The airline was American...the plane was a Douglas (by that time Mcdonnel Douglas) DC-10. It happened at Chicago O'hare...there are pictures of the incident at airliners.net (the search thingy is not working right now though.)
A DC-10 should be able to lose one engine and continue flying--however the loss of the engine destabilized the flight of the aircraft as well as ripped out a bunch of hydraulic systems. More than losing the power of the engine, the plane was doomed because it was no longer flyable. (The reason for the engine falling off is however more or less stated by you.)
I have yet to figure out why California collects them. I have never heard of what California does with them. Only Georgia uses fingerprints and does comparisons to see if its the same person renewing their license.
I heard that Texas has used their fingerprinting database to do identify corpses.
Because in America, we have this thing called presumption of innocence before guilt. Ya see, if I claim to be someone to a government official, and if s/he have no evidence that I am not who I claim to be, then they are to trust that I am saying the truth. An ID card reversed this role of innocence before guilt--now I'm guilty of not being anyone until I prove that I am someone. It may seem like a very techinical and almost obscure thing, but I think it has a huge effect on law, on government, on life.
And here's the funny part. I essentially go into a DMV and claim to be someone, and am believed, so that I can be issued a card that allows people to challenge my identity. It's such a weird contradiction. (This contradiction becomes even weirder if you include biometrics. Not only are you claiming to be someone, but you're also claiming that you haven't made any changes to particular parts of your body.)
Lots of comments here talk about the photo driver's license as being an ID card. Other than a few states still issuing non-photo licenses (VT and NJ for instance, and a bunch of others if you have a religious objection to being photographed)I more or less agree with this statement.
I like to say this about photo licenses:
"Like a lot of government programs, the photo driver's license is incapable of solving the problem that didn't exist until it was created."
Remember, photo licenses are fairly new docs. No state had them prior to 1967 (most did after 1974. The theory I have for this has to do with controlling draft dodgers...but I'm still working on the evidence.) Over and over again though, the fact came up that the photograph was not added to the license for anything to do with actually driving an automobile. (The non-photo license is more than adquate for administering motor vehicle law.) And I say to those who say that DL is optional--in most parts of this country, it is very hard to live life without it.
I can go on about this for a long time...but this is my main idea concerning this issue. DMV's now suddenly have the obligation to be identity controllers. There is some type of diminishing returns on the ability to do so with the population of your state. The fact of the matter is, your security system is only as good as your biggest weakness, and with driver's licensing, your biggest weakness is the fact that you have millions of cards out there issued by thousands of DMV officials. How anyone could think you could have a secure system with those types of numbers is unexplainable to me.
My fear is that we're gonna get into some vicious circle (which has already happened.) Photo's get added to licenses--identity theft begins. holograms get added to licenses--people trust the document more, but then it becomes more useful, so fraud gets worse. fingerprinting is thought to be a good idea, so we lose our privacy, and in the long run the document becomes even more valuable and then it costs $5000 to get a fake license--but it's worth it to the criminal who then can cash out a $50,000 bank account. What's next? As far as I am concerned, we're screwed, and I'm calling up my state legislator demanding that she introduce a bill making the photo optional on our state licenses. I think it's the only way to avoid the stupidity in the long run.
In 1992 the state of California brought out the new digitized driver's license. The DMV had this big pr campaign saying that it was impossible to counterfeit. That lasted for about two months until perfect fraudulent licenses were being found. How did it happen?
Because DMV employees were being bribed--as much as $5000 per license.
See, the thing is, if such a card is so powerful, then there will be a justification in getting a fraudulent one. Before photos were added to licenses (not all states require the photo incidentally) no one faked a license...because it couldn't do crap. No one bribed a DMV official for a license--they just drove the car. After the photo was added, then the license became a powerful document--now I can cash out someone's bank account, or write bad checks...et cetera.
And in the instance in California above--the criminals didn't even mess about trying to fake the card--they just bribed a DMV official. A biometric card wouldn't prevent this...because clearly the card would be made correctly--it's just representing the wrong identity. And if this were a national card, then there would be millions of cards made per year by thousands of government officials--all you have to do is find one to bribe (and it's easy...they don't make that much money ya know.)
In computers, they say that your security is as good as your biggest weakness. Consider the California driver's license--it's got microprinting and holograms and all that silly stuff. That's not the weakness of the card--the weakness is that it's issued to 30 million people by thousands of DMV employees and is verified at tens of thousands of different places. I don't care if you required DNA to issue such a card, the numbers just don't make it that secure.
if that were to exist...it simply moves the point of weakness elsewhere.
stay with me here
1. before 1996, ID's were not "required" to take a domestic flight. terrorists hop on board.
2. now...ID is required. terrorists use their ID to get on board, since the ID requirement is worthless and doesn't do anything. terrorists get on plane.
3. computer hook up occurs so that ticket agent can scan through names of people. in this instance terrorists may use stolen ID, fake ID (an ID "home created") or a fraudulent ID (one obtained from a legitimate source but on fake documents.) in either instance, ticket agent receives no information that said person is a security risk. terrorist boards airplane.
4. ID card interfaces directly with computer hookup. so therefore a stolen ID would not work, and a fake ID would be found immediately. so therefore the terrorists have to do whatever they can to get a fraudulent ID. it may mean using fake docs, it may mean bribing a DMV official (a frighteningly common occurence) but if you consider the fact that a large state has hundreds of DMV offices with thousands of employees who have access to an ID creation system making millions of ID's per year...it hardly seems possible that a serious terrorist (which is what we have here) couldn't go through some process to get a good fraudulent ID. the ID checks, terrorists boards plane.
therefore, as time goes on, we are just shifting the point of weakness around elsewhere, but not having a true effect on things. i'll maintain in the long run that scenario #4 is just as safe as scenario #1.
My specialty is driver's license privacy, so I spend quite a lot fo time thinking about this issue.
Here's a weird contradiction.
I go into my local DMV with a birth certificate and SSN card (which was originally obtained with my birth certificate...so basically I'm going in with a birth certificate and something that back that document up.)
I claim that the birth certificate and the SSN card I have correlates to a JimBobJoe born on date X at place Y, and that I am that JimBobJoe.
Without any evidence to the contrary, my claim is believed. Therefore, I am considered innocent (my claim is truthful) as opposed to being guilty (my claim is not truthful...since they have no way (mostly) of verifying my identity.) Hmm...what an interesting concept this presumed innnocence before guilt.
