Cringley on E-voting
alfredo writes "I am shocked that this story from I Cringley hasn't been sent in and posted at Slashdot. I thought the slashdot crowd would be all over this. Robert X Cringley has a take on the voting scandal a bit different than what we have seen in the past, and promises more to come."
The touch-screen voting is by far the worst possible way to do voting. Most common folks can't say "electronic voting" without biting their cheeks, and to say e-voting, is somewhat redundant because e-voting could be mistaken for election voting. When I worked E-day for Ontario's elections in October, I remember it was e-this, e-that... everywhere.
So call it e-voting and wonder why there is confusion.
"So the U.S. government threw $3.5 billion on the table to pay for modernizing voting throughout the land, which is to say making it more expensive and more complicated. That's a lot of money and it attracted a lot of interest. One company in particular, Diebold Systems, went so far as to buy a smaller company that made voting machines just to get into the market. Diebold thought that being in the automated teller business was a good starting point for changing the way America votes."
Why not? They handle lots of money every day, why not give them valuable votes to control too? Oh wait a minute. They are republicans, these Diebold folks, aren't they? Once you take E-day away from little old ladies, you lose all honesty in it, imho.
And little old ladies are really the reason why elections have worked in the past because they are far better at auditing things than any automated paper-trail could be. If you would mess with the machine to fix votes, you could mess with the audit paper to fix the audit. So maybe Cringley's point has some surface validity, but it's moot, IMHO.
He concludes that a paper trail would be necessary for voting machines. That's fine with me, and everything, but the one thing in this article that grabbed me was when he said: "...there is lots of money to be made whether the darned thing works or not, and not much of a penalty if it doesn't work. Two hundred and seventy-five billion is a lot of money to spend on software development, especially if 72 percent of that money will be either wasted completely or used to develop something that doesn't work intended."
This could be seen as the fatal flaw of humanity: we don't care if we fail. We all die anyway, so who cares? Live life, make money and make love and make war and have fun and that's about that. Who cares if we just spent more money on a project that totally failed, when most of the world is starving elsewhere? What does it matter to us?
Personally, I'd like to devise a way so that it *would* matter.
Simple way to make it secure... The electronic machine FILLS OUT A PIECE OF PAPER CORRECTLY AND COMPLETELY. The person INSPECTS this for correctness before making it his/her vote. -- E-voting keeps the democrat from crying "hanging chads, dimpled chads... RECOUNT, RECOUNT, RECOUNT!"
If anything encourages those 70-year-olds not to vote it's electronics. I think we should port this technology to the dmv, medicare, and the internet.
I am shocked that this story from I Cringley hasn't been sent in and posted at Slashdot :)
It has...
When anger rises, think of the consequences.
Confucius (551 BC - 479 BC)
The repeated bastardization of this columnist's name makes me cringe.
http://www.why-war.com/ http://www.sacbee.com/content/opinion/story/783747 5p-8778055c.html
Gentlemen, you can't fight in here! This is the War Room!
I can't imagine too many business owners liking those odds, but the picture does get darker. If 28 percent of software projects were complete successes in 2000, then 72 percent were at least partial failures. And in software, even partial failure generally means getting absolutely nothing for your money.
What does this mean? If you want a program that does X, Y and Z, and you get one that does X and Y, it could still be useful and worth the money you spend.
I think that when you look at lots of 'business' apps, all it has to do is get it close to right, it doesn't need to work 'perfectly' every time as long as it doesn't corrupt the data, and a lot of the QA work is simply mess with it until it gets stable, rather then having any kind of real proof that it works correctly.
That said, I think a lot of slashdot users, or at least me, noticed a lot of "hackwork" style coding with the Diebold voting system. Especially the use of Microsoft tools and MS access.
Its like they slathered together a bunch of components they already had, did a little debugging, and tried selling the the things.
What's frustrating about it is we all know that it's possible to do this simply, and well, but Diebold chose to do a crappy job and lie about it, rather then doing it right the first time.
autopr0n is like, down and stuff.
Australians designed a system two years ago that addressed and eased most of those concerns: They chose to make the software running their system completely open to public scrutiny.
Although a private Australian company designed the system, it was based on specifications set by independent election Hot Cocks, who posted the code on the Internet for all to see and evaluate. What's more, it was accomplished from concept to product in six months. It went through a trial run in a state election in 2001.
In my town we "conect the dots" to mark our selections on a paper ballot.
...)
That ballot is inserted into a machine that electronicly counts the votes and stores the physical ballot in a locked box.
Done.
Paper trail is present, no "hanging chads".
simple elegent. and easier to complete than filling in your name on the SATs (those Damn bubbles
comment directly in my journal
When you look at the matter as an IT project, you realize just how unlikely it was to succeed. I wonder what sort of answer he'll give next week.
SCREW THE ADS! http://adblock.mozdev.org/ Proud user of teh Fox of Fire - Registered Linux User #289618
The American Civil Liberties Union said in California that certain counties in the recent recall election were disenfranchised by not having touch screen voting
No, The American Civil Liberties Union said in California that certain counties in the recent election were disenfranchised by using punch card voting. The fact that one of the alternatives to punch card voting is touchscreen voting does not mean that the ACLU was demanding the counties use touchscreen voting, just that the counties not use the punch card voting systems which had lost their legal certification anymore!
Cringely's intentions are excellent but he plays into the biggest, most disasterous, most helpful to the voting companies fallacy in the entire mess:
Recording method of votes and tabulation method of votes are entirely separate, orthogonal concepts.
The first has to do with, do you make a mark on a piece of paper, pull a lever, or touch a button on a screen? The second has to do with, are the votes recorded on paper and dropped in a box to be counted somewhere, or are they put on a hard drive to be just added together somewhere?
The first is what electronic voting salesmen are mostly selling the systems based on. The second is what electronic voting's enemies are mostly complaining about, as it alone is what makes almost all of the potential cheating possible. There's *no reason the two have to go together*! You could have a touch-screen voting machine which prints out a scantron sheet, which then is dropped in a box and counted like a hand-filled-out scantron sheet would have been.
A lot of the support for "electronic voting" has come from the fact its proponents have attempted as much as possible to prevent the false choice of "Punch cards VS electronic voting!" and hoping pieces of paper won't come to people's minds. But much of the remainder of the support on this issue have come from people using the advantages of touch-screen voting to sell "electronic voting", acting as if the touch-screens are inseperable from the idea of storing votes for tabulation on fragile, black-box electronic media, and banking on public confusion about All Things Computer to assume people won't notice this.
Irritable, left-wing and possibly humorous bumper stickers and t-shirts
The whole system is open to public scrutiny - several people have reported bugs, including an academic. Nice contrast to the DMCA...
You have to question exactly why it seems to be impossible to build a box that can accurately record keypresses - 'cus that's what we are taking about. It doesn't have to count or tabulate or generate reports; all it has to do is accurately record votes for a few thousand people.
And what is so difficult with printing a dated slip of paper containing the vote and a validation checksum proving the paper was printed at a given time on a particular machine and a specific vote or list of votes were recorded for that voter?
He went to a wuniversity and got a wegree. I think that makes him very wualified.
Now excuse me while I go look for nuclear wessels.
it was based on specifications set by independent election Hot Cocks
Surely you must've known someone was bound to ask about this.
There are two kinds of people: 1) those who start arrays with one and 1) those who start them with zero.
It's only bad because it lacks auditability. With a paper trail, any fraud could be uncovered.
