Slashdot Mirror


Preview of New Block Cipher

flaws writes "Secure Science Corp. is offering a preview of one of the 3 ciphers they will be publishing througout the year. The CS2-128 cipher is a 128-bit block cipher with a 128 bit key. This cipher is proposed as a hardware alternative to AES, being that it is more efficient in hardware, simpler to implement, and comparably secure to AES-128. The preview of the CS2-128 cipher proposed is in html form and will be available in a published format at the end of April. At this time, requests are made for casual peer review and implementation. Secure Science will be offering a challenge at the end of April, introducing the cipher to the public. This ciphers implementation and usage will be offered in multiple hardware devices, such as wireless routers, cell-phones, and storage management hardware."

232 comments

  1. does this mean by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Funny

    he can beat neo now?

    1. Re:does this mean by krishn_dev · · Score: 2, Funny

      No... I cant ping him yet. :-D

    2. Re:does this mean by flaws · · Score: 2, Interesting

      Reference Code is available for download.

    3. Re:does this mean by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      readers may be interested in the history of the implementer of said code

  2. In case of Slashdotting... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Funny

    MD5 of article text: 79592dc553067bfafaa07086c07d2c8a

    1. Re:In case of Slashdotting... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0, Funny

      mod parent funny : +5!

    2. Re:In case of Slashdotting... by SeventyBang · · Score: 1

      Here's a quick test of the new standard to verify whether it can be cracked or not. Good luck and may the best man|woman win! a9;ERT.d0 07! @WQ#6 689 asdf8 @(*&@(*^@ dfj#))(JZZNS

  3. PGP: A Dangerous Program for a Dangerous Time by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Funny

    Hello,

    Recently I noticed that my teenage son Ezekiel had begun to encrypt
    his emails with a program called PGP. I was concerned because I'd
    always covertly monitored their email for any hints of illegal
    activity, drug use or interest in the occult - some of his classmates
    have begun playing Dungeons and Dragons and listening to KISS. Since
    Ezekiel was now using PGP, his activites were hidden from me!

    Additionally, I also overheard him talking of using a program called
    Stegasaurus to embed secret information into normal-looking pictures.
    Terrified that my son might be speaking in some sort of sinful code, I
    immediately grounded him for a month. He was only allowed to go to
    school and Bible study.

    Anyways, I've done several days worth of research on this and
    discovered a few things about PGP that I'd like to share with the
    readers of these newsgroups. To begin with, I realized that many of
    the claims made by the creators of PGP are blatently false. Although I
    do not have a background in mathematics (I have an AA in Photography)
    I was easily able to rebuild Ezekiel's private key via his public key
    and one of his encrypted messages.

    Of course I am above-average in intelligence, but PGP is supposedly
    unbreakable! Perhaps crytogrophers aren't as smart as they believe?
    Fortunately in this case Ezekiel was just discussing a girl he met in
    school - a situation I harshly reprimanded him for. However, while PGP
    may be a program with flaws, it got me thinking about other programs.
    Perhaps someone will construct a PGP-like program that cannot be so
    easily broken; one that would take days of computer time to hack!

    My concern with a program like this is that people who use
    cryptography always do so because they have something to hide. A sense
    of guilt and shame seems to drive them. They know that they are doing
    something wrong and desperately want to hide it from the eyes of the
    world (although hiding it from the eyes of God is another matter!
    LOL!)

    A study recently released by the Institute for Family Computing
    revealed that the top three uses of cryptography were for 1)
    "terrorist-related activity" 2) pedophillia and 3) drug abuse. In fact
    as far as I can tell, no legitimate use was on the top ten at all!

    What scares me about this is that law-enforcement agencies will be
    unable to sift through email to find people who are breaking the law,
    or otherwise engaged in suspicious activity. At a time when our nation
    is under siege, I find it disturbing that people are working on
    developing cryptography that cannot be broken, even by our protectors
    in the FBI and CIA! Only those with something to hide truly need
    cryptography.

    Thus I urge cryptogrophers world wide to refrain from working on such
    programs, until our nation is no longer at war. I would ask those of
    other countries to respect our right to self-defense and aid us in our
    time of trouble. Your cryptographic skills can be better put to use
    trying to find terrorists than to assist them.

    1. Re:PGP: A Dangerous Program for a Dangerous Time by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Perhaps someone will construct a PGP-like program that cannot be so easily broken; one that would take days of computer time to hack!

      This already exists! The world'ss best encryptors couldn't beat VME, even with an H2 at stake. Meganet even provided the client to break it, but the algorithm uses a million bits, so it was really hopeless.

      --
      This post is sarcasm. VME is a sick joke, and it's quite unsuitable for any serious security. Who would buy this, you ask? Why, the US Department of Labor, of course. A complete waste of tax dollars, that was.

    2. Re:PGP: A Dangerous Program for a Dangerous Time by maroonhat · · Score: 4, Funny

      Is your son a computer hacker?

      ...im quite sorry a site like the one my link points to exists but its hilarious none the less

      --
      The more I learn about Windows the more I am surprised it runs at all
    3. Re:PGP: A Dangerous Program for a Dangerous Time by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Informative

      adequacy.org is one of those sites that started out as a parody site, and then everyone seemed to forget what the site was really about. Some of the newer posts there (there aren't many, note that the "computer hacker" article you linked is one of the oldest yet still on the front page) are truly scary in their seriousness. I think even Landover Baptist manages to not take itself as seriously as some of adequacy's posters do.

    4. Re:PGP: A Dangerous Program for a Dangerous Time by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0, Informative
    5. Re:PGP: A Dangerous Program for a Dangerous Time by nihaopaul · · Score: 1, Offtopic

      "A study recently released by the Institute for Family Computing revealed that the top three uses of cryptography were for 1) "terrorist-related activity" 2) pedophillia and 3) drug abuse. In fact
      as far as I can tell, no legitimate use was on the top ten at all!"

      Legitimate use would be 1 to keep nosy people like you out, legitimate use would be to protect from forgery and identity fraud. legitimate use would be to protect your creditcard details when you buy online. and there are plenty more, its not just about keeping snoops out but also identity. so your "as far as I can tell, no legitimate use was on the top ten at all!" is incorrect.

      think outside the box, not just whats on the inside

    6. Re:PGP: A Dangerous Program for a Dangerous Time by Armadni+General · · Score: 1

      I suggest you stop trying to live your son's life for him.

    7. Re:PGP: A Dangerous Program for a Dangerous Time by pr0nsurf3r · · Score: 0

      People like you are part of the problem. You've failed to realize that there are lots of people that have legitimate need to encrypt some files.

      You sound to me like you've given your son a good moral background and done the best job you can in raising him. Be more confident in your teachings & parenting.

      But, how you could be so naive as to be willing to give up your right to privacy completely befuddles me. Don't get me wrong, national security is extremely important, but once you suggest that we give up any freedoms or privacy, its only a matter of time before we have neither freedom, nor privacy.
      Additionally, terrorists and hackers alike would have all these tools anyway even if they weren't public. Just in case you didn't know, there are terrorists who have college & graduate educations from some of the finest institutions in America. (Sleeper cells anyone?)

      Benjamin Franklin said
      "Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety."

      In this case privacy is an essential liberty

    8. Re:PGP: A Dangerous Program for a Dangerous Time by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It was a joke you dolt

    9. Re:PGP: A Dangerous Program for a Dangerous Time by cjHopman · · Score: 1
      "...your teachings & parenting.
      But, how you could be so naive as to be willing to give ..."
      </irony>
    10. Re:PGP: A Dangerous Program for a Dangerous Time by PrivateDonut · · Score: 0

      Under siege? Are you serious? You started the war! Deal with the consequences of starting a war!

    11. Re:PGP: A Dangerous Program for a Dangerous Time by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Someone lacks a sense of humor..

    12. Re:PGP: A Dangerous Program for a Dangerous Time by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      mmmmmmmm, yum yum, lots of yummy TROLL FOOD.

    13. Re:PGP: A Dangerous Program for a Dangerous Time by pr0nsurf3r · · Score: 0

      you got my embedded joke. (note the handle I used to post a reply too!)

    14. Re:PGP: A Dangerous Program for a Dangerous Time by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      weak save, nobody believes you

    15. Re:PGP: A Dangerous Program for a Dangerous Time by X0563511 · · Score: 2, Informative
      I was quite angry that this article existed untill i hit this:

      Your son will probably try to install some hacker software. He may attempt to conceal the presence of the software in some way, but you can usually find any new programs by reading through the programs listed under "Install/Remove Programs" in your control panel. Popular hacker software includes "Comet Cursor", "Bonzi Buddy" and "Flash".


      and realized it was meant to be funny. I hope.
      --
      For large sets, this will be our guide even unto death, for the LORD will work for each type of data it is applied to...
    16. Re:PGP: A Dangerous Program for a Dangerous Time by Jah-Wren+Ryel · · Score: 2, Funny

      Dude, I don't know what they call it in China, but over here, that's what's known as a joke, son! A joke!

      Your truly,
      Fog Horn Leghorn

      --
      When information is power, privacy is freedom.
    17. Re:PGP: A Dangerous Program for a Dangerous Time by TheoMurpse · · Score: 2, Insightful

      interest in the occult - some of his classmates have begun playing Dungeons and Dragons and listening to KISS.

      Can you people who are responding not tell it's a joke? Unless this was written 30 years ago or so!

    18. Re:PGP: A Dangerous Program for a Dangerous Time by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      This has got to be the most deliberate attempt at raising my BP. Well, I am just not going to Vamp on this, too bad.

      Dude, you are way above my current threshold.

    19. Re:PGP: A Dangerous Program for a Dangerous Time by brsmith4 · · Score: 1

      Moderation: +5 Funny, Insightful Troll

      Don't act like you didn't know.

    20. Re:PGP: A Dangerous Program for a Dangerous Time by BobNET · · Score: 2, Funny

      Recently I noticed that my teenage son Ezekiel had begun to encrypt
      his emails with a program called PGP.

      If my parents named me Ezekiel, I'd try to hide that fact too.

    21. Re:PGP: A Dangerous Program for a Dangerous Time by pinchhazard · · Score: 0

      no shit, hell of weak. are you retarded?

      --
      Do you love freedom??? Do you love freedom!!! DO YOU LOVE FREEDOM!!!!!!!!
    22. Re:PGP: A Dangerous Program for a Dangerous Time by Ant2 · · Score: 2, Funny

      So then, why are we posting this anonymously? Exactly what is it YOU are hiding? Is it SATAN?