Then...I am given a photographic ID document whose main purpose is to allow people to question who I claim to be--forcing me to prove who i am(presumed guilt before innocence.)
So, I am trusted to be who I say I am in order to get a document so people can not trust me to be who I say I am.
Like a lot of government programs, the photo driver's license is incapable of solving the problem that didn't exist until it was created.
The photo driver's license is a remarkable achievement--finally Americans everywhere had identities which could be easily stolen.
What do you do with those individuals (of which I am one myself) who refuse to be photographed for an ID card? Many states issue non-photo licenses for those with religious objections. (2 states issue non-photo licenses for anyone.)
do bert and ernie live with each other any more?
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Bert Is Evil
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I heard that on new Sesame Street shows that they no longer "co-habitate". I haven't watched a new show though...so I am unable to confirm this.
This is a big topic for me...I specialize in driver's license privacy...one thing that always fascinated me was, how did it come to pass that driver's licenses got to have pictures (mandatory in all states except NJ and VT)--if people were always so against mandatory photo identification documents.
My home state of Ohio added the mandatory photograph in legislation passed in September 1967 (at the same time requiring collection of SSN's as well.) On both issues, Ohio was a little early, but a lot of states did it in the same time period (new licenses issued after Jan 1 1969 had the photo.)
In the Ohio House and Senate, the legislation for collection of SSN's passed unanimously. In the Senate, the photo requirement passed unanimously, and passed 96-4 in the House. I was intrigued--only 22 years earlier, people were booing in theatres when Nazi's would demand "the papers" of some innocent European. What changed?
Furthermore, when I looked at the committee hearing records, the state highway patrol and the department of public safety had no opinion on the legislation--it has been said over and over again, the photo was not added for any reason related to operating a motor vehicle. The non-photo license is fine as a document simply to drive a car (and NJ and VT continue to confirm that.)
The best answer is the Vietnam war--somehow there is some relation between the draft and the photo driver's license. It appears that no state had a photo license prior to Gulf of Tomkin resolution, and at least 25 did after 1972 (in fact, legislation to repeal the photo requirement in Ohio appeared only after 1973.)
So, if history can be a lesson on this issue, there is a need to be concerned. A biometrically based national photo ID will be disastrous. It has been a bad solution which may have finally found a problem.
I believe the red light is just some part of the scanner. Interestingly enough, I have heard that Texas is the only state whose fingerprint scanner lights up (it doesn't in the other states, CA, HI, WV (opt.), GA and CO.) The reason is that people sincerely feel like its big brother who is scanning them (which, technically, it is) when the light lights up.
As for what they do with it...I can't figure that out. I know that they have used the thumbprint database to confirm that someone is dead when they have the corpse--but that seems like hardly a good enough reason to scan everyone's fingerprint.
I do know however that Texas DPS is not using it with relation to identity checking--I think only Georgia does that.
My guess: nuclear bomb on a boat in NYC's harbor. You read it here first.
I think you're definitely on the right track...however I disagree with you on where--I think they are gonna go West and give up the East for a bit.
See, these terrorists are really big on the symbolism thing...not just any building--but the WTC--not just any airline, but the two big ones--AA and United (in the old days, it woulda been TWA and Pan Am.)
So given that, and choosing something with lots of symbolism, I say the Golden Gate bridge and other areas in SFO.
problems with separated cockpit and cabin
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More On Tragedy
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I've seen this suggestion a lot, and i've been wondering about the potential problems with it.
It would be hard to make these changes at this time, since the cockpit is so close to the cabin anyway.
It may be possible in the future, but it'll take a complex redesign. The pilots need access to the lavaratories and galleys (for obvious reasons. If they have their own separate area, that area needs its own bathroom and galley.) On long range flights, the crew is swapped out and replaced with a fresh crew usually sitting in the passenger cabin--now they will need their own special area separate from the cabin.
And then pilots do often enter into the cabin if there is something strange going on--they need to be able to walk to a passenger window and look at the wing...perhaps if the plane is on the ground during winter and they need to make sure the deicing is going well, or if the aircraft is in air and the engine is doing something strange, or there is a leak from the wing. The pilot needs to look at these things from the main cabin.
Finally, I believe that international air regulations make it so that the pilot is the only person on the aircraft who can arrest someone (like the captain on a ship.) In an air rage situation, the pilot has to get into the cabin to perform the arrest.
I was just thinking about the worthlessness of requiring photo ID at airports just a few days ago...and I stumbled on this article...it's timeliness is tremendous.
To: cypherpunks@cyberpass.net
From: daw@cs.berkeley.edu (David Wagner)
Newsgroups: isaac.lists.cypherpunks
Subject: CDR: Re: FAA's new air passenger surveillance system
Date: 20 Apr 1999 20:14:24 -0700
In article ,
Declan McCullagh wrote:
> Tourist or Terrorist?
> by Declan McCullagh (declan@wired.com)
>
> 3:00 a.m. 20.Apr.99.PDT
> WASHINGTON -- A US$2.8-billion monitoring system
> championed by Vice President Gore will
> use computer profiles to single out airline
> passengers for investigation and scrutiny.
Thanks for forwarding this.
I've actually done a fair amount of research into the FAA's photo ID
security requirements, and what I've learned has really depressed me.
What most people don't know is that the FAA regulations which require
airlines to ask for photo ID don't apply if you aren't checking luggage.
(Caveats: Only applies to domestic flights. And a few airlines have
stricter regulations than what's required by law. I last checked about
6 months ago; if the policy has changed since then, all bets are off.)
However, there's an education problem -- many airline employees don't
know this, and in practice you will have a hard time convincing them.
Sadly, I think the FAA is complicit in this problem -- when I called them,
they (reluctantly) confirmed over the phone that this is indeed their
policy once I volunteered that I knew about it, but flat out refused to
confirm it in written form (!), saying that this information only goes
to those with a need-to-know.
But leaving that aside, what's far worse (to my mind) is that most of
these invasive "security" procedures are of dubious effectiveness. In
all honesty, I think they would be unlikely to slow down a motivated
adversary much.
For kicks, I've done some investigation and testing, and here is some
analysis on their effectiveness [1]:
1. Hand-searching carry-on luggage for selectees:
easily bypassed.
