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Boeing 737 Max Jets Grounded By FAA Emergency Order (nbcnews.com)
President Trump announced an emergency order from the Federal Aviation Administration on Wednesday grounding Boeing 737 Max jets in the wake of an Ethiopian Airlines crash Sunday and a Lion Air accident in October that together killed 346 people. The emergency order comes two days after the FAA said the Boeing 737 Max planes are still airworthy. NBC News reports: Trump's announcement came as the FAA faced mounting pressure from aviation advocates and others to ban flights of the planes pending the completion of investigations into the deadly accidents. Sunday's crash killed 157 people and the one in Indonesia in October left 189 dead. "We're going to be issuing an emergency order of prohibition to ground all flights of the 737 Max 8 and the 737 Max 9 and planes associated with that line," Trump announced, referring to "new information and physical evidence that we've received" in addition to some complaints.
The FAA said it decided to ground the jets after it found that the Ethiopian Airlines aircraft that crashed had a flight pattern very similar to the Lion Air flight. "It became clear that the track of the Ethiopian flight behaved very similarly to the Lion Air flight," said Steven Gottlieb, deputy director of accident investigations for the FAA. United States airports and airlines reacted to the order Wednesday, acknowledging that it will lead to canceled flights. American has roughly 85 flights a day on the Boeing Max 8 and Max 9 jets. United Airlines has about 40 such flights. Southwest Airlines has the most, about 150 flights per day on these types of jets out of the airline's total of about 4,100 flights daily.
The FAA said it decided to ground the jets after it found that the Ethiopian Airlines aircraft that crashed had a flight pattern very similar to the Lion Air flight. "It became clear that the track of the Ethiopian flight behaved very similarly to the Lion Air flight," said Steven Gottlieb, deputy director of accident investigations for the FAA. United States airports and airlines reacted to the order Wednesday, acknowledging that it will lead to canceled flights. American has roughly 85 flights a day on the Boeing Max 8 and Max 9 jets. United Airlines has about 40 such flights. Southwest Airlines has the most, about 150 flights per day on these types of jets out of the airline's total of about 4,100 flights daily.
Except they could still fly all over USA.
When the announcement was made there were 10 of these planes in the air.
Claims it was collusion with the Russians and Trump was paid in Aeroflot stock.
No.
Addis Ababa... subtropical Africa climate...
It's a critical safety system, required to obtain flight certification because of the larger, more powerful engines.
Without it, on full throttle, the aircraft doesn't have enough authority to bring the nose down once it goes up too high.
That's why only the MAX variants have this system, because they have larger engines.
It has nothing to do with auto-pilot, except the system is disabled when auto-pilot is engaged.
In cold weather? Like colder than cruising altitude of -60C?
But, no, different plane.
Canada too. Maybe mexico? The carribean? Not sure, but yeah there were still plenty of viable destinations.
While you can compensate for a poor design in software, the best way is to not make the poor design in the first place.
There is a 'neutral' point for the engines to be located such that a large amount of thrust causes the body to remain mostly neutral.
It's a critical safety system, required to obtain flight certification because of the larger, more powerful engines.
Without it, on full throttle, the aircraft doesn't have enough authority to bring the nose down once it goes up too high.
I don't suppose you have any citations for any of that? If it's actually true it's certainly significant, but I've seen zero evidence of that anywhere. All the documentation talks about it being designed to assist pilots avoid a stall under very specific conditions; absolutely nothing anywhere says that its safety critical, or that the aircraft cannot be controlled at some point prior to stall.
Cute.
I posted this 5 months ago: Reasons Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg should be replaced.
Though, I wonder why this issue didn't affect the A320neo Family of airliners, which use the LEAP-1A and PW1100G engines with much bigger front fans than the CFM56 and V2500 engines of the regular A320 Family of airliners.
And it's only been in service since May 22, 2017.
Considering the extreme safety of air traffic in general that's one freakishly unsafe plane.
It makes me glad I'm not the engineer/developer responsible for building that subsystem.
I stole this Sig
A clean-sheet design would absolutely have better positioning of the engines. Unfortunately, the 737 platform comes from an era of much smaller engines, so there just isn't enough under-wing clearance to fit modern turbines in the original locations (even versions with engine updates from 10-20 years ago have odd bulges around the nacelle where parts had to be relocated to fit).
