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Banks Begin To Use RSA Keys

jnguy writes "According to the New York Times (free bacon required), banks are begining to look into using RSA keys for security. AOL has already begun offering its customers RSA keys at a premium price. Is this the future of security, and is it secure enough? How long before everyone needs to carry around 5 different RSA keys just to perform daily task?"

208 comments

  1. um by NoGuffCheck · · Score: 0

    yes and no... mainly no.

    --
    serenity now!
  2. Heh? This is old news by zxSpectrum · · Score: 4, Informative

    I'm rather surprised: Several Norwegian banks have been using these RSA Hardware Tokens for a couple of years.

    1. Re:Heh? This is old news by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
      In Korea news is only for old people.

    2. Re:Heh? This is old news by EvilIdler · · Score: 2, Informative

      Not just a couple - I had it *eight years* ago with Storebrand..

    3. Re:Heh? This is old news by roady · · Score: 2, Informative

      Most of Europe is actually using either RSA tokens or RSA smartcards already.

  3. Banks are the problem by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Ever read your bank's privacy statement? They pretty much share your personal info to every 3rd party out there. Not to mention they offshore data management overseas.

    1. Re:Banks are the problem by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
      Not to mention they offshore data management overseas.
      Whew, what a relief! Here I thought they were offshoring data management domestically, right here on our own land!
    2. Re:Banks are the problem by Obiwan+Kenobi · · Score: 4, Informative

      I call FUD. I've worked in banks (and credit unions) as a network admin for over six years, and that is some bullshit.

      Now, understand that banks will use your information any way they can in-house, manipulate numbers and deposit totals and anything else analytical so they can sell a credit card or a loan (its called cross-selling). But what they cannot do is give your information to other 3rd parties without your direct consent unless its under federal mandate and/or decree (read: court order and/or the Patriot act).

      Now this is all fine and good, but when you do something substantial with your money and/or your financial outlook (say, investing or buying a home), you open up yourself to offers from 3rd parties. You sign a document saying so.

      Now the easiest thing is, before you sign something, ask them which companies are going to be behind this new venture. Whether it be an investing house (a lot of banks will farm out investing to a subsidiary and get kickbacks on it) or mortgages (who owns this loan? Can they sell it to a 3rd party mortgage company at a later date?), you need to simply be aware.

      Feel free to google "Bank Privacy" and read up on the hometown banks and the big boys: They all pretty much say the same thing. If they are under FDIC (for banks) or NCUA (for credit unions), they all fall under the same guidelines: Your information cannot be shared unless you say so. The federal privacy statements which are mandatory to be handed out upon opening an account, etc, say the same thing.

      Offshore data management services is simply a scarier way of saying Disaster Recovery. You want your bank to keep running even if the home office (or data center) explodes, right? Then don't start bitching about them backing up data in different places.

    3. Re:Banks are the problem by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Do you really call FUD?

      How often?

      Is the FUD number premium rate??

    4. Re:Banks are the problem by sirshannon · · Score: 2, Interesting

      As the grandparent post said, banks can and do share with pretty much whomever they want. And when you agree to their privacy policy, you gave them the express consent. My bank's privacy policy (which was mailed to me recently and is sitting on my desk) says "We do not sell information about our current or former customers and do not disclose such information to third parties, except as permitted by law." That's right, if they can legally get away with it, they will do it, according to their policy.

    5. Re:Banks are the problem by jasonditz · · Score: 3, Informative

      The bank I used to use actually said the exact opposite: They can share with anybody unless you specifically tell them not to.

      The thing is, every 3 months or so they send a new copy of the (slightly modified) privacy agreement and if you don't send them another letter saying don't share my info, they consider it acceptance of the 'new' policy.

    6. Re:Banks are the problem by wfberg · · Score: 1

      But what they cannot do is give your information to other 3rd parties without your direct consent unless its under federal mandate and/or decree (read: court order and/or the Patriot act).

      Really? How do credit rating agencies get information about your credit card debt without you ever having explicitly told your bank the information is theirs to share? Where exactly do all those pre-approved credit offers come from?

      Offshore data management services is simply a scarier way of saying Disaster Recovery. You want your bank to keep running even if the home office (or data center) explodes, right? Then don't start bitching about them backing up data in different places.

      Not about backing up, perhaps, but fleeing the jurisdiction (off-shore backups can be done just fine in Alaska and Hawaii) offers perks in that they can do way more than just back-ups with your data.

      --
      SCO employee? Check out the bounty
    7. Re:Banks are the problem by tchernobog · · Score: 1

      Actually, I had explicitly to sign a separated piece of paper to prevent my (italian) bank to share my info with 3rd parties. And it was me that had to request it... so you're right: they can't unless you say to them they're free to do so, but you do such just by opening a new account (at least, here in italy it's part of the contract, heh), and if you don't pay attention they surely won't tell you... i think it was this the guy above wanted to say.

      --
      42.
    8. Re:Banks are the problem by justins · · Score: 1
      Now, understand that banks will use your information any way they can in-house, manipulate numbers and deposit totals and anything else analytical so they can sell a credit card or a loan (its called cross-selling). But what they cannot do is give your information to other 3rd parties without your direct consent unless its under federal mandate and/or decree (read: court order and/or the Patriot act).

      Now this is all fine and good, but when you do something substantial with your money and/or your financial outlook (say, investing or buying a home), you open up yourself to offers from 3rd parties. You sign a document saying so.

      So what you're saying is that banks don't share your personal information with outsiders (and it's FUD to say so) unless you do any actual banking. That's really insightful.

      Feel free to google "Bank Privacy" and read up on the hometown banks and the big boys: They all pretty much say the same thing. If they are under FDIC (for banks) or NCUA (for credit unions), they all fall under the same guidelines: Your information cannot be shared unless you say so.

      And if you have to "say so" in order to get any banking done, the distinction is trivial.

      Offshore data management services is simply a scarier way of saying Disaster Recovery. You want your bank to keep running even if the home office (or data center) explodes, right? Then don't start bitching about them backing up data in different places.

      "Offshore" typically refers to another country. Why do they need to store my data in another country for backup purposes? Maybe they think the entire country will be destroyed? I think in that case my bank and I will have bigger problems.
      --
      Now before I get modded down, I be to remind whoever might read this that what I am saying is FACT. - bogaboga
  4. GnuPG? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Offering keys at a premium price? I can do gpg --gen-keys by myself, it's free!

  5. Article not about "RSA Keys" -- Hardware tokens by Steven+Reddie · · Score: 5, Informative

    The article is really talking about using hardware tokens for extra security since the private data is stored on an external token and can't be stolen by viruses, trojans, or phishing scams. I don't even see RSA mentioned in the article -- there is an inset picture of an RSA SecurID but that's as close as it gets.

    1. Re:Article not about "RSA Keys" -- Hardware tokens by HotNeedleOfInquiry · · Score: 4, Informative

      Wells Fargo issues the RSA SecurID devices for security. Not a test, not a trial, My wife and I each have one.

      --
      "Eve of Destruction", it's not just for old hippies anymore...
    2. Re:Article not about "RSA Keys" -- Hardware tokens by Baki · · Score: 1

      My bank (in switzerland) uses a smart card with a kind of calculator (challenge - response) for 5 years. Another large bank here uses securID (I work at the other one, it uses secureID cards also for internal authentication for at least 5 years).

      I don't think there is much news in this story.

    3. Re:Article not about "RSA Keys" -- Hardware tokens by xlv · · Score: 1

      Wells Fargo issues the RSA SecurID devices for security. Not a test, not a trial, My wife and I each have one.

      How did you manage to get one? Did you ask for it or did they contact you? Is it specific to some account types?

    4. Re:Article not about "RSA Keys" -- Hardware tokens by HotNeedleOfInquiry · · Score: 1

      We transferred a rather large business checking account to them from another bank. We do frequent international wire transfers and that might be why we got them. BTW, there was no charge for them.

      --
      "Eve of Destruction", it's not just for old hippies anymore...
    5. Re:Article not about "RSA Keys" -- Hardware tokens by xlv · · Score: 1

      Thanks for the info. I got business and personal accounts with them and didn't see any offer about it. My international transfers are only incoming so that may be why...

