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Kernel Exploit Cause Of Debian Compromise

mbanck writes "The cause of the recent Debian Project server compromise has been published by the Debian security team: 'Forensics revealed a burneye encrypted exploit. Robert van der Meulen managed to decrypt the binary which revealed a kernel exploit. Study of the exploit by the RedHat and SuSE kernel and security teams quickly revealed that the exploit used an integer overflow in the brk system call. Using this bug it is possible for a userland program to trick the kernel into giving access to the full kernel address space'. This issue has been fixed in 2.4.23. Thus, the Linux kernel compromise was not Debian specific."

130 of 673 comments (clear)

  1. A shift of focus by chrysalis · · Score: 4, Interesting

    It's fun to see how security research shifted from applications to kernels lately.

    --
    {{.sig}}
    1. Re:A shift of focus by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Funny


      It's fun to see how security research shifted from applications to kernels lately.

      Fun!? You must be Klingon.

    2. Re:A shift of focus by pclminion · · Score: 5, Informative
      The "nice" thing about kernel exploits (from a cracker's perspective, of course), is that it doesn't matter what sort of userland software is running on the machine -- if you can get local access, by whatever means, it is very easy to boost yourself to root.

      Traditional local root exploits are all based on overflowing a setuid application or server. But if the box doesn't have any vulnerable apps installed, the attacker is SOL. However, if the kernel itself is exploitable, it no longer matters whether those setuid programs are present. All you need is to somehow acquire local access, and wham, you are root.

      To summarize, kernel exploits are very convenient for turning local user account compromises into full-blown root compromises.

    3. Re:A shift of focus by Frymaster · · Score: 5, Funny
      what i want to know is...

      does this code belong to sco?

    4. Re:A shift of focus by GlassHeart · · Score: 4, Interesting
      The "nice" thing about kernel exploits (from a cracker's perspective, of course), is that it doesn't matter what sort of userland software is running on the machine -- if you can get local access, by whatever means, it is very easy to boost yourself to root.

      We should point out that you're talking about common kernels like Linux today, not that this must apply to any OS kernel. For example, if the kernel verifies the binaries it runs using digital signatures, then it can refuse to run unsigned binaries. The cracker's problem then becomes how to get an existing userland program (compiled by the trusted administrator) to issue the kernel call that results in the exploit, which is a much harder problem. A program may not ever make that system call, or may check its input so that you can't make it do the system call with (presumably) invalid parameters. In most cases, I expect that this means you have to insert a backdoor into a common program and wait for the trusted administrator to compile it for you.

      This sort of security is probably overkill and too tedious for a desktop box, but not unreasonable for a server which should only have a few programs installed and running anyway.

    5. Re:A shift of focus by SlashDotAgent · · Score: 2, Funny

      If only any Linux application could run on any distribution, just according to the kernel, like those exploits...

    6. Re:A shift of focus by Sloppy · · Score: 4, Funny

      That's why all the smart admins have been migrating their servers over to the best platform for the job: XBox.

      --
      As copyright owner of this comment, I authorize everyone to defeat any technological measure which limits access to it.
    7. Re:A shift of focus by Querty · · Score: 2, Interesting

      That's a silly reason for plugging DRM. Simply mount all user-writable space with option "noexec" and you have the same level of security.

      The reason this isn't done more often, is that it's a bit of a hassle for the power users.

    8. Re:A shift of focus by John+Whitley · · Score: 5, Informative
      That's a silly reason for plugging DRM. Simply mount all user-writable space with option "noexec" and you have the same level of security.


      Life is more complicated than that. Regular binaries can be run as: /lib/ld-linux.so /noexeced_path/myprog

      Even locking this out, any available program that is itself an interpreter (e.g. Perl, etc.) can be used to run code. Assume that any attacker (or their scripts) know this and will leverage it.

      I'm seriously beginning to think that we won't be able to achieve secure systems that reliably push the security problem to the social boundary until ground-up designs such as the Extremely Reliable Operating System mature.
    9. Re:A shift of focus by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Funny

      "Fun!? You must be Klingon."

      Today is a good day to get rooted.

    10. Re:A shift of focus by anthonyrcalgary · · Score: 3, Insightful

      With Linux Desktops being most popular in corporate settings, it's going to start being targetted by professional black hats, if it's not already. Security is a concern, even local exploits.

      A desktop system is exposed to tons of potentially hostile data. Strings are like acid, and a complex language like HTML is just asking for trouble.

      Don't get me wrong, OpenBSD is waaay into diminishing returns territory as far as security goes, but there's a few things that could be done to get 90% of the benefits, eg propolice in the kernel and W^X.

      --
      When someone might yell at me, it has to be OpenBSD.
    11. Re:A shift of focus by BokLM · · Score: 4, Interesting

      For example, if the kernel verifies the binaries it runs using digital signatures, then it can refuse to run unsigned binaries.

      It's also possible to use SELinux. With this module you can in details give permissions to any object in the system. A web server would not be able for example to run /bin/sh ... it would be blocked by the kernel. It's also possible to tell what syscalls are allowed for a program.

    12. Re:A shift of focus by John+Whitley · · Score: 2, Insightful
      That mechanism is an excellent means to DRM. The loader only loads files signed by the OS provider and nothing more.


      I disagree with your assessment. It depends on how the separation of mechanism and policy are implemented in the system. The "fear zone" you describe could only apply to a proprietary, binary-distributed system. Consider an environment where the system installer (call 'em the Admin) can install a public key at system setup time. Then, assuming the correctness of the signing system, the Admin can be assured that only properly signed binaries are run on that system. You'd want the build system and signing system to be off-network and physically secured.

      That said I think signed binaries are a stopgap, not an OS-level security architectural feature. You'd have to refuse to sign any interpreters, or else modify all of them to run only signed code. Furthermore, this doesn't address questions of code injection into an already-running application.
    13. Re:A shift of focus by John+Whitley · · Score: 5, Informative

      Seems like a stupid security hole.

      This thread on the Debian mailing lists talks about this issue, and a poster in this thread notes that SE Linux is capable of closing this hole (with example). I don't recall offhand what tools are available in grsecurity (www.grsecurity.net) to address this issue; check out the grsec mailing lists for more info.

    14. Re:A shift of focus by davecb · · Score: 2, Interesting
      It may be overkill for some very small boxes, but a good barrier between my web server and my work account is not to be sneezed at.

      In a life long ago, I used a Multics system which was running AIM, the kind of military-grade security that's in NSA's Linux, and couldn't even tell it was in place. The sysadmins could, but us developers only saw the usual group-like facilities.

      This is prefectly reasonable for a machine that's hosting my current personal projects along with my homework (;-))

      --dave (DRBrown.TSDC@HI-Multics.ARPA) c-b

      --
      davecb@spamcop.net
    15. Re:A shift of focus by GlassHeart · · Score: 2, Interesting
      Digital signatures don't help much, there is a multitude of other ways to mmap/read an executable into memory and run it.

