Domain: cryptome.org
Stories and comments across the archive that link to cryptome.org.
Comments · 1,257
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Re:And apparently Stratfor...
None of the laws you cite are valid, because: Assange was not under the jurisdiction of the United States at the time. He can't commit treason against the U.S. in the same way that you can't commit treason against China. As far as I know there is no international law covering postal services - this is covered by cross-boder treaties like the 1874 Treaty of Bern, not the legal system. International law covers things like war and genocide, it does not cover privacy of communications. Revealing the identity of intelligence officers isn't an international law crime either, otherwise all those Americans who mirrored the MI6 agent list would have been prosecuted.
If the actions of Assange were a crime in the country that he was resident in at the time, then it is their responsibility to prosecure him, under their own laws. At the time of the release, legal commenters said that it would be very difficult to prosecute, because the leaks were in turn published by the New York Times: in effect, any action against Assange would also have to be an action against the NYT, which would bring up First Amendment issues. I also recall reading at the time that no U.S. newspaper has ever been prosecuted for publishing leaked information.
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Re:*Stomps foot*
They played their hand right here. It isnt about actual harm its about control '.' RIAA also says it's 'virtually impossible' to prove that a site infringed willfully, as OPEN requires." what this tells me (we already know this here) is that it was never about protecting artists, it was never about doing the right thing, it was always about control
Yep. It's pellucidly clear at this point that they're less concerned about absolute profit and the "rights of artists", and more concerned about absolute control of content distribution. It doesn't even matter if they hold the rights to a particular work or not: they feel entitled to control where and how it is viewed, played or read, and to be in charge of (*cough*) revenue distribution (I use the term loosely.) A few years ago, one record company executive complained that Steve Jobs and Apple Computer were being selfish by keeping the profits from iPod sales. He said he was "still waiting for Apple to share out some of the profits from iPod sales." This on top of the fact that they were already receiving the lion's share of iTunes music sales, and making more money than ever before: why the man's head didn't explode on the spot still amazes me. Translating music-industry speak into a real language, it comes out more like this: "You stole our control of content distribution, you bastard, and we don't like that, so you should compensate us handsomely for it." Yeah, sure. Whatever you want to say about Jobs, he knew how to play hardball with the music industry.
Fact is, they've never forgiven the scientists and engineers of this world for many things ... the player piano, audio tape recording, the VCR, writeable optical media, DAT, flash memory, general-purpose computing and, of course, the Internet. Anything, a n y t h i n g, that they perceive as a threat they attempt to destroy, even though they've ultimately made billions on those technologies that they failed to suppress (such as the VCR.) You'd think their stockholders would have picked upon on that by now, and risen up to slay them. Regardless, given the opportunity the sociopathic Luddo-freaks running the entertainment companies of the world would eliminate most of the technological advances in consumer electronics for the past hundred years. They would do so in a heartbeat, with a grand sense of entitlement that would make lifetime welfare recipients look positively progressive.
The other problem with the content cartels and front organizations like the RIAA (well, one of many) is that they a. lie at every opportunity and b. have cried wolf so many times, for so little reason, that anyone with even half a functioning cerebral cortex will dismiss anything they say as the ravings of the psychotic weasels that they truly are. And I mean that sincerely: any individual or group that is willing to cause so much damage to legal systems around the world, to risk disrupting the greatest asset to modern civilization, the Internet itself, should be given a very public psych evaluation. Then they should be locked up until they realize how unimportant they truly are in the overall scheme of things. And then ... well, at that point they should probably be taken out back and shot.
"I say to you that the VCR is to the American film producer and the American public as the Boston strangler is to the woman home alone." -- Jack Valenti, 1982 For decades Jack was the voice other Motion Picture Association of America. He led the charge to get the VCR made illegal.
When that man died and was undoubtedly cast straight down into the Pit I, for one, didn't shed many tears. Unfortunately, not much has changed since then either, other than that they've infiltrated more governments around the world ... different people, same mindset. -
Re:Security through obscurity
Re : "IBM to avoid a potential weakness in the random S-boxes"
http://cryptome.org/nsa-v-all.htm "For this reason IBM developed Lucifer* with a key 128 bits long. But before it submitted the cipher to the NBS, it mysteriously broke off more than half the key."
