Computer Error Caused Qantas Jet Mishap

highways sends word that preliminary investigations into a Qantas Airbus A330 mishap where 51 passengers were injured has concluded that it was due to the Air Data Inertial Reference System feeding incorrect information into the flight control system — not interference from passenger electronics, as Qantas had initially claimed. Quoting from the ABC report: "Authorities have blamed a faulty onboard computer system for last week's mid-flight incident on a Qantas flight to Perth. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau said incorrect information from the faulty computer triggered a series of alarms and then prompted the Airbus A330's flight control computers to put the jet into a 197-meter nosedive ... The plane was cruising at 37,000 feet when a fault in the air data inertial reference system caused the autopilot to disconnect. But even with the autopilot off, the plane's flight control computers still command key controls in order to protect the jet from dangerous conditions, such as stalling, the ATSB said."

Comments

uhh huhs

[pak9rabid]

I'm sure this comes as no surprise to the /. community. Nice to see the truth actually did surface though.

Re:uhh huhs

[Anonymous Coward]

Except this isn't the truth either. They are blaming a computer for their mistakes. Computers don't make mistakes, people do.

The blame should lay with whoever input the incorrect flight data into that computer.

Questions:

[Ethanol-fueled]

From TFA:

"About two minutes after the initial fault, (the air data inertial reference unit) generated very high, random and incorrect values for the aircraft's angle of attack," the ATSB said in a statement.

Correct me if I'm wrong but don't most modern aircraft have an inertial navigation system and a seperate angle of attack transmitter protruding from the plane? Why no redundancy?

The incident was the fourth involving Qantas planes in two-and-a-half months[read TFA for the other 3 incidents]...

The plane's French-based manufacturer has issued an advisory on the problem and will also issue special operational engineering bulletins to airlines that fly A330s and A340s fitted with the same air data computer, the ATSB said.

Does Qantas' aircraft maintenance suck or does Airbus' quality control suck? Do both suck?

Finally, shame on the PR guys for blaming passenger electronics. Maybe it's a feature, not a bug...in case any government decides that they want to make another 9/11 ;)

Re:Questions:

[Anonymous Coward]

They never did, the initial reports that they were looking at laptop was a mistake by the journalist. Qantas said they were looking at the onboard computers (ie. the computer that was flying the plane) and the journalist thought computers that were on board (ie. the laptops that passengers were using).

Re:Questions:

[Cassius Corodes]

I suspect its more blame shifting. In Australia, Qantas have come under scrutiny for a spate of recent problems with their planes. Every other week its some kind of mechanical malfunction or whatnot. This is especially stinging as Qantas has a excellent reputation for safety. So they are eager to get the problem as far away from themselves as quickly as possible.

Re:Questions:

[The Good Jim]

Umm... the attitude sensor was a Northrop Grumman part, used in some Airbus models (2 A330 models, and A340) and "some other non-Airbus" aircraft. So it doesn't sound like an Airbus problem - it may even also be a Boeing problem! And it sounds like a software problem, not a Queerarse maintenance issue, for once! But what happened to quadruplex-redundant FBW - are only the flight control computers truly quadruplex redundant? It sounds like a single point of failure in a design which should have considerable redundancy. Jim

Re:Questions:

[Anonymous Coward]

That is just full of win. It means that at least two entire threads on Fark and Slashdot were just so much hot air.

Oh, wait...

Re:Questions:

[flydude18]

Correct me if I'm wrong but don't most modern aircraft have an inertial navigation system and a seperate angle of attack transmitter protruding from the plane? Why no redundancy?

Well, you're confusing some of the terms. An inertial navigation system is for navigation, e.g. north is that way. The failed computer, an "air data inertial reference unit" is (probably) the computer that collects the measurement data from angle of attack probes, pitot-static tubes, altimeters, and whatever other sensors they have, and calculates useful parameters like angle of attack, airspeed, altitude, etc...

They have redundancy. They surely have multiple angle of attack probes. They might even have multiple computers to compare the results. They surely try to detect and discard erroneous measurements. But sometimes the wrong things will fail at the wrong time and in the wrong way, and all the data will be junk. Murphy was, in fact, an aerospace engineer.

The flight control computer needs an angle of attack value. They don't have the option declaring the input suspicious and giving manual control to the pilot. Not on Airbus, anyway.

Re:Questions:

[dangitman]

Except that it was a journalist who made the claim of interference from a passenger's computer, not QANTAS.

Re:Questions:

[WalksOnDirt]

Boeing a/c do have a lot of computer controls, but they can all be easily overwritten by the CO/FO flying the a/c.

That actually sounds worse, but you probably meant overridden.

Re:Questions:

[William Robinson]

Why no redundancy?

Exactly my thought.

IANAE, but the Wikipedia says An ADIRU acts as a "single, fault tolerant" source for both pilots of an aircraft., and there are 3 ADIRUs.

From TFA,

faulty computer triggered a series of alarms and then prompted the Airbus A330's flight control computers to put the jet into a 197-metre nosedive.

I wonder whether the control computers are programmed to take decision to nosedive just like that OR consult other ADIRUs OR alarm the crew before taking that kind of decision.

Having worked for nuclear installations where I designed automations for, which always demanded to have 2 out of 3 voting redundancy and a careful fault tree analysis making sure no single point of failure would lead to any kind of disaster, I feel the control computer might have been taking decision without consulting other ADIRUs OR all 3 ADIRUs went bad at the same time. And both cases look very scary.

Just my thoughts.

Re:Questions:

[daver00]

Qantas HAD an excellent reputation for safety, but that is surely history now. What was it about 6-12 months ago they moved all of their international flights maintainance offshore. Qantas engineers went on strike etc. Lo and behold yet another outsourcing operation is falling flat on its face, unfortunately this time it could come at the expense of lives.

I'd be staying well away from Qantas international flights until they sort their shit out.

Re:Questions:

[MrNaz]

The real reason:

"It looks like you are trying to fly a commercial airliner. Would you like me to:
a) Make an announcement to passengers
b) Call the stewardess for some more coffee
c) Compensate for the incredibly high angle of attack"

Re:Questions:

[RichiH]

> Does Qantas' aircraft maintenance suck or does Airbus' quality control suck? Do both suck?

You hear a lot about Qantas failures, almost nothing about Airbus failures, at not any more than with the other companies. Without knowing much about Qantas, I suspect the mainly use Airbus & internal QA/maint sucks.

Re:Questions:

[I cant believe its n]

Boeing a/c do have a lot of computer controls, but they can all be easily overwritten by the CO/FO flying the a/c.

That actually sounds worse, but you probably meant overridden.

No, the GP is correct and the process is called "flash and burn" :-)

Re:Questions:

[S-100]

Quantas chose Airbus, so Quantas will have to take the blame for problems like this. The Airbus design philosophy has a greater dependence on flight control software. This added complexity has caused crashes in the past, and mishaps like this are to be expected. Thankfully, the defect only resulted in a transient out-of-control situation. Good thing this didn't happen on final (or at V1).

Re:Questions:

[TomSawyer]

When their A320 debuted at the French airshow, the computer got very confused at take off and simply refused to allow the pilot to pull up more than 20-30 feet off the ground, causing the a/c to crash into the forest at the end of the runway.

I remember reading about that in high school. It's one of the "cautionary tales" in The Day the Phones Stopped Ringing. While the computers were initially blamed, the final conclusion was human error caused by a misplaced confidence in technology. It wasn't that the computers wouldn't let them pull up. The plane was physically incapable of pulling up when the pilots tried to. The pilots were maneuvering to give the crowd a good look and they believed the computers wouldn't let them do so if the plane couldn't handle it.

Re:Questions:

[Anonymous Coward]

Ooh, so close. That was almost a sentence. Better luck next time!

Re:Questions:

[Achromatic1978]

Qantas. Not Quantas.

Queensland And Northern Territory Aerial Services.

Re:Questions:

[lendude]

Whilst Airbus and Boeing may have differing philosophies regarding the use and role of on-board computer flight systems, and whilst these may have bearing on some incidents, please read up on the incident you are referencing - it's nothing like you portray it: Air France Flight 296

Re:Questions:

[aussie_a]

Does Qantas' aircraft maintenance suck

Considering they've recently shipped it overseas where its cheaper (as opposed to being better), I wouldn't be surprised if that were the case.

I never heard about this sort of thing before Qantas moved their maintenance offshore.

Re:Questions:

[jabithew]

I always prefer Airbus because they rely on computers more. Human judgement is pretty poor, for the most part. The majority of crashes are caused by mechanical and pilot errors.

Plus they're more comfortable and I just trust European engineering more...

(p.s. Parent modded 0; -1 overrated. How?)

Re:Questions:

[aussie_a]

If Qantas cuts the costs of maintenance to such a degree that fatalities are not only likely, but inevitable, can anyone actually be charged with murder?

Re:Questions:

[Richard_at_work]

There have been no crashes attributed to the Airbus flight control system software, and Airbus doesn't depend on flight control software any more than Boeing - both the 777 and the 787 are fully fly by wire.

Re:Questions:

[Richard_at_work]

Correct - the Habsheim crash was caused by pilot stupidity in that he was both below the visible height of surrounding obstacles, and had brought the throttles back to idle. Engines take some time to come back from idle to 'take off - go around' thrust (TOGA), and he applied that thrust far too late.

Re:Questions:

[Richard_at_work]

A lot of the problems in recent months have been on Boeing aircraft...

Re:Questions:

[icebike]

Exceptional claims need exceptional proof.

Re:Questions:

[Viol8]

Oh yes there have.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_296

And don't retort with that old guff about it being the pilots fault.

Re:Questions:

[MassiveForces]

Which raises a good point - why is Q the only character that takes up two letters to type, since you 'can't' use it without U?

Re:Questions:

[FriendlyLurker]

Does Qantas' aircraft maintenance suck or does Airbus' quality control suck? Do both suck?

Australia is big, really big. I leave Sydney heading north, watch one full length movie, have a snooze, watch another full length movie then flick over to the map and get depressed... I have watched the only two decent films on offer, am already sick of the flight to Europe but I still have not even left Aussie borders. So with that in mind, my money is on Airbus's unit testing that sucks. Qantas is more than likely just the beta tester who runs the most miles.

Re:Questions:

[gnieboer]

While there's not enough detail in the article to make any real conclusions, I'm fairly certain the fault would have to be more complex than simply a single ADIRU going haywire. The autopilot worked correctly, and realized that if it was putting the aircraft in an angle of attack like that, something must be wrong with it, so disconnected itself as it should. And most similar systems I'm familiar with tend to have a capability to detect an erroneous reading, either by voting as you described, or by realizing that AoA can't change from 2 deg to 25 deg in 1/60th of a second so the input can't be right (or some similar 'common-sense' check), and faulting that component.

Re:Questions:

[digitig]

Which raises a good point - why is Q the only character that takes up two letters to type, since you 'can't' use it without U?

You can. See above.

Re:Questions:

[FriendlyLurker]

P.S. Qantas never claimed it was passenger electronics. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) http://www.atsb.gov.au/newsroom/2008/release/2008_43.aspx said that laptops could have interfered with the plane's on-board computer system... but the bureau also said in the same breath that it's too early to make that judgment. From that bland boring statement you arrive at Slashdots and dozens of other sensationlist news headlines: "Qantas Blames Wireless For Aircraft Incidents" http://mobile.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=08/10/09/1427232&tid=270
WTF? Even five at the source http://www.atsb.gov.au/newsroom/media.aspx would have determined that.
I come here for NEWS not fucking Fox-News...

Re:Questions:

[Anonymous Coward]

Correct me if I'm wrong but don't most modern aircraft have an inertial navigation system and a seperate angle of attack transmitter protruding from the plane? Why no redundancy?

OK, I'll correct you. You're wrong. The "seperate angle of attack transmitter" (sic) feeds information to the Air Data Inertial Reference System; it isn't a separate system. Avionics has become more and more integrated as time (and costs) have progressed. I suppose an anology from the days of mechanical flying would be the VG toppling with the autopilot in command, IIRC there was a crash many years ago when such an event caused a fatal accident when VG failure was exacerbated by the AP failing to disconnect. Just the sort of thing that integrated avionics and flight control systems were supposed to prevent. Airbus use a triple channel ADIRU system; this simply *shouldn't* happen. Still, given Airbus' past record, I'm sure when one of these types of failures leads to fatalities it will be pilot error. Or maintenance error. Or maybe just an Act of God.

Does Qantas' aircraft maintenance suck or does Airbus' quality control suck? Do both suck?

Neither. You may be interested to learn that in the time I have taken to write this several hundred people have died in automobile accidents. None have experienced ADIRS failure on an Airbus. Qantas' admittedly freak oxygen bottle accident has put the media spotlight on them; they - shock horror - have since experienced a gear door problem and - gasp - a hydraulic leak. Gosh. Pretty routine failures pumped up by the press into something they're not. In my job with a major airline (not Qantas) I would say I see hydraulic leaks around once a week and gear retract problems perhaps once or twice a year.

Re:Questions:

[digitig]

Good thing this didn't happen on final (or at V1).

That particular problem presumably couldn't have happened on landing because it wouldn't be flying on inertial navigation and it would be configured for landing and so the software will allow the plane to get into situations it forbids in flight such as a stall (required for normal landing, which is effectively a controlled stall).

Re:Questions:

[meringuoid]

And don't retort with that old guff about it being the pilots fault.

We don't need to. The article you linked to says it was the pilot's fault. It's listed as 'Pilot error (disputed)' insofar as the pilot blamed a dodgy altimeter and some of the evidence was improperly handled, but he was still convicted of manslaughter for it.

Re:Questions:

[Anonymous Coward]

Murder implies intent. Negligent manslaughter, tops.

Also, it's unclear if the computer malfunction had anything to do with maintenance.

Re:Questions:

[peterbye]

FAQIR -- Muslim or Hindu monk FAQIRS -- plural of FAQIR QABALA -- body of mystical teachings QADI -- Islamic judge QADIS -- plural of QADI QAID -- a Muslim tribal chief or senior official QAIDS -- plural of QAID QANAT -- gently sloping underground tunnel for irrigation QANATS -- plural of QANAT QAT -- leaf of the shrub Catha edulis QATS -- plural of QAT QINDAR -- Albanian currency QINDARKA -- plural of QINDAR QINDARS -- plural of QINDAR QINTAR -- Albanian currency QINTARS -- plural of QINTAR QOPH -- 19th letter of the Hebrew alphabet QOPHS -- plural of QOPH QWERTY -- the traditional configuration of computer keyboard keys QWERTYS -- plural of QWERTY SHEQEL -- any of several ancient units of weight SHEQELIM -- plural of SHEQEL TRANQ -- sedative TRANQS -- plural of TRANQ

Re:Questions:

[Viol8]

I happen to know someone who worked at Airbus in the 90s. Lets just say the early software had a few bugs that needed to be ironed out. But of course its far easier to blame the pilot in a rigged trial than ruin a large proportion of the european aircraft manufacturing industry.

Re:Questions:

[meringuoid]

I happen to know someone who worked at Airbus in the 90s. Lets just say the early software had a few bugs that needed to be ironed out. But of course its far easier to blame the pilot in a rigged trial than ruin a large proportion of the european aircraft manufacturing industry.

So you couldn't find a link that supported you, instead included one that contradicted you, and now we get anecdote and conspiracy theory? Sorry, but file me under 'unconvinced'.

Re:Questions:

[bitrex]

Qantas never crashed. But you've got to go to Melbourne to get the plane that flies from Cincinnati to Los Angeles.

Re:Questions:

[Richard_at_work]

The problem is, none of the evidence supports you at all - even the first officer on that flight didn't back up the pilots version of events.

Put simply - there have been 3,572 A320s built to date and continues to be one of the fastest selling passenger jets of all time, if there was a problem with their control system then where is the evidence? Where is the lack of confidence? Where is the customer doubt?

Also, the fact that Airbus has taken on other significant Airworthiness Directives without an issue casts extreme doubt on your conspiracy theory.

Re:Questions:

[Anonymous Coward]

It makes sense if the box was designed for fighter jets.

or it could be a noisy power supply rail to the sensor caused by dried out cold, depressurised capacitors that test good at ground level.
Or the programmer was lazy. This has happened on rockets and launch vehicles before, as well as sign overflow, and instant velocity, not instant average velocity etc.

As a guess, the designer probably allowed for a mid-air collission or explosion, and wanted to pilot to retain full control. The fix is firmware that is smart enough to suspect sensor could be on the fritz, and do some back of envelope calculations more appropriate for a passenger plane. Note corrections were not destructive to the airframe, just passenger unfriendly.

Re:Questions:

[nutshell42]

A global alert was issued in 2005 after a Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777 en-route to Kuala Lumpur from Perth experienced similar problems.

Investigators found a software glitch in a unit made by the same US manufacturer as the one in the Qantas plane combined with a mechanical problem.

Source

Re:Questions:

[u38cg]

No. They will have a chain of delegated responsibility from the board to the contractor. The blame will lie with whoever "didn't tell them about it" (ie kept their mouths shut because they'd lose the contract).

Re:Questions:

[MRe_nl]

Qantas never crashed:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kJZQkslDBjM

Re:Questions:

[Viol8]

This crash was in 1988. Don't you think they might have fixed that bug by now?

Re:Questions:

[Viol8]

Yeah , because there'll be confidential files lying around that you can google for and disprove an entire trial.

Re:Questions:

[Anonymous Coward]

It Looks like the aircraft has gone into a stall.
A)bort R)etry I)gnore

Re:Questions:

[Richard_at_work]

If the Habsheim crash was caused by a fault in the flight control system, there would still be a lack of confidence in the new system - there isn't, its one of the fastest selling aircraft of all time and all manufacturers are now using similar systems.

Re:Questions:

[PhilJC]

In the UK they could be prosecuted under the Corporate Manslaughter Act and potentially have their director's jailed. As for Australian law I aint got a clue..

Re:Questions:

[PhilJC]

You obviously don't play Scrabble much. Qi is my saviour!

Re:Questions:

[Lars T.]

This crash was in 1988. Don't you think they might have fixed that bug by now?

So why did you bring it up now? Anyway: Lauda Air Flight 004 - Boeing 767-3Z9ER, all 223 on board dead, in flight thrust reverser deployment due to a bug in the new electronic system.

