See? Space research does have spinoffs for everyday life. If we weren't trying to get to Mars, we wouldn't have this useful protocol for Earthside use.
It seems to me that, now that this is certain knowledge, the police cannot legally continue to outsource their tapping to this supplier. Surely there are required to find another, compliant, way of doing their intercepts with emergency status. Otherwise, they themselves are committing a crime. They could reasonably plead ignorance up to a certain point, but they cannot do so now.
While what you say has some elements of truth, and much that could be debated, it is entirely irrelevant to this article. Whatever the rule may be for entry to a country, is it relevant to use what is basically voodoo science to enforce them? This proposal has all the elements of 17th century witch-finding: the relationship between mitochondrial DNA and isotopic ratios in body parts has only very weak relationships to whatever basis the rules may be based on. There is correlation, which means that the relationships are true over large groups (a few hundred thousand, say). It is rather like saying that the average height of the UK population is height than that of the world, so all short people should be excluded because they are probably foreigners. Or, in fact, skin colour: there average Brit is not black, so (by the logic of this plan) no black can be a Brit.
Not sure I understand you. The Adult Education organisation was the plaintiff, the winner, in this case, complaining that the IT company they hired to set something up for them, used and modified GPL code (VNC) but did not, as required by the GPL, give them the modified sources. Presumably, the IT company was wanting to keep the AE organisation beholden to them for maintenance rather than, as the GPL hopes, being able to do it themselves or find someone else to do it if the wanted to. I.e. the GPL wanted to help the organisation you support, and the courts have just backed it up.
In December, Bansal asked Sellmon for her bank account so he could provide a monetary "gift" to her, court document said.
When Sellmon declined to provide Bansal with her bank account, he returned to her office workplace and handed her a plain envelope containing $2,000 in cash, telling her that "his company had a good year and he wanted to thank her," court filings said.
The clear implication is that the password was given well before December (otherwise why mention the month), and the contractor was just sharing the riches after the fact..
I do not feel that I am defending the woman, just trying to get a clear analysis of what occurred rather than a knee-jerk one. I think the problem here is stupidity and not criminality, and therefore any defence mechanisms put up against criminality would be wasted effort. One of the problems of current security processes is defending the things that are easy to defend, not the things that are easy to attack: armour-plating the front door while leaving the back door open. In this case, multiple checks might well have revealed that this woman was as honest as most - but not giving her training in the value of the passwords she was holding left the back door open. Those responsible for security too often ignore human factors in the wider sense: blackmail, writing passwords down, "helpful" sharing of critical information and so on.
The woman was stupid, and undoubtedly venial. Yes, she accepted $2000 which she certainly should not have done. But what would a stupid person who realises, too late, that they have given away the keys to the safe actually do? She shut up and hoped the problem would go away - which it didn't. To quote what is called Hanlon's Razor, "Never attribute to malice that which can be adequately explained by stupidity." I think this is a prime example.
Since it appears that, at the time she gave the password away, she had no expectation of reward, it is difficulty to ascribe her motivation to greed; that was my point.
Reading TFA, it looks as if she didn't sell the password, she gave it away to be helpful, and the contractor only later gave her the $2000 (and gift cards) as a present. I.e. she didn't realise what she was doing, that the password she gave him permitted him, basically, to authorise any bill he chose to submit. So she is primarily guilty of total stupidity rather than criminal intent. Maybe, for the good of the species, such stupidity should be treated as even more criminal - but it isn't.
What this makes clear, yet again, is that the human is the weakest point in any system, and any human who has not received positive training in security is a very weak point indeed. Which says that, whatever the physical security, any government database with thousands of users, let alone hundreds of thousands as planned form some, will be subverted, for certain, within months.
No - to reconstruct 1 sector you have to read one sector from every other drive, then write 1 sector to the replacement drive. Effectively, to reconstruct you have to read thw whole raid. So the read and write speeds both count.
Note that Goldacre won against Rust. To me, and to most of/., I am sure that the case is obvious. But anybody is entitled to their day in court: you sould not be able to say that someone's claim is "obviously" false, no matter how much you respect the person being claimed against, as I respect Goldacre.
And the Singh/Chiropractors case is still in the courts: the chiropractors have not won.
I am afraid this is an example of the cost of Free Speech: the Black hats have as much freedom as the White Hats - and so it must be.
The case here is for a common defence fund for the White Hats. Private Eye, when it was fighting Sir James Goldsmith, had such a fund, known as the Goldenballs fund. Lots of people chucked in a tenner or so to support the defence costs of the good guys. And if anybody is running such a fund for Singh, or for any future complants against Goldacre, I will chip in. It would be good if their attackers knew that the defence was well funded.
