Intel x86s Hide Another CPU That Can Take Over Your Machine -- You Can't Audit it (boingboing.net)
A report on BoingBoing, authored by Damien Zammit, claims that recent Intel x86 processors have a secret and power control mechanism implemented into them that runs on a separate chip that nobody is allowed to audit or examine. From the report: When these are eventually compromised, they'll expose all affected systems to nearly unkillable, undetectable rootkit attacks. Further explaining the matter, the author claims that a system with a mainboard and Intel x86 CPU comes with Intel Management Engine (ME), a subsystem composed of a special 32-bit ARC microprocessor that's physically located inside the chipset. It is an "extra general purpose computer." The problem resides in the way this "extra-computer" works. It runs completely out-of-band with the main x86 CPU "meaning that it can function totally independently even when your main CPU is in a low power state like S3 (suspend)." On some chipsets, the firmware running on the ME implements a system called Intel's Active Management Technology (AMT). This is entirely transparent to the operating system, which means that this extra computer can do its job regardless of which operating system is installed and running on the main CPU. From the report: The purpose of AMT is to provide a way to manage computers remotely (this is similar to an older system called "Intelligent Platform Management Interface" or IPMI, but more powerful). To achieve this task, the ME is capable of accessing any memory region without the main x86 CPU knowing about the existence of these accesses. It also runs a TCP/IP server on your network interface and packets entering and leaving your machine on certain ports bypass any firewall running on your system. Update: 06/15 18:54 GMT by M :A reader points out that this "extra computer" could be there to enable low-power functionalities such as quick boot and quality testing.
Editor's note: The summary is written with inputs from an anonymous reader, who also shared the story. We've been unable to verify the claims made by the author.
Editor's note: The summary is written with inputs from an anonymous reader, who also shared the story. We've been unable to verify the claims made by the author.
That my PC has an AMD CPU
This is key to enabling low-power functionality in Intel CPUs - think quick boot and quality testing. It doesn't have any surveillance or other purposes.
PCs have been shipping with IME for several years now. Has this person been living under a rock?
...I voted AMD.
Editor's note: The summary is written with inputs from an anonymous reader, who also shared the story. We've been unable to verify the claims made by the author.
Everyone is used to getting their news from social media anyway, so why bother verifying the claims before posting it as news?
-- All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing. -- Edmund Burke
Comment removed based on user account deletion
https://libreboot.org/faq/#int...
https://libreboot.org/faq/#amd
Both Intel and AMD had this for years - read above links ...
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Looks to be a regurgitation of Joanna's paper http://blog.invisiblethings.or...
This has been known for years and is present on Intel and AMD. What year is this?
From the article:
We have no physical separation between the components that we can trust and the untrusted ME components, so we can't even cut them off the mainboard anymore.
Why do you trust the main CPU, if you don't trust the ME chip?
This was mentioned along time ago with the VPro Chips having a cellular modem built in.
https://www.popularresistance....
This is for out of band management so devices can be monitored and restarted remotely (think: enterprise environments). Nothing to get wrinkles in your tin hat over. :)
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If it's really there and Intel has hidden it, I wonder if they could be successfully prosecuted for conspiracy to commit unauthorized computer access.
I don't like the idea of a computer inside my computer I don't have any control over.
I find the article a little on the high side of paranoia, however. Yes, it is possible to have unnamed people from unnamed places get in and get data from your system. The article does go out of it's way to point out that this isn't very likely. The firmware running the second CPU is heavily encrypted and hash-checked at runtime. Making it unlikely to be broken until the heat-death of the universe or we finally figure out the P=NP thing.
Conversely, I'd like to know what's going on under the cover Intel. If this is in the stuff I bought, I figure I have a legal right to be able to access it and run an audit on it. Without having to go through you. Conflict of interest and right of first sale and a few more things spring to mind as to why that's not a something I'd want to do.
I love AMT. AMT is definitely one feature of the Dell Optiplex small form-factor systems that I like to use for my headless home servers. Its like having a built-in Cyclades serial console server. For running headless systems its almost essential.
