Most stadium marquees have essential stat info. available, and hardcore fans will have important stats committed to memory (like the fact the Yankees have never lost a LCS series). Small radio headset to keep an "ear" on the broadcasters works just as well. If you're that desperate for real-time stats, call your friend at home using your cell phone.
"Scoring" baseball via PDA is sterile and it doesn't react well to spilled beer. A dog-eared scorebook from each season though is priceless.
Though I'm not offended by the use of PDAs for classical music, having audience members "heads down" at dramatic performances is probably not such a good idea.
At a performance this past July at the Syndey Opera House, there were projector-screen subtitles and plot elements provided to assist the audience. Perfect for opera newbies who aren't fluent in italiano. A PDA in this case, while perhaps fun, would have been impractical. Also, I think the screen illumination could be distracting for others.
This case was consolidated as part of multidistrict litigation from the Third, Ninth and D.C. Circuits. (op. at 14).
The 9th is an astute court, and intentionally "serves up" issues which the Supremes would otherwise neglect or not have before them. Please, before you critize their opinions on this or any other topic, RTFA.
One of the return to flight requirements is that NASA develop an "extension" to attach to the end of the RMS (robot arm) that can be used to inspect otherwise not viewable / inaccessable areas of the orbiter.
Spaceflight now (http://www.spaceflightnow.com/shuttle/sts114/0310 03target/) indicates that there are multiple technical goals for the first return to flight mission: "Mission STS-114, currently assigned to the shuttle Atlantis, will include a robot arm extension and sensors to look for damage to the ship's heat-shield tiles and leading edge panels; a spacewalk to test tile and leading edge repair techniques; another spacewalk to install a new gyroscope on the space station; and supply and equipment transfers to and from the lab complex"
As for the repair techniques and possibility that additional damage could occur... I would think that the RMS would be used as the work platform, as it has for other satellite-service missions. Depending on the kind of repair (I'm envisioning some caulk or spackle-like substance), it should be fairly easy to apply without too much danger of additional damage. The problem with this inspection or repair with Columbia was that there was no robot arm onboard for this mission. CAIB report, however, demonstrated that a scaffold/ladder of some kind could have been devised to allow inspection and access to the left wing leading edge.
From the "nothing is easy for NASA these days" department, Atlantis may miss its turn in the flight rotation after all. Although Discovery is currently in OMDP (Orbiter Maintenance Down Period), it or Endeavour may be the first to fly. With the loss of Columbia, the remaining orbiters are comparable in terms of capability, with the newer ones being slightly lighter thanks to new manufacturing techniques.
The reason for this is that Atlantis' nosecap (made of the same RCC material as the leading edge) was *NOT* inspected during its most recent OMDP period, even though someone generated paperwork saying it was. Evidently, it's a fairly complicated inspection that is expected to take several months. USAToday has a nice story on it: http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-10-02-shu ttle-bottomstrip_x.htm?csp=19_wxia
For anyone still following this thread, the Washington Post reports today that the ex-panel members fault Congress for inadequately funding NASA and NASA itself for sweeping their recommendations under the rug. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A408 70-2003Oct3.html
Particularly scathing is the following: "'Rather than committing to an adequate budget for the space shuttle, NASA and its congressional allies found it easier to get rid of those raising the alarm,' the former panel members said in a statement provided to The Washington Post."
Given the disclosures to date about NASA management, it is not surprising at all that they decided to squelch the messengers; just like they did the engineers who wanted on-orbit imagery during the mission. Mere resignations or re-assignments seem inadequate.
Alleged copyright infringement is a CIVIL action - since when does law enforcement drop by and seize evidence in such cases? Answer: Never. More likely, but still not probable, the RIAA can seek an injunction prohibiting a defendant from further allegedly infringing activity. If you violate the injunction, then it's contempt of court, which means possible jail time. Secondly, if you were to delete/hack/alter your computer after being served with the suit, they probably have a separate claim against you for spoliation of evidence on the theroy that once suit is started, you have an obligation NOT to destroy evidence, and if you do, is presumed that the evidence was detrimental to your position. I wouldn't worry about RIAA repo'ing your hard drive just yet.
Also, as pointed out elsewhere, from a purely economic standpoint, it often makes sense to settle for a nominal amount rather than even risk exposure to a potentially catastrophic judgment.