  6. Thumb drives by Huogo · · Score: 3, Interesting

    This is the perfect use for a thumb drive, so long as the computer you're using can be trusted. I can see a problem with people keeping all their keys on a thumb drive, and using it at a net cafe or something, but the computer at the cafe could be easily set to download the keys and key log the password to each set of keys. This can only be solved by something like an external device that will let you input a challenge code, and spit out a response code to gain access to the RSA key.

    1. Re:Thumb drives by jdhutchins · · Score: 2, Informative

      That's what I initally thought, but the article talks about a different kind of RSA "key". The article is about the hardware things that show a number that changes every 15sec or so, and you need that number to log in. The summary title is misleading (suprise suprise)

    2. Re:Thumb drives by dustman · · Score: 3, Interesting

      This is the perfect use for a thumb drive, so long as the computer you're using can be trusted.

      Although the article talks about a different technology, one of the core features of the technology you are talking about is that the computer does not, in fact, need to be trusted.

      Basically, the computer asks the hardware device to encrypt or decrypt some data. The device stores the key internally and never reveals it.

      It is a core concept of devices such as this that it is impossible to retrieve the key. The chips are designed such that they never reveal the key through the "official" interface (the encode/decode thing), and they're made so that taking the chip apart destroys the key.

    3. Re:Thumb drives by rzebram · · Score: 1

      So you mean a thumb drive to plug in to your thumb drive in order to gain access to your RSA key?

    4. Re:Thumb drives by John+Harrison · · Score: 1

      It is an even better application for smart cards. You need a $3 card and a $10 reader. And unlike a USB key it is meant to be quickly inserted and removed without any problems.

    5. Re:Thumb drives by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Funny

      Its all about the RSA, the DSA, Ol Dirty Bastard, Inspectah Deck, Raekwon the Chef
      U-God, Ghost Face Killer and the Method Man.

    6. Re:Thumb drives by Temporal · · Score: 4, Insightful

      I've always thought that what we really need is devices like this with an LCD display that tells you what, exactly, you are signing.

      For example, imagine paying for some goods with one of these devices vs. credit card or smart card...

      Smart card: You must trust that the card reader will not choose to use your card to sign things you didn't agree to. The reader could, for example, overcharge you, and you would have no way to know that it did until you checked your monthly statement. (And, hey, by that time, do you even remember if that item was $59 or $69?) For that matter, the reader could very easily make the charge under a different name, making it difficult to determine who committed the fraud.

      Credit card: In addition to the smart card caveats, you must trust that the entity reading your card will not distribute your credit card number to any entity whom you don't trust at any time in the future. For that matter, if you use the same credit card with multiple entities, you have no way of knowing which one leaked your number. How can you fight back? Who do you charge with fraud or neglegence? In most cases you just let them go and your credit card company covers the illegal charges, while the FBI spends massive amounts of resources in mostly fruitless efforts to track them down. Why do we use these things?

      The device I described: The LCD screen displays the question "Authorize payment of $59 to Acme Co.? Yes/No". No charge can go through without your device approving it. You only need to trust that your device will ask you to confirm any charge. And you can trust it because the manufacturer knows that if it screws up, they'll get their pants sued off.

      The only thing that could make it more secure would be to implant the device into your body so that people can't steal it. Though, it's probably better to just deal with having to revoke a cert once in awhile rather than have people cutting you open to get to your bank account. :)

  7. Re:For those who don't want to register: by lordsilence · · Score: 2, Insightful

    I'll rather register then read through this unformatted text ;) thanks anyhow.

  8. This is news? by Nehle · · Score: 5, Informative

    My bank (SEB, www.seb.se) has been using a hardware token system for years. I click the sign in button, enter my birthdate, receive two four-digit numbers, start the little device, enter my password and the two numbers and get a six-digit number that I enter in the login page and then I get logged in.
    Is this somehow different?

    Oh, and by the way, works like a charm and I feel a lot more secure than I do with static passwords

  9. House keys by tepples · · Score: 5, Insightful

    How long before everyone needs to carry around 5 different RSA keys just to perform daily task?

    How long before everyone needs to carry around 5 different physical keys? Let's see... we have the house key, the car key, the shed key, the bike key, the gun case key, the baseball card key...

    1. Re:House keys by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      people work in jails carry lots of keys now and for a long time in the past too

    2. Re:House keys by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      That's your problem.

      I have a key for my house and a key for my mailbox. That's all.

    3. Re:House keys by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      That's why the RSA approach, while great for "the one important authentication you have", doesn't scale. Eventually you have to go to PKI.

      Wall Street has used these things for over a decade. I once saw the (humorous and sad) situation (at a customer managing a LOT of money) of having a bunch of SecurID tokens (one per counterparty) taped to a monitor, each with the PIN scribbled on a Post-It :-)

    4. Re:House keys by dasunt · · Score: 1

      >> How long before everyone needs to carry around 5 different RSA keys just to perform daily task?

      > How long before everyone needs to carry around 5 different physical keys? Let's see... we have the [...] gun case key

      Your daily schedule seems to include riding the fences and looking for varmits.

      Be careful for that gray rabbit that stands upright, is always chewing on a carrot, and thinks you have a Ph. D. He's a tricky one.

      No matter what you do, never ever try to dynamite him.

    5. Re:House keys by Feztaa · · Score: 1

      If something like this replaces physical keys, that'd be great (it would raise the bar for lockpicking... instead of petty thieves with a few sharpened hunks of metal illegitimately opening locks, you'd need cryptographers and massive amounts of computing power to do it.

      As it is now, I have 4 keys -- one for my gate, one for the door to my apartment, and one for my bike lock -- as well as two proximity cards: one to get inside my building, and one to get into work. If these could all be replaced with one RSA key that does a challenge/response dealy, that'd be awesome.

    6. Re:House keys by oliverthered · · Score: 1

      I have a crowbar.

      Locking you house, car, shed, gun case just makes you feel a little safer. It deosn't prevent anyone from breaking in.

      --
      thank God the internet isn't a human right.
    7. Re:House keys by STrinity · · Score: 1

      If something like this replaces physical keys, that'd be great

      Yeah, because everyone wants to live in a world where they can't get into their house if the power goes out during a thunderstorm!

      --
      Les Miserables Volume 1 now up with my reading of
    8. Re:House keys by mindstrm · · Score: 1

      My crowbar won't care if your lock is RSA based or not.

    9. Re:House keys by TheoMurpse · · Score: 1

      You misspelled "varmint" and have offended my people!!!

      google:define:varmint

      vermin: an irritating or obnoxious person
      www.cogsci.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/webwn

      any usually predatory wild animal considered undesirable; e.g. coyote
      www.cogsci.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/webwn

    10. Re:House keys by Feztaa · · Score: 1

      We'll let you live in the one house that doesn't have UPS/battery backup on the card reader.

  10. Old News by Ann+Elk · · Score: 2, Informative

    Banks in Poland have been using physical security tokens for online access for a few years. Yawn...

    1. Re:Old News by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Funny

      Don't forget Poland!

    2. Re:Old News by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Maybe the US just didn't really need it since it had a relatively low crime rate, and the fact that Poland had it for a while seems to follow that logic (I've heard a lot of lovely stories about the crime rates in Poland, I got mugged last time I visited).

    3. Re:Old News by FooAtWFU · · Score: 1

      Query. If they use it for online access does that mean that they read them through some stupid Win Doze, Internet Explorer, embedded ActiveX control to actually access the device?

      --
      The World Wide Web is dying. Soon, we shall have only the Internet.
    4. Re:Old News by EricX2 · · Score: 1

      Welcome to a website called slashdot. This is an American website. Obviously everybody in the world (except for China) can post articles, but most articles are submitted by Americans. So if something is news to Americans, it is probably news on slashdot. Just because something has been around in Poland, doesn't mean it is old. Besides, do you want Americans going to polish sites and making stupid comments about stuff being old because we've had it for years? Of course not.

    5. Re:Old News by Ann+Elk · · Score: 1

      Perhaps the artitle title should have been "U.S. Banks Finally Begin To Use RSA Keys"...

    6. Re:Old News by Ann+Elk · · Score: 1

      No.