Re:Questions:

[Anonymous Coward]

Qantas HAS an excellent reputation for safety, and that is not history now. Qantas trick is not great maintenance or safety procedures, but to carry a live wallaby on plane flight.
Everybody knows that wallabies are so cute that even God (or Satan for the matter) can't kill them.

Re:Questions:

[Anonymous Coward]

ADIRU ... single, fault tolerant ... fault tree analysis

So, what you're saying is that the Internet did it.

Re:Questions:

[Anonymous Coward]

See corporate manslaughter.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corporate_manslaughter

Re:Questions:

[ThosLives]

This exactly. Either there is some hidden common-cause failure* in the ADIRUs that was missed in development (bad), or someone did not really perform hazard analysis/FTA/FMEA (bad), or this was a multiple-point failure (against which it is usually impossible to engineer).

In any event, it sounds most likely that the system architects made some assumptions that were incorrect, resulting in the use of invalid data. One philosophy that should be used in critical controls is "if you don't trust your inputs, don't use them." This means that you *must* have a contingency for missing required parameters. In this example, angle of attack is either a) absolutely critical for flight which means that you must guarantee redundancy or b) it is not absolutely critical so if that input is missing or suspect, you just stop controlling off it.

The other way to look at this is to compare the failure rate of these devices to the expected failure rate: how many million flight hours have been logged? Yes this is one failure and it resulted in some injuries, but if the failure rate is one in 10 million flight hours, is that acceptable? Or do we expect to increase the cost of developing aircraft an order of magnitude just to increase that failure rate to one in 20 million hours? Like all things, flying is about economic, social, and engineering tradeoffs. No form of travel will ever be "failure free", and while we need to ensure diligence, if we do see failures at very low rates we should be reasonable about it. (Of course, I would personally include "failure to use seatbelts" as part of the failure in this particular instance, but I'm ornery.)

* With three independent devices, if they all have the same software then they are not really independent - there is a potential common failure mode in the software in that instance.

Re:Questions:

[Robin47]

Iraq

Re:Questions:

[Goldenhawk]

The actual story turns out to be a lot more complicated than that. There is some evidence that Airbus didn't adequately warn pilots about two known problems: refusal of the engines to accelerate upon command, and an altimeter misreading problem (see http://www.airdisaster.com/investigations/af296/af296.shtml for info).

What actually happened (the true data from the crash) may never be known, because there was an apparent attempt by Airbus to cover up the true cause, by faking the flight recorder data (see http://www.crashdehabsheim.net/CRenglish%20phot.pdf for info). I'm not generally a conspiracy theorist, but in this case there is a LOT of evidence that Airbus and many officials hid the truth, to protect the state-run company from the proper blame.

Aside from the controversy, it is widely accepted in the aviation community (my job, by the way) that the COMPUTER was the cause of the problems, not the engines or sensors.

Since that accident, I have heard of several other Airbus accidents related to flight control computer "fly-by-wire" anomalies, and a number of pilots with whom I work refuse to fly on any Airbus aircraft for this reason. It's not the fly-by-wire thing that bothers them - it's the Airbus way of doing things.

Re:Questions:

[Zebra_X]

It might be a maintenance problem yet... was the part replaced at the proper time?

And of course, why is there not a redundant one?

Re:Questions:

[SoupIsGoodFood_42]

You do know that mechanics can also fail, right? From everything I've read on PPRuNe, Airbus is just as safe as Boeing, and it's only the uninformed people who don't really know what they are talking about who actually think that Airbus or Boeing are different enough in this area to justify not flying in one verse the other.

Re:Questions:

[T-Bone-T]

Those aren't English words and qwerty isn't even a word.

Re:Questions:

[schmidty-au]

Murder requires intent, which isn't there. QANTAS did not move maintenance offshore with the intention of killing its customers and staff. I'm uncertain of what the criminal liability would be -- manslaughter could perhaps be made out (I'm not sure you could even prove recklessness though), and there may be specific Commonwealth (federal) legislation that covers aviation accidents. QANTAS could be sued in negligence. I seem to recall reading on every paper airline ticket, though, that there are international treaties that limit the liability of airlines where crashes are concerned. I don't know if these treaties have been implemented as legislation in Australia. The airline would certainly be subject to the Australian Commonwealth jurisdiction. It would also be subject to the jurisdiction in which the hypothetical crash occurred.

Re:Questions:

[bpjk]

So is it pronounced like "Kwantas" or like "Kantas"?

Re:Questions:

[Jeff DeMaagd]

I'm not going to blame Airbus or their quality control yet. These investigations need to finish.

Personally, I'm more of a fan of Boeing's craft, but last I looked, maybe a year ago, Airbus has a similar safety record as Boeing on a per-passenger-mile bases. Maybe my memory is off, but both were about one death per 12 million passenger miles. I actually have a friend that's oddly afraid of Airbus craft (but not Boeing, despite similar records), and for some reason, is not afraid of driving, I think automobiles are about 10x more dangerous.

Re:Questions:

[MightyYar]

Plus they're more comfortable and I just trust European engineering more...

Well, you can't escape us reckless Yanks... this problem was caused by an American computer :)

Re:Questions:

[jefu]

FAQ Is this recognized as a word yet? I'm sure English language scrabble players are all looking forward to that day.

Re:Questions:

[zippthorne]

So.. Is it pronounced, "Kwan tus" or "Can't us"

Re:Questions:

[zolaar]

I believe it's pronounced "KROY-kee"

Re:Questions:

[TheSpoom]

That's an acronym, not a word.

Frequently Asked Questions.

Re:Questions:

[Anonymous Coward]

OK, I need someone better at logic/comprehension/something than myself.

If I push a knife through someone's chest, I can argue until the cows come home that my "intent" was merely to push a knife through a chest, but since there is a high probability that the consequence is death and I know it, that's pretty much murder. The death doesn't happen immediately as I decide it to - things must happen without my involvement, like blood escaping, that actually puts the body in a condition that makes it unable to maintain life. I am a murderer because I do something that makes death very likely, even if my "final aim" (thought crime), as it were, was not to end a life.

Similarly, if I make dangerous cost cuts, I'm doing something resulting in a high probability that the consequence is death, and I know it. Again, no death happens directly because I decide it - it happens because I do something that makes death very likely. So I am a murderer.

Lesser charges are, in my mind, for decisions which are not reasonably to be known to create a high probability of death.

Flaw is where?

Re:Questions:

[Anonymous Coward]

Well, look at who's got a Scrabble dictionary!

Re:Questions:

[fuzzyfuzzyfungus]

Murder would likely be very tricky, in terms of proving the necessary mens rea, unless you come across a cache of emails between high level Qantas people, mirthfully discussing how many people are going to die thanks to the new procedures. Manslaughter, on account of gross negligence, might well be a possibility, though.

Incidentally, I've heard of this type of question coming up with respect to some fatal industrial mishaps. In the US, penalties specifically for dangerous workplace conditions tend to hover somewhere between "impressively tepid" and "downright pitiful", so there have been cases where they attempt to prosecute directly for murder or manslaughter, rather than occupational health offences.

Re:Questions:

[oliderid]

Airbust QA sucks, sadly. They differ highly with how Boeing does things; they rely on computers *way* too much, which is why I will never fly on an Airbus a/c. The pilot is not given #1 priority in the cockpit.

I guess you won't ever fly a Boeing 787 either http://www.avtoday.com/av/categories/commercial/11668.html

Re:Questions:

[hughk]

A formere colleague worked on the A320. His concern was not the software as such (multiple programs across multiple architectures) but the fact that sensors can lie and under certain circumstances multiple sensors may present the same, incorrect view of the world giving issues to the flight control computers.

Re:Questions:

[Achromatic1978]

Kwan/Quan - tas.

Re:Questions:

[Anonymous Coward]

(p.s. Parent modded 0; -1 overrated. How?)

Why is this confusing?
If article started at 1 and had 1 point removed (overated) it would be "modded 0".

Re:Questions:

[NeMon'ess]

Thank you. Those possibilities answer my question of why didn't the software treat the sensor data as unreliable, given the data was apparently sudden and far out of line with the previous readings.

Or maybe that still needs to be programmed now that this incident has happened.

Re:Questions:

[dangitman]

Yeah, you'd think so, but that stupid "story" about the passenger's computer spread like wildfire across the media, without many seriously questioning it. It was like a game of "Chinese whispers."

Re:Questions:

[Anonymous Coward]

Queer and nasty, try another service.

Re:Questions:

[Anonymous Coward]

There was an aviation expert explaining the control system on Australian TV the other day.
From his description the 3 ADIRUs do not form a 2 out of 3 redundancy system. It sounded like they are 3 separate units with 2 being backups. He explained the procedure to deal with this issue is to turn the first one off and then use the second. If that fails then turn the 2nd one off and use the 3rd.
As an engineer who has worked with control systems I was surprised with the explanation as that sure as hell isn't "redundant" in my books.

Re:Questions:

[Anonymous Coward]

most likely all 3 ADIRUs went bad because they all had the same flaw in their design

Re:Questions:

[Anonymous Coward]

Since that accident, I have heard of several other Airbus accidents related to flight control computer "fly-by-wire" anomalies, and a number of pilots with whom I work refuse to fly on any Airbus aircraft for this reason. It's not the fly-by-wire thing that bothers them - it's the Airbus way of doing things.

Is that really the case? Or is it some oldfashioned thinking by older pilots? I remember how an A320 FO that posted regularly on the airdisaster.com forums said that pilots usually consider it "the perfect flight instructor" - the computer intervenes only they make a mistake and saves the day. In particular the stall prevention - if you suddenly must ascend you can just pull the stick back as far as it goes and the computer does the math and you don't need to check airspeed. Besides, shouldn't the same pilots refuse to fly the 777 since its fly-by-wire is digital (i.e. there is software processing the input and thus bugs could be present unlike the analog FBW in the Concorde).

Anyway, it's interesting if this turns out to be a computer + sensor flaw since then it would mean that yet another Airbus measure of preventing similar accidents as have happened to Boeing before, turns out to cause one. I remember that Airbus have designed their aircraft to have sensors detecting when the aircraft has touched down to prevent thrust reversers from being deployed too early and then at least one runway overshoot has happened because the sensors failed. That measure was a response to the Boeing 767 that was torn apart mid-air because one thrust reverser deployed all of a sudden. Someone airdisaster.com said that Airbus should install "I'm on the ground dammit!" buttons.

Re:Questions:

[geekoid]

"Does Qantas' aircraft maintenance suck or does Airbus' quality control suck? Do both suck?"

That is a good question,and kudos to you for seperating out the manufactures from the maintainer. Most people just blame the manufacture, even the the manufactures
A) DOesn't do maintenace, normally.
B) Doesn't build or select the engine. They will recommend, and test engines, but the buyer makes the final decision.

 

Re:Questions:

[jabithew]

Because without mods, nobody had rated it and it couldn't be overrated. Instead it should have been moderated with a real reason (e.g. Flamebait, as it is now, though I'm still not sure I see it).

well duh

[Brain Damaged Bogan]

...but don't expect the airlines to care about the facts when they decide to stop letting you use electronic devices on their flights. Common sense didn't get in the way of them banning nailclippers, shaving razors, liquids and many other innocuous day-to-day items.

Re:well duh

[cheater512]

The airlines dont ban those items.

Re:well duh

[Brain Damaged Bogan]

yeah, my tinfoil hat is particularly tight today. but they do ban some silly things, like safety scissors, and liquids in containers less than 500ml have to be checked and sealed in a small plastic bag by security, when if you really want a weapon it's easiest to make a shiv out of the plastic knives they give you or hide a small capsule of lighter fluid up your arse.

Re:well duh

[sumdumass]

I think you missed his point. It isn't the airlines that banned those things, it is unrelated but authoritative departments of government which did.

The blame for what you mention rest with agencies other then the airlines.

Re:well duh

[Anonymous Coward]

The airlines still don't ban those items.

It's the authorities controlling aviation in your country. In the USA this is split between TSA banning stuff for "security" (nail clippers) and FAA banning stuff for "safety" (personal electronics)

You're blaming the messager

Re:well duh

[Anonymous Coward]

Could you supply a link to where a recognised chemist explains how it would be unthinkable for a liquid bomb to work? There's been BBC reports on how people who made suicide tapes had prepared liquid bombs, and the BBC does not very often (only occasionally) get things completely wrong. I'm curious.

Re:well duh

[RichiH]

> It isn't the airlines that banned those things, it is unrelated but authoritative departments of government which did.

With considerable pressure of the airlines to keep cell-phones banned. Both because they want you to shell out for the in-flight system and because studies show that the majority of people would prefer not having some random guy babbling about his ulcer treatment during their flight to $expensive_location.

Re:well duh

[Kirth Gersen]

Brain Damaged Bogan:

Common sense didn't get in the way of them banning nailclippers...

It just occurred to me that I have used nail clippers to strip the insulation off wires for nearly fifty years. Perhaps the nail clippers were banned out of fear not of some sort of Ninja assassin technique, but of Osama ben Gyver.

Re:well duh

[Anonymous Coward]

I think YOU miss the point. BIG GOVERNMENT (tm) is the culprit. If only we had a conservative president instead of this tax and spend liberal from Connecticut with his elite Yale connections, we wouldn't have the creation of new, useless agencies like TSA and the bloating of existing agencies like the FAA.

Wait, what? Oh. Nevermind.

Re:well duh

[sumdumass]

You know, I have heard that the Airlines do that but I have never seen anything authoritative on it. It seems to be mostly conjecture and innuendos or cynical guesses by people attempting to reason why they are denied their cell phones. Maybe I missed the story that showed the proof on that, I could be wrong on.

I can see and understand those reasons offered being possibly valid which is probably the reason why they stick around so much. But I doubt any Airline would have actually admitted to those reasons outside of some uninformed working attempting his hand at reasoning why too. As for the well meaning but uninformed worker, well, I have had first hand experience with them. We used to carry a line of ISA pre-processing cards for a local factory's production line when I had my computer store open (they used a desktop computer to control line speeds and to push the cad files into the product machines). They were identical with the exception of software that was created by different sources and you could theoretically flash the units with either software for the role they took in the line. An employee of mine made the claim of better and worse quality parts being used as the reasoning between the more expensive and less expensive ones (there were two). The differences was the cost of the software where the CMOS on one was setup to control different types of motors and some idiot at the factory couldn't read their own specs, purchased the wrong ones, and I ate the replacement cost because he (on the advice of an ambitious tech who wasn't qualified to service the units) thought the better quality cards would last longer. I can go on about it was all my fault, how I should have been charged with down time or how the factory's tech should have just called us like the contract said instead of thinking that because he watched someone else fix it, he knew how to know (we sent techs to be trained by the systems control manufacturer) and so one, but I guess I'm running to far off topic now. I would still like to see something authoritative on it where that was the reasoning officially stated by some airline.

Re:well duh

[RichiH]

> Maybe I missed the story that showed the proof on that, I could be wrong on.

I don't have any proof myself, but I read several stories about this. Both online and in print.

Re:well duh

[BLKMGK]

Cell phones aren't banned either.

Maybe they should have...

[Anonymous Coward]

...tried turning it off and then on again.

Re:Maybe they should have...

[Anonymous Coward]

...tried turning it off and then on again.

Blue Sky of Death?

I know, ouch. X/

Re:Maybe they should have...

[Anonymous Coward]

That's what they did.

Been there, done that

[QuantumG]

put the jet into a 197-meter nosedive.

I've been in nose dives before.. it's awesome fun. Everyone is screaming and the assholes who refuse to keep their seatbelt fastened while seated quickly learn the *reason* why they request you to do this.

People pay good money for this experience, and with a little malfunction or two they give it to you for free. When you throw in the fact that you could very well be experiencing the last few minutes of your short pathetic little life - you can't get a better adrenaline rush.

Re:Been there, done that

[Splab]

I was thinking the same, "that will teach them to buckle up".

I do feel bad for those buckled in who got hit by the assholes flying through the cabin though. Also for the poor smuck on the toilet.

Re:Been there, done that

[BlackSabbath]

Dude! If only there were a "+1, Flamebait" ;-)

Re:Been there, done that

[_Hellfire_]

Also for the poor smuck on the toilet.

He must have been shitting himself...

Re:Been there, done that

[Anonymous Coward]

Cheapest way to experience zero G? Go along to your nearest glider/sailplane club and have a trial lesson. If you ask nicely, some of instructors will give you an aerobatic flight (loops, wing-overs, stalls, but not spins).

If the cable breaks during a winch launch, at a couple of hundred feet, you go zero g in order to recover. The motto is that if the mud (on the floor) floats around your face then you got it about right, whereas if it plasters itself on the canopy then you were too enthusiastic.

Before you go solo (which you can do at age 16/15/14 depending on where you live) you have to be able to repeatedly demonstrate that you can recover from cable breaks and also from a spin started at 1000ft in which you are descending at 100ft/s.

Not an experience you will forget.

Re:Been there, done that

[syousef]

He must have been shitting himself...

New meaning to the term prairie doggin'

Re:Been there, done that

[MichaelSmith]

put the jet into a 197-meter nosedive.

the assholes who refuse to keep their seatbelt fastened while seated quickly

Actually I think a lot of the people who got hurt in this case were either in or waiting for the toilet. One could ask why the toilet doesn't have seat belts and why you have to stand to queue for the loo.

Re:Been there, done that

[sych]

Yeah! Toilet-seat-belts and an electronic reservation system on the passenger entertainment units... and magnetic shoes too keep you on the floor while you walk to the loo!

Problem solved!

Re:Been there, done that

[TheLink]

Cheaper way to experience zero G:

Jump and fall...

Wheeee :).

Careful about the landing bit.

Re:Been there, done that

[daveime]

The fact that you are falling means NOT zero G you lemon.

G = Gravity ?

Sorry that the facts got in the way of your (almost) funny post.

Re:Been there, done that

[e2d2]

Astronauts in orbit are falling also but yet experiencing what is commonly referred to as "zero-G".

Sorry to get in the way of your.. whatever

Re:Been there, done that

[EvilDrMike]

No it's the poor sod that has to clean the toilet that I feel sorry for.

EDM

Re:Been there, done that

[marcosdumay]

"The fact that you are falling means NOT zero G you lemon."

