Score: 1

    KeepassX which is the cross platform version, is derived from Keepass 1.0 which doesn't use NET/Mono (instead uses Qt Libraries). Version 2.0 beta has recently been released for KeepassX.

  147. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    It's not just copy-paste operations that are affected, though. For example, the developer web portal for a fruity company used to actively interfere with the Auto-Type functionality of KeePass when logging in with Chrome, Safari and Firefox (but interestingly not when using MS-IE) until enough people complained to them to get them to stop it.

    So: (1) complain to the web site operator to get them to fix their site, or (2) when they refuse to fix their site just actively boycott them and call them out in public.

  148. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by Immerman · · Score: 1

    Key- and screen-loggers? Pretty standard stuff I believe. All that's required is the wrong virus or trojan sneaking on to your machine somehow.

    The main point is only that only one thing is needed to compromise security - knowledge - and thus is a stretch to cal two-factor under the traditional definition (at least so far as I understand it. I'm a programmer, but no expert on security)

    I certainly don't contest the challenge that it's probably significantly more difficult to bypass. At first glance it would seem to have great potential, IF done well. But I don't even know enough details to judge the theory, and as always implementation details will likely expose far more vulnerabilties to hackers. The question is, would it continue to be fundamentally more secure if it became the primary means of security, or is it's primary benefit that of being a small small enough target that it's not worth the effort?

    --
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  149. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by edtice1559 · · Score: 1

    A (well implemented) online password manager is just an encrypted database of your passwords using a simple piece of software. Just gets backed up for you for free. And usually has some clever tools to make it easier to get the data in to the password fields. There's already a more detailed explanation in this thread of how they work. Pretty much how your system does but more convenient.

  150. FUD removal. by techno-vampire · · Score: 1

    Key- and screen-loggers? Pretty standard stuff I believe. All that's required is the wrong virus or trojan sneaking on to your machine somehow.

    I presume, then, that you're not that familiar with Linux or how people use it. Aside from the fact that almost all of the virus/trojan programs out there won't run directly on a Linux machine, you still need root (Or, in Windows-speak Administrator.) rights to install new software. Not only that, most Linux users get their software from their distro's repositories and nowhere else. I won't say that it's impossible to infect a Linux box if you try hard enough, but I will say that it's exceptionally hard to do without the user assisting you. I know; I've had malicious websites try to slip in a drive-by download and all that happens is I get a dialog box asking me if I want to download the file and if so, where to put it. And, since most main-stream distros use SELinux, it's next to impossible for a program like that to do any damage to the system files.

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    1. Re:FUD removal. by Immerman · · Score: 1

      Actually Linux is my primary OS. But how does that help the rest of the world? A solution that improves security for the technocrati is great, but not really worth deploying to the masses. And until it's worth deploying to the masses, it's just not going to be generally available to the few.

      And even on Linux the security isn't impenetrable.

      Also, no, you don't need root to install new software on Linux, unless you want that software to be accessible to all users. That's not the way most repository interfaces are configured to operate, but you can always install software directly as well, just download and run the install script. Even back in University I had a library of personal software installed on my locked-down university account.

      --
      --- Most topics have many sides worth arguing, allow me to take one opposite you.
    2. Re:FUD removal. by techno-vampire · · Score: 1

      It may be possible to install software without root access, but it won't be able to do any damage to your system files, or have access to lots of other stuff that malware likes to modify.

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  151. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by mjwx · · Score: 1

    Since my password manager is a simple piece of software - an encrypted database of my passwords that runs on my computer with the data on my computer, I'd say yes, I have no reason not to trust it. I wouldn't put my bank login details in to it though, because of vulnerabilities + trojans + keystroke-loggers.

    Trust an online password manager - hell no.

    I have a very strange method of storing my passwords. I keep them in the mk I human brain.

    The real security risk is with the online service being compromised and databases or details being downloaded... As what happened to LastPass a few months ago.

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  152. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    war4peace's password list:

    fb
    username: war4peace
    password: facebook1

    linkedin
    username: war4peace
    password: linkedin1

    gmail:
    username: war4peace
    password: gmail1

  153. Re:Wait, you have to TYPE the password??? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    but now you want us all to have a facebook or g+ account to access our passwords?

    what if those services go down? what happens to that OpenID authentication?

  154. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by KGIII · · Score: 1

    You might be able to win $500 in an ADA case. It is even tax-free money I understand. Screen readers have issues with some radio buttons last I knew. Things may have improved I suppose.

    --
    "So long and thanks for all the fish."
  155. Does British Petroleum follow best practices? by tepples · · Score: 1

    Setup with a noVNC web interfaces, and sshkey management in the web management panel (so users can employ their personal ssh keys post-deployment

    [Unbalanced parentheses.] Which guide to configuring keys in popular SSH clients does your documentation link to?

    However I was (redundantly) asking why someone who calls themselves a security professional and system administrator does not follow BP.

    Because BP got hacked by Chinese? Naaah.