    23. Re:PGP: A Dangerous Program for a Dangerous Time by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I remember when this post got 80 replies when it was posted on Usenet in 2002. Read this thread on Google Groups. Effective trolling on Slashdot is impossible because we instantly know it is a joke (see the moderations: all Funny) but on Usenet there always was more clueless people (a neverending September, anoyne?) so you just have to read it. (Posting as AC because I'm not Karma whoring, it's truly hilarious.)

    24. Re:PGP: A Dangerous Program for a Dangerous Time by lildogie · · Score: 1

      > My concern with a program like this is that people who use
      > cryptography always do so because they have something to hide.
      > A sense of guilt and shame seems to drive them.
      > They know that they are doing something wrong and desperately
      > want to hide it from the eyes of the world (although hiding
      > it from the eyes of God is another matter! LOL!)

      Dear Mr. Ashcroft,

      My concern with a post like yours is that people who use
      "Anonymous Coward" always do so because they have something to hide.
      A sense of guilt and shame seems to drive them.
      They know that they are saying something wrong and desperately
      want to hide from any challenges to their views (although
      hiding from any challenges from God is another matter! LOL!)

    25. Re:PGP: A Dangerous Program for a Dangerous Time by MegaFur · · Score: 1

      and realized it was meant to be funny. I hope.


      Yeah, it's sort of sadly funny when it gets to the point where you just can't tell if it's supposed to be serious or not. When it gets to that point (which seems to happen more and more often the older I get--a lot of the fake commercials in GTA VC could be on the radio with only minor modification), that's when I decide I no longer care what the person is saying.

      In other words: if I can't tell if the person is trying to do parody or trying to be serious, I don't really care what they're saying anymore. Unless they're trying to nail me to a tree or something--then I'd care. And there in lies the danger of hysteria.

      --
      Furry cows moo and decompress.
    26. Re:PGP: A Dangerous Program for a Dangerous Time by sorbits · · Score: 1
      In other words: if I can't tell if the person is trying to do parody or trying to be serious, I don't really care what they're saying anymore.

      Half the fun with these parodies are the persons who can't tell that they are parodies and react with outrage.

    27. Re:PGP: A Dangerous Program for a Dangerous Time by Armadni+General · · Score: 0

      lol@me

  4. Is this good? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Sorry I never took calculus as a 2nd language

    1. Re:Is this good? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I didn't either. I had a year in high school as a "CE" (curriculum-enriched - basically, college prep) and spent the summer studying my posterior off with some other things. I CLEP'd out of three years of calculus so I wouldn't have to take it with my CompSci degree. The same went for Biology - even though I hadn't taken a class since 9th grade (only missed one question) and Freshman Comp. My advice: study and test out of anything and everything you can.

      Except: There's only one thing (subject) which is dangerous: if you are on a program which requires a foreign language program and you are able to test out of a year or two because of jr high and high school and still have two years to go. Then you find yourself in ten feet of water holding a cinder block in each hand. Drowning and there's nothing you can do.

  5. Review Expertise. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Insightful

    "Secure Science Corp. is offering a preview of one of the 3 ciphers they will be publishing througout the year."

    And how many people will have the expertise to provide a "review" that'll satisfy everyone?

    1. Re:Review Expertise. by m0rningstar · · Score: 1

      It's the standard crypto algorithm; I, personally, would be happy if they turn the algorithm over to open peer review. Anything else smacks of security by obscurity to me.

      If the algorithm is openly available and openly reviewed it may well be a viable alternative, though my understanding was that one of the reasons Rijndael was selected as the AES algorithm was it's ease of implementation in hardware and low memory footprint as compared to several of the other contenders.

      If it's not? Snake oil, or at least possibly. And I hate 'possibly'.

    2. Re:Review Expertise. by LnxAddct · · Score: 1

      I'm not even sure its worth reviewing... from the design intro it more or less stated that you give it a 128 bit key and it spits out 128 bits of ciphertext. In my book that is a one time pad and it won't be any more secure then using xor (in fact not using xor could make it significantly less secure). Now I'm assuming this isnt a one time pad so I'm also assuming the same key will be used many times considering it may act as a wireless key similar to WEP keys right now. Now I don't know about you but reusing a key every 16 bytes for transmitting large amounts of data just smells of trouble. Granted with an ideal algorithm it wouldn't matter, I have yet to see one sufficiently implemented on such a large scale. Yes in theory they do exist, but knowing the cipher text, and having a high probability of what was encrypted (assume some protocol like http), over a couple million packets I can't see this holding out any better then WEP. Granted none of what I'm saying is backed up by math, this is just what I've observed over the years. Come on folks, its 2005... time to implement rotating keys in an easy to use way... even my garage door uses one (granted that still wouldn't solve *all* of the problems). I'll stick with the NSA, they've ironically gained my trust.
      Regards,
      Steve

    3. Re:Review Expertise. by flaws · · Score: 1

      You need to read the actual doc. Either way, SSC is posting the code up in about 5 minutes.

    4. Re:Review Expertise. by viega · · Score: 2, Informative

      This is an incredibly ill-informed post. A cipher that takes a 128-bit input (plus a key) and produces a 128-bit output is a block cipher, just like AES is a block cipher. This has nothing to do with a one-time pad. First, no block cipher should be used in a mode where you encrypt plaintext 16 bits at a time, and that's it (this is called ECB mode). We DO however, have a ton of ways to turn a block cipher into a function that offers strong guarantees for both confidentiality and message authentication / integrity. These are constructs where we only have to make a single assumption, which is loosely that, given a randomly chosen key, an attacker will have no significant advantage in looking at an output and distinguishing it from a randomly chosen value of the same size. Your comment about rotating keys doesn't even make much sense. Most network protocols (e.g., SSL/TLS) basically do that... every connection they end up choosing a different random key. This is basic key management, it has little to do with the block cipher, and it's something we know how to do reasonablyy well.

    5. Re:Review Expertise. by Zeinfeld · · Score: 2, Informative
      I'm not even sure its worth reviewing... from the design intro it more or less stated that you give it a 128 bit key and it spits out 128 bits of ciphertext. In my book that is a one time pad and it won't be any more secure then using xor (in fact not using xor could make it significantly less secure).

      Not in my book or anyone else's. It is a block cipher with a key size and a block size of 128 bits, but it is designed to be used in chaining mode which a one time pad ain't.

      Now I'm assuming this isnt a one time pad so I'm also assuming the same key will be used many times considering it may act as a wireless key similar to WEP keys right now.

      The problem with WEP was not the reuse of the key, it was the modification of RC4 so that it did not discard the initial bits from the PRG. These were known to be weak when RC4 was designed.

      The secure science people are not well known on slashdot but in the field they are very well known and they have a pretty high reputation for their work on anti-phishing. Now that does not mean that I would put them in the same class as Rivest, Biham and Shamir when it comes to cipher design.

      There is an argument to be made that it is better to use a block cipher with a possibly inadequate number of rounds than risk using a stream cipher. Block ciphers are much better understood and their failure modes are much less likely to be catastrophic. A poor 128 bit block cipher is likely to result in an effective cipher strength of maybe 80 bits. A poor stream cipher can collapse to an effective cipher strength of 16 bits or less, particularly if it is not used properly.

      So this is a bit like if Schneier or Kocher came up with a cipher, they are not a Rogaway or a Rivest but they are not exactly flakes peddling snake oil. I suspect that their work will receive significant attention.

      --
      Looking for an Information Security student project suggestion?
      Try http://dotcrimeManifesto.com/
    6. Re:Review Expertise. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Ummm... probably the same number of people who have the expertise to provide a "review" of AES that'll satisfy everyone. In other words, 0.

    7. Re:Review Expertise. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      In my book that is a one time pad

      You're reading the wrong book.

      In a one time pad, the key is exactly the same size as the entire plaintext.

      Not '128 bit key and it spits out 128 bits of ciphertext'. If your plaintext is a hundred megs, your key is a hundred megs and your ciphertext is a hundred megs.

      Add the caveat that you can only use your hundred meg key once and you have a one time pad. And it's secure, even if the algorithm is a lowly xor.

      Use xor and a key shorter than your plaintext, and you're hosed. Use a key to encrypt more than one message, and you're hosed. But use a key as long as your message and only use it once? The most secure crypto there is. The only problem, and what makes it generally impracticable, lies in making sure both ends have the right key for a message without an attacker getting their thieving hands on it.

      Your whole post reeks of misunderstanding basic cryptography concepts.

    8. Re:Review Expertise. by slavemowgli · · Score: 2, Informative

      FYI, Schneier *did* come up with a cipher. Look up "Blowfish" and "Twofish". The latter was even submitted to the NIST AES contest from which Rijndael ultimately emerged as the winner, and it was one of the most serious contenders, too.

      --
      quidquid latine dictum sit altum videtur.
    9. Re:Review Expertise. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Funny

      Not to mention "Solitaire"

    10. Re:Review Expertise. by Seigen · · Score: 1
      Well I know enough to review it and may look at it sometime when I get time. That being said it takes a lot of reviews and a lot of hammering at algorithms before you gain a reasonable degree of certainty that it is secure and even then, sometimes a discovery will be made that makes what was secure now insecure.

      All in all I'd seriously avoid anything that hasn't been explored for a year or two in any serious applications unless there is some very compelling reason not to. Certainly the AES 128 in my PhD project is more than fast enough to keep up with 802.11b in software. Of course I haven't tried 100MB yet, but I rather suspect there are hardware chips that will handle AES as well. To an extent I'm slightly suspicious when someone says they have a new private key algorithm that is better since only time and a lot of cryptanlaysis shows that.

      Remember that private key encryption is generally always fast, and simple compared to public key encryption. This is why elliptic curve cryptography is interesting because of the speedup and the shorter key length possible while, apparently, keeping the same level of security. (Some basic discussion of elliptic curve cryptography is in that link.)

  6. Well....maybe by erick99 · · Score: 2, Insightful
    We prove that our design is immune to differential and linear cryptanalysis as well as argue it resists several other known attacks.

    Is it really immune? I don't know enough about the subject to understand the paper but that struck me as a bold statement

    --
    http://www.busyweather.com/
    1. Re:Well....maybe by patchvonbraun · · Score: 5, Informative

      Immunity in this case meaning that the work factor for mounting the attack is greater or equal to the work factor for brute-forcing the key. If brute-forcing the key costs 2**128 operations, and differential costs 2**129, for example, then you'd be crazy to attempt differential cryptanalysis, when bruting the key is cheaper. I admit to not having RTFP, so I can't evaluate their claim of immunity to DC and LC, but modern ciphers are deliberately designed to be resistant to attack via DC and LC.