The only thing I don't like about it is that you need to have Windows installed to be able to update it as part of the updates released by Dell.
Editor's note: The summary is written with inputs from an anonymous reader, who also shared the story. We've been unable to verify the claims made by the author.
Uh, the claims are quite true. I've been using these features at work for about a decade to perform remote OS installs and HD re-imaging at remote locations, where the on-site staff only pop in a new blank HD.
All Core i7 CPUs have this in them standard, and many i5's too especially at the higher end.
[PDF] Datasheet on the MEBX management engine:
http://download.intel.com/supp...
[PDF] How to enable and use the AMT active management engine:
http://www.intel.com/content/d...
And here is the SCS software used on another computer to control an AMT enabled computer:
http://www.intel.com/content/w...
RealVNC works with an AMT enabled computer out of the box too and with all the normal features you would expect like remote keyboard/video/mouse control, redirected drives, etc. But isn't a free program.
Other VNC clients seem to be hit or miss but even when they work you only get remote KVM, you'd have to use the built-in AMT web server to configure drive redirection and issue power on/off/reboot commands.
There is a similarly limited VNC client included in the SCS software link above, and a second web browser window will let you do the rest, even if slightly clunky, but still for free.
Place the PC in a faraday cage. Record any radio transmission that is large enough to cross distance.
Have a PC (lets go with Non-Intel) hooked up and set up to be a point to point network connection. Monitor all traffic being sent from the PC.
Put barebones (say really old version of Linux on it)
If something is unexpected then we have a theory to work on. Otherwise is is just some nut trying to get us to use AMD or something.
If something is so important that you feel the need to post it on the internet... It probably isn't that important.
It may use the same physical interface, but it has its own address, and it can be disabled if someone is ultra-paranoid about it.
The author's claims that the ME lacks the ability to be audited and that backdoors cannot be removed are patently false.
- The ME is as many have pointed out an ARC processor. There are known disassemblers for ARC and there are few custom instructions (read: beyond standard ISA) - two that I'm aware of.
- The bootrom verifies the flashrom and provides some minimal cryptography and verification related routines. This is a mask ROM, not updatable. The flashrom is overwritten when you flash the bios, hence the main OS and binaries (threadx btw) are overwritten. This would remove any backdoor.
- The ME region of the BIOS is a FAT16 filesystem.
- The ME binaries are unencrypted, PE executables and contain signature verification sections to prevent unauthorized code from loading.
- The only encrypted contents of the filesystem are data files that the binaries use.
Now all this being said, there is a way to load additional modules from the main CPU's operating system through HECI (north bridge interface), however this again requires cryptographic signing.
Source: Former Intel engineer. Additionally none of these are details that cannot be pieced together from Intel published documents and 5 minutes with a hex editor/disassembler.
And how to ensure it stays disabled?
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This is not new & lots of others sell similar functionality Dell DRAC, HP ILO... Those usually have dedicated Ethernet ports, but generally function the same way. I've been helping our workstation guys roll out Intell vPro for remote administration of laptops & workstations. It operates in a powered down state & can do 802.1x authention to the network while the OS is powered down. So ya, there is definately an out of band processor there that can wake the system up & do remote control type stuff. It's a feature Intel is selling & marketing.
Can't comment on the ability of it to do arbitrary memory reads & what not, but that isn't suprising in thoery. It's much less scary than the article is making it out to be, although it is another attack surface to concerned with just like RDP or SSH.
This is the same FUD from Hack-a-day from last Janumanary
DUPE ALL THE THINGS!
Anononymous poster, check!
Be sure to mine the +5 comments from old stories for cheap karma!
the preceding comment is my own and in no way reflects the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Even that its network connection is independent of the CPU and any filtering is described.
I have been aware of AMT since it was discussed as a way to do an psueudo-console connection on modern systems that lack a serial port in FreeBSD kernel debugging discussions. I suspect that Linux discussions also show how to do this as IT IS NOT SECRET!