(Anecdote: Whem I fly as a selectee, the usual procedure is that they
search my luggage at the gate in advance, then let me roam before
boarding. This does not require much thought to bypass: show up early,
stash your bag in a public locker before the search, then retrieve it
afterwards.)
(Anecdote: Once, rather than searching my bags immediately, the
checkin agent put a sticker on ticket that was supposed to alert
the gate agent not to let me on the plane without searching my bag.
I was truly impressed: I thought for once their hand-search procedure
was going to be effective. When I got to the gate, the gate agent
stared at the sticker for about 30 seconds, clearly not sure what it
meant, then finally looked at me and waved me through, without the
search. Maybe it was just a fluke, but I'm skeptical.)
2. Photo ID requirements:
laughable.
(I assume I don't need to mention that if teenagers find it easy to
obtain fake IDs, presumably would-be terrorists can also get one.)
3. Profiling:
I am very skeptical.
(Suppose I have an ID under a false name. I use it to get a credit
card under that name, then buy a suit and a round-trip ticket in
first class. How is the profiling going to pick me out of the
crowd of business travelers??)
4. Random bag searches as you pass through the metal detectors:
probably not very reliable, though surely they help a little.
(Anecdote: When the security guard at the X-ray detector asked if he
could search my bag (a random suspicion-less search), I played dumb
and asked "Do I have to?". He said, warmly, "Oh, are you late for
your flight?". When I nodded yes, he let me go without searching.
Friendly guy!)
(Anecdote: One FAA document had to advise security guards to not pick
just small bags for the "random" searches. Turns out that some
guards were avoiding the big bags because they took more effort to
search.)
5. The metal detectors & X-ray machines entering the gate:
actually a pretty good defense, but they can be defeated without too
much effort.
(Simple attack: carry a big bulky "laptop" that actually contains
a pound of nasty explosives. This is pretty hard for the good
guys to stop with current procedures, sadly...)
(Anecdote: Ever wonder how they get the beer and other supplies into
the bars and restaurant near the gate? Lucky Green tells an
eye-opening story about the time he saw them wheeling these kegs of
beer around the metal detectors as the guards waved them on. When
you realize that these are opaque containers that block X-rays, it
is clear that pretty much anything could potentially be transported
past the security perimeter in a keg, no questions asked, if you can
position yourself as the beer-supplier.)
6. Positive bag matching.
PBM is seems like it must be a pretty good defense, if you assume the
terrorist doesn't want to die from his own bomb, and if you apply it to
every passenger, although even then, it still can be defeated.
(The attack that seems hard to prevent: The terrorist finds a flight
with a stopover, boards with a bomb in his carry-on luggage, then gets
off the plane at the intermediate destination (leaving his carry-ons
up in the overhead compartment) and never re-boards.)
(Another weakness: In practice, it's only applied to fliers that "hit"
in the profile, so adversaries actually have two ways to defeat PBM:
avoid the profile, or play the stopover trick mentioned above.)
Notice how the most privacy-invasive security techniques (ID checks,
profiling, hand-searches, etc.) are also the ones that are the least likely
to be effective in practice?
It seems the ineffective techniques (photo ID checks, etc.) are there
just to reassure the flying public that the FAA "is doing something",
i.e. perception management (normally called "pulling the wool over your
eyes") rather than real security. Sadly, it's exactly their privacy-invasive
nature which makes these techniques work well for perception management,
so I don't think we'll be rid of this problem soon.
Another big problem the good guys have is transitive trust. If you pass
security in Podunk Airport and fly to JF Kennedy, you can then wander around
the "secure" area and get on another flight from JFK to SFO, without ever
going through security in JFK -- and if Podunk Air is lax about security,
you can use them to bypass the strict security in JFK. In other words, the
security of the US airport system is only as strong as its weakest link.
I don't envy the position of those responsible for aviation security; if
the goal truly is to prevent terrorist attacks (not just to project a false
sense of security, as the cynics would suggest), they have a very hard
problem on their hands.
However, I fear that the FAA has struck a terrible balance in their current
aviation security policy: it is not strict enough to offer real defense, but
just harsh enough to invade our privacy -- we give up some of our freedom
when flying, and in return, all we get is "security procedures" that don't
actually do much to protect us. All this is surely old hat for the grizzled
cypherpunk, but depressing nonetheless.
Footnote 1.
Normally I would be a little reluctant to post this kind of detailed
information on weaknesses in the aviation security infrastructure --
while I value my privacy and freedom to travel, the last thing I want to
happen is for someone to go bomb a plane after reading this post (no
matter how unlikely that may be in practice).
Nonetheless, if we as a society are going to make an informed policy
decision, we can't kid ourselves. We live in a democracy, and the public
needs to know the flat honest truth.
It's one thing to sacrifice some privacy if you gain a lot of security
in return. It's another thing entirely to needlessly sacrifice freedom
if we gain absolutely no security in return. And I think the evidence
shows that we have gained nothing in return for the extra restrictions
on our freedom to travel. The real terrorists surely know this; the flying
public deserves to know, too.
However, there are a lot of exceptions, mostly cultural.
It also depends on whether or not there is an undue burden on the state (or some private individual) in creating an exemption for someone's belief.
For instance, your faith may dictate that you may not work on Saturday's. It has been decided that the employer would be excessively burdened by being required to move employees around to accomodate you. However, it's not an undue burden to ask other employees if they mind working on Saturday to fill your space.
Another example is that states are required to issue non-photo driver's licenses to those who have some type or religious objection to being photographed/photographed for identification purposes. The minor burden to the state is outweighed by the fact that the individual loses quite a lot of liberty in not being licensed to operate a car.
In the example of Amish...many of their exceptions are rooted in the fact that, pretty much creating their own independently working society, whatever they do doesn't really burden the state that much.
As time has gone on though, we have probably allowed even more exceptions--it's just become politically incorrect to mess about with the Amish.:-)
There is this issue that I have with particular departments at my university being notoriously hard for as far as I can tell no good reason. Math, Chemistry and Physics fall there. The technical departments had some sorta weird egotism that simply did not pervade in other departments. Why is it in Chemistry that they need to make tests that 75% of the students will do no better than 60% correct, and curve accordingly. Why is it that Math insists on having en masse finals whereas no other department does that (and thank god for that too...otherwise it would be chaos.)