No, not on conventional hardware such as ARM and the Atom. The (failed) Transmeta system was intended to do something like this - but they didn't pull it off. Each CPU has its own very hard-wired instruction set, and the one thing it does well is executing that instruction set. Every layer you add on top of that consumes power and nanoseconds: the art of OS design is to consume that to the best effect.
We are already wondering how fast a native ARM system would be. Emulation on a netbook is an absolute no-go: you lose ten times over the gains you made by putting in an ARM. They are very, very differnt architectures: I would expect a 20:1 or worse slowdown by running in emulation.
There are already Arm based netbooks out there, using the current low-perofmance chips, so presumably Arm has a reasonable reference on how fast their new chip will run a Linux netbook.
I do not agree that it replaces the maps functionality. It cannot answer questions like "If I follow a straight line from A to B, how many cliffs and rivers are in the way?". Or "what is that huge building over there?". It can only tell you where you are, not what the rest of the country is like. There have been deaths in the Scottish Highlands possibly attributable to people trying to navigate by GPS close to cliff edges. Your statement may apply to road maps for car drivers, but it certainly does not apply to maps in general.
You are correct that any action put you on dozens of different databases. The problem is combining them into a single giant database. The danger of a database rises non-linearly with the amount of different data sources in it.On the one hand, one bit of data contamination can harm every aspect of your life, rather than a single portion. On the other, there is only one single target for the malicious to attack. Having multiple databases is a great level of security. Would you want to put all your money in a single investment, however allegedly wonderful, or would you rather have it spread across the market so that you are not vulnerable to a single failure? This is the same: everything about you is in one place, and it only takes one malicious or incompetent person to ruin your life. Nothing man-made is as good as this database has to be. Surely on/. we do not need point out that technology fails. British politicians, technological illiterates nearly all, have a touching belief that the technology fairies (us) will do the right thing infallibly. A long list of fiascos has not dented this belief.
The problem comes when it is available to a clerk checking up on, say, a missing property tax payment, or even an application to build a garden shed. While they need to be accessible to the right people at the right time, they should only be accessed by people who know that they are are handling critical data. They should be treated very carefully, and you simply cannot train up the vast number of people with access to the ID database to treat such records with the right respect. Under current plans, there could be 2 million people with access the the ID database - whereas I would be worried if twenty thousand could access the criminal records database,
o Who is a "trusted" editor?
o What is the qualification process for earning "trust"?
As in every organisation/nation/what have you, a founding group declares themselves worthy of trust, and decided how that is to be passed on. In the US, a group of people got together and declared unilaterally that they represented the people, and wrote a Constitution. There is no ultimate source of trust: it always derives from a founding group who pass on their self-declared trustworthiness to others. You, the outsider, can merely decide whether you consider that self-assigned virtue significant enough and thus whether to trust that institution (e.g. Wikipedia). But in the end, you have to make up your own mind.
If you are religious, you may believe in a divine source of trust - but it still seems to get passed to some pretty dodgy humans.
Or Uranium or Helium or Lithium or just about all the other elements ending in -um
I grant that Davy omitted the second i, but people like regularity - especially in regular structures like the Periodic Table. The extra letter has been added, so far as it has, by popular demand,
Cellphone. Photo passive wallplate near parking bay. You already entered your car number into the phone. Send composite to some magic number, maybe with a time. Get back a "$XX for Y minutes Y/N?" type Y, $XX charged to your phone account (unless you set up separate billing). Also sets an alarm on your phone "Parking runs out in 10 minutes". Repeat process on return to car, if desired, for refund of unused units.
Requires co-operation of phone operator, who will be happy in return for a slice of the gross. Does not require financial types. No expensive hi-tech left on street..
One reasonable reason for using a nick - not anonymous, but not your proper name - is that too many people have the same name. I have the good fortune to be, thus far, net unique (there is a picture of a four-year-old boy with the same name, so in five or six years I may have competition. But I have worked in in situation where two people in a company of 100 had the same name. If you have a common name first name (John, Mohammed) and second name (Smith, Hussein), the possibilities for confusion are considerable.
Slashdot Mirror
See? Space research does have spinoffs for everyday life. If we weren't trying to get to Mars, we wouldn't have this useful protocol for Earthside use.
Double NASA's budget at once.
On of the linked articles said that they headphones off, with RT on the flight deck audio. They were aware of the audio, but not listening to it.