The MCAS system was implemented because the 737-MAX engines are placed more forward of the wing which will tend to induce a nose up pitching moment particularly at high angles of attack near stall. This would've probably been a certification issue.
Now the 737 MAX had the engines placed so far forward to enable enough ground clearance. The original 50-year old 737 had low bypass engines which much smaller and could be placed directly under the wings. The newer models already ran into ground clearance issues, and this was initially solved by putting the engine systems to the side of the engine creating a distinct ovoid nacelle shape. With the new GE Leap engines, this fix was no longer sufficient due to larger engine diameter, hence the repositioning forward.
Newer aircraft like the airbus a300 series and the airbus a220 (bombardier cseries) never had this issue because they were designed to accomodate large diameter newer generation engines. The basic design of the 737 has always suffered from this flaw and really Boeing should have invested in a new aircraft design rather than try to re-engine an aircraft that was never designed for it. This was like fitting a V-12 engine into a model T.
Sad to see the once-proud remnant of American industrial might, Boeing, brought low like this. I thought Airbus lost it on Air France 447 when the pilot pulled his sidestick all the way back and kept it there until the plane crashed. On a Boeing, the dual control sticks would have revealed this and lives would have been saved. But now, we have this:
"One high-ranking Boeing official said the company had decided against disclosing more details to cockpit crews due to concerns about inundating average pilots with too much information â" and significantly more technical data â" than they needed or could digest."
So they:
1) Design an aircraft that has an inherent tendency to pitch up
2) Implement an a system to persistently add control inputs during critical phases of flight
3) Do NOT disclose system description to pilots in FCOM
How about fundamental rules:
Understanding what automation systems do.
Control the automated systems according to strong pilot skills.
Shutting down free speech with violence isn't fighting fascism. It IS fascism!
Apparently not, since there is a checklist for disabling it. The problem in the crashed flights is that it happened at a time when the pilots are fairly busy anyway and they didn't realize what was happening.
I'm not a pilot but I wonder if the better approach wouldn't have been to just recommend turning it off before they even take off.
According to Boeing, it's just meant to make the plane handle more like the non-MAX version of the 737.
The A320 series had the ground clearance necessary to accomodate the new engines without needing to reposition them, hence no stability issues due to the engine placement that might have required an equivalent MCAS system.
The MCAS system was implemented because the 737-MAX engines are placed more forward of the wing which will tend to induce a nose up pitching moment particularly at high angles of attack near stall. This would've probably been a certification issue.
It would have been a certification issue because it changes the handling characteristics of the aircraft, not because it's inherently unsafe. The MCAS is meant to automatically counter the changes so that the aircrew can fly the aircraft the same way they would a legacy 737. It has to do with Boeing being able to sell the aircraft without excessive certification requirements for pilots, rather than anything to do with safety.
This was like fitting a V-12 engine into a model T.
That's a horrible comparison. The fact that the engines are more powerful has nothing to do with anything. The placement and shape of the engine cowlings is the issue.
This was like fitting a V-12 engine into a model T.
How dare you speak badly of such things!
Probably because the 737 platform was designed in the 60s while the A320 platform was designed in the 80s.
Pax? Is that the latest /. AC lingo?
It's the standard aviation industry term for passenger.
It is America. Tobacco, GMO, aircraft, corrupt politicians are safe until absolutely proven bad.
No.
Addis Ababa... subtropical Africa climate...
More relevantly, the altitude is 7700 ft. This narrows the safe takeoff envelope somewhat.
Any 737 MAX planes currently in the air will continue to their destinations and then be grounded “effective immediately,” Trump said. https://people.com/travel/ever...
He just had to do it. I'm a dictator Donnie made the completely authoritarian decision to ground them.
And had he not done so, he would be a corporate stooge endangering innocent life.
I've long wondered why Boeing doesn't make a clean sheet replacement for the 737. For a plane sold in such vast numbers, the case for a clean redesign is much easier to make. My understanding is that currently they're looking to a 757 replacement/A321 competitor (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_New_Midsize_Airplane) as their next clean design, with a 737 replacement possibly after that.