      The security token looks something like a small calculator. To turn it on, you must enter a PIN. During an online transaction, the web site provides a challenge number (8 digits, I think). You enter the challenge number into the token, and it provides a response (another 8 digit number). You type the response into an edit field on the web form, press "submit" (or whatever), and the transaction completes. Very easy, as long as you don't lose your security token...

  11. Chinese Supercomputers Crack Normal Passwords by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0, Interesting
    The reality is that the RSA key is a godsend for protecting your accounts. Many Americans are simply unaware of the fact that the Taiwanese have essentially given all the key computer technologies to mainland China. Beijing can now assemble a supercomputer based solely on the technology from Acer, a Taiwanese company with major investments in mainland China. This supercomputer can easily crack the passwords of many accounts at your bank, brokerage, etc.

    The RSA will help to protect Western bank/brokerage accounts from Chinese theft. That the majority of stolen credit card numbers end up in the hands of Chinese gangs, aided and abetted by Beijing, in Southeast Asia should surprise no one.

    1. Re:Chinese Supercomputers Crack Normal Passwords by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Most of what you just said is wrong, could you possibly be trying to spread a little AC FUD?

    2. Re:Chinese Supercomputers Crack Normal Passwords by RzUpAnmsCwrds · · Score: 4, Insightful

      "The reality is that the RSA key is a godsend for protecting your accounts. Many Americans are simply unaware of the fact that the Taiwanese have essentially given all the key computer technologies to mainland China. Beijing can now assemble a supercomputer based solely on the technology from Acer, a Taiwanese company with major investments in mainland China. This supercomputer can easily crack the passwords of many accounts at your bank, brokerage, etc.
      The RSA will help to protect Western bank/brokerage accounts from Chinese theft. That the majority of stolen credit card numbers end up in the hands of Chinese gangs, aided and abetted by Beijing, in Southeast Asia should surprise no one."

      Nice troll. The fact is that the Chinese, as well as *the rest of the world* have had access to computer technology equivilent to that which exists in the US for *years*. There's nothing new.

      Moreover, you don't use a "supercomputer" to crack bank accounts. The fact is, you can't brute force the passwords on bank accounts unless you are able to steal the password hashes - and by then you've already broken the system.

      Bank accounts are being stolen using phishing, not supercomputers.

    3. Re:Chinese Supercomputers Crack Normal Passwords by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I feel some sort of congratulations is in order. Nearly every time I see you posting anti-Chinese material, you manage to get any number of serious and usually indignant replies.

      From one to another, well done.

    4. Re:Chinese Supercomputers Crack Normal Passwords by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      If your going to troll with the Chinese fear factor, why not use something real like mainland China now owns enough US debt to force the US to ignore Taiwan should push come to shove they have 1/2 a trillion dollars of the US economy they can threaten to flush.

  12. Yes, it IS different... by wcdw · · Score: 4, Interesting

    This sounds like SecureID cards, which are time-synched to a master server which runs the same algorithm/seed. SecureID has a long history in the IT world, and works relatively well (and, as far as I know, no one has ever hacked the algorithm).

    Sounds like your device just calculates a response based on two inputs; don't know why that wouldn't be just as easy in software. (You _can't_ turn a SecureID card off, so it can't get out of synch with the server, unlike software.)

    Not to say that your device isn't secure - more reverse engineering would be required to determine that - but the two approaches *are* very different.

    --
    If you're not living on the edge, you're just taking up space!
    1. Re:Yes, it IS different... by Nehle · · Score: 1

      intrigued by your response I checked if this was the case.
      It does, however, appear that the device is time-synched with the server, as entering the same keys at two different points in time gave two different answers.
      So it appears this nothing is different then?

    2. Re:Yes, it IS different... by wfberg · · Score: 4, Interesting


      Sounds like your device just calculates a response based on two inputs; don't know why that wouldn't be just as easy in software. (You _can't_ turn a SecureID card off, so it can't get out of synch with the server, unlike software.)

      Not to say that your device isn't secure - more reverse engineering would be required to determine that - but the two approaches *are* very different.


      The approaches are different mostly in the way that securID can't do challenge/response. Note that most hardware tokens that can do challenge/response also use a hardware clock.

      The immideately obvious benefit of challenge/response is that it offers far better protection against replay attacks - securID numbers are valid for 10 seconds, whereas a parallel login session using C/R will use a different challenge (in fact, the resolution is worse than 10 seconds since the server will usually accept the previous and next number as well, in order to resync to correct for clock drift).

      Also, some e-banking authentication schemes require you to enter both a challenge AND the amount (or recipient's bankaccountnumber) you're transferring; this prevents malware on your PC (or a man-in-the-middle) altering the amount without you detecting it. This is obviously impossible to do with a non-C/R scheme like SecurID.

      Example; when I add an account number to my e-banking site's address book, I'm asked for the response to a challenge that's clearly and human-readably derived from the bankaccount# (1 number is dropped) - so malware can't change the acount#s I add to my address book.

      In my mind, even devices without a hardware clock that can do C/R are preferable to securID schemes that do have a clock but no C/R.

      Also note that tokens that do C/R usually need to be unlocked with a PIN before use (they already come with a keypad, so why not?) - this means you get two-factor authentication basically for free, and the PIN only needs to be checked by the token itself, so it's not stored on the server, not even in a hashed form (which is trivial to brute force for 4/5 digit codes anyway).

      While securID might be very well accepted in the IT world, and is easy to roll out, it's certainly not the most secure or well thought-out authentication method by a long shot. And they're damn expensive given how simple their design is! Just a clock and an LCD that shows the hash of the current_date/time_rounded_to_the_closest_10_second s and its secret key..

      --
      SCO employee? Check out the bounty
    3. Re:Yes, it IS different... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The algorithm has been hacked - http://whitepapers.zdnet.co.uk/0,39025945,60023455 p-39000579q,00.htm for a paper that gives some details. However, it's still of little use unless the hacker knows the serial number of the token in question and has access to the "secret" token data from the secureID server...

    4. Re:Yes, it IS different... by dannyp · · Score: 3, Interesting

      Most SecurID implementations will only authenticate a specific token code once within its validity window. A replay attack (even within the time validity window) will fail after the first good authentication.

      There are still man-in-the-middle vulnerabilities, but no worse than with a challenge-response

    5. Re:Yes, it IS different... by wcdw · · Score: 1

      Interesting.... It sounds like it is a similar approach, in any event. The SecureID cards 'randomly' change values (every 60 seconds?); you just type in whatever is currently on the screen.

      I can't help but wonder if your device has a battery-backup for the clock, or otherwise how could it be time-synched, if you can turn it off? A possibility that occurs to me is something along the lines of the salt used for many Unix password schemes. The password can be encoded any one of a finite number of ways, resulting in a different encrypted value each time, but all tied back to the original input.

      --
      If you're not living on the edge, you're just taking up space!
    6. Re:Yes, it IS different... by wcdw · · Score: 3, Interesting

      One point I wanted to add is that although SecureID may be well accepted in the IT world, it is _NOT_ that easy to roll-out. Or wasn't, the last time I had to play games in that world, anyway; it HAS been a while.

      Note that I never claimed that it was the most *secure* solution, and yes, the lack of challenge/response does limit it's usefulness.

      However, if I can reverse engineer the bank's device and discover the algorithm in use, it becomes worse than useless, in that instills a false sense of security.

      Strong passwords are still less hassle, don't sacrifice much to security concerns (if never expressed in clear text), and just aren't that freaking hard to create. Pre-shared keys are even better, depending on how strong they are, and how they're distributed. And how well keys are guarded/revoked-if-stolen. ;)

      --
      If you're not living on the edge, you're just taking up space!
    7. Re:Yes, it IS different... by wcdw · · Score: 1

      Thanks for the link; I was actually not aware of even that much hacking done on those cards. It does seem a little limited, although I can envision some scenarios where it would be exploitable.

      --
      If you're not living on the edge, you're just taking up space!
    8. Re:Yes, it IS different... by Dan+Farina · · Score: 1

      There's not much of an algorithm to hack...

      psuedorandom number generator which maps the time uniformly over the keys....that's all. And a sufficiently long seed, of course.