The professors from these departments often have an awful unfriendlyness with regards to teaching their students. Too many researches, not enough people who are truly designed for teaching imho.
My city of Cincinnati is far too busy building stadiums.
That somehow implies that the money that is going to the stadiums could somehow be directed to the schools. At some level that may be possible (although in Ohio, I can't think of a single example of a big vote for a countywide sales tax for schools--which is how the stadiums were/are funded in Cincy. In Cleveland, countywide taxes on alcohol and cigarretts "sin taxes" were enacted, and our new stadium in Columbus was paid for...haha, private funds, no tax dollars. We in Columbus raised our middle finger high at new taxes, and got our new arena anyway:-P
Either way, the funding processes above for stadiums are not the same for school funding (I've never heard of a property tax for stadiums, at least not in Ohio.) The process for lobbying, getting the public to vote on them, and enacting them is very different (stadium projects are usually handed over to the counties, whereas schools are a municipal matter, in general.)
So I think its disingeniuous to say that one can pay for another. What's worse is saying that the feds are buying B2 bombers instead of paying for schools--when the feds have almost no interest in the schools at all, it's a local/state matter.
On another note, let me just add that Ohio urban schools are tremendously wealthy--in spite of the results. For instance, Columbus spends about $11,000 per student per year, I think Cincinnati was about $10,000 per year (that's calculated by dividing the yearly budget of the entire school system by the amount of students. The state does their accounting differently, and gets $7400 for Columbus and $8007 for Cincinnati for FY 1999.) Either way, the finest private school in Columbus is not $11,000 a year and $7400 per year is on the high side.
Here are a few solutions off the top of my head for some of these issues:
*administrative costs of urban school systems is outrageous, and accounts for much of the tremendous expenses involved with those school systems, something has to be done about it. furthermore, it appears that the advantages of size, in the economics sense of economies of scale, do not work with education--small systems are the way to go
*also not working in education is the study of it...my opinion is that the people who actually study education are the worst educators--furthermore, end tenure and raise teachers pay--like politics, there may be a few good politicians like there are a few good teachers, but the system is bogged down by too many people sticking around for way too long--make it easier for people to come and go out of the private sector into education, and then be able to leave again
*end forced schooling--i dunno at what age, but there is nothing worse than someone who doesn't wanna be there--also, there is nothing wrong with having multiple age groups in schools--if they wanna come back when they are 25 into a regular school--let them do it, having older peeps around will benefit everyone i think the idea that everyone should be segregated into age groups is not only artificial but counterproductive
*find some alternative methods--montesorri is a wonderful school system, it's not for everybody admittedly, but it works well for many children. there is a belief out there that the education system that we have today wasn't designed to teach children as much as inculcate them in such a way so that they are stupid and non-inquisitive. if you knew you had to teach a child as many things as possible, from ages 6 to 18, is the current system the one you would design to achieve that task?
at any rate, that's a ramble, apologies made
a fascinating theory...but doesn't always stick
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RIAA To Target CD-R
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The legislation is very clear, if I borrow a CD from you and make a copy of it on my "tax paid" CDR I am breaking no law.
Perhaps in this instance, but not in every. Please see the Iowa drug stamp tax for a good counterexample.
Interesting Libertarian Party argument...
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Triana Mothballed
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Few people, even hardcore Libertarians have noted a small fight that's been going on in the LP.
You see, the Space Exploration part of the party's Comprehensive Platform mentions Lagrange Libration Points. There is a movement in the party to have that part removed, since no one ever talks about Lagrange points anyway. The fact that cnn.com mentions it is actually may give this part of the platform a bit more life.
You can still fight the mandatory photograph. Vermont and New Jersey issue licenses without photographs still, as does Quebec. Many states do on religious objection as well.
Because state DMV's never cared to properly adjust the contrast on their printing equipment.
Polaroid makes ID making systems which correct themselves for those kinda factors automagically...they seem to create ok pictures (see this, in particular check out CO, DC and WV.)
Consider moving to NJ or VT--they still issue non-photo licenses.
The thing that is making me go insane is that there is a very simple cause and effect situation going on here, and law enforcement, politicians, and just about everyone completely fail to understand it.
It's very simple. Security measures are added to ID cards (whether to make their security integrity better, or to collect more information on the individual to secure the database.) The perception is that the new measures greatly increase the security of the ID card. Therefore, new uses for that card manifest, or people trust it much more in situations that they wouldn't have done before. Effect--the cost to have a good fraudulent ID have risen, but so has the gains to be had with a good fake ID. For instance, Ohio introduced the photo license in 1969. So let's say you had a fake one in 1969...it did jack shit. Now so many uses have popped up, I may be able to walk into a bank with the right fake ID, and cash out a bank account. Perhaps it costs me $1000 to get a good fake license...but it would be worth it if I can cash out someone's bank account.
In 1992 California upgraded to the digitized driver's license. The CA DMV marketed it as an uncopyable document, and with the driver's image and fingerprint archived. Big mistake...they raised the perception of trust too much. Suddenly there were significantly more fraudulent CA digitized licenses than there were fraudulent laminate licenses. How? People were going into DMV's and bribing DMV officials...the document was just too useful not to.
Bribing of DMV officials goes on :
http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/19.27.html#subj2
And if you want quantity...just steal the equipment:
http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/21.15.html#subj6
Finally, they say that security is only as good as its biggest weakness. With ID cards the biggest weakness if the sheer amount of people involved. Millions of licensed individuals, thousands of DMV employees with access to the system, and hundreds of thousands of different checkpoints/uses. It is folly to expect any security in this system whatsoever. And what bothers me is that states wanna fingerprint, use facial recognition, iris scan, or whatever to secure something which is insecurable.
My suggestion for peeps out there...move to Vermont or New Jersey--they still issue non-photo driver's licenses.:-)
I have no problem with the fact that you would prefer a card that does ten different things...you can have that card. I just don't want it forced on everybody else, including myself.
Actually, several states, including New Jersey and Vermont still issue non-photo driver's licenses.
In many states, a marijuana possession conviction can get your license revoked (I can think of Ohio and Virginia off the top of my head.) The posession can be just walking down the street smoking the joint--being away from a car...it may still result in license revocation.