... it was the former CEO of Diebold and the election used his machines). Sounds like an election Saddam would be proud of.
As it stands, the owners of these companies (who heavily back the Republicans) have carte blanche to steal elections because we now have no way to prove it happened. We'll just keep having these funny little incidents where a white republican male gets 83% of the vote in a black district against a democrat incumbent (yes, it happened
ATMs? The CIA? Tickets for trains and subways? Building access cards?
All transactions which tie the individual to the action.
Why no paper trail in voting machines?
Maybe because voting is supposed to be anonymous?
Let me tell you a little story...
In the town where my mother grew up, the population was in the thousands. Not more than ten thousand, in the mid-thousands.
During one election, one of the parties came to my mother's house, and picked up my grandmother to go take her to vote, because they had been watching the poll place, knew everyone who showed up, and knew what the exact vote was, before the vote was counted, because of who showed up to vote. They knew my grandmother didn't vote yet, and made sure they took her to vote because they needed her vote, it was that close.
Now let me tell you another story. The first time I voted when I turned 18 here in the US, I noticed that the voting place workers were putting the signature cards in precise order on top of the voting machines (the ones with the arm you pull to close/register vote/open curtain). They placed them in precise order according to the order that each person went into the booth. On those cards was your signature, that they used to compare against your voter card. So they could go back, and according to the order of the cards, and the order of the registered vote, figure out what your vote was. Of course, this is supposed to be impossible, your vote is supposed to be anonymous.
Fat chance. If you believe your vote is ever anonymous, you are a fool.
I later was able to obtain more information that confirmed my theory about whether votes are anonymous or not, and whether they can be fixed or not.
The touch screen voting simply brings new technology to a problem thousands of years old. Power corrupts, absolute power corrupts absolutely.
If you are an idealist, then you believe in the voting system. And if you believe in the voting system, you believe in anonymous voting. A paper trail obliterates anonymous voting, not just in small towns like my first story, but in all towns in cities, because of the breakdown by precinct making it possible to localize and fragment the US population.
For you younger folk, do you remember the 2000 election?
Remember the husband/wife absentee votes from two people in a foreign embassy in a small country? The husband was appointed by Clinton. The two votes came back, and were added in whe
If it is so easy (I personally think it is) why isn't there an open source alternative?
Base it on OpenBSD for security
Touchscreen input
Take the votes
Print out what they voted
Ask "Is this correct?"
Answer yes/no
Place printout into audit box on the way out the door
What is so hard?
If tyranny and oppression come to this land, it will be in the guise of fighting a foreign enemy. - James Madison
Now here's the really interesting part. Forgetting for a moment Diebold's voting machines, let's look at the other equipment they make. Diebold makes a lot of ATM machines. They make machines that sell tickets for trains and subways. They make store checkout scanners, including self-service scanners. They make machines that allow access to buildings for people with magnetic cards. They make machines that use magnetic cards for payment in closed systems like university dining rooms. All of these are machines that involve data input that results in a transaction, just like a voting machine. But unlike a voting machine, every one of these other kinds of Diebold machines -- EVERY ONE -- creates a paper trail and can be audited. Would Citibank have it any other way? Would Home Depot? Would the CIA? Of course not. These machines affect the livelihood of their owners. If they can't be audited they can't be trusted. If they can't be trusted they won't be used.
Every one creates a paper trail? Have you seen it? How does it work? How is this different from any other kind of human-readable data dump, besides being on paper, and how do we know we can trust it?
I think the only way to do this is to require that the software be completely open source, with the code posted on the internet for anyone to audit. I've heard this is what the Australians have done. There's still plenty of money to be made supplying the hardware, and deploying and managing the system.
If EVERY OTHER kind of machine you make includes an auditable paper trail, wouldn't it seem logical to include such a capability in the voting machines, too?
The reason why the voting machine doesn't produce an audit trail is that it's rather difficult to produce such an audit trail AND assure that votes cast will be anonymous. Elsewhere in the world people who voted for the "wrong" candidate faced retaliation, and the US voting system was set up to try and prevent that. Some systems that will "chop up" receipts have been proposed, but a failure in the mechanism might cause it to lose anonymity. I've proposed a method of having both audit and anonymity, but it's a bit on the complex side.
I was under the impression that he had sold out a long time ago, as far as I know a number of folks pen under his name these days.
It should come as no surprised when the unexpected is published under his banner.
don't worry, US congress will buy a bunch of this by 2004.
...since Republicans can sniff out the Liberals, I'm sure every employee working there is a Republican also.
If there were a Liberal working there, there would be problems. But since they can be sniffed out, they don't have to worry about any one of thousands of employees blowing the whistle...
And since there are no Liberals among thousands of employees, the execs won't have to worry about serious jail time and bankrupting legal fees either...
I ask, what difference will it make? The problem, as I see it, is getting people to go to the voting places in the first place, or to put it another way, getting people involved in the political process. My friend wrote a piece for our local paper, encouraging people to get involved (in addition to just voting), and I am sorry to say, it had little or no measurable effect. It is very discouraging.
Alaska Village invited to test cheap, clean nuclear power
The only thing necessary for evil to triumph is for good people to do nothing. Most people are law-abiding but unimaginative, and would never dream that their elected representatives could have less than perfect motives ..... and by the time they noticed anything was amiss, it would be too late already. If someone could have the power to subvert an election, they would effectively have absolute power forever. The election process must be protected from any such interference. If we cannot have faith in the fundamental processes of democracy, then it makes a mockery of the whole of democracy.
Who is prepared to stand up to this sort of abuse of power and excess of authority? Perhaps it's time for everyone to get active, however possible. The very foundations of democracy are under threat.
Je fume. Tu fumes. Nous fûmes!
I would bet the manufacturers came up with the "no receipt" requirement. That way, when there is a fiasco with the next election about someone getting a negative number of votes and no paper ballots to do a recount, there will be a move to replace the paperless machines with machines that do have a paper trail.
It's all about repeat business.
Just to remind everyone who seems to be forgetting this, there is actually one very good argument for why there *shouldn't* be a paper trail for electronic voting: it doesn't just make it possible to audit machines, it makes it possible to audit PEOPLE.
Buying votes may be illegal, but that doesn't mean it doesn't happen, and one of the main problems for prospective vote-buyers now is the fact that there's no way to ensure that the people you're paying to vote a certain way are actually doing so.
Then along comes the electronic voting receipt, which by its very nature *has* to be easily readable/auditable and *has* to have a very good system for ensuring it's authentic. Now, you can buy somebody's vote and be sure they actually vote the way you wanted. You can even do it a little more insidiously, perhaps, and in a way that might not necessarily even be quite so illegal, offering somebody some sort of small in-kind gift if they show you their Bush voting receipt, or even just an intangible reward like membership in a club or something.
In areas where people of one political alignment are vastly in the majority, voters who swing the other way sometimes need to keep their political preferences quiet, and this could make it harder for them to do that ("If you're *really* a Bush fan, show us your voting slip.")
Let alone the idiots who'll get the damn things framed to hang up in their house if the guy wins, the people who'll put them in plastic badge holders and wear them around their necks all day, protesters who'll publicly burn them, etc. I don't know, it just seems very wrong to me for there to be any record at all of your vote that can go with you outside of the voting booth.
Now with some paper ballot systems it's expected that after checking your receipt you'll deposit it in a box at the polling station (and not keep a copy for yourself), but even in that case people can pocket them / swap them with fake ones (which won't matter except in the unlikely event of a recount) or give some potential vote-buyer a discreet glance at the thing before turning it in.