    9. Re:Yes, it IS different... by Florian+Weimer · · Score: 1

      This sounds like SecureID cards, which are time-synched to a master server which runs the same algorithm/seed. SecureID has a long history in the IT world, and works relatively well (and, as far as I know, no one has ever hacked the algorithm).

      The algorithm was posted to BUGTRAQ in 2000.

    10. Re:Yes, it IS different... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You've made a fundamental mistake. SecurID is a challenge response system. Except the Challenge is the current time as known to the token. (I've never seen a token, or server for that matter, that wasn't off to some degree.)

      You only need to enter the response.

      "The approaches are different mostly in the way that securID can't do challenge/response. Note that most hardware tokens that can do challenge/response also use a hardware clock."

      I've not seen one that uses the clock for authentication. (These type of devices typically have removable batteries). That of course doesn't mean that one doesn't exist. But all that does is add an extra challenge, and I don't think it needs to be pointed out that multiple types of challenges are better then one.

      "The immideately obvious benefit of challenge/response is that it offers far better protection against replay attacks - securID numbers are valid for 10 seconds, whereas a parallel login session using C/R will use a different challenge (in fact, the resolution is worse than 10 seconds since the server will usually accept the previous and next number as well, in order to resync to correct for clock drift)."

      SecurID and Safeword type (which is what you are describing) handle replay in the same way. The first response is accepted all others are denied and logged. What to do when there is a replay attempt is a policy issue.

      While it is true that SecurID tokens have a window of oppurtunity for a certain response. This is also true of safeword type cards, in that a challenge has a limited lifespan, time based tokens just have a longer window. The default window for SecurID is 3x(tokencode interval) where the default tokencode interval is 60secs, though it can be optioned at purchase to be up to 2 mins.

      Safeword style tokens have to deal with challenge replay attacks, unlike SecurID style tokens.

      "In my mind, even devices without a hardware clock that can do C/R are preferable to securID schemes that do have a clock but no C/R."

      I would hope you would look for more in a token system then whether you should tick the C/R checkbox. The first international standard for C/R tokens was shown to be broken depressingly quickly. Implementation is more important then features.

      "Also note that tokens that do C/R usually need to be unlocked with a PIN before use (they already come with a keypad, so why not?) - this means you get two-factor authentication basically for free, and the PIN only needs to be checked by the token itself, so it's not stored on the server, not even in a hashed form (which is trivial to brute force for 4/5 digit codes anyway)."

      You can get PIN based securID tokens (520 model), but the server does know the PIN (The tokencode you send is generated from the time and your PIN).

      Where you enter the PIN is irrelevant, as long as you have a PIN and a token you get the benefit of two factor authentication.

      Likewise worrying about the server knowing your PIN is a bit silly. This is the same server that is authenticating you, if you don't trust it, then the whole system is screwed to start with.

      "While securID might be very well accepted in the IT world, and is easy to roll out, it's certainly not the most secure or well thought-out authentication method by a long shot. And they're damn expensive given how simple their design is!"

      It is as secure as the implementation, and as with most hardware tokens it is easier to attack the wetware part then crack the system.

      I think that the fact that SecurID has been around for so long should give some idea of their security. (Do a search for Secure Dynamics)

      As for expense, they are a premium brand, you _are_ paying for the brand, but their tokens are extremely well made. Its not cheap to make a high precision clock. They are built extremly tough, and while I have seen credit card style tokens returned by users damaged, I've yet to see a keyfob style token returned. Any hit big enough to damage

    11. Re:Yes, it IS different... by oliverthered · · Score: 2, Informative

      If you read the GPP you would have found out that CR is less prone to man-in-the-middle attacks.

      A CR system can take multiple inputs (one of which could be a hash of your transaction data)
      making the response unique to the transaction.

      SecurID uses a simple token that is not unique to the transaction and so is very vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks.

      --
      thank God the internet isn't a human right.
    12. Re:Yes, it IS different... by lachlan76 · · Score: 1

      However, if I can reverse engineer the bank's device and discover the algorithm in use, it becomes worse than useless, in that instills a false sense of security

      Only if you have the seed/key which is used. It's not like I've ever worked with the things, but I would assume that there is a key used to seed the PRNG.

    13. Re:Yes, it IS different... by Nexx · · Score: 1

      1) it's random seed value, presumably known to both parties, with a known time-based permutation/generation algorithm.
      2) you can't turn it off.

    14. Re:Yes, it IS different... by wfberg · · Score: 1


      However, if I can reverse engineer the bank's device and discover the algorithm in use, it becomes worse than useless, in that instills a false sense of security.


      No, not if the algorithm is properly designed; it should rely on the secrecy of the key, not the algorithm. And yes, all tokens are keyed, otherwise they would be completely interchangeable, which they're not.

      Strong passwords are still less hassle, don't sacrifice much to security concerns (if never expressed in clear text), and just aren't that freaking hard to create. Pre-shared keys are even better, depending on how strong they are, and how they're distributed. And how well keys are guarded/revoked-if-stolen. ;)

      Non-shared keys are better. Like, oh say, public key encryption.

      The SecurId algorithm is here btw (from another post in this thread).

      --
      SCO employee? Check out the bounty
    15. Re:Yes, it IS different... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      SecurID is no harder to roll out then any other token. And RSA have made a lot of progress on this front in the last couple of years.

      The lack of challenge/response doesn't limit its usefulness. It is a different solution to the same problem. (hint: The current time as known to the token, and the current time plus drift value known to the server is the "challenge")

      The algorithm has been in use for many years, and proof of concept crackers have existed for a long time. (These were developed from the software tokens) However knowing the algorithm doesn't do jack unless you know both the seed and the current drift value.

      I think you have failed to understand how these tokens are used. They are used in _addition_ to an alphanumeric password. You can have your strong password and the token, this is two-factor authentication.

      Pre-shared keys (one time pad) suffer distribution issues. This can be worked around with token as you only have one factor in transport to the user.

  13. If client can't be trusted, all bets are off! by Ron+Bennett · · Score: 4, Insightful

    At first glance, the external token as described in the article sounds secure, but since the person only types it in once per login, phishing really isn't that much more difficult than before.

    Two ways off the top of my head a phisher can defeat this ...

    1. Grab login data in real-time from an IRC channel, etc and race to login before the code changes - for extra measure, disable the user's connection for a little while - DoS, etc.

    2. Proxy the request - that is don't try to steal the login data itself, but rather hijack their session and go to town.

    Some may think, ok "check the person's ISP (IP range, etc) too" ... sounds like that would blow #1 away, but not if the phisher then logs in via the victims machine.

    In a nutshell, if the client machine can't be trusted, all bets all off!

    Yes, tokens raise the bar, but I fear banks will use this more as an excuse to erode consumer protections for fruadulent transactions; Verify by VISA comes to mind.

    Ron

  14. just need a physical digit wallet by emkman · · Score: 3, Interesting

    If we are going the route of RSA keys, we need a secure digital wallet, where one key contains all the credit cards and bank info we need. This will keep all the info just as secure but we wont need a billion different keys for all our different accounts.

    --
    Moderation Totals: Flamebait=2, Troll=1, Redundant=1, Insightful=6, Overrated=1, Underrated=1, Total=12. (not mine)
    1. Re:just need a physical digit wallet by kzh · · Score: 1

      How secure is your current wallet with your personal details? It is quite interesting to note that we get overzealous when considering all things digital - yet our current methods of security and identification involve a photograph on laminated cards (in the case of drivers' licences). With the advent of digital identification and such, we do need to take more care in the way in which we implement the technology - as due to the global nature of IT, certain security measures become easier to cirucumvent and automise. However, we don't want to go overboard and have to remember the compramise we must make between ease of use and security.

      --
      There are 10 types of people in the world.. those who understand binary and those who don't
    2. Re:just need a physical digit wallet by noselasd · · Score: 1

      So, you want just one key ? Whose the authority over that key ?
      It could govern the key to my bak account, should it also govern the
      key to say the local video rent store ? Would I trust the local
      videostore to also have autority over my bank account ?

    3. Re:just need a physical digit wallet by lachlan76 · · Score: 1

      I think he meant something like Password Safe where you control the master key, and that protects all the others.

  15. If you don't know what RSA is... by JaF893 · · Score: 0, Offtopic

    Check out this Wikpedia article.

