Intel x86s Hide Another CPU That Can Take Over Your Machine -- You Can't Audit it (boingboing.net)
A report on BoingBoing, authored by Damien Zammit, claims that recent Intel x86 processors have a secret and power control mechanism implemented into them that runs on a separate chip that nobody is allowed to audit or examine. From the report: When these are eventually compromised, they'll expose all affected systems to nearly unkillable, undetectable rootkit attacks. Further explaining the matter, the author claims that a system with a mainboard and Intel x86 CPU comes with Intel Management Engine (ME), a subsystem composed of a special 32-bit ARC microprocessor that's physically located inside the chipset. It is an "extra general purpose computer." The problem resides in the way this "extra-computer" works. It runs completely out-of-band with the main x86 CPU "meaning that it can function totally independently even when your main CPU is in a low power state like S3 (suspend)." On some chipsets, the firmware running on the ME implements a system called Intel's Active Management Technology (AMT). This is entirely transparent to the operating system, which means that this extra computer can do its job regardless of which operating system is installed and running on the main CPU. From the report: The purpose of AMT is to provide a way to manage computers remotely (this is similar to an older system called "Intelligent Platform Management Interface" or IPMI, but more powerful). To achieve this task, the ME is capable of accessing any memory region without the main x86 CPU knowing about the existence of these accesses. It also runs a TCP/IP server on your network interface and packets entering and leaving your machine on certain ports bypass any firewall running on your system. Update: 06/15 18:54 GMT by M :A reader points out that this "extra computer" could be there to enable low-power functionalities such as quick boot and quality testing.
Editor's note: The summary is written with inputs from an anonymous reader, who also shared the story. We've been unable to verify the claims made by the author.
Editor's note: The summary is written with inputs from an anonymous reader, who also shared the story. We've been unable to verify the claims made by the author.
That my PC has an AMD CPU
This is key to enabling low-power functionality in Intel CPUs - think quick boot and quality testing. It doesn't have any surveillance or other purposes.
Editor's note: The summary is written with inputs from an anonymous reader, who also shared the story. We've been unable to verify the claims made by the author.
Everyone is used to getting their news from social media anyway, so why bother verifying the claims before posting it as news?
-- All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing. -- Edmund Burke
https://libreboot.org/faq/#int...
https://libreboot.org/faq/#amd
Both Intel and AMD had this for years - read above links ...
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This has been known for years and is present on Intel and AMD. What year is this?
From the article:
We have no physical separation between the components that we can trust and the untrusted ME components, so we can't even cut them off the mainboard anymore.
Why do you trust the main CPU, if you don't trust the ME chip?
I don't like the idea of a computer inside my computer I don't have any control over.
I find the article a little on the high side of paranoia, however. Yes, it is possible to have unnamed people from unnamed places get in and get data from your system. The article does go out of it's way to point out that this isn't very likely. The firmware running the second CPU is heavily encrypted and hash-checked at runtime. Making it unlikely to be broken until the heat-death of the universe or we finally figure out the P=NP thing.
Conversely, I'd like to know what's going on under the cover Intel. If this is in the stuff I bought, I figure I have a legal right to be able to access it and run an audit on it. Without having to go through you. Conflict of interest and right of first sale and a few more things spring to mind as to why that's not a something I'd want to do.
I love AMT. AMT is definitely one feature of the Dell Optiplex small form-factor systems that I like to use for my headless home servers. Its like having a built-in Cyclades serial console server. For running headless systems its almost essential.
The only thing I don't like about it is that you need to have Windows installed to be able to update it as part of the updates released by Dell.
Editor's note: The summary is written with inputs from an anonymous reader, who also shared the story. We've been unable to verify the claims made by the author.
Uh, the claims are quite true. I've been using these features at work for about a decade to perform remote OS installs and HD re-imaging at remote locations, where the on-site staff only pop in a new blank HD.
All Core i7 CPUs have this in them standard, and many i5's too especially at the higher end.
[PDF] Datasheet on the MEBX management engine:
http://download.intel.com/supp...
[PDF] How to enable and use the AMT active management engine:
http://www.intel.com/content/d...
And here is the SCS software used on another computer to control an AMT enabled computer:
http://www.intel.com/content/w...
RealVNC works with an AMT enabled computer out of the box too and with all the normal features you would expect like remote keyboard/video/mouse control, redirected drives, etc. But isn't a free program.
Other VNC clients seem to be hit or miss but even when they work you only get remote KVM, you'd have to use the built-in AMT web server to configure drive redirection and issue power on/off/reboot commands.
There is a similarly limited VNC client included in the SCS software link above, and a second web browser window will let you do the rest, even if slightly clunky, but still for free.
Place the PC in a faraday cage. Record any radio transmission that is large enough to cross distance.
Have a PC (lets go with Non-Intel) hooked up and set up to be a point to point network connection. Monitor all traffic being sent from the PC.