The only way to get around these problems is to create a system where a receipt is human-readable but easily counterfeitable so that nobody can verify its authenticity except the elections board; I don't quite know how such a system would work, though, and it seems like it would have a lot of potential for confusing people.
So IMHO receipts are not the solution, open-source is the solution; open things up to public scrutiny and receipts become largely unnecessary. Or better yet, stick to paper ballots but use *good* paper ballots; fill-in-the-bubbles, perhaps, which have been used quite effectively in many places.
> Answer yes/no
- Answer No.
- Choose again.
- Choose the SAME one.
- Get new printout.
- Repeat.
[...]
- Stuff N printouts into audit box.
The day after, call for printout recount.
Boom, profit.
What is so hard? Designing a reliable system is, obviously.
Not fun, I know.
-- B.
This sig does in fact not have the property it claims not to have.
For every vote cast, you print off a paper ballot, marked with only the machine ID, no identifying information. The voter is permitted to see this ballot through plexiglass, and decide if it indicates the correct choice. If they hit the "NO" button is it shredded, and they start over. If they hit "YES", it goes into a bin, and they can leave.
You audit hte machine by comparing the tally in the machine with the tally in the bin.. you don't need to be able to check every individual vote and decide which.. just knowing you have discrepancies is all that matters.
As it stands, the owners of these companies (who heavily back the Republicans) have carte blanche to steal elections
Or, Democrat "activists" could hack the machines to steal elections. Or, renegade Libertarians could hack the machines to give the election to the Libertarian candidate. Or maybe Ross Perot can finally win.
If there's no auditing, that is BAD, and it doesn't matter which political party you hate the most. Leave the whole Republican/Democrat thing out of this discussion.
steveha
lf(1): it's like ls(1) but sorts filenames by extension, tersely
Please, when people post someone's name in the title of a Slashdot story, the least they could is check if the name is written correctly.
But since this is Slashdot and more people write "Cringley" than "Cringely", maybe you should all petition to get his name changed.
Like many other readers the magnitude of failure in e-voting amazes me. In Europe they are starting a huge project to develop an e-voting platform which can be used from mobile ohones, ove the internet and presumably other channels. It will be interesting to see how that goes after following our domestic e-voting failures.
The Australian Capital Territory Electrol Commission is on the web - and this page might be of interest
...
http://www.elections.act.gov.au/Elecvote.html
and it has links to the source code and the process of viting and FAQs. They appear to have a full disclosure and a public debate on this. It can potentially - arguably - be made a bit "more better" by printing the vote on paper.
From the FAQ:
Does the system print out a copy of my vote?
No. There is no need to print a copy of any votes. The Electoral Act 1992 does not provide for a "paper trail" of electronic votes cast. This is not required as the software for the voting and counting systems has been rigorously tested, independently audited, and published for anyone to see on the internet. In addition, audit trails and security systems will be in place to verify that the software used in production is identical to the tested and audited software, and to verify that the data actually counted is the data cast by voters in polling places. This approach is intended to ensure that there will be no way in which electronic votes can be tampered with. The system is intended to be more transparent and secure than the existing paper ballot method.
How do I know that what goes in is what comes out?
EVACS was extensively tested by the developers and the ACT Electoral Commission before the Commissioner was satisfied that it was suitable for use at the election. More information on testing.
A reference group, consisting of representatives from parties, MLAs and special interest groups, including ACT Blind Citizens Australia and the Proportional Representation Society, provided feedback during development and testing of the system. More information on consultation.
The Commission contracted an independent software auditing firm to audit the software code of the system to ensure that the software did not contain code that would have the affect of altering the result of the election. For example, checks were undertaken to ensure that no code had been included that would change the votes recorded by electors or would insert or substitute fraudulent votes, or would in any other way alter the election outcome. More information on auditing.
Election officials in electronic polling places account for barcodes in much the same way as they do for paper ballots. They provide records of barcodes issued, which are compared with the number of electronic votes cast.
Voter data on removable media is stored in sealed pouches for transport. Seals are placed on the pouches in the presence of scrutineers and removed in the same way, much in the way the seals on ballot boxes are used. Multiple copies of the data are made, which are transported separately to the counting centre. These multiple copies could be compared with one another to prove that no tampering had taken place.
Following the 2001 election the Commission surveyed a random sample of 95 batches of ballot papers, containing 4,640 ballot papers from the three electorates, and compared the written ballots with those that had been data entered. No data-entry errors were found. More information is in the Electronic voting and counting system review(pdf - 921 kb)
First, the reason there's no paper trail despite all of Diebold's other machines having a paper trail is that the Diebold voting machines aren't made by the same people. Diebold bought another company that was already making voting machines, and they haven't had anything like enough time to "merge" the two companies' engineering groups. You see this all the time in IT, some company (Cisco, for example) buys another company, and starts selling their product (the PIX, for example) with their name on it (so now it's the Cisco PIX), but it takes years to actually do more than piddle on it to make it smell like the parent company. Looking at the Cisco example, the PIX is still an odd-man-out product in the Cisco product line.
Second, it's not hard to produce an audit trail *and* assure the votes cast will be anonymous. You just have to make two decisions:
1. The auditable ballot is the real ballot.
2. The vote is complete when the auditable ballot is complete and saved, not when the "user-friendly" ballot is complete.
There's two basic ways of doing this.
One way is to make the touchscreen machines a more convenient way to generate your traditional ballots. That is, the touch screen produces a human-and-machine-readable form (OCR, punch card, whatever). You're taking advantage of the fact that the machine's card punch always punches clean through, that its printer always colors inside the lines, but no more than that.
The other is to let the user see the auditable ballot, but keep it inside the machine. Once it's printed, the user punches "VOTE" or "CANCEL" below the window, and the ballot is delivered (visibly) to the ballot box or the shredder.
Intermediate between these, have a printable ballot that's got a random machine-readable tag on it that the user can deliver into one of two slots, the ballot box or the shredder. After the machine has read the tag it verifies that the voter didn't just shred a blank piece of paper... but the tag is not stored after the ballot has been accepted and it's generated anew using an external entropy source (such as the timing of the voter's screen-taps or keystrokes) for each ballot, so there's no trail leading to the voter.
Any of these would work. The first one could be retrofitted to existing optical or punch card systems, which would allow for precincts to complete their votes even if their electronic machines are down.
Why, oh why, does anyone think a paper trail will make any difference? As I recall there was a thorough paper trail in Florida 2000. In fact, the paper trail isn't the main issue here, so much as the accountability of those who control the process, and/or derive benefit from it.
Build a secure, open, and accountable system... I dare you. Then take it to Congress and offer it to them under Creative Commons or something. See whether they even look at it before tossing it in the trash. Cringley has missed the point entirely. And IT IS THIS:
As long as we allow those in power to decide HOW they come to power, we will also allow them to decide WHO is in power. And it will continue to be THEM and not the every day people of the United States. This is the issue, despite what most would have you think. People in power will keep their power because they think they know what is best for you, and because they like it. You will keep paying them to lead you to the slaughter, because you are a sheep who needs a shepherd.
You can have all the elections you want, but if the candidates are selected from the same pool of 500 rich white men... then the voting doesn't matter.
a) put a check in box A if you want a rich white man to run the world.
b) put a check in box B if you want a rich white man to run the world.
c) don't check either box and watch the rich white men rule the world.