    1. Re:If you don't know what RSA is... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      This is actually not correct. The Wikipedia entry is on the RSA crypto algorithm.

      The article is referring to the old SecurID hardware token used for authentication.

  16. Not surprised... by 4alexnyc · · Score: 4, Interesting
    Considering most of my friends in corporations already use these devices to get access to the corporate network, I'm not surprised they're looking to bring it to the general public. I is highly effective.

    To answer the 5 tokens keychain question: there is a software token device also available: http://www.rsasecurity.com/node.asp?id=1313/

  17. What did you expect? by ravenspear · · Score: 3, Funny

    That the /. summary would actually reflect the same interpretation, or dare I say it, even the factual content of the article.

    You must be new here.

  18. I suppose this doesnt surprise me.. by doormat · · Score: 2, Interesting

    I use an 8 digit PIN and a RSA hardware token to log into work remotely.

    --
    The Doormat

    If you're not outraged, then you're not paying attention.
  19. Re:For those who don't want to register: by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
    and for those who want a headache

    MOD PARENT DOWN!

  20. Carry around 5 keys by gspr · · Score: 3, Insightful

    How long before everyone needs to carry around 5 different RSA keys just to perform daily task?

    It's not like a million keys are harder to carry around than one...

    1. Re:Carry around 5 keys by irc.goatse.cx+troll · · Score: 1

      You do realise we're talking about a device that generates a number in sync with the server, and not a simple ascii file, right?

      This, not this. (or this)

      --
      Pain lasts, kid. Its how you know you're alive. Sometimes I think this growing up thing is just pain management-TheMaxx
    2. Re:Carry around 5 keys by YU+Nicks+NE+Way · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Actually, it is harder to carry a million keys around than one. There are two different kinds of hardware tokens: a SIM-based smartcard or a paired key generator. The first has very limited capacity, enough for only a few keys, and the second can't carry more than one key at a time.

  21. This is new? by wfberg · · Score: 4, Informative

    I've been using physical tokens to log on to e-banking for years. Not only that, but tokens that are significantly more secure than securID fobs, in that they support challenge/response and using a PIN to unlock it (two-factor security, and the PIN is only used with the token so it needn't be known at all to the bank).

    In fact, most banks are now switching to keypads that you plug your existing bankcard in, so they can piggyback on the tamper-resistant chipcard that's already on there (although it's slightly less advanced than some tokens, since chipcards don't support a clock that's permanently ticking).

    Most devices are from Vasco who provide a wide range of tokens (some more secure than others). They even have challenge/response tokens that don't require you to copy the challenge; they have optical sensors that can read out a code that's blipped out by flashing blocks on your screen. Way cooler devices than those RSA securIDs.

    --
    SCO employee? Check out the bounty
    1. Re:This is new? by cpeikert · · Score: 1

      Challenge-response isn't inherently more secure than an auto-updating number based on time. Both are basically implementations of a pseudo-random function. With the auto-updater, the current time is essentially the challenge. And not having to type/scan in an explicit challenge is a lot more usable.

    2. Re:This is new? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I don't know about you, but there is no way in hell I'm putting a program thats been helped along by the Israeli secret service on my computer. I may buy Vasco stuff when I can run code written by someone else (with source I can inspect) and that there is no real trace between the tokens and my company.

    3. Re:This is new? by wfberg · · Score: 1

      Challenge-response isn't inherently more secure than an auto-updating number based on time. Both are basically implementations of a pseudo-random function. With the auto-updater, the current time is essentially the challenge. And not having to type/scan in an explicit challenge is a lot more usable.

      With C/R the challenge can be extended with human-readable data; my bank required me to enter bank-account numbers I add to my e-banking address book as a challenge in my token. Other banks require the amount you're transferring to be entered as a second challenge for transactions above a certain amount. This prevents spy/ad/malware/a man-in-the-middle from altering the data you sent (vs. the data you see in your browser).

      An even more advanced scheme would allow you to digitally sign the entire transaction on a tamper-resistant device that doesn't get infected with virusses/malware as easily as your average windows PC does.

      Transaction acception codes aren't just about authentication of the user, they're about non-repudiation of the transaction itself.

      --
      SCO employee? Check out the bounty
  22. How long by bob65 · · Score: 1

    How long before someone finds a fast way of factoring large numbers and we're all screwed?

  23. full text (nicely formatted) by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    A hardware token is only one way to increase security. At E*Trade, customers who want to conduct wire transfers must wait for a confirmation number to be sent to their cellphones or personal digital assistants, then enter that number to complete the transaction, Mr. Levine said.

    People who sign up for the E*Trade hardware tokens and lose them will have to call customer service to authenticate themselves, he said.

    U.S. Bancorp plans to try out a system involving hardware tokens that will be based on technology from VeriSign, the Internet security company. The bank declined to add details.

    The urgency surrounding the issue is linked to an increase in "phishing," the practice of sending fraudulent e-mail messages en masse to bait people into disclosing sensitive information. Newer scams involve "malware," which can install itself on a computer through e-mail or pop-up ads, detect when someone starts to use an online banking program or make a credit card payment, and then record the person's keystrokes and capture account details. The victims do not even have to do something foolhardy like giving away account numbers or passwords.

    "We're just seeing new stuff out there all the time," said Dave Jevans, chairman of the Anti-Phishing Working Group, a coalition of companies in financial services and information technology. But he added: "I don't think people need to be any more scared than going to an A.T.M. at nighttime. They need to be cautious; don't do silly things."

    People who run antivirus software on their home computers, who have installed firewalls to guard against incursions, and who take other security precautions need not worry so much about the proliferation of online threats, security experts say. But they add that these people are probably not in the majority.

    Some bankers say they are leery about rushing to install new systems that may not solve all the problems. Concerns over phishing have "provoked some of the government agencies to come up with simple solutions to very complex problems," said John Carlson, a former regulator with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency who is now a senior director at BITS, the technology arm of the Financial Services Roundtable, a trade group.

    "Consumer acceptance and ease of use are huge issues," he said.

    At Wachovia, which offers both hardware tokens and digital certificates to corporate customers, Joanne Young, the wholesale business manager for e-commerce, says that the certificates are easier to use, although unlike the tokens, they are not portable from one machine to another. When she telecommutes, "I always have to find my hardware token on my computer at home," Ms. Young said. "My kids are always moving it on my desk."

  24. Re:House keys - forgot one... by AetherBurner · · Score: 3, Funny

    I have a church key that I carry too.

  25. We should be careful of this.... by I+kan+Spl · · Score: 2, Interesting

    Putting all of one's eggs into the same basket of crypto is probably a bad idea. If banks all adopt RSA as a standerd way of doing logins at ATM's and or online then there will be a major upheval if anyone cracks RSA.

    RSA is based on the idea that prime numbers are very hard to find, and with some of the research that is currentl going into that field I would be very wary of using that idea as an end-all.

    If banks are to adopt a universal crypto system, then perhaps AES or some form of elliptic curve crypto would be a better choice?

    --
    My UID is prime and so is this number: 09 F9 11 02 9D 74 E3 5B D8 41 56 C5 63 56 88 C0.
    1. Re:We should be careful of this.... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
      RSA is based on the idea that prime numbers are very hard to find

      I'm not trying to be picky, but actually that's not the problem; rather, it's factoring the product of two large prime numbers. I'm no math wizard, but this seems to be something that eventually won't be hard to do (as computers speed up and algorithms improve).

    2. Re:We should be careful of this.... by sparklehackery · · Score: 1, Insightful
      I'm no math wizard, but this seems to be something that eventually won't be hard to do

      no kidding.
    3. Re:We should be careful of this.... by bobbuck · · Score: 2, Informative
      Just one problem. As computers get bigger they can check more keys. But a MUCH smaller match in computer power can make the keys so much bigger. Compare a 40bit key vs 80bit key. Bob and Alice's computer has to do twice as much work at 80bits. Eve-the-evesdropper's computer has to do 2^40 times as much work. (I know this is not techincally correct but it's the same idea.)

      People have been trying to factor large numbers for a long time, and it's a difficult problem.