Somewhat off topic, but I'm wondering if anyone's homeowner's or other insurance has provided coverage to any allged infringers.
Four days before its doomed reentry, an Air Force telescope in Maui took these images of the Columbia. http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=8128
Presumably, there are other "assets" which could have provided higher resolution.
True... the Saturn V's third stage (SIV-B) can burn for 420 seconds. It was fired twice per mission, first to circularize a parking orbit around earth, then for the TLI (trans-lunar injection) burn. After the TLI, the Apollo CSM would undock, extract the LM, and discard the SIV-B booster. The CSM's engine would only be used to "brake" into lunar orbit, and then to esacpe lunar orbit on return to earth. (On Apollo 13, these were done by the LM's engine.)
So, all of the Saturn V was used to hurl a relatively light (25 ton) craft to the moon. By comparison, this is about 80% of what the shuttle can lift to LEO. THIS is what we've accomplished in 30 years?
In some European cities (thinking of Rome in particular) there are entire sections (or times) that only taxis and delviery vehicles are allowed. People adapt because they have to.
Not too great of a chance of anyone doing anything for the greater good on this side of the pond anytime soon, unfortunately. (Thanks, W.)
My understanding is that this Advisory Board was (or had become) a bunch of managers who were afraid of making anything more than "recommendations." For example, they recommened a full-envelope crew escape system, an idea which has been considered and shelved as too costly and heavy for the shuttles.
Beyond things like that, they would never issue a "No go" edict (particulaly with the Administrator and the ISS Schedule hovering over them) and risk their careers.
This Board should be dissolved, and replaced with an independent oversight board which answers to no one (execpt perhaps Congress, but certainly not the Administrator) which must clear each and every launch according to strict, non-waivable criteria.
No one knew about the foam impact in realtime during the shuttle's 8-minute ascent seqeuence. It wasn't seen until the next day when engineers were reviewing post-launch film. At that point, the shuttle was in orbit. There was no data available at the time of ascent (though some was later found in the form of sensor readings from the left wing that suggested the foam strike) warranting an abort.
Second, Columbia had two EVA suits onboard as all shuttles do. The suits are a moot point unless you can get another shuttle up there in time.
As pointed out in the CAIB report, if NASA had concluded early in the mission that Columbia was mortally damaged, there was a possibility that Atlantis (which had already been mated to its ET/SRB stack in anticipation of an upcoming mission) could be launched before consumables aboard Columbia ran out. Once in proximity, the Columbia crew, using the two EVA suits and others brought by Atlantis, could have been transferred to Atlantis. Columbia would have (presumably) been de-orbited ito the ocean or brought down on autopilot (unlikely).
Also as CAIB noted, there was PLENTY that could have been done, aside from as one engineer said, "crossing our fingers and hoping for the best." None of it was ever done, however, becuase NASA managers failed to appreciate the possibility of damage to the thermal protection system. Even if it was detected and Atlantis couldn't be launched in time, there were ideas to stuff all sorts of junk (like water-filled bags which would freeze prior to reentry) into the breach in an attempt to fortify the structure just enough to allow for re-entry and bailout (the shuttle needs to be subsonic and in level flight for bailout), even if a landing would be impossible.
As it is, the wing held together (rather impressively) through most of re-entry and the computers worked like mad to compensate for the asymmetrical drag. Eventually, however, the wing's deformity induced yaw forces that the control surfaces and steering rockets could not compensate for - when Columbia lost this tug of war, the left wing dropped, the nose swung hard to the left (relative to the path of travel) in a "skid" -all adding up to a very bad day at hypersonic speeds.
To say that there was "nothing" NASA could have done (had they appreciated the extent of the damage) is just not true.
Lost in the post-Columbia ducking-and-cover was the unveiling of its nuclear propulsion initiative, perhaps ironically titled "Project Prometheus."
Appears to be a follow-on to the Project Orion (nuclear launch to interplanetary travel idea) of the '50s, without the atmospheric hydrogenbomb vs. pusher-plate. Ion propulsion is good and clean, but probably too slow for manned interplanerary flight (in terms of other consumables that would have to be carried) unless there is a real habitiability breakthrough. Plus, by the time you reached max. accelleration, you'd have to pitch around and start braking so you can maneuver into a capture orbit. Might be intriguing for trans-Jupiter flights, but gravity assists are pretty standard now.