On what reference frame?

Re:Been there, done that

[smellsofbikes]

This is not as cheap an experience, but a cautionary tale for any other pilots out there:
Don't put your dog in the back seat, like you do in your car. DO put your dog in a pet carrier and then *belt* that carrier to the seat.

Because there are very few things worse than hitting *actual* severe turbulence. Not that wussy stuff the airliners call severe turbulence: I'm talking the FAA definition. "Occupants are forced violently against seat belts or shoulder straps. Unsecured objects are tossed about. Food Service and walking are impossible." That part about 'unsecured objects'? That's the dog. Being tossed about. While airsick. While violently unhappy about the experience.

Re:Been there, done that

[daveime]

What astronauts experience in space isn't really zero-gravity ... it's called microgravity, and is about 0.001 x the gravity found on earth.

So yes, "zero gravity" isn't really, and thus they do experience "falling" ever so slightly.

And in any case, no matter how look you check the GP, you will not find ANY reference of the words "space" OR "astronaut" ... they were only added in a wiping-egg-off-face exercise to my reply, which is still valid.

Re:Been there, done that

[Anonymous Coward]

The few things probably include hitting the ground/mountain or body of water... That usually upsets most people's[1] travelling schedule a bit.

[1] Except for those who were intentionally planning that particular trip.

Re:Been there, done that

[geekoid]

You know what the eeriest thing is.
That moment of silence between the "something is wrong gasp and the terrifying screams"

Re:Been there, done that

[MemoryAid]

That's argot, not lemon.

Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[Dutch Gun]

...until you get all the bugs worked out of those systems. And unfortunately, lessons of these kinds are often paid in tragedy. These passengers should consider themselves lucky that the pilots reacted so quickly.

Not trying to be too flippant, as I can scarcely imagine the complexity of trying to create what essentially needs to be an infallible system in such a complex problem space. As a programmer, thinking about putting my life in the hands of a computer program scares the living hell out of me. The whole issue is that computers, by and large, lack "common sense", and are prone to accept garbage input without question.

Apparently, this was caused by "a malfunctioning computer". Isn't there sort of redundancy check on anything that could cause the computer to send the plane plummeting toward the earth? One faulty computer can cause this? I'm sure the article is over-simplifying the problem, but still...

Re:Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[Cochonou]

A faulty computer system can result from a software bug (e.g. Ariane 5 first flight), or from an hardware malfunction/maintenance issue. It is not yet clear what the nature of the problem was.

Re:Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[Rakishi]

Pilots aren't infallible and make mistakes often enough. In other words a computer system doesn't need to be perfect to be better than what it's "replacing."

Re:Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[Anonymous Coward]

The main point here is that the computer was doing the SAFE thing, in response to the inputs it was given. Why it did not have redundant inputs in this case will remain to be seen, but nevertheless.

The accident statistics of fly-by-wire planes can be looked up, and they're not very different from other planes.

That being said, there's been some controversy over the methodology used to develop the Airbus flight control systems, so if you're very paranoid you might want to stick with Boeing (n-version programming at Airbus vs. 1-version with more verification at Boeing).

Re:Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[AJWM]

Strictly speaking, the Ariane 5 first flight mishap was a specification bug, not a coding bug, so it depends on your definition as to whether it was really a "software" bug. (Even more strictly speaking, it was a procedures bug: they left running an inertial measurement unit that wasn't needed after launch (it provided ground reference for the nav system while on the pad). They'd done this on Ariane 4 but the 4's flight profile didn't take the unit out of limits the way 5's did.)

Re:Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[jamesh]

Thanks, I'll pass on that flight ... until you get all the bugs worked out of those systems

It's interesting the way people rationalize things isn't it?

Statistically, you are far more likely to die in a car on the way to work than you are in a commercial passenger aircraft. Statistically, the computer system in a commercial passenger aircraft is far less likely to fsck things up than a human pilot (although that's saying nothing about the _size_ of the fsckup, should one occur...)

I drive around 600km a week in my car. A lot of that is spent at 110km/hour on a freeway, and at 100km/hour along some reasonably windy and hilly roads. I often think about the ways that such an activity could end rather badly for me, but it doesn't worry me greatly.

In about a week though I'm going to be getting onto an airplane for the first time in about 28 years, and the thought of it has me a little nervous - far more so than driving a car which is, statistically speaking, far more dangerous.

A car crash here in Australia will often make the news, possibly only locally unless more than a few people lost their lives. A plane crash of any reasonable size will make the news world wide, and will probably continue to do so for weeks after the event. The Quantas Airbus 'mishap' didn't kill anyone, and the majority of the passengers have probably mostly healed whatever injuries they did sustain by now, and yet here in Australia the incident still makes the news daily. The logical part of your brain should tell you that that is a comforting thing - it's so unusual that it is still newsworthy a week later. The less logical parts of your brain though are constantly reminded that while safe, air travel is not 100% safe.

For me I think the difference is the time I will have to contemplate things should something go wrong. In a car, the time between the realization of error (mine or someone elses) and things ending badly is going to be measured in seconds. In an airplane, the time between when I realize that things are not as they should be and the time when I won't be thinking anymore could be measured in minutes. That is a pretty chilling thought for me...

Re:Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[Viol8]

Sometimes people rationalise things correctly. I've been in 4 car crashes in my life , 2 were my fault, 2 weren't. I'm still here uninjured to write about them. What are the chances I'd still be alive if I'd been involved in 4 plane crashes? Pretty damn close to zero I'd say.

Re:Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[Anonymous Coward]

I don't think fly-by-wire means what you think it means. Fly-by-wire describes a system where the pilots commands are transmitted by wire to the hydraulic systems in the wing and tail. This is opposed to a system where the hydraulics run all the way to the pilot's yoke and the pilot provides the force necessary to move the flight controls. Although fly-by-wire aircraft may be computer controlled, it is neither mandatory or implied that this is the case. Much like how drive-by-wire cars with electronic throttles and steering would not be considered to be computer controlled by most people.

Re:Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[Anonymous Coward]

Actually the statistics are that only 1 in 8 incidents classified as crashes are fatal, and that if you took a flight every day it would take an average of 250(ish) years before you were involved in such an incident.

Re:Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[RAMMS EIN]

Interesting. I've always thought that "fly-by-wire" meant that the controls and the steering of the aircraft were essentially decoupled: you use the controls to "tell" the computer how you want to fly, and the computer then flies the plane for you. The "wire" in this case refers to a virtual wire the plane flies along. For extra clarification: some fighter planes are so unstable that they need constant adjustment. A fly-by-wire system would then allow the pilot to steer smoothly, while the computer made all the micro-adjustments necessary to actually keep the plane on the expected course.

Re:Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[RAMMS EIN]

I think (but I haven't actually looked at the numbers) that a lot of today's aircraft incidents and accidents are caused by the pilot and the computer having different ideas about what to do. For example, a pilot trying to land a plane while the computer has decided to abort the landing.

Re:Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[couchslug]

As an aircraft mechanic, the idea of fly-by-wire controls doesn't bother me. Aircraft are IMO acceptably safe, although dramalicious and mediagenic when they do crash. Shit happens.

There are lots of stuffs to worry about (like my commute to work on a highway full of retards in a few minutes) but I sleep like a log when flying.

Re:Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[Anonymous Coward]

> The main point here is that the computer was doing the SAFE thing, in response to the inputs it was given.

Actually it was the safe thing to do anyway. While it makes the news, a nose-dive at that altitude has little risks, even more so compared to a stall, thus it is not really a unreasonable "fallback" procedure as long as you are _really_ sure you are high up and no other planes below.

Re:Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[MichaelSmith]

Or a configuration bug because the module which wrote diagnostic information to a data channel should have been set not to generate diagnostics at all.

Re:Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[MichaelSmith]

Some times normal cable actuated controls fail in strange ways too.

Re:Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[jamesh]

Sometimes people rationalise things correctly. I've been in 4 car crashes in my life , 2 were my fault, 2 weren't. I'm still here uninjured to write about them. What are the chances I'd still be alive if I'd been involved in 4 plane crashes? Pretty damn close to zero I'd say.

I don't think your use of 'chance' is really correct. But to follow on with your logic... I don't know the numbers in your case, but lets say you've been in a car one million times, and you've been in a plane once. We know you have had 4 car accidents and zero plan accidents. 0.0004% of your car trips have ended in a crash, while 0% of your plane trips have ended in a crash. Based on those statistics, which one would you choose?

The problem is that you neglected to take into account the likelihood of an accident occurring, but rather focused on the outcome of the accident, should it have occurred. Even in the case of TFA nobody was killed - several people were badly injured, but most were uninjured.

According to this site:

Your chances of being involved in an aircraft accident are about 1 in 11 million. On the other hand, your chances of being killed in an automobile accident are 1 in 5000. Statistically, you are at far greater risk driving to the airport than getting on an airplane. However, the perception is that you have more control over your fate when you are in your car than as a passenger traveling on an airplane. Experience shows otherwise, considering that over 50,000 people are killed on the highways every year.

Re:Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[daveime]

Lies, bloody lies and statistics, again ...

Instead of focussing on the likelihood and relative risk of DYING in a car or plane, does anyone have statistics on the relative chance of SURVIVING a crash in either of those modes of transports.

I'd take a car over a plane anyday ... in a car crash you do have some element of control over your fate ... in a plane plummeting from 37,000 feet down to 0 feet, you are fucked 99.9999% of the time.

Re:Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[highways]

It's rare that a single factor causes a mishap in a "high reliability system" such as aviation and nuclear power. Analysis generally shows there are at least 7 factors ("latent conditions") that are present before bring down the system.

Take a hypothetical incident of "pilot error". OK, the pilot stuffed up. But why? Was his training inadequate? Was there a change in schedule that delayed the flight and hence he was more fatigued? Was there a risk-taking culture where management turned a blind eye?

When these individually harmless factors all combine in an unpredictable manner, accidents can occur. The systems are so defensively designed that almost all errors are predicted, both technical and human. Almost.

This accident model is generally known as the Reason Model or the Swiss Cheese model (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swiss_Cheese_model) and is widely accepted by accident investigators. In investigating every nook and cranny, all these causal factors are usually identified and hopefully mitigated in the future.

That's why the final report can take months or even years to produce. The preliminary report is often a distraction to keep the media at bay while the real reasons are sorted out.

For a good example of this process, take a look at the Air New Zealand crash in Antarctica (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_New_Zealand_Flight_901) - a progression from the original accident report though to a royal commission.

Re:Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[highways]

Actually, many large aircraft that hit the dirt are perfectly airworthy, but the crew have completely lost where they are - they may be in cloud or otherwise have lost their situational awareness.

It has been said that about 1/3 of major accidents are "controlled flight into terrain" - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CFIT

Re:Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[tomRakewell]

In an airplane, the time between when I realize that things are not as they should be and the time when I won't be thinking anymore could be measured in minutes. That is a pretty chilling thought for me...

Don't worry! Most of the time, you never know what hit you in an airplane catastrophe. If the aircraft breaks up at 35,000 feet (as a result of a mid-air collision, fuel tank explosion, terrorist attack, etc.), you're none the wiser. You'll probably be killed by flying debris within a second, and if you survive the break-up, you'll have the oxygen boil out of your blood a few seconds after that.

Much more frequently, you'll hit a mountain while flying in zero visibility. Zero seconds to worry.

A large portion of accidents occur when the plane lands. Tail or wing strike, skidding off the runway, etc. These calamities are likely to occur even more rapidly than a car crash. You probably won't be able to complete the sentence "Oh shi----!"

Or maybe your plane is overweight and can't get enough power to take-off properly. In this case, you've got 20 seconds max to contemplate your fate. And it will probably take you 10 seconds realize that it is really happening. "Why is it taking so long to take off? Is the plane really flipping upside down? Is this REALLY happening?? Oh, oh, yes, it is..."

Being in a plane that plummets to the ground for a minute or two isn't that likely. When seated on your flight, you should really be aware that your life could be snuffed out without warning at any minute.

Re:Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[Free the Cowards]

Talk about broken reasoning! The fact that car crashes are more survivable does not outweigh the fact that they are vastly more common and therefore your chances of dying in one are vastly greater.

Your chance of a fatal car accident on a trip of any given length is ten times greater than your chance of a fatal airplane accident on the same trip. The fact that you'd probably be dead after 4 plane crashes is irrelevant, because you wouldn't have had 4 plane crashes.

Re:Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[mdielmann]

Thanks, I'll pass on that flight ... until you get all the bugs worked out of those systems

It's interesting the way people rationalize things isn't it?

Statistically, you are far more likely to die in a car on the way to work than you are in a commercial passenger aircraft. Statistically, the computer system in a commercial passenger aircraft is far less likely to fsck things up than a human pilot (although that's saying nothing about the _size_ of the fsckup, should one occur...)

So, how many chambers does your revolver need before you're okay with playing russian roulette?
The issue is the unknown more than anything else. I'm pretty ambivalent about flying in airplanes, even small private craft. But I'm not too happy with the idea of flying in an airplane which is suffering from random errors of unknown frequency. And despite the relatively few number of cases heard, we don't know the true frequency. How do we know the problem isn't caused by degradation, which means every flight has more risk than the one before it?
At least when I get in my car, I have a fair idea of the risks involved (although I may miscalculate those risks), and have some chance of averting or minimizing mishaps.

Re:Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[horli]

Whether car driving is more dangerous than flying depends on the statistic you are applying. If you compare 1 km car driving with 1 km flying, the car is more dangerous. But if you compare 1 hour of car driving against 1 hour flying than suddenly flying is the most dangerous transportation.

Re:Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[Anonymous Coward]

Statistically, you are far more likely to die in a car on the way to work than you are in a commercial passenger aircraft.

Similarly, the people who take separate flights "so the children won't lose both parents if there's a crash", but who still drive twenty miles on the freeway to the airport -- together in the family car.

Re:Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[evilviper]

Most of the time, you never know what hit you in an airplane catastrophe.

I'm not sure what scenario is most common. But I know there have been several incidents where the passengers and crew have had MINUTES of spiraling out of control as the jet falls from altitude, before hitting the ground. eg. Alaska Airlines Flight 261, after several minutes of difficulty controlling the aircraft, completely inverted and dived at full speed for 81 seconds before impact.

Enjoy your trip!

Re:Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[evilviper]

Statistically, you are far more likely to die in a car on the way to work than you are in a commercial passenger aircraft.

That's the thing about crash statistics... They don't consider individual cases.

If you're not drunk, or a teenager who just got a license, you're much less likely to be killed in a car accident. If you're driving during daylight hours, near the speed limit, not talking on a cell phone, etc., etc., your odds go down much more.

Cars are really a terrible comparison, because YOU control your odds of being killed. Not so with any form of mass transit. Airlines should properly be contrasted with other forms of mass transit, like trains and buses, rather than cars (or bicycles, or walking, et al.).

And it's a poor comparison anyhow, because the distances traveled in airliners greatly outstrips that of cars. You wouldn't compare the per-mile accident statistics of walking with commercial flights, though I bet, per mile, you'll see far more deaths from walking... That doesn't mean there's any chance of being killed by walking to your fridge (heart attacks and other underlying medical conditions that could kill you during any activities not withstanding).

Re:Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[Rakishi]

Why would this matter, it's a worthless measure since the chance of an incident is vastly different between the two.

Re:Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[hifiandrew]

Statically, someone has to be that statistic. To that person, statistics are irrelevant. "In my experience, there's no such thing as luck" -Obi Wan

Re:Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[didroe84]

That doesn't make it worthless as you could use it to weight the chances of being in a plane or car incident. Thus giving you a better measure of the risk, assuming you're a good driver of course :)

Re:Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[NeMon'ess]

Airliners rarely break up from a mid-air collision. Most of the time part of all of a wing or tail is what gets sheared off. Then the plane takes some time depending on altitude to reach the ground. If the elevator is gone, then the pilots try desperately for minutes to fly the plane only on thrust, resulting in a horrible rollercoaster path that ends in vain with the exception of a 2003 Baghdad DHL attempted shootdown incident.

You couch your comfort with the word probably. And you're probably right that in general the fireball will come fast. But not necessarily. Plenty of times people survived the impact, but the aluminum supports holding up the seats will collapse, breaking people's legs and leaving them trapped. Then the fireball erupts through the cabin.

Re:Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[jamesh]

If you're not drunk, or a teenager who just got a license, you're much less likely to be killed in a car accident. ...
Cars are really a terrible comparison, because YOU control your odds of being killed.

In a car you have some control over the odds. But you do in a plane too. You can choose an airline on the basis that they have a good safety record, and not just on price.

But if you think you have 'control', as opposed to a 'small amount of control' of the odds in a car then you are kidding yourself. Good drivers die on the roads too. You may not be a drunk, a teenager who just got a license, or a truck driver who's been driving for 72 hours straight, but there are plenty of others on the road who do fit that criteria, and that's what you don't have control over.

Re:Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[jamesh]

"In my experience, there's no such thing as luck" -Obi Wan

In my experience, there is no such thing as 'the force' either.

Your "someone has to be that statistic" argument is a bit silly. Every time you go for a walk there are numerous ways you could die (fall over, something falls on you from above, get hit by a car, get shot or stabbed by a mugger, etc). Are you going to not do that either just because you "don't want to be that statistic"?

Re:Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[evilviper]

Good drivers die on the roads too. [...] but there are plenty of others on the road who do fit that criteria, and that's what you don't have control over.

Decent drivers die on the roads through no fault of their own. GREAT drivers, however, almost never do. There are things you can't control while driving (like the weather, hidden road debris, etc.), but "other drivers" isn't actually one of them. Your own driving has a HUGE influence on others. Go look up some "defensive driving" techniques.

I can practically guarantee I will never be rear-ended by another vehicle, because of how gradually I decelerate to a stop... ie. the driver behind me has a huge amount of reaction time. If he completely fails to react (drunk, distracted, heart attack, whatever), I'm paying attention, and almost always have a way out (like changing lanes) and in the worst case it's just going to be a 5MPH (net speed) collision, so fatalities are extremely unlikely.

I can also nearly guarantee I will never be side-swiped... Cars have substantial inertia, and it's pretty easy to tell if one is safely slowing to a stop (or close enough that you'll get by before they violate the intersection), or if it's going to be risky to pull out in front of them. You can ALWAYS adjust your speed so you don't cross an intersection at the exact moment cross traffic is pulling up and potentially failing to stop.