Slashdot Mirror
The airline was American...the plane was a Douglas (by that time Mcdonnel Douglas) DC-10. It happened at Chicago O'hare...there are pictures of the incident at airliners.net (the search thingy is not working right now though.)
A DC-10 should be able to lose one engine and continue flying--however the loss of the engine destabilized the flight of the aircraft as well as ripped out a bunch of hydraulic systems. More than losing the power of the engine, the plane was doomed because it was no longer flyable. (The reason for the engine falling off is however more or less stated by you.)
I have yet to figure out why California collects them. I have never heard of what California does with them. Only Georgia uses fingerprints and does comparisons to see if its the same person renewing their license.
I heard that Texas has used their fingerprinting database to do identify corpses.
Because in America, we have this thing called presumption of innocence before guilt. Ya see, if I claim to be someone to a government official, and if s/he have no evidence that I am not who I claim to be, then they are to trust that I am saying the truth. An ID card reversed this role of innocence before guilt--now I'm guilty of not being anyone until I prove that I am someone. It may seem like a very techinical and almost obscure thing, but I think it has a huge effect on law, on government, on life.
And here's the funny part. I essentially go into a DMV and claim to be someone, and am believed, so that I can be issued a card that allows people to challenge my identity. It's such a weird contradiction. (This contradiction becomes even weirder if you include biometrics. Not only are you claiming to be someone, but you're also claiming that you haven't made any changes to particular parts of your body.)
Lots of comments here talk about the photo driver's license as being an ID card. Other than a few states still issuing non-photo licenses (VT and NJ for instance, and a bunch of others if you have a religious objection to being photographed)I more or less agree with this statement.
I like to say this about photo licenses:
"Like a lot of government programs, the photo driver's license is incapable of solving the problem that didn't exist until it was created."
Remember, photo licenses are fairly new docs. No state had them prior to 1967 (most did after 1974. The theory I have for this has to do with controlling draft dodgers...but I'm still working on the evidence.) Over and over again though, the fact came up that the photograph was not added to the license for anything to do with actually driving an automobile. (The non-photo license is more than adquate for administering motor vehicle law.) And I say to those who say that DL is optional--in most parts of this country, it is very hard to live life without it.
I can go on about this for a long time...but this is my main idea concerning this issue. DMV's now suddenly have the obligation to be identity controllers. There is some type of diminishing returns on the ability to do so with the population of your state. The fact of the matter is, your security system is only as good as your biggest weakness, and with driver's licensing, your biggest weakness is the fact that you have millions of cards out there issued by thousands of DMV officials. How anyone could think you could have a secure system with those types of numbers is unexplainable to me.
My fear is that we're gonna get into some vicious circle (which has already happened.) Photo's get added to licenses--identity theft begins. holograms get added to licenses--people trust the document more, but then it becomes more useful, so fraud gets worse. fingerprinting is thought to be a good idea, so we lose our privacy, and in the long run the document becomes even more valuable and then it costs $5000 to get a fake license--but it's worth it to the criminal who then can cash out a $50,000 bank account. What's next? As far as I am concerned, we're screwed, and I'm calling up my state legislator demanding that she introduce a bill making the photo optional on our state licenses. I think it's the only way to avoid the stupidity in the long run.
In 1992 the state of California brought out the new digitized driver's license. The DMV had this big pr campaign saying that it was impossible to counterfeit. That lasted for about two months until perfect fraudulent licenses were being found. How did it happen?
Because DMV employees were being bribed--as much as $5000 per license.
See, the thing is, if such a card is so powerful, then there will be a justification in getting a fraudulent one. Before photos were added to licenses (not all states require the photo incidentally) no one faked a license...because it couldn't do crap. No one bribed a DMV official for a license--they just drove the car. After the photo was added, then the license became a powerful document--now I can cash out someone's bank account, or write bad checks...et cetera.
And in the instance in California above--the criminals didn't even mess about trying to fake the card--they just bribed a DMV official. A biometric card wouldn't prevent this...because clearly the card would be made correctly--it's just representing the wrong identity. And if this were a national card, then there would be millions of cards made per year by thousands of government officials--all you have to do is find one to bribe (and it's easy...they don't make that much money ya know.)
In computers, they say that your security is as good as your biggest weakness. Consider the California driver's license--it's got microprinting and holograms and all that silly stuff. That's not the weakness of the card--the weakness is that it's issued to 30 million people by thousands of DMV employees and is verified at tens of thousands of different places. I don't care if you required DNA to issue such a card, the numbers just don't make it that secure.
5.) a few states issue non-photo licenses--therefore you have a document that allows you only to drive a car, and doesn't work for ID purposes.
if that were to exist...it simply moves the point of weakness elsewhere.
stay with me here
1. before 1996, ID's were not "required" to take a domestic flight. terrorists hop on board.
2. now...ID is required. terrorists use their ID to get on board, since the ID requirement is worthless and doesn't do anything. terrorists get on plane.
3. computer hook up occurs so that ticket agent can scan through names of people. in this instance terrorists may use stolen ID, fake ID (an ID "home created") or a fraudulent ID (one obtained from a legitimate source but on fake documents.) in either instance, ticket agent receives no information that said person is a security risk. terrorist boards airplane.
4. ID card interfaces directly with computer hookup. so therefore a stolen ID would not work, and a fake ID would be found immediately. so therefore the terrorists have to do whatever they can to get a fraudulent ID. it may mean using fake docs, it may mean bribing a DMV official (a frighteningly common occurence) but if you consider the fact that a large state has hundreds of DMV offices with thousands of employees who have access to an ID creation system making millions of ID's per year...it hardly seems possible that a serious terrorist (which is what we have here) couldn't go through some process to get a good fraudulent ID. the ID checks, terrorists boards plane.
therefore, as time goes on, we are just shifting the point of weakness around elsewhere, but not having a true effect on things. i'll maintain in the long run that scenario #4 is just as safe as scenario #1.
My specialty is driver's license privacy, so I spend quite a lot fo time thinking about this issue.
Here's a weird contradiction.
I go into my local DMV with a birth certificate and SSN card (which was originally obtained with my birth certificate...so basically I'm going in with a birth certificate and something that back that document up.)
I claim that the birth certificate and the SSN card I have correlates to a JimBobJoe born on date X at place Y, and that I am that JimBobJoe.