  156. Re:Does BP follow best practices? Someone didn't. by Demonoid-Penguin · · Score: 1

    Setup with a noVNC web interfaces, and sshkey management in the web management panel (so users can employ their personal ssh keys post-deployment)

    [Unbalanced parentheses.] Which guide to configuring keys in popular SSH clients does your documentation link to?

    We don't provide one. Support refers users to the official security guides for the appropriate distro, general questions are answered using this as the main source. Documentation for users is almost identical to that on Digital Ocean (they target the same market segment). We don't write subject documentation for users. They do, if we approve it we pay them and publish it (it's the low cost end of the market, minimal SLA).

    Internally we follow NIST procedures and are audited to meet several ISO 27K standards (mainly for insurance purposes). We don't own any data centres, or control the hardware. That's a very common practise, with all but the high-end hosting providers (usually).
    Our internal procedures are more stringent with the main (non-hosting) business as most of the clients are Defence related (this is Canberra, the majority of work here is Defence related).

    However I was (redundantly) asking why someone who calls themselves a security professional and system administrator does not follow BP.

    Because BP got hacked by Chinese? Naaah.

    [smile] where following BP means jumping in a tug and telling the captain to "follow that slick".

  157. Re:Wait, you have to TYPE the password??? by swillden · · Score: 1

    When the services go down, you can't log in to the relying sites. Luckily, core infrastructure like the account systems is a very high priority for the engineers, and the big providers have plenty of resources to keep them up -- and they do. My bank's site is down far, far more often than Google's auth servers, for example. How much more often? I don't know... I've never seen Google's auth servers down.

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  158. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    And you think a script, which can read the passwordfield cannot replace all hooks the site adds to password fields?

  159. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by MrL0G1C · · Score: 1

    The difference is the online password manager requires I supply my password to them - weakness/trust issues there. With an online password manager you have to trust that they are hacker-proof (unlikely) and you have to assume that all staff are trustworthy, and you have to assume that security services also are keeping your info safe.

    Backing up my password is as easy as emailing myself the encrypted passwords to a couple of email addresses - takes a few seconds. My password database doesn't require that I be online, very useful if a internet/network info is in the password database.

    --
    Waterfox - a Firefox fork with legacy extension support, security updates and better privacy by default.
  160. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by MrL0G1C · · Score: 1

    My password database says 314 items.

    There's no way I would remember all those, especially as they are randomly generated strings.

    --
    Waterfox - a Firefox fork with legacy extension support, security updates and better privacy by default.
  161. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by war4peace · · Score: 2

    Darn it!

    --
    ...gis sdrawkcab (usually not responding to ACs; don't bother posting as AC)
  162. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by edtice1559 · · Score: 1

    I don't know of any online password managers implemented this way. They keep the backup of your encrypted password file and keep it synchronized. When you need to use a password, you download that file, decrypt it, and then automatically fill in the password field. If implemented the way you describe, I would agree to avoid them. But the ones mentioned in this thread, as far as I know (and other commenters seem to think so as well), don't work that way. They are simply a better version of the process you described and accessible to more people.

  163. Re: Scripts that interact with passwords fields aw by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Extensions use JavaScript. For all intents and purposes, they are "scripts."

  164. Yes, exactly by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Except where blocked by the website, my passwords are 20-character random strings *which I have never seen*. No two alike, of course. (One bug I found is a site where the mobile site only uses the first 16 characters of the password, while the normal web site uses all 20.)

    This is much better than any set of passwords I could remember (I remember a dozen maybe, including things I use away from the computer like my ATM PIN and my security system passcode and my safe combination). The database has *hundreds* of accounts in it.

    So yeah, I get *really* angry at sites that work hard to make themselves less secure and/or harder to use.

    In the password manager I'm using two-factor authentication before it can unlock the database. Nothing's perfect, of course; but this seems far better than anything else I could possibly use within the current framework.

    I don't see how OpenID really helps -- it just comes down to the password I use on the master site then.

  165. Re: Scripts that interact with passwords fields aw by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Note that KeePass has automagic fill-in crap, too.

    This post is about password managers like KeePass, LastPass, etc and not about built-in password managers in browsers (which are also generally encrypted, btw).

  166. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by ZeroWaiteState · · Score: 1

    The correct approach is to simplify password requirements and use two-factor authentication, not allow manipulation of the password field. If passwords have to get complex enough that you can't keep them in your head, they aren't really knowledge-based authentication anyway.

  167. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by ZeroWaiteState · · Score: 1

    "as far as I know (and other commenters seem to think so as well), don't work that way" AFAIK != secure. If you were the only holder of the decryption key for your data, the vendor would make sure you knew that. The fact that people are not sure is not a promising sign. Many of the ones discussed are hosted on hardware which must be leased by the hour, but are offered free of charge to users. There is an inherent conflict of interest for the provider of the service, even if their intentions currently are above board. I'm not saying they're worthless, because every federated identity management system has problems, but users often assume there is less counter-party risk than there really is.

  168. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by dave.haku · · Score: 1

    Overreact much?