      I suggest you consider the solution again. The underlying bug (kernel buffer overflow, for instance) doesn't disappear. It's just much harder to exploit. In an unsigned system, it's a pretty trivial task to download a binary that makes the "proper" kernel call. If a compiler is installed, you can even just type in a program.

      On the other hand, on a signed system the only way is to get an existing signed binary to make a bad system call. That's still possible, but now we're talking about two bugs, one in the kernel and a corresponding one in an user space program. Given that a dedicated server should be running the smallest number of the most trusted programs, this may not be such an easy task, and at the very least may slow down the attacker.

      So what are these multitude of ways you can run an arbitrary application?

    16. Re:A shift of focus by GlassHeart · · Score: 2, Insightful
      That's a silly reason for plugging DRM.

      Sorry, I must have been vague, although some responses have grasped the main point of what I'm talking about.

      The binaries are signed by the local root user (preferably on a separate box), at install time. The public key is installed in the kernel. This is about the root user preventing the box from running anything he did not install, not for the program's copyright owner or whoever else to control if it can run. As you can see, this has little to do with DRM, where another party controls what runs and what doesn't on your machine.

      I'm also mainly talking about servers, on which ideally only a few trusted programs are installed. This lowers the signing overhead, and doesn't have a "power user" problem.

      Since it is hard to coax an existing signed application into making your evil system call, the most likely target would then be the various script interpreters. That's a valid concern, and you should restrict yourself to those interpreters with a sandbox concept, and are well implemented.

      The point is, by requiring two separate "points of failure", we are restricting the exploit to the intersection of time between the introduction and fixing of each bug. If no application bugs are known (to the cracker) at the time the kernel is vulnerable, you cannot exploit the bug. The reverse is also true.

      I hope this helps clarify the point.

    17. Re:A shift of focus by Net_Wakker · · Score: 2, Funny
      Today is a good day to get rooted.
      I don't know, but ever since I saw the goatse-guy this just no longer has the same meaning...
    18. Re:A shift of focus by worf_mo · · Score: 2, Funny

      does this code belong to sco?

      And can those who have bought a license sue them now?

    19. Re:A shift of focus by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Funny

      Yes, the secret is out. Hyper Text Markup Language is a language.

  2. Shows the dangers of C by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 4, Funny

    If the kernel was coded in visual basic, this wouldn't be happening.

    1. Re:Shows the dangers of C by Cro+Magnon · · Score: 2, Redundant
      If the kernel was coded in visual basic, this wouldn't be happening.


      Get real! Everyone knows kernels should be coded in COBOL!
      --
      Slow down, cowboy! It has been 4 hours since you last posted. You must wait another few hours.
    2. Re:Shows the dangers of C by stefanlasiewski · · Score: 5, Funny

      By 'this' do you mean the exploit wouldn't be happening? Or the Kernel?

      --
      "Can of worms? The can is open... the worms are everywhere."
    3. Re:Shows the dangers of C by Lussarn · · Score: 4, Funny

      Why not Brainfuck

      If you can't read your own code who else can..

    4. Re:Shows the dangers of C by penguin7of9 · · Score: 2, Informative

      I hate to break it to you but that runtime saftey isn't magic, it's implemented by an unsafe runtime somewhere.

      You're on the right track. Now, if you think a little further along the same lines, you'll see that you are much better off implementing safety once, in a single place in the runtime, rather than trying to implement it in user code in 6 million lines of kernel code. It's called "reuse", "abstraction" and "encapsulation", and it's as important for safety as it is for anything else.

      In some situations runtime saftey can cause a serious performance hit that at a kernel level will significantly slow the entire system.

      You're missing the point. Modula-3 and C# don't force you to write safe code everywhere, they give you the option to choose. (Not that it is relevant to this discussion, but the overhead of enforcing runtime safety strictly is also small.)

      Safe runtimes are great for high level apps but they aren't a magic bullet.

      That's why languages like Modula-3 and C# offer both safe and unsafe constructs. The problem with C and C++ is not that they have unsafe constructs, which systems programming languages need, but that they don't separate unsafe and safe constructs.

  3. what kind of person... by potpie · · Score: 5, Funny

    What kind of person spends that much time trying to find exploits in operating system kernels? Likewise, why do I spend so much time on www.thinkgeek.com/fortune.shtml? We are a sad people.

    --
    Esoteric reference.
    1. Re:what kind of person... by Smallpond · · Score: 3, Informative

      What kind of person?
      spammers

      People who expect to make money by hacking systems and using them to send millions of unsolicited emails.

    2. Re:what kind of person... by vadim_t · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Oh, I am sure that there are very few people who really sit down and think "Hmm... how could I find an exploit in the kernel?". I think it's much more likely that it's some fairly normal programmer, working on something completely unrelated who one day makes a call the wrong way and finds that it crashes the kernel. And there comes the choice, to be a nice guy and send a mail to LKML, or to check that nobody seems to have noticed it yet and use it to break into some interesting place?

    3. Re:what kind of person... by ashridah · · Score: 5, Informative

      The kind who only has to read through LKML to realise that a potential root bug was discovered in september, but wasn't fixed in 2.4.22, and doesn't appear to have been backported to the kernel?

      ashridah

    4. Re:what kind of person... by noda132 · · Score: 4, Insightful

      What kind of person spends that much time trying to find exploits in operating system kernels?

      The kernel developers, i.e., Andrew Morton. Good for him, too.

      There *was* a patch before the Debian systems were compromised. Hopefully in the future these things will be given more attention before they blow up.

  4. Userland exploits by Hayzeus · · Score: 5, Funny

    The evidence mounts: users should be eliminated.

    1. Re:Userland exploits by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 4, Insightful

      No really, a user account is as good as root on almost all systems. If you need security, don't have user accounts on the system.

  5. Hurray for the Debian Security Team! by pegr · · Score: 2, Informative

    And thus, a previously unknown kernel exploit is discovered and patched! (Now how many more exist?)

    Hats off to the Debian Security Team.

    1. Re:Hurray for the Debian Security Team! by isaac338 · · Score: 2, Funny

      It obviously was known previously, as whoever cracked the Debian servers must have known about it.

    2. Re:Hurray for the Debian Security Team! by __past__ · · Score: 3, Insightful
      Hats off to the Debian Security Team.
      And to the RedHat and SuSE security teams for helping them to track it down. In other words, hats off to the whole Free Software Community for collaborating when desaster strikes.
    3. Re:Hurray for the Debian Security Team! by Feyr · · Score: 2, Informative

      actually, the exploit was known (found by andrew morton) but didn't make it to 2.4.22 in time. RTA

    4. Re:Hurray for the Debian Security Team! by Troed · · Score: 5, Informative

      The bug had been found by Andrew Morton before, and was already fixed in 2.4.23. Thus, it wasn't unknown. It might even the because it was known that it was exploited aswell, I assume.

      Quoting the Bugtraq post:

      This problem was found in September by Andrew Morton, but unfortunately that was too late for the 2.4.22 kernel release.