At some point, an Europa Orbiter / Lander / Submersible was proposed (Icepick was the name, I think), it got axed in one of the budget fights.
Because of Galileo's extemely elliptical orbit -- think of a comet around the sun -- (required because it's mission was to visit most of Jupiter's moons), it's constantly in need of tweaking in the form of thruster firings to keep it from blundering into something (besides Jupiter) while still keeping its antennae pointed towards Earth.
The maneuvering fuel is nearly gone, and the spacecraft components have sustained many tens of times their design tolerances of radiation. Taken together, it's entirely possible that Galileo would soon become uncontrollable and crash somewhere like Eurpoa, where we may one day send probes to search for life. Because Galileo was not sterilized before launch, it would contaminate wherever it ended up, and could cast doubt of any future test results from expeditions there.
(As a testimony to the hardiness of life, microbes on a camera lens or something were brought to and back from the moon, it wasn't until later that they realized someone sneezed on the lens or some nonsense and the damn bugs survived the whole round trip).
While it would be nostalgic to have left Galileo in orbital purgatory around Jupiter, it's not possible to do this with any assurance that it won't later be a hazard. It is fitting, in a way, that Galileo will become part of Jupiter, the target of so much of its (and his) focus. If only NASA would bring the success of this mission into the public spotlight as a way to raise awareness as to its more successful programs.
Coming soon to Saturn - Cassini, July 4, 2004. (Alas, the last of the "great explorer" probes.)
In one of Tom Clancy's recent books (the one preceding Executive Orders), some U.S. operatives in a hotel overlooking an airport are posing as a Russian TV crew. They use a EMP-like device disguised as a camera light to fry the electronics on enemy planes as they land, causing them lose control, crash, etc. Might sound like fiction, but then again, Clancy also theorized a passenger jet slamming into the Capitol, so then again, it might not.
As for terrorists using some kind of SAM to hit a passenger jet, it's not an unlikely scenario, already been tried a few times overseas. I'd be more concerned with an attempt to take one out on takeoff than landing - the engines are at max thrust (making a massive IR signature), and the plane's angle of attack is high in a departure climb, so the forward relatively low, making it less maneuverable (even at max thrust). Even if the pilot would try to evade, it's much more difficult, he'd have to drop the nose to gain speed, and by then, half a wing would probably be missing.. then there's all the fuel. Could be quite messy.
Columbia had two EVA suits onboard, but no Remote Manipulator ("robot arm") in the cargo bay which would have made inspecting the suspected wing more difficult, but not impossible. The CAIB report theorizes that two astronauts using an improvised ladder fashioned from on board materials could have hung the ladder over the side of the cargo bay and "climbed" down it to inspect the wing. The most scorching indictment is NASA is that no one had the foresight and imagination during the mission to insist on this or any other type of inspection.
Somewhere in the scrap-heap of paper circulated 15+ years ago as part of the Rogers Commission investigating Challenger, is something called a "Shuttle-C" - and an unmanned, wingless, throwaway cargo module with an orbiter's aft fuselage.
Since it's not coming back, no need for a heat sheild or those pesky tiles.
Since it's unmanned, no need for life support.
All of that weight saved is a commesurate increase in cargo capacity, who knows, maybe it could even go beyond LEO. Bolted to an external tank and SRBs, it is a Saturn V/Energia-class heavy-lift vehicle. It would compliment an OSP for crew transfers rather nicely. Keep the remaining orbiters in the shed unless we need them for something specific like servicing HST or ISS construction, just a thought.
The analogy between "driving to work" and coordinating a series of simultaneous controlled explosions to accellerate from zero to 17,500 mph is a little over 8 minutes is a little weak, they simply are not equivalent in terms of complexity.
Moreover, I'm not sure I understand the "body count" analysis in your post. By that reasoning, we should just fly first, worry later until a sufficient number of people have died.
