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Yes
http://www.pawb.uscourts.gov/pdfs/transcripts.pdf

While the states can not copyright some things
http://www.wfsu.org/gavel2gavel/briefs/01-897_report.pdf

They can allow turd parties to gouge like the RIAA.
http://www.sbscpublicaccess.org/transcripts.php

Not exactly a troll in my opinion. Essentially I'm having trouble understanding your position. Do you believe that companies have the right to protect their IP but individuals and nonprofits like the FSF don't? The GPL is quite clear (if you're a lawyer, and unlike EULAs and the individual, corporations surely have lawyers to review their licenses) about what is required, just like their other contracts.

Your point that releasing their source would cause them to violate other agreements is invalid, so they should be released from it. This is equivalent to saying that since the other agreements require them not to distribute the source, and this conflicts with the GPL, they should be exempt from those other agreements.

Why should a corporate license involving monetary exchange be any different than licenses exchanging nonmonetary things of value* (a promise to release source). Do you think that corporate licenses don't also have "hooks" that make you do this or that or include an advertising clause or whatnot?

So I ask: do you believe that corporate licenses have more rights than individual/nonprofit ones? Or do you believe that a promise to release code is an invalid condition in a contract? Or perhaps the GPL isn't clear? Aside from those, I can't really see where you're basing your arguments.

Also if all they want to include is glibc or whatnot, they can just release the source to that, it's not an all or nothing thing, free and proprietary software can mix on a system (aggregation) under the LGPL, which most base GNU/Linux libraries are. And the kernel explicitly states that systems running it need NOT have all their software released under the GPL, as a clarification in a grey area.

* See Jacobsen v. Katzer, the document I link to from the still-in-progress case makes it extremely clear that nonmonetary promises of sharing alike are valid terms for the purpose of a license/contract.

Some notable qutoes fromt the actual Court of Appeals ruling http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinions/200804/07-1086-1112217.pdf

Deceptive conduct--like any other kind--must have an
anticompetitive effect in order to form the basis of a
monopolization claim. "Even an act of pure malice by one
business competitor against another does not, without more,
state a claim under the federal antitrust laws," without proof
of "a dangerous probability that [the defendant] would
monopolize a particular market." Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at
225. Even if deception raises the price secured by a seller, but
does so without harming competition, it is beyond the antitrust
laws' reach. Cases that recognize deception as exclusionary
hinge, therefore, on whether the conduct impaired rivals in a
manner tending to bring about or protect a defendant's
monopoly power. In Microsoft, for example, we found
Microsoft engaged in anticompetitive conduct when it tricked
independent software developers into believing that its
software development tools could be used to design crossplatform
Java applications when, in fact, they produced
Windows-specific ones. The deceit had caused "developers
who were opting for portability over performance . . .
unwittingly [to write] Java applications that [ran] only on
Windows." 253 F.3d at 76. The focus of our antitrust
scrutiny, therefore, was properly placed on the resulting harms
to competition rather than the deception itself.

--

We also address whether there is substantial evidence that Rambus engaged in
deceptive conduct at all, and express our serious concerns
about the sufficiency of the evidence on two particular points.

The patent is a patent application to the World Intellectual Property Organization. I'm unclear if In Re Bilski would apply, given that Bilski is an American decision.

Of course the United States could tell WIPO to go stuff it, but that doesn't set a very good precedence, given the number of U.S. corporations which would like to leverage WIPO to prevent copyright infringement abroad.

This is what you get, by the way, when you have a treaty organization (the United Nations) with a bureaucratic agency (WIPO) pretending to be a world government but without the appropriate checks on power upwards or the appropriate guarantees of power downwards. (The U.S. Constitution, by contrast, guarantees checks upwards through the democratic process, and guarantees downwards by requiring all member States to be republics. The U.N., on the other hand, is no such critter: we don't elect U.N. officials and member States are not required to be democratic.) Now I can't even make a damned sandwich without licensing the appropriate technology from Geneva...

Bilski was about business method patents not tied to any machine. The Federal Circuit tried to make this clear in the In re Bilski opinion itself (page 21):

We further reject calls for categorical exclusions beyond those for fundamental principles already identified by the Supreme Court. We rejected just such an exclusion in State Street, noting that the so-called "business method exception" was unlawful and that business method claims (and indeed all process claims) are "subject to the same legal requirements for patentability as applied to any other process or method." 149 F.3d at 1375-76.[Fn23 Therefore, although invited to do so by several amici, we decline to adopt a broad exclusion over software or any other such category of subject matter beyond the exclusion of claims drawn to fundamental principles set forth by the Supreme Court.]

It is true that the validity of many broadly drafted claims may be at issue, but many software claims just do not make sense unless the claims are understood to be tied to computational devices. For example, Beauregard claims, which are claims on a computer readable media adapted to implement a method or system, are considered patentable by the PTO. These kind of claims are very popular because they allow patent holders to go after the software distributors rather than end-users.

It will be harder to enforce software patents, now that the defense lawyers can wield Sec. 101 with more power. But it is a mistake to declare victory against software patents based on a case where all the PTO wanted was for the patent applicant to add "computer implemented" to the claim language.

Ah, here it is. DDB Tech v. MLB Advanced Media (Fed. Cir. 2008). And commentary by Dennis Crouch. I was wrong. It originated out of the 5th Circuit (Western District of Texas), but it was actually a Federal Circuit decision. So be aware of what you're signing. And if you're concerned, consult a lawyer.

Once again, this post is not legal advice.

