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More alternative links, besides www.wikileaks.be:
www.wikileaks.ws
www.wikileaks.cx

WikiLeaks information about the story at the Sunshine Press copy of WikiLeaks: Cayman Tax Avoidance.

The way WikiLeaks recommends to find stories about the censorship: Google News.

Excellent article: Wikileaks' Leaked Documents Blocked But Unbowed. I got all the above information from that article.

Quotes from the Cryptome.org story mentioned in the parent comment:

"The website WikiLeaks.org has been taken off line in many parts of the world. "

"Several factors have taken the site off line including DDoS attacks, which was followed by a fire which took out the main servers hosting the site in Sweden..."

Wikileaks previously published hundreds of documents obtained from a whistleblower of the Swiss Bank, "purportedly showing offshore tax evasion and money laundering by extremely wealthy and in some cases, politically sensitive, clients from the US, Europe, China and Peru."

WikiLeaks is available at it's IP address: http://88.80.13.160/ also a mirror site: http://wikileaks.be/ For the docs at the centre of the controversy, you can get them at http://cryptome.org/wikileaks-bjb.htm

In 2004, the signs in the river next to manhattan warning ships of a submerged gas pipeline were removed -- I assume it was fear that someone would try to do this on purpose. But, I think that the increased chance of someone damaging it by dropping anchor outweighs the chance of intentional damage... but I feel safer now that these safety signs have been removed (sarcasm).

Geothermal scares me because I don't know how the earth can replenish its internal heat if it's surrounded with so much water and air that's rarely above 100F.

yeah, if we are not careful the earth might stop spinning and the density of the earth's crust will increase by .000000000000002%, by all means be careful

Then there's nuclear. By itself, it consumes precious little real estate,

That's what they said in Chernobyl, "Hey let's put this reactor here, it will consume precious little real estate."

I notice that the key difference from these orbital photos of nuclear power plants how "little" real estate they consume. The difference is they consume arable land, and wind can be put in remote areas or at sea.

the only output is steam...and the radiation output is a fraction of coal

I've seen this laughable point brought up so many times like some sort of card trick that *suddenly* coal power is more radioactive that nuclear power. All it illustrates is how blaze ah the nuclear industry is with radioactive isotopes that are cancerous to humans depending on what element they analogue. Of course it's qualified with the phrase "In normal operation" to distance the nuclear industry from it's many 'incidents' where radioactive elements are released into the environment. Windscale, Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and a plethora of 'accidents' that, because it's "an accident", doesn't get included in the radiation released by nuclear power plants cause it's "not normal operations". Beside older Nuclear power plants vent approximately 100 cubic feet of Noble gasses roughly every two weeks, that decay into deadlier elements, and thats NRC standard operating procedure.

It is irrelevant how much radioactive elements are released "in normal operation" because the entire supporting cycle releases so many radioactive elements and radioactivity and only exists to support reactors "In normal operations". Incidents are a fact of life for nuclear power, they happen because the nuclear industry exists, so telling me that the entire coal industry worldwide releases more radioactivity than Chernobyl released and will continues to release just illustrates that nuclear industry and it's supporters cannot take responsibility for it's failures and instead tries to qualify it with "In normal operations" . Beside's, all radioactive elements accumulate in the food chain.

If you toss in breeder reactors, or reprocessing of spent fuel,

sure, when the material sciences advance enough to solve the engineering problems that prevent building a reactor above 1Gw that last's longer than 40 years - let's say a facility should last 1000 years. Sure breeders will be useful one day, but today alot more work needs to be done to develop that technology.

then you end up throwing out the whole Yucca Mountain problem

and replace it with the mess you have now, dood A geologically stable (yes I know this is not Yucca) waste repository is the begining of a breeder program - not an after thought

and are left with a 100 year half life problem to deal with

600 years for that sort of fissile ash, but also ALOT more radioactive emphasizing the need for a waste dump made of GRANITE, not pumice.

and more power than mankind can calculate using any time soon

Do you reckon it will be too cheap to meter?

All this benefit, and it's a constant supply of power, too.