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Boeing considered raising the landing gear, but considered it too costly as it meant changes to the centre wing box and associated structure, so they bodged it with an engine higher on the wing and software to compensate for the negative handling characteristics. And then they didnt tell anyone who actually flew the aircraft...
Because it would cost too much - the MAX series was Boeing *reacting* to Airbuses launch of the A320NEO family. Boeing had had a study ongoing for years about launching a clean sheet 737 replacement, and were going down that road for introducing in the mid 2020s, but then Airbus launched the NEO and airlines started their fleet renewal processes as a result.
Boeing was caught so off guard that, when a customer no one thought would ever buy Airbus again (due to bad blood after a crash - AA wanted Airbus to take all the blame, Airbus said nope, your pilots were to blame, AA didn't place another order with Airbus as a result) placed an order for the NEO and split it by also placing an order with Boeing, they ordered "130 Airbus A320NEO aircraft AND 130 Boeing aircraft (whatever Boeing comes up with as a 737 replacement)"...
Make no mistake, the MAX is a reaction - otherwise they would have lost a lot more of the market than they already did by the procrastination they did over the A320NEO launch.
Profit.
Domestic spying is now "Benign Information Gathering"
In future airplanes will have a pilot and a dog. The dog is there to bite the pilot if he tries to touch the controls. The pilot is there to feed the dog.
Prove anything by multiplying Huge Number times Tiny Number
That's great; I'm sure the airspace industry as a whole would love to have your input on how to automatically figure out which AOA vane is giving bad data. As of now I'm unaware of any aircraft which actually does so. Certainly none of the aircraft I've worked on do.
Also if you could please explain to me how you plan to do so, I'd love to hear it.
Not really relevant. Nobody in the USA was thinking "holy shit, we can't fly to Canada any more? Better ground the fleet!".
The US and Canada both reacted to new data about the flight path of the Egypt Air 737. Canada just reacted slightly faster.
AA wanted Airbus to take all the blame, Airbus said nope, your pilots were to blame
Shouldn't the NTSB be deciding who is to blame?
The NTSB came to its own conclusions regarding its investigation (they blamed both, but primarily the airlines training), but AA wanted Airbus to pay all the compensation and costs of the crash, as well as publicly assuming responsibility, so as to preserve AAs reputation.
In addition to more thrust, the engines are more-forward located. Additional thrust causes the plane to climb at a high angle, lessening lift until a stall is probable. The software causes the nose to point down prevent a stall. Down right in to the ground it seems.
I didn't mention that Canada announced it a few hours before the USA; that was you (or some other anonymous twat).
The FAA was forced to take Boeing's dick out of its mouth and wipe its chin.
Dude, anyone with an understanding of basic electronics and motors can see how the AoA sensor can be checked inflight. I just looked at the schematic on https://www.satcom.guru/2018/12/angle-of-attack-failure-modes.html
I am sure their engineer thought about how it could be done, but it was too costly to implement. For computer electronics, it's basically a 5x to 10x increase in cost to implement error detection logic so I imagine it's the same here. It's the same reason why you don't see these kind of designs in desktop computers system, but worth having on server systems.
You know that Boeing is going to push out new software to try to address the issue right? It's for sure not as good as if it was originally designed in silicon, but the software solution will come pretty close.
From this.
Dude, anyone with an understanding of basic electronics and motors can see how the AoA sensor can be checked inflight.
That's great! Please explain.
I am sure their engineer thought about how it could be done, but it was too costly to implement.
If it were just Boeing, I might buy that argument, but you're suggesting that every aircraft manufacturer in the world decided to skimp on it just to save a few bucks ... which seems a lot less likely.
You know that Boeing is going to push out new software to try to address the issue right? It's for sure not as good as if it was originally designed in silicon, but the software solution will come pretty close.
The software update is reportedly for the MCAS, not for the AOA system. Not sure why you think that's relevant.
There is a 'neutral' point for the engines to be located such that a large amount of thrust causes the body to remain mostly neutral.