This gives other community precedence in other lawsuits across the nation.

1. The word is precedent
2. That isn't how precedent works

First, there are two types of precedent:
A) Binding precedent is... binding
B) Persuasive precedent is not binding and can be any court decision anywhere, even outside your country.

The type you're thinking of is binding.
The only cases that become national binding precedents are filed & decided in Federal Appeals Court.
State Court decisions are, at most, applicable to the circuit.

This case was decided in City Court, which means it isn't binding anywhere other than that city.
IANAL, YMMV, etc.

I just finished reading that court document. This case ranks up there among the stupidest patent claims of all time.

CSIRO claims the use of OFDM indoors. Not that they invented OFDM transmission, because they didn't, but they were the first to come up with the brilliant idea of using it inside your house instead of outdoors. In other words, I'm totally allowed sit outside and use wireless on my laptop, but if I go inside the house then I'm infringing the patent. I swear I'm not making this shit up.

Now you're probably thinking that taking your laptop into your house is totally obvious. And now three federal judges agree.

I've been reading this court document describing the recent decision this evening. IANAL, but it seems Buffalo has presented entirely reasonable and valid evidence for prior art. Additionally, CSIRO's '069 patent as originally filed specified the 10 GHz frequency range while 802.11 A/B/G/N transmissions occur in the 2.5 and 5 GHz ranges. It seems CSIRO in 1995 amended/revised their patent to remove the very specific 10 GHz reference and instead cited the more general term 'radio frequencies'. They also added new claims specifically cited in the Buffalo case. I've only read the first 25 of 40 pages, but IMHO Buffalo has presented a strong case to be reviewed more carefully than any summary judgment ever oculd. In other words, it's not so much "they aren't paying the inventors for their work" or stealing Intellectual Property. It's more like, "Buffalo presented a case the court summarily ruled against, and CSIRO is trying to enforce a possibly invalid patent." Read the document, and make your own decision. Then come back and post some more.

Here is a link to an mp3 of the oral argument in this case, for the interested.

And here's the website for the law practice of the attorney who represented Jacobsen.

A link to the defendant's attorneys, who notably do not list intellectual property among their specialties. It is arguable that the defendant made a poor choice of attorney for this case.

And finally the Stanford lecturer who was the primary author on the amicus brief in support of Jacobsen.

This case may not be as strong a precedent as it appears at first glance. Bruce Perens's article, while informative, failed to mention a few important legal details, which I will try to fill in here. Please note that I am not a lawyer, and this is not legal advice.

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, where this case was heard, has a more limited jurisdiction than the regional circuits (1st through 11th and DC). Generally speaking, the Federal Circuit hears cases arising under the patent laws, and it also has jurisdiction over a hodgepodge of federal administrative law issues (veterans claims, the Merit Service Protection Board, certain government contracts, etc). In this case, the appeal was heard by the Federal Circuit because of a tie-in to patent law, though that was not the subject of the appeal.

Why does it matter that the Federal Circuit heard the case? It's important because the Federal Circuit does not set precedents for copyright law. Instead, it relies on the precedents of the regional circuit that would have heard the case were it not for whatever side issue brought it under Federal Circuit jurisdiction. Here, the Federal Circuit used the copyright precedents of the Ninth Circuit because the case originated in the Northern District of California, which is in the Ninth Circuit.

So, this case is really only indicative of what two (of twelve) Federal Circuit judges and one district judge from New Jersey thought the Ninth Circuit would do if the appeal were heard there. It is not binding precedent on the Federal Circuit, nor the Ninth Circuit, nor any other regional circuit. Different circuits often have different interpretations of the law (called a circuit split), which can often only be resolved by a Supreme Court decision. It would not surprise me if other circuits take differing views on the validity or precise nature of open source licenses.

I would not even take this case as saying much about the Federal Circuit's own views. As pointed out earlier, one of the appellate judges in this case is a district court judge who does not normally take part in Federal Circuit cases. I would also point out that the Federal Circuit is known for having a very broad range of judicial philosophies represented on its bench, with judges often writing dissenting opinions in patent cases. There is no guarantee that even another case before the Federal Circuit would come out the same way, especially if it originated in a different circuit.

All is not doom and gloom, however. Courts are notoriously conservative and reluctant to make the first move in a new area of the law. Now that there is something to hook into, it is possible that district courts and other circuit courts will make use of the Federal Circuit opinion as persuasive authority in their own decision making. Just beware that there is no guarantee that will happen.

This case may not be as strong a precedent as it appears at first glance. Bruce Perens's article, while informative, failed to mention a few important legal details, which I will try to fill in here. Please note that I am not a lawyer, and this is not legal advice.

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, where this case was heard, has a more limited jurisdiction than the regional circuits (1st through 11th and DC). Generally speaking, the Federal Circuit hears cases arising under the patent laws, and it also has jurisdiction over a hodgepodge of federal administrative law issues (veterans claims, the Merit Service Protection Board, certain government contracts, etc). In this case, the appeal was heard by the Federal Circuit because of a tie-in to patent law, though that was not the subject of the appeal.

Why does it matter that the Federal Circuit heard the case? It's important because the Federal Circuit does not set precedents for copyright law. Instead, it relies on the precedents of the regional circuit that would have heard the case were it not for whatever side issue brought it under Federal Circuit jurisdiction. Here, the Federal Circuit used the copyright precedents of the Ninth Circuit because the case originated in the Northern District of California, which is in the Ninth Circuit.