I'm not really comfortable about it, but it is very useful, has been designed with security in mind and should be very difficult to suborn, and Intel considers it a feature that is advertised, so IS NOT A SECRET!
Kevin Oberman, Network Engineer, Retired
Out of band management processors are nothing new. Neither are the myriad other special purpose chips in a system that can be exploited as general purpose processors, some less predictably than others.
If the only goal was simply to provide low-power functionality, the coprocessor would be fully controlled by the operating system (ultimately, by the owner of the machine).
In fact, the main goal is to provide remote administration capabilities (what they call Intel Active Management Technology). In other words, the idea is to allow a remote administrator to take over the machine in a way that is independent of and invisible to the main operating system and processor. This serves a legitimate purpose in an "enterprise" environment (one person administers a large number of diverse machines) -- for example it allows taking back control of a cracked machine, or recovering critical data from memory after OS crashes. However, this feature is not useful for a privately administered single-user machine.
Finally, by definition a remote administration feature is a back door. This one is incredibly dangerous: a rootkit running on the coprocessor is entirely invisible to the operating system, has its own independent network access, and can monitor the disk, the memory and all other peripherals. In principle the remote management features must be activated via the System BIOS and you can set a password there, but really your only measure of safety against this back door is your trust that there are no bugs in Intel's code.
Why isn't Intel allowing you to replace the firmware? Because it's hard to ensure that the owner of the machine is the one initiating the firmware replacement. The real troubling point is that Intel isn't allowing you to disable this feature with a hardware switch. Hardware switches (jumpers on the motherboard) are a way of controlling the system available only to the physical owner of the machine. Having a hardware switch would satisfy both the enterprise and security-concious customers.
To be extra safe, remove the BIOS battery (it was an old habit of mine to remove the distributor rotor to keep my car from being stolen).
“He’s not deformed, he’s just drunk!”
I'm of the opinion that management features need to get data from the motherboard, and each mobo manufacturer would have to be complicit for this potential attack to affect everything (assuming a bug or backdoor exists). *IF* there's a backdoor in the ME, and *IF* all (or at least YOUR) motherboard manufacturers are complicit, even *THEN* a good external firewall would stop most conceivable attacks.
It really is unfortunate that it is so clouded with mystery and seemingly waiting for a clever enough exploit.
If you are concerned a little, ensure that AMT is disabled.
If you are concerned a little more, consider grabbing an AMD next time. While AMD has similar things, Intel seems like it is both more featured and a larger attack surface, so an AMD exploit might be absent or would take longer to surface.
If you are concerned moderately, ensure that external sources can never successfully send a packet to your PC, by use of an external firewall that is trusted.
If you are concerned a lot, exclusively use open source products from before the mandatory inclusion of the ME. Have one to act as your firewall / router (maybe running OpenBSD or Trisquel), and another to do productivity on. You'll be limited on the power of the chip, of course.
Frankly, I think it is wise to distrust the ME a little bit. Especially because, as part of Intel chips, it is going to be in so many places- it is a lot of faith to put in untested code. But for the ME to be able to hurt or help you, the motherboard has to support its features, and there are a lot of motherboards, a lot of BIOSes- it is still a pretty diverse setup, and many don't support AMT at all.
So, how do I turn the damn thing off? (I suspect the answer to be "can not", but anyone that knows otherwise - let me know)
I do, however, notice that there are no open listening ports on my current Intel computer, when scanned externally. Is this thing always on? What conditions enable it (so that I'd know to avoid those)?
those have executable memory space too, just like the printers
look, if you have a camera, it's hackable
if you have a video card, it has memory and chips that can be used by someone else
face it, you're being spied on, and the Gestapo loves that
-- Tigger warning: This post may contain tiggers! --
...why didn't our ancient alien overlords stop the NSA from doing this?
Vernor Vinge drew up some diagrams of what this would look like, whereabouts 2005: http://vrinimi.org/front9uns.j...
The Coreboot people have been trying to work out how to deal with this stuff for a long time. See https://www.coreboot.org/Intel.... They're trying to work out how to disable it, but progress is not that good.