In any event, look at it this way - if you drive down an unpaved gravel road every day, it's not unforeseeable that someday, sooner or later, there will be a rock that kicks up and destroys your windshield. It's a risk, you accept it by driving the road. The flaw is never thinking that the rock will fly up and hit your windshield or that if it did hit, the glass would be fine, just like the managers never thought the foam that they knew was hitting the Shuttles was a danger - they even spoke of it with quasi-harmless description for the damage, "popcorning."
Instead, they act denser than any substance known to man. In fact, safety margins were so eroded that controller were unaware of mortal damage to the ship for over two weeks as it circled overhead. In my mind, such negligence is inexcusable.
While Challenger was attributable in part to NASA's pressure to launch and maintain a schedule (so called "Go Fever"), this time, everyone just crossed their fingers and hoped for the best. Dropping the ball in such an obvious way is worse, as it's omniously indicative of a dysfunctional institution.
And no one (including Boeing) thought to hypothesize what would happen if the foam hit the RCC, everyone assumed it hit the tiles beneath the left wing.
It was the "groupthink" that made the collective efforts of otherwise well-trained and intelligent people fail to ask the important and hard questions about the foam debris issue. Instead of asking whether the damage caused by the foam was insignificant, they asked whether any damage at all occurred. Management put the people with the slide rules and grave concerns on the defensive, asking THEM to justify the safety concerns when they should have assumed "worse case" until proven otherwise.
Even then, it's not clear that anything could have been done once Columbia reached orbit (as the imagery of the debris strike was not reviewed until after ascent), but it would have, at least, given the crew a chance. As it was, they died more because of wholly preventible human failings than a flaw in the design of the system.
What I find most distressing is how the mission managers and program managers have all run for cover. There are people to blame, starting with the folks who never followed up on the previous foam issues; the managers who squelched engineers requests for imagery; and the mission team who met a handful of times during the flight (even though the regs require daily meetings) and never thought of what might happen if the foam had hit the RCC. Come on, it IS rocket science guys.
A few years ago, Clementine detected indications of water-ice in some permanently shadowed craters near the southern lunar pole. One of those could make a great place for a telescope, particularly one in the IR-band. The coolant would last a heck of a long time thanks to the permanent shadow. We could even use the water-ice on site to create a closed-loop LOX-cooled telescope perhaps. I'd rather see that project than any one of a number of unneeded DOD projects.
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I, for one, welcome our vampiric litigious overlor... oh.. they're already here, that's right.
"Scoring" baseball via PDA is sterile and it doesn't react well to spilled beer. A dog-eared scorebook from each season though is priceless.
At a performance this past July at the Syndey Opera House, there were projector-screen subtitles and plot elements provided to assist the audience. Perfect for opera newbies who aren't fluent in italiano. A PDA in this case, while perhaps fun, would have been impractical. Also, I think the screen illumination could be distracting for others.
The 9th is an astute court, and intentionally "serves up" issues which the Supremes would otherwise neglect or not have before them. Please, before you critize their opinions on this or any other topic, RTFA.
Spaceflight now (http://www.spaceflightnow.com/shuttle/sts114/0310 03target/) indicates that there are multiple technical goals for the first return to flight mission: "Mission STS-114, currently assigned to the shuttle Atlantis, will include a robot arm extension and sensors to look for damage to the ship's heat-shield tiles and leading edge panels; a spacewalk to test tile and leading edge repair techniques; another spacewalk to install a new gyroscope on the space station; and supply and equipment transfers to and from the lab complex"
As for the repair techniques and possibility that additional damage could occur... I would think that the RMS would be used as the work platform, as it has for other satellite-service missions. Depending on the kind of repair (I'm envisioning some caulk or spackle-like substance), it should be fairly easy to apply without too much danger of additional damage. The problem with this inspection or repair with Columbia was that there was no robot arm onboard for this mission. CAIB report, however, demonstrated that a scaffold/ladder of some kind could have been devised to allow inspection and access to the left wing leading edge.
The reason for this is that Atlantis' nosecap (made of the same RCC material as the leading edge) was *NOT* inspected during its most recent OMDP period, even though someone generated paperwork saying it was. Evidently, it's a fairly complicated inspection that is expected to take several months. USAToday has a nice story on it: http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-10-02-shu ttle-bottomstrip_x.htm?csp=19_wxia
Particularly scathing is the following: "'Rather than committing to an adequate budget for the space shuttle, NASA and its congressional allies found it easier to get rid of those raising the alarm,' the former panel members said in a statement provided to The Washington Post."