So, this case is really only indicative of what two (of twelve) Federal Circuit judges and one district judge from New Jersey thought the Ninth Circuit would do if the appeal were heard there. It is not binding precedent on the Federal Circuit, nor the Ninth Circuit, nor any other regional circuit. Different circuits often have different interpretations of the law (called a circuit split), which can often only be resolved by a Supreme Court decision. It would not surprise me if other circuits take differing views on the validity or precise nature of open source licenses.

I would not even take this case as saying much about the Federal Circuit's own views. As pointed out earlier, one of the appellate judges in this case is a district court judge who does not normally take part in Federal Circuit cases. I would also point out that the Federal Circuit is known for having a very broad range of judicial philosophies represented on its bench, with judges often writing dissenting opinions in patent cases. There is no guarantee that even another case before the Federal Circuit would come out the same way, especially if it originated in a different circuit.

All is not doom and gloom, however. Courts are notoriously conservative and reluctant to make the first move in a new area of the law. Now that there is something to hook into, it is possible that district courts and other circuit courts will make use of the Federal Circuit opinion as persuasive authority in their own decision making. Just beware that there is no guarantee that will happen.

And there's your sticky issue, what exactly are the damages.

From the court order itself (which you can download for about $0.40) there were a set of undisputed facts:

1. MDY began selling Glider on June 14, 2005. Through September 10, 2008, MDY has sold approximately 120,000 licenses for Glider. The amount of gross revenues received by MDY from the sale of Glider from June 14, 2005 through September 10, 2008 is approximately $3.5 million dollars.
2. Blizzard spends at least $942,614.57 per year responding to customer complaints as to bots generally and implementing a bot enforcement program to decrease the number of bots in the game. Glider represents the large majority of bots used in connection with World of Warcraft.
3. Between December 22, 2004 and March 18, 2008, Blizzard received more than 465,000 in-game petitions from users complaining about bots. Several thousand of these petitions mention Glider by name. Blizzard has continued to receive complaints about bots generally, and Glider specifically, after March 18, 2008.

There were also a set of disputed facts and legal conclusions:

1. That MDY and/or Donnelly's conduct caused harm to Blizzard both in the form of the direct expenses used to combat Glider use and infringement, as well as in the form of lost subscription revenue, lost profits, and harm to Blizzard's goodwill and reputation.
2. That Blizzard's damages expert would testify that the lost subscription revenue and harm to Blizzard's goodwill and reputation can be quantified to exceed $20 million dollars.
3. That MDY and/or Donnelly's conduct was willful and wanton and an award of the highest amount of statutory damages--$2,500 per sale of the Glider software--would be appropriate.
4. That Blizzard is entitled to an award of punitive damages against MDY and Donnelly for their intent to cause injury to Blizzard or because they were motivated by spite or ill will or because MDY and Donnelly acted to serve their own interests, having reason to know and consciously disregarding a substantial risk that their conduct might significantly injure Blizzard.

It looks like the $6M are actually stipulated damages. That is, both parties have agreed that if there are to be any damages, they will be $6M exactly. Issues of liability can still be appealed. But, issues of what the damages should be are no longer in dispute. This means that Blizzard and MDY can both keep their legal costs down. Instead of sniping about damages (spending $10 to prove $1 in damages), they can keep their lawyers arguing a handful of core legal issues.

The trick they try to do is contract state work out to private companies and then allow those companies to have the copyrights.

This is informative: Veeck vs. Southern Bldg Code (case no. 99-40632-cv2):

The issue in this en banc case is the extent to which a
private organization may assert copyright protection for its model
codes, after the models have been adopted by a legislative body and
become âoethe lawâ. Specifically, may a code-writing organization
prevent a website operator from posting the text of a model code
where the code is identified simply as the building code of a city
that enacted the model code as law?

The government got this one right!

From reading the case document one learns the following details. . .

"Creekstone Farms Premium Beef" processes 300,000 head of cattle per year. This means they're not a farm; they're a rendering plant, and that means they buy beef from anybody who sells, using whatever standards, feeds, drugs, etc., those individual farmers choose. This is the factory farm system at its full bloom, cute, trust-inspiring name aside. --And what they are trying to do is to hedge their bets against the nightmare of having to cull entire herds if tests for BSE come up positive.

So what? How is that bad?

It's bad because these guys are NOT concerned about your health. They are part of a multi-billion dollar per year industry which is being threatened by the import standards of other countries which want, very rightly so, to make sure their populations are not being poisoned.

The renderer, "Creekstone" wants to use the cheapest and fastest-working BSE testing kit on each of the cows they kill in the full knowledge that the test isn't effective. --That is, the test can only read large concentrations of BSE prions in brain tissue, and is thus more effective the older the cow is, 5 years being the mean average. Creekstone kills its cows at 24 months, and the test isn't even rated for use on cows under 30 months.

Thus the test won't actually find infected cows and Creekstone will be able to sell them with impunity.

But it's worse than that. . .

See, now if a BSE infected cow is found, all the cattle it had contact with are destroyed, resulting in an insurance premium and profit-loss nightmare. But if a cow happens to be found using this test, (which there is a slight chance happening in the most extreme cases of infection), then the company can argue that the rest of the herd should be spared because, "See, we caught the sick one! Our system worked. We don't need to cull the herd because, after all, each animal is individually tested!"