Oh really, then why do Nukleer power plants struggle to get 24 "Full Power Years" out of a reactor designed to last 40 years?

Nuclear is here, it's clean and it's safer than burning coal. There's plenty of research to do to add to its benefits,

Wind

Ah yes, the Versatile Disc..

Sometimes it fucks you...

And sometimes you fuck it...

Yes, of course, Wikileaks is our moral compass on "truthiness". No way they are spinning and scamming for their own benefit.

  You have short memory.
  http://cryptome.org/wikileaks/wikileaks-leak.htm

    wikileaks calling pot black

Well, the US Government thinks they know what we think. Thinking of crime is a crime in itself for them. Think before you think!

I'd imagine that the creepy dude in the next apartment gets a quite usable signal from your wireless keyboard. As does the hippie type upstairs and the guy across the hall with too many teeth, two expensive cars, and no visible means of support. Then there are the fake cable company employees out in the parking lot. Maybe they are using that 27 element yagi on top of the van for something other than tracking errant cable TV signals down.

I don't think it is something to be overly paranoid about unless you are in charge of security for a company with real secrets to protect, but here's a link http://cryptome.org/tempest-leak.htm.

Note that TEMPEST is mostly concerned with inadvertent radiation from equipment that is supposed to be hard wired. Wireless stuff deliberately puts out an RF signal, so its range is probably going to be a lot greater.

MS Explorer is sinking after hitting an iceberg - pictures
Explorer lists heavily after hitting submerged ice off of Antarctica and began taking on water - pictures
Apparently it went down, and 150 people had to be evacuated. Not sure what the weird boat pics are about... digg

I'm not sure how Mr. Shamir envisions a simple "math error" causing a problem.

From the horse's mouth Also note the update at the top of the page.

I am no a mathematician but surely if you're going to submit a computer aided proof you must submit a full copy of the program. The are all manor of subtle mistakes that can be made in a program that could cause serious problems with a proof.

Suppose you inspect the source and find it to be faultless, how can you trust the compiler. And if you hand compile the compiler, how can you trust the CPU? Surely it's turtles all the way down.

In many ways, establishing the correctness of a computer-aided proof is very much like security engineering. You want to verify that the whole software stack is operating correctly before you can trust the result. Having the source-code is a pre-requisite to this exercise.

Changing to topic slightly, I was particularly heartened to see that the open-source mathematics framework being developed one of the authors of the article involves the use of Python.

My immediate thought when seeing the title to the article was "Python is the answer." When some problem or algorithm intrigues me the first thing that happens is that I reach for the Python interpreter.

Python seems to deftly marry precision with looseness. When code is laid out in Python I find it is easier to see what it's trying to do than other languages. It's aesthetic qualities aside, it supports a number of features out of the box which I imagine would be ideal of mathematicians. To list a few, it's treating of lists and tuples as first class objects, support for large integers, complex numbers, it's ability to integrate with C for high-performance work.

I often think of Python as "basic done right" and it's ideal for mathematicians (or anybody) who don't want to think about programming but the problem at hand.

Simon

And the hits just keep on comin'. It would be silly to ever trust those people(Hushmail and others like them) to begin with. But, as it turns out, your hardware's giving you up anyway.

It was on the Cypherpunks list - then picked up at CRYPTOME.

http://cryptome.org/hushmail-rat.htm

what those guys at KWikileaks have done is no worse than what http://cryptome.org/ were doing/did(are they still up?)

Go ahead and keep on arguing about Iraq and the "war on terrorism" and Jane Fonda and some other irrelevant bullshit. I'm just gonna keep on reading and getting my lulz.

Oh, give me a break that's FUD and you know it. No, your open source programs may not be able to touch TC applications or TC data, but there's nothing inherently magic about open source code. To prevent open source you'd have to prevent any unsigned code, which would bring pretty much all of Windows development, proprietary, in education or otherwise to a screeching halt. That $600 million anti-trust fine would be a $6 billion fine if Microsoft ever tried to pull something like that. What is likely is that it'll be another Windows/IE/WMP/TC required lock-in, and maybe some very secure closed networks will refuse to let non-attestated machines on, which could be a good thing since MAC spoofing is trivial and bringing a hostile host on a network with stolen credentials is too easy. To think that your average residential ISP will give a shit about your Linux machine is tinfoil loony-bin scaremongering, and won't get you taken seriously anywhere.

