This is the case. A man was sued by a woman. He was driving at the time, and as a result of the fit he crashed into her car, injuring her. Thus it was mainly a personal (physical) injury case, in which various psychological factors were included as aggravating features. Any alleged trauma itself would not have been grounds to bring suit, but aggravated the charge which was actionable. This is still slightly silly, but nowhere near as silly as the mis-report above.
But in order to obtain a positive acceleration, one must first overcome the -9.8m/s^2 acceleration.
No. The rocket is sat on the launchpad. Its acceleration and velocity are both zero. There is a 9.8 N downward force exerted on it by gravity for every kg of total mass (which is counteracted by an equal and opposite upwards force on it by the ground.) You have to provide an upwards force in excess of that exerted by gravity to raise the acceleration, and therefore the velocity, above zero. The rocket never has an acceleration of 9.8 m/s2 unless you just happen to be providing an upwards force of 19.6 N per kg. (Most rockets tend to exceed this point rather rapidly. 1g acceleration would be a highly inefficient way to get to space - you want as much as the cargo can take.)
Actually, any positive velocity, no matter how small, will do.
And to get this positive velocity you must first produce a positive acceleration. True, you can reduce power *a little* as soon as you're moving, and keep doing so the higher you get as gravity weakens. But remember that to maintain even constant velocity you need to keep burning fuel to maintain that 9.8 N per kg force (at the surface), and that the longer it takes you to get up there, you will need vastly more fuel to complete the launch.
However, the smaller the velocity, the further away from the Earth the vehicle must travel in order to achieve orbit.
If you require *stable* unpowered orbit, yes.
If you're prepared to keep burning that fuel you can maintain a powered orbit at any reachable velocity. For as long as your fuel lasts.
In reality, one only has to achieve slightly more than 9.8m/s^2 acceleration and maintain that for the duration of the trip to space.
Actually, any positive acceleration no matter how small will do - though the higher the more efficient the launch will be. This means you have to generate a force of at least 9.8 N per kg of rocket at the surface though.
Granted, the shuttle uses a LOT more than just 9.8 m/s^2 acceleration, but it still never reached speeds of 9,000 mph.
Indeed, but the shuttle is not an ICBM. The difference being not the launch, but the landing. The shuttle has to land in one piece and keep its human cargo in one piece too. The ICBM may well go up at the same speed, but on the way down you want it to be going as fast as possible precisely because you want to give the target as little time as possible, so you make it aerodynamic and throw it down from low earth orbit.
As for the figures, to maintain geostationary orbit you need to travel at just under 7000 mph. You wouldn't want the rocket to go anywhere near that on the way up - because you don't want it to reach or pass geostationary orbit, you want it to come back down again. However on the way down it it going to be going a lot faster than Mach 1.
If you hack my back account you're stealing from me. If you persuade my employer to give you money through false pretenses you are defrauding them. (The situation is somewhat better here: I know what I'm owed so if it doesn't turn up I can still make sure I get it from my employer. If it turns up then goes missing I get it back from the bank. They are then responsible for chasing any fraudsters. The suppliers and genuine affiliates in this case can probably never know for sure just how the payments *should* have gone.)
Although that appears to be the end effect, technically they're stealing from the suppliers. The suppliers made a deal with the linking site - promote our stuff and we'll give you a percentage back. Instead of giving that percentage to the linking site who deserve it, the suppliers' money is instead being directed to Morpheus et al. Now the linking site may be pissed off but it's the suppliers who have the legal right and technical means to stomp very hard on the offenders.
Got that - part of the settings I copied from the moz prefs.js initially. I have network.proxy.type set to 1, and network.proxy.http and network.proxy.http_port set to appropriate things. Can't get it to work past the proxy at all.
I'd read the FAQ before reading this story. I've tried copying the proxy settings over from the moz prefs.js and they appear to just be ignored. Internal servers work fine, anything past the firewall, no.
I think for such a system to work you need a technology that uniquiely (sp?) identifies you and only you, such as an RSA token
RSA does not uniquely identify individuals. Assuming the maths works out (which I am actually pretty confident about) all it can ever say is that the entity answering the challenge has access to the private key corresponding to the public key the challege was generated with. What's the difference? Well...
that generates a number along with an access code that only you know.
This is very much harder that you realise. There are so many ways this can fail. Deliberate ones such as group or role keys shared between multiple individuals (a better solution for auditability might be to make the role a CA and have it sign special <role+individual> keys), and the more subtle fact the it's never *you* who performs the challenge-response calculation. You delegate the authority for that to your client machine, which you assume is trustworthy to not leak your key or passphrase, and also only to engage in transactions that you have authorised.