Had this action been allowed by the courts, it would have constituted a scam which would have saved the cattle industry potentially billions of dollars, and they know it. Why else would they be willing to pay the cost of 300,000 BSE testing kits per year and the extra labor required to implement those tests? When have you ever heard of a corporation deliberately deciding to increase the cost of its production system without being legally compelled to do so? --This is insurance against having to kill entire herds should mandatory testing turn up sick cows, and obviously Creekstone, --and this is the important part-- knows that there is a high enough likelihood of BSE infected cows turning up in their herds to warrant this expense.

The only way cows can get BSE is if they are fed brain tissue from other infected animals --specifically the cows which die or are wounded on the farm, and which are minced up and deliberately added into the feed supply.

If you want to eat safe, then buy local, buy free range. Free Range Organic meat tastes a LOT better, doesn't cost a whole lot more, and hey, it wont kill you.

The final point I would note here is the article itself is an example of asinine journalism. Either the journalist is corrupt or stupid or both for writing such a misleading article. That's the kind of journalism which can get people killed. We see a lot of that kind these days.

-FL

A real question here is *why* the FDA is so hell bent on blocking testing for mad cow disease... and I think we all know the reason why... the tests would reveal that mad cow disease is rampant within the US Beef supply.

As additional support for this theory, I offer this factoid: The US response to mad cow disease was to institute new regulations that mandated cows be slaughtered before they could reach the age that mad cow disease can first exhibit symptoms. This regulation does nothing to stop the spread of mad cow disease, of course, but it is very effective at sweeping the problem under the rug.

RTFA:

Because most cattle slaughtered in the United States are less than 24 months old, the most common mad cow disease test is unlikely to catch the disease, the appeals court noted. If the government does not control the tests, the USDA is worried about beef exporters unilaterally giving consumers false assurance.

The actual decision (PDF) made it clear that the company wanted to use the test that won't work. Not letting them use a test that will only give a positive result, accurate or not, is not sweeping things under a rug.

Here is the actual court decision, which contains a more detailed account of what actually happened. Among other things, it makes it clear that the source code never left the guy's home.

The names aren't usually codified, but occasionally they are. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. ch. 4,

Ok, but from my way of looking at it, they realized they made a mistake by including the name so they completely nullified the entire chapter 7 years later just to fix that error. :)

Even if the names themselves weren't codified, some statutes refer to legislation by name.

Well, that's cheating. The reference to the ECPA does not come from the ECPA itself, it came from another bill passed almost ten years later in 1996. The ECPA did not include its own name in the statutes.

Even if neither of those were true, however, the name of the legislation is often used by the judiciary to determine what Congress's intent was. See, e.g., Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008) available at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=rss_sho&shofile=07-1101_021.pdf (resolving an ambiguity in the Communications Decency Act based on the name of the legislation).

As we all know, that's just dumb given how frequently the names of bills are just political cover for changing the law to do the exact opposite, and in this case I think the court erred. But hell, reading that decision is weird. They sure seemed to rule the opposite of the way they were talking about the good samaritan clause.

U.S. District Court District of Arizona (Phoenix Division) Civil Docket For Case #: 2:06-cv-02555-DGC Assigned to: Judge David G. Campbell http://www.pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/ Pull up the legal documents for yourselves. Blizzard's Motion for Permanent Injunction is Docket #84 and the Judge's Order that found in favor of Blizzard's tortious interference with contract claim (as well as 2 copyright claims).

U.S. Disctrict Court
District of Arizona
Civil Docket For Case #: 2:06-cv-02555-DGC

Docket #83 is an Order from the Court stating that MDY is granting judgment in favor of Blizzard with respect to Blizzard's Tortious Interference with Contract Claim. This is because MDY fufilled all seven of Arizona's factors used to determine this. (Page 23, Lines 13 - 22)

The court will set a final pretrial conference by seperate order. Trial will concern the claims that remain unresolved - portions of the DMCA claim, the trademark claim, and the unjust enrichment claim - and damages or other remdies.

Go pull up the document yourselves and read what the judge has written. Its 27 pages. You can find Blizzard's Motion for Permanent Injuntion as well. That is 11 pages and docket #84.

http://www.pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/

That's not exactly true. The names aren't usually codified, but occasionally they are. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. ch. 4, available at http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode47/usc_sup_01_47_10_4.html.

Even if the names themselves weren't codified, some statutes refer to legislation by name. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. 230(e)(4), available at http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode47/usc_sec_47_00000230----000-.html ("Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the application of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986...").

Even if neither of those were true, however, the name of the legislation is often used by the judiciary to determine what Congress's intent was. See, e.g., Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008) available at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=rss_sho&shofile=07-1101_021.pdf (resolving an ambiguity in the Communications Decency Act based on the name of the legislation).

So I don't think it's true that "only historians care" about the names of legislation, because judges care, and to the extent that judges are in charge of interpreting legislation and therefore determine what the law is, anyone interested in knowing what the law is cares.

Okay, to all the people who are arguing with you, I respectfully implore: Please read the "fine" decision. The courts have said that border searches don't require reasonable grounds for suspicion because they are "different" than searches within the U.S.

Now, if this upsets you and you live in the U.S., complain to Congress. It'll take you maybe fifteen minutes to bang out a letter to your congressman/woman and your two senators explaining that you think DHS is going too far. I have already done so, and I got back nice, polite letters explaining that there's a war on terror going on, etc., etc. They're not going to listen to me and the handful of people from EFF and the ACLU. But if their email boxes are swamped with complaints from Slashdotters (and their friends and families), maybe Congress will do something. Otherwise, resign yourself to the possibility that your electronic toys may be impounded and scrutinized at the border.