Unless they make hacker tools illegal. Seriously, you think the U.S. government wouldn't love to ban unsigned software to protect the children from terrorists, porn, and pedophiles? The SSSCA aka Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act was essentially the legislation that could have done it. Thank god Hollings is gone at least.

Oh, give me a break that's FUD and you know it. No, your open source programs may not be able to touch TC applications or TC data, but there's nothing inherently magic about open source code. To prevent open source you'd have to prevent any unsigned code, which would bring pretty much all of Windows development, proprietary, in education or otherwise to a screeching halt. That $600 million anti-trust fine would be a $6 billion fine if Microsoft ever tried to pull something like that. What is likely is that it'll be another Windows/IE/WMP/TC required lock-in, and maybe some very secure closed networks will refuse to let non-attestated machines on, which could be a good thing since MAC spoofing is trivial and bringing a hostile host on a network with stolen credentials is too easy. To think that your average residential ISP will give a shit about your Linux machine is tinfoil loony-bin scaremongering, and won't get you taken seriously anywhere.

Unless they make hacker tools illegal. Seriously, you think the U.S. government wouldn't love to ban unsigned software to protect the children from terrorists, porn, and pedophiles? The SSSCA aka Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act was essentially the legislation that could have done it. Thank god Hollings is gone at least.

http://cryptome.org/google/kunia-us.htm

Screw this B.S.

Knowledge is power.
Even seemingly insignificant information

http://www.cryptome.org/

> there are profound difficulties involved in scaling quantum computing.

15 was factored with a quantum computer in 2001: http://cryptome.org/shor-nature.htm
Now, six years later, we've advanced to the point where we can factor, um, 15.
(Maybe this is a method expected to scale better in future or something. But, as you say, not an immediate problem.)

I've been following the Wikileaks idea for a bit, every since Cryptome published a bunch of info about it.

I'm in two minds about Wikileaks. On the one hand, the idea is kind of cool - I'm all for whistle-blowers, and think they perform a vital function. It's sometimes important for the public to see information that could be blocked from public release due to legal pressures.

But on the other hand, maybe that information should not be in the public domain, as it could put lives at risk (as was argued in the previous link).

Also, it's ultimately flawed in the same way that business Web 2.0 review-type sites are flawed: you can't trust the information worth a damn. People have a terrible habit of trying to set up someone they feel disgruntled about, or wish to slander a company that they feel treated them unfairly. Or, of course, they could just be out to rubbish a competitor.

Wikileaks is likely to become a stomping ground of disinformation, misinformation, and vendettas, and if they think the wisdom of the crowds is going to be able to judge that a piece of information is, in fact, a forgery, they're fools.

Also, who exactly will be held accountable when it's used, say, to swing an election, only for us to discover that the information in question was bogus? Wikileaks? Will they hand over the leaker?

I can't help but feel that Wikileaks may, in fact, do more harm than good. A few bad incidents at Wikileaks, and it's highly likely that the law (and government, business etc.) is going to come down hard to silence legitimate whistle-blowers under the pretext of protecting themselves from slander and libel.

What's really needed is a system of legal mechanisms to encourage and protect leakers in the real world, as well as allow a system of accountability. The incidents described by leakers who stepped forward regarding corruption in Iraq indicates that there are simply not enough legal avenues open to help and protect whistle-blowers.

Telling the whole world about it might not be the smartest thing to do.

EFF seems to think it is the smartest thing to do.

Are these people liars?

http://cryptome.org/cia-plane-nc.htm

Proof or GTFO.

John Young's Cryptome site already blew the lid off this stale but frightening story about Wikipedia.

Your own fake Wikipedia article is the best way to thwart the No-Such-Agency spooks and other miscreants who secretly control Wikipedia and push their own evil agenda to the detriment of truth and knowledge.

The Wayne Madsen Report is currently the best source of out-the-spooks reportage.