"As a result of closed-door negotiations with officials of the NSA, IBM agreed to reduce the size of its key from 128 bits to 56 bits. The company also agreed to classify certain details about their selection of the eight S-boxes for the cipher." *Lucifer was first sold as a cash-dispensing system. -
Re:Names Please?
Khaled el-Masri http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khalid_El-Masri was "released" at night on a desolate road in Albania after US rendition.
More at http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,490514,00.html
The NSA may be at Shkoder http://cryptome.org/jya/nsa-scs.htm -
Re:But which places are...
Stay away from the UK, Canada, Australia ect. via http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UK–USA_Security_Agreement
Stay away from anywhere the UK/US has had bases "British Bases in Cyprus and Signals Intelligence" e.g. http://cryptome.org/2012/01/0060.pdf
Stay away from anywhere that has cheap telco peering loops to the USA thats going to save you lots .....
Your down to failed states, theocracies, Kingdoms, disputed zones with expensive telcos, changing local laws, taxes, gifts and investors fine print.
If you upset the USA, most of the EU has friends willing to help with some form of rendition.
Enjoy classified charges, no lawyer to evaluate or challenge the evidence. -
Re:Correction for the title.
Ah yes, [Citation needed], AKA, "I'm far too lazy to check the facts, but I'm going to disagree with you regardless, because I prefer to wallow in my own ignorance."
What are you disputing exactly? Here, have a bunch of links, not that I expect you to read them if you can't even be arsed to use Google to confirm a point:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3074669.stm
http://cryptome.org/ltte-vigil.htm
There's plenty more sources out there, it's a pretty well researched area. I'm not sure what exactly you're disputing, because you just posted a meaningless one liner, but terrorist groups of all shapes and sizes have long used counterfeit goods as a source of funding, as has organised crime. If you're not disputing that I can only assume you're disputing that these groups act in the UK, and if it's that you're disputing I can only ask, where have you been for the last few decades? There's been many cases of individuals linked to terrorism being guilty of financing terrorism in the UK- and they're only the ones the police have detected and been able to build enough evidence for a criminal case against. You only have to look at my 3rd link to see the scale of the Tamil operations in the UK to see that they absolutely are operating here.
Honestly, I'm all for defending digital piracy, but let's please not try and blur it all in together and hide the ugly facts of physical piracy. Read my other post in response to the AC that replied to me - I made it quite clear that I actually see digital piracy as the cure to physical piracy which genuinely does fund terrorism and organised crime.
If people are going to start lumping physical piracy in with digital piracy and argue that piracy is fine, then the battle is already lost, because those defending piracy really are genuinely being irrational at that point, and the MPAA really can bill them as terrorist sympathisers. That's not right, because digital piracy is a separate issue, with separate knock on effects - the effects of digital diracy are IMO harmless, and potentially even beneficial (increased access to knowledge, no evidence of decreased profits as a result), whilst the effects of physical piracy are quite problematic (funding of organised crime etc.). As I say, the former can actually act as a market that counters the latter, which means digital piracy likely actually decreases funding for terrorism and organised crime because people are no longer buying counterfeit content when they can download it at home. They will though, if that option is taken away.
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PsyOps, OSS, CIA, and a rubberhose in a crypotree!
I BREAK FOR WATER BOARDING!
:: PsyOps ::
+ http://www.pipeline.com/~psywarrior :: The Office of Strategic Services :::
+ http://guardianspies.com/
+ http://osssociety.org/
+ http://ossreborn.com/
+ http://ossog.org/
+ http://ossinitaly.org/
+ http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/oss/oss.htm :: CIA ::
+ http://www.zoklet.net/totse/en/politics/central_intelligence_agency/index.html
+ http://cryptome.org/0005/cia-iqt-spies.htm
+ http://www.youtube.com/user/ciagov
+ http://www.flickr.com/photos/ciagov
+ http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1004145-1,00.html
+ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KUBARK
+ https://www.cia.gov/ ::: WoW! :::
+ http://publicintelligence.net/
+ http://cryptocomb.org/
+ http://www.cryptome.org/
+ http://www.cryptogon.com/
+ http://afio.com/
+ http://www.afcea.org/signal/signalscape/
+ http://rijmenants.blogspot.com/ -
PsyOps, OSS, CIA, and a rubberhose in a crypotree!