Have fun selecting random boxes in your next "election," fellow Americans. The Bush dynasty (and their pals in texas, florida, georgia, oklahoma... you get the idea) don't care how you vote, as long as you don't think.
Why, oh why, does anyone think a paper trail will make any difference? As I recall there was a thorough paper trail in Florida 2000. In fact, the paper trail isn't the main issue here, so much as the accountability of those who control the process, and/or derive benefit from it.
Build a secure, open, and accountable system... I dare you. Then take it to Congress and offer it to them under Creative Commons or something. See whether they even look at it before tossing it in the trash. Cringley has missed the point entirely. And IT IS THIS:
As long as we allow those in power to decide HOW they come to power, we will also allow them to decide WHO is in power. And it will continue to be THEM and not the every day people of the United States. This is the issue, despite what most would have you think. People in power will keep their power because they think they know what is best for you, and because they like it. You will keep paying them to lead you to the slaughter, because you are a sheep who needs a shepherd.
You can have all the elections you want, but if the candidates are selected from the same pool of 500 rich white men... then the voting doesn't matter.
a) put a check in box A if you want a rich white man to run the world.
b) put a check in box B if you want a rich white man to run the world.
c) don't check either box and watch the rich white men rule the world.
Have fun selecting random boxes in your next "election," fellow Americans. The Bush dynasty (and their pals in texas, florida, georgia, oklahoma... you get the idea) don't care how you vote, as long as you don't think.
As someone who's studied both, it seems very strange how much they borrow from one another, and yet most practicioners I've met from each field has been thoroughly ignorant of the other.
From one side, Systems Engineering is quite an old field, mostly championed by the government itself to attach "best practice" management processes to increase the viability of major complex construction projects (since a lot of civil engineering projects were failing at the time). It's basically the simple process of structured decomposition of a complicated problem into a variety of simple ones: problem analysis, requirements, specifications, functional/structural decomposition, building & assembling components, verifying that your system meets the specifications/requirements, and finally validating whether your system actually solves the problem. As systems get more complex, doing all the bookkeeping to keep track of those handfuls of tasks becomes an information management project in and of itself.
Software engineering came along, and suddenly they were going through major SW projects in 1-2 year cycles, instead of 10-20 year cycles for bridges, dams, buildings, etc. Needless to say, the SW engineers gained experience in full life cycle systems engineering of projects much more quickly than most of the old traditional SE's could build in an entire lifetime. This was both good and bad... As you may well be familiar with, we've raised our SW engineers to enjoy reconstructing things on their own from scratch, and to be somewhat resistant to doing the research on how other related projects / fields have fared in the past. As a result, they've rediscovered many of the SE fundamentals on their own, but at the same time, we're going through the same mistakes that had caused massive project failures in the past to do so.
Wow, it's like anonymous balots never existed and can't be duplicated by machines that also tally votes electronically. Why not print out a ballot for voter inspection that's dropped into a lock box for hand counting if needed? Nah, we'd better go back to pottery shards, paper is just too easy to nail people with.
Friends don't help friends install M$ junk.
From the end of the article: Now back to those voting machines. If EVERY OTHER kind of machine you make includes an auditable paper trail, wouldn't it seem logical to include such a capability in the voting machines, too? Given that what you are doing is adapting existing technology to a new purpose, wouldn't it be logical to carry over to voting machines this capability that is so important in every other kind of transaction device?
This confuses me. I'd love to know who said to leave the feature out and why?
Next week: the answer.
The answer? Because it's cheaper. And because ultimately the only ones that can hold these companies responsible for their fraudulent behavior are the people of America, who are too fat and docile to do any such thing.
If these walls could talk they'd probly still ignore me. --MF DOOM
A system using perfectly fair machines can still be compromised if you control the central server the machines report to.
A paper trail that informs the voter what he just voted for, and poll workers what the tally/results are for their presinct is necessary to prevent tampering with the reported vote tally.
Diebold is one of our GOP-supporting overlords. It would be difficult to detect if they passed a backdoor password/method that allowed/permitted selected GOP hackers to modify vote tallys, or spoof a voting machine to overwrite previously reported legitimate tallies.
One of the Diebold memos suggested that votes were sitting unencrypted on an open ftp server, so the impression is even someone with the most basic technical skills could browse and alter them.
I think you're confusing two issues here. The issue in the 2000 Florida election was one of improperly marked ballots: punches in the wrong place, in too many places or only partly in place (the dimpled and hanging chads from punches that didn't go all the way through). So the reason to lose the punch cards for voting is that they were complicated, leading to votes not being counted or ballots being rejected due to multiple votes for the same office.
So let's accept for the moment the idea that punch card ballots are bad. I do accept this, but if you don't, pretend you do for the moment. Now consider the problem with their replacement: the touch screen system.
In a touch screen system, you touch to indicate your choices and then touch again to indicate that your choices are the ones you meant to make. You register on the machine that it accepted your vote precisely the way you intended.
What happens then? Without a paper trail, you are taking it completely on faith that the machine transferred your instructions accurately into its memory, that the votes for that machine were transferred accurately to the machine that collects up the votes from the local machines and so on down the line. At any point from the voting machine to the final tally, you have no confidence that somebody didn't play with the software or with the numbers. And if there's belief that there's a problem, there is absolutely no way to determine whether or not the final tally reflects the actions of the voters.
The idea of a paper trail is to have each individual vote written to a paper receipt. The receipt drops into a window, so the individual voter can examine it and verify that it reports their vote accurately (i.e. matches what the machine said they did). Once the voter has said that yes, the receipt is accurate, the machine drops it into a locked box, just as the punch cards are kept in a locked box today. And if there's any question about the vote, all these paper receipts can be collected and tallied, whether by hand or by some kind of optical scanner. And we can have some confidence that the numbers reported by the machines are in sync with what the individual voters saw on their paper receipts.
My point again is that the problems with the paper ballots in the past were with the methods of marking those ballots and their layouts. (Remember Palm County's butterfly ballots?) Those problems go away with a well designed voting machine. But now we have a lack of a paper trail of any kind.
As an aside, I'm sure the lack of a paper trail in the new voting machines was a way for the manufacturers to save money/offer local governments a lower bid. The paper trail should have been in the original RFP. That it wasn't shows the incompetence of those who set up the bid process.
Use the machine.
Machine prints out two pieces of paper. One has your name, the other doesn't. Transaction numbers on both for future reference.
Compare for accuracy, keep the one with your name, toss the other in the ballot box.
Simple.
You say , ' Its like they slathered together a bunch of components they already had, did a little debugging, and tried selling the the things.' and I assume you were talking about Diebold.
But the article clearly _implies_ the opposite,
'If EVERY OTHER kind of machine you make includes an auditable paper trail, wouldn't it seem logical to include such a capability in the voting machines, too? '
I also find this very odd. From a software engineering point of view why would you not reuse the codebase you already had to solve this very similar problem. ??????
It must have been more work to actively remove the audit trail than to rewrite from scratch.
Seems twisted, any ideas?
Be very careful of picking on a name you've never heard without doing even the most rudimentary research. You risk looking like a bigger jackass when it turns out that this guy is a well-known and respected name in the field.
Here's some information you could have gotten had you thought to click on the "about Bob" link in the article. If you'd spent literally two seconds doing your research you would have had at least this and would look that much less foolish.
http://www.pbs.org/cringely/about/
This is his bio however so you should probably progress to the next step (warning this may take 10 seconds or more) and enter his name in google.