Did banning this video save any children? http://www.cryptome.org/

According to documents which the Coast Guard provided to the Committee (mere hours before the hearing) the Coast Guard confessed that during the Bluewater projects the Coast Guard only provided one or specification was provided to Lockheed Martin in regards to the this series of ships being required to protect classified information was "MIL-HDBK-232, Red/Black Engineering - Installation Guidelines.", and that there were zero... get this... ZERO other TEMPEST requires, measurements, or guidelines listed in the contract spec.

In turn this allowed LM to deliver nothing of value in regards to TEMPEST, but wait, it gets even worse. Lockheed Martin even ignored the requirements of MIL-HDBK-232, so that when they delivered the they were not in compliance with even the single TEMPEST related specification they were given as part of the contract.

According to documents which the Coast Guard provided to the Committee (mere hours before the hearing) the Coast Guard confessed that during the Bluewater projects the Coast Guard only provided one or specification was provided to Lockheed Martin in regards to the this series of ships being required to protect classified information was "MIL-HDBK-232, Red/Black Engineering - Installation Guidelines.", and that there were zero... get this... ZERO other TEMPEST requires, measurements, or guidelines listed in the contract spec.

In turn this allowed LM to deliver nothing of value in regards to TEMPEST, but wait, it gets even worse. Lockheed Martin even ignored the requirements of MIL-HDBK-232, so that when they delivered the they were not in compliance with even the single TEMPEST related specification they were given as part of the contract.

According to documents which the Coast Guard provided to the Committee (mere hours before the hearing) the Coast Guard confessed that during the Bluewater projects the Coast Guard only provided one or specification was provided to Lockheed Martin in regards to the this series of ships being required to protect classified information was "MIL-HDBK-232, Red/Black Engineering - Installation Guidelines.", and that there were zero... get this... ZERO other TEMPEST requires, measurements, or guidelines listed in the contract spec.

In turn this allowed LM to deliver nothing of value in regards to TEMPEST, but wait, it gets even worse. Lockheed Martin even ignored the requirements of MIL-HDBK-232, so that when they delivered the they were not in compliance with even the single TEMPEST related specification they were given as part of the contract.

I really hope it will make the work faster but will be very surprised if any 'real' info is ever released.

1 May 2007. A. writes to Cryptome:

I couldn't help but notice that Verio issued the shutdown notice on the same day that you posted the first information from the Coast Guard Deepwater program debacle.

Is is possible that either the Coast Guard or Lockheed is behind shutting you down?

http://cryptome.org/cg-unmet.htm + Coast Guard Unmet TEMPEST Requirements April 23, 2007
http://cryptome.org/cg-ugly.htm + Ugly Questions for Coast Guard on TEMPEST April 22, 2007
http://cryptome.org/cg-leakage2.htm + Michael DeKort on Coast Guard TEMPEST Leakage April 22, 2007
http://cryptome.org/cg-leakage.htm + James Atkinson on Coast Guard TEMPEST Leakage April 21, 2007
http://cryptome.org/cg-screwup.htm + Coast Guard Big Time Screw Up April 20, 2007

Cryptome answers:

A, you hit the nail on the head. The Deepwater expose, and attempts to conceal it, points to the prime suspect for the shutdown. Verio would not buckle for anything less, based on past practice, and are probably hoping the shutdown would be seen for what it really is: they've been ordered not to disclose anything which would call attention to the Deepwater material and its threat to national security.

The congressional folks may have more to demand answers about trying to suppress Deepwater failures: subpoena Verio, show the defense cartel's dirty fighting is getting dirtier.

The archived Deepwater material will be posted shortly.

1 May 2007. A. writes to Cryptome:

I couldn't help but notice that Verio issued the shutdown notice on the same day that you posted the first information from the Coast Guard Deepwater program debacle.