It seems to me that, now that this is certain knowledge, the police cannot legally continue to outsource their tapping to this supplier. Surely there are required to find another, compliant, way of doing their intercepts with emergency status. Otherwise, they themselves are committing a crime. They could reasonably plead ignorance up to a certain point, but they cannot do so now.
Careful - only in the US do you have a year after publication. In the UK, and i think in the rest of Europe, you must patent before publication,
While what you say has some elements of truth, and much that could be debated, it is entirely irrelevant to this article. Whatever the rule may be for entry to a country, is it relevant to use what is basically voodoo science to enforce them? This proposal has all the elements of 17th century witch-finding: the relationship between mitochondrial DNA and isotopic ratios in body parts has only very weak relationships to whatever basis the rules may be based on. There is correlation, which means that the relationships are true over large groups (a few hundred thousand, say). It is rather like saying that the average height of the UK population is height than that of the world, so all short people should be excluded because they are probably foreigners. Or, in fact, skin colour: there average Brit is not black, so (by the logic of this plan) no black can be a Brit.
Not sure I understand you. The Adult Education organisation was the plaintiff, the winner, in this case, complaining that the IT company they hired to set something up for them, used and modified GPL code (VNC) but did not, as required by the GPL, give them the modified sources. Presumably, the IT company was wanting to keep the AE organisation beholden to them for maintenance rather than, as the GPL hopes, being able to do it themselves or find someone else to do it if the wanted to. I.e. the GPL wanted to help the organisation you support, and the courts have just backed it up.
To quote TFA
In December, Bansal asked Sellmon for her bank account so he could provide a monetary "gift" to her, court document said.
When Sellmon declined to provide Bansal with her bank account, he returned to her office workplace and handed her a plain envelope containing $2,000 in cash, telling her that "his company had a good year and he wanted to thank her," court filings said.
The clear implication is that the password was given well before December (otherwise why mention the month), and the contractor was just sharing the riches after the fact..
I do not feel that I am defending the woman, just trying to get a clear analysis of what occurred rather than a knee-jerk one. I think the problem here is stupidity and not criminality, and therefore any defence mechanisms put up against criminality would be wasted effort. One of the problems of current security processes is defending the things that are easy to defend, not the things that are easy to attack: armour-plating the front door while leaving the back door open. In this case, multiple checks might well have revealed that this woman was as honest as most - but not giving her training in the value of the passwords she was holding left the back door open. Those responsible for security too often ignore human factors in the wider sense: blackmail, writing passwords down, "helpful" sharing of critical information and so on.
The woman was stupid, and undoubtedly venial. Yes, she accepted $2000 which she certainly should not have done. But what would a stupid person who realises, too late, that they have given away the keys to the safe actually do? She shut up and hoped the problem would go away - which it didn't. To quote what is called Hanlon's Razor, "Never attribute to malice that which can be adequately explained by stupidity." I think this is a prime example.
Since it appears that, at the time she gave the password away, she had no expectation of reward, it is difficulty to ascribe her motivation to greed; that was my point.
Reading TFA, it looks as if she didn't sell the password, she gave it away to be helpful, and the contractor only later gave her the $2000 (and gift cards) as a present. I.e. she didn't realise what she was doing, that the password she gave him permitted him, basically, to authorise any bill he chose to submit. So she is primarily guilty of total stupidity rather than criminal intent. Maybe, for the good of the species, such stupidity should be treated as even more criminal - but it isn't.
What this makes clear, yet again, is that the human is the weakest point in any system, and any human who has not received positive training in security is a very weak point indeed. Which says that, whatever the physical security, any government database with thousands of users, let alone hundreds of thousands as planned form some, will be subverted, for certain, within months.
No - to reconstruct 1 sector you have to read one sector from every other drive, then write 1 sector to the replacement drive. Effectively, to reconstruct you have to read thw whole raid. So the read and write speeds both count.
And he therefore has a rising global temperature, which is the same mechanism the body uses to get rid of infections.
Note that Goldacre won against Rust. To me, and to most of /., I am sure that the case is obvious. But anybody is entitled to their day in court: you sould not be able to say that someone's claim is "obviously" false, no matter how much you respect the person being claimed against, as I respect Goldacre.
And the Singh/Chiropractors case is still in the courts: the chiropractors have not won.
I am afraid this is an example of the cost of Free Speech: the Black hats have as much freedom as the White Hats - and so it must be.
The case here is for a common defence fund for the White Hats. Private Eye, when it was fighting Sir James Goldsmith, had such a fund, known as the Goldenballs fund. Lots of people chucked in a tenner or so to support the defence costs of the good guys. And if anybody is running such a fund for Singh, or for any future complants against Goldacre, I will chip in. It would be good if their attackers knew that the defence was well funded.