    5. Re:Hurray for the Debian Security Team! by Pros_n_Cons · · Score: 2, Informative

      And thus, a previously unknown kernel exploit is discovered and patched! (Now how many more exist?) Hats off to the Debian Security Team.

      from the article: "This problem was found in September by Andrew Morton, but unfortunately that was too late for the 2.4.22 kernel release." Good work by the Debian team in catching it before REAL problems ensued.
      Hats off to Redhat and SuSe for reversing the code.

      --

      -- "of course thats just my opinion, I could be wrong." --Dennis Miller
    6. Re:Hurray for the Debian Security Team! by krbvroc1 · · Score: 2, Insightful

      This problem was found in September by Andrew Morton, but unfortunately that was too late for the 2.4.22 kernel release.

      If this was found after 2.4.22 but before 2.4.23 release then it should have been announced and patched. How is this any different than what Microsoft does? We complain (rightfully so) about security through obscurity and lack of transparency. In this case a KNOWN kernel exploit was left in the open for 1-2 months?

      Looking at the 2.4.23 CHANGES file I'm still not clear who/what fixed this. The closest think I see is: ": o Add TASK_SIZE check to do_brk()". Nothing from Andrew Morton's CHANGES entry implies a fix to this. Perhaps "make printk more robust with "null" pointers?" How do we know? Why wasn't it reported to the security groups immediately when it was found (or was it?).

    7. Re:Hurray for the Debian Security Team! by cortana · · Score: 2, Informative

      The bugfix has already been backported to the 2.4.18 kernel in Debian 3.0. From DSA-403-1:

      [The bug] has been fixed in version 2.4.18-12 of the kernel source packages, version 2.4.18-14 of the i386 kernel images and version 2.4.18-11 of the alpha kernel images.

      Of course, had you read the article, you would already knew this. ;)

    8. Re:Hurray for the Debian Security Team! by adrianbaugh · · Score: 3, Insightful

      This had been rumoured for several days before the actual announcement was made.
      I'm guessing it was found and corrected, as a bug, but not thought to be exploitable, therefore no security announcement[0]. Later on, when debian.org got cracked, someone put two and two together and made the security announcement. I must admit, it seemed fairly weird to me for a long time, and I thought up a few lovely conspiracy theories, but in the end I think the simple oversight scenario is the most likely.

      [0] After all, plenty of bugs get fixed in the kernel without being specially announced. If it was subtle someone probably just overlooked the fact that this particular bug was more problematic than any of the others fixed in that patch.

      --
      "'I pass the test,' she said. 'I will diminish, and go into the West, and remain Galadriel.'"
      - JRR Tolkien.
  6. Re:How did they get in to run a userspace util? by PPGMD · · Score: 2, Informative

    I believe an earlier article said that it appeared that he sniffed a password to the box.

  7. RTFA by Stradenko · · Score: 5, Informative

    Recently multiple servers of the Debian project were compromised using a Debian developers account and an unknown root exploit. Forensics revealed a burneye encrypted exploit. Robert van der Meulen managed to decrypt the binary which revealed a kernel exploit. Study of the exploit by the RedHat and SuSE kernel and security teams quickly revealed that the exploit used an integer overflow in the brk system call. Using this bug it is possible for a userland program to trick the kernel into giving access to the full kernel address space. This problem was found in September by Andrew Morton, but unfortunately that was too late for the 2.4.22 kernel release.

    This bug has been fixed in kernel version 2.4.23 for the 2.4 tree and 2.6.0-test6 kernel tree. For Debian it has been fixed in version 2.4.18-12 of the kernel source packages, version 2.4.18-14 of the i386 kernel images and version 2.4.18-11 of the alpha kernel images.

  8. How does this compare... by IamGarageGuy+2 · · Score: 2, Insightful

    to the winodows hole found the other day. Has anybody heard if that was fixed yet(not sure if it has been 48 hours yet). Technically this hole was fixed before it was found. It looks like another win for open source.

    --
    Stay tuned for new sig...
    1. Re:How does this compare... by Evil+Adrian · · Score: 3, Insightful

      It doesn't compare, because most Slashdot users won't be making a huge stink about it the way they would with a Microsoft hole.

      --
      evil adrian
    2. Re:How does this compare... by EverDense · · Score: 3, Insightful

      This story is about how great the Open Source Community is for fixing an exploit. The Microsoft story was about how incompetent Microsoft is for having an exploit.

      Actually the Windows story was about how Microsoft had not patched an exploit they had known about for months.

      This Linux exploit had ALREADY been patched.

      --
      http://jesus.everdense.com/
    3. Re:How does this compare... by DickBreath · · Score: 3, Insightful

      What this should be is a story about how a Linux exploit hasn't caused millions of dollars in damage affecting hundreds of thousands of servers in less than 24 hours, affecting ATM networks, gas pumps, etc.

      Or maybe it should be a story about how Linux users don't shoot the messenger. "They shouldn't have made the exploit known before the patch was available." -- the oft heard commercial software providers' complaint about how irresponsible it is to exploit a system before the patch is available.

      --

      I'll see your senator, and I'll raise you two judges.
  9. Bang goes everyone's uptimes... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Funny

    yup... this'll make ms-windows look good on the uptime front for at least a week...

  10. Will redhat provide an rpm??? by cybrthng · · Score: 4, Interesting

    Just wondering if they will still support us lowly 7.3 and 8.0 users anymore with a fix for this.

    1. Re:Will redhat provide an rpm??? by teg · · Score: 2, Informative

      Just wondering if they will still support us lowly 7.3 and 8.0 users anymore with a fix for this.

      Red Hat is supporting these releases until the end of this year, so I'd expect them to.

  11. Yup by ENOENT · · Score: 4, Funny

    Just like Nancy Reagan said: Users are Losers.

    --
    That's "Mr. Soulless Automaton" to you, Bub.
  12. So it sounds like.... by satyap · · Score: 5, Informative

    So it sounds like someone used a compromised user account to get in, ran a binary that exploited the bug, and got root that way. This is a local exploit, then.

  13. Time for better security. by Sheetrock · · Score: 5, Insightful
    It's obvious that with the gradual acceptance of Linux by the business community, it's time for a stricter security model to be adopted. While OpenBSD has not shared in the commercial success of Linux, it does have one area of technical superiority: its security review process has yet to permit a remote root compromise in a standard install.

    Linux is a compelling choice in the Free Software world because of its pace of development and wide availability of software. However, it is this strength that is becoming a weakness. Perhaps it is time to slow down and review with more vigor to mimic the accomplishment of OpenBSD.

    --

    Try not. Do or do not, there is no try.
    -- Dr. Spock, stardate 2822-3.




    1. Re:Time for better security. by Free+Bird · · Score: 3, Interesting
      [OpenBSD's] security review process has yet to permit a remote root compromise in a standard install.


      Strictly true, but there has been one remote hole and many local root holes. Remote hole + local root hole = remote root hole.