This came out a few days ago, and even GrabTheMic, a fledling slashcode site had a post about it.
This is big time stuff here that needs to be discussed at the dinner table, and not just 'geek' discussion boards. Our very rights are at stake, and I bet that the majority of the nation doesn't even know about it or if they do, they don't know why they should care.
Get the word out.
Last night my daughter asked me whether we would have electronic voting. I said we would, but that there will be more controversy about it than we ever had about paper voting. She asked why.
I told her that computer people and academics have known for decades that the way to ensure the correctness of a process is not just to examine the input and output, but to let everyone see the inner workings of it.
That made sense to her. She's 15, headstrong, and as honest as a light switch. She asked how we can believe the voting machine company won't cheat unless we know how the machine works.
I also said the worst thing they'll try to do is to send the results over the Internet.
Then it occurred to me. They should send the results
-
over the Internet
-
And by telephone
-
And by burning CD's and mailing them
-
And by printing the individual ballots on paper, hand-tallying the votes, and carrying the results to Washington with briefcases handcuffed to little old ladies.
Overkill with quadruple checks, all of which have to agree.sigs, as if you care.
Did anyone else read: "Cringe - E-vote" - nevermind.
|>>?
so it can be anonymously counted. Don't forget this part.
I mean, since everything this man says warrants /.
I don't understand what all the fuss is about.
We would be a lot better off if we took voter registrations that were "unused" (person didn't vote) and entered a random vote for them. This would have a number of interesting effects:
- We could continue to delude ourselves that we were getting the election results we deserved. There would be a vote from every person.
- If you didn't vote, you would know that a vote was being entered for you ANYWAY. This would likely drive as many people toward voting as it would drive away out of sloth and lack of caring.
- Accuracy of voting would be about what it is today. Come on, do you really think it is statistically better then random selection?
So each voter has a unique id, negating the possiblity of stuffing the 'recount ballot box'. The computer could encode everything in a bar code (id and votes), so re-counts could be done automatically in case the electronic system fails. And if /that/ system fails, the actual votes could be counted by hand easily, since it could be printed cleary on the card, perhaps in a system that makes hand counting easier.
One of the outputs should be declared the legally authoritative source, so it would make sense this would be the human-readable format that the voters themselves would be checking.
Another system would be to keep the unique ID thing, but to get another print out you would have to put the card through the shredder that recognized the ID. But really, thats not necesary.
Everything in the system should be open source as possible, from the video driver to user interface. so that groups like the EFF could check it out. The results could be stored on the machines themselves, sneaker-net could be used to bring the ballots in, perhaps encrypted by a private key unique to each voting machine. These encrypted results could be made available directly to interested parties, along with the public keys.
Instead of sneaker-net, each ballot box could run a server allowing any interested party to download the encrypted results. The problem with this is the possible security hazard of having the systems online at all, the advantage of the snearker-net is that it wouldn't have to have anything to do with the internet.
Another idea would be for every voter to have their own private key encoded on their voter registration card. The encrypted results could be made available using one of the methods above, public keys would be made available to the general public. This has the benefit of every citizen having a private key, which could be used for encypted online communication as well. Granted, if your the NSA this would be a disadvantage. The other problem is how the inital creation of the private key would take place. It would have to be done by some trusted party. Ideally, the voters themselves, though I'm not sure how that would work. Though really, at some point you have to trust your county clerks office, so they may as well do it.
Granted, lots of ways to do it. Not easy, but far from impossible.
There are lies, damned lies, and then there are statistics.
Article:
The bad news is that in 2000, only 28 percent of software projects could be classed as complete successes (meaning they were executed on time and on budget) while 23 percent failed outright (meaning that they were abandoned).
According to my math, that means that 49% of projects took longer and cost more than they were supposed to. Note later in the article, this 49% is considered wasted:
Article:
Two hundred and seventy-five billion is a lot of money to spend on software development, especially if 72 percent of that money will be either wasted completely or used to develop something that doesn't work intended.
But something's wrong. Let's come up with a product and let's call it OS X or Mandrake or Windows XP. All of the above were not completed on time. In fact, I'd say I'd rather have a polished late product than release something on time for the sake of doing so. (Name good software that was released on time someone?) So I guess all the money spent on all of them was wasted.
Someone hit this guy with a clue stick.
-- Political fascism requires a Fuhrer.
"I am shocked that this story from I Cringley hasn't been sent in and posted at Slashdot. I thought the slashdot crowd would be all over this."
... if everyone sat around being "shocked" that other people hadn't sent in particular things (remember, we all have different interests, schedules, favorite news sources, Cringely tolerance), then Slashdot would be down to reviews of books and the occasional MP3 player ;)
How do you think Slashdot works? Why would you be shocked -- if you yourself had not submitted it until now, why the big surprise?
Most of the stories on Slashdot are submitted by people who read the site and have the motivation, however triggered, to submit summaries / links / whatever
With all the talk about an audit trail and how trivial it is, I have to ask, where's the audit trail now? I've used both the old mechanical lever machines and pen and paper ballots, neither provided me with a receipt to ensure that my vote actually counted. It would be just as easy and trivial to "lose a few votes" as it would be to alter the little 1's and 0's in an e-voting machine.
Also, how does one reconcile differences between the number of people signing into their precincts and the total number of votes cast? I've always had to vote on numerous things at a time so it's certainly possible that I could simply not care enough about a particular position to bother voting for anyone at all.
Voting will never be completely tamper proof. In my opinion Cringley brings up a more interesting point about software development processes than anything truly insightful about e-voting machines.
Another week, another Cringley article! This man knows everything!
Oh Cringley, if only i were as wise as thee. Thou' truely does know everything there is too know about knowing.
Last thing I read the budget ran out before they implemented a paper audit trail. So, ho hum.
-- Free software on every PC on every desk
This isn't politics (at least not in this particular column) it's engineering. And one thing engineers of great big IT systems know
...is that engineers aren't invited to the meetings where the (political) decisions are made, and are summarily ignored before and after those meetings, therefore...
they are never on time, never on budget, and sometimes don't work at all.
'nuff said.
Business isn't willing to pay for products, innovation and careers, so we get brands, mortgage commercials and layoffs.
C-r-i-n-g-e-l-y, Robert X.
The name is written wrongly in the blurb no less than four times! But at least the submitter is consistent with himself...
I have to ask now more than ever : why is this particular mis-spelling so prevalent?
Xavier
Do I make sense? Please report if not.
Lawrence Person (lawrencepersonh@gmailh.com (remove all "h"s to mail)
http://www.lawrenceperson.com/
Cringely should really stop writing. Just about everything I've ever read by him put me in a fit of rage over his failure to raise important points or his ineptitude on realising the fundamental problems in his own proposals. The guy can argue a point like a fish can ride a bicycle. In the past his ramblings have prompted me to e-mail him up to 5 times requesting him to stop filling the internet with this sort of mindless opinionated filth, or at least make simple corrections to his articles which he inevitably fails to do (and no, I don't adopt a conceited "I AM RIGHT" attitude in my mails, I just argue a point in a polite and formal manner, backed up with numerous reputable references). I can't believe he's held his job since everything he says is usually so much flamebait and pontification. I'll be modded troll for this, but I hope at least one or two people agree with me.
patch: get confirmation prior to printing.
Slashdotters are growing in influence. Now we bring puny servers to their knees, AND help focus public attention as alternative press, leading "mainstream" media to cover news stories that matter to Nerds. Congratulate yourself on helping the leaders to follow the people.