Not that I put myself in the category of great drivers at all. I'm pretty good, though, and always improving. This is just stuff anyone can do if they pay attention and focus on driving, rather than most people who just barely following the rules most of the time, and are at the mercy of the road which is so common today.

Re:Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[jamesh]

I can practically guarantee I will never be rear-ended by another vehicle, because of how gradually I decelerate to a stop

I was rear-ended about 10 years ago. I was stopped at a major intersection, and had been stopped for several seconds. In that case there was nowhere to go - I did notice the car coming towards me in the rear view mirror, but there was not time to do any sort of check if I wanted to drive forwards to get out of the way.

I can also nearly guarantee I will never be side-swiped.

The only other accident I was in I was stationary at a pedestrian crossing and a car came around the corner and crushed my front guard. I didn't have any time to react in that case, but had I seen the car coming earlier my options would have been to drive forward and risk hitting pedestrians, or reverse into the car behind me.

A drunk driver can swerve suddenly giving you not enough reaction time to avoid the accident. A driver can overtake over a blind hill and hit you head on with no time to do anything. A kangaroo can be unavoidable (I have pulled up to a complete stop before and still had a collision with a kangaroo - they are truly stupid animals, and can do quite a bit of damage to your car with their own inertial mass).

By driving carefully and paying attention you can certainly go some way to reducing the chance of an accident involving another road user, but I think you have less control over it than you think.

Re:Thanks, I'll pass on that flight...

[geekoid]

It's statistically more likely to happen if you only include vehicles exceeding 400Kph.

Statistics are FUN!

oblig star trek blahblah

[ocularDeathRay]

SOOOOO.... you are saying the inertial dampeners were offline?

Re:oblig star trek blahblah

[Kjella]

SOOOOO.... you are saying the inertial dampeners were offline?

If the inertial dampeners were offline they'd only shake around a bit like on a bumpy road. No need for seat belts - or even seats at all for people along the back row. Which is actually quite realistic really, except the reason they wouldn't need them should be that they're splattered against the hull.

Re:oblig star trek blahblah

[OldManAndTheC]

Yes, but that was only because Kirk told the flight computer that "everything I tell you is a lie, including this". Typical. If I ever see him boarding my plane, I'm switching to Klingon Air.

Not an isolated incident

[Davemania]

This isn't an isolated incident. Although I think the string of technical incidents suffered by Qantas isn't a coincidence either. "A global alert was issued in 2005 after a Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777 en-route to Kuala Lumpur from Perth experienced similar problems. Investigators found a software glitch in a unit made by the same US manufacturer as the one in the Qantas plane combined with a mechanical problem." http://www.australianit.news.com.au/story/0,24897,24499849-15306,00.html

Re:Not an isolated incident

[fatmal]

a Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777 en-route to Kuala Lumpur from Perth experienced similar problems.

And the Qantas flight was also going to Perth? I blame all the iron ore thats still in the ground around Perth!

Re:Not an isolated incident

[Anonymous Coward]

its almost like a new bermuda triangle... both this incident and the 2005 one occurred roughly in the same place... definitely not ballin'

Re:Not an isolated incident

[khing]

I've read that Qantas outsourced the maintenance of their planes to a Malaysian subsidiary of Malaysian Airlines, so chances are both planes were serviced by the same group of people. "Qantas management denies safety standards have been compromised by a decision to outsource aircraft maintenance to Malaysia, but such perceptions are difficult to counter when the incidence of mechanical failures has spiked just at the time when more Qantas aircraft are being sent overseas for routine overhauls coincidence or not."linky

Re:Not an isolated incident

[TimSSG]

I think I found an link talking about the 2005 Boeing 777 incident. http://www.airlinesafety.com/faq/777DataFailure.htm Tim S

Re:Not an isolated incident

[sapphire wyvern]

a Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777 en-route to Kuala Lumpur from Perth experienced similar problems.

And the Qantas flight was also going to Perth? I blame all the iron ore thats still in the ground around Perth!

Obviously the government should take all possible action to have it dug up and removed from the country as fast as possible. Won't somebody think of the children?

Re:Not an isolated incident

[deniable]

China's way ahead of you on that one. China for child safety!

Actually, I think it's the special transmitters we put in at Exmouth. It's part of a state government initiative, "F*** the Tourists." A definite vote getter.

Re:Not an isolated incident

[TheLink]

"I've read that Qantas outsourced the maintenance of their planes to a Malaysian subsidiary of Malaysian Airlines, so chances are both planes were serviced by the same group of people"

Not necessarily:

http://www.news.com.au/couriermail/story/0,23739,24152399-5017323,00.html

http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2008/8/15/nation/20080815171659&sec=nation

As for the 777, the Malaysian pilots were lucky or did a better job of handling the incident - no injuries:

http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2005/AAIR/aair200503722.aspx

Re:Not an isolated incident

[TheLink]

I meant the MAS pilots (who might not be Malaysians at all).

Re:Not an isolated incident

[MichaelSmith]

I know a guy who used to work for Qantas doing maintenance. After the incident with the oxygen tank he drew a picture for me of its position inside the aircraft. It was pretty clear to me that the tank or valve could easily have gone through the centre fuel tank. Funnily enough, there was one instance of that tank blowing up, wasn't there?

Re:Not an isolated incident

[MichaelSmith]

"F*** the Tourists." A definite vote getter.

Not the ugly ones thanks.

Re:Not an isolated incident

[hifiandrew]

An America West Airbus A320 flight I was on had something like this happen, just not as severe. Flying along in smooth air at cruise altitude, we suddenly drop like a rock for 5 seconds. The wing speed breaks deployed. Scariest drop I've ever had on all my time flying. The copilot said it was an "auto pilot adjustment" mmmm humm .....

Re:Not an isolated incident

[aaron alderman]

The common factor is Perth.

Perhaps all that Iron Ore in the Pilbra is messing up the instruments. The new "Bermuda Triangle"?

Re:why fly qantass?

[Divebus]

Unglaublich. Du kanst niemal richtig Rechtschreibung machen. Du Dep. Auber wirklich soll Quntas Boeing flugzueg aussuchen. Sorry for bad Englisch.

Glad it didnt happen ...

[Anonymous Coward]

at an altitude of 196 meter.

Thanks, I'll pass the ground...

[Ostracus]

"Apparently, this was caused by "a malfunctioning computer". Isn't there sort of redundancy check on anything that could cause the computer to send the plane plummeting toward the earth? One faulty computer can cause this? I'm sure the article is over-simplifying the problem, but still..."

Yes. It's called "a pilot". Under some circumstances "plummeting towards the earth" is a legitimate maneuver. Keeping it there too long isn't...unless of course you're stopping a hijacking.

faulty onboard computer system

[alxkit]

was it Elbot of Artificial Solutions? then it wasn't faulty - it was just misunderstood.

os

[flakron]

betcha it was running windows millenium

Re:os

[deniable]

Not likely. How did it take off in the first place?

Re:os

[flakron]

that's a mystery

"caused the autopilot to disconnect"

[distantbody]

So the autopilot ...jumped?

Re:"caused the autopilot to disconnect"

[MichaelSmith]

So the autopilot ...jumped?

Needed to be blown up again.

Let's all fly Qantas, then

[jonaskoelker]

As we all know, Qantas never crashed. Def-definitely never crashed.

Re:Let's all fly Qantas, then

[Fzz]

This was definitely not a crash. No, definitely not, really. Honest. Accidentally parking a 747 on a golf course could happen to anyone, and in no way constitutes a crash.

Re:Let's all fly Qantas, then

[evilviper]

As we all know, Qantas never crashed. Def-definitely never crashed.

Not actually true, there just haven't been any since 1951:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qantas#Airline_incidents

Southwest Airlines and America West Airlines (both US) are about the only airlines who can credibly claim to have never had a passenger fatality.

Quantas' claims

[myxiplx]

From the summary: "not interference from passenger electronics, as Qantas had initially claimed"

Care to show me where Quantas claimed that? It seems to be all the rage to say that Quantas are shifting the blame, but so far I've seen nothing at all to indicate that was the case. What I *have* seen was a statement from Quantas saying they were investigating passenger electronics as a possible cause. Now I know it doesn't make such good news, but I'm afraid there's a world of difference between being investigating something and trying to place the blame on it. Unfortunately that's a distinction that appears to be lost on the crowd...

Re:Quantas' claims

[Anonymous Coward]

It's spelt Qantas.

Re:Quantas' claims

[Anonymous Coward]

Yeah, this was a furphy caused by CmdrTaco posting a misleading summary. Qantas claimed nothing. In fact they are required to keep their mouths shut while the ATSB goes about its investigation.

But then this being /. it's not the first time that people have gotten worked up over untruths caused by poor journalism.

Re:Quantas' claims

[Anonymous Coward]

hmmm - care to show you where quantas claimed that - drip drip drip... a confidential briefing to a reporter maybe?

Re:Quantas' claims

[Anonymous Coward]

I believe a crappy headline from Digg.com started it all. Qantas never claimed anything about the cause before this official report, exactly as their lawyers instructed.

Re:Quantas' claims

[aug24]

"there's a world of difference between being investigating something and trying to place the blame on it."

Not in a press release there isn't.

HTH
Justin.

Re:Quantas' claims

[Anonymous Coward]

AKA there PR reps didn't brainwash the journalists properly.

does that mean we've found a use for PR?

Re:Quantas' claims

[Anonymous Coward]

It's spelt Qantas.

It's spelled spelled.

Re:why fly qantass?

[Divebus]

Ausgezeichnet! Neh.. es ist nur kvatch Deutch. Auber Wunderbare Theorie wegend der LHC. I'm surprised it didn't fold up the wings.

Don't forget the spin

[tgv]

And what do you think Qantas is going to retort? That the malfunction was caused by radio signals from passengers' electronic devices. Duh! Look at it. A computer starts spewing "random data". That can only be caused by random radio waves from random clicking with a wireless mouse. No, in a few months time, everyone bringing a wireless mouse on board will be considered a terrorist.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Anonymous Coward]

They already DID blame it on passenger electronic devices.
At least on TV.
Somehow nobody seemed to notice but since in our country you're not supposed to use any devices in-flight anyway (except for mp3 players etc. - no phones), we don't care.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[icebike]

So what if they do make such claims?

If all it takes is a kid with a gameboy to bring down the Airbus then their entire fleet should be grounded.

The aircraft systems design would be completely unsafe as there are far more powerful transmitters in any urban area.

No, in truth, Airbus planes would be raining from the skys if it were indeed susceptible to such interference. It would have never been certified.

But more important, why did the controls not respond to the pilots? Why would the computers be programmed to prevent a Stall in an *diving* aircraft?

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Jules Labrie]

At 37000 feets the air is so thin that the range between the cruise speed and stall speed is relatively small. In other words, you need an autopilot to fly in that altitude. So a dive after an autopilot disconnect makes sense, although it's questionable if has to be so strong that some passengers get hurt.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[im_thatoneguy]

If the pilots lost consciousness they would lose control of the aircraft and may slump on to the controls and put the plane into an unsafe course.

The computers put the plane INTO a dive to prevent a stall they *thought* was taking place.

In this case the pilots attempted to abort the 'safety' maneuver but the computer decided that the pilots through incompetence or perhaps incapacitation did not actually intend to kill all aboard and took the action it thought was necessary.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[amirulbahr]

The way I understood it the 197 metre drop (doubt it was a total nosedive) happened in between the autopilot coming off, and the pilot taking control.

AFAIK, cruising at that altitude it wouldn't take much to cause that sort of drop.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[AlecC]

RTFA. The computer was being fed random and wildly varying attitude inputs. It first pitched up, then dived, presumable responding to different random attitude inputs.

Regarding the earlier point: ATC people say they regularly hear the distinctive "ditda ditda" of an active cellphone on their channel because the pilots haven't turned off their own cellphones. So (a) active cellphones are failing to crash planes, even on presumably the most sensitive part of the craft, the flight deck, and (b) pilots know it and don't care.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[jherekc]

I'm sorry Dave, I'm afraid I can't do that...

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Anonymous Coward]

because a diving aircraft CAN stall; a stall occurs when the angle of attack ( the angle between the mean chord of the wing and the relative airflow past the wing) exceeds a critical value. A stall can occur at any airspeed and is not dependent on the aircraft attitude. A stall condition is effectively the loss of th ability of an airfoil to generate lift, and could for example prevent an aircraft from being able to pull out of a dive.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stall_(flight)
hmmm... my CAPTCHA is 'terrify'

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Anonymous Coward]

Surely - watching too many movies? Typically - when sitting in a seat with a high back (such as in a plane cockpit), a person of average weight would initially slump to one side, in the event of losing consciousness (as the pilot would be strapped in) - he/she would not lean forward enough to "slump on to the controls" as you put it.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[N Monkey]

And what do you think Qantas is going to retort? That the malfunction was caused by radio signals from passengers' electronic devices. Duh! Look at it. A computer starts spewing "random data". That can only be caused by random radio waves from random clicking with a wireless mouse. No, in a few months time, everyone bringing a wireless mouse on board will be considered a terrorist.

RTFA. Qantas were investigating a possible link.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[AB3A]

Most active cell phones won't cause problems. Hell, I've accidentally left my cell phone on while flying IFR and I didn't notice a thing. The track on flightaware didn't show any problems either.

The problem is that we don't know for certain that the cell phone is working properly. This is why we have regulations such as 14CFR91.21 and policies that below 10,000 AGL, you may not operate any instruments.

A quick look at NASA's ASRS database shows 9 entries concerning potential interference from portable electronic devices. So this isn't just an academic concern. Several of these entries indicated that the reporters had seen these sorts of issues before, but that it hadn't been reported.

When the flight crew tells you to shut off your toys before landing, gentlemen (and ladies, if there are any here) SHUT IT OFF! The risk of a screw-up is not yours to take. You can scream and holler at the flight crew about the injustice of denying you ten more minutes on your crack-berry once you're safely in the terminal building. Until then, their word has the full force of Admiralty Law. Shut it off or they'll do it for you.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Anonymous Coward]

You're right. I am a pilot, and I leave my cell phone on all the time. The only time it interferes with anything is when I have a cheap head set on.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[tgv]

You have probably never heard of random processes. From this data you cannot rule out the possibility that a radio signal would almost never interfere, but just very, very occasionally would. If the chances of such a fluke would be 1 in 100 million hours, that would still warrant total prohibition of wireless equipment, since with 11000 flights per day there is one such event per year (according to some, there are more than 25000 flights per day in the US alone).

Re:Don't forget the spin

[electrictroy]

Nonsense. The air is thin but not THAT thin. B-29 Superfortresses routinely flew at that height, via human piloting. You don't "need" an autopilot.

>
>>>incorrect information... prompted flight control computers to put the jet into a 197-meter nosedive.

Nice. I hear that car manufacturers want to include similar accident-avoidance measures in cars. That's just what I need - my car's old computer going senile, and suddenly swerving me head-on into oncoming traffic.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Anonymous Coward]

Dave Bowman: What are you talking about, HAL?
HAL: This mission is too important for me to allow you to jeopardize it.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[phoenix321]

If you need an autopilot to keep the airplane from stalling, then yes, you probably have a stall within seconds after disconnecting the autopilot. And in a stall situation you have no lift from the wings, therefore the plane will immediately and rapidly lose altitude. Modern Airbus and Boeing are engineered to dive forward in these cases, so the stall is self-limiting in the sense that the aircraft will fall until the air is denser or airspeed is higher to let the wings generate lift again thus recovering from the stall.

The resulting forces are well within design limits of current airframes but may seriously injure passengers that had not used their seatbelts or were walking around at this moment.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Beatlebum]

You question why the computers would be programmed to prevent a stall in a diving aircraft. Obviously you have only a superficial knowledge of aerodynamics. Stalls occur when the wing exceeds its critical angle of attack, this can happen in a climb, a dive, a turn or straight and level flight.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Jules Labrie]

Yes and no. Yes, the air is not THAT thin, but first there is a big difference in the security requirements between 21th century airlines and WWII military aviation. Second, the A330 has a very different (and more fuel efficient) wing profile from the B-29, which stalls at only 91kts.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[elevtro]

Get your tinfoil hat on, it goes deeper than that. It was someone's wireless computer they used to crack in to the airplane's computer to feed that bad data. We all know that people smart enough to crack in to the system would get on the plane to bring it down.
Oh, even better, blame it on some jyhad extremists. Ha ha ha, since they were bringing down the plane, lets make those vampires so they could fly to safety.
All that just to blame someone else for a mistake, and to fortify the un-found claims that wireless electronic devices shouldn't be used while in flight.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[jb.cancer]

RTFA. The computer was being fed random and wildly varying attitude inputs.

They should get Debian software.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Anonymous Coward]

No. I am a pilot, and you are confusing 37000 feet with 56000 feet. At the altitude where the U-2 flys, over 3 miles higher than 37000 feet, the stall and maximum allowable speeds are nearly on top of each other.

At 37000 feet you have a wide margin of speed available between stall and cruise. What gets closer together is the airplane's top cruise speed and the Mach limit.

The dive after autopilot disconnect is crap; the airplane should be trimmed for level flight by the autopilot to save fuel and system wear.

The dirty secret about airbus airplanes is that the autopilot is never really disconnected; the flight computers will always play 'nanny'. In this case, the computer got 'vertigo' and said 'ZOMG we're too steep', slammed the plane around to keep up speed. Wrong move by the wrong system. If the autopilot disconnects, the airplane should hand control to the pilots, not try to tear the plane apart.

Looking at the article, people suffered spine damage as a result of the (improper) maneuver. Considering that one Airbus aircraft has had a tail fall off in flight due to stress cracking, I'd wonder if this airplane hadn't exceeded it's structural G-force limits during the computer's unscheduled aerobatics.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Registered Coward v2]

But more important, why did the controls not respond to the pilots? Why would the computers be programmed to prevent a Stall in an *diving* aircraft?

But even with the autopilot off, the plane's flight control computers still command key controls in order to protect the jet from dangerous conditions, such as stalling, the ATSB said.