      Merry Christmas! (or as they say at the NSA: qp93eywufaldksvnh)

    4. Re:We should be careful of this.... by TedCheshireAcad · · Score: 1

      Perhaps, but probably not in our lifetimes. This is the holy grail of modern mathematics.

    5. Re:We should be careful of this.... by thogard · · Score: 1

      Don't forget that RSA's security is also based on the concept that keys are 1:1 and they aren't.

    6. Re:We should be careful of this.... by Spiked_Three · · Score: 2, Informative

      "If banks are to adopt a universal crypto system, then perhaps AES or some form of elliptic curve crypto would be a better choice?"

      AES was not written in the US - so it is highly unlikely that US banks would adopt it as a first solution. Keep in mind the only US organization (NSA) that can truly say whether or not it is breakable will not say.
      Same goes for eliptical curves - they (NSA) will definetly say not all curves are secure - but they will not say which ones and why, but I doubt if you will see eliptical curves in any military applications in the future.

      Neither of these are possible choices for US banks.
      I have sat in these meetings between banks and NSA - and the banks are in quite a bind - they know they need to move past DES, but NSA won't tell them anything classified - so they have to put their foot out looking for the landmines on their own. Then NSA pipes up and shakes their head "no" when the do something wrong, which so far is everything. So what are the banks to do? My bet is they do eventually end up with AES, but after a couple of false starts.

      --
      slashdot troll = you make a compelling argument I do not like the implications of.
    7. Re:We should be careful of this.... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Rivest Shamir and Adleman....

      Banks can already adopt any of these and a lot already have.
      All newer hardware encryptor on ATM's can now use any alrorithn be that 3DES, RSA or AES.

      They just need ATM hardware vendor to sign your public key, and key exchange away you go.

      All the newer encrypting pin pad hardware on ATM's have multiple encryption protocol support via firmware, which is downloaded at platform startup.
      where that platform be OS/2 or NT4/2k or XP - so they will adapt to a new protocol if required.

      Also have a look at EMV card encryption while your picking holes in ATM security..
      you are proably already carrying around a RSA encrypton signed Visa or Mastercard.

  26. Article not about "RSA Keys" -- Hardware token by Commander+Trollco · · Score: 0

    The article is really talking about using hardware tokens for extra security since the private data is stored on an external token and can't be stolen by viruses, phishing scams, or trojans. I don't even see RSA mentioned in the article -- there is an inset picture of an RSA SecurID but that's as close as it gets.

    --
    http://persianews.on.nimp.org/?u=Tar_Baby
  27. Re:For those who don't want to register: by Xentropy · · Score: 5, Interesting
    A better solution is to use the archive link, which doesn't require registration:

    http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/24/technology/24onl ine.html?ex=1261544400&en=7cc80182b7687ad9&ei=5090 &partner=rssuserland

    (Link created by the NY Times Link Generator: http://nytimes.blogspace.com/genlink )

  28. OT: What happened to searching slashdot? by SteeldrivingJon · · Score: 0, Offtopic


    The slashdot search page is gone. All that's available is the kinda useless Google search field at the bottom of the page.

    What's the deal?

    --
    September 2011: Looking for Cocoa/iOS work in Boston area Cocoa Programmer Quincy, MA
    1. Re:OT: What happened to searching slashdot? by SpaceLifeForm · · Score: 1

      Obviously re-working the pages. Your tilde link is no longer on the main page either.

      --
      You are being MICROattacked, from various angles, in a SOFT manner.
  29. What the world is coming to? by melted · · Score: 1

    Next thing you know - they'll start using the "internets"!

  30. You don't need multiple tokens!! by initsix · · Score: 1

    Anyone else that does RSA Ace administration can confirm this for me, but you should be able to use the same RSA token for multiple accounts. That means ONE token for access to your bank, credit union, online stock broker, whatever.
    RSA tokens come with accompanying software (or a key) which is used to import the token to the ACE authentication server. With that software you can load one token into multiple RSA servers. With a token and its software, you could send your accompanying token software to Bank A and to Bank B, they load your RSA token and you can then use the same token to authenticate to both accounts. As an added measure of security, the usernames do not have to be the same, nor does the accompanying PIN for each account.
    The software I use now for importation imports batches of Ace tokens that we distribute to customers, but I am sure it wouldn't be difficult to supply one "key" per token.
    I have steadily been seeing more and more phishing schemes in my email and they look more and more legit every day. Two factor authentication needs to be implemented soon before more and more people lose their money to scammers.
    I would be more than happy to pay $50-$100 for a token and software that I could use to authenticate to all my online financial services.

    1. Re:You don't need multiple tokens!! by confusion · · Score: 3, Interesting
      I admin'd an ace server for a long time, in an org that had multiple groups running them. It is true that you can use an RSA token on many ace domains - buuut the problem is largely organizational. Even within the same company, it was sometimes hard to get the seed files back and forth.

      Each customer will need to provide their seed file to each new back. *IF* banks were able to settle on all using the same technology (RSA/ACE), most certainly all of them would have different policies on pins, etc, rendering it a pretty confusing thing for customers. Don't underestimate the problems that would cause.

      Jerry
      http://www.syslog.org/

    2. Re:You don't need multiple tokens!! by Nonesuch · · Score: 1
      initsix writes:
      Anyone else that does RSA Ace administration can confirm this for me, but you should be able to use the same RSA token for multiple accounts. That means ONE token for access to your bank, credit union, online stock broker, whatever.
      Yes, this is technically possible.

      There is one serious flaw in this approach -- because the ACE/SecurID tokens use a single embedded shared-secret "seed", any organization which has the key (seed file) for your token can in theory emulate that token perfectly, spoofing the randomly generated number (Source code has been published to demonstrate this for older SecurID soft tokens, see above URL). The seed would always be the same for all places you auth to, only the PIN would differ.

      So your credit union could, if they can keyboard-sniff the PIN, spoof a login as you into your bank or stock broker.

      RSA tokens come with accompanying software (or a key) which is used to import the token to the ACE authentication server. With that software you can load one token into multiple RSA servers. With a token and its software, you could send your accompanying token software to Bank A and to Bank B, they load your RSA token and you can then use the same token to authenticate to both accounts. As an added measure of security, the usernames do not have to be the same, nor does the accompanying PIN for each account.
      Earlier this year RSA changed how they ship the seed media, so this is no longer easily possible.

      Now when you order a batch of tokens, RSA asks for the license info from the server you will use the tokens with, and ships the seed media encoded so the seeds can only be loaded onto that one specific server.

      The software I use now for importation imports batches of Ace tokens that we distribute to customers, but I am sure it wouldn't be difficult to supply one "key" per token. I have steadily been seeing more and more phishing schemes in my email and they look more and more legit every day. Two factor authentication needs to be implemented soon before more and more people lose their money to scammers.

      I would be more than happy to pay $50-$100 for a token and software that I could use to authenticate to all my online financial services.

      I'm not sure that I would just a single token that authenticates across multiple entities. How can I know that a hacker at my credit union isn't using my credentials to empty out my brokerage account?

      The good news is that AOL and other businesses are offering tokens to users for around ten bucks a pop, where we pay around fifty bucks (we buy batches of two thousand tokens to even get the price this low).

  31. Carry around 5 keys-DNA. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I carry around DNA. That's all the key I need.

    1. Re:Carry around 5 keys-DNA. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I carry around DNA. That's all the key I need.

      You better hope nobody decodes and copies your DNA. You'll be pwned for life.

  32. Argh... please make the distinction by kaedemichi255 · · Score: 2, Informative

    The distinction really should be made between RSA encryption keys used for crytopgrahic algorithms, and RSA SecureID Tokens, which are what this news item is referring to, but are different from the public/private encryption keys!

  33. Customers expected to pay? by Xentropy · · Score: 5, Insightful
    I'm willing to admit up-front that being the victim of a security breach or some kind of fraud is distressing to the customer, but given the fact most banks (and certainly any bank I would do business with) have zero liability fraud policies nowadays, the only party for whom such a device would be saving money is the bank.

    Therefore, why are customers expected to pay $10 for these? Certainly, banks will recoup the costs somehow (through higher fees in general), but isn't the net effect of this type of technology supposed to be a savings? Isn't it the bank's responsibility (and liability) to make sure their customers' accounts are secure (assuming a reasonable amount of due diligence by said customers)? Isn't the savings in reduced fraud and security breaches supposed to outweigh the cost of the security devices? If not, why does the technology exist?