Is is possible that either the Coast Guard or Lockheed is behind shutting you down?

http://cryptome.org/cg-unmet.htm + Coast Guard Unmet TEMPEST Requirements April 23, 2007
http://cryptome.org/cg-ugly.htm + Ugly Questions for Coast Guard on TEMPEST April 22, 2007
http://cryptome.org/cg-leakage2.htm + Michael DeKort on Coast Guard TEMPEST Leakage April 22, 2007
http://cryptome.org/cg-leakage.htm + James Atkinson on Coast Guard TEMPEST Leakage April 21, 2007
http://cryptome.org/cg-screwup.htm + Coast Guard Big Time Screw Up April 20, 2007

Cryptome answers:

A, you hit the nail on the head. The Deepwater expose, and attempts to conceal it, points to the prime suspect for the shutdown. Verio would not buckle for anything less, based on past practice, and are probably hoping the shutdown would be seen for what it really is: they've been ordered not to disclose anything which would call attention to the Deepwater material and its threat to national security.

The congressional folks may have more to demand answers about trying to suppress Deepwater failures: subpoena Verio, show the defense cartel's dirty fighting is getting dirtier.

The archived Deepwater material will be posted shortly.

1 May 2007. A. writes to Cryptome:

I couldn't help but notice that Verio issued the shutdown notice on the same day that you posted the first information from the Coast Guard Deepwater program debacle.

Is is possible that either the Coast Guard or Lockheed is behind shutting you down?

http://cryptome.org/cg-unmet.htm + Coast Guard Unmet TEMPEST Requirements April 23, 2007
http://cryptome.org/cg-ugly.htm + Ugly Questions for Coast Guard on TEMPEST April 22, 2007
http://cryptome.org/cg-leakage2.htm + Michael DeKort on Coast Guard TEMPEST Leakage April 22, 2007
http://cryptome.org/cg-leakage.htm + James Atkinson on Coast Guard TEMPEST Leakage April 21, 2007
http://cryptome.org/cg-screwup.htm + Coast Guard Big Time Screw Up April 20, 2007

Cryptome answers:

A, you hit the nail on the head. The Deepwater expose, and attempts to conceal it, points to the prime suspect for the shutdown. Verio would not buckle for anything less, based on past practice, and are probably hoping the shutdown would be seen for what it really is: they've been ordered not to disclose anything which would call attention to the Deepwater material and its threat to national security.

The congressional folks may have more to demand answers about trying to suppress Deepwater failures: subpoena Verio, show the defense cartel's dirty fighting is getting dirtier.

The archived Deepwater material will be posted shortly.

1 May 2007. A. writes to Cryptome:

I couldn't help but notice that Verio issued the shutdown notice on the same day that you posted the first information from the Coast Guard Deepwater program debacle.

Is is possible that either the Coast Guard or Lockheed is behind shutting you down?

http://cryptome.org/cg-unmet.htm + Coast Guard Unmet TEMPEST Requirements April 23, 2007
http://cryptome.org/cg-ugly.htm + Ugly Questions for Coast Guard on TEMPEST April 22, 2007
http://cryptome.org/cg-leakage2.htm + Michael DeKort on Coast Guard TEMPEST Leakage April 22, 2007
http://cryptome.org/cg-leakage.htm + James Atkinson on Coast Guard TEMPEST Leakage April 21, 2007
http://cryptome.org/cg-screwup.htm + Coast Guard Big Time Screw Up April 20, 2007

Cryptome answers:

A, you hit the nail on the head. The Deepwater expose, and attempts to conceal it, points to the prime suspect for the shutdown. Verio would not buckle for anything less, based on past practice, and are probably hoping the shutdown would be seen for what it really is: they've been ordered not to disclose anything which would call attention to the Deepwater material and its threat to national security.

The congressional folks may have more to demand answers about trying to suppress Deepwater failures: subpoena Verio, show the defense cartel's dirty fighting is getting dirtier.

The archived Deepwater material will be posted shortly.

1 May 2007. A. writes to Cryptome:

I couldn't help but notice that Verio issued the shutdown notice on the same day that you posted the first information from the Coast Guard Deepwater program debacle.