Airbus' design philosophy is that the flight control system will maintain the aircraft within the design envelop, preventing a pilot from executing a maneuver that would place the aircraft outside of the allowable envelop. While this is good during normal conditions, emergencies and unexpected problems can cause unintended consequences and possible unplanned impact with the ground. There have been other incidents and accidents resulting from FCS override of pilot commands or responding in a manner that was correct by the programming but wrong for the situation.

It's a fundamental design philosophy - the software can do a better job than humans - that is fundamentally a bad approach to system design in dynamic environments.

Lesson - designers can't anticipate all circumstances that software will face; the ability to manually override and take corrective action is needed for trained operators to be able to make the decisions they are there to make.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Lord Ender]

Auto-pilot can make mistakes. But humans make mistakes much more frequently. We are all safer if we turn the piloting of heavy machines over to computers. That California train wreck never would have happened if we had taken the emotional, error-prone sack of meat out of the control system.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[sribe]

The resulting forces are well within design limits of current airframes but may seriously injure passengers that had not used their seatbelts or were walking around at this moment.

One thing I've been wondering since this story first broke: exactly how many dumbfucks had unbuckled their seat belts at the earliest opportunity, for no reason at all. 50+ is way more people than would ever be standing up or moving about at one time. Or were people actually injured by flying objects? Enquiring minds want to know, especially those of us smart enough to keep our damn seat belts on!

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Lord Ender]

The flight crew adamantly demands a shut off my iPod shuffle, which has the EM characteristics of a wristwatch. I will continue to ignore them.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Anonymous Coward]

This is why we have regulations such as 14CFR91.21 [gpo.gov] and policies that below 10,000 AGL, you may not operate any instruments.

Ok so let me get this straight.

When taking off or landing, the airplane is passing through airspace that is positively chock full of not only cell phone RF, but RFI from everything else like power lines, microwaves, home electronics, wireless access points, etc.

And you expect me to believe that a single cell phone on the plane itself poses a danger, but only at low altitudes?

Give me a break.

If there was anything to these rumors we'd have airplanes crashing on takeoffs and landings like clockwork. Not to mention anytime they happened to intersect with a microwave relay transmitter or high powered satellite downlink.

Use your brains people.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[B30-7A]

The A330 also has much more powerful engines but neither of those really matter. The reason the pilot controls didn't respond is a matter of fly-by-wire philosophy. Do you allow the pilot to put the plane is a situation that will stall the plane or worse break it, or do you prevent the pilot from flying outside the capabilities of the plane. Airbus's philosophy is the latter. The only problem is - what if the flight control computer is wrong.

You do *not* need an autopilot to fly at that altitude. And yes I am an autopilot engineer.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[hedwards]

Indeed and this has been a known problem with Airbus' designs for sometime. While it's unlikely that this sort of thing would ever happen, the design of the planes makes it pretty much impossible to fly completely manually. Boeing planes on the other hand are capable of being flown manually should the need arise. Hell you can even do loop-de-loops should you need to.

That's not necessarily to say that Airbus planes aren't safe, just that they aren't typically designed to deal with this sort of bug in the system. Manual controls aren't meant to be used except in rare events.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[hedwards]

Indeed, I used to do that, but these days I take the advice given and leave it on at all times, well not all times if I need to go to the lavatory I don't. But Even a somewhat loosened belt is far more effective for the likely problems in flying. It'll hold you in the seat for turbulence or against being sucked out far better than none will.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Anonymous Coward]

While you're right that the iPod shuffle can't cause problems, you're wrong to not listen. Saying its ok to not follow a rule because you know better is a poor excuse, assuming harm would not be caused if the rule were followed. You may eventually get some other device at some point and still think you're right and you may be right, but there will always be a blurry line between the time when you're right and the time you're wrong. People shouldn't have to put their trust in your hands because you think you know better.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Nobo]

Nonsense. The air is thin but not THAT thin. B-29 Superfortresses routinely flew at that height, via human piloting. You don't "need" an autopilot.

Firstly, the B-29 had the wings of a glider and cruised at 220 knots. The Airbus by contrast has swept wings optimized for cruise at .82 mach. What makes you think your intuition about the B29 is worth anything given the differences between those aircraft?

Secondly, the B29 was flown by autopilot in cruise. Preview "Bringing the Thunder" on Google books, page 155, for the memoirs of a B-29 pilot.

That said, this is not even an autopilot issue. The true source of this problem is the flight control system of the Airbus, which features a "self protection" system that intends to prevent the aircraft from stalling at any expense, and in this case, actively threatens the safety of the aircraft itself.

The truly frightening thing about this is that the air data computer clearly resumed normal operation at some point during the dive, and the aircraft was recoverable. Had this been a permanent failure of the air data computer, an airbus pilot has no way to override the aircraft's intentions and recover from the dive. An airbus pilot can only watch, as the airplane says, "No, really, I'm stalling, I have to hold the nose down and pick up airspeed!". With a failed ADC computer constantly and erroneously telling flight controls that the aircraft is in stall, an Airbus would dive, trying to recover, until it impacts the ground.

By contrast, A pilot of a Boeing aircraft can tell his aircraft that it's worldview is wrong and fly it by hand in any circumstance.

This represents a fundamental difference in philosophy. Airbus trusts the computer and the system more than it trusts the pilot -- It says that the probability of a systems failure causing incorrect control commands and threatening the aircraft is less than the probability of a confused, tired, or impaired pilot losing control of the aircraft. Boeing, by contrast, trusts the pilot more than it trusts the system.

There have been aircraft accidents where an Airbus aircraft has crashed in situations where a Boeing aircraft would have been flyable by a human pilot.

There have also been aircraft accidents where a Boeing aircraft has crashed due to incorrect pilot procedures which could have been overridden by an Airbus aircraft's flight control system.

Each philosophy has its risks and rewards.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Joe The Dragon]

Auto trains and grade crossings do not mix also the railroad union will put a stop to that as well.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Anonymous Coward]

Have you ever read the Daily WTF? That shit is VERY common in numerous industries. I work in an industry whose products you get into daily to get to work. Hacked together VB scripts to calculate PID coefficients for everything from ABS to Throttle control. And when ship dates and flash lock down dates come, you go with your 'best option'.

I see nothing that makes me think the Airplane industry is any different. They may have more levels of auditing but some of that scares me.

Anonymous for obvious reasons.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Anonymous Coward]

RTFA. The computer was being fed random and wildly varying attitude inputs. It first pitched up, then dived, presumable responding to different random attitude inputs

When Airbus decided to go with all fly by wire and computer stabilized aircraft, it was just a matter of time before something went wrong. Much in the way that hydraulic aircraft are susceptible to problems with the hydraulic systems. I guess, for me, it's a little more frightening to know that a software bug can kill a couple of hundred people fairly easily. (rather than an o-ring)

Re:Don't forget the spin

[DaveAtFraud]

Typically, recent civilian and many military aircraft are "three dimensionally stable". The only exceptions to this are stunt planes and fighter aircraft. For pretty much everything else, the airplane will not only continue to fly straight and level once trimmed but will even return to straight and level after a control is deflected. That is, push the yoke forward and the increased speed causes additional lift and the plane returns to level flight. Deflect the yoke the other direction, the rudder or the ailerons and the same sort of "counter force" does the same thing; the plane returns to level flight. It just won't necessarily be on the same course as before. This is something that is typically demonstrated to a student pilot on their first flight with an instructor.

The old inertial autopilots kept a plane on the same course based on the directional gyro, turn and bank and rate of climb devices. Good enough to give the pilot a break but they only kept the plane headed in the direction originally input. Modern autopilots tie into the global positioning system and on-board navigation computers to allow things like a great circle route to be flown under autopilot that also corrects for changes in wind.

Only a very few recent fighter planes are so unstable that they require the on-board computer to keep the plane flying. The F-117 was the first such aircraft deployed. The idea is that making a fighter plane unstable means that it has no inherent preference as to which way to fly thus making it more maneuverable. On the other hand, there is no incentive to design such instability into an airliner and lots of reasons not to (like what happens when the autopilot fails).

Cheers,
Dave

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Moofie]

It would be more accurate to say that stall is a function of airspeed and attitude. It's not dependent ONLY on airspeed or attitude, but you can induce stall by varying either.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[lysergic.acid]

i think this was a prudent policy when portable electronics and wireless devices first became popular. planes were operated by complex & high tech machinery, and they had not been tested against such EM interference. it would have been foolish to allow such devices to be operated on a plane before studying the interaction between these devices and airplane equipment.

however, it's now 2008. the "we don't know what might happen, so let's just ban all electronic devices" attitude is no longer acceptable. FAA or NTSB should have conducted research into the safety of using such devices on planes. flight equipment regulations should have been updated to ensure safe operation in an environment with active wireless/electronic devices. and if needed, cellphone, laptop, and other wireless device manufacturers could be required to test the EM output of their products to determine whether they pose a significant risk of interfering with other electronic equipment.

these studies have to be done eventually, and frankly they've been put off for much too long already. there's absolutely no reason why we can't determine once and for all whether consumer electronics pose a threat to passenger planes.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Anonymous Coward]

I don't believe it for a second. I'm not arguing that people *should* be allowed to use phones in planes, but the whole interference thing is just not the case.

          ON a completely irrelevant note I like the exemption in 14CFR91.21 for electric shavers -- does a pilot or crew really need to shave that bad that they have to do it in the plane rather than at the airport? 8-)

          But, as a practical matter, I *did* forget to shut my phone off for a flight, and the big effect is it almost entirely drains the battery even during a few hour flight, because the phone will not lock onto a signal. So leaving it on is pointless and drains the battery. (This was at normal height; a smaller plane that flys at like 10,000? That might be a different matter, but that's also your own plane to make a decision.)

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Anonymous Coward]

And you'll have your iPod forcibly taken away and disabled, you'll get to finish the flight duct taped to the chair, and arrested on landing. The flight crews authority is pretty much absolute, complain once the flight is over, write letters to the FAA/NASA/TSB but when they give you an instruction you would be extremely foolish to ignore it.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Lord Ender]

They can take my iPod so long as they also take away everyones' wristwatches.

Perhaps I'll clip my shuffle to a wristband? That'll confuse them.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Free the Cowards]

You have a sort of twisted concept of what a stall is. A wing does not cease to generate lift in a stall. In fact, when a wing stalls, it is at the point where it is generating the maximum lift for a given airspeed. A stall is simply the point where, as angle of attack increases (the angle at which the wing meets the oncoming air), lift decreases. In normal flight, increasing angle of attack generates increased lift which allows for stable flight. When stalling, the airplane does begin to fall, but not nearly as fast as it would fall if the wing were producing no lift at all.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Free the Cowards]

I keep my seat belt fastened as well, but consider that you are protecting against what are literally one-in-a-million events. It's not like a car, where not wearing your seat belt has a good chance of making the difference between life and death, or between a normal life and being horribly crippled. While it does happen sometimes, your chances of being involved in an incident where wearing an airliner seat belt saves you from serious injury or death are about as good as your chances of winning the lottery. That's not to say that you shouldn't wear it, but I would not call people who don't wear them "dumbfucks".

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Mister Whirly]

Why not? The ban on liquids, matches, and lighters is pure security theater as well. May as well extend that to other areas.
I mean, if electronic devices could reliably cause enough interference crash planes, why would the 9/11 terrorists have even bothered with box cutters? If it were that easy, I doubt it would be hard to disguise some electronic interference device as some other piece of electronic equipment.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Anonymous Coward]

You can scream and holler at the flight crew about the injustice of denying you ten more minutes on your crack-berry once you're safely in the terminal building.

Fat fucking chance. These days, if you scream and holler about a roach crawling on the floor in a terminal, yopu'll be face down on the floor with a jackboot on your neck. Power lust among TSA people is now a requirement in their psychological testing.

Shut it off or they'll do it for you.

Only if they catch you with it on, hardon boy. And it's been pretty well proven that they can't detect squat.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[hifiandrew]

Case and point of trusting the computer more than the pilot: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mvEOQzmDzL0 seems not much has changed.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[WolfWithoutAClause]

One point I believe you've missed. There probably isn't 'an' ADC computer, so I suspect that they just switched off the broken one and used a different one.

Only if this was a fundamental design error could the aircraft have crashed, but it doesn't sound like this was.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Anonymous Coward]

"Only a very few recent fighter planes are so unstable that they require the on-board computer to keep the plane flying. The F-117 was the first such aircraft deployed."

Good post, but the F-16 was the first aircraft with fly-by-wire. In fact, the F-117 used the F-16 avionics system.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Anonymous Coward]

Actually, the self-limiting feature of stall recovery comes from a reduction in the angle of attack, which is the only factor affecting lift disruption (airflow separation) over the wing.

Higher air density and airspeed have no direct effect on stall, except that both are needed to produce the required lift for sustained, level flight.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Intron]

Interesting side note. The equipment companies developed aluminum grade crossing gates, but the railroads preferred the wood or fiberglass ones for legal reasons. After a crash, you can find the fragments in the front of the car to prove it ran through the barrier before being hit by the train.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Anonymous Coward]

The GGP poster made a blanket statement that flying at 37000 feet requires an autopilot, which is just silly. GP was showing this to be a foolish statement by presenting a fairly primitive aircraft that had no problem flying at 37000ft. Frankly, I think GGP is trolling.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[ThrowAwaySociety]

A quick look at NASA's ASRS database shows 9 entries concerning potential interference from portable electronic devices. So this isn't just an academic concern.

Sorry, but nine anecdotal reports out of thousands of flights per day is absolutely an academic concern. Heck, UFO collisions pose more of a threat than that.

Absolutely, passengers should obey the flight crew, because it's the law. But investigators should not trust flight crew's diagnosis when they say that the altimeter seemed to respond whenever a passenger pressed the number 3 on his BlackBerry.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Incongruity]

And my understanding is that Boeing does it the other way, where it allows the human pilot to override the computer, correct? Funny, I always figured that doing it the airbus way would get someone into trouble some day...

But, then again, how many times have pilots/pilot error brought down aircraft? Maybe we should let the machines be the last line of defense =)

Re:Don't forget the spin

[DougF]

Parent is still correct. Fly by wire has nothing to do with the stability design of the aircraft. Modern fighters could still work via cables and pulleys, it would just weigh a lot more...not a problem with the A-10, big problem with the F-22 and F-35.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Unassuming Puppy]

Had this been a permanent failure of the air data computer, an airbus pilot has no way to override the aircraft's intentions and recover from the dive. An airbus pilot can only watch, as the airplane says, "No, really, I'm stalling, I have to hold the nose down and pick up airspeed!".

Uninformed poppycock.

Airbus aircraft can be switched to a mode called "Direct Law".

In that mode, the control surfaces correspond 1:1 with the stick.
http://www.airbusdriver.net/airbus_fltlaws.htm

There have been aircraft accidents where an Airbus aircraft has crashed in situations where a Boeing aircraft would have been flyable by a human pilot.

No, there haven't.

Your citation is conspicuously absent.

And please don't troll with the Habsheim crash, which would have ended same (worse) if you tried the same insane stunt with a Boeing 737.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[dunkelfalke]

like the ac said, do what the flight crew sais. they might be wrong but they are still the authority as long as you are in the air. don't be a dick just for the sake of it.

i myself used a bluetooth gps reciever together with my pocketpc in the flight, but i especially asked whether i am allowed to do it.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Hawke666]

It's "Case in point".

Re:Don't forget the spin

[icebike]

A wing will not exceed its critical angle of attack in a dive.

Only pulling out of a dive too quickly can cause that.

Why would airbus build control surfaces capable of ripping a plane apart? Would Boeing ever do that?

Quote:
The Star-Telegram reported on this issue a year ago (Nov. 12, 2006) because of the potential that it could be related to the 2001 fatal crash of American Airlines Flight 587 in New York:

        Five years after an American Airlines jet crashed in New York City and killed all 260 passengers and crew members, questions linger about whether the type of plane involved has flaws that could imperil other flights.

        An investigation concluded that the crash of Flight 587, on Nov. 12, 2001, in a Belle Harbor neighborhood, was largely due to pilot error. The co-pilot made overly aggressive attempts to steer the Airbus A300 as it bounced from side to side in turbulence created by another jet that had taken off ahead of it.

        The pilotâ(TM)s actions put so much stress on the aircraftâ(TM)s vertical stabilizer, or tail fin, that it was torn off, fatally crippling the wide-body jet, the National Transportation Safety Board said in its final report. For a pilot to break the airplaneâ(TM)s structure in flight was unprecedented, the NTSB said.

--endquote.
From http://startelegram.typepad.com/sky_talk/airbus/

Re:Don't forget the spin

[dunkelfalke]

well, here is a counter example: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TSB-EqorBno

Re:Don't forget the spin

[icebike]

Well said.

The reason cell phones are not allowed on planes has nothing at all to do with air safety.

The FCC and cellphone industry demanded the FAA put that restriction in because a cell phone at 10000 feet (or higher) can light up more cell towers and generate more handoff requests than the system was ever designed to handle.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[ckblackm]

Or if we'd have taken the un-emotional text messesaging device out of his hands.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[phoenix321]

Stall is, according to a well-known online encyclopedia, "an event that causes the wing to lose lift suddenly", so to speak. Which is what I described. The airplane does not fall down like a dead duck, because aerodynamic drag will reduce downfall and initiate a momentum to turn the aircraft like a weather vane towards the air current.

Stall is, and I'm pretty confident in that, the point BEYOND the angle of attack that creates the maximum lift. In normal flight conditions you can trade off aerodynamic drag vs. airfoil lift. If you'd plot this as angle-vs.lift, a stall is the sharp downturn of lift at the end of the scale.

See this plot for details:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:LiftCurve.svg

It would not even matter, if the airplane would actually fall down or not - because if the stall point is crossed, the G-forces change rapidly under any circumstance. A steep climb would be halted suddenly causing all non-seatbelted passengers to continue climbing for a second until they decelerate with their heads on the overhead bins with quite some force.

Look at the plot again, you were right when you said that crossing the stall point does not mean immediate and absolute loss of lifting force. But a sudden and strong decrease in many cases.

And as a stall induces high aerodynamic drag while further decreasing lift, you have a positive feedback loop on your hands that forces the pilot or the flight computer to rapidly start a nosedive because otherwise the remaining lift would be lost very quickly. Combined with a high drag the aircraft could start to tumble and become unrecoverable, therefore some headbutts on the overhead bins are the option with the least injuries in this case.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Free the Cowards]

That well-known online encyclopedia is wrong, then. A stall is not an event that causes the wing to lose lift suddenly. It is defined as passing the airfoil's critical angle of attack. The end result is to move from the standard negative feedback loop which keeps the airplane flying straight to a positive feedback loop which causes it to begin to drop.