    2. Re:Well....maybe by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Interesting

      I don't know enough about the subject to understand the paper but that struck me as a bold statement

      You can prove that an algorithm is immune to DC by proving that the number of plaintext/ciphertext pairs needed is greater than the number of possible plaintexts and ciphertexts. Immunity to LC can also be proven. Cryptography prior to DES was largely unmathematical juju. Cryptography today is a thing of math and science. The techniques for breaking an algorithm are known mathematical formulas, and these can be designed against.

      So, why would you use a cipher that doesn't do this?

    3. Re:Well....maybe by cait56 · · Score: 1

      It's clearly an overstatement. The most they can claim is that it is immune to any known differential or linear cryptanalysis. of course that only proves that their PR peson isn't a mathmatician.

  7. "provably just as secure as AES-128"? Bah. by Jepler · · Score: 5, Informative

    I read the paper. They devote, oh, a page or so to attacks. Proven as secure as AES? bah.

    1. Re:"provably just as secure as AES-128"? Bah. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Informative

      Two words: Branch Number.

      Also the fact the round function is complete (say unlike AES) "integration style" attacks are not applicable.

      Keep in mind this is based on the research of the CS-Cipher (Vaudenay) and this.

    2. Re:"provably just as secure as AES-128"? Bah. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
      Two words: Branch Number


      Those weren't the two words I was thinking about when I read this.....
  8. I wonder... by agraupe · · Score: 1

    If I'll be able to understand how this one works. The only algorithm I've ever understood well enough to write an implementation is RC4. I would like to see a strong algorithm that is fairly simple to understand, but I fear that such a thing is not possible.

    1. Re:I wonder... by nkh · · Score: 2, Informative

      AES is really more simple to understand than DES, you definitely should have a look at it: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AES

    2. Re:I wonder... by flaws · · Score: 2, Informative

      There are no plans to patent these ciphers. They are for public consumption.

    3. Re:I wonder... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Nah, I'm sorry, but I don't think you understood RC4. It's a different thing to be able to implement an algorithm than to be able to understand how it really works.

    4. Re:I wonder... by STrinity · · Score: 1

      The only algorithm I've ever understood well enough to write an implementation is RC4.

      You're doing better than me. The only one I could write an implementation for is ROT-13.

      --
      Les Miserables Volume 1 now up with my reading of
  9. VPN Usage? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Is is possible that this may replace current VPN encryption algorithms since it is supposedly "easy to implement in hardware"?

    Not long ago there was talk of how fast certain boards could do VPN work because they had offloaded certain algorithms to a specialized chip.

  10. Re:Worse than previewing non-existant products... by dartboard · · Score: 2, Informative

    I can't tell if you're trolling or not. Good one, if you are. Otherwise you're an idiot. :-)

  11. Go with what is widely used by John+Harrison · · Score: 5, Insightful
    One of the advantages of AES, 3DES and DES is that as heavily used standards they attract a lot of research. You can have a lot of confidence that if there is a weakness it will be discovered and made public. The same is not true of proprietary ciphers. As a example look at the 40 bit encryption used by TI for RFID tags that was recently broken by a bunch of university students. If those students had been malicious they could have broken it and not told anyone. They could have then exploited the weakness for years because the cipher isn't widely studied so it is unlikely that someone else would have bothered to crack it. If TI had simply gone with 3DES there would have been no problem.

    The moral of the story: stick to the standards people.

    1. Re:Go with what is widely used by John+Harrison · · Score: 1

      I should probably mention that the above is in no way meant to endorse the use of single DES in the present.

    2. Re:Go with what is widely used by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Informative

      Ouch, SHA-1 is FIPS-180-1 and DSA is FIPS-186-2, those are both broken - stick to the standards, and also improve upon standards. That is the goal - the standards will change - cryptography is based on time and finance. Standards of what? PKCS, OpenPGP, NIST? Who's standards are we talking about?

    3. Re:Go with what is widely used by badriram · · Score: 1

      Sorry but that argument goes both ways. Just because something is a standard does not everyone is find a fault. No matter what cipher if the person has malicious intent it is a problem, and that is one that we deal with everyday with security vulnerabilities as well.

      Standards have their own share of problems, if one major standard like 3DES is broken and is published, it will take a lot of effort to protect all the systems that use it.

      I am not saying that what is said is the correct view, I am saying both sides have points but neither is really better.

    4. Re:Go with what is widely used by provolt · · Score: 2, Informative

      While SHA-1 has been technically broken in that it doesn't provide strong collision resistance, strong resistance is not really necessary for most applications.

      The attack on it finds two messages that hash to the same value. (Strong collision resistance) The attack does not work when trying to find a message the matches a specified hash value. (Weak collision resistance).

      I don't think the attack on SHA-1 gives anyone a warm fuzzy feeling. But the current attack isn't a huge attack and it still is largely impractical. Additionally there are three other algorithms defined in FIPS PUB 180, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512. (-512 and -384 are the same algorithm, except 384 just truncates the answer from the -512 algorithm.)

      I'm not aware of any attacks on the DSA algorithm. I believe there were some attacks particular implementations of the pseudo-random number generator. In addition FIPS 186 defines two other algorithms for digital signatures, RSA and ECDSA. I don't believe there are any known practical attacks on either RSA or the Elliptic Curve DSA.

    5. Re:Go with what is widely used by flaws · · Score: 1

      The FIPS-186 requires sha-1 seed for k, I was referring to that. You're right, it's not a pre-image collision, but it still is a blow to standards as we speak.

    6. Re:Go with what is widely used by Zeinfeld · · Score: 4, Interesting
      As a example look at the 40 bit encryption used by TI for RFID tags that was recently broken by a bunch of university students. If those students had been malicious they could have broken it and not told anyone. They could have then exploited the weakness for years because the cipher isn't widely studied so it is unlikely that someone else would have bothered to crack it. If TI had simply gone with 3DES there would have been no problem. The moral of the story: stick to the standards people.

      Whenever a 40 bit cipher turns up the most likely reason is the export restrictions. When TI was doing its work they could not stick to the standard.

      Plus 3DES is not exactly a great cipher, the small block size means that certain attacks become possible after 2^32 blocks of ciphertext, that is only 32 Gb of data which is not a lot of data.

      The TI problem was due to using the same cipher for 15 years without periodic security reviews.

      --
      Looking for an Information Security student project suggestion?
      Try http://dotcrimeManifesto.com/
    7. Re:Go with what is widely used by A+beautiful+mind · · Score: 1

      SHA-1 broken is still much stronger than (unbroken) MD5 bruteforce was. I can't find the excellent post comparing it with wall sizes, but its something like MD5 is a 40 cm wall compared to SHA-1(unbroken) which is 9km high wall, and with SHA-1(broken) which is a 2km high wall.

      The numbers are made up but more or less accurate.

      --
      It takes a man to suffer ignorance and smile
      Be yourself no matter what they say
    8. Re:Go with what is widely used by Fweeky · · Score: 2, Interesting
      http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2005- February/024862.html via http://it.slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=140093&cid= 11730436:
      "let's say that unbroken SHA-1 represents a 100 meter (328 ft) wall. if a
      break allows a collision to be found in merely 2^69 operations (on
      average), that would mean the wall has crumbled to 4.9 cm (1.9 in) tall.
      that's broken!!

      OTOH, let's say that unbroken MD5 represents a 100 meter (328 ft) wall.
      comparing unbroken MD5 to broken SHA-1 means the wall would actually grow
      from 100 meters (328 ft) tall to 3.2 km (1.99 miles) tall. SHA-1, even if
      it's broken enough to find a collision in 2^69 operations (on average), is
      still stronger than MD5 was ever meant to be.

      again, using unbroken MD5 as our reference of a 100 meter (328 ft) wall,
      unbroken SHA-1 would be a wall 6553.6 km (4072 miles) tall. SHA-1 was
      intended to be incredibly stronger than MD5."
    9. Re:Go with what is widely used by provolt · · Score: 1

      I think if you want to make a comparison between walls and SHA you need a better starting place.

      I would look at breaking a SHA-1 as building a wall. The brute-force method (acting as if it's unbroken) is like building a wall as high as the moon (about 382,000 km). Using the attack that reduces SHA-1 to 2^69, is like building a wall 186 km high.

      Building a 186 km wall is a lot easier than building a 382,000 km wall. However, neither of them are really feasable. Someone with the right abilities and finances might be able to do the easier tasks, but not for anything practical.

  12. Great news for DRM by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0


    because uncrackable hardware encryption is just what the industry wanted

    1. Re:Great news for DRM by A+beautiful+mind · · Score: 1

      You could invent the best encryption, or even the perfect one, still it would be like beating a dead horse with DRM. Why? The problem is that You store the KEY and METHOD on the same non-trusted environment(user's machine) as the encrypted data AND you're actually decrypting it. That's how you see the video/music/etc. Nothing stops someone from extracting the key from the obfuscated binary and decrypting the file easily.

      --
      It takes a man to suffer ignorance and smile
      Be yourself no matter what they say
  13. Hardware based? by breakbeatninja · · Score: 0, Troll

    Hardware accelerated encryption is a novel idea, but how easy is it to to a "peer review" of something that requires a proprietary device to truly recognize the benefits of it?

    --
    shop.envescent.com - Computer hardware and more.
    1. Re:Hardware based? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Informative

      It's not really novel. DES, the government backed standard from the 70's, was intentionally designed for hardware implementation (the s-boxes it used were made to be of a size that could be practically implemented with the existing technology at the time).

      Software based standards are not practical for large scale deployment, the time to encrypt can often become a serious bottleneck. It's a major reason why public key cryptography, implemented in software, is frequently used only for the initial key exchange for a hardware based cryptographic scheme like DES or AES.

      -ShadowRanger

    2. Re:Hardware based? by jpetts · · Score: 1

      Well, hardware-based crypto is not really that new: see http://www.computer.org/computer/homepage/1004/sec urity/ for example.

      And it's not that difficult to peer review crypto accelerators. For a given input you get a given output. Since you are free to choose your input, the possibility that somebody could try and recognise test vectors and encrypt those correctly, while faking on non-test vectors becomes vanishingly small for a reasonably large set of pseudo-random test inputs, if you verify the output against an audited software implementation.

      --
      Call me old fashioned, but I like a dump to be as memorable as it is devastating - Bender
    3. Re:Hardware based? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      ShallowRanger,

      You keep using that word........I don't think it means what you think it means.

  14. Re:Worse than previewing non-existant products... by LewsTherinKinslayer · · Score: 1

    The information would be readily available shortly after its public release as a product, I'm sure. There is no such thing as security through obscurity.