Is is possible that either the Coast Guard or Lockheed is behind shutting you down?

http://cryptome.org/cg-unmet.htm + Coast Guard Unmet TEMPEST Requirements April 23, 2007
http://cryptome.org/cg-ugly.htm + Ugly Questions for Coast Guard on TEMPEST April 22, 2007
http://cryptome.org/cg-leakage2.htm + Michael DeKort on Coast Guard TEMPEST Leakage April 22, 2007
http://cryptome.org/cg-leakage.htm + James Atkinson on Coast Guard TEMPEST Leakage April 21, 2007
http://cryptome.org/cg-screwup.htm + Coast Guard Big Time Screw Up April 20, 2007

Cryptome answers:

A, you hit the nail on the head. The Deepwater expose, and attempts to conceal it, points to the prime suspect for the shutdown. Verio would not buckle for anything less, based on past practice, and are probably hoping the shutdown would be seen for what it really is: they've been ordered not to disclose anything which would call attention to the Deepwater material and its threat to national security.

The congressional folks may have more to demand answers about trying to suppress Deepwater failures: subpoena Verio, show the defense cartel's dirty fighting is getting dirtier.

The archived Deepwater material will be posted shortly.

Right, Cryptome happily chokes on slashdot, but not to worry, mirrors are available as noted below.

Cryptome and its affiliated sites will continue with another ISP, in the US or elsewhere. Or if necessary, underground, or via means not easily shuttered, or by way of whatever is invented for opposing technologies of information control (credit to Steven Wright, author of The Technologies of Political Control: http://cryptome.org/stoa-atpc.htm).

Russia and the U.S. had been snooping VDT images since the early 1970's or earlier. van Eck just made it public by publishing a paper on how to do it with $100 of Radio Shack parts. cryptome.org forum postings include a reference to a 1973 book.

• User Friendly
• Cryptome
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• Stupid Security
• This Is Broken
• Popular Wireless
• Tribe
• Slashdot main page
• Ask Slashdot
• Worse Than Failure (formerly known as the Daily WTF)
• Fantasyland

Of these entries, RISKS, Cryptome, Slashdot, Ask Slashdot, Worse Than Failure, and the Sidebar WTF section of Worse than Failure are all also subscribed in my RSS feed reader, along with BBC News, the Public Daily Brief and some select search terms in Google News.

Well; you jest, but this has already been addressed by the FAA: http://cryptome.org/faa021307.htm. Under this policy, I believe that you could be arrested for flying an aircraft like this without explicit authorization from the government. I do aerial photography with rc helicopters for my wife's real-estate company and you wouldn't believe the crap I have to deal with when people see that I have a flying camera in their neighborhood.
Personally, I'd rather use purpose built avionics in my models than try to jerry-rig lego sensors. I don't want to be liable if the electronics fail in my aircraft and it damages someone's property or worse.

The entire piece is disinformation. It "argues" from a Naive Perspective, using variations of the Argument from Incredulity fallacy in each case. This is exactly the sort of piece Winston produced for Minitrue in Orwell's _1984_ in order to shape the public reality. It's difficult to accept that so many people are taking seriously the idea that any unauthorised data on a classified-restricted subject is to be not only dismissed entirely, but ignored completely.

http://cryptome.org/

Quoth the parent: See my comment here.

You might think you own it, but SUPRISE, you are licensing it.

The fact you keep repeating the same wrong information doesn't make it any less wrong.

Adobe made that same claim you are making. It didn't go over well in court. It didn't go over too well for Microsoft either (Microsoft Corp. v. DAK Indus). Novell tried that argument, and got shot down too (Novell, Inc. v. CPU Distrib., Inc., 2000 ).

"...the Ninth Circuit held that the economic realities of the agreement indicated that it was a sale, not a license to use."

"... Like Adobe, CPU argued that it purchased the software from an authorized source, and was entitled to resell it under the first sale doctrine. Novell claimed that it did not sell software but merely licensed it to distribution partners. The court held that these transactions constituted sales and not a license, and therefore that the first sale doctrine applied. 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9975 at *18."

"...The Court finds that the circumstances surrounding the transaction strongly suggests that the transaction is in fact a sale rather than a license. For example, the purchaser commonly obtains a single copy of the software, with documentation, for a single price, which the purchaser pays at the time of the transaction, and which constitutes the entire payment for the "license." The license runs for an indefinite term without provisions for renewal. In light of these indicia, many courts and commentators conclude that a "shrinkwrap license" transaction is a sale of goods rather than a license."