Yup, and that's how the other versions are configured. These new MAX configs have physically larger engines, so - to prevent have to redesign the whole aircraft to deal with them - the engines are positioned a little bit further forward, and a centre of the engine a little bit higher off the ground (ie closer to the wing). The centre of thrust is consequently moved forward and up in relation to the centre of gravity. The result is the craft will nose-up under full throttle.
The other problem is that companies were assured pilots would not need training in the new system, however a critical difference between this system and normal auto-pilot systems is that this system does not turn off when pilots attempt an overide.
Seriously, what the *bleep* does this kind of corporate malfeasance have to do with Millennials? You do know this kind of crap existed before Millennials, right?
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Pax? Is that the latest /. AC lingo?
It's the standard aviation industry term for passenger.
Presumably, the term is a an abbreviation for "Paxed in like sardines".
The problem in the crashed flights is that it happened at a time when the pilots are fairly busy anyway and they didn't realize what was happening.
Not really. The first time it happened for Lion Air was as they approached 2,000 feet and went flaps up. Not a particularly busy time, but it did catch them off guard and they lost about 400 feet altitude. They, for whatever reason, then decided to drop the flaps again ... which fixed the issue since MCAS doesn't operate with flaps down. They continued to climb to about 5,000 feet at which point they went flaps up again.
From that point on they were struggling with it for something like 8 minutes, but maintaining altitude the entire time. It's mind boggling that they didn't think to either drop the flaps again, or to go to their runaway trim checklist. They continued to fight it until shortly before the end, at which point the black box makes it look like they just gave up and plumeted out of the sky.
tl;dr: "busy" had nothing to do with it.
I'm not a pilot but I wonder if the better approach wouldn't have been to just recommend turning it off before they even take off.
Not really, unless there's a lot more wrong with the system than we currently know. It does actually make the aircraft easier to fly without needing conversion training, and it does help prevent stalls. Pilots just need to follow their checklist if it acts up.
According to Boeing, it's just meant to make the plane handle more like the non-MAX version of the 737.
Yep, that's the gist of it.
I would argue that either the pilot can recognize whether the plane is about to stall and ignore the AOA sensor entirely, in which case both sensors are non-essential, or the pilot can't, in which case the pilot also can't reliably determine which sensor is wrong. More importantly, if the pilot can, then the avionics systems should be able to do so as well. And if not, then that single backup is only useful when the sensor fails outright (e.g. no output, wiring fault, etc.).
And in this case, because the plane makes critical decisions that impact the airworthiness of the aircraft in response to that data and apparently cannot determine which AOA sensor is lying, having only two AOA sensors just means that the risk of the entire system failing because of incorrect data is twice as high as if it had only one AOA sensor. Assuming it is practical to fly the plane with both stall warnings and MCAS disabled, then everyone would arguably be better off if the aircraft had only a single AOA sensor, statistically speaking. If that were the case, we'd have probably had only one crash in the first two years, instead of two (not that such numbers would be good, mind you, just less appalling).
IMO, having too little redundancy can actually be worse than not having any at all. It seems likely that this aircraft, as designed, cannot be made safe unless Boeing adds either a second pair of independent AOA sensors or a couple of Pitot tubes as backups for resolving disagreements. Two sensors clearly isn't enough, given their apparent propensity for failure at low altitudes.
Check out my sci-fi/humor trilogy at PatriotsBooks.
No people under the jurisdiction of the FAA have died in those two crashes. Incase you are unaware, the FAA is an American agency, and only has control over US skies, and US bound flights.
The FAA pays attention to world wide flight data and bases some decisions on what it sees there. The Lion and Ethiopian crashes we're under the jurisdiction of the counties in which they originated from and crashed.
Similarly, China has its own agency too, and that agency grounded the planes well in advance of when the FAA did.
You're proposing turning an AOA sensor into an AOA + pressure sensor. Extra complexity just adds more failure modes. What happens if the pressure sensing side of your AOA vane fails? How exactly are you detecting pressure in the first place, and how will it react to things like moisture, dust, or ice? How will you determine whether a pressure change is due to a change in airspeed, or a stuck vane?
Assuming you overcome all of those issues, what happens if the failure is electrical rather than mechanical? What happens if the vane is installed incorrectly and therefore misaligned? What happens if the vane is bent, and otherwise functioning perfectly but giving a slightly different reading due to an offset angle?