      I'm not denying OpenBSD's superiority, but its security record isn't that much better than that of the other BSDs.
    2. Re:Time for better security. by chrysalis · · Score: 4, Interesting

      Well... yes... and no.

      The strength of OpenBSD is that people continously audit the code and implement preventive stuff like privilege separation to reduce the risks in case of a vulnerability.

      On the other hand, the code of BSD kernels is a real mess. Some parts are really tricky, with glue between historic and new code and a lot of ugly, possible unsafe macros everywhere. The Linux kernel framework is way cleaner and more robust. When something goes wrong in a kernel thread, it can almost always properly recover and not just go to panic().

      And Linux has also some barriers like SELinux that theorically renders uncommon situations not exploitable. Theorically, because there can still be bugs in SELinux or other parts of the kernel that would bypass it.

      The "barriers" approach, although described as useless by some people is, in a real world, very efficient. Grsecurity (or recent OpenBSD with PaX and co) and SELinux make it very difficult to write reliable exploits. Still if an exploit would work, it will only work after having filled gigabytes of log files, giving a change to system administrators to take an action on time.

      The cons of the "barriers" approach is that it cures the implications of a problem, not the cause. The bug is still there, but instead of being exploitable to execute arbitrary code, it crashes the process (eventually immediately restarted with a tool like Monit or Supervise).

      The OpenBSD auditing approach aims at curing the bug itself, thus not causing any crash.

      Both approaches are actually complementary, but still not 100% efficient.

      The only way to make reliable and secure (even from a theoric point of view) is to prove the code. Unfortunately it's not a trivial task and it can't be made upon an existing unix-like base.

      But if you never heard about it, have a look at the very promizing EROS Project :
      http://www.eros-os.org/

      --
      {{.sig}}
    3. Re:Time for better security. by bahamat · · Score: 5, Informative

      I don't mean to burst your bubble, bash Theo or OpenBSD, but I read Bugtraq daily, and I can't count the number of exploitable bugs reported in the OpenBSD kernel over the past few weeks, but it would probably take both hands and at least one foot. Linux however, iirc, had somewhere about 3. Given this info, I wouldn't be so hot to boast about OpenBSD's QA process.

      I repeat, I'm not trying to bash OpenBSD. Just trying to bring a little balance to the arguement. OpenBSD is an excellent choice for an operating system, but it's designed by humans. Humans make mistakes.

      The real flaw in what happened with this exploit is that there were no backport patches created. When the ptrace vuln came out I was able to patch my 2.4.19 and 2.4.20 systems right away, I didn't have to wait for the next release to come out in order to get a working fix.

      This should trun into a plea to the developers, if a bug is discovered through the normal course of development that is potentially serious enough for older kernels, it should be brought out into the open and the fix backported.

    4. Re:Time for better security. by jgreene_81 · · Score: 2, Interesting

      If you had read the article...

      Recently multiple servers of the Debian project were compromised using a Debian developers account

      You would notice it was not a remote exploit. OpenBSD has had its share of local exploits lately too.

      Don't get me wrong, OpenBSD is good stuff and has a great way of approaching security. But in this case, it could have been compromised just the same.

    5. Re:Time for better security. by jemfinch · · Score: 4, Interesting

      While OpenBSD has not shared in the commercial success of Linux, it does have one area of technical superiority: its security review process has yet to permit a remote root compromise in a standard install.


      You know, when I install a computer, I consider the "install" to be the files installed on my hard drive. "/bin/ls" is part of the "install." "/sbin/ifconfig" is part of the "install." "/usr/libexec/ftpd" is part of the "install."

      Apparently, however, the OpenBSD developers disagree. Something has to actually be running to be part of the "install." Thus, by their definition, none of those programs are part of the "install."

      Good thing, too. Because /usr/libexec/ftpd has sure as hell had a remotely-exploitable root hole.

      Jeremy

    6. Re:Time for better security. by keesh · · Score: 3, Informative

      This wasn't a remote root exploit. It was a local root exploit, and OpenBSD has had several of those.

    7. Re:Time for better security. by wirelessbuzzers · · Score: 4, Insightful

      While I agree with your point, OpenBSD's numbers are a bit skewed. For one thing, there has been one remote root compromise, not none.

      Second, that "standard install" has most of the features turned off... No Apache, etc... I don't even know if SSHD is on by default. I mean, they could have zero remote root compromises if their standard install didn't include network drivers.

      I know that OpenBSD can't possible comb every line of apache and all the other contrib software ten times over, but this would be a problem for the Debian folks too.

      --
      I hereby place the above post in the public domain.
    8. Re:Time for better security. by Coryoth · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Hmmm, if someone made a Linux distribution that included no network or modem drivers in the _default_ install, they could probably go a while with no remote holes in the default install.

      Okay, OpenBSD is nowhere near that bad, but the default install doesn't actually do that mcuh - you have to turn on _some_ services if you want to do anything, and I presume that doesn't caount as "default install"?

      Jedidiah

    9. Re:Time for better security. by eyeball · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Never mind that the default install is basically useless.

      Define useless. It comes with a compiler, make & other build tools, and an ftp client. What more would a real unix user need?

      --

      _______
      2B1ASK1
    10. Re:Time for better security. by spotter · · Score: 2, Insightful
      And Linux has also some barriers like SELinux that theorically renders uncommon situations not exploitable. Theorically, because there can still be bugs in SELinux or other parts of the kernel that would bypass it.

      And in this case, SELinux wouldn't have helped, because the bug let user space programs into the kernel's memory space, and once that happens all bets are off, much like what would happen if any program could write to /dev/kmem.

    11. Re:Time for better security. by Pflipp · · Score: 3, Funny

      bash Theo

      Never EVER put these words together. It's like keeping the Bible next to the Koran. You'll never know just when they will auto-ignite!

      --
      "We can confirm that Debian does *not* ship the version with the trojan horse. Our version predates it." [CA-2002-28]
    12. Re:Time for better security. by drinkypoo · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Your very own argument has a big fat hole through it. You are counting bugs which have been found. OpenBSD is subject to ongoing proactive review. Linux, on the other hand, primarily approaches security through "whoops, I just got rooted, here's a patch" or "I noticed this thing while I was working on this other thing, accidentally." Given the two different styles of code review, the fact that the OpenBSD team found more potentially exploitable bugs does not mean that OpenBSD has more of them. It doesn't mean they have less, either, I'm not saying that.

      --
      "You're right," Fisheye says. "I should have set it on 'whip' or 'chop.'"
    13. Re:Time for better security. by Homology · · Score: 3, Insightful
      don't mean to burst your bubble, bash Theo or OpenBSD, but I read Bugtraq daily, and I can't count the number of exploitable bugs reported in the OpenBSD kernel over the past few weeks, but it would probably take both hands and at least one foot.