Put barebones (say really old version of Linux on it)
If something is unexpected then we have a theory to work on. Otherwise is is just some nut trying to get us to use AMD or something.
If something is so important that you feel the need to post it on the internet... It probably isn't that important.
It may use the same physical interface, but it has its own address, and it can be disabled if someone is ultra-paranoid about it.
The author's claims that the ME lacks the ability to be audited and that backdoors cannot be removed are patently false.
- The ME is as many have pointed out an ARC processor. There are known disassemblers for ARC and there are few custom instructions (read: beyond standard ISA) - two that I'm aware of.
- The bootrom verifies the flashrom and provides some minimal cryptography and verification related routines. This is a mask ROM, not updatable. The flashrom is overwritten when you flash the bios, hence the main OS and binaries (threadx btw) are overwritten. This would remove any backdoor.
- The ME region of the BIOS is a FAT16 filesystem.
- The ME binaries are unencrypted, PE executables and contain signature verification sections to prevent unauthorized code from loading.
- The only encrypted contents of the filesystem are data files that the binaries use.
Now all this being said, there is a way to load additional modules from the main CPU's operating system through HECI (north bridge interface), however this again requires cryptographic signing.
Source: Former Intel engineer. Additionally none of these are details that cannot be pieced together from Intel published documents and 5 minutes with a hex editor/disassembler.
This is not new & lots of others sell similar functionality Dell DRAC, HP ILO... Those usually have dedicated Ethernet ports, but generally function the same way. I've been helping our workstation guys roll out Intell vPro for remote administration of laptops & workstations. It operates in a powered down state & can do 802.1x authention to the network while the OS is powered down. So ya, there is definately an out of band processor there that can wake the system up & do remote control type stuff. It's a feature Intel is selling & marketing.
Can't comment on the ability of it to do arbitrary memory reads & what not, but that isn't suprising in thoery. It's much less scary than the article is making it out to be, although it is another attack surface to concerned with just like RDP or SSH.
If the only goal was simply to provide low-power functionality, the coprocessor would be fully controlled by the operating system (ultimately, by the owner of the machine).
In fact, the main goal is to provide remote administration capabilities (what they call Intel Active Management Technology). In other words, the idea is to allow a remote administrator to take over the machine in a way that is independent of and invisible to the main operating system and processor. This serves a legitimate purpose in an "enterprise" environment (one person administers a large number of diverse machines) -- for example it allows taking back control of a cracked machine, or recovering critical data from memory after OS crashes. However, this feature is not useful for a privately administered single-user machine.
Finally, by definition a remote administration feature is a back door. This one is incredibly dangerous: a rootkit running on the coprocessor is entirely invisible to the operating system, has its own independent network access, and can monitor the disk, the memory and all other peripherals. In principle the remote management features must be activated via the System BIOS and you can set a password there, but really your only measure of safety against this back door is your trust that there are no bugs in Intel's code.
Why isn't Intel allowing you to replace the firmware? Because it's hard to ensure that the owner of the machine is the one initiating the firmware replacement. The real troubling point is that Intel isn't allowing you to disable this feature with a hardware switch. Hardware switches (jumpers on the motherboard) are a way of controlling the system available only to the physical owner of the machine. Having a hardware switch would satisfy both the enterprise and security-concious customers.
I'm of the opinion that management features need to get data from the motherboard, and each mobo manufacturer would have to be complicit for this potential attack to affect everything (assuming a bug or backdoor exists). *IF* there's a backdoor in the ME, and *IF* all (or at least YOUR) motherboard manufacturers are complicit, even *THEN* a good external firewall would stop most conceivable attacks.
It really is unfortunate that it is so clouded with mystery and seemingly waiting for a clever enough exploit.
If you are concerned a little, ensure that AMT is disabled.
If you are concerned a little more, consider grabbing an AMD next time. While AMD has similar things, Intel seems like it is both more featured and a larger attack surface, so an AMD exploit might be absent or would take longer to surface.
If you are concerned moderately, ensure that external sources can never successfully send a packet to your PC, by use of an external firewall that is trusted.
If you are concerned a lot, exclusively use open source products from before the mandatory inclusion of the ME. Have one to act as your firewall / router (maybe running OpenBSD or Trisquel), and another to do productivity on. You'll be limited on the power of the chip, of course.
Frankly, I think it is wise to distrust the ME a little bit. Especially because, as part of Intel chips, it is going to be in so many places- it is a lot of faith to put in untested code. But for the ME to be able to hurt or help you, the motherboard has to support its features, and there are a lot of motherboards, a lot of BIOSes- it is still a pretty diverse setup, and many don't support AMT at all.
The Coreboot people have been trying to work out how to deal with this stuff for a long time. See https://www.coreboot.org/Intel.... They're trying to work out how to disable it, but progress is not that good.