I BREAK FOR WATER BOARDING!
:: PsyOps ::
+ http://www.pipeline.com/~psywarrior :: The Office of Strategic Services :::
+ http://guardianspies.com/
+ http://osssociety.org/
+ http://ossreborn.com/
+ http://ossog.org/
+ http://ossinitaly.org/
+ http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/oss/oss.htm :: CIA ::
+ http://www.zoklet.net/totse/en/politics/central_intelligence_agency/index.html
+ http://cryptome.org/0005/cia-iqt-spies.htm
+ http://www.youtube.com/user/ciagov
+ http://www.flickr.com/photos/ciagov
+ http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1004145-1,00.html
+ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KUBARK
+ https://www.cia.gov/ ::: WoW! :::
+ http://publicintelligence.net/
+ http://cryptocomb.org/
+ http://www.cryptome.org/
+ http://www.cryptogon.com/
+ http://afio.com/
+ http://www.afcea.org/signal/signalscape/
+ http://rijmenants.blogspot.com/ -
Re:Is it worth a year in a hellhole?
A "trap" as in going from http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/01/social-radar-sees-minds/ - been watched
to been a COINTELPRO (Counter Intelligence Program) like trap - 'lets download tools and ..."
or http://cryptome.org/0006/anonymous-wabc.htm
http://cryptome.org/0006/anonymous-mused.htm -
Re:Is it worth a year in a hellhole?
A "trap" as in going from http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/01/social-radar-sees-minds/ - been watched
to been a COINTELPRO (Counter Intelligence Program) like trap - 'lets download tools and ..."
or http://cryptome.org/0006/anonymous-wabc.htm
http://cryptome.org/0006/anonymous-mused.htm -
Re:DHS = Ministerium fur Staatssicherheit
Actually, here is the list: http://cryptome.org/2012/01/0001.pdf (its long..so go check if your favorite site is on there)
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More detail - please
Link to some more sources people
http://cryptome.org/2012/01/0035.htmhttp://www.dhs.gov/files/publications/gc_1281732303362.shtm#3
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Re:After all the advancements in cryptography
If every point of sale, transfer, bank network and card is well encrypted the GCHQ and NSA will be very unhappy.
For how long will they be able set and flood the world with very low cost weak crypto is the question.
http://cryptome.org/nsa-v-all.htm
Setting the Data Encryption Standard (DES) was the hint. -
Re:incredible
The same thinking that went into the 56 bit Data Encryption Standard as been "free of any statistical or mathematical weaknesses"?
http://cryptome.org/nsa-v-all.htm
If its crypto and many people use it - expect it to be weak, carrieriqed ect.
The real trick is getting so many very very smart people to buy into wifi and use it around the world as usable.... safe.... -
Re:Trust?
Re "If it's phoning home, we can detect it."
The problem is not so much what is "phoning home" everyday but the carrieriq like layer between any shipped phone in parts of the world wrt https and all input.
From 2006 "FBI taps cell phone mic as eavesdropping tool" http://news.cnet.com/2100-1029-6140191.html
Before that you had the fun of the safe 56 bits and the Data Encryption Standard.
More at http://cryptome.org/nsa-v-all.htm
Products have shipped for generations before smart people began to discover what they had really installed and recommended beyond the accepted public math and low price. -
Re:Duh!
It's a pretty famous case*, a special European commission was even formed to investigate it.
For the lazy: http://cryptome.org/echelon-ep-fin.htm
[*] ie. a Google for something like "nsa boeing airbus" would have found a cite in seconds
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Re:I Agree
For the same reason that the Boston strangler should be allowed access to women alone at home a.k.a. because you should stuff your stupid analogies right back where they came from.