Accidental ones are the threat here though. You can have your passphrase shoulder-surfed. You can leak a non-critical password or enough information about the way your mind works to allow a good social engineer to reconstruct your passphrase. (Some people are *very* good at this.) Protocol failures may accidentally send out secret data when they shouldn't. Your system may be attacked by trojans over the wire, or by physical monitoring means by a sufficiently committed adversary. The fact is that no one's client machine is absolutely trustworthy in the sense required above, and although it may be statistically unlikely that any one person is ever attacked, or that an exploit is ever developed and deployed for the remaining vulnerabilities that even the most security conscious user inevitably leaves exposed, this still does not make their machine trustworthy.
This is why using a single key for multiple systems, and the whole single sign-on thing are bad ideas. These systems fail badly - a single compromise exposes every function of the key to abuse, and having lost your whole visible 'identity' it can be very hard to convince some people to revoke their trust in that key.
By separating different functions into different keys and different sign-ons, you both limit the scope of any one breach, and also make it easier to convince third parties (who may never have met you in the flesh, and may never do) of the problem by pointing out the different behaviour patterns in your multiple 'identities'.
Hunter says Microsoft was proactive in contacting people about it before the subscriptions expired.
So if they don't have the records, how did they do that? Did they follow a very strict privacy policy and delete the data as soon as its primary purpose was exhausted? A more cynical alternative is that they know exactly who is eligible but by being less "proactive" in chasing participants after the trial they'll have many fewer free copies of Office to give out.
The issue is not so much being able to read writing, but that the clarity of vision you require to read lettering (should it be there) also implies that you are able to see other objects on the road around you sufficiently well to drive safely. Of course it may also be useful to be able to note down the license number of other road users who by their own dangerous driving involve you in an accident then speed off.
Not with PS disks. Reading the data isn't usually that hard, however the disk format makes use of certain bit patterns which CD-R drives can not or will not write. Such as zeroed out checksum fields which a CD writer will replace with a properly calculated checksum "for you", and data hidden in the ATIP section which is already burned in with media-vendor information in CD-R(W) blanks. So far only an official Sony-licensed equipment or pressing plants will write these.
If the gas man calls while you're in the middle of watching, or you get a phone call, or you need the loo or to fetch more snacks, or something else crops up and you have to abandon watching it altogether, is it really fair to prevent you from pausing or stopping playback, then rewinding partially or restarting the film to catch up?
What if the hardware crashes during playback? How easy do you expect it to be to get either a refund or your ability to watch the film back? Where does the burden of proof lie?
Given that you *can* watch a bought film now as much as you want, and a rented one as much as you can in the time available, and there are a lot of people who do end up watching particular favourites many many times, do you believe the industry will price single-view films appropriately for those people. I don't think people would care so much if the cost was less than a quid, but I suspect initially they would be priced somewhere between rental and theatre prices (but you don't get theatre hardware to watch it on.)
Given that single-view films may happen, do you expect existing distribution channels to stay exactly as they are, or do you think it's likely that 'unrestricted' copies would be subject to increasing release schedule delays or raised pricing to support this potentially more lucrative model?
Basically, do you expect the industry to play fair, or to continuously attempt to charge more and more money for less and less customer value, in direct opposition to pretty much any other economic trend, unless there is very strong customer opposition in the market place?
By "everyone", you must mean "tinfoil hat wearing slashbots".
Oooh, bitchy. I think it's only natural and sensible to ask what they're up to, and to ask harder the harder they try not to tell you. I'm not suggesting a crusade against them, but their work has a direct effect on many of us here, so it is in the public interest for them to be open about their processes.
This guy doesn't do PR (and isn't allowed to if he tries) for a reason.
Which is unfortunate, because what most probably wanted was insights into the way they work, which you almost certainly would not get from a PR rep. As you say, PR staff don't approve patents, so what's the point in asking them how or why patents are approved? We are a technically minded audience and want technically rich answers which they would be less likely to be able to provide.
How can two companies apply for a patent about the same technology within such small time gap? (3 weeks). Where their research teams working in the same building? Did they go to high school together?
Or perhaps it was a reasonably obvious (to an expert working in the field) extension to recently published research by a third party.
An attacker with enough resources could encrypt all possible 2048 byte paintexts with all possible 2047 byte keys.
There's a nice analysis of this at the start of Applied Cryptography. Basically a brute force attack against symmetric keys larger than some limit (which is between 128 and 256 bits) requires resources far in excess of what the universe can provide to a solution running with current technology. There is provably not enough matter to store the results, or not enough energy to run any possible algorithm. The problem is not only a practical impossibility (which it becomes much earlier with current tech) but a theoretical impossibility according to our current understanding of the universe.
The easy way forward in attacking problems of this size is to analyse the encryption algorithm and find some weakness which leaks additional information, drastically reducing the effective key size. Otherwise you have to discover some radical new methodology outside the bounds of current physical theory. Even quantum computing will not be useful against some of these classes of problem - a totally unforeseen approach is required. I feel fairly confident that I'm not going to meet an attacker with "enough resources".