    It sounds great and all, but unless offered as a free service, I'll sit this one out.

    1. Re:Customers expected to pay? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Therefore, why are customers expected to pay $10 for these?

      Same reason they pay for cheques.

    2. Re:Customers expected to pay? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      why are customers expected to pay $10 for these?

      Why not? The banks ding us for fees when we withdraw our own fucking money, and for any other thing they possibly can. Why would you expect them to foot the bill for this, rather than pass it along to their customers?

      Banks are next to worthless these days. If I didn't need to write checks to pay my bills, I'd buy a good safe and keep my money in my house. I think I'd manage to survive without that whopping $20 in interest I'm earning in a year.

    3. Re:Customers expected to pay? by thogard · · Score: 4, Insightful

      I don't know about you, but I like the plausible deniability of the existing system. I fear banks that have very strong online controls because when they make mistakes, they will simply say "the computer proved it was you" and there is far less recourse. Its the same reason that I used credit cards on line and won't ever use a debit card on line. The credit card is their money, the debit card controls my money.

    4. Re:Customers expected to pay? by Sentry21 · · Score: 1

      Consider it this way. Let's say the cards really cost $10 for the bank. They have basically two options.

      The first is common: make the customer pay for the card, one-time up-front. Most utilities will do this for hook-up charges, etc. as well.

      The second method is to include this in day-to-day charges. A lot of people say 'this should be part of the cost of doing business', but look at it this way. Banks aren't going to take money out of their profits to pay for something, they're going to raise your fees.

      So let's say they raise your fees by $0.50/month. That's 20 months to have the card pays off. What this means is that anyone that gets a card more than once every 20 months (loses it, changes banks often, etc) is paying less than they are taking. Meanwhile, loyal customers (anyone who holds an account more than 20 months) end up paying MORE in the end.

      I was talking to a customer of a major utility in Ontario who was upset that they were charging him a $25 administration fee even though he'd been a loyal customer for years. I told him that if they absorbed it into the costs, then the more loyal the customer, the more they would pay, while the customers that move around a lot (once every two years) would pay less.

      Don't complain about up-front costs, because if they tucked them away, you'd pay more in the end.

    5. Re:Customers expected to pay? by Xentropy · · Score: 1
      You have a nice point about up-front vs. "hidden" fees, but my point was really focused more on whether this is really an expense at all. If it will cost more for these devices than it saves in reduced fraud, why are we even considering their use? If they're saving money, then charging for them is doubly rediculous since zero liability policies mean the party saving the money isn't even the party expected to spend money to help save it. It's analogous to an employer making a new employee pay out of their own pockets (or deducting the cost from their first paycheck) for their building access/ID card. The card is there to protect the employer and its assets, not the employee.

      Bottom line, if the feature is optional with a fee, I'll sit it out (at the bank's expense if my account is hacked, no less). If it's required to open/maintain an account and incurs a fee to obtain, I'll take my business elsewhere. A smart bank will distribute these for free to members who wish to use them, since they should--if they are a valid technology at all--save the bank more money than they cost.

  34. Seemless by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I think the future will be programs that seemlessly encrypt and digitally sign everything without anybody having to know or care. We can see this in SSL. Really, manually encrypting and having to use RSA and PGP keys will never catch on with the general populace.

  35. Mmmmm RSA by mg2 · · Score: 1

    As long as I don't have to memorize three RSA keys, I don't really care how many I have to use throughout the day -- give me a usb token or give me death.

  36. Customers expected to pay?-Recursive. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Insightful

    "Therefore, why are customers expected to pay $10 for these? Certainly, banks will recoup the costs somehow (through higher fees in general)"

    And this mystery group that will be paying the fees is?

  37. Sweeden uses a similar token system by ScottMacVicar · · Score: 3, Interesting

    A friend who is studying in sweeden at the moment has basically a scratch card with 40 numbers on it, when she goes to login she enters her username, password and then scratches off a panel to get a 8 digit numeric token to enter.
    When she has used about 30/40 the bank send out a new card.

    Its a whole lot cheaper than handing out SecureID devices to customers and i'm really suprised that most banks dont have this already, its the size of a credit card and fits nicely in a wallet.

    1. Re:Sweeden uses a similar token system by pekkak · · Score: 2, Informative

      It's the same in Finland. I have a card with about 100 disposable passwords and when I have used most of the passes the bank sends me a new card. In my opinion this is a lot more secure method than the permanent password scheme employed by many American banks. No offense, but as can be seen from the many comments posted here already, the US banking system is not exactly the state of the art. I mean, US still uses paper checks which I find astonishing. There must be incredible amounts of work and thus expenses involved in handling all those checks.

      --
      What are we going to do tomorrow night? The same thing we do every night, Pinky. Try to take over the world!
    2. Re:Sweeden uses a similar token system by Nonesuch · · Score: 1
      ScottMacVicar writes:
      A friend who is studying in sweeden at the moment has basically a scratch card with 40 numbers on it, when she goes to login she enters her username, password and then scratches off a panel to get a 8 digit numeric token to enter. When she has used about 30/40 the bank send out a new card.

      Its a whole lot cheaper than handing out SecureID devices to customers and i'm really suprised that most banks dont have this already, its the size of a credit card and fits nicely in a walle

      Now this sounds like something that can easily be implemented in Open Source.

      The software should not be difficult to implement (just a simple variation on RMD160 S/Key to produce short alphanumeric keys?) and the hardware to print your own scratch off cards runs maybe a couple of grand at most.

      While this approach might not be a good solution for other places where SecurID is deployed (I use my token at work 8-20 times a day), it makes a lot of sense for online banking where people might authenticate once a week/month, and don't mind waiting for the post to get their next set of one time passwords.

    3. Re:Sweeden uses a similar token system by TheToon · · Score: 1

      And if the cards are properly generated (i.e true random), they should be as safe as one-time pads.

      And nothing beats truly random onetime pads :) For small stuff like authentication, one time pads are feasible like this. You cannot use them to encrypt the entire transaction... bla bla for a full explanation of the various one-time pad schemes go read The Code Book by Simon Singh.

      In fact, before any of you start to comment on crypto you should at least have read that book (I know many of you have read it, so just keep posting :)

      --
      //TheToon
  38. re: by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I wonder why NY Times has not companied to Slashdot about the blatant copying of materials from their site.

    Secondly, why the mods here continue to give points to people who do.

  39. For CC charges too by The+Cisco+Kid · · Score: 2, Insightful

    If they *DONT* protect credit(/debit) card charges with this, its somewhat useless, since thats the simplest way for someone to suck the money out of someones account.

    If they do require charges to a credit card to be authorized by the SecureID card, it not only protects against outright stealing, but also prevents a merchant from saving your CC# and automatically rebilling you without your permission unless you jump thru their hoops to 'cancel' somne service - their only recourse is to terminate the service, which is as it should be.

  40. RSA keys for AOL members by PFritz21 · · Score: 1

    Does AOL also sell their members' RSA keys to spammers and the ilk?

  41. Re:Put up or Shut up by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Insightful

    Breaking News! Sources have just confirmed that local schools contain all the machinery necessary for creating a password cracking super computer!

    Seriously though.. How would Russia be any different? Or any other industrialized nation? Or, hell, the local high school? Frankly, anyone can build at least a small scale super computer these days, and it's not hard at all to crack the kinds of passwords we're talking about here. Most of it can be done using ready-made software and requires almost no technical knowledge.

    Parent needs to take a chill pill and quit blaming China for America's problems.

  42. Re:Put up or Shut up by ScrewMaster · · Score: 4, Insightful

    All of which is irrelevant. If China (or any other country) wants to get hold of a few hundred PCs to build a clustered supercomputer it's just not that difficult to do. Cripes, if Iraq can get hold of nuclear tech how hard can it be to buy a few commodity computers (or even high-end processors) on the open market? Why is this even a question?