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cryptome.org had some great posts on SSL
http://cryptome.org/0005/ssl-broken.htm on this issue.
Welcome to en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clipper_chip, Enigma or the fun of Data Encryption Standard era standards in your new safe browser. -
Re:Digitask
Cryptome has this leaked Digitask presentation, detailing how their "Remote Forensic Software" product works. Among others, the presentation lists HTTPS, IM-Clients, encrypted POP, SMTP, GPG, VPN, Skype and disk-encryption as possible targets for their "LI" (Lawful(!) Interception) systems.
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And to add to the mixhttp://cryptogon.com/?p=25289
http://cryptome.org/0005/ssl-broken.htm
(Correction: SRI is Stanford Research International. It was originally called Stanford Research Institute so as to suggest it was affiliated with Stanford University -- located nearby -- but after a lawsuit from Stanford, SRI changed the I to "International.")
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Data Retention PDF
http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/cellular-spy.pdf -- Shows retention durations of a few major providers, and lists various types of data retentions.
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Re:Protest is in the news & has a goal
There are photos and videos here:
http://www.cryptome.org/ -
Re:Any reliable coverage?
I think cryptome has some great photos, and probably a few other links too. http://cryptome.org/ If you look on the front page, there are multiple "Occupy Wall Street: links.
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Re:Because it isn't really news
Except that it is a real protest - large or small - that addresses one of the most hideous beasts in the known universe. Some images can be seen here: http://cryptome.org/info/bologna-abuser/bologna-abuser.htm and elsewhere on the site.
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Re:Links & hints to the data
Originally full release was certainly what I understood him to want. He's also been under pressure from places like Cryptome (heartwarming story of recovering "the Beast" there). I can quite believe that he's glad that someone has given him the excuse. That doesn't take away from the fact that the Guardian's release of the files completely changes the game.
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Links & hints to the data
http://cryptome.org/z/z.7z (368MB) pwd: ACollectionOfDiplomaticHistorySince_1966_ToThe_PresentDay# http://pastebin.com/SBq9Xpsr http://cryptome.org/xyz/x.gpg.torrent (Returns xyz_x.gpg, 409MB. No passphrase yet) http://cryptome.org/xyz/y.gpg.torrent (Returns xyz_y.gpg, 88MB. No passphrase yet) http://cryptome.org/xyz/y-docs.gpg.torrent (Returns xyz_y-docs.gpg, 8MB. No passphrase yet) http://cryptome.org/xyz/z.gpg.torrent (Returns xyz_z.gpg, 368MB. Passphrase below) "xyz_z.gpg" and "z.gpg" appear to be identical and both decrypt to "z.7z." The decrypted file is "z.7z," 368MB, which unzips to "cables.csv," about 1.7GB in size, dated 4/12/2010.
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Links & hints to the data
http://cryptome.org/z/z.7z (368MB) pwd: ACollectionOfDiplomaticHistorySince_1966_ToThe_PresentDay# http://pastebin.com/SBq9Xpsr http://cryptome.org/xyz/x.gpg.torrent (Returns xyz_x.gpg, 409MB. No passphrase yet) http://cryptome.org/xyz/y.gpg.torrent (Returns xyz_y.gpg, 88MB. No passphrase yet) http://cryptome.org/xyz/y-docs.gpg.torrent (Returns xyz_y-docs.gpg, 8MB. No passphrase yet) http://cryptome.org/xyz/z.gpg.torrent (Returns xyz_z.gpg, 368MB. Passphrase below) "xyz_z.gpg" and "z.gpg" appear to be identical and both decrypt to "z.7z." The decrypted file is "z.7z," 368MB, which unzips to "cables.csv," about 1.7GB in size, dated 4/12/2010.