      You appearantly don't pay much attention to what your read then, since for OpenBSD 3.4 there are two security fixes. One local and one remote denial of service. One of the security fixes are only relevant for i386.

      http://openbsd.org/errata.html

  14. Well then they'd better get some help by Hal+The+Computer · · Score: 5, Funny
    CLIPPY:
    You appear to be trying to write a kernel. Do you want to:
    • Automatically make sure the Visula Basic DLL is included in your program?
    • Answer some questions and have me generate a nice windows kernel for you?
    • Straigten me, and turn me into a very attractive piece of modern art?
    --

    int main(void){int x=01232;while(malloc(x));return x;}
    1. Re:Well then they'd better get some help by Ann+Elk · · Score: 2, Funny

      I always thought Clippy needed an option to eject the CDROM...

  15. The kernel patch... by lurp · · Score: 5, Informative
    Here's the kernel patch that fixed the overflow in brk():
    http://linux.bkbits.net:8080/linux-2.4/diffs/mm/mm ap.c@1.32?nav=cset@1.1148.2.2.

    The patch is from 9 weeks ago... I wonder if the exploit writer got the idea from looking at the kernel changelog...

    1. Re:The kernel patch... by toirdnim · · Score: 2, Insightful

      One scary thing to consider about open-source software is that vulnerabilities are published in gory detail often before people bother to upgrade to the patched version.

    2. Re:The kernel patch... by maximilln · · Score: 2, Interesting

      You can bet your bottom dollar that people who write exploits spend more time monitoring changelogs than they do actually writing exploits.

      I'm more concerned about the security of the computing world as a whole. The Windows kernel is significantly more bloated and full of overlapping loops, crappy memory management, and all sorts of extra junk that just doesn't need to be in a kernel. With that in mind--how many kernel level exploits do you suppose exist in Windows? Knowing the lack of punctuality with which MS addresses the issues what do you suppose the proportion of cracked computers across the globe is?

      It'd be a perfect escape route for all of those people who have been accused of insider trading: "I never told them anything. They must've been using an unknown Microsoft Windows exploit to monitor my private transactions in real time."

      --
      +++ATHZ 99:5:80
    3. Re:The kernel patch... by pclminion · · Score: 4, Insightful
      It's only "gory detail" to those who are capable of reading the code: i.e., the crackers. The entry for that patch in the ChangeLog basically reads: "Bounds checking on do_brk()". Only a programmer will recognize that this is a security problem, and the ChangeLog entry is vague and doesn't explain the importance of the change.

      If fixes are made which affect security, the ChangeLog should clearly spell out that it was a SECURITY fix. I guess people don't want to admit that they have found a security problem...

    4. Re:The kernel patch... by smcv · · Score: 2, Informative

      Since the Debian security advisory says the bug was found by Andrew Morton in September, my guess is that it was fixed in 2.4.23 as an ordinary bug, but nobody realised it was an exploitable security hole until a day or two ago.

    5. Re:The kernel patch... by debrain · · Score: 2, Funny

      but nobody realised it was an exploitable security hole until a day or two ago

      I'd say someone figured it out at least a week ago. ;)

    6. Re:The kernel patch... by maximilln · · Score: 2, Informative

      I suppose you're a troll that wants me to quote direct lines of code from the Win32.dll and then diagram how they fit into the overall architecture. Yet you and I both know that I'd be legally liable for decompiling a proprietary Microsoft library without their express written consent if I did that.

      You're saying you've seen the memory management parts of the Windows kernel. Have you seen it in the form of source code, decompiled? Or do you expect me to believe that you just watch it in active memory, in real time? In either case you would need to be a real technical programmer to have any clue what you're looking at. If you were a technical programmer then you wouldn't need me to tell you that the Windows kernel code is bloated and inefficient compared to a Linux kernel.

      My Linux 2.4.23 kernel is still less than 1 mb. Six plugins later, each of around 100k, all of my hardware is accessible from the bash prompt. I've never seen a Windows system that can do that.

      --
      +++ATHZ 99:5:80
  16. There goes my Saturday by mariox19 · · Score: 5, Funny

    I had just convinced myself there was no compelling reason to upgrade my kernel from 2.4.22.

    Actually, there still isn't, since the likelihood of my machine "coming under attack" is slight. But, what's the point of running Linux if you're not going to get all worked up over things like this ;-)

    Happy make menuconfig to all!

    --

    quiquid id est, timeo puellas et oscula dantes.

    1. Re:There goes my Saturday by jmv · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Remember that unless you have untrusted local users, the patch is not critical.

  17. Comment removed by account_deleted · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Comment removed based on user account deletion

  18. Agreed by DenOfEarth · · Score: 4, Insightful

    I agree with you totally. It's one thing to say that Linux is rock-solid secure, but in the real world this just might not always be true. It is however, a good thing to be able to say that the parties concerned with this particular security breach have been forthcoming to the community. A large part of security is just that. Hats off to the debian people.

    1. Re:Agreed by RealProgrammer · · Score: 2, Insightful

      It's hubris to say that your code is "rock solid secure". You can say it, but you'd better not think it.

      Say (or think) instead:
      • we're as secure as effort allows
      • we know of no exploits
      • or even, in a pinch:
      • we're more solid than our competitors

      The brk(2) call is about as mundane a system call as there is. Maybe the C library calls feof(3) or abs(3) are more boring.

      Every program has its metaphorical brk(2) call. Who would look there for an exploit?

      Calling your code "rock solid secure" is a sure path to complacency. Besides, it'll look really bad when someone finds a hole in your brk(2).

      --
      sigs, as if you care.
  19. Re:How did they get in to run a userspace util? by Stradenko · · Score: 2, Insightful

    There would then need to be a vulnerability in apache/httpd to allow a user to execute arbitrary code.

  20. red hat and SUSE to the rescue by 2057 · · Score: 3, Insightful

    it seems everyones favorite whipping boys did alot of work in finding and fixing this bug. AND THEY SHARED THE INFO, who says corporate linux is evil now!@

    --
    For The Best Jazz/Hip-hop fusion > COlD DUCK
  21. Re:Hmm, Methinks I've Heard this theme before by RetroGeek · · Score: 5, Funny

    Several million others that I missed, which courteous slashdotters will point out.

    I'm sorry Dave, I can't do that...

    --

    - - - - - - - - - - -
    I am a programmer. I am paid to produce syntax not grammar. Deal with it.
  22. Re:How did they get in to run a userspace util? by g1zmo · · Score: 5, Funny

    I believe an earlier article said that it appeared that he sniffed a password to the box.

    Or perhaps "she" sniffed a password?

    I refuse to believe that the really hot, Debian-using, password-sniffing, root-exploiting geek girl is a myth.
    --
    I have found there are just two ways to go.
    It all comes down to livin' fast or dyin' slow.
    -REK, Jr.
  23. The real question remains.... by RedHat+Rocky · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Any word on the parties behind the attack?

    The question remains, who is targetting Open Source? With this being the latest in several high-profile attacks, the evidence would suggest a determined effort is under way to put egg on the Open Source face.

    Who? Why?

    --
    Anything is possible given time and money.
    1. Re:The real question remains.... by mbanck · · Score: 2, Informative
      There is also no mention of the original point of entry - which was said to be a sniffed password.