You're certainly arrogant enough to think you can in 5 seconds come up with a solution which nobody in the aerospace industry has ever come up with, but arrogance and competence are not the same thing.
The sad thing is that both AF447 and these two crashes could probably have been prevented by requiring more sensor redundancy and requiring that the redundant parts be made by at least two (or, ideally, three) different manufacturers, so that simultaneous failures caused by design flaws won't result in failure multiple sensors simultaneously.
Check out my sci-fi/humor trilogy at PatriotsBooks.
Do you guys know who the director of the Federal Aviation Authority is right now? Nobody does, because Trump has never gotten around to appointing one. To be fair, he's been very busy with the golf co-championship and everything, and it probably just slipped his mind.
Nothing matters any more.
You are welcome on my lawn.
You're kinda right but you're missing the purpose of dual sensors. If you want true redundancy you would obviously want 3 or more sensors. When you install 2 sensors, you're not looking for one to be a backup for the other; rather you're looking for them to check each other. If they disagree then you know that the system as a whole is no longer trustworthy, and you can throw signals at the aircrew to let them know not to depend on the readings.
Now, as that relates to MCAS, Boeing had two options in the case of sensor disagreement:
1. Go with the best-case sensor reading, in which case you will likely not react to an actual stall condition.
2. Go with the worst case reading, in which case you may react to a condition which isn't actually a stall.
3. Ignore them completely, in which case the MCAS system becomes inoperative and can't prevent a stall.
They decided to go with the worst case reading because, generally speaking, stalls are bad. You want to prevent them as much as possible. Going nose down when you don't need to is also bad, but not nearly AS bad unless you happen to be close to the ground .... and they tried to make sure that wouldn't happen by disabling the system when the flaps are down. Even if you are at a relatively low altitude with the flaps up for some reason, a stall is typically worse than going nose down because a stall requires significant altitude to recover from.
It was a rational design choice. Where they probably erred the most was in not telling pilots about it. I'm not sure that it would have made a difference to that Lion Air crew even if they had been told, but they still should have been informed.
It's also worth noting that, at least if the folks on PPRuNe are correct, and assuming I'm understanding correctly, even though the aircraft itself has two AOA sensors, the MCAS system only uses one of them, which is to say that if they disagree, it has no idea.
Worse, from what I've read, this aircraft in its default configuration lacks the extra AoA gauges to independently show the output of the two AoA sensors to tell you that the MCAS system is getting crap data, instead providing only an AoA Disagree light. And apparently, a few don't even have that (WTF?).
It sounds to me like there are multiple aspects of the way the MCAS system was designed that are seriously flawed, any one of which should have resulted in it not being certified to fly. But the most serious of those, assuming I understand correctly, is that this system effectively has no redundancy at all, yet is in a position to seriously wreck the airworthiness of the aircraft.
Check out my sci-fi/humor trilogy at PatriotsBooks.
Are you an Old Economy Steve who's engaging in a case of "a noun, a verb, and millenials?"
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Power supplies are different. If one works, that's enough. For sensors, dual isn't good enough. You need a third one as a tie-breaker if the others disagree.
But it was pilot error, right?
Confucius say, "Find worm in apple - bad. Find half a worm - worse."
Unless it has access to an extra set of control surfaces that aren't accessible to the pilots, how does MCAS get this authority?
Confucius say, "Find worm in apple - bad. Find half a worm - worse."
Meanwhile, at least a hundred people die in car accidents every day just in the U.S. Every day, day after day after day after day....
IMO, having too little redundancy can actually be worse than not having any at all.
It depends on the failure mode: if the failure mode is to give no readings then the twofold redundancy is better. If the failure mode is to five false readings then the twofold redundancy is worse.
SJW n. One who posts facts.
Both show that you should not give a single person so much power.
Don't fight for your country, if your country does not fight for you.
Actually these multifunction probes (Pitot, AOA and TAT) are exactly what Airbus uses on the A380 and the A350 at the very least. The A350 has three multifunctional probes and one each of single function probes.