You're correct that the stall is that region at the end where the lift curne drops off rapidly. However you can be right at the top of that drop-off, with the wing producing 99% of your weight in lift, and still be stalled.

Your description of what happens during a climbing stall is completely wrong. In order to cause passengers to hit their heads on the overhead bins, there would have to be a downward force on the airplane. All a stall causes is a reduction in the normal upward force. It is certaily possible that an overly aggressive stall recovery might cause people to hit their heads, but the stall itself can never do that.

I'm not sure why you think the airplane would "tumble" in a prolonged stall, but this simply isn't true. Depending on the aircraft and the situation it's possible that it will enter a spin, and spinning a large airliner is generally considered to be a Bad Move, but this is not a "tumble".

Stalls are common in some smaller aircraft and they are not the sort of violent thing you describe. In larger aircraft they are considered something to be avoided, but while I've never flown an airliner, the basic aerodynamics still work the same and still tell you what happens. A stall simply is not going to create the effects described.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[phoenix321]

You need all three within certain limits to recover from a stall, in any case: airspeed, density and angle of attack. If any of these is missing or too low resp. too high, the airfoil will not produce lift and is stalled.

A stalled aircraft will also decelerate due to aerodynamic drag. Decreasing angle of attack will not increase airspeed meaning the airfoil could very well still be under the required air current per second for a laminar flow and still be stalled. Given enough altitude, a controlled nosedive is much better and quicker than applying engine power. Engine spin-up can take up to 30 seconds for large airliners and would not much in extremely high altitudes. A nosedive increases airspeed, air density(= absolute mass and speed of air passing the wing) and decreases angle of attack, therefore bringing back, after laminar air flow is re-established, lift.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[phoenix321]

Sudden loss of altitude is not uncommon and would've not made the news if it wasn't Quantas or 10 or more people. A downward air current or a sudden change of air pressure (=density) can be met at any moment even in fair weather.

Wearing your seatbelt can mean the difference between being woken up from sleep during a two-second fall or having your nose broken on the overhead bin. If you're on the way to the lavatory or are hit by loose items, well, bad luck. And people who trade a possibly broken nose for not wearing a seatbelt that most other people don't even notice after 30 seconds, well, they might not be the most intelligent and rational people around. Oh and there are seatbelt extenders for larger sized people, you can even buy them discreetly if you're too shy to order one from the flight attendants every time...

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Ihmhi]

In WW2 they probably did "Baloo" style autopilot, which means they jammed a crowbar between the yoke and the dash.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Free the Cowards]

Please don't make the mistake of thinking that people who make different tradeoffs than you do are stupid. Even the nose-breaker is incredibly rare, and in my opinion not defending against it is an entirely rational choice, even if it's not the one you or I would make.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Anonymous Coward]

No, there haven't.

How about the one where the tail fell off over New Jersey? I don't see that happening to Boeings.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[GreatDrok]

"If the pilots lost consciousness they would lose control of the aircraft and may slump on to the controls and put the plane into an unsafe course."

I'm not sure how this would be possible since the Airbus 330 has a side mounted joystick rather than the traditional yoke.

However, I have to agree that fly by wire is presenting some disturbing scenarios.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[AB3A]

It doesn't matter what you think or who you are. I'm a registered professional engineer and an instrument rated pilot. On the ground, my opinion is good enough for expert testimony on this subject before a court of law. In the air, I do as the captain says.

If the crew is looking for a potential source of interference to their gear and they discover you fondling your iPod, the crew has every right to restrain you using any means necessary. They will remove whatever batteries the toy has to remove any possibility that it is the cause of interference, and they'll be within their rights, no matter who you might be.

Oh, and one other thing: Admiralty law is very old and international in nature. No civilized country will deny a captain's rights to do whatever he or she feels is needed for the safety of flight.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[amRadioHed]

What's the difference? Wouldn't an aluminum gate be just as busted as a fiberglass one if a car ran through it fast enough to shatter the fiberglass?

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Anonymous Coward]

There are good reasons to trust the computer than the pilot these days, particularly after 9/11.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[WhiteHorse-The Origi]

Yeah I was on an Airbus recently and it was horrible to use the Microsoft system interface for the games and movies. I doubt anyone would be stupid enough to out-source avionics software or run an airplane on Windows...

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Lord Ender]

Sure, you can power trip all you want, but only an idiot on a power-trip would go after an iPod shuffle while ignoring battery-powered wrist watches. Electronically, they are basically the same, and they don't have radio transmitters.

Idiots with power are a scary thing. How long do you think you could keep your job if you went around restraining everyone with a wristwatch?

Re:Don't forget the spin

[AB3A]

Idiots with power, eh? You make sure you tell them that when you're in cuffs on the ground.

I could argue with you about the technical merit of what you're saying, but I'm not going to bother because I don't have to.

The law is clearly not on your side, nor are you likely to change it. The bottom line is that once you board a vessel, the Captain, or a surrogate working for the captain (the crew), has full authority to do whatever they feel is necessary for the safety of the voyage. That condition continues until you disembark.

That's Admiralty law. Get over it.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Lord Ender]

And you will lose your job if you handcuff everybody with a wristwatch.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[omfglearntoplay]

The Dynamic Vehicle Control in my 350Z almost got me killed once or twice. I was turning left across oncoming traffic to drive into a side road, and because it was a sharp turn the inside rear wheel started to slip a little. But since there was oncoming traffic I needed to gun it a little to avoid any close calls... except that the friggin VDC decided my tire slipped too much so it apparently put on the brakes and cut some power to my engine... effectively slowing me to a crawl. Oh yeah, that was FUN! I thought for sure I was gonna die from one of the SUVs coming my way.

Now when I think about it, I turn it off (via a button) unless it's raining.

Now when I

Re:Don't forget the spin

[geekoid]

Humans can make descions automated system can't.
Sometime the best chance of surviving a situation is taking the aircraft beyond it's designed capabilities.

Like the pilot the saved many lives by rolling the 747*. Had he tried to correct, the wings would have probably fallen off.literally. While they had the data, no pilot has been ever to reproduce that particular maneuver.

*or was it a DC 10? hmm this happened years ago

Re:Don't forget the spin

[geekoid]

Never trust the machine, the machines isn't your friend. - Clone 2 Born 2:02 Died 2:04

Re:Don't forget the spin

[geekoid]

"active cellphones are failing to crash planes, even on presumably the most sensitive part of the craft,"
Incorrect presumption, but go on.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[geekoid]

Yes, there are many cases on the internet concerning PEDs interfering. Most people have seemed to focus on the Cell broadcast; which is only ONE concern. It's isn't a 'cell phone ban', it's a PED ban.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[geekoid]

NTSB had conduct studies, several in fact. PEDs can cause a problem., under the right circumstances.

There is a reason PEDS are liscenced for ground use only. You are violating FCC rules if you use one in an aircraft.

"these studies have to be done eventually, and frankly they've been put off for much too long already. there's absolutely no reason why we can't determine once and for all whether consumer electronics pose a threat to passenger planes."

we ahve, they do.

It depends on a lot of variables. Shape of the jull, location in the plane, shielding in the wiring harnes(which can decrease with time), Quality of the PED, PED leakage, how they interact with other PEDs. Just to name some.

Also, Aircraft instrumentation is tested against PEDS individually, not as a system. Usually.

As someone who has sat in a McDonnell Douglas lab and watched instrumentation fail duo to PED interference, I take it seriously.
  It is very complicated, and there are a lot of variables, but since we are talking abut 100's of peoples lives it should not be taken lightly.

Now if the NTSB get's it's way and PED FCC licensing require air flight this problem would go away. Of course your precious toys might go up 3% in cost.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[geekoid]

They can't do it reliable, that's the problem. It does happen. You can't fly the plane where you want it to go if you interfere with it's system. Those religious zealots wanted to control the place of impact of there faith based initiative

Re:Don't forget the spin

[__aailob1448]

And yes I am an autopilot engineer.

That is so cool. Only on /. can I expect to read stuff like that :)

Anyways, keep on engineering and try not to fuck up like the last guy ;)

Re:Don't forget the spin

[AB3A]

Have you ever looked at ALL the packaging that came with your electronics? Remember that little Part 15 statement? It comes from 47CFR15. Basically it says that your device may radiate RF and that if it does interfere with something that you MUST shut it off. That's the foundation for the previous law I cited.

You overlook the fact that there already are studies for RF radiation, and they show that the device does work within acceptable limits when it was manufactured. You do not know what condition it is in now. The flight crew has no way of knowing what condition it is in now. Someone could have spilled water on it and you might not notice any problems. Yet it could be making all sorts of RF noise.

I'll grant you that incidents like this are thankfully rare occurrences. But they are not unknown. Your suggestion is well founded in a perfect world, where everything works exactly as designed. However as an engineer with many years of experience, and as a pilot who flies IFR in my own airplane, I know that this can happen. Until aircraft navigation systems stop using radio signals, I doubt there will come a time when this can not happen.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[sribe]

Airline accidents are very rare. Turbulence is not. I've been on planes more than once where stuff went flying--including people.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[Free the Cowards]

In such a way as to seriously injure those people, though?

I'll grant that turbulence is not nearly as rare as accidents, but it seems to me that turbulence severe enough to cause substantial injuries is rare enough that leaving your seat belt off is not spectacularly stupid.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[MemoryAid]

Perhaps it should be mentioned that autopilot is used to maintain precise altitude control so planes can be stacked into more altitude slices (every 1000 feet). Back in the days of B-29's, and until recently, altitude measurement in the upper altitudes of flight was only good enough for 2000 foot slices.

So the autopilot is an ATC system requirement, not an aircraft requirement. A plane without autopilot would require special handling if they did not meet the RVSM requirements. More of a "supposed to have" than a "need", you might say.

Re:Don't forget the spin

[AB3A]

The mistake you're making here is that YOU THINK the PED and the aircraft avionics are both working flawlessly. Without an extensive test bench, you don't know that. Your PED could have a manufacturing defect. It could have been dunked or dropped. It could be radiating anything. With anything that amplifies (and that includes digital logic) you can have parasitic oscillation and not know it.

I'll grant you that 99.9999% of the time, that situation probably isn't a big deal. But with hundreds of thousands of passengers every day, and thousands of flights, the probabilities will eventually catch up with you.

Put that near field next to a leaky antenna port or a coaxial cable that may be frayed, and you risk the sort of problem that we're discussing here.

Oh, and the 10000 foot rule is simple: there isn't anything you'd be likely to run in to right away if you got off course.

As you said, use your brains.

FFS, kdawson!

[Anonymous Coward]

Can't you go even a single day without plastering Slashdot with non-stories from your beloved Australia?

Re:FFS, kdawson!

[Anonymous Coward]

Shut up seppo!

They did claim it...

[raehl]

"We're investigating passenger electronics as a possible cause" is just marketing speak for "While we have no idea what happened, we want you to think it was passenger electronics."

Re:They did claim it...

[myxiplx]

Ok, if they had released a statement saying they were investigating passenger electronics and nothing else, then yes, as you say there would be an argument that they were trying to shift the blame. However I defy you to find any such message coming from Quantas.

If you actually read the original article (http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10536660), you will find that it's the NZ Herald who made the statement that Quantas were probing the laptop link. And even that looks like nothing more than a trumped up headline since it appears that the statement was actually made by a spokesman for the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), in response to what was looks to me like a leading question from the Courier Mail:

"Certainly in our discussions with passengers that is exactly the sort of question we will be asking - 'Were you using a computer?'," The Courier Mail quoted an Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) spokesman as saying.

So somebody at the Courer Mail asked the Australian Transport Bureau if they will be asking passengers about their computer use (which is probably a routine part of the investigation anyway), and somehow the ATSB's reply to that gets morphed into Quantas trying to shift the blame onto laptops....

Mob intelligence... don't you just love it. o_0

Computers never make errors

[VincenzoRomano]

As they are as stupid as cows.
Errors are only made by Humans, from the design up to the operation level.
These "announcements" are made just to hide some possibly high level human error.
If a sensor is feeding wrong data it's because of either a human engineering error or because of some fault that goes undetected (by humans)!

Re:Computers never make errors

[Peaker]

Humans never make errors, as they are merely made by evolution, from the design up to the operation level.

Blame evolution :-)

Re:Computers never make errors

[Anonymous Coward]

No, I blame un-intelligent design instead!

Come on

[silvermonkeynz]

This is precisely why having commercial aircraft under total computer control is a bad idea. Even though you can fly "stick" everything must first be put through the computer - which as we have just seen is not infallible.

Re:Come on

[digitig]

This is precisely why having commercial aircraft under total computer control is a bad idea. Even though you can fly "stick" everything must first be put through the computer - which as we have just seen is not infallible.

Whereas, of course, humans are infallible. Er...

Re:Come on

[Asic Eng]

That's just a design trade-off. Let's say you have system A: if computer and pilot disagree, the computer is given ultimate control - and system B: if computer and pilot disagree, the pilot is given ultimate control. That's understandably an emotional issue for some, but it shouldn't be. It's clear that in some cases the computer will be wrong, and in others the pilot will be wrong. Sometimes the pilot will initiate the correct action, and the computer will - erroneously - override him, but sometimes the reverse will apply, too. The question is: which one of these do occur more often, what kind of errors are these, which kills/injures more people? If system B kills less people, then you should use that one otherwise you must select system A. In both cases there will be some people who will be killed by one system which would have been saved by the other.

A single incident isn't enough to show which system is superior, you need to establish a metric to measure their performance statistically.

If this had happened on final approach..

[Viol8]

.. this wouldn't have been a sidebar on page 5 of most papers. There would be 200 dead people lying in pieces near perth. Any computer malfunction which causes an aircraft to nosedive 650 feet in seconds is a VERY serious bug.

Re:If this had happened on final approach..

[Anonymous Coward]

If this had been on final approach, it hadn't happened, since the circumstances would have been radically different, and not triggered the error. The difference in flight speed and stall speed at high altitude is very, very slim, (look up the U-2 for an extreme reference), and since you DON'T want to stall an Airbus, the computer did the _safe_ thing and dropped the nose. I'd take a 650f/s nosedive over a stall or spin in a commercial jet any day, thank you.

Swiss German

[krischik]

Swiss German is a spoken only language [1], the Swiss write standard German [2]. And the LHC is in French spoken part of Switzerland and therefore the official project languages for the LHC are English and French.

[1] Meaning: There are no official spelling rules and if one wants to write down Swiss German anyway one has to make up spelling on the fly.
[2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standard_German

Re:Swiss German

[bornwaysouth]

I had wondered why babblefish didn't cope at all well with what had been said, and wondered if it was an odd dialect, or more likely, a wry comment in non-standard German. I deliberately mangle English at times.

I was wondering though that if a black hole had been created, it would possibly oscillate through the Earth, back and forth. The period of passage could be longer than 50 mins if it started with excess velocity, and went some distance above the earth before returning. So it would be largely invisible, and only noticed if it collided with a particularly vulnerable bit of gear. A sort of malign Flying Spaghetti Monster, without the theological support. It's just a speculative whimsy. Or it could just be that after 5 billion years of cosmic ray bombardment, one of them finally hit a plane. This is much easier to believe than the possibility that a software engineer screwed up the flight compensation.

Re:Swiss German

[TechnicalThug]

Actually, it *is* possible to write Swiss-German (and many teenies do), although it would look and sound unlike German (as german speakers coming here find)

Darn News !

[da5idnetlimit.com]

And I had almost finished building my 2KW Bluetooth mouse and with the Flight simulator rig, you know, in that little shed just after the airport fairway...

Re:Darn News !

[phoenix321]

Did you fit that magnetron inside the mouse or did you just bluetooth-enable your microwave?

Re:why fly qantass?

[Anonymous Coward]

Chuck Norris kann schneller stehen als du rennen kannst.

DO178B

[gnieboer]

For those that are interested in coding/test methodologies, the FAA created a system called "DO178B" which defined as set of software assurance standards for aircraft. (Note, it's not coding standards, it's assurance standards)

Wiki link: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DO-178B

It set different standards for different types of code. The movies would be Class E, a non-critical nav system maybe C or D, FCS probably A. But even then, the code can be made modular to decrease the assurance level required. For instance, an artificial horizon needs to work, right? But you normally have more than one in a cockpit. If one goes bad, you can use the other, not catastrophic. But the key is the pilot(s) need to recognize that it's busted. What if one froze in place in flight during landing? The pilot might follow it and go ka-boom.
So by itself, an electronic artificial horizon would require level A ($$$) software so that it 'never' fails. This is very very expensive (for level A the post-compiler machine code must be analyzed for possible compiler issues, and MC/DC http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modified_Condition/Decision_Coverage coverage)
So instead, they write it to a lower level, and then create a small set of code that cross-checks everything and kills off any horizon that's malfunctioning by placing a big "X" (or whatever) on the screen instead. Lower risk and greatly reduced cost.

Re:DO178B

[digitig]

For those that are interested in coding/test methodologies, the FAA and EUROCAE jointly created a system called "DO178B/ED12b" which defined as set of software assurance guidelines for aircraft.

The important bit in that change is that they are guidelines, not standards; DO178b/ED12b is not mandatory (although compliance makes certification a whole lot easier).

Re:DO178B

[gnieboer]

You're absolutely right, they aren't standards, that's my mistake.

Re:DO178B

[digitig]

For those that are interested in coding/test methodologies, RTCA and EUROCAE jointly created a system called "DO178B/ED12b" which defined as set of software assurance guidelines for aircraft.

Fixed my own fix for me.

Re:DO178B

[RAMMS EIN]

``But you normally have more than one in a cockpit. If one goes bad, you can use the other, not catastrophic.''

That is, unless the other one goes bad, as well. Which isn't even that unlikely, given that both of them are in the same aircraft and thus will be exposed to similar conditions - perhaps even the exact same inputs.