      This has been confirmed in an earlier post.

      So which individual was sending passwords in the clear?

      Exactly how the attacker managed to get the password is unknown so far. It suffices to say that he got the password and thus access to the machines.

      And if it's a Debian developer who's done this

      There are far easier ways for Debian Developers to mess up Debian. That's why there are the tough entry exams, aka the Debian New-Maintainer process.

      Michael

  24. Re:so are other distros possible infected? by Nothinman · · Score: 5, Informative

    This is a local exploit, it can't be used until you have a shell. Debian had the misfortune of having a developer's password stolen and used to get a shell, other distros would have to have similar problems with either passwords or network accessable services.

    This isn't a special situation, everyone should be checking the integrity of their servers periodically anyway.

  25. Kicking it up a notch. by _Sprocket_ · · Score: 5, Funny


    And they call Windows unsecure. How does crow taste, Slashdot?


    Pretty good if you know how to spice it right. The trick is, knowing you've got crow to eat. How's that mystery meat you're chewing on?

    (there's a joke about feeding trolls to be made in this somewhere)
  26. Up 107 days... by jehreg · · Score: 5, Funny
    kc grub # uptime 17:21:06 up 107 days, 22:45, 1 user, load average: 0.35, 0.82, 0.47

    Great..... there goes my uptime.....

    If I have to reboot more than once per year, I'm switching to Windows.

    1. Re:Up 107 days... by Roadkills-R-Us · · Score: 2, Funny

      If I have to reboot more than once per year, I'm switching to Windows.

      Yeah, then you only have to reboot once a day!

    2. Re:Up 107 days... by prock307 · · Score: 2, Funny

      Hmmm.... Although this could start a flame war...

      I would have been up for 367 days today if some idiot didn't grab my server's keyboard instead of the M$ W2K box next to it to do a 3-finger-salute.

      Needless to say I have disabled that "feature" now.

      rock@phantom:~$ uptime
      Unknown HZ value! (2) Assume 100.
      16:47:42 up 256 days, 1:51, 1 user, load average: 0.00, 0.00, 0.00

    3. Re:Up 107 days... by silicon+not+in+the+v · · Score: 2, Funny

      Whoa! Windows crashed a Linux box just sitting next to it! I think that may be a first.

      --
      We may experience some slight turbulence and then...explode. -Capt. Mal Reynolds
    4. Re:Up 107 days... by Haeleth · · Score: 2, Funny
      If I have to reboot more than once per year, I'm switching to Windows.

      Why does everyone always make fun of Windows' uptime records? I'm proud of what my GNU/Windows box can achieve. Look...
      haeleth@Cynewulf ~
      $ uptime
      01:21:28 up 15:37, 1 user, load average: 0.00, 0.00, 0.00
      That's nearly a whole day!
  27. What comes first? by golan · · Score: 2, Interesting
    The patch is from 9 weeks ago... I wonder if the exploit writer got the idea from looking at the kernel changelog...
    That's something I've always been thinking about. Do crackers follow security announcements and changelogs and stuff like that to make exploits or are the patches made because of a cracker that discovered a vulnerability and used it to crack a box? Are there any stats about this? Any info?
  28. I feel your pain.... by The+Ape+With+No+Name · · Score: 2, Funny

    me@spyder:~$ w
    17:26:24 up 168 days, 5:52, 5 users, load average: 0.70, 0.78, 1.59


    D'oh. Well what to do....

    --toby

    --
    Comparing it to Windows will be a moot point, since El Dorado is going to have a 40% larger code base than XP.
  29. Double standards by Overly+Critical+Guy · · Score: 2, Interesting

    But according to most admins here, they don't immediately apply Microsoft patches, so they can do their little "tests" to make sure everything keeps running fine.

    But when Linux has a kernel exploit and is patched, people will point to that--"But it's already patched! Download the new kernel!"

    --
    "Sufferin' succotash."
  30. Re:This smells like the work of... by Overly+Critical+Guy · · Score: 4, Interesting

    Every time there's some sort of compromise on a high-profile Linux network, some idiot tries to implicate Microsoft on the basis of idle speculation.

    Why it continues to be modded up as "Insightful" every time, I'll never know. Honestly, what insight was gleamed by this post?

    --
    "Sufferin' succotash."
  31. Re:It's Linux's fault not Debian(!?) by mbanck · · Score: 2, Insightful
    It's ok because it's the kernel that's been exploited; not Debian. wtf?

    Nobody says it's OK. This is a serious problem. I was just saying that this problem was not Debian-specific, i.e. it could have happened on any other Box running a (by that time) released Linux kernel, as long as the attacker had local access.

    what's Debian without the Linux kernel?

    Not much. But note that Debian also works on Debian (GNU/)*BSD and Debian GNU/Hurd, not only Debian GNU/Linux.

    Michael

  32. Um, no by Overly+Critical+Guy · · Score: 3, Insightful

    You know, people hack things. Kiddies hack servers.

    Why does it always have to be a "determined effort" against Open Source? Honestly...how paranoid do you have to be to think that? You do realize a lot of idiot kiddie (and professional) hackers are aware of Linux.

    Let me put your underlying implication to rest--no, it wasn't Microsoft. No reason to believe such. It was just some idiot hacker, like it always is.

    --
    "Sufferin' succotash."
  33. Not yet by dmeranda · · Score: 4, Interesting

    I just checked the current Red Hat 9 kernel source RPM and it does not have the patch yet [kernel-2.4.20-20.9.src.rpm]. I would expect a new kernel to show up soon though....I hope. The supposed patch which fixed this was in do_brk() [a /. comment further down provides the bk url]

    --- 1.31/mm/mmap.c Fri Sep 12 06:44:06 2003
    +++ 1.32/mm/mmap.c Thu Oct 2 01:18:19 2003
    @@ -1041,6 +1041,9 @@
    if (!len)
    return addr;

    + if ((addr + len) > TASK_SIZE || (addr + len) < addr)
    + return -EINVAL;
    +
    /*
    * mlock MCL_FUTURE?
    */
  34. Re:Well, well, well... by maximilln · · Score: 2, Interesting

    Before you demand humility from the Open Source community you might want to check relative numbers. How many available kernel exploits have been identified over the last 5 years of Linux? How many available kernel exploits have been identified over the last 5 years of Windows?

    It's not really a fair polling system, though. Microsoft can spend millions to squelch the public notification of any severe exploits if they need to. The fact is that unless we're actually the ones writing exploits we'd never know.

    There are some basic principles which point towards secure code. Proper flowcharting. Proper logic design. Efficient code. Time and again Microsoft has demonstrated its disregard for proper flowcharting and logic design (eg. "We have a deadline to meet. Make that code work any way you can so we can put this sh*t on the shelves and sell it!") and the code is blatantly bloated. Where Microsoft fails on all three criteria Linux makes a comprehensive effort of achievement. It may not be very technical or factually based but, in the absence of any real or reliable numbers, it's the best benchmark to use to compare the two.