"It's such a fine line between stupid and clever" -- David St. Hubbins, Spinal Tap
More accurately, Dick Donnie saw FOX reporting other countries grounding the planes. At first, he thinks that would be bad for American business and after that nice CEO from Boeing gave him a ringy-dingy to pump his ego. However, aides were also watching and realized the danger that Dick Donnie would be in were one of those planes go down in America while the the FAA hadn't grounded the planes. He'd be blamed. It was unconscionable that he could be blamed, after all he is a genius. So he mouths off in a statement to the press including the bit about planes becoming too complicated for pilots...not for him, of course, he is a genius.
Meanwhile, over at the FAA and the Dept. of Transportation where Madame Chao, Mitch McConnell's wife, had been supporting the previous policy of "those crazy foreigners and their grounding OUR American planes", they get wind of Dick's pronouncement and immediately issue their own press release that claimed with consultation with Canada, they had heroically decided to ground the planes. Dick's ego is preserved, all is well.
With hindsight, it might have been better for Boeing to modernise the Boeing 757 instead of stretching the role of the Boeing 737 so much: https://www.businessinsider.co...
back in my day, the trolls were all members of the GNAA! and they were proud of it! kids these days.......
What's really sad is how people pass judgement while at the same time having no fucking clue about what they are talking about.
While you can compensate for a poor design in software, the best way is to not make the poor design in the first place.
This isn't a poor design. It is just a design. Control is part of most finely tuned complex and efficient machines. Discounting anything for daring to need an instrumented control loop is just ignorance of the world around you.
MCAS controls the trim of the whole horizontal stabiliser (fixed stab and movable elevator move as one) whereas the pilot controls
only the elevator part. This method of trim gives full control authority at all trim settings, as opposed to an elevator trim that uses some of the elevators travel to do the trimming, limiting the maximum control throw. Every time the pilots pulled back, the system added more down trim, then they ran out of elevator throw.
Then the big lawn dart.
If by "chaotic mismanagement of the grounding" you mean, "waited until there was evidence to make a decision affecting safety" then sure. Exactly 0 incident occurred between the time of the crash in Africa and the grounding of the aircraft in the USA. Seems they acted rationally to wait for evidence before grounding aircraft out of media fear...
Yes it's an anecdote! Were you expecting original research in a Slashdot comment?
These tragedies require understanding. Passengers and crew fears need assurances. The costs enormous but safety a cornerstone of the gigantic airline industry. The convenience and low cost very good for economic activity. Near term will be yet another head wind into a shaky economy.
Having 3 multifunction probes and 1 standalone AOA vane is not an example of true redundancy with only 2 sensors ....
so they bodged it
You mean made a design decision?
And then they didnt tell anyone who actually flew the aircraft...
Less hyperbole please. Not only are the changes to the design known by pilots, they are known by the frigging public.
Best post so far.
Could have used links to reports on how they just said the opposite for those who didn't just see and remember from a few days ago.
Good thing no emergencies requiring quick responses have happened...
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It's a critical safety system, required to obtain flight certification because of the larger, more powerful engines.
Without it, on full throttle, the aircraft doesn't have enough authority to bring the nose down once it goes up too high.
That's why only the MAX variants have this system, because they have larger engines.
Not quite.
The CFM International LEAP engines were too big to fit underwing like the current engines on the Classic and Next Generation (NG) airframes, so what Boeing did was put the engines forward of the wing and higher so that the thrust was now going directly under the wing which can cause the pitch to increase. Airliners keep their engines on underwing nacelles precisely to avoid that problem but the 737 MAX couldn't because it was too low to the ground. The anti-stall system is designed to compensate for this by automatically changing the elevators to reduce the Angle of Attack. The problem is the system is wrongly interpreting the actual Angle of Attack so it's erroneously pushing the nose of the plane towards the ground.
Rather than raise the 737 off the ground which was the logical option, Boeing tries to correct an inherent physical design flaw with software, software that has malfunctioned to cause a fatal incident twice in the last six months. Considering that air travel has become insanely safe, up to and including exploding engines and batteries with no fatalities on new models, two extremely fatal accidents in less than six months is a serious flaw.
Calling someone a "hater" only means you can not rationally rebut their argument.