Without any evidence to the contrary, my claim is believed. Therefore, I am considered innocent (my claim is truthful) as opposed to being guilty (my claim is not truthful...since they have no way (mostly) of verifying my identity.) Hmm...what an interesting concept this presumed innnocence before guilt.
Then...I am given a photographic ID document whose main purpose is to allow people to question who I claim to be--forcing me to prove who i am(presumed guilt before innocence.)
So, I am trusted to be who I say I am in order to get a document so people can not trust me to be who I say I am.
Like a lot of government programs, the photo driver's license is incapable of solving the problem that didn't exist until it was created.
The photo driver's license is a remarkable achievement--finally Americans everywhere had identities which could be easily stolen.
What do you do with those individuals (of which I am one myself) who refuse to be photographed for an ID card? Many states issue non-photo licenses for those with religious objections. (2 states issue non-photo licenses for anyone.)
I heard that on new Sesame Street shows that they no longer "co-habitate". I haven't watched a new show though...so I am unable to confirm this.
This is a big topic for me...I specialize in driver's license privacy...one thing that always fascinated me was, how did it come to pass that driver's licenses got to have pictures (mandatory in all states except NJ and VT)--if people were always so against mandatory photo identification documents.
My home state of Ohio added the mandatory photograph in legislation passed in September 1967 (at the same time requiring collection of SSN's as well.) On both issues, Ohio was a little early, but a lot of states did it in the same time period (new licenses issued after Jan 1 1969 had the photo.)
In the Ohio House and Senate, the legislation for collection of SSN's passed unanimously. In the Senate, the photo requirement passed unanimously, and passed 96-4 in the House. I was intrigued--only 22 years earlier, people were booing in theatres when Nazi's would demand "the papers" of some innocent European. What changed?
Furthermore, when I looked at the committee hearing records, the state highway patrol and the department of public safety had no opinion on the legislation--it has been said over and over again, the photo was not added for any reason related to operating a motor vehicle. The non-photo license is fine as a document simply to drive a car (and NJ and VT continue to confirm that.)
The best answer is the Vietnam war--somehow there is some relation between the draft and the photo driver's license. It appears that no state had a photo license prior to Gulf of Tomkin resolution, and at least 25 did after 1972 (in fact, legislation to repeal the photo requirement in Ohio appeared only after 1973.)
So, if history can be a lesson on this issue, there is a need to be concerned. A biometrically based national photo ID will be disastrous. It has been a bad solution which may have finally found a problem.
I believe the red light is just some part of the scanner. Interestingly enough, I have heard that Texas is the only state whose fingerprint scanner lights up (it doesn't in the other states, CA, HI, WV (opt.), GA and CO.) The reason is that people sincerely feel like its big brother who is scanning them (which, technically, it is) when the light lights up.
As for what they do with it...I can't figure that out. I know that they have used the thumbprint database to confirm that someone is dead when they have the corpse--but that seems like hardly a good enough reason to scan everyone's fingerprint.
I do know however that Texas DPS is not using it with relation to identity checking--I think only Georgia does that.
My guess: nuclear bomb on a boat in NYC's harbor. You read it here first.
I think you're definitely on the right track...however I disagree with you on where--I think they are gonna go West and give up the East for a bit.
See, these terrorists are really big on the symbolism thing...not just any building--but the WTC--not just any airline, but the two big ones--AA and United (in the old days, it woulda been TWA and Pan Am.)
So given that, and choosing something with lots of symbolism, I say the Golden Gate bridge and other areas in SFO.
I've seen this suggestion a lot, and i've been wondering about the potential problems with it.
It would be hard to make these changes at this time, since the cockpit is so close to the cabin anyway.
It may be possible in the future, but it'll take a complex redesign. The pilots need access to the lavaratories and galleys (for obvious reasons. If they have their own separate area, that area needs its own bathroom and galley.) On long range flights, the crew is swapped out and replaced with a fresh crew usually sitting in the passenger cabin--now they will need their own special area separate from the cabin.
And then pilots do often enter into the cabin if there is something strange going on--they need to be able to walk to a passenger window and look at the wing...perhaps if the plane is on the ground during winter and they need to make sure the deicing is going well, or if the aircraft is in air and the engine is doing something strange, or there is a leak from the wing. The pilot needs to look at these things from the main cabin.
Finally, I believe that international air regulations make it so that the pilot is the only person on the aircraft who can arrest someone (like the captain on a ship.) In an air rage situation, the pilot has to get into the cabin to perform the arrest.
I was just thinking about the worthlessness of requiring photo ID at airports just a few days ago...and I stumbled on this article...it's timeliness is tremendous.
s ec crit.htm
http://cryptome.unicast.org/cryptome022401/faa-
To: cypherpunks@cyberpass.net
From: daw@cs.berkeley.edu (David Wagner)
Newsgroups: isaac.lists.cypherpunks
Subject: CDR: Re: FAA's new air passenger surveillance system
Date: 20 Apr 1999 20:14:24 -0700
In article ,
Declan McCullagh wrote:
> Tourist or Terrorist?
> by Declan McCullagh (declan@wired.com)
>
> 3:00 a.m. 20.Apr.99.PDT
> WASHINGTON -- A US$2.8-billion monitoring system
> championed by Vice President Gore will
> use computer profiles to single out airline
> passengers for investigation and scrutiny.
Thanks for forwarding this.
I've actually done a fair amount of research into the FAA's photo ID
security requirements, and what I've learned has really depressed me.
What most people don't know is that the FAA regulations which require
airlines to ask for photo ID don't apply if you aren't checking luggage.
(Caveats: Only applies to domestic flights. And a few airlines have
stricter regulations than what's required by law. I last checked about
6 months ago; if the policy has changed since then, all bets are off.)
However, there's an education problem -- many airline employees don't
know this, and in practice you will have a hard time convincing them.
Sadly, I think the FAA is complicit in this problem -- when I called them,
they (reluctantly) confirmed over the phone that this is indeed their
policy once I volunteered that I knew about it, but flat out refused to
confirm it in written form (!), saying that this information only goes
to those with a need-to-know.
But leaving that aside, what's far worse (to my mind) is that most of
these invasive "security" procedures are of dubious effectiveness. In
all honesty, I think they would be unlikely to slow down a motivated
adversary much.
For kicks, I've done some investigation and testing, and here is some
analysis on their effectiveness [1]:
1. Hand-searching carry-on luggage for selectees:
easily bypassed.