    --
    +++ATHZ 99:5:80
  35. Re:Well, well, well... by jmv · · Score: 2, Insightful

    Part of what you say is right... However, the difference is that with Windows, what you hear about are *remote* holes, while in this case, it's a *local* hole. That makes a big difference. Local holes are frequent on any OS and regardless of what you do, a rogue local user can always do bad things. Remote holes are much worse, as anyone can attack your machine, not only local users. There have been very few remote holes with Linux (at least compared to Windows).

  36. Re:Well, well, well... by biendamon · · Score: 2, Insightful

    You're right, of course. This is an instance of a real security hole discovered in the kernel itself, and not of the garden-variety "could-theoretically-happen-under-XYZ-circumstance s" type you usually see with Linux. So that makes...hmmm...one. One real hole in the Linux kernel this year. Congratulations! You've proven that Linux isn't perfect. Which those of us who aren't trolls or delusional already know.

  37. What Crow? by IBitOBear · · Score: 5, Interesting

    Exactly what crow is that?

    Would that be that a legitamate error was found verified and fixed in public in just about two weeks with no hiding or spin?

    If Windows had a memory allocation error (application memory space being the thing controled by brk) of this sort would they allow it to be publicized?

    Once they made the "patch" available, would you be able to apply it to every past version of Windows?

    Would you be able to verify that the patch was applied to windows?

    If Debain's FTP server had been running IIS and windows, what kind of forensic annalysis would have been done, and how LIKELY is it that the *SINGLE* *INCIDENT* compromise would have lead to a complete and detailed report from Microsoft, and a fix?

    The "linux is more secure" argument is not (truthfully) based on the idea that linux is inherently error free. It is based on the idea that the persons experiencing the problems can determine what those probems actually are; come up with a fix; have that fix reviewed [and installed] (by all who care) *WITHOUT* needing to waking some sleeping-bear corporations nacient interest in the suffering of their lowly surfs... er... "customers".

    --
    Innocent people shouldn't be forced to pay for inferior software development.
    --"Code Complete" Microsoft Press
  38. Wrong by Compact+Dick · · Score: 2, Insightful
    I get flamed for being a so-called "Microsoft shill" constantly for pointing out the obvious--operating systems are as secure as their admins/makers.
    You get flamed because you're not Overly Critical when an exploit is revealed in closed source software. In fact, you're downright silent. When you get that sorted out, notice the flames dying down.

    Good luck!
  39. Re:so are other distros possible infected? by virtual_mps · · Score: 2, Insightful
    Gentoo's machines are being upgraded over the next hour. However, Gentoo forbids password logins for ssh (pk only), so they're less vulnerable to password stealing anyway.

    Right. So instead of stealing the password the intruder has to take the extraordinary step of stealing the key. And you've got an even worse problem in the general case when dealing with keys, because you have a hard time enforcing things like password expiration (just how long can someone use that stolen key to get into your system?)
  40. Mysteries of good system administration by Pflipp · · Score: 5, Interesting

    What I find intriguing is that those fine folks at Debian have come this far at detecting the exploit and tracking down the who's and why's (with the who's still being left undecided for the public, anyway).

    Honestly, if I were smart enough to sniff a password, I'd also be smart enough not to let anyone know I've sniffed. Still, the folks at Debian were able to blame the unpriviledged account part on a sniffed password. Now how do you gain evidence for something like that?

    Likewise, if I'd be smart enough to gain local root access by flipping the kernel, I would also be smart enough to ditch the binary with which I did that. Nevertheless, though after a thorough research, the Debian team has found the binary and managed to understand its potentials.

    But still, what intrigues me the most is that they have found out that they were hijacked in the first place. Now I have a rock solid system for that at home, which is an 8 Mb RAM Sparc Classic, which starts to trash so hard at the least of activity, that I would well be alarmed if someone else than me was using that machine for whatever purposes. But as I may assume that those Debian machines weren't that low-end, how could you ever expect to know when you have been exploited?

    --
    "We can confirm that Debian does *not* ship the version with the trojan horse. Our version predates it." [CA-2002-28]
    1. Re:Mysteries of good system administration by eddy · · Score: 2, Informative

      But still, what intrigues me the most is that they have found out that they were hijacked in the first place.

      Because they suddenly started spewing oopses. RTFAs:

      "On November 20 it was noticed that masters' kernel was generating a lot of oopses. While investigating this it was discovered that murphy was showing the exact same oops, which was an overly suspicious coincidence." -- Compromise details

      --
      Belief is the currency of delusion.
    2. Re:Mysteries of good system administration by Pflipp · · Score: 2, Interesting

      OK, I was afraid that this part would be misunderstood, but: how could you ever expect to know that you have been exploited? E.g., as in: how big is the chance that an average Debian (or other) machine at any time (other than now, of course) has been exploited without anyone being aware? And how do you expect to prevent this situation?

      --
      "We can confirm that Debian does *not* ship the version with the trojan horse. Our version predates it." [CA-2002-28]
  41. Re:My my my, yet another Linux bug. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Windows has tons of local root exploits, which nobody is bothering to fix because they're too busy patching the remote exploits.

    If Windows had a bug like this, it wouldn't be news. Microsoft hardly even tries to defend against such things. The only reason this is newsworthy is because Linux attempts to set a higher standard.

  42. Re:Well, well, well... by You're+All+Wrong · · Score: 2, Insightful

    "
    How many available kernel exploits have been identified over the last 5 years of Windows?
    "

    Sorry - Linux loses here. They don't call it a kernel exploit in windows. It's always an exploit in a separate subsystem instead.

    Shhhh! Don't go telling everyone that the subsystem has access to every byte of RAM, and every I/O port, as that would spoil the fun.

    YAW.

    --
    Your head of state is a corrupt weasel, I hope you're happy.
  43. Re:Well, well, well... by HeghmoH · · Score: 5, Insightful

    The worst Linux exploit of the year: an obscure kernel vulnerability that allowed one person to gain control of one box, disrupting one small OS group for a few days.

    The worst Windows exploit of the year: a hole in the RPC services (which you can't turn off) that allowed a worm to gain control of millions of Windows boxes, disrupting the entire internet.

    How does this make Linux equally bad as Windows, then?

    --
    Mod down posts with a "Free Mac Mini/iPod" sig, they're spam!
  44. Re:Well, well, well... by _Sprocket_ · · Score: 4, Insightful
    Perhapse you would like to add a point to copy-and-pasting the Linux Security advisory page? Maybe some context? Some sign of understanding what you're reading?

    A couple of points...

    1) Note that of the 15 listed advisories:

    5 are the same BIND DOS vulnerability

    2 (or 3 if you count Turbolinux's mega-update) are the same Ethereal vulnerability (DOS, possible arbitrary code)

    2 are the same stunnel hijacking vulernability
    2) None of these vulnerabilities lead to a remote exploit (although it could be argued one might be able to create a favorable condition with the ethereal issue)

    Sure - Linux runs buggy code too. If that's your point, make it. But this hardly seems to be a suitable response to the parent's (semi-trollish) comment on MS' run of remote exploits.