Gerald Eastman has been exposing them for years:
https://www.thelastboeinginspe...
"This post is an artistic work of fiction and falsehood. Only a fool would take anything posted here as fact."
That's not the whole story.
737 was originally designed for unsophisticated airfields, hence Boeing placed the engines low and used a very short landing gear so aircraft mechanics wouldn't need a platform to work on the engines. That decision came back to bite them in the arse two decades later when Boeing tried to fit the CFM56 under the 737 wing. They had to modify the engine and still couldn't fit the larger fan model that fit a 707 just fine.
"It's such a fine line between stupid and clever" -- David St. Hubbins, Spinal Tap
That is not entirely true. If FAA certifies an airplane as airworthy, itâ(TM)s recognized by other certification authorities worldwide so the plane does not have to be certified separately in Europe by EASA and in every other country separately. The same way, if EASA certifies a plane, it can fly in US.
Is not valid in other cases I believe, eg if Cocos Islands (as an example) certifies a plane, that is definitely not recognized worldwide.
So: if FAA said it can fly and the. It crashed all over the world itâ(TM)s defjnitdly FAA problem. And more acutely Boeing problem.
Just barely, but he's sure as heck no Millennial.
And "Millennialism" isn't a thing because being a Millennial isn't an ethos or belief system, it's a generation. You're misusing the "-ism" prefix. Generations develop certain behaviors in response to their environment. That's very different than what you're implying by using the phrase "Millennialism", which is that the behavior is a deliberate adherence to an ideal; like Catholicism or Capitalism or Socialism.
Thing is I'm not sure you're aware of what you're implying. There's a lot of general hate for Millennials going around (as there always is for the current up and coming generation. Seriously, Socrates did this crap) and I think you're honestly just picking up on it. I'm not calling you out or anything, but I think your general understanding of the world would improve if you'd reflect on where your opinions of the current generation came from and why you have them.
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Now they are, but American pilots were pissed that Boeing withheld information.
https://www.post-gazette.com/business/pittsburgh-company-news/2018/11/13/Boeing-US-pilots-flight-feature-737-MAX-Indonesia-crash-Lion-Air/stories/201811200001
And the aircraft as a whole are airworthy. The Lion Air aircraft was not airworthy because it had not been repaired. That's a maintenance failure, which led to a crash when combined with pilot error. There's nothing in that crash to indicate that the MAX as a fleet are not airworthy. There may be something about this second crash which eventually leads to that conclusion, but at this point it's all just speculation.
Here is the 78-page prelim from the Indonesia NTSC (counterpart to US NTSB) on the Lion Air 610 crash on 2018-10-29;
Very technical reading:
http://knkt.dephub.go.id/knkt/...
No, the DC-10 continued to fly passengers long after problems were fixed. I flew it twice.
Read what I wrote.
If you cannot understand, then feel free to ask for clarification.
If you have nothing to say about it, then perhaps you should say nothing.
Freedom = (Meaningful - Coerced) Choice != (Speech | Beer^2), and sad sock puppets' bad mods avail them naught.
I think the training is critical. The crew that flew the next-to-last flight of the Lion Air plane did figure it out. Literally - they had the same problem but figured out they needed to turn off the autotrim. This really seems like it might be an interaction of a changed flight characteristic and under-trained pilots. What surprises me is that, after the Lion Air disaster, that these pilots would still not properly diagnose the issue. Presumably the investigation will shed more light on that. Sure Boeing is preparing an update to make this outcome less likely, but surely every pilot flying a 737 max would be super-aware of this problem after Lion Air. It seems like maybe the issue is that the pilot can think they've turned off the auto-trim when they actually haven't.
I think the idea is that the pilot shouldn't actually need the AoA data to fly, so just indicating that data is not available because the sensors disagree is sufficient. So the purpose of the second AoA sensor is just to detect a fault, not to provide redundancy. Possibly the issue is that if the pilot doesn't expect the system to use the AoA sensor data once it is known to be bad, he may not realize that the automatic system needs to be disabled.