Re:DO178B

[gnieboer]

True, the catch is that most software 'errors' tend to be caused by unexpected inputs. For instance, horizon 1 probably receives a signal from (mechanical) gyro 1 and horizon 2 from gyro 2. So the chances of a simultaneous failure are reduced because of good old fashioned mechanical redundancy. Airbus resolves this concern by having flight computer software "A" written by a completely independent team from the designers of flight computer software "B". Then each aircraft has both versions "A" and "B" running simultaneously. The theory is that independent designers won't create the same bug. There's obviously debate on that, as Boeing doesn't follow the same methodology.

Re:DO178B

[highways]

The regulators (e.g. FAA/CASA/JAA) will accept compliance with DO-178B as a method for certifying avionics. If a manufacturer chooses not to comply with the standard, then they need to show how their method results in a probability of failure of less that 1e-12 for a flight critical box.

Hence, DO-178B serves as a de-facto standard for avionics software certification.

If you want examples of levels, the flight control system is class A, weapon systems are class B (on military aircraft) and Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) is Class D.

DO-178B is very waterfall centric and leaves little scope for any bottom-up development. It also places restrictions on dynamic linking or anything else that cannot be analysed at compile time - polymorphism is a big no-no, as is dynamic allocation of memory.

Speaking of compilers, they need to be certified too - no GCC there. The irony is that is is much easier to certify an assembler than a compiler and therefore far less costly. For larger projects (i.e. > $10M ), you can get certified compilers for C, Ada and a bunch of mysterious languages like Jovial (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JOVIAL).

Yes, they have heard of C++. A small subset of the language is approved for use on the JSF.

I can hear the sighs loudly and clearly already

Re:DO178B

[digitig]

The regulators (e.g. FAA/CASA/JAA) will accept compliance with DO-178B as a method for certifying avionics. If a manufacturer chooses not to comply with the standard, then they need to show how their method results in a probability of failure of less that 1e-12 for a flight critical box.

Hence, DO-178B serves as a de-facto standard for avionics software certification.

But DO178B/ED12B only contains the word "shall" 3 times (that orders for the document shall be accompanied by payment, one that the committee shall review it and one that says "shall" is avoided in the document); "must" is pretty much the same. In other words, you don't have to do everything DO178B/ED12B says in order to be compliant.

If you want examples of levels, the flight control system is class A, weapon systems are class B (on military aircraft) and Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) is Class D.

"Level", not "Class"

DO-178B is very waterfall centric and leaves little scope for any bottom-up development.

As are all standards and guidelines for safety related software, because nobody has come up with a better way of managing safety yet. This doesn't actually stop bottom-up development, provided the elements at the bottom also follow a waterfall (in other words, at the very bottom they are properly specified and are verified and validated against that specification)

It also places restrictions on dynamic linking or anything else that cannot be analysed at compile time - polymorphism is a big no-no, as is dynamic allocation of memory.

Could you tell me where that is in the document, please? I have it in front of me, but can't find what you're referring to (and I know IEC61508 better than DO178B/ED12B). Still, for the more stringent levels that's appropriate. Testing and static analysis tend to catch different bugs, and for something that can kill a few hundred people there's a strong case for making sure that as many bugs as possible are caught.

Speaking of compilers, they need to be certified too - no GCC there.

Again, I can't see that in there. Para 4.4.1b gives the option of use of qualified tools or "combinations of tools and parts of the software development environment" ... "chosen to achieve the necessary level of confidence that an error introduced by one part would be detected by another". In other words, if the compiler isn't qualified, show how you'll be catching compiler bugs.

Yes, they have heard of C++.

I'm not sure who you mean by "they". DO178B/ED12B was published in 1992, and although C++ existed then it wasn't standardised until 1998, but that's not really relevant. DO178B/ED12B doesn't recommend or deprecate any language, it only says what has to be achieved. That's why it's still usable 16 years later (although a new version is in development, and due for publication RSN).

I can hear the sighs loudly and clearly already

Yes. Safety critical software development is far more conservative than most commercial software development. But there are good reasons for that. In the safety industry we like to be really confident that something is going to be pretty dam close to right, and won't accept things that make programming easier or cheaper unless we're confident that they're at least as safe as what we're already using. It's a specialist field with specialist techniques and approaches.

That's not crash

[Anonymous Coward]

*That's* a crash.

Imperial or metric, choose one

[otie]

put the jet into a 197-meter nosedive... The plane was cruising at 37,000 feet

Jeez. Would it be too hard to pick one measurement system and stick with it? FYI, 37000 feet = 11 277.6 meters

Re:Imperial or metric, choose one

[Anonymous Coward]

systemeng here posting anonomously to conserve modpoints. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) rules say that aircraft elevations are handled in feet. Air pressure is to be in millibars however. . . IIRC.

Re:Imperial or metric, choose one

[geekoid]

I think you mean

197 meters = 600 feet

Don't forget quantas tried to blame passengers

[freedom_india]

Don't forget Quantas tried to blame passenger electronics for this and tried to shift blame off them.
According to Quantas Corporate Policy, passengers are pests and hassels for their "Safe Flying" policy.
So they are trying to "that guy" passengers from flying with them.
You know what? They succeeded!
I will never fly quantas: Ever!
Their award-winning bad-service, shitty gum-chewing airhostesses, their aussie-time-mentality and now unsafe aircraft are NOT the places where i rest my hairy ass.

Expect some heads rolling

[ThePhilips]

[...] incorrect information from the faulty computer triggered a series of alarms [...]

Avionics is mission critical/life support stuff. That means all stuff - including darn cables - must detect errors. Triple (at least) redundancy is there for a reason - to go on working no matter what.

This will not only cause some heads rolling (figuratively speaking), but also in charges and very likely conviction. And this would be very easy to find: in avionics (like in all similar fields) all the review documents have signatures and very clear (and strict) distribution of responsibilities.

Computer Error Caused Qantas Jet Mishap

[Anonymous Coward]

Computer says no.

-1 Flamebait

[Anonymous Coward]

Queerarse

Is it really necessary to use this term?

Re:-1 Flamebait

[The Good Jim]

Probably not. But they have been known colloquially as Queerarse for at least 20 years, mostly due to the reputation of their male flight attendants. Jim

Re:-1 Flamebait

[Anonymous Coward]

I've never heard that before. It doesn't seem particularly common, but I'll give you the benefit of the doubt. I thought you were using it as an adjective.

Still one of the best aviation flight safety

[vorlich]

histories to date. Qantas is one of the safest airlines in the world. Anyway, aside from the likes of Ariana,http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ariana_Afghan_Airlines air travel remains amongst the safest forms of mechanised transport. Compare and contrast the risks of road traffic accidents and their level of fatality amongst the under 30's.

Re:Still one of the best aviation flight safety

[MichaelSmith]

Air travel in Australia is generally very safe because it is:

• Relatively warm and dry - ice is not such an issue
• Flat - very little terrain to run into
• The population is small so air traffic is light - less chance of a collision

Additionally the civil aviation authority has always been run by a bunch of absolute pricks who always get their way, which tends to give them a lot of control over the aviation business, as opposed to letting the airlines run it themselves.

Re:Still one of the best aviation flight safety

[evilviper]

Qantas is one of the safest airlines in the world.

That's quite a loaded statement.

Worldwide, 8 of the top 10 are in North America. Delta and Southwest being virtually tied for the #1 spot, both a large margin ahead of any others.

Lufthansa (#4) and British Airways (#7) rounding out the top 10.

Quantas ranks just 17th. Since there are likely more than 100 airlines, I suppose you could call them "one of the safest" in some vague way. Top 20 (out of ~100) isn't exactly great, though.

http://www.planecrashinfo.com/rates.htm

More informative link

[Spikeles]

A better article link would have been the official ATSB media release document

Information

[Anonymous Coward]

The information you are looking for can be available in Wikipedia so please go through it. So that you can more information than what you are looking for.
-------------------
jack

Link Building | Social Bookmarking

Microsoft's Ethical Guidelines

[Anonymous Coward]

(on-board computer)
Do you accept Microsoft's Ethical Guidelines? Cancel? Allow?

(Allow)

(on-board computer)
Guideline: In the very rare case of a Blue Screen, blame passenger's wireless devices. Have a nice fli@#%^^^

authorities have no authority.

[cheekyboy]

Every time some big shot suit says some crap, why do pleb believe em.

So called authorities should STFU, or retire.

Im sure airline hardware goes thru FCC testing too.

You dont spend $100M on a plane, and make it crap.
Though some airlines like to pay $25k for pilots flying a $50m tube.

EMI

[Anonymous Coward]

Any chance the Boeing 777 incident and the Airbus occurrence are related from an EMI perspective in that they were both in proximity to the Harold E Holt transmission facility?

Different airframes, similar occurences same massively powered tx station...

Like all board of directors

[cheekyboy]

That approved the outsourcing to save a few bucks.

I bet all the execs drive top safe euro BMWs

Something similar

[Anonymous Coward]

I have experienced that during takeoff.

Autopilot turned off during takeoff ascent, and the plane started falling freely. Took about 10-20 seconds before the pilots took action: Full throttle maximum ascent. Afterwards they pretended it was an evasive maneouver due to small private cessna flying the wrong way, but they lied..

Well it felt like 20 seconds might have been only 10 i guess. but quite long..

Re:Something similar

[cherokee158]

That sounds unlikely to me. The autopilot is generally not engaged until a few minutes after takeoff. Even if it disengaged suddenly during a stable ascent, there is no reason for the plane to suddenly start falling out of the sky. (That would be a stall, and commercial airliners have so many stall warning devices that it requires some truly extraordinary circumstances to stall one.)

In any event, if your airliner was stalled for a good ten seconds, you would have lost several thousands of feet and would probably no longer be around to complain about it.

It is actually far more likely that a small plane blundered into the flight path or the airliner and forced a temporary altitude change to avoid him (Happens all the time...there is significant tension between the airlines and GA pilots for this reason).

What information do you have that makes you believe the pilot was lying?

Did some idiot use MS operating system?

[Myraq]

That's the most likely explanation for the faulty onboard computer system that's feeding incorrect data to the flight control.

Re:Did some idiot use MS operating system?

[morgan_greywolf]

Flight control computers don't use general purpose OSes like Windows or Linux or OS X. Typically they either write the code on the bare metal of the box or they might have some RTOS like WindRiver VxWorks or QNX. These are single purpose computers. It's not like the pilot's going to be playing Solitaire or Minesweeper on the Flight Console.

Re:Did some idiot use MS operating system?

[Myraq]

Well, that's the joke... It's no longer funny once you try to analyze it. -- The pilot must have confused the controls with MS Flight Simulator.

Re:why fly qantass?

[phoenix321]

Aber kann er auch einen Stein erschaffen, der so schwer ist, dass er ihn nicht mehr heben kann?

Boeing Fanbois

[Lars T.]

Stupid pilot tries spectacular stunt and fails.

Oh, and how easy is it to override one reverse thruster engaging in flight?

Video of Airbus A320 Testing Flight Envelope

[dangle]

At about 3 minutes, the software prevents roll beyond 67 degrees. At about 4:30, an attempt is made to stall the aircraft, at which time the software overrides the throttle settings. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LO5l6_d6yck "Blimey!"

Re:Video of Airbus A320 Testing Flight Envelope

[djtachyon]

I think this is even more interesting, albeit tragic. This is an airshow video of an early A320 test flight. A computer glitch assumed the pilot was trying to land and wouldn't allow the plane to pull up. The dozen or so people on the plane died.

Re:Video of Airbus A320 Testing Flight Envelope

[highways]

Actually, 3 people died, one who couldn't undo her seat belt, a disabled child, but I have forgotten the third. All died of smoke inhalation.

It was the "launch" flight of the first commercial "fly-by-wire" plane, taking paying passengers between cities, albeit with an airshow appearance in between.

The plane was perfectly airworthy when it hit the ground. The myth of a computer glitch in this instance centres on speculation and fear of the pilot no longer having direct control over the hydraulics. The "alpha floor" function of the fly-by-wire system prevents the aircraft from stalling. It didn't actually activate in this instance.

Overall, the pilot was too low, too slow and by the time he realised, too late. Air France management approved the additional joyride as a PR junket, and changed the flight plans at the last minute from a different airfield nearby - which was a mistake in itself.

It's one of those cases where everything is not as it seems. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_296

Re:Video of Airbus A320 Testing Flight Envelope

[djtachyon]

Thanks for the correction, a lot of info has been updated on that flight from the last time I checked.

Either way, big snafu.

Re:Video of Airbus A320 Testing Flight Envelope

[greyhueofdoubt]

In the future, every time I ever see an Airbus, all I will think is, "...Flying like a french ferret up your trouser-leg."

So thank you for that.

-b

Re:Video of Airbus A320 Testing Flight Envelope

[Neanderthal Ninny]

However, not all things can be programmed. This is video of A320 that was doing a flyby pass for the press which it should have passed low, straight and level, however, the A320 computer thought it was landing since the landing gear was down, hence the nice landing glide slope, but the computer didn't see the trees in the way so the pilot attempted to over-ride the computer, hence you hear full power from the engines just before they entered the trees, but the plane was too low and became a expensive tree trimmer.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_EM0hDchVlY&feature=related
AirFrance, AirBus, French aviation authorities said it was pilot error. However, they sequester the flight and voice data so we can only assume this fault. Recently someone got a hold of this data and released it and I read the data and voice and I personally think the pilot was not at fault but pilot was having hard time trying to override the computer and manually take over the flight controls.
Not all computer controlled things are prefect. In this case, to make low pass the landing gear had to be extended, however, this triggers the landing program which at that time needed several items to bypass the landing sequence. Now this can be done with press of two buttons. If you hear the voice recorder you can year the pilots having a very difficult time with trying to bypass the computer for the low pass, hence you seeing the wagging of the plane, just before they enter the tree they finally bypass the computer and order full power and correct flaps to fly out but since they were too low they hit the trees and plowed through the trees and into the ground.
I used to work on these flight control computers and they are 99.99% good but we, humans, still need to make up the last .0099999999... I love flight computer since they relieve much of flight work but we still need to monitor them to prevent these errors.

1 in 5000?

[fullgandoo]

But I am very suspicious of these statistics. For one, I can't find the exact formula they're using. I think they must be using something like "distance travelled divided by number of deaths". Which IMO is not a good measure when comparing with road travel. And how do they come up with "1 in 5000" chance of dying in a car accident. Doesn't this also imply that every one in 5000 motorists will have a fatal accident?

A better measure would be number of flights divided by crashes. Or number of hours flying divided by crashes.

Re:1 in 5000?

[jamesh]

After I posted that I got to thinking along those lines too. I think they might have been using statistics based on 'of all the people who were killed in accidents, 1/5000th of them died in car crashes, and 1/11000000th of them died in plane crashes', so the statistics really didn't help my point, and just confused the issue. Most people spend less time in a plane so even if the 'chance of a given plane trip ending badly' vs 'chance of a given car trip ending badly' were even, the chance of dying in a plane crash is going to be much lower.

What I would need is 'total person-hours spent in planes vs number of deaths' vs 'total person-hours spent in cars vs number of deaths'...

Boeing too

[Fzz]

Umm... the attitude sensor was a Northrop Grumman part, used in some Airbus models (2 A330 models, and A340) and "some other non-Airbus" aircraft.

As you said, this same part is used on several makes of aircraft. In fact the only similar occurrence I know of actually happened on a Boeing 777. You can read the details here.

It is concerning that a single failed sensor can cause this sort of upset, but it doesn't (at first glance) seem like either Boeing or Airbus are any better where this particular failure mode is concerned. And both the A330 and the B777 have excellent safety records, considerably better than the previous generation of planes. Without playing down the seriousness for the passengers who were hurt, at least the rest of the flight control system seems to have prevented the plane pulling its wings off in both cases.

Airbus mishap

[Anonymous Coward]

Aren't they the ones that used to have software that would drive it into the ground if you pulled all the way back on the stick?

Proofread the Title on the Main Page . . . ?

[swingerman]

So, someone at /. needs to proofread the titles that are actually posted on the main page of /. On the main page, this story had the title "Computer Error Caused Qantas Jet[.]" When I saw that, I thought that a computer error had caused a certain Quantas jet to exist, which gave me a quick laugh for the morning.

Re:Qestions:

[Anonymous Coward]

Fine. Have it yor way. We'll just say it as "Khantas" then. If there's no "u" we're not bond to prononce it like yo want.

KHAAAAAAAAaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaan!!!

Tubulence

[Anonymous Coward]

Didn't Michael "Doomsday" Crichton already publish this novel?

Re:Tubulence

[SL Baur]

That was _Airframe_ and no, the circumstances there were backwards. The man flying the plane was the pilot's son and not certified on flying that particular model of aircraft. A counterfeit part failed, causing a warning light to appear in the cockpit. The pilot panicked and took over manual control of the plane. Not knowing how to control the plane under those circumstances, the plane then porpoised three times before the pilot lost consciousness and the autopilot could take over and resume normal flight.

Completely backwards situation to this one.

Missing option

[marcosdumay]

S)pin! spin! spin! All the way down!

Re:Missing option

[Sponge Bath]

S)pin! spin! spin! All the way down!

Sounds like a status report from the McCain campaign.

knew it.

[DragonTHC]

Quantas can suck it. Saying that wifi caused this. total BS.

they also said that a wireless mouse caused a similar incident last month.

total BS.

They don't build planes susceptible to interference from consumer devices. They know the frequencies quite well. Everything on an airplane is shielded.

Re:knew it.

[LeadSongDog]

They don't build planes susceptible to interference from consumer devices. They know the frequencies quite well. Everything on an airplane is shielded.

Funny thing about deployed systems. No matter how hard you try, they drift from their nominal configuration. Vibrating cable jackets chafe, shields short out, and suddenly what used to be isolated isn't any more. A technician crimps a connection just a tad too tight and creates an RF low impedence shunt. Or a temporary cable substitution doesn't get recorded and becomes permanent. Add to that the pressure to keep assets earning revenue so that inspections are being done on 48 or 60 month cycles and you have a pretty low degree of confidence in the shield reliability (by aircraft engineering standards that is - still waaay better than your car). Do yourself a favour and leave the cell phone off. Just in case. All that said, it seems way more likely to be an ADIRS software problem. Discontinuities in the inputs should have been detected as a systems issue - real physical bodies don't go through instantaneous change of position or velocity. There have been a number of similar incidents on Airbus and Boeing fly by wire aircraft over the last eight years. In several, there were multiple failures of the ADIRU ring laser gyros caused partly by inadequate shock and vibration isolation. ARINC's system architecture doesn't cope terribly well with simultaneous failures, but (so far) passenger aircraft still have humans available to assume control when the bots go sideways.