--
make install -not war
The Florida election results clearly showed the problems with punch card voting.
Actually, according to a study by MIT and CalTech, punch cards are comparable to other voting methods, and, depending upon who you believe, possibly better. Though I've been unable to find the study itself, I've seen it mentioned by Neal Boortz and others. (I've not been able to find the study; nonetheless, I've found Boortz to be accurate in his facts more often than not.) Punch cards actually come out on top of the other methods.
However, many of these problems were due to poor ballot design...
Enh; I don't know. The infamous "butterfly ballot" certainly seemed simple enough to me, and to the third graders to whom it was shown, and to the Democratic Party officials who designed and approved it, and nobody seemed to complain when it was published in the newspaper, but I'm sure I'm missing something.
Imagine that...you have to maintain a mechanical device. This ought to be a crime, at least of negligence.
Poor training of poll workers? Admittedly, I've not been one, but it seems simple enough. If not, then this falls under the same "negligence" bit, as above. Poor training of the voters? As I said, the ballot seemed clear enough; if the voters couldn't figure it out, then I suppose we ought to be pointing fingers at the schools for turning out uneducated graduates. Further, if they couldn't understand, and couldn't be arsed to ask the poll workers for help, well, if they don't care that much, if they can't be bothered to check their votes, do we really want them voting? I don't mean that as flamebait--if you take the time to consider your vote, and act carefully to get it right, why should somebody else, who had no idea for whom they voted, have just as much say?
Moderate drunk! It's more fun that way!
The machines may have faults and deficiencies. That doesn't mean that they are worse than the previous system or are a clear and present danger to democracy.
In the past, I've voted in districts that used punched cards and mechanical lever machines. The punched cards are difficult to use for some people and are error prone. Mechanical lever machines have their own set of vulnerabilities and do not generate an audit trail. Even paper ballots can be subverted.
I'd like to see the problems with the Diebold machines, and their software development process, addressed before the next election. That doesn't mean that I am awake all night, worrying about some conspiracy of political operatives and uber-hackers stealing the election.
Mea navis aericumbens anguillis abundat
It is becoming obvious that the 2004 US election has already been decided.
Bush will have been elected (not re-elected because he was appointed by the Supreme Count for his first term) by 51% to 49%.
The touchscreen voting machines have no paper record of the votes entered. They are made by a company that gave the maximum amount permitted to the Republican party. The CEO of the company is a conservative Republican. The Republican congressional representive in the district where the machines were tried in the 2002 election was elected by an 80% margin.
The software used to count the votes is closed and proprietary. Anyone who challenges it could be sent to prison for DMCA violations.
If the Soviets did this thirty years ago, the Republicans would jumping all over it as evidence of the total institutional corruption of the communist system. They aren't saying shit now.
I do encourage you to vote. It's a great habit that you don't want to get out of.
Just don't seriously expect it have any meaning.
Thank you,
why no audit trail was included, I don't know what to tell him.
Seems obvious to me.
Richard Steven Hack - This sig is TOO GODDAMN SHORT TO DO ANYTHING USEFUL WITH! MORONS!
The problem with the voting machine development is not whether it was done using open or closed source. Cringley soesn't even mention open source. The problem is, the govt. didn't specify what kind of information was required, i.e. paper trail, to verify the machine is working correctly. The govt. through a lot of money at a problem without even understanding themselves what they wanted, and probably didn't write the contracts such that they wouldn't pay if they didn't get working machines. Therefore, they got a half-hearted effort from Diebold, who has been successful with similar machines, because Diebold was interested in maximizing profit.
The Electoral College has only been around for a couple of hundred years. You can't expect every American to have heard about it.
No, the common man isn't stupid. But he is poorly-educated. People choose not to educate themselves. That is fine, they can vote for a man who actually knows how a bill becomes a law.
A true democracy truly is a mob. Were we in a "true democracy," there would still be slavery. There would be no true United States, as the Confederacy would still be around. There would be no real civil rights. Immigration would have shut down long ago, meaning the loss of many of the inventions that have helped make America a world power. A mob is only as smart as its dumbest member.
I would even argue we need it now more than ever. With the power of the mass media, fads have unprecedented power. After 9/11, every person who even looked Arabic would have been put in jail.
I once was talking about the recall, and I said something to the extent of: "Our government was based on a series of checks and balances. Regular elections are a check against the power of the people." I would say the same about representatives.
Your post was optimistic. Optimism is good. But at some point you have to face reality. We need a representative democracy. We need representatives who will actually do the unpopular thing every now and then, because it is right.
i don't understand why making a computer voting system is so hard. you make a booth with a screen. people come in. people look at their ID and then they go into the booth. they slide their ID (either driver license or a special voter card) into the machine. it checks to see that they are registered and if they have voted already. if they are ok to vote the candidates come up on a screen. it will have their picture and their name so dumb people won't mess it up. you touch the person/option you want to vote for. the results aren't sent over any network. the same people that usually go pick up the punch cards go to each machine and get the results. the only stuff you need to send over a network is the check at the begining to see if they are registered and if they have voted yet or not. there are web sites all over the net that have voting things and they can remember if you've voted before. they work ok. why can't this type of voting work that well?
You cannot provide a paper record to the voter, because it would undermine the ability to vote anonymously. An employer/union/church/spouse/etc. could demand it be provided as proof that you voted correctly, not just that you voted.
When ballots were entirely paper there was a practice called "chain balloting" where a loyal party member would take their ballot out of the polling place and allow their precint captain to fill it in correctly. The next loyal party member would then take that ballot in, place it in the box, and take their ballot back out to the precint captain...
It was an illegal practice
The real reason that a paper trail is needed is that unlike normal commercial transactions, a voter must be able to vote when they show up at the polling place. You can't give them a rain check 1 time in 1000, or even in 1 in 10,000 due to equipment failure.
If we have a voting system that is dependent on power, it won't be long before somebody deliberately triggers a power failure in the portion of the state that was going to vote the "wrong" way.
It protect the voter against mistakes.
Like voting for Bush?
That's not a mistake. It's a disaster.
-kgj
-kgj
We have black boxes on planes, even in cars now. The technology obviously exists where we could have these "black boxes" in voting machines, sealed and relatively tamper-proof. Of course, if these means are left to corporations like Diebold, they'd be one-use-only-type items that would be expensive and necessary to replace for every election, whereas the open source community would undoubtedly come up with just as secure a solution that was re-useable and exponentially more economical.
The key to getting the public to care about these issues has less to do with educating them to the technology or scaring the crap out of them to "do the right thing" but instead to focus on the fact that this is taxpayer money, YOUR money that needs to be wisely spent to insure that YOUR vote is properly counted.
...what can be adequately explained by stupidity.
Here is how I see it: Diebold makes sale kiosks for Home Depot, ATMs for Citybank, and voting machines for the government. Diebold comes to each customer and says, "We can save you XXX dollars on every machine if you don't need a paper printer in it".
What do the customers say?
Home Depot manager: "XXX dollars and no paper? Are you nuts? We'll lose ten times that on fraud!"
Citybank manager: "XXX dollars and no paper? Are you a complete moron? We'll lose hundred times that on lawsuits!"
Government bureaucrat (he does not care about fraud - someone gets elected one way or the other, the bureaucrat will have his job, and he can't get sued): "XXX dollars? What a great idea!"
The Civil Rights Commission found no one who was unfairly denied the right to vote despite it being in their institutional and personal interest to do so.