It seems like this might come down to a situational awareness issue. i.e. for some reason the pilots don't think the automated system is still active and therefore don't follow the runaway trim checklist. Another alternative is that this happens more often than one would expect or is very similar to something else that the pilots are used to just fighting for a bit and then it goes away. Either way, the pilots are not acting as Boeing expects in this situation and it is necessary to understand why.
And I mean that. Your thoughts are too well organized for the talking points you're putting forth. You're writing from a script someone gave you on Millennials.
/. worth it to whoever pays you? Is the pay itself worth it? Maybe you'll be dead before the problems your causing come to roost, but your children won't be.
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It's still cold at high altitude. If you ever get there...
Confucius say, "Find worm in apple - bad. Find half a worm - worse."
If you're an engineer, we are in big trouble. I never suggested that "your idea" was bad because it was shit sensor design; I pointed out it was stupid because it doesn't fix the problem you were trying to address. If you believe that 2 of those sensors would be fully redundant you must be mystified by why Airbus uses 3 of them, and you definitely shouldn't be allowed to engineer anything.
The first crash, they at least had the complicating factor of not knowing anything about MCAS. I don't really understand how they could not realize that their trim system was malfunctioning, given that they kept countering it with the trim switches, but ok, lacking knowledge of MCAS, maybe they got confused and thought it was something else.
That should never be the case with any other aircrew again. Everyone knows about it now. So it'll be interesting to see what happened in the second crash.
You are stating things like they are facts tho, when you yourself stated it's all speculation.
Which things?
Admit you don't know shit like the rest of us. Yesterday you were a staunch supporter of "these planes are airworthy". Well the FAA is saying, no right now they are not.
The FAA isn't saying any such thing; if you really insist on paraphrasing their actual statement it is more along the lines of "given new data we are temporarily grounding these aircraft until more information can be gathered". That's it.
I will gladly admit that I don't know any more about the Ethiopian Airlines crash than anyone else here.
Given all the nonsense that has been posted here, I clearly know far more about the Lion Air crash, the 737 MAX, and aviation in general than the vast majority of you.
I'm happy to admit that I know less about the avionics systems than one other guy who commented earlier, and I'm happy to defer to him on those topics. The rest of the incompetents repeating shit they heard from a buddy ... you can go fly a kite.
Slashdot told me there was nothing wrong with the planes. Now today they are not safe? WTF?
Understand the difference between "safe"/"airworthy" and "pilots don't know how to fly it". A plane can be perfectly airworthy while the pilots aren't trained to recognize one specific issue and how to trivially correct it.
Without it, on full throttle, the aircraft doesn't have enough authority to bring the nose down once it goes up too high.
If "the aircraft" doesn't have enough authority to bring the nose down, then how can the pilot ever bring the nose down, and how can the MCAS bring it down? The MCAS doesn't create new control surfaces. It adjusts the trim. Just like the pilots can. And the pilots can always push the yoke forward ... to bring the nose down.
Every aircraft where the engines are not on the center of drag (thus drag and thrust are not coaxial) will either pitch up or down when the throttles are changed. The aircraft can handle it. And the pilots can handle it.
It has nothing to do with auto-pilot, except the system is disabled when auto-pilot is engaged.
It uses the same control surfaces that the autopilot uses, including the same electric trim. If you can disable the electric trim control for the autopilot (which you can) then it will be disabled for MCAS.
And Boeing distributed this information to all customers last November.
That is not entirely true. If FAA certifies an airplane as airworthy, it's recognized by other certification authorities worldwide
And then the AD that FAA issues are also recognized worldwide. Which clearly wasn't followed in this case, since the Nov, 2018 Emergency AD was ignored by Ethiopian Airlines, just as they ignored the Boeing notice the same month.
So: if FAA said it can fly and the. It crashed all over the world itÃ(TM)s defjnitdly FAA problem.
First, it's not FAA's fault that non-US airlines ignore ADs and notices from the aircraft manufacturer. Second, it's not FAA's fault that you can't use a simple apostrophe or write a complete sentence.
It does seem odd that given an apparently working solution they didn't stick with it at least long enough to go around and land or at least return to it, then land.
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No. A bodge may retroactively qualify as a design decision by dint of actually fucking working.
Confucius say, "Find worm in apple - bad. Find half a worm - worse."