Slashdot Mirror
This is the case. A man was sued by a woman. He was driving at the time, and as a result of the fit he crashed into her car, injuring her. Thus it was mainly a personal (physical) injury case, in which various psychological factors were included as aggravating features. Any alleged trauma itself would not have been grounds to bring suit, but aggravated the charge which was actionable. This is still slightly silly, but nowhere near as silly as the mis-report above.
No. The rocket is sat on the launchpad. Its acceleration and velocity are both zero. There is a 9.8 N downward force exerted on it by gravity for every kg of total mass (which is counteracted by an equal and opposite upwards force on it by the ground.) You have to provide an upwards force in excess of that exerted by gravity to raise the acceleration, and therefore the velocity, above zero. The rocket never has an acceleration of 9.8 m/s2 unless you just happen to be providing an upwards force of 19.6 N per kg. (Most rockets tend to exceed this point rather rapidly. 1g acceleration would be a highly inefficient way to get to space - you want as much as the cargo can take.)
And to get this positive velocity you must first produce a positive acceleration. True, you can reduce power *a little* as soon as you're moving, and keep doing so the higher you get as gravity weakens. But remember that to maintain even constant velocity you need to keep burning fuel to maintain that 9.8 N per kg force (at the surface), and that the longer it takes you to get up there, you will need vastly more fuel to complete the launch.
If you require *stable* unpowered orbit, yes.
If you're prepared to keep burning that fuel you can maintain a powered orbit at any reachable velocity. For as long as your fuel lasts.
Actually, any positive acceleration no matter how small will do - though the higher the more efficient the launch will be. This means you have to generate a force of at least 9.8 N per kg of rocket at the surface though.
Indeed, but the shuttle is not an ICBM. The difference being not the launch, but the landing. The shuttle has to land in one piece and keep its human cargo in one piece too. The ICBM may well go up at the same speed, but on the way down you want it to be going as fast as possible precisely because you want to give the target as little time as possible, so you make it aerodynamic and throw it down from low earth orbit.
As for the figures, to maintain geostationary orbit you need to travel at just under 7000 mph. You wouldn't want the rocket to go anywhere near that on the way up - because you don't want it to reach or pass geostationary orbit, you want it to come back down again. However on the way down it it going to be going a lot faster than Mach 1.
If you hack my back account you're stealing from me. If you persuade my employer to give you money through false pretenses you are defrauding them. (The situation is somewhat better here: I know what I'm owed so if it doesn't turn up I can still make sure I get it from my employer. If it turns up then goes missing I get it back from the bank. They are then responsible for chasing any fraudsters. The suppliers and genuine affiliates in this case can probably never know for sure just how the payments *should* have gone.)
Steve Ballmer didn't create the universe - he just likes to think he did. You could probably fit one inside him though.
Although that appears to be the end effect, technically they're stealing from the suppliers. The suppliers made a deal with the linking site - promote our stuff and we'll give you a percentage back. Instead of giving that percentage to the linking site who deserve it, the suppliers' money is instead being directed to Morpheus et al. Now the linking site may be pissed off but it's the suppliers who have the legal right and technical means to stomp very hard on the offenders.
"Bad idea" doesn't even begin to cut it, however it has unfortunately been done.
Someone's now filed this as Bug 170517.
Got that - part of the settings I copied from the moz prefs.js initially. I have network.proxy.type set to 1, and network.proxy.http and network.proxy.http_port set to appropriate things. Can't get it to work past the proxy at all.
I'd read the FAQ before reading this story. I've tried copying the proxy settings over from the moz prefs.js and they appear to just be ignored. Internal servers work fine, anything past the firewall, no.
RSA does not uniquely identify individuals. Assuming the maths works out (which I am actually pretty confident about) all it can ever say is that the entity answering the challenge has access to the private key corresponding to the public key the challege was generated with. What's the difference? Well...
This is very much harder that you realise. There are so many ways this can fail. Deliberate ones such as group or role keys shared between multiple individuals (a better solution for auditability might be to make the role a CA and have it sign special <role+individual> keys), and the more subtle fact the it's never *you* who performs the challenge-response calculation. You delegate the authority for that to your client machine, which you assume is trustworthy to not leak your key or passphrase, and also only to engage in transactions that you have authorised.
Accidental ones are the threat here though. You can have your passphrase shoulder-surfed. You can leak a non-critical password or enough information about the way your mind works to allow a good social engineer to reconstruct your passphrase. (Some people are *very* good at this.) Protocol failures may accidentally send out secret data when they shouldn't. Your system may be attacked by trojans over the wire, or by physical monitoring means by a sufficiently committed adversary. The fact is that no one's client machine is absolutely trustworthy in the sense required above, and although it may be statistically unlikely that any one person is ever attacked, or that an exploit is ever developed and deployed for the remaining vulnerabilities that even the most security conscious user inevitably leaves exposed, this still does not make their machine trustworthy.