  45. Re:Well, well, well... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Informative
    The worst Windows exploit of the year: a hole in the RPC services (which you can't turn off) that allowed a worm to gain control of millions of Windows boxes, disrupting the entire internet.

    You can turn off RPC (aka DCOM) with this utility: http://grc.com/dcom/

  46. Re:Why aren't the using Debian Stable? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Funny

    No, I think Debian is still using kernel 2.0.0. There is going to be a new Debian release "any day now."

  47. Re:Well, well, well... by swissmonkey · · Score: 3, Insightful

    1) It's not obscure anymore
    2) You don't know how many persons used this exploit to take over Linux servers
    3) You don't know how many Linux servers were taken over by this exploit
    4) Yes, When an exploit hits Windows, it hits many more machines, because there's many more Windows boxes than Linux
    5) You obviously have missed all the remote exploits affecting tons of server software on Linux this year(openssh, apache, etc...), any of these could lead to owning the whole machine when used with this local exploit

  48. Re:Well, well, well... by FreeLinux · · Score: 2, Insightful

    an obscure kernel vulnerability that allowed one person to gain control of one box

    This statement is missing a qualifier that is very important: 'That we know of so far'. How do you know that there is only one person who has the exploit? How do you know that said person only rooted the Debian boxes. How do you know that a larger group of people don't have this exploit and don't already own a flotilla of zombie systems? How do you know that your box isn't owned by such a group at this very moment?

    It is these "obscure kernel vulnerabilities", that we assume no one has an exploit for, that are the most dangerous of all. Vulnerabilities of this type allow very highly skilled crackers (with intentions unknown) to own countless systems and do what they will for extended periods of time without detection. Debian thinks that this is weeks old. Suppose that this is only the cracker's latest version of the exploit and that previous versions haven't owned those machines for months or years?

  49. Re:Well, well, well... by Sri+Ramkrishna · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Um no.

    First the exploit compromised one of the largest linux distribution and potentially they could have put trojan horses in all our packages and we would really be up shit river when that happens.

    Secondly, we are no longer getting package updates so they have successfully stopped Debian development while they patch all this.

    Although it's not in the scale of windows, if GNU/Linux had larger marketshare this would have been a big deal.

    sri

  50. Re:Well, well, well... by yourmom16 · · Score: 2, Interesting

    I haven't clicked the link in your sig because:
    1. It's a timyurl link(ie. probably goatse), and
    2. The description sounds like goatse as well.

    --
    "We have got to make Stan understand the importance of voting, because he'll definitely vote for our guy." - South Park
  51. I think BSD is better written... by bluGill · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Having looking at both sources for linux and BSD, I think that BSD is better written in total. That isn't to say that there are no ugly parts in BSD, or no nicer parts in linux, just as a whole BSD is nicer.

    To save you some time I present the next 3 replys to this post.

    Is not
    Is too
    Is Not

  52. Re:Well, how about 570 days by g0sub · · Score: 2, Interesting

    Screw Linux! :)

    [root@balder toor]# uname -a;uptime
    SunOS balder 5.8 Generic_108528-07 sun4u sparc SUNW,Ultra-250
    2:42am up 864 day(s), 7:26, 2 users, load average: 0.07, 0.06, 0.05
    [root@balder toor]#

  53. What release did it APPEAR? by whoever57 · · Score: 2, Interesting

    What about 2.2.x series kernels, is there a similar patch?

    --
    The real "Libtards" are the Libertarians!
    1. Re:What release did it APPEAR? by kasperd · · Score: 2, Insightful

      What about 2.2.x series kernels, is there a similar patch?

      I wrote some exploit code for the 2.4 kernel, it didn't work on 2.2, so maybe 2.2 never had this vulnurability.

      --

      Do you care about the security of your wireless mouse?
  54. How to decrypt a burneye encrypted exploit? by TimFreeman · · Score: 3, Interesting
    The article saith:
    Forensics revealed a burneye encrypted exploit. Robert van der Meulen managed to decrypt the binary which revealed a kernel exploit.
    Does anyone have an idea how he managed to do that? The only approach I can imagine is a dictionary attack.

    Here is a tool that may have been used.

    1. Re:How to decrypt a burneye encrypted exploit? by wichert · · Score: 4, Informative

      UNF burninhell was indeed used. The problem was that the binary was (probably manually) fudged so that burninhell would not recognize it as a proper burneye encrypted file. Robert had to manually fix that before burninhell would accept the file and started to brute-force guess the password used.

  55. Proof-of-concept exploit code by devine10 · · Score: 3, Informative


    Grab it here

  56. 2.4.23-pre7 by kbmccarty · · Score: 2, Informative

    It was introduced in 2.4.23-pre7, disguised as "Add TASK_SIZE check to do_brk()" in the changelog.

    If you aren't averse to compiling your own kernel, the fix is a really easy two line patch. Just add the following to mm/mmap.c at line 1047 (immediately after "if (!len) return addr;")

    if ((addr + len) > TASK_SIZE || (addr + len) < addr))
    return -EINVAL;

    I'm enjoying the thrill of compiling patched kernels on two different machines as I write this. Thank goodness for Debian's make-kpkg.

    --
    - Kevin B. McCarty
  57. For the Security ANAL. by 1lus10n · · Score: 2, Interesting

    Say it with me ....

    There is no such thing as Utopian security. IF your hooked in your vulnerable. period.

    I don't know why people make such a big deal out of security for computers. Think about it. In real life things aren't very secure, I could break into most homes and steal things, or break things if i wanted to. but I don't. Why ? the threat of punishment, and not-so-common sense.

    If your a person who has deviant desires why wouldn't you break into a house ? VISIBLE security that would make punishment (ie jail) more likely would be the major reason. its not that the house is burglar proof, its that society has come to deal with criminals in the most effective way possible, and it doesn't usually hinder the average person. I think this is what we are lacking with computers, a clear cut enforcer. a "police" type body that could enforce laws such as "cracking and entering". and programs similar to an ADT-type of alarm system. We need a real solution. and Utopian code is not it. and making absurd laws are not it either.

    --
    "Two things are infinite: the universe and human stupidity; and I'm not sure about the the universe." --Albert Einstein
  58. Learning from your mistakes by Walles · · Score: 2, Insightful
    The question that should be asked now is:

    Imagine there is a buffer overflow in the kernel's brk() implementation that nobody knows about. What kind of security measures (other than finding the bug and fixing it) could prevent that buffer overflow from being exploited by an attacker?

    When that question has been answered, go implement the answer, and this won't happen again.

    --
    Installed the Bubblemon yet?
  59. Re:Wow, a Clippy joke by AJWM · · Score: 2, Informative

    What ever happened to Scrappy Doo?

    You need to watch the recent (well, couple years now I guess) Scooby Doo live-action/CGI movie. It explains all.

    (And my excuse is that I have kids -- I rented the DVD for them. That's my story and I'm sticking to it.)

    --
    -- Alastair