  169. Re: Scripts that interact with passwords fields aw by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Been using last pass for years, I've never been compromised. Don't be so arrogant. Just because something is closed source doesn't mean it's bad, and there have been plenty of security audits of last pass.

    And, seriously, copying passwords to the clipboard... I'm not being patronizing, I'm just saying that doesn't seem safe. The clipboard has no safeguards.

  170. Re: Scripts that interact with passwords fields a by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Yeah now that I think about it, any running process can watch the clipboard -- that's the point of the clipboard. If a malicious process can determine when you are copying from keepass (prob not too hard), your screwed.

    You may think you're too smart for that to happen, but it can.

  171. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by aNonnyMouseCowered · · Score: 1

    "I wouldn't put my bank login details in to it though, because of vulnerabilities + trojans + keystroke-loggers."

    So how do you input your bank login details? Vulnerabilities, trojans, and especially keystroke-loggers would affect you (if you have a compromised computer) whether or not you have a password manager or not. Beyond these common securities issues, the only flaw of many standalone password managers is using the clipboard as temporary storage. So in theory, malware that targets the clipboard could steal your password. I don't know about Windows, but I recently installed a security app that showed me how this was clearly a problem in Android since all (most?) apps have the "permission" to cut-n-paste the clipboard. A built-in browser-specific password manager won't suffer from this problem.

  172. PLEASE - websites - stop blocking, Community Issue by DaveStadnick · · Score: 1

    I completely agree with the basic post - PLEASE - websites - stop blocking password managers!!! For whatever the reason - bad code or a belief that I am more secure if you block my password manager (you know better than I, what is in my best interest?). Yes - I understand that there are a number of downstream issues, but how are they related? For instance, if I have a key logger on my system - then I am in DEEP - DEEP - DUU - DUU!! And there is nothing that "you" blocking my password manager is going to do that will make this better. Of course, if I don't have a key logger, and you block me - then I am not happy. ---- Really - tech community - I think the issue is how we collect, organize, distribute, mobilize and communicate to the password blockers that their web site is not acceptable to us! Kinda what the original post said about "experts" taken to the next logical response.

  173. Re:Wait, you have to TYPE the password??? by agm · · Score: 1

    Length is all that matters for passwords. You're better off with "thatswhatshesaid" (26 ^ 16) than "B4c0nL0v3r!" (72 ^ 11).

    Agreed completely. It annoys me when a site or app forces me to have a number, a mixture of case or some other stupid rules that make a password difficult to remember. A password like "welcometothehotelcalifornia" or "onawarmsummersevening" are easy to remember, quite secure, and don't need numbers or capitals.

    My bank restricts the password to be a maximum of 8 characters long. It's ridiculous.

  174. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by Khyber · · Score: 1

    " I've been in the software business for almost 40 years,"

    Software, not security.

    "I suggest you study texts on encryption, and maybe read the technical details of how a good cloud-based password manager like LastPass actually works"

    https://blog.lastpass.com/2015...

    That's all I fucking need to know. A piece of paper holding my passwords is more secure in my wallet than my passwords are with LastPass or KeepPass. I also have the ability to actually defend my stuff if someone tries to take it, whereas someone hacks your shit and it's gone, you're fucked. By the time you realize it, it's too late, they've made off with your stuff.

    "Your super-whiz-bang method still requires a password, it seems"

    Good authentication requires everything, including a password. We could switch to biometrics, you're fucked because there are any number of ways to get around that, including taking your head off. With a password added for second verification (or third verification, in this case) taking your head does me no good unless I was able to get the password from you before hand.

    "How do you hash the passwords for your sites? Still using MD5?"

    You silly noobs using hashes and salts. Nowdays smart people embed that information in an image file, good old steganography. You think you got a password database? Enjoy the cluster of hentai you just downloaded. Get past the fact that there's information inside the image? Good luck decrypting the white noise format used to encode it. Unless you have used my server software, you aren't going to be able to do much with it.

    --
    Still waiting on Serviscope_minor to wake up to fucking reality and realize that Jessica Price isn't going to fuck him.
  175. Re:Scripts that interact with passwords fields aws by MrL0G1C · · Score: 1

    My bank doesn't use a simple fixed password system, it uses drop down boxes where it picks some digits from a long pin. It's this pin and the fixed password that I memorise instead of store.

    There's also a hardware key system.

    --
    Waterfox - a Firefox fork with legacy extension support, security updates and better privacy by default.
  176. A cell phone costs hundreds more per year by tepples · · Score: 1

    many RPs don't trust random providers.

    How does Stack Exchange, an RP, get away with trusting random OpenID 2.0 IDPs?

    Google, Facebook, Yahoo and AOL

    As far as I can tell, signing up for most of these requires a valid subscription to cellular telephone service, as Yahoo's sign-up form states: "Your mobile number is required." I've been told that the same is true of Facebook in some places. In your opinion, is it reasonable to require each server operator to maintain an ongoing subscription to a mobile phone plan with unlimited incoming SMS in addition to the domain, web hosting, wired Internet service, and VoIP that the server operator already has?

    no, I can't tell you how to find out who your users are or what they use

    That's what I was afraid of.