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Links & hints to the data
http://cryptome.org/z/z.7z (368MB) pwd: ACollectionOfDiplomaticHistorySince_1966_ToThe_PresentDay# http://pastebin.com/SBq9Xpsr http://cryptome.org/xyz/x.gpg.torrent (Returns xyz_x.gpg, 409MB. No passphrase yet) http://cryptome.org/xyz/y.gpg.torrent (Returns xyz_y.gpg, 88MB. No passphrase yet) http://cryptome.org/xyz/y-docs.gpg.torrent (Returns xyz_y-docs.gpg, 8MB. No passphrase yet) http://cryptome.org/xyz/z.gpg.torrent (Returns xyz_z.gpg, 368MB. Passphrase below) "xyz_z.gpg" and "z.gpg" appear to be identical and both decrypt to "z.7z." The decrypted file is "z.7z," 368MB, which unzips to "cables.csv," about 1.7GB in size, dated 4/12/2010.
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Links & hints to the data
http://cryptome.org/z/z.7z (368MB) pwd: ACollectionOfDiplomaticHistorySince_1966_ToThe_PresentDay# http://pastebin.com/SBq9Xpsr http://cryptome.org/xyz/x.gpg.torrent (Returns xyz_x.gpg, 409MB. No passphrase yet) http://cryptome.org/xyz/y.gpg.torrent (Returns xyz_y.gpg, 88MB. No passphrase yet) http://cryptome.org/xyz/y-docs.gpg.torrent (Returns xyz_y-docs.gpg, 8MB. No passphrase yet) http://cryptome.org/xyz/z.gpg.torrent (Returns xyz_z.gpg, 368MB. Passphrase below) "xyz_z.gpg" and "z.gpg" appear to be identical and both decrypt to "z.7z." The decrypted file is "z.7z," 368MB, which unzips to "cables.csv," about 1.7GB in size, dated 4/12/2010.
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Links & hints to the data
http://cryptome.org/z/z.7z (368MB) pwd: ACollectionOfDiplomaticHistorySince_1966_ToThe_PresentDay# http://pastebin.com/SBq9Xpsr http://cryptome.org/xyz/x.gpg.torrent (Returns xyz_x.gpg, 409MB. No passphrase yet) http://cryptome.org/xyz/y.gpg.torrent (Returns xyz_y.gpg, 88MB. No passphrase yet) http://cryptome.org/xyz/y-docs.gpg.torrent (Returns xyz_y-docs.gpg, 8MB. No passphrase yet) http://cryptome.org/xyz/z.gpg.torrent (Returns xyz_z.gpg, 368MB. Passphrase below) "xyz_z.gpg" and "z.gpg" appear to be identical and both decrypt to "z.7z." The decrypted file is "z.7z," 368MB, which unzips to "cables.csv," about 1.7GB in size, dated 4/12/2010.
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Re:Buckle up folks...
I can definitely agree to this. I can go further and point to an existing example: Cryptome, which has been around since 1997 or so.
all it would take is for it to be expanded a little bit.
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Re:Password
Poster of #37272208 here. Re-confirmed that "z.gpg" (368881482 bytes) decrypts with "ACollectionOfDiplomaticHistorySince_1966_ToThe_PresentDay#" to "z" (368027580 bytes) which is a 7z file. This uncompresses to "cables.csv" (1730507223 bytes).
Acquired via z.gpg.torrent (link from http://cryptome.org/).
Note that this could be part of insurance.aes256, which is 1.4 gigs. But I somehow doubt that Wikileaks would punish the informants like that simply as a "from hells heart I stab at thee" act. But maybe.
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Re:Password
Poster of #37272208 here. Re-confirmed that "z.gpg" (368881482 bytes) decrypts with "ACollectionOfDiplomaticHistorySince_1966_ToThe_PresentDay#" to "z" (368027580 bytes) which is a 7z file. This uncompresses to "cables.csv" (1730507223 bytes).
Acquired via z.gpg.torrent (link from http://cryptome.org/).
Note that this could be part of insurance.aes256, which is 1.4 gigs. But I somehow doubt that Wikileaks would punish the informants like that simply as a "from hells heart I stab at thee" act. But maybe.
