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Secure Internet Live Conferencing, or SILC is what you need (or might want to look at anyway:). Pidgin can be used as the client.

...and here are some more softwares and guides related to privacy, pseudo/ano-nymity and security:

tor.eff.orgonion routing anonymizer
www.i2p.netsecure/anonymous interactive network
freenetproject.orgsecure/anonymous distributed file system
www.turtle4privacy.orgf2f peer network
gnunet.orgsecure p2p infrastructure
www.cspace.insecure p2p infrastructure
www.openswan.orgVPN with opportunistic encryption
silcnet.orgsecure internet live chat
ihu.sourceforge.netp2p VoIP with crypto

wiki.noreply.orgHow to give anonymous talks
azureus.sourceforge.netazureus over p2p
cryptnet.netguerrilla software development how to

Using your monitor as a AM transmitter. This little program is a real eye opener for those who still thinks that TEMPEST attacks are something you just see in the movies.

We use SILC for communication.

Secure Internet Live Conferencing :: It's a snap to install, has support in GAIM but also has a very decent client of it's own...not sure why this wheel needs to be re-invented.

Your quotes around `"secure"' are, of course, well justified: gaim's encryption, being in-band, means an intercepter can still ascertain to whom you were talking, and when. Two alternative systems where not even this data is sniffable, include Skype (of all things) and Silc.

1. Trillian. SecureIM, but Windows only.
2. SILC. Open encryption standard, many *nix ports.
3. JohnyTech. Windows encryption for a bunch of different IM protocols.
That ought to get you started.

In essence, IRC is an old protocol, it needs help.

SILC is unicode-only, encrypt-only, allows MIME messages, uses a hybrid topology to be netsplit resistant, etc.

SILC isn't fully p2p as one poster suggested, but it's a lot better than IRC.

SILC http://silcnet.org/

It is quite silly to think that Email is secure in today's day and age, however what none of these bankers considered was using ssh and then say something like silc to have a secure conversation. Most large institutions with RIM have the BES and thus using ssh is an option. which is certainly more secure than email, but is it totally secure? Or still prone to eavesdropping?

Maybe they should use Secure Internet Live Conferencing (SILC)...

SILC is basically like IRC, but with secure key authentication. public key cryptography for private messages. Channel crypto, etc.

It's what I use, and it's probably a popular choice of organized crime and terrorists.

SILC is a good example.

Simply use SILC. http://silcnet.org/ Then you have a chat-net that was designed with encryption in mind. Bye, Frank

To replace the poorly designed IRC protocol?

It's here.

Or you could use SILC which is an encrypted/authenicated chat network. Every client has to generate a public/private keypair, so you could get/post public key fingerprints in the workplace/wherever, then simply authenicate each user who comes into the channel, or password protect the channel.

It's like IRC, but with public key encryption built in from the ground up. And All SILC software is Open Source (GPL).

So far, the only complaint I've received is the lack of a good MS-Windows client.

The X and text clients for Unix are usable, and there's even an Irssi module. but the Windows clients lack the polished user interface that people have come to expect from their Microsoft-centric chat services.

BTW, SILC Client 1.0.1 was released this week.

It's like IRC, but with public key encryption built in from the ground up. And All SILC software is Open Source (GPL).

So far, the only complaint I've received is the lack of a good MS-Windows client.

The X and text clients for Unix are usable, and there's even an Irssi module. but the Windows clients lack the polished user interface that people have come to expect from their Microsoft-centric chat services.

BTW, SILC Client 1.0.1 was released this week.

Well if you are concrened with privacy, I suggest you look into encrypted irc.

IRC is obsolete and completely insecure. There is no justification whatsoever for still using IRC in 2003. It is like using telnet instead of ssh - stupid. Check out SILC to see what IRC wishes it could be!

SILC has the answers. ;)
SilcNET
It's a totally new protocol built from the ground up on being secure, unlike IRC.

Not used it myself yet, but it sounds neat.

Ooops, I screwed up the link to SILC, it's actually http://www.silcnet.org. I hope Pekka isn't mad :-)

I'd never use such black holes as AIM or ICQ. My vote goes to SILC, a protocol/client/server using encryption. I suggest you checking out http://www.silcnet.org/ for more about SILC - Secure Internet Live Conferencing.

IRC? bah. bring on silc.