(Anecdote: Whem I fly as a selectee, the usual procedure is that they
search my luggage at the gate in advance, then let me roam before
boarding. This does not require much thought to bypass: show up early,
stash your bag in a public locker before the search, then retrieve it
afterwards.)
(Anecdote: Once, rather than searching my bags immediately, the
checkin agent put a sticker on ticket that was supposed to alert
the gate agent not to let me on the plane without searching my bag.
I was truly impressed: I thought for once their hand-search procedure
was going to be effective. When I got to the gate, the gate agent
stared at the sticker for about 30 seconds, clearly not sure what it
meant, then finally looked at me and waved me through, without the
search. Maybe it was just a fluke, but I'm skeptical.)
2. Photo ID requirements:
laughable.
(I assume I don't need to mention that if teenagers find it easy to
obtain fake IDs, presumably would-be terrorists can also get one.)
3. Profiling:
I am very skeptical.
(Suppose I have an ID under a false name. I use it to get a credit
card under that name, then buy a suit and a round-trip ticket in
first class. How is the profiling going to pick me out of the
crowd of business travelers??)
4. Random bag searches as you pass through the metal detectors:
probably not very reliable, though surely they help a little.
(Anecdote: When the security guard at the X-ray detector asked if he
could search my bag (a random suspicion-less search), I played dumb
and asked "Do I have to?". He said, warmly, "Oh, are you late for
your flight?". When I nodded yes, he let me go without searching.
Friendly guy!)
(Anecdote: One FAA document had to advise security guards to not pick
just small bags for the "random" searches. Turns out that some
guards were avoiding the big bags because they took more effort to
search.)
5. The metal detectors & X-ray machines entering the gate:
actually a pretty good defense, but they can be defeated without too
much effort.
(Simple attack: carry a big bulky "laptop" that actually contains
a pound of nasty explosives. This is pretty hard for the good
guys to stop with current procedures, sadly...)
(Anecdote: Ever wonder how they get the beer and other supplies into
the bars and restaurant near the gate? Lucky Green tells an
eye-opening story about the time he saw them wheeling these kegs of
beer around the metal detectors as the guards waved them on. When
you realize that these are opaque containers that block X-rays, it
is clear that pretty much anything could potentially be transported
past the security perimeter in a keg, no questions asked, if you can
position yourself as the beer-supplier.)
6. Positive bag matching.
PBM is seems like it must be a pretty good defense, if you assume the
terrorist doesn't want to die from his own bomb, and if you apply it to
every passenger, although even then, it still can be defeated.
(The attack that seems hard to prevent: The terrorist finds a flight
with a stopover, boards with a bomb in his carry-on luggage, then gets
off the plane at the intermediate destination (leaving his carry-ons
up in the overhead compartment) and never re-boards.)
(Another weakness: In practice, it's only applied to fliers that "hit"
in the profile, so adversaries actually have two ways to defeat PBM:
avoid the profile, or play the stopover trick mentioned above.)
Notice how the most privacy-invasive security techniques (ID checks,
profiling, hand-searches, etc.) are also the ones that are the least likely
to be effective in practice?
It seems the ineffective techniques (photo ID checks, etc.) are there
just to reassure the flying public that the FAA "is doing something",
i.e. perception management (normally called "pulling the wool over your
eyes") rather than real security. Sadly, it's exactly their privacy-invasive
nature which makes these techniques work well for perception management,
so I don't think we'll be rid of this problem soon.
Another big problem the good guys have is transitive trust. If you pass
security in Podunk Airport and fly to JF Kennedy, you can then wander around
the "secure" area and get on another flight from JFK to SFO, without ever
going through security in JFK -- and if Podunk Air is lax about security,
you can use them to bypass the strict security in JFK. In other words, the
security of the US airport system is only as strong as its weakest link.
I don't envy the position of those responsible for aviation security; if
the goal truly is to prevent terrorist attacks (not just to project a false
sense of security, as the cynics would suggest), they have a very hard
problem on their hands.
However, I fear that the FAA has struck a terrible balance in their current
aviation security policy: it is not strict enough to offer real defense, but
just harsh enough to invade our privacy -- we give up some of our freedom
when flying, and in return, all we get is "security procedures" that don't
actually do much to protect us. All this is surely old hat for the grizzled
cypherpunk, but depressing nonetheless.
Footnote 1.
Normally I would be a little reluctant to post this kind of detailed
information on weaknesses in the aviation security infrastructure --
while I value my privacy and freedom to travel, the last thing I want to
happen is for someone to go bomb a plane after reading this post (no
matter how unlikely that may be in practice).
Nonetheless, if we as a society are going to make an informed policy
decision, we can't kid ourselves. We live in a democracy, and the public
needs to know the flat honest truth.
It's one thing to sacrifice some privacy if you gain a lot of security
in return. It's another thing entirely to needlessly sacrifice freedom
if we gain absolutely no security in return. And I think the evidence
shows that we have gained nothing in return for the extra restrictions
on our freedom to travel. The real terrorists surely know this; the flying
public deserves to know, too.
It isn't as cool as when Dr. Honeydew and Beaker on The Muppets changed solid gold into cottage cheese. That ladies and gentleman, is progress!
However, there are a lot of exceptions, mostly cultural.
:-)
It also depends on whether or not there is an undue burden on the state (or some private individual) in creating an exemption for someone's belief.
For instance, your faith may dictate that you may not work on Saturday's. It has been decided that the employer would be excessively burdened by being required to move employees around to accomodate you. However, it's not an undue burden to ask other employees if they mind working on Saturday to fill your space.
Another example is that states are required to issue non-photo driver's licenses to those who have some type or religious objection to being photographed/photographed for identification purposes. The minor burden to the state is outweighed by the fact that the individual loses quite a lot of liberty in not being licensed to operate a car.
In the example of Amish...many of their exceptions are rooted in the fact that, pretty much creating their own independently working society, whatever they do doesn't really burden the state that much.
As time has gone on though, we have probably allowed even more exceptions--it's just become politically incorrect to mess about with the Amish.
I agree with you...but let me add just one thing.