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Re:would somebody tell me
Yes massive cost cutting and "positional asphyxia" over the years "Deaths in police custody since 1998: 333; officers convicted: none"
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/dec/03/deaths-police-custody-officers-convicted
http://cryptome.org/info/totten-protest/totten-protest-01.htm
The Darcus Howe interview with the BBC is very telling too. -
This is Official Chinese Policy
This is part of China's asymmetric warfare strategy laid out in this document over ten years ago:
Unrestricted Warfare
by Qiao Liang and Wang XiangsuiRead through the document. China is at war with the US because the Chinese Politburo knows that the only way they can hold on to power in the long run is to crush all viable alternative economic systems. The accumulation of US debt, the hacking of US and Western systems, and the ongoing Charm Offensive are all designed to put the US and the West in a position where we are forced into the Chinese model.
Most likely, politicians don't say anything because they are simply too scared. I'm sure China has dirt on many of our leaders. This is why we have not pressed China on WTO issues such as undervaluing the Chinese currency and the rare earth mineral export ban -- both of which are illegal under the treaties China signed in 2001.
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And we have to get used to even more surveillance
Cryptome just released news that the FBI is trying to put surveillance software on every PC as a way to deal with anonymous criminals. http://cryptome.org/0005/fbi-trojan.pdf see for yourself.
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Re:Unfortunately....
On the other hand, decrypting data amounts to interpreting evidence for the prosecutor. Suppose the defendant had been using secret code words, known only to her and her co-conspirators; should the prosecutor have the right to compel her to explain those code-words? What makes AES any different, other than the fact that it is a well-designed and difficult to crack cipher?
The argument that the police will be unable to gather evidence if criminals use encryption is just as weak, considering the techniques they have developed for defeating such measures:
http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/crypto-spy.pdf -
Cooper still operating
I'm surprised Cooper continues to operate since the NRC identified escape route problems in 1994.
"The elevated river level caused the closure of several area roads including a portion of Interstate 29 and Route 136 in the State of Missouri which isolated one of the planned emergency evacuation routes."
http://cryptome.org/0004/cooper-npp-flood.htm
Don't raft down stream I guess. -
Re:History in the making
Extended "because of the leaks" which they are hiding and the NRC denies but somehow we let foreigners slip into our nuclear facility and publish the data on the International Atomic Energy Agency site (or similar international nuclear regulatory committee??) but you conveniently cant find or remember any of the links? Why don't you check out: Cryptome. Course maybe they're part of the nation-wide conspiracy to and are just doctoring up photos of the plant safely behind the aquadam. After all, you read something somewhere on the internet that you can't remember.
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Re:More like iDoughnut
copied the link wrong, sorry:
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Re:What about this particular instance?
You have to mine bitcoins in blocks. Blocks have 50 bitcoins. That's where the magic number 50 comes from. (No, I don't know why this is.)
There are quite a few 'pools' out there where everyone involved helps and if someone in the pool finds it, everyone splits the win.
Yes, this sounds just like a lottery pool because it is. http://cryptome.org/0004/bitcoin-lottery.htm Bitcoin is one giant lottery with winners every day.
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Re:The Onion Router
Tor may hide the endpoints to a midpoint party, but you can bet it would only be a matter of time before the closest exit node to Pakistan would be honeypotted.
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Re:Whack-a-mole
Ok, sorry, yes, the reactor in Fukushima is inside a concrete shell. However, the storage pool is not. Further, the Fukushima concrete shell was not designed for explosive or impact containment, because it seems it was broken apart by the hydrogen explosion in at least one of the reactor buildings (which I gather was outside of the concrete containment). Pictures taken from the air of the damaged buildings appear to show the top of the actual reactor pressure vessel (which was itself inside a steel containment vessel) exposed in at least reactor 4:
http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-npp8/daiichi-photos8.htm
I.e. the Fukushima design does NOT appear to have had any high-strength concrete containment, other than one designed for general structural support and low-pressure vapour/liquid containment.
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Re:never
so now, due to the wikileaks embarrassment, we have government departments adjusting their policies, discouraging information sharing and keeping their info segregated
You may agree or not, but that is precisely Assange's stated goal, http://cryptome.org/0002/ja-conspiracies.pdf
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Re:Misleading summary
For the BSD users http://cryptome.org/0003/fbi-backdoors.htm
The NSA would not really care what OS you use, its all networking in plain text and a known ip to them.