The activities of the police, like those of other public officials, are subject to public scrutiny. . . . Videotaping is a legitimate means of gathering information for public dissemination and can often provide cogent evidence, as it did in this case. In sum, there can be no doubt that the free speech clause of the Constitution protected Robinson as he videotaped the defendants on October 23, 2002. . . . Moreover, to the extent that the troopers were restraining Robinson from making any future videotapes and from publicizing or publishing what he had filmed, the defendants' conduct clearly amounted to an unlawful prior restraint upon his protected speech. . . . We find that defendants are liable under [42 USC] 1983 for violating Robinson's Fourth Amendment right to be protected from an unlawful seizure. -- Judge Harvey Bartle III

http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/05D0847P.pdf

So, does this mean IT admins are going to add a few sites to the list of undesirable crackz/warez/p4sswordz addresses?

Where I said:
Your statistics are correct, however there is some additional information that should be considered.

The 9th Circuit Court processed (the courts say "terminated") 13,424 cases in 2006. That's right, over thirteen thousand. Out of thirteen thousand, 22 cases were heard by the Supreme Court, and 19 were reversed. That is not a bad record.

Data here http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsa2006.pl (choose 9th Circuit) and here http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususc/judbus.html (choose 2006).

Also, note that the appeals process is designed to overturn incorrect decisions. For an example of this, see the statistics at this http://web.mit.edu/keithw/www/statestats.html page. Note the percentages of cases that are reversed or vacated for all courts.

The percentage of overturned cases should be higher for the Supreme Court, as they get to decide whether to review cases or not. This means they will mainly choose cases where they think they need to correct a bad decision, clarify a law, etc. So, having a high percentage of cases overturned by the Supreme Court means that the Supreme Court is doing its job well, not that the other courts are doing a bad job.

Where I said:
Your statistics are correct, however there is some additional information that should be considered.

The 9th Circuit Court processed (the courts say "terminated") 13,424 cases in 2006. That's right, over thirteen thousand. Out of thirteen thousand, 22 cases were heard by the Supreme Court, and 19 were reversed. That is not a bad record.

Data here http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsa2006.pl (choose 9th Circuit) and here http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususc/judbus.html (choose 2006).

Also, note that the appeals process is designed to overturn incorrect decisions. For an example of this, see the statistics at this http://web.mit.edu/keithw/www/statestats.html page. Note the percentages of cases that are reversed or vacated for all courts.

The percentage of overturned cases should be higher for the Supreme Court, as they get to decide whether to review cases or not. This means they will mainly choose cases where they think they need to correct a bad decision, clarify a law, etc. So, having a high percentage of cases overturned by the Supreme Court means that the Supreme Court is doing its job well, not that the other courts are doing a bad job.

I actually don't know much about the DC Circuit, but judging (pun intended) from your comments, neither do you. Appointments aren't willy-nilly with each new administration. You appoint one when someone retires or expires or advances, for the most part. There are 3 (soon-to-be 4?) GW Bush appointees on the court.

And I didn't bother to read through it, but this may be of some value to people, if a bit dry: http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/bin/opinions/allopinions.asp.

* Sentelle - Reagan appointee
* Ginsburbg - Reagan
* LeCraft Henderson - Original Bush
* Randolph - Original Bush
* Rogers - Clinton
* Tatelle - Clinton
* Garland - Clinton
* Rogers Brown - New Bush
* Griffith - New Bush
* Cavanaugh - New Bush
* Edwards - Carter (!)
* Silberman - Reagan
* Williams - Reagan

The Judge is Louis Stanton, contact information: 500 Pearl St., Room 2250 New York, NY 10007 Chambers Phone: (212) 805-0252 Deputy Phone: (212) 805-0123 http://www1.nysd.uscourts.gov/judge_info.php?id=31 It'd be nice if someone could find his home phone number or that of his daughter or wife (Susan Helen Stanton is the daughter, Phoebe R. Stanton is the wife). Let's see how he likes his personal information spread around. Repost. Stanton, Phoebe R Age:65+ 1021 Park Ave, Apt 2C New York, NY 10028-0959 (212) 876-1751 Doesn't anyone remember the writer's strike? They were striking for compensation for internet released videos. Companies like Viacom were against paying writers for internet material dubbed simply as "promotional." Now they want sue Google for lost revenue of online video clips?? Oh the irony of it all. Philippe P. Dauman, CEO/President/Director of VIACOM 1515 Broadway New York, NY 10036 Phone: (212) 258-6000 411.com gives us this number for him too. (212) 258-6639 Enjoy, and make his life a living hell. Here's the list of all the brands you now want to avoid because Viacom is being a bitch. media networks,bet networks,bet,bet j,mtv networks, atomfilms, addictinggames, cmt, comedy central, gametrailers, harmonix, logo, mtv, mtv2, mtvn international, mtvu, mtv tr3s, neopets, nickelodeon - nick jr., nick at nite, noggin, parentsconnect, quizilla, rhapsody, shockwave, spike tv, the n, tv land, vh1, vh1 classic, vh1 soul, virtual worlds, xfire, filmed entertainment, paramount pictures corp, paramount pictures, dreamworks studios, paramount vantage, mtv films, nickelodeon movies, home entertainment, global reach, brand index If this doesn't show up well, copy and paste into a word processor..