That's funny, because this link says they found "it was widespread voter disenfranchisement, not the dead-heat contest, that was the extraordinary feature in the Florida election. The disenfranchisement was not isolated or episodic. And state officials failed to fulfill their duties in a manner that would prevent this disenfranchisement."
So I ask you AC, are you lying or just misinformed?
When people say "audit trail", they mean "audit trail where the voter verifies that the printout reflects who they voted for". That neatly deals with your scheme, at least as I understand it.
Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from a rigged demo
--Andy Finkel (J. Klass?)
Potential margin of error? So did Democrat chads hang more often than Republican or Independent chads?
Sure, the small margin of victory did make any error all the more significant, but the error should have evened out over the large number of votes.
This is the key problem with e-voting: if the machines are hackable, there will be too few hacks, all with unpredictable impacts, to keep statistical error to a minimum. Millions of votes will, however, minimize the error from chads (or other current, fallible methods) to zero.
Sure, any of these things could happen, but it would be far easier for the people who control the closed, proprietary system to use it to further their interests. And all three major companies that build and sell e-voting machines are staunchly Republican. And, if you look at the history, many many more strange things have happened with e-voting machines that favor Republicans than Democrats or Independents.
Remember the husband/wife absentee votes from two people in a foreign embassy in a small country? The husband was appointed by Clinton. The two votes came back, and were added in when everyone was watching. I forget the country, but I'm sure there is a record somewhere because of how close the election was. Those two votes were counted in the Clinton column. So the public knows that this husband and wife, who were the only two absentee votes coming from that country, voted for Clinton. And if you watched the votes for other offices as the vote was registered (I didn't), you would have been able to ascertain who they cast their vote for other offices, such as Senator, etc.
See, now this kind of creeps me out. Here in Australia, when you send in an absentee vote, you have 2 envelopes. You put your vote (or votes, if you're electing for more than one House) into the first envelope. The only info on this envelope is your constituency(ies). You then place this envelope into another envelope that has your indentifying info so you can be marked off the electoral roll, and send it in.
The person who opens the outer envelope has absolutely nothing to do with the person who opens the second envelope. The first 'opener' just chucks the inner envelope into a big pile and marks your name off the roll. The box with all these non-identifiable envelopes then gets carted off to the tally room, to be opened and counted by someone who has no idea who cast your vote.
I might add that here in Australia, we have preferential voting (rather than first-past-the-post), we still use paper ballots, mark our vote in pencil, which is then counted by hand, and can still produce a reliable result by election night. It's virtually immune from many of the technical problems relating to power supply, data transfer, auditing, etc. that have been discussed in this thread, and it still works reliably and well. It might cost a little more to run over time (though not much more, by the sounds of it), but nobody ever said democracy was supposed to be cheap.
SofaMan -- Occasionally Battling Evil With His Mighty Powers Of Indolence.
PUBLIC DOMAIN idea, go for it....
print a receipt with a UPS like tracking number on it, show all the results on a web site, by tracking number, so anyone can count the votes at home with a small program. You can check your vote by tracking number and have 5 days after voting to change it. The vote is not done till after said 5 days.
No big deal, DO NOT PATENT THIS, it's now public domain by posting it here, mark it down in case someone tries to patent it, save the date too.
What is probably even more crucial is a discussion about voting being accessible and easy. What's amazed me in the post 2000 election discussion is how fast we've stopped talking about all of the voters who were disenfranchised by having huge difficulties getting to a working election center.
The underlying reason why all of use really want to see internet voting is because it would be easier for us to vote. We can pay all of our bills online. We can file our taxes online. Why can't we vote?
The reason is because it is a really difficult security problem to solve. I'm just amazed there isn't more discussion about how to solve that problem than the discussion talking about a poor implementation of the short-term, band-aid solution.
Specifically, I thought http://www.eucybervote.org/xootic2000.pdf has described a really good start to how to really solve the security problem.
I dunno, it seemed pretty self-explanatory to me.
This is one of the main benefits of the parlimentary system. I think that the US and rest-of-the-world systems both have their plusses and minuses, but I think a BIG benefit of the parlimentary system is that it tends to lead to a multi-party system with a coalition government. In general the US system yields a president with a lot of power and a congress that fights itself all the time. Note that quite a few prime ministers over the years have been strong leaders just the same - think Winston Churchill.
The nice thing about a parliamentary system is that all the battles are local - no big-money campaigns involved.
Yeah, there's a great idea:
We'll use the necessarily inaccurate count from necessarily failable paper methods to check the potentially perfect results from the electronic methods.
Keep paper out of it. It can easily be done and verified electronically; paper only reintroduces the significant margins of error that harm the process in the first place.
paper only reintroduces the significant margins of error that harm the process in the first place
wrong. maybe it feels nice to say that, but it's factually inaccurate. paper isn't responsible for ballot errors. it's a host of other factors starting with human ineptitude and/or corruption. speaking of which, no hanging chad ever managed to create -15,000 votes for a candidate from a precinct with only a few hundred voters. you can chalk that up to broken proprietary voting software. and if you had done the smallest bit of research on the topic (e-voting), you would know that's the tip of the iceberg.
Cringely closes this week's column with:
This confuses me. I'd love to know who said to leave the feature out and why?
Next week: the answer.
Who is John Cabal?
Yup GWB reelection committee, and he has publically stated he will do anything to get Dubya relected.
Scared yet?
-- Back to the shadows again...
I am looking forward to Cringley's next column where he proposes to answer the question of why auditing capabilities were not inlcuded in the touch screen voting machines.
I'll venture a guess at this... it's not that Diebold hasn't already thought of this, but that they are fulfilling the MINIMUM requirements of what has been requested of them. Then they get millions of machines out there, and there is another electoral controversy, this time involving e-voting machines. So a Diebold executive proposes that states invest in the next generation machine, which has a paper auditing trail. And then Diebold gets to sell two machines instead of one, doubling their revenue.
Look at it another way... every Microsoft product on the market could be revised and upgraded and improved in limitless ways... so why don't they? Because they don't have to. As long as they are growing sales at an acceptable rate, then they will simply sell the upgrades, which add a few more features--just enough to stimulate the next round of sales, and no more. The worst possible situation MS (or any other software company) could find themselves in is to sell a FINAL product, to which no future upgrade would ever be needed.
"I am shocked that this story from I Cringley hasn't been sent in and posted at Slashdot. "
I'm not shocked, and I'm somewhat glad we went more than 7 days without one of his articles. He's not a bad guy, but he's a person with an opinion, which is a commodity on Slashdot. Let's see more real news.
Which fits because with OSS, your less likely to need to start from scratch, meaning you can pitch into an app which is already a success, and you just about cannot over estimate the benefits of the collaboration, as you really do save so much time and effort, but probably most important, the vital things that you have never been able to convince your pointy haired types mattered, (you know minor stuff like stability, actually working, instead of looking really like it would work), gets done. Of course the commercial world does give something back for this, mainly that finished look and feel, that really don't matter that much in the geek world but are vital in the Marketing World.
in my life God comes first.... but Linux is pretty high after that
Francis Smit
In some states, especially ones like California where direct democracy is popular, there can be dozens of items on the ballot. Sure, if the vote was just "Select one of candidate A, B, or C" it'd be easy. But when you add in several bond issues, some highway votes, a couple of proposed laws, etc, it can become difficult to count by hand in a reasonable timeframe.