  15. Already cracked ! by MajorDick · · Score: 4, Funny

    Well, I called up DVD Jon , and within about 15 minutes he had a working exploit for the cipher.

    Oh well off to the next

    Nothing to see here already been cracked...move along....

    1. Re:Already cracked ! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      and it will be titled "Everyone can lick my balls because I've done it again"

  16. Snake Oil? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Top Questions:

    1. Is this a proprietary or patented algorithm?

    2. Has this algorithm gone through the usual rounds of analysis among the nations top cryptographers?

    3. Has it been implemented in a FIPS 140-2 certified cryptographic module?

    That should keep them busy.

    1. Re:Snake Oil? by flaws · · Score: 5, Informative

      1) No - it is open source and technically public domain. 2) That is what we are attempting now - the preview is to get it lined up with crypto experts to review. 3) If it gets past 2, then that is something to consider.

    2. Re:Snake Oil? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Insightful

      FIPS-140 certification can only be granted to modules that implement NIST-approved algorithms such as AES. It is extremely difficult to get NIST to approve any algorithm that isn't already on the list, for primarily economic reasons. Thus, to dismiss a new algorithm because it is not FIPS-140 certified sounds impressive at first glance, but makes no sense in the real world of cryptographic products.

    3. Re:Snake Oil? by dtfinch · · Score: 2, Informative

      "Secure Science Corporation"

      Domain Name: SECURESCIENCE.NET
      Registered through: GoDaddy.com
      Created on: 24-Oct-03

      A quick search through the sci.crypt archives suggests that they employ at least one cryptographer who ought to be qualified to tell if it's clearly clearly.

      But my own inexperienced mind tells me that a 4x4 sbox seems awfully small, and that they've put an awful lot of effort into making it efficient in hardware requiring a minimal number of gates. It's not hard to just make a secure cipher, but it is extremely difficult to make one that's fast and simple while still being secure. IANAC (I am not a cryptoanalyst) though, so only time will tell.

      A patent search for "Secure Science Corporation" does not return any results.

    4. Re:Snake Oil? by m0rningstar · · Score: 2, Insightful

      You know ... the first two questions and the answers are excellent.

      I'm not sure that having it FIPS-140 certified buys a vast amount from a technical perspective above and beyond the first two. It's a necessary step for getting the Federal government to use it, but I'd trust the external peer review prior to that.

      However -- there's the two points addressed: open standard and accepted for review. Given some time to analyse and review it, this sounds like a decent addition to the arsenal, IF it passes said review.

      (I'm no cryptographer. I don't even play one on /.)

    5. Re:Snake Oil? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      They have registered a number of other domains too! I found two of them so far:

      pseudoscience.com
      securescientology.com

    6. Re:Snake Oil? by PetiePooo · · Score: 1

      ... and that they've put an awful lot of effort into making it efficient in hardware requiring a minimal number of gates.

      Which in my view equates to "easier to brute-force." Am I missing something?

      It seems to me that the easier it is to implement in hardware, the more implementations will fit in a single FPGA/ASIC, the smaller/cheaper/faster a hardware-based brute-force attack would be...

      Recommendation: stick with AES. We don't need YAWEA (Yet Another Weak Encryption Algorithm)...

    7. Re:Snake Oil? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Look at the posting history for fl@ws. Is this secure science using slashdot to promote their own egos? He submitted this article and a news report that interviews ssc. Wonder what other replies are by ssc..

    8. Re:Snake Oil? by russotto · · Score: 1

      A brute force attack on a 128 bit cipher is completely impractical -- even if you made it 256 times easier to implement it in hardware, it would still be completely impractical.

  17. Maybe there's something I'm not getting here, by sporktoast · · Score: 4, Insightful

    but what is "casual peer review" and why would it be desired (over perhaps more in depth peer review) for an encryption technology?

    --
    In a related story, the IRS has recently ruled that the cost of Windows upgrades can NOT be deducted as a gambling loss.
    1. Re:Maybe there's something I'm not getting here, by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0


      Um, yep. Looks like a cipher to me. There's yer casual peer review. Next!

    2. Re:Maybe there's something I'm not getting here, by wannabgeek · · Score: 1

      I guess they mean don't expect to be paid, or rewarded for review :-)

      --
      I'm much more funny, interesting and insightful than the moderators think
    3. Re:Maybe there's something I'm not getting here, by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Informative

      Since the respect of cryptographers time is money - casual means, don't spend too much time on it until it's fully published and finalized. The challenge offers incentive to take an in-depth review since it's worth it if you break it. Casual is, please don't spend too much labor breaking this if it takes more than a good portion of your time until Secure Science offers payment.

    4. Re:Maybe there's something I'm not getting here, by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Well, may be 'cuz they know if one does any "in-depth" analysis, they're bound to break it. So they don't want anyone to give it more than "casual" review :-)

    5. Re:Maybe there's something I'm not getting here, by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I just took a casual look at your algorithm and see an obvious break. But I will wait until you are offering money for me to come forward. cheers

  18. patents by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    will these ciphers be patented?
    if so, they will die on day one.

  19. Re:Worse than previewing non-existant products... by Jaime2 · · Score: 1

    See the past /. story about Mobil SpeedPass hacking if you want to see why hiding an encryption protocol is really stupid. http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=05/01/30/161724 0&tid=172&tid=1/

  20. Re:Worse than previewing non-existant products... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Funny
    I can't tell if you're trolling or not. Good one, if you are. Otherwise you're an idiot. :-)

    "A little from column A, a little from column B". Personally I think he's half idiot and half trolling for his fucking conga line free mac sig.

  21. Hey! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Can I buy some weed from you?

  22. Re:Worse than previewing non-existant products... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    That's the stupidest idea I've ever seen. It only makes minimal sense in a single business's internal cryptographic format, and even then it's a bad idea.

    The basic principle of cipher design, established in the 1800s, says that a good cipher's security is provided by the key, not knowledge of the system. If they don't release the system, they can't get feedback that might expose weaknesses in the system. A publicly known, rock solid algorithm beats a possibly weak, possibly private scheme every time.

    After all, they want to sell this. It's a little hard to keep implementation details secret when you *sell* the chips.

    -ShadowRanger

  23. Hardware DRM here we come!! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Insightful

    oh dear...is that the time?

  24. Hardware acceleration by meestaplu · · Score: 2, Insightful

    Now, I know that it's provably hard to attack a good encryption scheme. However, if this one is easier to implement in hardware -- if the cipher can be hardware accelerated more easily -- does that mean that an attack on this scheme could also be hardware accelerated more easily?

    1. Re:Hardware acceleration by rhythmx · · Score: 3, Informative

      No. Encryption algorithms are supposed to act as one way functions when you don't have the key. If this algorithm is properly implemented (but nothing ever really is), no intrinic property of the algorithm would speed up the cracking process. Going backwards (decryption) *with* a key is faster, but going backwards without a key (cracking) is totally different.

    2. Re:Hardware acceleration by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Insightful

      As I noted in an earlier comment, every modern private key scheme is designed with hardware acceleration in mind to allow for speedy encryption. If the key is long enough and the system is secure enough to make the only possible attack exhaustive test, it doesn't really matter how fast you can decrypt. If it takes a microsecond per message and you have to run a brute force attack on a message with a 128 bit key, it will take well over a million years to get the plaintext.

      -ShadowRanger

  25. Snake-oil... by rhythmx · · Score: 4, Insightful

    "We prove that our design is immune to differential and linear cryptanalysis"

    See Bruce Schneier's "Snake Oil", Warning Sign #8: Security proofs.

    "Secure Science will be offering a challenge at the end of April, introducing the cipher to the public."

    See: Warning Sign #9: "Cracking contests" and "The Fallacy of Cracking Contests"

    All of this may be well and good, but I don't any real engineers are going to be choosing this over AES anytime soon. AES was a competition backed by NIST to replace the current encryption standard (3DES). Most of the world's top cryptographers submitted thier algorithm. Only after a very long and very thourogh peer review process did the NIST declare Rijandel's submission to be the winner, and therefore the new AES standard.

    1. Re:Snake-oil... by flaws · · Score: 2, Interesting

      Ironically, Secure Science got an email from Schneier, his quote was "Wow. Definitely not Snake-oil."

    2. Re:Snake-oil... by cpeikert · · Score: 4, Insightful

      "We prove that our design is immune to differential and linear cryptanalysis"

      See Bruce Schneier's "Snake Oil", Warning Sign #8: Security proofs.


      Two things: number one, you can prove immunity to these two kinds of attacks, in a formal, rigorous way. That doesn't mean there are no attacks, but it's decent evidence of security.

      Number two, proofs of security are a very good thing. Just because snake-oil salesmen claim to have "proofs of unbreakability" does not mean that security proofs are bad. A rigorous proof of security against a well-specified, formal attack model should inspire lots of confidence. Without security proofs, cryptography would still just be mostly ad-hoc-ery.

    3. Re:Snake-oil... by flaws · · Score: 1

      may I also demonstrate that Schneier awarded $10,000 to a team of crypto experts that broke a part some of the twofish cipher during NIST competition. http://www.schneier.com/twofish-contest.html

    4. Re:Snake-oil... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Part of the AES design specs was to be hardware friendly / low gate count- the competition was tough. I am sure not being able to build an inline decrypter was part of the story too, hence the need for 'rounds' and anti-parrallelism. As for cutting back on rounds - bad idea - some really clever inroads have been made.

      They should change their business model in symbian software for mobiles that use the OSS cryptolib's

    5. Re:Snake-oil... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0


      "We prove that our design is immune to differential and linear cryptanalysis"

      See Bruce Schneier's "Snake Oil", Warning Sign #8: Security proofs.


      You read the paper right? It includes a proof for the given claims.

      Of course you misquote Schneier and get +5 Insightful... nice

    6. Re:Snake-oil... by ambrosine10 · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Really? Source please.

    7. Re:Snake-oil... by jpetts · · Score: 2, Informative

      You can't reliably prove security for anything other than the one-time pad. All you can do is prove that the attcks you have chosen will not work. Attempting to prove security is attmepting to prove a negative: namely that no attack more efficient than brute force exists.

      --
      Call me old fashioned, but I like a dump to be as memorable as it is devastating - Bender
    8. Re:Snake-oil... by flaws · · Score: 1

      go to the site and email us, we'll send you the source.

    9. Re:Snake-oil... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Funny

      To: flaws@securescience.com
      From: bruce@schneier.com
      Subject: Peer Review

      Flaws,
      Peer review some algorithm you just made up? Wow. Definitely not Snake-oil. Gimme a break.