Given the disclosures to date about NASA management, it is not surprising at all that they decided to squelch the messengers; just like they did the engineers who wanted on-orbit imagery during the mission. Mere resignations or re-assignments seem inadequate.
Also, as pointed out elsewhere, from a purely economic standpoint, it often makes sense to settle for a nominal amount rather than even risk exposure to a potentially catastrophic judgment.
Somewhat off topic, but I'm wondering if anyone's homeowner's or other insurance has provided coverage to any allged infringers.
Seems like the RIAA would have a heck of a time trying to track me down from a public hotspot, no?
"The Revolution" roller coaster at Six Flags, Magic Mountain in Valencia, CA, gives you 4.9 Gs. Probably better on re-entry also.
Presumably, there are other "assets" which could have provided higher resolution.
So, all of the Saturn V was used to hurl a relatively light (25 ton) craft to the moon. By comparison, this is about 80% of what the shuttle can lift to LEO. THIS is what we've accomplished in 30 years?
Not too great of a chance of anyone doing anything for the greater good on this side of the pond anytime soon, unfortunately. (Thanks, W.)
Beyond things like that, they would never issue a "No go" edict (particulaly with the Administrator and the ISS Schedule hovering over them) and risk their careers.
This Board should be dissolved, and replaced with an independent oversight board which answers to no one (execpt perhaps Congress, but certainly not the Administrator) which must clear each and every launch according to strict, non-waivable criteria.
Second, Columbia had two EVA suits onboard as all shuttles do. The suits are a moot point unless you can get another shuttle up there in time.
As pointed out in the CAIB report, if NASA had concluded early in the mission that Columbia was mortally damaged, there was a possibility that Atlantis (which had already been mated to its ET/SRB stack in anticipation of an upcoming mission) could be launched before consumables aboard Columbia ran out. Once in proximity, the Columbia crew, using the two EVA suits and others brought by Atlantis, could have been transferred to Atlantis. Columbia would have (presumably) been de-orbited ito the ocean or brought down on autopilot (unlikely).
Also as CAIB noted, there was PLENTY that could have been done, aside from as one engineer said, "crossing our fingers and hoping for the best." None of it was ever done, however, becuase NASA managers failed to appreciate the possibility of damage to the thermal protection system. Even if it was detected and Atlantis couldn't be launched in time, there were ideas to stuff all sorts of junk (like water-filled bags which would freeze prior to reentry) into the breach in an attempt to fortify the structure just enough to allow for re-entry and bailout (the shuttle needs to be subsonic and in level flight for bailout), even if a landing would be impossible.
As it is, the wing held together (rather impressively) through most of re-entry and the computers worked like mad to compensate for the asymmetrical drag. Eventually, however, the wing's deformity induced yaw forces that the control surfaces and steering rockets could not compensate for - when Columbia lost this tug of war, the left wing dropped, the nose swung hard to the left (relative to the path of travel) in a "skid" -all adding up to a very bad day at hypersonic speeds.
To say that there was "nothing" NASA could have done (had they appreciated the extent of the damage) is just not true.
Appears to be a follow-on to the Project Orion (nuclear launch to interplanetary travel idea) of the '50s, without the atmospheric hydrogenbomb vs. pusher-plate. Ion propulsion is good and clean, but probably too slow for manned interplanerary flight (in terms of other consumables that would have to be carried) unless there is a real habitiability breakthrough. Plus, by the time you reached max. accelleration, you'd have to pitch around and start braking so you can maneuver into a capture orbit. Might be intriguing for trans-Jupiter flights, but gravity assists are pretty standard now.
At some point, an Europa Orbiter / Lander / Submersible was proposed (Icepick was the name, I think), it got axed in one of the budget fights.
The maneuvering fuel is nearly gone, and the spacecraft components have sustained many tens of times their design tolerances of radiation. Taken together, it's entirely possible that Galileo would soon become uncontrollable and crash somewhere like Eurpoa, where we may one day send probes to search for life. Because Galileo was not sterilized before launch, it would contaminate wherever it ended up, and could cast doubt of any future test results from expeditions there.