The Judge is Louis Stanton, contact information: 500 Pearl St., Room 2250 New York, NY 10007 Chambers Phone: (212) 805-0252 Deputy Phone: (212) 805-0123 http://www1.nysd.uscourts.gov/judge_info.php?id=31 It'd be nice if someone could find his home phone number or that of his daughter or wife (Susan Helen Stanton is the daughter, Phoebe R. Stanton is the wife). Let's see how he likes his personal information spread around. Repost. Stanton, Phoebe R Age:65+ 1021 Park Ave, Apt 2C New York, NY 10028-0959 (212) 876-1751 Doesn't anyone remember the writer's strike? They were striking for compensation for internet released videos. Companies like Viacom were against paying writers for internet material dubbed simply as "promotional." Now they want sue Google for lost revenue of online video clips?? Oh the irony of it all. Philippe P. Dauman, CEO/President/Director of VIACOM 1515 Broadway New York, NY 10036 Phone: (212) 258-6000 411.com gives us this number for him too. (212) 258-6639 Enjoy, and make his life a living hell. Here's the list of all the brands you now want to avoid because Viacom is being a bitch. media networks,bet networks,bet,bet j,mtv networks, atomfilms, addictinggames, cmt, comedy central, gametrailers, harmonix, logo, mtv, mtv2, mtvn international, mtvu, mtv tr3s, neopets, nickelodeon - nick jr., nick at nite, noggin, parentsconnect, quizilla, rhapsody, shockwave, spike tv, the n, tv land, vh1, vh1 classic, vh1 soul, virtual worlds, xfire, filmed entertainment, paramount pictures corp, paramount pictures, dreamworks studios, paramount vantage, mtv films, nickelodeon movies, home entertainment, global reach, brand index

The domain information for the US court system is:

United State District Court
Southern District of New York
http://www1.nysd.uscourts.gov/index.php
207.41.15.28

Country IP Range: 207.40.0.0 to 207.43.255.255

It should be fun finding out what Youtube videos, the court system have been viewing...

Here are some details about the Hon. Louis L Stanton:

http://www1.nysd.uscourts.gov/judge_info.php?id=31

It provides some ways to contact him (including a phone number) for those who might want to share their displeasure over his ruling.

The CNET article used a wrong URL when linking to the decision by the appellate court. The domain name should be pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov. You can download the PDF of the opinion here.

old enough that the link to the court ruling returns 404 not found

correct link

During its 2004-05 term, the Supreme Court reversed 84 percent of the cases it chose to hear from appeals of 9th Circuit decisions... But the high court reversed 100 percent of the decisions it heard from the 1st, 2nd, and 10th Circuit Courts of Appeals

By law, all pleadings and motions filed in a United States District Court must be signed by an attorney of record or by the litigant appearing pro per. Fed Rul. Civ. Proc. 11(a); http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/Rule11.htm. United States District Courts in all states now require counsel to e-file substantially everything, effectively requiring e-signatures on every court document that is filed.

In the Eastern District of California, attorneys' e-signatures under Rule 11(a) and mis-use of e-signature privileges are specifically covered by Local Rules 7-131(c) and (d), insuring the integrity of the process. http://www.caed.uscourts.gov/caed/staticOther/page_459.htm And after at two years of experience with the system, our Judges, US Magistrates, court staff, attorneys, and paralegals would NEVER willingly go back to the old ways (which included fax-filing options).

In complex cases, California State Courts can order the parties to use Case Home Page, a well-run private, user-supported e-case management service that also requires e-signatures. (http://www.casehomepage.com). I am litigating a class action lawsuit and at least 12 related individual cases in San Diego County that would be logistically and economically impossible without the help of Case Home Page.

By taking advantage of off-the-shelf IT products (including video-conference capability), the Bench and Bar have cut our previously HUGE environmental footprint while providing user-friendly, fast, accessible, and substantially more economical service to our clients.

I'm prejudiced, of course: I helped beta the Eastern District Court's e-filing and case retrieval systems and take proud ownership of what my colleagues, our Judges, and the Court's consulting and resident geek staff members accomplished at extremely low cost to the Taxpayer. I beta tested a number of browsers running Linux (I think I used Yellow Dog and Red Hat for the tests), Windoze XP (both native and using a PowerPC compatible emulator), and MacOS 9 and X in a number of configurations using dial-ups, DSL, T-1 and T-3 access points. The Court's IT staff was a joy to work with and, as a Federal Bar Assn. Member, I'm really stoked to have been a part of the process.

So faxes? " . . we don' need no steenkin' Faxes!"

Before somebody claims that Judge Lamberth is some kind of left wing judicial activist, let me point out that he served in the JAG corps, including one year in Vietnam and then as a prosecutor until he was appointed to the bench by Ronald Reagan in 1987. There he endeared himself to the Republicans by his rulings against the Clintons.

Here is his official biography and here is the wikipedia article about him.

Ok first off here is the ruling

Link to pdf

Second it is done by the 9th court of appeals the most over turned court in the land.

Third they are stretching the powers of searching they reference a search done in a van where items were in plain view. This required the powering up of a laptop and then looking around a bit of a stretch. Also the agent did not ask to search the laptop thus not having rights to start searching through something not in plain view.

Fourth , but no where near least, the guy is implicated in having kiddie p0rn. Hello! If you are not breaking the law the you really have nothing to fear.

Five at all times during a warrant less search you always.. always! have the right to stop the search. Ya it might mean you will be detained a little bit more but if you have done nothing illegal then it is something to have a little hassle to stand up for your rights. Besides at that point if they really really wanted to get in there they are not under the several of the search clauses and will need to get a warrant to proceed. I don't care what everyone says blah blah blah if you are not breaking the law they you don't have anything to hide period. If you bow up on them they will only suspect you have something to hide, common sense.