      Bruce

      >Bruce,
      >We just came up with a 1337 crypto algo. You wanna peer review it for us?
      >Peace,
      >flaws

    10. Re:Snake-oil... by ambrosine10 · · Score: 1

      Apparently English is not your first language. What I meant was, where's the proof that Schneier said that. You sound like a used-car salesman.

    11. Re:Snake-oil... by ambrosine10 · · Score: 1

      That sounds about right.

    12. Re:Snake-oil... by viega · · Score: 2, Interesting

      Another ill-informed post. There's a difference between absolute security and computational security. We can easily build provable security schemes for confidentiality and integrity, where we prove computational security against all possible attacks. It's not as theoretically absolute as a one-time pad because there is a computational bound where there might be some technological breakthrough (but that's very unrealistic). Or, more likely, the very modest assumption made about the underlying block cipher will not hold. If someone ever says, "AES is broken", that basically will mean they proved that assumption doesn't hold... for AES. Honestly, that seems quite unlikely to happen any time soon, and until it does, the assumption is such that you have a provably secure scheme against all computationally feasible attacks.

    13. Re:Snake-oil... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Bruce is a /. regular; maybe he'll show up and answer this :)

    14. Re:Snake-oil... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Hear that? That was the sound of a joke going completely over your head.

    15. Re:Snake-oil... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      In all fairness, every encryption algorithm is something somebody "just made up".

      Some have more knowledge of cryptography than others, but it boils down to someone somewhere (or a few people, somewhere) using mathematics to build a cipher.

      If they're actually opening it for peer review, then they're trying to do the right thing, and Schnier's "gimme a break" means nothing.

      If this is just a gimmick, it will become evident over time. There are valid reason to be skeptical, but a single 'gimme a break' from Schnier doesn't prove they're not coming from the right place.

    16. Re:Snake-oil... by David+Jao · · Score: 1
      We can easily build provable security schemes for confidentiality and integrity, where we prove computational security against all possible attacks.

      No, you can't. Doing this requires proving that P is not equal to NP, which nobody has done. You can prove security against all known attacks, but not against all possible attacks.

      What you probably meant to say is that we can easily build provably secure systems under reasonable number-theoretic assumptions such as hardness of integer factorization or hardness of discrete log. In other words, if we assume that integer factorization is hard, then we can build some systems which are guaranteed to be secure, in the sense that any successful attack on those systems would lead to fast integer factorization.

      This does not mean that the underlying system is guaranteed to be secure, because the underlying assumption might be false. For example, we do not currently have any proof that integer factorization is actually a hard problem, unless you know something that no other researcher knows. All we have so far is several decades of experience indicating that integer factorization is likely to be hard.

    17. Re:Snake-oil... by flaws · · Score: 1

      The gimme-a-break was a joke comment - the original claim is that Schneier said that it wasn't snake oil.

    18. Re:Snake-oil... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
      You can't reliably prove security for anything other than the one-time pad. All you can do is prove that the attcks you have chosen will not work. Attempting to prove security is attmepting to prove a negative: namely that no attack more efficient than brute force exists.

      You can prove if you had a function key=break_cipher(plaintext, ciphertext), that that function could be called as a subroutine to quickly solve some other hard problem, possibly even some problem that is proven to take exponential time (like satisfiability of Presburger arithmetic, although I don't think any encryption algorithm has yet been proven to be so).

      For example, there is a public key cryptography scheme my Michael Rabin, which I think involved computing n**2 mod pq. It was proven that if there was a function that could reverse the public key function, then that function could be called a polynomial number of times to perform factorization. Factorization is not proven to take exponential time, but a sub-exponential time factorization algorithm is something that many computer scientists have sought and failed to find for decades. On the other hand, perhaps supporting your point, I believe that Rabin public key cryptography had some problem where most randomly selected keys were "weak" in that they were susceptible to some exploit, and they care involved in picking keys made the process a lot more complex that RSA.

      As another example, I believe that there is an encryption scheme called Lattice Encryption where computing the key from a chosen plaintext attack could be used to solve an NP-complete problem in polynomial time, which is another problem that has received the kind of attention that factoring has.

      It would be nice if there were an algorithm where breaking the algorithm was proven to be a fast solution to a proven intractible problem (like Presburger arithmetic), but I don't think any such algorithm has even been developed. That, however, does not mean that it is impossible.

    19. Re:Snake-oil... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      D'oh. My joke detecter died yesterday.

      Sorry. :)

    20. Re:Snake-oil... by viega · · Score: 1

      I said originally that there's the underlying assumption that the underlying block cipher is a PRP. The proof of security of the encryption scheme is secure relies on a weak assumption about the block cipher, but the attack then is on the block cipher, not the scheme for using the block cipher. The whole point is that, for the most part, we can prove security for almost everything we need, and can boil it down to a few minor assumptions that people strongly believe to be true (such as AES is a PRP).

  26. Hopefully by sigloiv · · Score: 0

    this won't get cracked as easily as SHA-1.

    --
    Software is like sex. It's better when it's free. -Linus Torvalds
    1. Re:Hopefully by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      easily? are you fucking retarded?

  27. Re:Worse than previewing non-existant products... by Dr.Dubious+DDQ · · Score: 3, Insightful
    things like these need to be kept, yknow, secret....

    No, they don't - not if they're GOOD security.

    The intention is that with good encryption techniques, the "bad guys" can know all about how the system works...and it will work anyway. What's the point in making sure nobody sees you hiding your key under the doormat (security-through-obscurity) if the key doesn't work for anyone but you anyway?

  28. Re:Worse than previewing non-existant products... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Just adding in a reference for that principle, which I couldn't find the source for.

    "The significance of the key is an enduring principle of cryptography, and it was definitively stated in 1883 by the Dutch linguist Auguste Kerckhoffs von Nieuwenhof: "The security of a cryptosystem must not depend on keeping secret the crypto algorithm. The security depends only on keeping secret the key."" - Excerpted from http://www.simonsingh.com/History_of_the_Science_o f_Secrecy.html

    -ShadowRanger

  29. I wonder... by Dr.Dubious+DDQ · · Score: 2, Interesting

    ...how badly patent-encumbered these ciphers are going to end up being?

  30. I stand corrected! by John+Harrison · · Score: 4, Funny

    You are right. Nevermind what I said. Buy the snake oil, it has a better track record.

    1. Re:I stand corrected! by flaws · · Score: 1

      Snake Oil is disguised crypto - this is open source crypto proposal. There is no snake-oil intended, since you're looking at all the math and its functions. Snake oil is when you're trying to sell something. You don't understand this paper, so you don't know what you're talking about. But crypto experts will disagree with your position.

    2. Re:I stand corrected! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Where's the source then? Post it right here so everyone can see your magnificent work.

    3. Re:I stand corrected! by flaws · · Score: 2, Informative

      www.securescience.net/ciphers/csc2/csc2ref.c

    4. Re:I stand corrected! by flaws · · Score: 1
    5. Re:I stand corrected! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      it is quite surprising that you would publicly release source code written by a self-proclaimed amateur cryptographer......

    6. Re:I stand corrected! by flaws · · Score: 1

      He gets payed, he's professional. :) So you've made up your mind that you're a dick and you have no knowledge whatsoever about crypto.

    7. Re:I stand corrected! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      his professional ability is analagous to that of william hung. just because he gets paid doesn't mean he's actually any good. it does make for a jolly good show though.

    8. Re:I stand corrected! by flaws · · Score: 1

      Ok, so far he has gone farther then the hater involved in his comments. Calling anything snake-oil without actually understanding or reading the material is quite flagrantly absurd. Any well-read cryptographer will understand this paper and continue to take it seriously. You obviously don't, in an attempt to hide your lack of knowledge.

    9. Re:I stand corrected! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      being a well-read cryptographer myself and having read your paper, it is quite flagrantly absurd to claim this algorithm is comparably secure to an algorithm that has been reviewed extensively for years by qualifed cryptographers. i would like to modify my comment ever so slightly, i believe we are dealing with a william hung of companies here. a team of 50 amateurs will never add up to one true professional. good day sir.

    10. Re:I stand corrected! by flaws · · Score: 1

      Well, I hope to receive your comments on the actual algorithm then. You think quite highly of yourself, and at this time you have no ground to stand on. We believe it is comparably secure by design, and we offer the challenge to be proved wrong. Our confidence in the cipher itself seems to be the only problem you seem to have with this. You can think what you want, but we have had "professionals" take a look and actually tell us that this is definitely not snake-oil. So you're the only one in support of your argument. I suggest you keep hating, that's what you're good at.

    11. Re:I stand corrected! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      professionals are one thing, qualified professionals are another. as you have already stated, you consider a professional as a person who simply gets paid. looking at who you hire, your standard for professionals is much to low. I offer no hate my dear boy, only a brutal reality with which you are unhappy to deal with. my time, as any other qualified professional, is very valuable. you must pay properly for my formal review of your work. I suggest you put your money where your mouth is and provide a real challenge with real stakes for real money. who knows, you may wind up with a lucrative contract just like william hung.

    12. Re:I stand corrected! by flaws · · Score: 1

      If you read the slashdot post, it is a casual preview, with intent to offer a challenge. We will be seeking formal professional review, coupled with a public challenge backed by monetary compensation. I don't disagree with that point, and we are seeking review. But at this point, we are simply introducing the cipher to the public for comments and reviews of a casual nature.

    13. Re:I stand corrected! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      and casual comments you shall receive. years of casual comments does not make ones cypher secure. in order to receive proper analysis you must provide a fair and worthwhile challenge. for your sake, I hope your username is not a foreshadowing of things to come for your company. maybe we can go double or nothing on your second cypher.

    14. Re:I stand corrected! by flaws · · Score: 1

      The username is a joke about finding flaws ;) I believe you are preaching to the choir, as this has been our intent. Introduce the cipher, get a formal review process started and a worthwhile challenge.

    15. Re:I stand corrected! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      you may want to consider paying out to all cryptographers that break your cypher. with the chances of a break being so high, a lot of cryptographers may spend time on it only to submit their break after the first person. these odds reduce the chances for a cryptographer to see a return on his time investment. I suggest a lower payout but a guaranteed payout to all people who break the cypher. the payout may also be weighted by the success of the break. every order of magnitude reduced on the cypher should consquently double the reward. creative and valuable payouts will ensure a good review of your code.

    16. Re:I stand corrected! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      One additional comment, if I may. Please include in the rules of your challenge that contest winners are to be paid with top priority in the event of a bankruptcy. Having been involved in a number of these challenges over the years the payouts typically lead to vc's jumping ship in order to avoid a payout. rules against this type of behaviour would be much obliged.

    17. Re:I stand corrected! by flaws · · Score: 1

      SSC refuses VC capital for many reasons, including reasons such as this. Our focus is actually on security, not "security through marketing".