64 bit Windows 7 just reduces the malware and provides a cleaner network.
Maybe in the short term. But its just a matter of time before any Windows system is overrun with malware and viruses.
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Re:Misleading summary
For the BSD users http://cryptome.org/0003/fbi-backdoors.htm
The NSA would not really care what OS you use, its all networking in plain text and a known ip to them.
64 bit Windows 7 just reduces the malware and provides a cleaner network. -
Re:Exactly
TOR is 86% US government financed according to PGPBOARD Administrator Alan Taylor. ( http://www.pgpboard.com/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=435 ).
Why? (Aside from SIGINT made possible by their covert control over the software and many of the routers, of course.) http://cryptome.org/0003/tor-spy.htm .Don't trust TOR too much. Even if all the above were false, it is a very small network with thin traffic running over providers' links that we have known for several years are being monitored by the NSA for traffic analysis.
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Re:Fuck Geohotwhat does Apple do to jailbreakers? nothing.
Jailbreaking is distinctly different from circumventing a copy / rights protection mechanism. But of course Apple DID object to it and cited the DMCA amongst other laws. They failed because their case wasn't strong enough.
what does MS do to non commercial pirates? nothing. (except for the genuine advantage check)
People have extrapolated that because MS privately prefers pirates to be using their desktop OS than a rival's somehow it applies to consoles or other matters. It doesn't. Indeed they took down cryptome.org using the DMCA. Used it as the basis to bring criminal charges against modchip importers. And even used it to shut down a popular "homebrew" modding site JTAG hacks. In other words MS has been as active in stamping on modders / homebrew as Sony ever was.
And of course Nintendo is as active at prosecuting hackers / cart importers.
People seem to think that Sony is acting out of turn here when it isn't. It's actions are precisely in keeping with other console manufacturers, stamping on the hackers / importers and banning end users who mod. Colour me surprised. If you buy a closed system where copy protection / DRM is implicit to the model you can expect the full weight of the platform holder to come down on anyone who threatens that model. And in most jurisdictions they'll have the law on their side.
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they dont learn
TSA did the same thing a while back with the passenger screening manual. http://boardingarea.com/blogs/thewanderingaramean/2009/12/the-tsa-makes-another-stupid-move/ http://cryptome.org/0001/tsa-ssi-02.htm You would think that they put out a memo on how to properly redact digital documents?
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Re:The truth
I agree with most of your first three paragraphs, but the second two dealing with the UAV photos I have to rebut.
Note the object sitting on both pipes.
... guess it's width. Now look at he edge of the item. Care to guess how thick it is? ... Under the dust layer it is clearly Yellow. Care to guess what it is and where it came from?You're implying that it's part of the containment vessel. Let's look at a specific picture for comparison: http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-npp/pict10.jpg
My origin is at the upper left. The object you're describing is at X:20%, Y60%. Note the thickness of the cut off pipe at X:70%, Y:30%. This is thin walled stuff. In other photos you can see the twin pipes are at the same level as that raised section, and similarly supported. The containment vessel is very thick and heavy. If that was the dome or another section of the containment flung from #3, it would have destroyed or at least damaged the pipe. My analysis: It's just a chunk of wall, similar to the chunks laying in front of #4.
... look next to the reactor 3 building where the pile of plumbing is lying next to the building. All that plumbing is uniform is size. I'm thinking that is scattered fuel rods from the cooling pond.
http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-npp/pict6.jpg - Are you referring to the stuff to the lower-left of the steam, and similar-sized stuff strewn across the top of the turbine hall? I think it's too big to be fuel rods, and too small and mangled to be fuel assemblies. It looks like structural steel from the building.
Lastly, if the stuff flung up in the explosion was fuel rods or containment chunks, we'd be seeing much higher radiation levels in the vicinity of the #3 building. Instead the high levels are centered around #2, where there *was* an explosion inside containment that caused a breach.