So stop with the America bashing if you don't like America leave! If you are not in America and hate it Stay out! Simple as that.. too many people just wanna bash cause they can.

The answer is that it depends. The costs of collection would likely outweigh any recovery. What's important here is that the plaintiffs got the injunction and the defendants have no possibility of ever paying off the judgment. The judgment does give the MPAA leverage over the defendants. Of course, the great thing about America is Chapter 7 Bankruptcy. If the MPAA threatens to collect, the individual defendants can threaten to file bankruptcy. (In a nutshell, Chapter 7 wipes the slate clean, including pre-bankruptcy judgments.) The judgment also means that the business's assets, to the extent there were any, are probably wiped out.

In the US, you can't be fired due to being called for Jury duty. Unfortunately, your employer isn't required to keep paying you (some will, some won't), and the government only pays a few dollars a day.

According to http://www.uscourts.gov/jury/jurypay.html Federal Jurors make $40 a day ($50/day if the trial goes over a month). That's less than the federally-mandated minimum wage for private employers, assuming an 8-hour day. Other types of courts can pay much less - the county court near me pays $15/day.

This is one of the major problems in our jury system, as far as I'm concerned. If I'm ever in serious trouble, I really don't want to be tried by a group of twelve people who either couldn't figure out how to get out of jury duty, or who actually think $40 a day is a good deal.

Typical of slashdot you totally misunderstand what has happened.

1) The decision is not pro big business. On one side was a comparitively small IP licencing company (Rambus) and on the other was the government (FTC) and some of the largest companies on Earth(Samsung, Micron, Hynix).
2) The court decided that even conduct that harms consumers (eg raises prices) does not come under anti-trust law if the competitive process is not harmed.
3) The FTC did try and prove Rambus lied to their competitors but was rebuffed - "Because of the chance of further proceedings on remand, we express briefly our serious concerns about strength of the evidence relied on to support some of the Commission's crucial findings regarding the scope of JEDEC's patent disclosure policies and Rambus's alleged violation of those policies."

The decision is at http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/200804/07-1086-1112217.pdf if you want to avoid spouting further nonsense.

On your advice, I went back and read the opinion:

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/6D5D931898D8168188257432005AC9B8/$file/0650581.pdf?openelement

The points I made, specifically the unconstitutionality of warrantless searches of a US citizen, are not covered.

Others were, though:

> Generally, "searches made at the border . . . are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border . . . ." United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977).

This logic seems somewhat weak, and unsustainable. A search at the border is reasonable because it's a search at the border. Is there something magical about the border? Is it like the Twilight Zone? Can they shoot me for no reason and get away with it, simply because I'm at the border? What are the limitations of what these agents can do at the border, simply because it's the border?

And it still doesn't address the rights of a US citizen to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. Just because I'm coming back through the border shouldn't make one iota of difference. I know this now enters "internet arguing" territory, but if I establish that I'm a US citizen, my Fourth Amendment protections should automatically kick in. I emphasize "should"; reality currently says it doesn't work that way. That's my point. I don't understand why our rights are suspended just because we're at the border - and we're certainly not informed of the fact when we leave the country.

Here's a though: If they let me pass, and I drive away from the Customs inspection, and then they change their mind about inspecting my vehicle, can they drag my ass back to the border and wreck my vehicle - apparently that's Ok, if it's deemed necessary - just to satisfy their curiosity? Where does the scrutiny of the border agents end? As soon as I'm cleared to pass? Seems like a lot of subjectivity - and flexibility of our Constitutional protections - granted to these border agents.

Don't take my perceived hostile tone personally; this whole notion just vexes me. I'm terribly vexed.

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/6D5D931898D8168188257432005AC9B8/$file/0650581.pdf?openelement

1. He was randomly chosen for secondary questioning. Perfectly legal and constitutional.

2. He left the images on the desktop in a folder. They were not hidden.

3. This cannot be a violation of the 4th amendment because it was a border search. Border searches have been challenged and found to be constitutional numerous times in the past.

4. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 153 (2004). Generally, "searches made at the border . . . are
reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border . . . ."

Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152. Therefore, "[t]he luggage carried by a traveler entering the country may
4179 UNITED STATES v. ARNOLDbe searched at random by a customs officer . . . no matter how
great the traveler's desire to conceal the contents may be."

He made no attempt to conceal the images as they were left on the desktop, but even if he had attempted to conceal them it wouldn't have mattered anyway.

5. Courts have long held that searches of closed containers and their contents can be conducted at the border without particularized suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. This includes items such as a purse, wallet, or pockets. A laptop is no different.

6. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (emphasis added), the Supreme Court has held open the possibility, "that some
searches of property are so destructive as to require" particularized suspicion. Id. at 155-56 (emphasis added) (holding that complete disassembly and reassembly of a car gas tank did not require particularized suspicion).
Since the search of his laptop did not require it to be damaged in any way, and the defendant also stated that his laptop was not damaged, it was again a legal search.

The only way he was going to get away with this is if he had shoved a memory stick up his butt and made sure he didn't do anything that caused suspicion.

Yes. The EDVA Local Rules say that attorneys can file subpoenas pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(3), which says that the court clerk has to issue a subpoena to any party (or their attorney) who asks for one. Like much of the discovery process under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the judge/magistrate isn't supposed to get involved until the parties or a subpoenaed person have a dispute. And even then, they're supposed to try to resolve it out of court.