(As a testimony to the hardiness of life, microbes on a camera lens or something were brought to and back from the moon, it wasn't until later that they realized someone sneezed on the lens or some nonsense and the damn bugs survived the whole round trip).
While it would be nostalgic to have left Galileo in orbital purgatory around Jupiter, it's not possible to do this with any assurance that it won't later be a hazard. It is fitting, in a way, that Galileo will become part of Jupiter, the target of so much of its (and his) focus. If only NASA would bring the success of this mission into the public spotlight as a way to raise awareness as to its more successful programs.
Coming soon to Saturn - Cassini, July 4, 2004. (Alas, the last of the "great explorer" probes.)
As for terrorists using some kind of SAM to hit a passenger jet, it's not an unlikely scenario, already been tried a few times overseas. I'd be more concerned with an attempt to take one out on takeoff than landing - the engines are at max thrust (making a massive IR signature), and the plane's angle of attack is high in a departure climb, so the forward relatively low, making it less maneuverable (even at max thrust). Even if the pilot would try to evade, it's much more difficult, he'd have to drop the nose to gain speed, and by then, half a wing would probably be missing.. then there's all the fuel. Could be quite messy.
Columbia had two EVA suits onboard, but no Remote Manipulator ("robot arm") in the cargo bay which would have made inspecting the suspected wing more difficult, but not impossible. The CAIB report theorizes that two astronauts using an improvised ladder fashioned from on board materials could have hung the ladder over the side of the cargo bay and "climbed" down it to inspect the wing. The most scorching indictment is NASA is that no one had the foresight and imagination during the mission to insist on this or any other type of inspection.
Since it's not coming back, no need for a heat sheild or those pesky tiles.
Since it's unmanned, no need for life support.
All of that weight saved is a commesurate increase in cargo capacity, who knows, maybe it could even go beyond LEO. Bolted to an external tank and SRBs, it is a Saturn V/Energia-class heavy-lift vehicle. It would compliment an OSP for crew transfers rather nicely. Keep the remaining orbiters in the shed unless we need them for something specific like servicing HST or ISS construction, just a thought.
Moreover, I'm not sure I understand the "body count" analysis in your post. By that reasoning, we should just fly first, worry later until a sufficient number of people have died.
In any event, look at it this way - if you drive down an unpaved gravel road every day, it's not unforeseeable that someday, sooner or later, there will be a rock that kicks up and destroys your windshield. It's a risk, you accept it by driving the road. The flaw is never thinking that the rock will fly up and hit your windshield or that if it did hit, the glass would be fine, just like the managers never thought the foam that they knew was hitting the Shuttles was a danger - they even spoke of it with quasi-harmless description for the damage, "popcorning."
Instead, they act denser than any substance known to man. In fact, safety margins were so eroded that controller were unaware of mortal damage to the ship for over two weeks as it circled overhead. In my mind, such negligence is inexcusable.
While Challenger was attributable in part to NASA's pressure to launch and maintain a schedule (so called "Go Fever"), this time, everyone just crossed their fingers and hoped for the best. Dropping the ball in such an obvious way is worse, as it's omniously indicative of a dysfunctional institution.
And no one (including Boeing) thought to hypothesize what would happen if the foam hit the RCC, everyone assumed it hit the tiles beneath the left wing.
Even then, it's not clear that anything could have been done once Columbia reached orbit (as the imagery of the debris strike was not reviewed until after ascent), but it would have, at least, given the crew a chance. As it was, they died more because of wholly preventible human failings than a flaw in the design of the system.
What I find most distressing is how the mission managers and program managers have all run for cover. There are people to blame, starting with the folks who never followed up on the previous foam issues; the managers who squelched engineers requests for imagery; and the mission team who met a handful of times during the flight (even though the regs require daily meetings) and never thought of what might happen if the foam had hit the RCC. Come on, it IS rocket science guys.
A few years ago, Clementine detected indications of water-ice in some permanently shadowed craters near the southern lunar pole. One of those could make a great place for a telescope, particularly one in the IR-band. The coolant would last a heck of a long time thanks to the permanent shadow. We could even use the water-ice on site to create a closed-loop LOX-cooled telescope perhaps. I'd rather see that project than any one of a number of unneeded DOD projects.