    18. Re:I stand corrected! by John+Harrison · · Score: 2, Informative
      As the maker of the original "snake oil" comment, let me make a few clarifications. First, I am not the AC that is replying to you. I have posted AC to /. less than 5 times in six years, and not at all in the last six months. Second, the "snake oil" comment was about the amount of review a cipher (any cipher, not this one in particular) has undergone, not whether it is open source. It seems to me that all of the AES candidates have undergone more review than this cipher. Yet even the designers of some of those candidate ciphers have said that people should use AES because it is the standard and it will receive more research going forwad, even though they personally think their own creations have advantages.

      Though there is good work that has been done on CS, most of it appears to be done by the creators of it. Finally, from the article:
      As of yet no full cryptanalysis of the CS-Cipher is known to exist.

    19. Re:I stand corrected! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I suggest you keep hating, that's what you're good at.

      In the words of the great Silky JOHN-ston...

      "Ah hate you... Hate you... Hate you... Don't even know you and ah hate you..."

    20. Re:I stand corrected! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      John - I agree with you, I believe that we are attempting to make CS2 more public so that we may receive review.

  31. Re:Worse than previewing non-existant products... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
    The point? The point comes in the shape of a gun pointed at you as the thief tells you to put the key in the lock or you're dead.

    In that case we need lasergun equipped mobile drone patrolbots that will guard you until they are fried to a nice crisp. In fact, why not a whole legion for every man?

    We all deserve our horde of guardbots!!!

    Wait, what were talking about again?

  32. Paper in PDF format by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    put in the public last year...

  33. Use binary, or hexadecimal? by Eunuch · · Score: 1

    Part of the problem with these ciphers is having to constantly convert to and from decimal, which is a very poor base to use in computer science.

    --
    Transcend Humanity. Please.
    1. Re:Use binary, or hexadecimal? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Much worse is having to convert the English messages into the language computers understand: machine language. That or "assembly" language, which is a very good base to use in negotiations with labor unions.

  34. Ugh by TechyImmigrant · · Score: 2, Insightful

    Ugh.

    1) No decrypt specified. So it doesn't work with many modes.

    2) Complete ambiguity in the endianess of the test vectors. Which end is which?

    3) Optimized for HW complexity. We have AES for that. We want new ciphers optimized for security.

    --
    Evil people are out to get you.
    1. Re:Ugh by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      1. Decrypt is not required for CCM, CTR, OMAC, EAX, GCM and a bunch of other modes. CBC mode for encryption is not really a good idea.

      2. The cipher is applied on the octet level, there are no "endianess" issues.

      3. This cipher has some benefits over AES. Namely the lack of integration (a/k/a square attack) properties.

    2. Re:Ugh by viega · · Score: 2, Interesting

      If you can't invert the function than one of the following is true:

      1) You don't have a one-to-one mapping of inputs to outputs, which makes this more like the compression function of a hash function, but will certainly be weaker than optimal for the intended purpose (we could then talk about how much weaker, but at the very least we no longer have a pseudo-random permutation, and it's not even a proper pseudo-random function, which means none of our traditional block cipher proofs will hold as is).

      2) The one-to-one mapping exists, but there's a hard problem making it difficult to invert, in which case you have invented a public key cryptosystem (highly unlikely)

      or

      3) The inversion is possible and not computationally hard, the designer just wasn't clueful enough.

      There's also the possibility that the poster wasn't the designer, wasn't correct, and it is a plain ol' invertible block cipher.

    3. Re:Ugh by flaws · · Score: 1

      ctr/gcm/ccm/eax can encrypt/decrypt without a "decrypt" mode of the cipher.

    4. Re:Ugh by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The round function is a bijection it's just less efficient in the inverse direction.

      Since you REALLY DON'T NEED the decrypt function there is no point in specifying it. Though if you really want to it is possible.

    5. Re:Ugh by viega · · Score: 1

      What does that have to do with the price of tea in China? As a matter of fact, if you were observant, you would have noticed that I co-authored GCM.

    6. Re:Ugh by viega · · Score: 1

      Agreed that it is not strictly needed. However, it is useful to specify simply for the purposes of testability. It's easier to test that encryption is done properly if you have a decryption implementation to test against.

  35. Alternates to AES by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    There were plenty of alternates to the NIST AES "contest" when it was first proposed. Some of them were simpler to implement in hardware than the finalist. Unless they're suggesting that this new scheme would have beaten Rijndael in the original proposal, I'm not sure I see the point. I would much rather see additional scrutiny paid to elliptics or another technology that will actually buy something in the implementation or key size.

    1. Re:Alternates to AES by chialea · · Score: 1

      I've only seen the suggestion that elliptics will win in terms of keysize for public-key crypto. Has anyone done interesting work on block ciphers with elliptics?

      Lea

    2. Re:Alternates to AES by simmoril · · Score: 1

      You can't really do a block cipher with a Public Key Cryptosystem (or at least, that's not how it's intended to be used). Usually what you do is you generate some random session key for CS^2, and use a PKC like Elliptic Curve Cryptography to transmit this session key to the other party. Afterwards, you just use CS^2 w/ the session key to encrypt all the traffic.

      In terms of raw storage size, yes, ECC has a smaller keyspace than say RSA, but this is mostly due to the fact that on the integer line, primes are fairly sparse (http://mathworld.wolfram.com/PrimeCountingFunctio n.html). Therefore, you need to take a relatively huge chunk of the integer line to be able to grab enough primes such that finding the two primes which make up the key is incredibly tough.

      ECC on the other hand, doesn't really have this problem. ECC is a variant on the discrete logarithm problem (http://mathworld.wolfram.com/DiscreteLogarithm.ht ml), where instead of using integers, we use points on the elliptic curve instead. The difference here is that every point on the curve can be used. So, since we don't have all these composite numbers cluttering up the place, the amount of 'space' the elliptic curve takes up is much smaller, and therefore the key is also much smaller.

      Two problems exist with ECC. The first is that ECC could possibly be slower than RSA (although it's been argued that this is ok, since your key is much smaller than RSA). The second problem (and this is mostly a personal opinion) is that Certicom essentially has a stranglehold over ECC technology (they own over 130 ECC-related patents). This would make most every decent implementation of ECC very patent-encumbered.

    3. Re:Alternates to AES by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Yeah, you're absolutely right and I didn't mean to imply EEC for the purposes of block usage. I haven't looked into it as much as I'd like yet, but my understanding is that the openssl impl. isn't really encumbered by patents.

    4. Re:Alternates to AES by chialea · · Score: 1

      *cough*

      You might want to reread my post. I was not implying you would possibly ever want to use a PK cryptosystem to construct a block cipher. I was responding to the parent who was talking about using ECC for block ciphers. As I'm not aware of any such work, I asked for a reference. I do in fact understand what eliptic curves are, and how people use them in the realm of cryptography.

      Lea

    5. Re:Alternates to AES by simmoril · · Score: 1

      My apologies, the wording of the posts was misleading.

      Oh well, for anyone who wanted to know how PKC and ECC works, there you go :-)

  36. Easy killer... by danielrm26 · · Score: 4, Insightful
    "This cipher is proposed as a hardware alternative to AES, being that it is more efficient in hardware, simpler to implement, and comparably secure to AES-128."
    Comparably secure? The Rijndael algorithm has been around for a pretty long time and has undergone a lot of scrutiny. Wait until this new kid has been around the block for a few years; then we talk about comparisons to Rijndael.

    "You keep using this word. I don't think it means what you think it means."
    --
    dmiessler.com -- grep understanding knowledge
    1. Re:Easy killer... by slavemowgli · · Score: 1

      I can see their reasoning:

      1. Nobody has broken AES-128 yet.
      2. Nobody has broken our algorithm yet.
      3. Therefore, the two are comparable in terms of security. :)

      --
      quidquid latine dictum sit altum videtur.
    2. Re:Easy killer... by danielrm26 · · Score: 1

      So DES is the same then too? I think there is a significant jump between being proven to be relatively secure and simply not having been broken yet.

      --
      dmiessler.com -- grep understanding knowledge
    3. Re:Easy killer... by slavemowgli · · Score: 1

      In case it wasn't obvious from the smiley (or the comments' contents as such), that was a JOKE. :)

      --
      quidquid latine dictum sit altum videtur.
  37. 128 bits is only 16 bytes. by ABeowulfCluster · · Score: 1

    Why don't they just have 1000 bytes (~8000 or so bits) as encryption keys?

    1. Re:128 bits is only 16 bytes. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Because it would take infinity to create.

    2. Re:128 bits is only 16 bytes. by slavemowgli · · Score: 1

      To sum it up, that'd be rather slow. Keep in mind that algorithms like AES are not just supposed to run in reasonable time on your latest Pentium-4 PC; they're also supposed to run in reasonable time on that embedded device.

      That being said, I kinda have the feeling that you're also thinking of asymmetric algorithms like RSA etc. where keysizes of 1024 or 2048 bits are common; it's important to realize that these cannot directly be compared to the keysizes of symmetric algorithms (like AES).

      --
      quidquid latine dictum sit altum videtur.
  38. Where I work by digitalchinky · · Score: 2, Interesting

    Crypto systems do not always need to be brute forced: 'More often than not' it is a brain dead technician sending the keys across a timeplex, via satellite, and then over HF or something equally as silly, out to their remote site.

    Key exchange is where the biggest failures occur (that I see). Many crypto systems still in use throughout this part of the world (still) work in a similar method to the old enigma typewriters - typically they are rapidly broken because they send identical messages using different keys, then send the same message in clear text via some other link.

    1. Re:Where I work by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Believe it or not, modern ciphers are designed to resist both known plain text and known cipher text attacks. If you compare Enigma to a modern cipher, it's not even close in terms of mathematical rigor.

    2. Re:Where I work by digitalchinky · · Score: 1

      Agreed, though I was making reference to the 'weakest link' so to speak - that being the human operator.

      What you say is entirely appropriate, and accurate.

    3. Re:Where I work by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      There aren't any cyphers that are designed to resist a purchase-key attack or rubber hose cryptanalysis. There are a few entire systems (but not individual cyphers) designed to resist brute force rubber hose cryptanalysis but even those can be broken with the good old purchase-key attack.

  39. I don't get it... by cperciva · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Maybe I'm misreading the description, but it looks to me like this is an 8-round cipher with a round function considerably simpler than Rijndael's round function.

    Given that 8-round Rijndael is broken, it seems highly optimistic to think that this new cipher will not be broken.

  40. Compared to... by null-sRc · · Score: 2, Informative

    whitenoise labs, a cryptography startup that just got it's algo's patented...