I have to say, I am actually pretty surprised by this news. I had no idea boingboing was even still going...
Secret? ummm welcome to a decade ago. The only thing secret about this appears to be the authors lack of knowledge about technology from the last decade. This has been a common selling point for a long time with its various iterations to allow management of machines regardless of OS and/or health of said OS so that you can fix shit remotely.
When I looked up what ME was when it was invented it basically said it can do stuff while your computer is off. I thought "well that's exploitable and besides that, very suspicious." Now fast forward and people finally caught on. If this hits the news media that a computer can be permanently hackable and even while in sleep mode, every last consumer is rushing out to get AMD-based systems. Corporations will too! They don't want their data secretly stolen past their OS's anti-malware suites. Intel might as well have mailed a check for 5 billion dollars over to AMD and after the BS in their pricing lately and monopoly abuse and dishonest product naming, they deserve it.
I've had this really tiny drill bit for ages and I've been wanting to find a use for it. Thanks to Intel I now at last can do something with it.
How is this "news" or "claims" if the Intel AMT / ME documentation described this from the very start?
Is any of this enabled by default? Does it have to be manually activated in BIOS? None of my systems repsond on those ports. Ofcourse it's enabled for NSA already, but for us ordinary people?
I have been reading many different types of justifications on the security of the CPU makers (whatever be the brand). However we can't overestimate the fact that we are humans and that anybody can make mistakes, in particular with so complex artifacts as CPUs. These hidden parts and their security mechanisms can have bugs (yesterday, today or tomorrow). And also, they are not designed only to work with previous and current scenarios, but with the unknown future ones that are completely unexpected.
Thinking on this issue I checked quickly what CPUs have the Cisco Firewalls (just to check a famous brand), and notice that they have different ones depending on the appliance model, from the AMD Geode to some Intel Xeon variants, so there are possibilities even on security appliances for this to be exploited.
The problem with this hidden CPU approach is that they can bypass the computer built security without the operating system noticing it, with potentially dangerous consequences. And we are updating our software regularly but the most of the people is not aware of the updating on the underlying things (if they can be updated). The lack of knowledge in this respect is a dangerous thing.
But what can be done?
A very few are careful enough on checking the internal hardware specifications on the networking devices, the ones could protect any not so well controlled hidden device inside our network. So, it is really important to learn more about what we really have and if it is possible to combine "different" layers of appliances. For example, not to rely only on Intel or only on AMD for both servers and security appliances, or even to combine x64 and x32 with ARM, MIPS or other type of CPUs. This way, if there is a breach because some architectural failure, the next layer won't suffer the same fate because it is different (not necessarily because it is better). This combination of suppliers is something it is already being recommended for antivirus on enterprise environments (don't trust only in one supplier).
On the other case, when knowing extra ports and other elements that nobody is actively controlling within our network, will be possible to understand better that maybe that "extra" traffic has a hardware and not a software origin.
Our modern environments are rich and powerful, but this richness doesn't come for free. We need to understand it and control it correctly.
https://communities.cisco.com/...
Joanna has been researching this for a while, this is her presentation at 32c3.
our new Intel Management Engine overlords.
Star Trek transporters are just 3d printers.
I fail to see why this is such a big deal. This type of approach has been used for years. I am most familiar with the Oracle ILOM but IBM, HP, and others do something similar. I guess when they do it on a chip basis people treat it differently than when they do it on a system. When I first started working with computers, the machines would use multiple boards to implement the cpu. Now people act as if the world has been recreated because we have System-in-a-chip technology. While I recognize the progress and agree that things have improved, the approach is still the same when you think in terms of functional units.
Highly unlikely.
Self-importance and self-indulgence is the root of ALL evil.
Including computers capable of out-of-band communication and control of the local machine has been a staple of server design for DECADES - corporate desktops have included this facility for years as well. This is nothing more than yet another server technology migrating to end-user desktops. It is fascinating that the article describes this as 'secret' yet includes links to public pages on intel's website that document this over 8 years ago.