There is this issue that I have with particular departments at my university being notoriously hard for as far as I can tell no good reason. Math, Chemistry and Physics fall there. The technical departments had some sorta weird egotism that simply did not pervade in other departments. Why is it in Chemistry that they need to make tests that 75% of the students will do no better than 60% correct, and curve accordingly. Why is it that Math insists on having en masse finals whereas no other department does that (and thank god for that too...otherwise it would be chaos.)
The professors from these departments often have an awful unfriendlyness with regards to teaching their students. Too many researches, not enough people who are truly designed for teaching imho.
My city of Cincinnati is far too busy building stadiums.
:-P
That somehow implies that the money that is going to the stadiums could somehow be directed to the schools. At some level that may be possible (although in Ohio, I can't think of a single example of a big vote for a countywide sales tax for schools--which is how the stadiums were/are funded in Cincy. In Cleveland, countywide taxes on alcohol and cigarretts "sin taxes" were enacted, and our new stadium in Columbus was paid for...haha, private funds, no tax dollars. We in Columbus raised our middle finger high at new taxes, and got our new arena anyway
Either way, the funding processes above for stadiums are not the same for school funding (I've never heard of a property tax for stadiums, at least not in Ohio.) The process for lobbying, getting the public to vote on them, and enacting them is very different (stadium projects are usually handed over to the counties, whereas schools are a municipal matter, in general.)
So I think its disingeniuous to say that one can pay for another. What's worse is saying that the feds are buying B2 bombers instead of paying for schools--when the feds have almost no interest in the schools at all, it's a local/state matter.
On another note, let me just add that Ohio urban schools are tremendously wealthy--in spite of the results. For instance, Columbus spends about $11,000 per student per year, I think Cincinnati was about $10,000 per year (that's calculated by dividing the yearly budget of the entire school system by the amount of students. The state does their accounting differently, and gets $7400 for Columbus and $8007 for Cincinnati for FY 1999.) Either way, the finest private school in Columbus is not $11,000 a year and $7400 per year is on the high side.
Here are a few solutions off the top of my head for some of these issues:
*administrative costs of urban school systems is outrageous, and accounts for much of the tremendous expenses involved with those school systems, something has to be done about it. furthermore, it appears that the advantages of size, in the economics sense of economies of scale, do not work with education--small systems are the way to go
*also not working in education is the study of it...my opinion is that the people who actually study education are the worst educators--furthermore, end tenure and raise teachers pay--like politics, there may be a few good politicians like there are a few good teachers, but the system is bogged down by too many people sticking around for way too long--make it easier for people to come and go out of the private sector into education, and then be able to leave again
*end forced schooling--i dunno at what age, but there is nothing worse than someone who doesn't wanna be there--also, there is nothing wrong with having multiple age groups in schools--if they wanna come back when they are 25 into a regular school--let them do it, having older peeps around will benefit everyone i think the idea that everyone should be segregated into age groups is not only artificial but counterproductive
*find some alternative methods--montesorri is a wonderful school system, it's not for everybody admittedly, but it works well for many children. there is a belief out there that the education system that we have today wasn't designed to teach children as much as inculcate them in such a way so that they are stupid and non-inquisitive. if you knew you had to teach a child as many things as possible, from ages 6 to 18, is the current system the one you would design to achieve that task?
at any rate, that's a ramble, apologies made
The legislation is very clear, if I borrow a CD from you and make a copy of it on my "tax paid" CDR I am breaking no law.
Perhaps in this instance, but not in every. Please see the Iowa drug stamp tax for a good counterexample.
Few people, even hardcore Libertarians have noted a small fight that's been going on in the LP.
You see, the Space Exploration part of the party's Comprehensive Platform mentions Lagrange Libration Points. There is a movement in the party to have that part removed, since no one ever talks about Lagrange points anyway. The fact that cnn.com mentions it is actually may give this part of the platform a bit more life.
You can still fight the mandatory photograph. Vermont and New Jersey issue licenses without photographs still, as does Quebec. Many states do on religious objection as well.
Why drivers lisense photos always turn out bad
Because state DMV's never cared to properly adjust the contrast on their printing equipment.
Polaroid makes ID making systems which correct themselves for those kinda factors automagically...they seem to create ok pictures (see this, in particular check out CO, DC and WV.)
Consider moving to NJ or VT--they still issue non-photo licenses.
The thing that is making me go insane is that there is a very simple cause and effect situation going on here, and law enforcement, politicians, and just about everyone completely fail to understand it.
:-)
It's very simple. Security measures are added to ID cards (whether to make their security integrity better, or to collect more information on the individual to secure the database.) The perception is that the new measures greatly increase the security of the ID card. Therefore, new uses for that card manifest, or people trust it much more in situations that they wouldn't have done before. Effect--the cost to have a good fraudulent ID have risen, but so has the gains to be had with a good fake ID. For instance, Ohio introduced the photo license in 1969. So let's say you had a fake one in 1969...it did jack shit. Now so many uses have popped up, I may be able to walk into a bank with the right fake ID, and cash out a bank account. Perhaps it costs me $1000 to get a good fake license...but it would be worth it if I can cash out someone's bank account.
In 1992 California upgraded to the digitized driver's license. The CA DMV marketed it as an uncopyable document, and with the driver's image and fingerprint archived. Big mistake...they raised the perception of trust too much. Suddenly there were significantly more fraudulent CA digitized licenses than there were fraudulent laminate licenses. How? People were going into DMV's and bribing DMV officials...the document was just too useful not to.
Bribing of DMV officials goes on :
http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/19.27.html#subj2
And if you want quantity...just steal the equipment:
http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/21.15.html#subj6
Finally, they say that security is only as good as its biggest weakness. With ID cards the biggest weakness if the sheer amount of people involved. Millions of licensed individuals, thousands of DMV employees with access to the system, and hundreds of thousands of different checkpoints/uses. It is folly to expect any security in this system whatsoever. And what bothers me is that states wanna fingerprint, use facial recognition, iris scan, or whatever to secure something which is insecurable.
My suggestion for peeps out there...move to Vermont or New Jersey--they still issue non-photo driver's licenses.
I have no problem with the fact that you would prefer a card that does ten different things...you can have that card. I just don't want it forced on everybody else, including myself.
Actually, several states, including New Jersey and Vermont still issue non-photo driver's licenses.
In many states, a marijuana possession conviction can get your license revoked (I can think of Ohio and Virginia off the top of my head.) The posession can be just walking down the street smoking the joint--being away from a car...it may still result in license revocation.