    Company link:
    http://www.whitenoiselabs.com/

    Cryptographic analysis link:
    http://www.whitenoiselabs.com/papers/Wagner %20Secu rity%20Analysis.pdf

    Performance anaylysis link:
    http://www.whitenoiselabs.com/papers/UVIC%2 0Perfor mance%20Analysis.pdf

    So whitenoise encryption offers a cheaper solution that is mathematically stronger, and computationally order log n complexity where n is filesize (therefore faster too)

    and please tell me why anyone in their right mind would still bother using this shoddy, expensive, slow method for cell phone encryption?

    --
    -judging another only defines yourself
    1. Re:Compared to... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
      "-judging another only defines yourself"

      And that's a bad thing?

    2. Re:Compared to... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Informative

      Right. And who would care to use shoddy Whitenoise? It's been broken already.

      Look here: http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/250

      tsk...tsk...tsk..

    3. Re:Compared to... by null-sRc · · Score: 1

      that article simply states one guy's theory of how he might break it.

      he hasn't broken it, and after reading his theory, i doubt he will since he's off on numerable points.

      --
      -judging another only defines yourself
  41. Think of the gnomes! by Godman · · Score: 1

    You know that "DVD Jon" is just a code name for a bunch of slave gnomes who sit in somebody's basement and crack stuff, right? Free the gnomes!!!

    --
    I have this really funny quote that I like to put here. Unfortunately, there's this really annoying thing called a char
  42. Troll... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Duh!

  43. Re:Worse than previewing non-existant products... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    What's the point in making sure nobody sees you hiding your key under the doormat (security-through-obscurity) if the key doesn't work for anyone but you anyway?

    If they took the key you wouldn't be able to use it. This doesn't apply to crypto. I'm just pointing out that it's never a good idea to hide things under doormats.

  44. Not readily extensible to larger keys? by macklin01 · · Score: 1

    From TFP:
    Our original 256-bit key designs were designed to use the round function to lower the design, implementation and cryptanalysis time. However, all of our attempts were either weak against reduced round related keys attacks or were too inefficient for on-the-fly computation. As a result for this design we reduced the key size to 128-bits.

    In general (not just in cryptography, which is certainly not my field), it's a good thing to have an idea how to extend an algorithm when designing it. Here, however, that doesn't seem to be the case.

    Presumably, advances in computing hardware will eventually render this 128-bit algorithm unsecure, and it would be necessary to extend the algorithm to a higher-bit cipher. However, the quote above seems to indicate that they don't really know how to extend it to higher bits and still provide the necessary cryptoanalysis and implement it well. That doesn't sound like a good thing in a design.

    In contrast, many other crypto algorithms are fairly easy to strengthen over time just by increasing the key size, since such algorithms already have a substantial amount of cryptoanalysis and it's known how large the keys need to be with a given amount of computational power (with known attacks, granted). I'd be curious to see whether or not the problems they encountered are insurmountable. -- Paul

    --
    OpenSource.MathCancer.org: open source comp bio
  45. open source != public domain by coyote-san · · Score: 1

    Public domain has a very specific legal meaning. Open source is definitely not in the public domain. It is protected by copyright and all of the "open" licenses are precisely that - licenses to use that code (or documentation, images, etc.) in specific ways.

    Of course some companies make the mistake you made... and when they're caught they're usually act surprised to learn that 1) somebody cares and 2) that somebody has enforceable legal rights.

    As for the second comment, that's all anyone serious about security needs to know. Get back to us after at least five years of serious review by experienced cryptographers - until then you're pissing in the rain and trying to sell umbrellas.

    (P.S., are you familiar with the saying that any fool can invent an encryption algorithm that they can't crack... and only a fool would believe that that proves nobody else can either?)

    --
    For every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong. -- H L Mencken
    1. Re:open source != public domain by flaws · · Score: 1

      Slashdot is one heck of a way to get this out there. We don't expect it to solve anything over night. We have stated our case by issuing the paper and expect review.

    2. Re:open source != public domain by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Well said! I have downloaded the source and it references a "License". Nowhere does it say it is public domain. Nowhere does it say it is open source.

    3. Re:open source != public domain by flaws · · Score: 1

      Technically Public domain = paper is public domain, code is not.

  46. Time again for One Time Pads? by quarkscat · · Score: 1

    Considering the number of "hired guns", and
    the amount of resources poured into various
    3 letter alphabet soup government organizations,
    any reliance upon the "next big thing" in ciphers,
    like ellipse curve encryption, is likely to end
    badly. AES-1 was supposed to have been the hot
    new encryption, but has been found vulnerable.
    I don't expect much better long term security
    with a number of other encryption methods,
    particularly with the "seal of approval" of those
    same 3 letter alphabet soup organizations.

    A CD-R chock full of books in ANSI text or XML
    or even PDF format could easily provide the basis
    for a lifetime's worth of OTP (One Time Pad)
    encryption. Perhaps it is time to revisit older
    methods married to newer technology, instead of
    newer methods with bleeding edge technology.
    I seem to recall an awful lot of problems with
    pseudo-random number generators and the seeding
    methods they used, not so very long ago.

    1. Re:Time again for One Time Pads? by ManuelKelly · · Score: 2, Funny

      This sounds like someone has finally found a use for all of those AOL cd's. A completely new set of pads delivered to your door monthly.

    2. Re:Time again for One Time Pads? by gweihir · · Score: 1

      A CD-R chock full of books in ANSI text or XML
      or even PDF format could easily provide the basis
      for a lifetime's worth of OTP (One Time Pad)
      encryption.


      Completely unusable. An one-time pad with a structure is insecure. One that is actually text can be broken automatically today, we wrote such a programm in a crypto-lab during my CS studies. Required not much encrypted text either. Some kBs or less.

      --
      Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
    3. Re:Time again for One Time Pads? by flosofl · · Score: 1

      A CD-R chock full of books in ANSI text or XML or even PDF format could easily provide the basis for a lifetime's worth of OTP

      Nope. You do not base OTP on blocks of known words. That can be deciphered rather easily. The OTP needs to be random characters. You'd be better off using binary files (but still not as good as a truly random pad). I think you may have confused concepts from a book cipher and OTP.

      --
      "This calls for a very special blend of psychology and extreme violence" - Vyvyan "The Young Ones"
    4. Re:Time again for One Time Pads? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      i was going to mod you up as you have a point - but hopefully someone else will as i want to post a reply.

      but to pick up on the previous point of aol CDs
      as long as you have a large 'noise' set that one can standardize on to generate one time pads [however you feel is effective as long as your co conspirators know the method, then one can solve the one time pad distribution problem. making it quite valuable]

    5. Re:Time again for One Time Pads? by DarthTaco · · Score: 1

      That's only if you use the pad more than once, right? I mean, if it was used only once then there is no way to know when you've decrypted the message properly. This post could be the cypher text of a message, and with however many keys there are available, you could decrypt it into any other message you wanted, and never know which one was right.

    6. Re:Time again for One Time Pads? by gweihir · · Score: 1

      Unfortunately, no. You can recognise language e.g. from its letter frequency, letter-pair frequency, word frequency, etc.. You can take two arbitrary texts in english. Use one as pad and the other as message. While this may not allow a complete automatic recovery of both texts from the encrypted text only, automated tools can come pretty close. And we are not talking true wizardry here, but more a semester project for some smart undergrads. Any cryptoanalyst will just laugh at this stuff.

      Incidentlially this type of chiffre is known as "Rebecca" chiffre, since some spy used the novel "Rebecca" as pad in WWII.

      --
      Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
  47. ideologically neutral? by grikdog · · Score: 1

    One of the advantages of Rijndael as the AES cipher (when such was still undecided) was ideological neutrality, unlike American, British, Japanese or Israeli ciphers. At least, no one seriously believed Belgium was out to destabilize world hegemonies. It probably behooves contenders for a "hardware replacement" for AES to demonstrate a similar lack of pups in the brouha.

    --
    ``Tension, apprehension & dissension have begun!'' - Duffy Wyg&, in Alfred Bester's _The Demolished Man_
    1. Re:ideologically neutral? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Does canada count as somewhat neutral? The inventor is from Canda.

  48. Origin of Cryptography by Big_Oh · · Score: 2, Funny

    "...This implies that cryptography may come ultimately from the infantile sexual pleasure that children obtain from the muscle tension of retaining the feces." From Kahn's "The Codebreakers".

  49. Tom St Denis? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Aren't those algorithms same? similar? to Tom's ciphers? Didn't he work there?

  50. Crypto Law Public Domain vs. Copyright P.D. by billstewart · · Score: 2, Informative
    "Public Domain" actually several relevant specific legal meanings.
    • US Technology Export Laws (which were written back when the Free World was the enemy of Communism to prevent Commies from getting militarily useful technology, and kept around much longer as a fiction to prevent citizens from having private communications that the FBI and NSA couldn't wiretap) defines "public domain" essentially as open knowledge that can be freely discussed, at least by academics, without the same limitations as non-public-domain crypto technology which mustn't be disclosed to those nasty Foreigners (except Canadians and sometimes Brits.) Those laws aren't totally gone, but they're mostly gone and it's easy enough to work around them for the most part.
    • Copyright and Patent have their own different meanings of Public Domain - If something is copyrighted, you can't copy the exact implementation, but you can write your own code that implements the same mathematical functions. But it it's public domain, feel free to Xerograph it, retype it, whatever.
    • But if something is patent-protected, you can't implement the algorithm/business-method/hardware yourself, even writing your code from scratch in a clean room, unless you've got a license from the patent-holder.
    --

    Bill Stewart
    New Fast-Compression-only CPR http://preview.tinyurl.com/dy575ks
  51. Software peer review... of closed hardware??! by kafka47 · · Score: 1

    "The preview of the CS2-128 cipher proposed is in html form and will be available in a published format at the end of April."

    The "peers" "review" the code. Perhaps they find vulnerabilities or exploits in the implementation.

    And then the company releases it... in hardware.

    Then, who peer reviews that? Sounds supremely fl@wed. :-)

    /kafka

  52. More hardware-efficient than Rijndael? by ca1v1n · · Score: 5, Insightful

    I've actually designed the encryption end of a synthesizable Rijndael chip. It was lab 5 of ECE 435 at U.Va. Granted, that's a 4 1/2 credit course, and there were only 5 labs, but still. Adding the decryption would have less than doubled the work, and considerably less than doubled the silicon. Implementing AES in hardware is NOT hard. In the name of laziness, I did it in a highly parallel fashion a lot of work that could be serialized to reduce the transistor count by about a factor of 8, before getting to even slightly fancy optimization techniques.