No, not on conventional hardware such as ARM and the Atom. The (failed) Transmeta system was intended to do something like this - but they didn't pull it off. Each CPU has its own very hard-wired instruction set, and the one thing it does well is executing that instruction set. Every layer you add on top of that consumes power and nanoseconds: the art of OS design is to consume that to the best effect.
We are already wondering how fast a native ARM system would be. Emulation on a netbook is an absolute no-go: you lose ten times over the gains you made by putting in an ARM. They are very, very differnt architectures: I would expect a 20:1 or worse slowdown by running in emulation.
There are already Arm based netbooks out there, using the current low-perofmance chips, so presumably Arm has a reasonable reference on how fast their new chip will run a Linux netbook.
I do not agree that it replaces the maps functionality. It cannot answer questions like "If I follow a straight line from A to B, how many cliffs and rivers are in the way?". Or "what is that huge building over there?". It can only tell you where you are, not what the rest of the country is like. There have been deaths in the Scottish Highlands possibly attributable to people trying to navigate by GPS close to cliff edges. Your statement may apply to road maps for car drivers, but it certainly does not apply to maps in general.
You are correct that any action put you on dozens of different databases. The problem is combining them into a single giant database. The danger of a database rises non-linearly with the amount of different data sources in it.On the one hand, one bit of data contamination can harm every aspect of your life, rather than a single portion. On the other, there is only one single target for the malicious to attack. Having multiple databases is a great level of security. Would you want to put all your money in a single investment, however allegedly wonderful, or would you rather have it spread across the market so that you are not vulnerable to a single failure? This is the same: everything about you is in one place, and it only takes one malicious or incompetent person to ruin your life. Nothing man-made is as good as this database has to be. Surely on /. we do not need point out that technology fails. British politicians, technological illiterates nearly all, have a touching belief that the technology fairies (us) will do the right thing infallibly. A long list of fiascos has not dented this belief.
The problem comes when it is available to a clerk checking up on, say, a missing property tax payment, or even an application to build a garden shed. While they need to be accessible to the right people at the right time, they should only be accessed by people who know that they are are handling critical data. They should be treated very carefully, and you simply cannot train up the vast number of people with access to the ID database to treat such records with the right respect. Under current plans, there could be 2 million people with access the the ID database - whereas I would be worried if twenty thousand could access the criminal records database,
Yes, but that's one heck of a qualification.
o Who is a "trusted" editor?
o What is the qualification process for earning "trust"?
As in every organisation/nation/what have you, a founding group declares themselves worthy of trust, and decided how that is to be passed on. In the US, a group of people got together and declared unilaterally that they represented the people, and wrote a Constitution. There is no ultimate source of trust: it always derives from a founding group who pass on their self-declared trustworthiness to others. You, the outsider, can merely decide whether you consider that self-assigned virtue significant enough and thus whether to trust that institution (e.g. Wikipedia). But in the end, you have to make up your own mind.
If you are religious, you may believe in a divine source of trust - but it still seems to get passed to some pretty dodgy humans.
Add a solar powered battery charger. If the sun doesn't exist, the inability to decode this packages is one of the smaller problems she will have.
No, USB 3.0 is still copper. Early development went for optical, but that got dropped. Just 8 conductors instead of 4 in the cable.
Or Uranium or Helium or Lithium or just about all the other elements ending in -um
I grant that Davy omitted the second i, but people like regularity - especially in regular structures like the Periodic Table. The extra letter has been added, so far as it has, by popular demand,
Cellphone. Photo passive wallplate near parking bay. You already entered your car number into the phone. Send composite to some magic number, maybe with a time. Get back a "$XX for Y minutes Y/N?" type Y, $XX charged to your phone account (unless you set up separate billing). Also sets an alarm on your phone "Parking runs out in 10 minutes". Repeat process on return to car, if desired, for refund of unused units.
Requires co-operation of phone operator, who will be happy in return for a slice of the gross. Does not require financial types. No expensive hi-tech left on street..
75-year tie in to today's technology. Sheesh!
One reasonable reason for using a nick - not anonymous, but not your proper name - is that too many people have the same name. I have the good fortune to be, thus far, net unique (there is a picture of a four-year-old boy with the same name, so in five or six years I may have competition. But I have worked in in situation where two people in a company of 100 had the same name. If you have a common name first name (John, Mohammed) and second name (Smith, Hussein), the possibilities for confusion are considerable.
Nepenthes attenboroughii. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/science/article6799283.ece