Re:knew it.

[DragonTHC]

that hardly seems like a problem caused by personal electronic devices, especially with wireless service starting to be offered on some commercial flights.

Those are all systems which require constant maintenance and should have it. Seems like a solid class-action against airbus, quantas, or the maintenance company.

Someone didn't do their job correctly. That's what happened. Human error. All those problems you described are human error.

Re:knew it.

[LeadSongDog]

Seems like a solid class-action against airbus, quantas, or the maintenance company.

Ah, but which one? Don't forget Northrop Grumman and the avionics integration/testing company (no way Airbus would do that job themselves-too much legal risk to the bottom line). They'll all point their fingers around the circle and say "It could have been his fault for all anyone can tell." At least in this case, the evidence didn't go up in smoke.

But nobody seriously thinks that cell phones are the cause, it's just a fringe conjecture that has to be considered and ruled out.

Got that one right

[DaveAtFraud]

Here's what I said when the original article appeared. Good to know I can still diagnose software bugs; even in software I didn't have anything to do with writing.

Cheers,
Dave

QWERTY

[peterbye]

Apparently it is: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/qwerty

Finally!

[snspdaarf]

Someone that gets it right, or at least, seems to agree with me. :-) I believe that the "deaths per passenger mile" are just for PR. The real measure should be either "deaths per incident" or "survivors per incident." Otherwise, we are measuring how many people get killed when everything goes as planned.

Let the mythbusters test that

[Joe The Dragon]

Let the mythbusters test that

Moderators on crack

[Free the Cowards]

Overrated? What the hell? How can this post possibly be overrated with a score of 2? Come on, you asshole moderator. Show your face and defend your score. I dare you. I'm sure you're far too cowardly to do it, but I dare you to come here and reply to my post and tell me why you think this post is "Overrated". No doubt you're too chicken to do it, but I'll be waiting.

Re:Moderators on crack

[geekoid]

um, they can't post where they moderated.
Maybe you were a 5 when they moderated you?
Anyway, you are overrated..naw, just screwing with ya. You should be modded informative.

Re:Moderators on crack

[Free the Cowards]

They can post where they moderated. If they post as themselves, then they undo the moderation they did. (Which would be fine by me!) They can also post anonymously without affecting their moderation.

As for me being at 5, this is not the case. When I made the above post, the original had a score of 1 and showed nothing in the moderation box but "Overrated". The only conclusion: one person had marked it Overrated from its starting score of 2.

Since then, of course, the moderation has become even more insane. Just goes to show that the moderators on this site are completely nuts.

Thanks for the support though!

Suck on THAT, beatches

[RogueWarrior65]

That's right, morons, my laptop and other electronic gear DOES NOT AFFECT THE FLIGHT CONTROLS!!!

And neither does my 3.5 ounces of liquid! Real terrorists always work in groups. Don't think for one minute that a bunch of them aren't going to combine their 3 ounces.
 

No, it was human error

[Ancient_Hacker]

No, the computer did what it was programmed to do.

Unfortunately the programming specs did not require the program to do the most reasonable thing when presented with bad input data.

There should have been some testing spec along the lines of "and furthermore it should be possible to replace any air data input by /dev/random without affecting safety of flight".

In the old days I'd require that any program would tolerate a simulated money at the keyboard. Sooo many programs failed that simple test!

Re:No, it was human error

[Anomalyst]

> I'd require that any program would tolerate a simulated money at the keyboard How does keyboarding linden dollars help establish tolerance for erroneous data?

As Bruce Schneier says...

[smellsofbikes]

If you read about it on the news, you don't have to worry about it. That's why it's news, because it's unusual.
It's the ways people die that the newspaper doesn't bother reporting that are going to get you.

Man rated ... triple redundancy?

[Anonymous Coward]

Whatever happened to "Man rated" software requiring triple redundancy?
I've worked on man-rated avionics. We were 5x redundant with each computer voting on the correct answer using data from different sensors. As you lost sensors, all data from the dropped sensor was ignored.

So ... 3+ of these GPS juuuuckers sent bogus data? I think I'd want a refund.

And, I'd start flying non-Airbus aircraft instead.

computers like this are new in comm air

[Anonymous Coward]

so the statistics of the past really have zero bearing on the future.

anytime you change some fundamental part of your system (in this case, the control system of the aircraft, from hydraulics, wires, etc, to all software) you are really talking about apples and oranges

not for long w people like you

[Anonymous Coward]

this is a new kind of problem in aircraft safety... and instead of hopping all over it and trying to get to the bottom of it, and demand changes,, people like you are saying 'nothing to see here, move along'.

how many injuries will it take before people like you accept that this is a new problem in aircraft safety, and will require new methods to keep things safe?

Lost inertial reference

[Animats]

It's still too early to tell what happened.

The info now is that one of the air data units produced a bad inertial reference. There are three such units in an Airbus, and the flight control computers should have been able to vote the bad data out of the consensus for a single failure. That didn't happen, and it's important to understand why. That's the real problem. Single failures of inertial units should not produce a loss of control.

Apparently the failed inertial unit correctly produced a fault indication. Then, two minutes after the fault indication, it started producing bad pitch data. This resulted in a pitch-down command from the flight control system, which was trying to stabilize the aircraft but running off bad data. Maximum pitch down was 8.5 degrees and the aircraft only lost 650 feet of altitude. But at the tail end of the aircraft, the accelerations were high. The injured passengers were probably not belted in.

The air data units themselves are made by either Honeywell or Litton (now Northrup-Grumman). So far, the manufacturer hasn't been identified publicly.

Loss of inertial reference is serious. The pilot's artificial horizon display was also producing wrong data. In clouds, the pilot can't reliably tell which way is up. But at least an Airbus is basically stable. In unstable aircraft that require active control to fly at all, like most of the stealthed aircraft, this is an eject situation.

(I've dealt with inertial problems in robot ground vehicles. Our DARPA Grand Challenge vehicle worked badly because we had about 4 degrees of heading noise in the inertial system. We tried to compensate for that in software, but never got the compensation to work well enough. We needed to upgrade to a far more expensive fibre optic gyro. After we donated the vehicle to UC Santa Cruz, they got a FOG gyro and are currently installing it.)

Re:Lost inertial reference

[tqft]

http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/10/16/2392534.htm

"Air safety investigators say they will look into claims signals from a naval communications base near Exmouth in Western Australia's north may have caused last week's Qantas mid-air emergency."

"The communications base was originally used by the US Navy."

This is actually good news

[ChrisA90278]

It would be FAR worse of an electronic device would have been found to have caused the problem. That would mean I could design a "death ray" transmitter. The powerfull microwave with a beam antenna. I aim it at airliners as they fly over. No need to get a bomb past TSA. What a disaster that would be.

Now it sounds like they can fix this with some procedural changes and training and later with a software fix.

Redundancy information

[Okian Warrior]

Okay, I am an avionics software engineer, who also understands electronics. Here's some info.

I cannot comment on the Airbus specifically, since I did not work on it directly, but on other aircraft (747, &c) it works like this:

There are 2 air data computers. These take in sensor reading from various parts of the ship and calculate results based on these readings and then distribute the information to other parts of the ship via an internal communications bus.

Sometimes the calculations are performed by the remote device and the ADC just passes them on; for example, the altimeter takes air pressure readings and calculates altitude and airspeed.

I'm glossing over some details for clarity, but you get the overall picture.

That's the theory, now let's look at reality and personal experience.

1) It turns out that a bad solder joint can act like a diode (perhaps someone from the physics department can further explain?), so an AC signal passing through such a joint will generate high frequency interference, much like a light dimmer does. On past aircraft there have been instances where quite a bit of EM interference was generated and such interference has been a problem BUT... ...those were instances of bad solder joints on devices actually installed in the aircraft, and which were directly coupled to other devices, so it's no big surprise that massive amounts of high frequency interference were getting fed to other systems and causing general mayhem.

The general fear is that your iPod might have such a fault, and that the random frequency it generates is exactly what is needed to spoof a signal needed by system. Some of the older navigation systems are based on "presence of RF signal", and could conceivably be confused by a much closer/much weaker transmitter.

Modern nav signals are modulated in various ways, so that the system can tell the difference between a real signal and noise.

2) Having written software which receives information from both nav computers, one might ask the question: What do you do when the nav computers disagree?

In a modern aircraft, YOU IGNORE IT. We found cases where the nav computers disagreed on the altitude calculation by 600 feet, which is a HUGE differential. If you try to throw up some sort of error message, maintenance will pull your product (not the broken computers) and send it back with a note saying "it keeps showing an error message".

This, of course, is very expensive for everyone involved. The process never ends, and the nav computers never get repaired. So the expedient solution is to ignore problems you discover in other people's devices and keep your mouth shut. So long as it's not your product that knocks the plane out of the sky, you're good.

3) A curious feature of software is that it's repeatable. If you give it the same inputs, it will calculate the same outputs every time.

So the question arises, if you have two identical devices making calculations on identical input data and there's a fault in the software, will redundancy do any good?

What we found is that identical systems will behave identically, and if one side goes haywire the other side will screw up in exactly the same way, and there will generally be no way to detect this. If the input doesn't seem quite right, then check it with the other side. It's saying the same thing? Well, OK. It must be correct... it just seems funny though.

(Note: You generally can't use different algorithms for your calculations, because there really aren't that many ways to multiply rate times time, for instance. All the behaviour is precisely specified and there aren't too many ways to code "if this happens, do that". Also, having multiple algorithms would *double* the amount of certification work you need, since it would result in essentially two different devices. Certification costs 15x the amount of development.)

This is why software systems on aircraft have extremely strict internal consistency requirements - it's mu

why accuse before the review?

[saintsfan]

I don't understand why accusations are made before the review has been performed and conclusions drawn. I'm not sure whether anyone suffered from this specifically, but it doesn't seem responsible or professional.

irrelevant and incorrect

[celtic_hackr]

The problem is that the fly-by-wire computer in the Airbus determines the state of the plane. The plane will only stabilize if the computer tells the plane to. The fact that the plane has a stable design is irrelevant to the fact that the computer controls the plane and not the pilot. If the computer decides that crashing the plane is the proper thing to do, there is nothing anyone can do except take out the computer. This is not your grandfather's autopilot. Think more along the lines of Airplane 2's autopilot, which is where I think Airbus gets it's design from [cue MI theme music].

You're also wrong on the stability of military aircraft. Several US fighter jets and even the new bombers are not aerodynamically stable, and cannot be flown by hand. Many others are also only aerodynamically stable at supersonic speeds. You can prove this by making Styrofoam replicas of military aircraft and launching them by hand. An aerodynamically stable design will glide, and one that is not will crash spectacularly. If you cannot make a glider of an aircraft design, then it is not aerodynamically stable at subsonic speeds.

Re:irrelevant and incorrect

[DaveAtFraud]

With an aerodynamically stable airplane, if the attitude control computer fails, it's still may be possible to fly it "by hand." With an unstable airplane, the only thing the pilot can do is punch out under the same circumstances. Fly by wire (and lots of computing power) makes it possible to control an airplane that is aerodynamically unstable; it does not require that the plane be unstable. That's a design decision. Hopefully Airbus, etc. still provide the equivalent of a turn and bank indicator, rate of climb indicator, and gyro-compass so the pilot has a chance of flying the plane even if the attitude control computer goes wonky (and a way to take the attitude control compuer off-line).

Your second example is very bogus. As an example, a flying wing such as the B-2 will make a very poor Styrofoam glider but the origins of the flying wing goes back to WWII. Quite obviously, the B-35, N9M, etc. didn't have a flight control computers but were controllable none the less. The problem with your example is that modeling things like the effect of a wing's dihedral on Styrofoam glider scales and speeds is difficult to do. This is primarily a result of the simple fact that lots of effects such as boundary layer conditions are not linear. It takes a huge amount of effort to craft an aerodynamic replica of a full size airplane that allows wind tunnel tests to be run on scale models and still get valid results. Just because a styrofoam model doesn't glide says little or nothing about the stability of the full size airplane.

Cheers,
Dave

Re:irrelevant and incorrect

[Littleman_TAMU]

Wouldn't your replica have to have the same CG and CP as the real plane? I would think you'd also have to throw the plane at the same relative speed and in a way that mimics the real engines. I call BS. I'm not an aero engineer, but I (think I) know enough to know that simply making a scale model that *looks* like a plane doesn't mean it's a good approximation of the real thing.

Re:irrelevant and incorrect

[celtic_hackr]

I never said a plane that wasn't aerodynamically stable couldn't be flown by hand, only that current military ones can't. While the flying wing was controllable without aid of a computer control, it is aerodynamically unstable and killed many pilots, which is why the Air Force stopped using them, until they had the ability to use computer control.

I never said it was easy to make a Styrofoam replica of a full size airplane. Stop trying to make my words say things they didn't. Don't make me pull out airfoil designs and engineering schematics and fluid dynamics equations to prove that what I said is true.

You're absolutely wrong, an accurate scale model glider absolutely will tell precisely how aerodynamically stable a full size plane will be at sub-sonic speeds. It doesn't have to be Styrofoam, I was just using an example material; use any appropriate material you like.

If a 3' wingspan model plane sinks like a rock when launched so will 30' wingspan full size plane. Lastly, I choose Styrofoam because it gives an advantage in having natural buoyancy tendencies and will make even some poor aerodynamic designs flight capable, even when there might not be comparable materials to make a full size craft light enough to achieve sufficient lift.

Re:irrelevant and incorrect

[celtic_hackr]

I never said to make one that "looks" like the actual plane, I said "replica". A replica is a precise copy at a scaled size. It has to be precisely the same in all aerodynamic aspects including yes center of gravity, but not all aspect of the plane need to be duplicated to determine simply aerodynamic stability at sub-sonic speeds. It's not an easy task that just anyone could do. Which is why I didn't say go down to you local hobby shop and assemble a scaled model and try to fly it. I am educated as an Aerospace Engineer. But rather than sit down and spout engineering speak, I chose to just use lay English.

Remember, we were talking about the ability of a plane to self-correct itself aerodynamically speaking, not whether it was possible to fly a plane through intervention. It is certainly possible to fly many things that are not aerodynamically stable, and all commercial craft are aerodynamically stable. It is only military aircraft that are pushing the envelope, to obtain key military advantages not possible inside that framework.

All of which is irrelevant to the fact that the Airbus plane in question could self correct if allowed to or be corrected by the pilots if allowed to, but the system is built in such a way as to lock out the manual control of the plane in certain situations and to take away manual control in certain situations. Hence these planes cannot be prevented from crashing once the onboard system is convinced it must do something that will in actuality cause a crash. All the pilots can do is sit and watch it happen, or bail out if they can.

Not Swiss German

[L-Train8]

Not Swiss German. Just normal German with typical internet spelling and grammar.

Penny Arcade reference

[L-Train8]

A kid with a GameBoy, huh?

Mechanized overlords?

[DinDaddy]

I thought we would all die in the rise of the machines, not the descent of the machines.

Re:Becoming less true...

[colinnwn]

Historically all aircraft have been self-trimming, otherwise they were more likely than not to end up a big smoking hole in the ground. Another notable exception is the Concorde, which predates the F-117.

But with fly by wire, there is really no reason for aircraft to fly stable. The difference between normal flight with the aircraft under pilot control, and autopilot, is a shade of grey. If the computer is always flying the aircraft why make the aircraft more stable, when you could make the aircraft more responsive or more efficient instead and have the computer keep it on the straight and narrow.

Lightning

[Anonymous Coward]

I think its funny how they freak out over a cellphone being on..... but have little problem fly/landing while there is lightning around.

computer controlled aircraft

[Anonymous Coward]

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for flying Quantas airlines. This is your flight control computer speaking, reminding you that, now that computers completely control the aircraft, nothing can go wrong.... go wrong... go wrong... go wrong... go wrong...

Re:Don't forget the spin SPIN SPIN SPIN!

[davidsyes]

"On the other hand, there is no incentive to design such instability into an airliner and lots of reasons not to (like what happens when the autopilot fails)."

But, that makes flight... less ... interesting.

I rather LIKE *most* (but not all) of the turbulence. Sometimes, I had to stick my face between the window and seat to keep my smiles out of view. However, on a trip to Asia in '98, the Air France plane's wings were literally (virtually/almost) flapping like a bird (well, exaggerating...), but it was *quite* noticeable. On landing, the touchdown was so stiff i thought the gear would fail or penetrate the deck.

On an SWA flight from Seattle, same time frame, we had that massive weather front on the West Coast. The turbulence was so horrible, i wasn't smiling on that flight. Nobody was. It was so bad we kept losing altitude, couldn't evade, had little or no room to climb, and it kept getting worse. It got so much worse the SWA attendants were passing out extra food, began jumping around and playing games, and did anything they could to create laughter to distract us from the outside.

When we safely touched down in San Jose, we ALL burst out in cheers. IIRC, some people had tears in their eyes, and seemed drained by the experience. I think everyone of us thanked the cockpit crew and the attendants, but really it was fate/karma/engineering and weather that individually could have yanked our plugs.

Last Message in the Log...

[Anonymous Coward]

Reboot Complete, current altitude -9.

What about the ...

[mdjohnst]

Okay so it wasn't someones phone that did it, but this is not the first instance of aircraft instrument trouble in that area. Now what else is in the area of Exmouth? 1 : The phased antenna array, 2 : Pine gap .. Americas installation which is part of the echalon program. now both of these, the phased antenna array in particular pump out massive amounts of em interference. Since this isnt the first instance of plane trouble in the area, merely the most reported/ serious, maybe they should look into the EM in the area and see if that could be having an effect. Thats alot more EM then all the mobile phones in Perth city put together. I know the airbus systems are pretty heavily computerised, but I am not sure about how hardened they are. I know someone on here said they are an auto pilot engineer. Thoughts?

Anonymous Coward

[Anonymous Coward]

"But even with the autopilot off, the plane's flight control computers still command key controls"

WTF ? Pilot should have a red button that when pressed shuts down all computers and allows to take over the ship under total manual control