"...Ownership of a copy should be determined based on the actual character, rather than the label, of the transaction by which the user obtained possession. Merely labeling a transaction as a lease or license does not control. If a transaction involves a single payment giving the buyer an unlimited period in which it has a right to possession, the transaction is a sale."

"Raymond Nimmer, The Law of Computer Technology 1.18[1] p. 1-103 (1992). The Court agrees that a single payment for a perpetual transfer of possession is, in reality, a sale of personal proper and therefore transfers ownership of that property, the copy of the software. "

So, at least in the US, a one-time payment for a perpetual use of software is a SALE, regardless of what you call it, and rightfully so. They can't change that with a EULA any more than a car dealership could claim you had a one-time lease payment, with a lifetime use period and the right to transfer the lease for free (thus avoiding legal regulations with regards to sale of vehicles). Any reasonable court would rule that such was a sale, not a lease. What you call it doesn't matter.

• The idea of legislation like this got kicked of in the UK in 2000, it was assumed illegal, expensive and hard to sell, by the proponents in criminal intelligence, police and MI5/6 GCHQ.:

  "our needs are in conflict with existing legislation arising from data protection provisions and ECHR [european convention on human rights]. In addition, there is significant commercial pressure to delete data. There are also significant public policy issues to address."

• The idea got kicked to international forums. These draw less attention than a national (UK) parliament debate.
• The forum chosen, first the G8. Then the council of EU ministers. Only the small group of justice and home affairs ministers gets involved. This is all closed doors stuff.
• The trick one suspects, UK bureaucrats coordinated and briefed with their European counterparts so when the ministers came back home and asked "should we do this?" all they heard was rosy stories. (Costs go only to a few filthy rich telco`s, no legal problems, trust the cops its effective... no sign of a debate on effectiveness, the trustworthiness of this data or controls on its use)
• Activists get wind of the plans, the secrecy and lack of oppertunities for input fires them up even more. Petitions are started
• The EU parliament gets involved arguing many millions of euro`s of costs make this an economic issue over which the parliament would have a say, questions get asked, research is started...
• The Netherlands (and others?) holds up the vote in the council
• The civil rights commission and vocal parliamentairians start building a compromise with some research behind it
• One assumes the nameless pro legislation forces get the big party blocks in a backroom and threatens to pass the legislation in the council if no deal is reached. An empty threat since the Netherlands no longer supports the legislation on the table??
• The big party blocks with a majority in the EU parliament pass the legislation without much of the suggested amendments.
• The experts and vocal parliamentairians are very very pissed of they were ignored
• people say the legislation was passed only since it allows a lot of room to national government to set their own standard. Thus ending the absurd haggling over mandatory minimum years in Brussels.

present day: National proponents realizing the haggling now has to happen on a national level come out in full force with these current crazy plans. Though their detour trough Brussels did win them that national legislation is now mandatory with a 09 deadline. People still don`t know the legislation is one court decision away from being declared against the European human rights convention as foreseen by the proponents in 2000. Bits of freedom, which fought this in the Netherlands from the beginning has been out of cash for a while. I left out the bit where this 2000 legislation was cast as a reaction to (Madrid, london) terrorist attacks. It was even "fud"-ed as only directed at terrorism (Smallprint: and serious crime... What, isn`t terrorism a serious crime, so why mention that explicitly?)

The result: badly/broadly defined legislation without *any* of that pesky research into effectiveness, legality and cost... Oh, and prety much only *one* critical article in the UK press at a time when it was possible to protest this. (So, no campaign issue for Blairs opposition) This legislation gets passed trough the EU at many times the speed of the plan for an UK wide "national identity register" and ID cards (Sorry, "entitlement cards"). But the real haggling gets shifted to the national level and the EU is used just to make the legislation some "mandatory technicality from Brussels". All of this with minimal effect o

The Associated Press story (note: that link is not the original) states that he was photographing the railroad trestle bridge that's near the locks. But as you say, some of the other details pulled from my memory were wrong (e.g. Homeland Security told him he needed advance permission from the US Corps of Engineers, not a permit per se). Fortunately the gist of my post was correct.