There's not much new here. If you're familiar with CALEA, the law that hooked the Government into the phone system big-time, this is basically the same set of requirements the FBI wanted for voice calls. There was a big disagreement in the voice world over in-band signalling. The question was whether a "pen register" warrant authorized access to signalling data that goes over the voice channel, like Touch-Tone tones sent to some non-carrier device. The FBI was bitching about that for years.

The trouble with all this stuff is that Congress didn't mandate proper auditing. Every surveillance event in CALEA ought to be logged by the Judicial Branch, at the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. We don't have that.

I just looked up the 2008 median income tables published by the government:

http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/20080201/bci_data/median_income_table.htm [usdoj.gov]

Oregon beats both Ohio and Florida in median income for every category except Ohio barely eeks out a win in the family of four median income. (The new growth in Oregon is in single and couples without children or with one child and in Hispanics with two or more kids -- you can see that would drag down the family of four count.)

Unfortunately, those aren't real statistics. The are CPI adjusted numbers based off the 2006 numbers we were comparing earlier. They actually paint a worse picture for oregon then the other number we were talking about. You see, the take the latest numbers (2006 is the last consumer survey compiled I believe), adjust it for the inflation in the area and then it is used as a base income for a means test to decide if you make too much too much money or have too much asset value in order to file bankruptcy or certain types of bankruptcy. What it is showing is that Oregon had had an large amount of inflation (consumer price index increase which really isn't an inflation value but is treated as one).

The CPI is good for determining factors about the economy but currently they only survey about 7 major geographical areas with a few specific samples averaged in somehow. It is basically lumping Oregon in with california, Washington, Idaho and a few other states. It isn't a real reflection of median income but a projection of how much it would have to of increased to keep the same standards of living since the last survey was compiled.

Air quality indexes show Oregon beating the shit out of Ohio and beating Florida in ozone and a wash in particulates.

I'm not sure where you got your numbers ridiculing Oregon.

lol.. There we go with that context thing again. I never said anything about ohio'd particulate matter for one. For two, I specifically stated when comparing Oregon's non hydroelectric plants, Florida does a better job. Read that exactly as it says, when comparing kilowatt to kilowatt produced by the non hydro plants (that Florida simply can't use because it lacks the necessary rivers), Florida is better on emissions. This means that for the pollution Oregon does do, it does it better then Florida. Keep reading those pages and do the math. you will get to the same numbers and come to realize that when they put their mind to it, Oregon can pollute the best.

From looking at the electricity profiles, Oregon creams Florida and Ohio in every measure across the board.

Only if you count the hydro, which seeing how Florida has spent so much effort on their conventional plants, if they had the same hydro resources available, you wouldn't be able to casually say that.

So, in all those things you've criticized Oregon for, it turns out it's all a pack of delusions.

I don't know why I am still amazed at how ignorant you are. What it turns out to be is that you simply don't understand context and you simple don't understand the processes you are blindly championing. You seem to be willing to ignore anything that stand in the way or your Ideals. That what it turns out to be.

Lets look at some numbers. Oregon produces, by your own links, 53,340,695 megawatthours of electricity using primarily hydroelectric generation. For the non hydro plants, they produce about .5 thousand metric tons of sulfur dioxide and Nitrogen Oxide per megawatthour with about 293 thousand metric tons of Co2 for the same. In contrast, florida produces about 4.2 time the amount of electricity (223,751,621 megawatthours) with fossil fuels as their primary source and is the second largest electr

Correct IANAL and read this court opinion ( http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/97D0773P.pdf ) which supports the facts interpretation of map data. This actually means that companies will be very protective of their/your data because you could use it to compete against them.

The technical meaning of "circumstantial evidence" is different from the casual connotation. Circumstantial evidence is anything that requires an inference to be made by the jury. That is, it's anything that's not a directly observed fact (usually reported by a witness as testimonial evidence). Forensic evidence like fingerprints and DNA is circumstantial.

Most criminal cases are convicted at least in part on circumstantial evidence. The US Supreme Court has ruled that there's no difference between circumstantial and testimonial evidence for deciding cases. (In fact, eyewitnesses are notoriously unreliable. Circumstantial evidence like DNA matches are often more reliable than testimony.)

To quote from the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals pattern for jury instruction

http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/Internet/crim_jury_insts/html/chap1_8.htm

--
1.06 DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

    (1) Now, some of you may have heard the terms "direct evidence" and "circumstantial evidence."

    (2) Direct evidence is simply evidence like the testimony of an eyewitness which, if you believe it, directly proves a fact. If a witness testified that he saw it raining outside, and you believed him, that would be direct evidence that it was raining.

    (3) Circumstantial evidence is simply a chain of circumstances that indirectly proves a fact. If someone walked into the courtroom wearing a raincoat covered with drops of water and carrying a wet umbrella, that would be circumstantial evidence from which you could conclude that it was raining.

    (4) It is your job to decide how much weight to give the direct and circumstantial evidence. The law makes no distinction between the weight that you should give to either one, or say that one is any better evidence than the other. You should consider all the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, and give it whatever weight you believe it deserves.

ahem. Federal District Court is the "trial-level" court in the Federal System. There are 94 such districts in the United States.

Hard to believe, but they were taken offline by court order in the United States. A corrupt Swiss Bank, Julius Baer, objected to wikileaks posting documents showing malfeasance on the part of the bank, so this crazy judge, Jeffrey White, who really doesn't understand the First Amendment (and was nominated to the Federal bench by Bush of course), ordered the site to be taken offline. Here's a BBC link describing what happened. And another one from Counterpunch.