    You need some registers, some shifters, and some very minimal control logic. Doing the sbox algorithmically isn't terribly fast and requires a fair amount of logic, so generally you just use a 256 byte ROM for the sbox. With die space being as expensive as it was when DES was being designed, it's understandable that they did some weird things to make it fit on the chip. These days, nobody blinks at 10k transistors, even on embedded devices.

    Sure, their 4x4 sbox is going to take a lot less space on the chip, but does that really buy anything? Their design document shows that 32 of them are necessary to do a whole round in a single step, while only 4 are needed for Rijndael. That's 2048 bits of ROM on CS2 and 8192 bits of ROM for Rijndael, but CS2 takes 33 rounds while the 128-bit version of Rijndael takes only 10. The amount of hardware required for comparable throughput is about the same, though Rijndael's pipeline is an order of magnitude shorter, due to fewer rounds and the rounds not having to go through that barrel-shifter network.

    1. Re:More hardware-efficient than Rijndael? by tomstdenis · · Score: 1

      The idea is pipeline. The main round function is 4 layers of FPHT networking. So unroll the cipher [thankgod it's not that large] and you get 32 layers of FPHT networking.

      Now make a pipeline with 32 stages... load key then load plaintext.

      So effectively you have a 2 cycle encrypt operation, you can encrypt to 16 DIFFERENT keys simultaneously, and a "cycle period" is roughly as long as one layer of FPHT.

      Gonna encrypt all to one key? Then precompute the key schedule and load one block per cycle...

      Tom [the author of CS^2 and the LibTom projects]

      --
      Someday, I'll have a real sig.
    2. Re:More hardware-efficient than Rijndael? by ca1v1n · · Score: 1

      Ah, that *is* cool. Thanks for explaining it! The document linked is a bit sparse. Mind filling it out a little? We're all really curious.

  53. Author? Rationale? Trustability? by billstewart · · Score: 3, Insightful
    Reference code is important, and while the paper's pretty brief, it looks believable at first glance (I'm an engineer who's dealt with lots of crypto, but am not a crypto mathematician) - it claims to have addressed at least the most important popular attacks.

    But it doesn't say who wrote the algorithm (just the reference code) - is it someone known to the community? It's written by the anonymous academic "we" - it references a couple of papers by Tom St. Denis, but has the feel of somebody who doesn't natively speak English, and the web version has spelling problems. The paper's about 8 months old - has some version of it been submitted to any of the academic journals, and have any of the published it? fl@ws says later they're working on getting some professionals to look at it, which is a good start (realistically, if the academic community doesn't generate its own buzz, you're going to have to hire credible people to vet it to start to get some attention so that more people will start trying to attack it.) The posting mentions a "challenge", which is usually a bad, bad sign, though this looks better than the usual snake oil that does that.

    Things I'd hoped to see that are missing include

    • Why should we care? There are lots of crypto algorithms out there, some of which, like the AES candidates, have been thoroughly beaten up by the community. Is there some weakness (esp. with Rijndael) that this addresses?
    • "Faster in hardware" - Sometimes hardware's interesting, but only if you're going to sell lots of it; it needs to perform decently in software. There's a bit of discussion of some of the issues, particularly making it fit on 8-bit processors, in case anybody still uses those, but nothing indicating that any speed testing has been done, or indicating what quantities of memory it needs or sensitivity to running on various architectures (e.g. x86 or something with enough registers or ARM or MIPS, 8/16/32/64 bit issues, etc.) The reference code does indicate that it can at least be implemented in C without hopeless quantities of bit-twiddling, which is a good start.
    • I couldn't really tell which block modes were useful - CBC, counter-mode, etc. Is there anything different here than AES?
    • How well does it parallelize - if you're trying to pump out maximum speed on something other than a discrete 8-bit chip, such as an array of cells in an FPGA or ASIC, does that work ok? Or is the answer simply "go use whichever standard operations mode you like, just as you would with AES or 3DES?
    • Is 128 bits long enough for both the key and the block? There was some discussions about originally trying to design for 256-bit keys, but cutting back to 128 for efficiency reasons. If making it fit onto an 8051 is part of your design criteria, that may be necessary, but many algorithms have some encryption modes that aren't as useful because of birthday attacks because the keys are too short.
    --

    Bill Stewart
    New Fast-Compression-only CPR http://preview.tinyurl.com/dy575ks
    1. Re:Author? Rationale? Trustability? by Ckwop · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Why should we care? There are lots of crypto algorithms out there, some of which, like the AES candidates, have been thoroughly beaten up by the community. Is there some weakness (esp. with Rijndael) that this addresses?

      The only "weakness" in AES is that the transform is incomplete. Nobody has turned this into an attack and it's unlikely to become a source of attack.

      I couldn't really tell which block modes were useful - CBC, counter-mode, etc. Is there anything different here than AES?

      No, modes of operation are independent of the underlying block cipher.

      How well does it parallelize - if you're trying to pump out maximum speed on something other than a discrete 8-bit chip, such as an array of cells in an FPGA or ASIC, does that work ok? Or is the answer simply "go use whichever standard operations mode you like, just as you would with AES or 3DES?

      I've not read the details of the spec to be able to answer this question. Sorry :(

      Is 128 bits long enough for both the key and the block? There was some discussions about originally trying to design for 256-bit keys, but cutting back to 128 for efficiency reasons. If making it fit onto an 8051 is part of your design criteria, that may be necessary, but many algorithms have some encryption modes that aren't as useful because of birthday attacks because the keys are too short.

      This isn't really a concern. In order for birthday attacks to come about using CBC, or some other chaining mode, you'd have to encrypt around 2^64 blocks. The block is 128-bit long, which gives 2^4 * 2^64 = 2^68 bytes of encryption before the probabilities become an issue. If you're encrypting that much with a single key, you're insane.

      You might think counter mode would help you avoid that problem, but alas, it does not. In a random stream you'd expect each group of 128-bits to be equally probable. With CTR, however, we know that each 128-bit block of the keystream will only be repeated after 2^128 encryptions. This fact allows you to distinquish CTR from random after around, you guessed it, 2^64 encryptions.

      Oh btw, donate to Tom St Denis he writes a cool cryptolib.

      Simon.

    2. Re:Author? Rationale? Trustability? by flaws · · Score: 1

      Tom St Denis is the author of this, Secure Science is sponsoring the project and further endeavors of the project. Secure Science does not claim ownership to the paper, but invests in the interest of the author.

  54. Great! by tasadar24 · · Score: 1, Funny

    Finally I can change to something better then rot-13!

  55. This is from a 2002 usenet posting... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    http://groups.google.de/groups?selm=4e2f159f.02071 91637.3e2c334@posting.google.com

  56. 40 bits! by oliverthered · · Score: 1

    Wouldn't any 40bit cipher be 'easy' to crack due to the small keyspace, especially if it's easy to compute.

    I just hope that the passwords on my private keys use a algorithm that's so slow no one could brute force my password.

    --
    thank God the internet isn't a human right.
    1. Re:40 bits! by John+Harrison · · Score: 1
      Yes, it would, that was my point in mentioning that it is 40-bit. I choose that as an example because it sprang to mind as a recent high profile complete compromise of a non-standard cipher that was completely and totally broken, rather than something that has simply been shown to have weaknesses but not actaully broken.

      Obviously the system being discussed here isn't using 40-bit keys. I don't know if they are doing something else that is stupid. That is why heavily reviewed ciphers are a good thing. Now, is this cipher heavily reviewed? Or are they trying to get a lot of people to use it in order to attract attention to it and then get it reviewed? If that is the case then the cart is before the horse, isn't it?

    2. Re:40 bits! by oliverthered · · Score: 1

      I think it's 'quite' common to brute force the password people place on there keys because:
      a: The password is usually in a smaller keyspace than the key.
      b: The algorithm use to protect the key via a password is relatively simple, i.e. if I took me ten seconds to test each key a 40bit key would have been good enough.

      --
      thank God the internet isn't a human right.
  57. you only have to read the first paragraph of TFA by museumpeace · · Score: 1

    To see what its biggest weakness is...its a SECRET KEY TECHNOLOGY! all the wonders of unbreakability that are claimed may be true, let the hoped for flood of reviewers decide that. The whole scheme stands or falls on protection of the keys...I can't afford a courier the way DOD can so I am not sure how I am getting my key sent to my intended secure recipients.

    --
    SLASHDOT: news for people who can't concentrate on work or have no life at all and got tired of yelling back at the TV.
  58. Wheres the science? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    For a company called Secure Science I would expect something better than a publicity stunt. If these algorithms are really that good then they should be reviewed by cryptagraphy experts instead of a proof by mass media exposure. Wheres Bruce Schneiers review? Wheres the peer reviewed journal articles? This looks more like hype than security or science.

  59. No-one is perfect... except God. by abb3w · · Score: 2, Funny
    Although Ido not have a background in mathematics (I have an AA in Photography) I was easily able to rebuild Ezekiel's private key via his public key and one of his encrypted messages. Of course I am above-average in intelligence, but PGP is supposedly unbreakable!

    As the United States has known since its founding, all cryptographic algorithms (even the one-time pad) are vulnerable to attack via divine revelation, even in the absense of the ciphertext itself. Those able to take advantage of this regularly are a pearl without price in the intelligence community.

    Your services have immense potential value for your country in the hunt for terrorists like Osama Bin Laden. If you'd like a circular describing opportunities for employment with the NSA, just pick up your phone, call your mother, and ask for one.

    --
    //Information does not want to be free; it wants to breed.
  60. Re:you only have to read the first paragraph of TF by durdur · · Score: 1

    So? It's a block cipher, and it has a secret key. This is not a weakness if you use it in the way it is intended to be used. Such a cipher presumes that you have you have appropriate protection for the key (which could be stored in a secure hardware device, for example) and use a secure key exchange mechanism (such as Diffie-Hellman) if you are using it over a transport layer.

  61. Re:you only have to read the first paragraph of TF by convolvatron · · Score: 1

    umm. like other secret key technologies, its probably quite useful as a bulk data encryption after a session key has been negotiated using public/private

  62. Brilliant! by jgoemat · · Score: 1

    A cipher that is more efficient in hardware and therefore more easily brute-forced. What will they come up with next?

  63. Secret Key by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I may be wrong, but I think I recall reading in the big red book that most encryption is done with symmetric keys. Public-key methods are orders of magnitude slower. Thus, you encrypt the symmetric key with the recipient's public key (so only they can read it), and sign it with YOUR private key (so they know you sent it). The symmetric key is then unpacked and used to do the heavy lifting.