A lot of hyping going on here, no doubt of that but the sad fact is that IIP is totally broken by design. And this is clear by just reading the two page, so called, "crypto" protocol. They have made all the classical mistakes with Diffie-Hellman and in general protocol design (ever heard of NOT using Diffie-Hellman without digital signatures!?). It is clear that they don't have any kind of background in cryptography or security. As mission critical application IIP cannot be recommended. For securing your chats from your parents, I guess it's fine for that. Take a look at SILC instead.

This is inferior to the great SILC protocol. But whichever you choose, it really doesn't matter. You think creating a "channel" on invisible irc will protect your defacer crew's conversations from the feds? Not if they go on invisible irc and join your fucking channel . There are many different ways that this so called security can be bypassed, and most of them involve a person being a dumbass -- and as this article from the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology states, a dumbass, most often, is unwilling to admit or recognize that he is indeed a dumbass.

Using speakers to transmit the signal is of course the simple way to go about creating software radio transmitter and receiver, but not the only one. This software, called Tempest-AM (and I hear Frequency Modulation is coded too, though not released) creates a pattern on the monitor screen which causes the monitor to transmit radio signal on the selected carrier and frequency. The software could be used to transmit data as well, at least if a bit more novel modulation would be employed.

So the question should not be, to which IRC network we want to move, but where we want to move.

Ah, for all you standard weenies, SILC has been submitted to IETF as a next-generation chatting protocol draft. Really check it out, this is the future of chatting (and it's free and open source).

often they'll go to a hacker chat room, a place on the Web using an Internet Relay Chat which provides them some anonymity [my emphasis]

Real "hackers" use IIP (Invisible IRC Project), which provides strong anonymity on IRC. Another, somewhat related, sweet project is SILC, which, though it doesn't provide anonymity, adds strong crypto to IRC.

They should check SILC - next generation distributed conferencing with strong cryptography used for authentication and privacy.

Here's the original Tempest-AM that the Tempest for Eliza use for its routines:

http://silcnet.org/priikone/english/programs.shtml #tempest.'

It's got a longer introduction to the subject in the README file.

Chatting has been insecure for ages and still people just don't understand to use chat protocols that are secure. People should try for example Secure Internet Live Conferencing (silcnet.org). There's constant development in the cryptology but suggestion 10MB keys are just stupid. People should use existing tools, free tools to be more exact and be done with the problem.

I am not talking about the embarrasing mutilation of the english language, but the fact that you can tell from the wording that the person who wrote it is neither a cryptographer by profession or someone who seems to have digested any significant amount of litterature related to cryptography or security in general. If you've read a good deal of scientific papers on cryptography and related areas, perhaps digested a couple of books you can spot this quickly. People who understand cryptography express themselves quite differently. They strive to be precise and they are much more reluctant to call anything safe without at the same time either giving some measure of what they mean by "safe" or pointing out limiting factors. And God forbid: they'd never point their finger at a complex system and say that it was provably safe unless they could actually prove it.

I doubt you'll ever se any formal proof that SILC is secure.

I know most people would say "so what?". A lot of people would even say "well, you don't need a Ph.D to write a crypto app" -- and they would be right. you don't. however you still have to know a bit about cryptography and a LOT about how you avoid basing conclusions on assumptions.

(Just ask Bruce Schneier if his book "Applied Cryptography" suddenly lead to more quality crypto software being written. Tip: it didn't. It lead to more inept people writing even more bad crypto software). But you do need to understand what you are doing to make any kind of valid statement about what one should expect.

In any case, my point is that it takes a certain kind of mindset to design and implement anything having to do with security. The aforementioned white paper was apparently written by someone who understands some of the mechanics involved, but who doesn't seem to have absorbed any of the intellectual discipline good cryptographers convey in their writings.

I was thinking about downloading the thing and possibly install it, but if the white paper is that naive, what is the actual system going to be like? Probably not worth the bother from a security point of view, although one might actually learn other things from such a system (for instance their approach to message routing etc. I don't know I never got that far once it became obvious to me that this was the wrong place to look for a *secure* system)

So why am I writing this? To slam SILC?

Definitively not.

I'm writing it because most people are too ignorant, or to arrogant about their ignorance, to realize that they probably wouldn't be able to tell a more secure system from a less secure system. Also, because I think it is important that people try to make an effort to understand what type of security something provides -- ie. exactly what does the system prevent and what doesn't it prevent. I'd like people to *think* instead of choosing their security solutions the way most consumers choose toothpaste.

Especially Question 2.3. SILC goes waay beyond just "encrypted IRC".