Best Slashdot Co
The main problem in the USA isn't how we gather votes, although there are problems in some states (Florida). There is a more fundamental problem in that we aren't using the right voting mechanism. In the US, we use plurality voting -- a.k.a "first across the line" -- to determine who wins an election. This means that a candidate for whom only 30% of the people voted can win an election simply because there was no other single candidate with more votes.
This has a number of problems, but they can all be summed up by saying that plurality is one of the least fair, if not the least fair, way of determining the winner of a democratic election that you can get. Consider:
- Say 40% of the people vote for candidate A
- 35% of the people want candidate B
- 25% want candidate C
In the US, candidate A will win. However, what if all of the voters for C would rather have B than A? Then 60% of the population would rather have B than A, and the minority candidate has won.This situation encourages strategic voting; that is to say, voters for C have to decide whether they want to vote honestly, for C, or whether they should vote for B just to make that they don't get their least favorite candidate, A.
This is why we only have two parties in the US, and why -- despite the large number of Greens and Libertarians, neither party has a chance of winning. We don't even know what percentage of the US population is Green or Libertarian (or anything else, for that matter) because they aren't voting honestly. They're voting for the lesser of two evils. This system practically guarantees alienation of the largest number of people -- the majority ends up with a candidate they don't want, unless they lie when voting and vote for the candidate that they dislike the least who also has the best chance of winning.
There are voting mechanisms which allow people to vote their true opinion without being alienated. The most popular are Condorcet -- complex, but the most fair; Approval Voting -- not as fair as Condorcet, but much simpler, and can be implemented with existing voting technology; and Instant Runoff -- less fair than approval, no more simple -- but better than plurality.
Many democratic countries do not use plurality voting, although plurality is the most common. For example, Australia, Northern Ireland, and the Irish Republic (among others) use single transferable vote[1]. In fact, 68 countries (~2b ppl) use plurality, 31 countries (~400m ppl) use single transferable vote, and two countries (~18m ppl) use IRV (instant runoff) -- this is according to International IDEA Handbook.
There is a huge amount of information about Condorcet and Approval Voting available on the web. The Citizens for Approval Voting page is a good start, if you're at all interested in improving voting in the US. If you're interested in the mechanics and mathematics of the systems, start with Condorcet -- most sites that talk about Condorcet are less about how to get it implemented politically, and are more about how it works, fairness tests, and how it compares to other systems. The Wikipedia entry for "voting system" is particularly useful.
It is unfortunate that an editorial that starts out taking an IT engineers view devolves so quickly to ranting. The fair, equitable, passing of elected positions from one term to the next is critical to our way of life. It is a violation of our inalienable rights to leave elections up to attorneys, media personalities, or national political machinations. I am in favor of auditable, verifiable elections that give Americans confidence in the transfer of power at any level. Conversely, I am adamantly opposed to anything to the contrary. Having said that let's set some facts straight: The government, Congress, does not buy voting machines nor pay any companies to develop them. Individual states, counties, and voting precincts are making those decisions. Comparing all software projects to already completed and sold software is a ridiculous form of logic. Though I and everyone else agree that changes need to be made, the statistics you are matching are a non-fit. There are already fixes required and underway. You need to research topics you express opinions on. California, Maryland, and Ohio all have changes they require to all electronic voting systems in their states. The changes are good, especially California's printout/audit trail requirement. Electronic voting - engineered well, manned by trained staff, and managed well by counties and states - is the most efficient and logical application of technology for this time intensive and hotly contested job. Let's keep debating the why, how and who of it but don't fill up the air with uninformed noise. There is too much of it already.
Hey whoever marked me as a troll you are a fucking turd and im going to hack your fucking account if i can find you. none of my comments were troling and my information is pretty solid.
I suppose, then, that Microsoft is writing the viruses and worms that attack Windows and IE? It "would be far easier" for them to do it.
Machines with no audit trail are at risk of fraud, period. You don't need to single out the Republicans as possible villains.
steveha
lf(1): it's like ls(1) but sorts filenames by extension, tersely
Australia, Northern Ireland, and the Irish Republic (among others) use single transferable vote
I'm from Ireland - I grew up in a country with one of the more complex votings systems in the world. We're talking 10+ rounds of elimination rounds and recounts, and much anguish by marginal politicians over a few minor votes.
It's not perfect -- you still get arseholes elected to office - but at least most people's votes are counted... unlike the US where the majority of votes seem to be instantly cast away and you get candidates elected by minorities of voters.
With a preference system politicians at least have to make efforts to reach out to minorities and divergent viewpoints. Sometimes this leads to nasty political compromises, but oftne it leads to coalitions with similar viewpoints and ethics.
One effect I've noticed on a personal level however is that because of the tragically simple plurality voting used in most of the US, people in the US are honestly baffled by anythiong that resembles fair voting. Most of them just don;t get it. Mired in an artifically bipolar system designed to promote competition and bilateral conflict, many people seem to view compromise and multilateralism with suspicion or misunderstanding.
The way you learn to vote undoubtedly influences your social universe -- you form unspoken but deeply held opinions about what is possible and what is impossible within a "democracy". THe US needs a more modern voting system as part of a first step towards engaging people once more with the democratic environment rather than engaging in identity politics and the elimination of dissent.
Da Blog
I suppose, then, that Microsoft is writing the viruses and worms that attack Windows and IE? It "would be far easier" for them to do it.
that's a stupid rebuttal. I guess you failed the logic part of the SAT where you match the statements that are most alike.
Viruses don't help Microsoft whereas using doctored voting machines to elect Republicans directly helps the Republican owners of the E-Voting machine companies. For example, it helps them to get them and their friends elected to some of the most powerful political positions in the world.
using doctored voting machines to elect Republicans directly helps the Republican owners
And if Democrat "activists" doctored some voting machines, that wouldn't help them? Wow, you've convinced me. Voting machines with no audit trails are only dangerous in Republican hands! You get a gold star for logical reasoning!
Believe what you will; I've spent enough time on this. Have a nice life.
steveha
lf(1): it's like ls(1) but sorts filenames by extension, tersely
Where did you learn statistics? Bush 'won' the election by only a a few hundred votes out of millions cast in that state. In fact, different sets of requirements for counting ballots actually come up with different results (for example, if you were to count ballots where the person punched a hole for bush/gore/whoever and wrote down the same name in the write-in spot, then gore would have won).
There were over 10,000 votes that were not counted. And yes, different voting districts used different technology. So if districts that used paper ballots or un-hacked electronic ballots were more republican, then more republican votes would be counted correctly.
autopr0n is like, down and stuff.
OF COURSE paper is responsible for ballot errors. It HAS to be. You even brought up hanging chads, which is just one specific example of how paper ballots are naturally imprecise.
no hanging chad ever managed to create -15,000 votes for a candidate from a precinct with only a few hundred voters
This has nothing to do with electronic voting; any voting system could have done the same. Errors that can cause this is just as present in paper systems.
I have to say I'm proud to be a Nevadan, so far the only state that is REQUIRING a paper trail for auditing purposes for electronic / touch screen voting.
So NYAH NYAH all you other states, we kick ass.
Not only that, but we love standing up to the Federal Government, just look at the Yucca Mountain project, everyone here is raising holy hell about that, as we don't have ANY FUCKING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, and they're wanting to foist all of THEIR waste in OUR state, and with not too much concern for the safety of over HALF our citizenry, who do not live very far from this proposed nuclear waste dump.
Good job Nevada government!
1f u c4n r34d th1s u r34lly n33d t0 g37 l41d Capitalization really works: i helped my uncle jack off a horse