Particularly, a musical score cannot be read by the majority of the public but can be used as a means of communication among musicians. Likewise, computer source code, though unintelligible to many, is the preferred method of communication among computer programers.

Because computer source code is an expressive means for the exchange of information and ideas about computer programming, we hold that it is protected by the First Amendment.
-- Junger v Daley

"If a threat to national security was insufficient to warrant a prior restraint in New York Times Co. v. United States, the threat to plaintiff's copyrights and trade secrets is woefully inadequate."
-- DVDCA v Brunner

Actually they've been trying to implement an uncrackable watermarking system which would flag restricted music, then they wanted to mandate all recording devices and computers everywere detect these watermarks (at an increased expense in terms of cost for hardware and/or processing time--scanning all audio data is not free). It was called SMDI. Didn't really fly: first off, Professor Ed Felton showed he could easily crack the watermarking. Second, the bills which would've enforced things like the mandatory watermark detection (such as the SSSCA --info at EFF) caused a huge uproar. I think the MPAA also wanted it for video too.

I mean those systems could cause major problems. Just imagine if you are filming your best friend's wedding, some joker walks by with his jukebox--maybe not even audiable enough for you to notice, but loud enough for the system to detect it, and the watermarking causes your camera to stop recording. Let's say you lose the "I do" part. That could really happen.

From what I understand, banks and national treasuries have convinced some software and hardware developers to detect watermarking for photographic things. Such as Photoshop and printer drivers and such. Some printers also create a fingerprint so supposedly the secret service (or whatever agency controls currency fraud in your country) can trace the printed paper back to who printed it.

For some real information, check out the 'Leaked' WikiLeak mailing list via (my favorite) Cryptome:

http://cryptome.org/wikileaks/wikileaks-leak.htm
http://cryptome.org/wikileaks/wikileaks-leak2.htm

For some real information, check out the 'Leaked' WikiLeak mailing list via (my favorite) Cryptome:

http://cryptome.org/wikileaks/wikileaks-leak.htm
http://cryptome.org/wikileaks/wikileaks-leak2.htm

>He is free to travel by foot, bike, motorcycle, car, boat, or other device himself while not violating applicable pedestrian or traffic laws, or by bus or train, entirely anonymously.

"Since 9/11, Amtrak now requires ID on many of its routes, and it is the only long-haul passenger train service in America."
"There is a single nationwide bus service today (Greyhound)... I have seen a friend be refused passage on Greyhound because they lacked an ID. "

>He is free to travel by foot, bike, motorcycle, car, boat, or other device himself while not violating applicable pedestrian or traffic laws, or by bus or train, entirely anonymously.

"Since 9/11, Amtrak now requires ID on many of its routes, and it is the only long-haul passenger train service in America."
"There is a single nationwide bus service today (Greyhound)... I have seen a friend be refused passage on Greyhound because they lacked an ID. "

The ATnT NSA spying case shows all email is monitored anyway and ATnT will cooperate for their own benefit. It isn't just the emails of the passengers that is captured, everyone's is and they filter for anyone they care to.
http://yro.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=06/04/29/04 0225

The Vodaphone Greece spying case shows that mobile phones can be tapped with simple software at the switch.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6182647.stm
http://www.mindfully.org/Technology/2006/Bove-Tsal ikidis-Bugging22aug06.htm

The recent FBI case shows the mobile phone is a microphone that can be turned on at any time, it means they don't just monitor telephone calls, but all conversations. The greek spying case was probably much bigger than announced, and may well have been more than just telephone calls.

http://yro.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=06/12/04/04 56220

The SWIFT case shows that any large corporation will hand over any information is it is threatened in any single market. That means that SWIFT may be handing information over to the Russians, but we would never know unless it leaked out.

(EU condemns swift spying)
http://cryptome.org/eu-swift-hit.htm

Talking of freedom etc, check out this:

http://cryptome.org/bdvp-stasi.htm

Time for some people to leave town and get a new identity!