This is why using a single key for multiple systems, and the whole single sign-on thing are bad ideas. These systems fail badly - a single compromise exposes every function of the key to abuse, and having lost your whole visible 'identity' it can be very hard to convince some people to revoke their trust in that key.
By separating different functions into different keys and different sign-ons, you both limit the scope of any one breach, and also make it easier to convince third parties (who may never have met you in the flesh, and may never do) of the problem by pointing out the different behaviour patterns in your multiple 'identities'.
I think that's bullshit:
So if they don't have the records, how did they do that? Did they follow a very strict privacy policy and delete the data as soon as its primary purpose was exhausted? A more cynical alternative is that they know exactly who is eligible but by being less "proactive" in chasing participants after the trial they'll have many fewer free copies of Office to give out.
The issue is not so much being able to read writing, but that the clarity of vision you require to read lettering (should it be there) also implies that you are able to see other objects on the road around you sufficiently well to drive safely. Of course it may also be useful to be able to note down the license number of other road users who by their own dangerous driving involve you in an accident then speed off.
Surely a malapodium? Or is that a squid with a sore leg? I can never remember...
Oh very nice, after all he's done to squash the anti-trust proceedings. Allegedly.
Not with PS disks. Reading the data isn't usually that hard, however the disk format makes use of certain bit patterns which CD-R drives can not or will not write. Such as zeroed out checksum fields which a CD writer will replace with a properly calculated checksum "for you", and data hidden in the ATIP section which is already burned in with media-vendor information in CD-R(W) blanks. So far only an official Sony-licensed equipment or pressing plants will write these.
Nah, that's biology. Chemistry is about burning things.
If the gas man calls while you're in the middle of watching, or you get a phone call, or you need the loo or to fetch more snacks, or something else crops up and you have to abandon watching it altogether, is it really fair to prevent you from pausing or stopping playback, then rewinding partially or restarting the film to catch up?
What if the hardware crashes during playback? How easy do you expect it to be to get either a refund or your ability to watch the film back? Where does the burden of proof lie?
Given that you *can* watch a bought film now as much as you want, and a rented one as much as you can in the time available, and there are a lot of people who do end up watching particular favourites many many times, do you believe the industry will price single-view films appropriately for those people. I don't think people would care so much if the cost was less than a quid, but I suspect initially they would be priced somewhere between rental and theatre prices (but you don't get theatre hardware to watch it on.)
Given that single-view films may happen, do you expect existing distribution channels to stay exactly as they are, or do you think it's likely that 'unrestricted' copies would be subject to increasing release schedule delays or raised pricing to support this potentially more lucrative model?
Basically, do you expect the industry to play fair, or to continuously attempt to charge more and more money for less and less customer value, in direct opposition to pretty much any other economic trend, unless there is very strong customer opposition in the market place?
Oooh, bitchy. I think it's only natural and sensible to ask what they're up to, and to ask harder the harder they try not to tell you. I'm not suggesting a crusade against them, but their work has a direct effect on many of us here, so it is in the public interest for them to be open about their processes.
Which is unfortunate, because what most probably wanted was insights into the way they work, which you almost certainly would not get from a PR rep. As you say, PR staff don't approve patents, so what's the point in asking them how or why patents are approved? We are a technically minded audience and want technically rich answers which they would be less likely to be able to provide.
Well, what do you expect from someone whose own /. username is vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks?
Or perhaps it was a reasonably obvious (to an expert working in the field) extension to recently published research by a third party.
If it didn't infect /. moderators too it wouldn't be possible.
Never attribute to malice that which can be adequately explained by stupidity.
Anyway, why the big stapler fetish all of a sudden? They're only staplers FFS. I don't get it...
There's a nice analysis of this at the start of Applied Cryptography. Basically a brute force attack against symmetric keys larger than some limit (which is between 128 and 256 bits) requires resources far in excess of what the universe can provide to a solution running with current technology. There is provably not enough matter to store the results, or not enough energy to run any possible algorithm. The problem is not only a practical impossibility (which it becomes much earlier with current tech) but a theoretical impossibility according to our current understanding of the universe.
The easy way forward in attacking problems of this size is to analyse the encryption algorithm and find some weakness which leaks additional information, drastically reducing the effective key size. Otherwise you have to discover some radical new methodology outside the bounds of current physical theory. Even quantum computing will not be useful against some of these classes of problem - a totally unforeseen approach is required. I feel fairly confident that I'm not going to meet an attacker with "enough resources".