    I mean, sure, China has openly ripped off numerous technologies from a number of countries to bootstrap their high-tech economy, but to say that our banking industry is in danger specifically from China because they can (holy CPU chip, Batman!) build a Beowulf cluster is sort of ridiculous. China is a significant threat to the Western world, for a variety of reasons, but I'd say banking fraud is probably not one of the biggest ones. I'd be more concerned about Russia or Nigeria.

    --
    The higher the technology, the sharper that two-edged sword.
  43. Re:Put up or Shut up by athanis · · Score: 1

    Yes, many Taiwanese companies have a subsidiary in China. And as China steadily opens up, so will just about every other developed nation in the world! So? Are you claiming that China is going to build a beowulf cluster to crack all the passwords and take over the world? C'mon!

    I think this attitude that China, by having access to computer hardware, is a major threat is downright crazy. The RSA keys aren't there are protect the West from China! That's the kind of FUD that is endangering the West itself.

    Further, i do not argue that the 'reputable' news sources you mentioned are reputable. But that's just what they are: reputable. Don't take everything you read as the gospel, there are ALWAYS biases and opinions in any news media.

    People, wake up! This isn't the 70's and hell, if anything, I'm feeling that the the States is becoming more and more commie and that China, OTOH, is running towards a more capitalistic economy!

  44. SecurID by streak · · Score: 1

    I personally have an RSA SecurID that I use for work and I love it. I think its a really great system and it meets our authentication needs. In case you aren't familiar (or haven't read other posts), SecurID is a fob that can put on your keychain that lasts I think 5 or so years and gives you a new 6 digit token each minute. This combined with your own passphrase authenticates.

    The fob uses time-based encryption against the auth server so that it knows at a given point in time what the 6 digit number should be.

  45. SEB uses VASCO SecureID tokens by hanssprudel · · Score: 3, Informative

    Since this is already being moderated up, I want to note that poster is wrong.

    The system that the grandparent describes is based on VASCO "Digipass" devices, that work just like the RSA secureid tokens, only that they also support PINs and challenge/response authentication. That means that if everything is done correctly (which I can't swear to) these tokens, which SEB have been using for more than five years, are considerably more secure than the normal RSA SecureID.

    Basically (very simplified) your normal SecureID will create a checksum from a secret and the current time, so the server can verify that person logging in is holding the token at this time. The Digipass, on the other hand, creates a checksum of the secret, the time, and the challenge from the server. This verifies that the person logging in has access to the token at this time, and created a checksum for this particular log in. And the fact that it also requires a personalized PIN to access the device means that stealing it will do you little good.

    1. Re:SEB uses VASCO SecureID tokens by wcdw · · Score: 1

      Well, frankly, it doesn't seem like it would be that hard to figure out how to dummy the PIN entry on the front end if one had the physical device in hand.

      Then again, with the SecurID card, it's even easier. ;)

      The only real problem I see is the 'if done right' part. Conceptually it's a better solution than SecurID (no surprise, the market does usually evolve). As far as actual USE goes, it seems a little less convenient.

      (Note that I have successfully fought every effort to make me actually _carry_ a SecurID card, so that opinion is based mostly on anecdotal evidence. I *do* know that the SecurID cards *don't* always handle clock drift, despite the 'X previous key / Y future keys' settings on the server.)

      Personally, I like the convenience of Firefox storing my passwords so I don't have to type them. If by some chance my firewall gets hacked, or my site gets burgled, it's easy enough to change/cancel them (unfortunately Linux doesn't really have any well-integrated file-system-based encryption, though I'm sure that will change).

      Then too, who knows what encryption will look like in the world of quantum computing? The thought of having to carry a bunch of keychain devices to be able to access my accounts is annoying, at best. I don't WANT a bunch of crap clogging up my keyring. It's bad for the ignition switch on the car, and worse for the one on the bike....

      --
      If you're not living on the edge, you're just taking up space!
    2. Re:SEB uses VASCO SecureID tokens by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I've done RSA SecurID training, and we've recently evaluated VASCO's range. From the product information I read, they have two lines of tokens, SecurID like time based tokens and Safeword like challenge response tokens. Unless they've been recently added to the range they didn't have a combined token.

      RSA makes a SecurID token that requires a PIN on the token itself. Just not many people buy them. If you are using an encrypted path (SSL) to handle man in the middle attacks, then the cost/benefit is not favourable unless you are extremely paranoid.

    3. Re:SEB uses VASCO SecureID tokens by Aeiri · · Score: 1

      Knoppix (3.7 at least) gives you the option to have an AES256 encrypted filesystem when you choose to create a persistent home directory.

      I personally find the amount of software on Knoppix extremely impressive, as when I tried to create my own LiveCD for only the software I need, it turned out to be 1.4 GB. Knoppix has ALL of the software I need (minus Firefox, Thunderbird, and Azureus), plus about 200 more applications...

      I hate Knoppix' ugly interface though, and the security it actually has on it (no firewall, no root password (!), sudo logs in as root no matter what), and my solution to this is to create an automatic boot script that changes everything, along with keeping the settings I use it Slackware, all via a 128MB USB Pen Drive. I haven't perfected my implementation yet (I'm still on Slackware right now ;)), but you might want to try to do the same if you can.

      All of your stuff on a single CD and a USB Pen Drive, that's what I'm trying to create, and I'm very very close to completing my goal :)

  46. Re: Why the mods give points to NYT ripoffs by wcdw · · Score: 0, Offtopic

    Well, duh. Because most of us don't WANT to have to contribute our DNA just to read the freaking article.

    --
    If you're not living on the edge, you're just taking up space!
  47. Frustrating.... by confusion · · Score: 1
    It seems like most of the rest of the civilized world has already adopted hardware tokens of some sort for online banking security, but here in the good ole USA, we're yet again behind the times.

    My fear is that each bank would adopt a different technology to implement this, and I would be keeping track of 7 different tokens right now. OTOH, that is not a bad price to pay for better security of my money and lower fees, etc. on my bank accounts.

    The reality is that, depite the big inconvenience, US banking customers who are victimized aren't feeling a lot of pain. Banks here are priding themselves on how quickly they restore your money if someone wipes out your account. As such, there isn't a big demand from customers for a higher level of security, so the inconvenience caused by moving to a token-based system will likely not be very successful, unless something changes.

    Jerry http://www.syslog.org/

  48. Solution to multiple tokens... by rdunnell · · Score: 1

    This is really why they are pushing federated identity so hard in various circles.

    The solutions to multiple tokens are either to use a federated identity scheme where authentication may come from a business partner but authorization comes from your own systems (MS Passport, Liberty Alliance, etc) or to put certificates on smart cards that you already might have (e.g. a EMV chip card that also stores "money") so that having many tokens is not really a problem. It's possible that you could do both - have federated identity with smart card tokens. This will probably happen someday.

    The former is probably a huge challenge in the area of contracts, working agreements, protocols, etc etc etc. but it's being pursued because it's a good idea and would ultimately be worth the challenge. The latter is pretty easy except in USA where smart cards are not so prevalent. I guess contactless chip (RFID) could work for this purpose though...

    For the tin foil hat crowd, please note that "federated" does not mean "federal." Although it's perfectly conceivable that the government could provide this authentication service to its citizens/wards (and some countries probably already do), it probably wouldn't happen in the USA for various reasons IMO.

  49. SecurID vs. Smart Cards by tji · · Score: 1

    "RSA keys" in the title is a bit misleading.. It makes it sounds like a full crypto implementation, using smart cards and all the capabilities that implies. Confusing the RSA crypto algorithm, with the SecurID card, a product made by the company RSA.

    SecurID is just a clunky authentication system using a hardware token to display numbers used for the authentication (although, they do also offer software tokens. there is nothing magical about the hardware)

    Why not go to a modern smart card system? It can store full certificates, and tie directly into really strong security/crypto. Tie the smart card / cert into the autentication of your system, and into IPSec, SSL, etc.

    SecurID offers only the authentication piece, based on a completely closed algorithm.

    1. Re:SecurID vs. Smart Cards by Nonesuch · · Score: 2, Informative
      writes:
      "RSA keys" in the title is a bit misleading.. It makes it sounds like a full crypto implementation, using smart cards and all the capabilities that implies. Confusing the RSA crypto algorithm, with the SecurID card, a product made by the company RSA.
      A common mistake. Most of the articles I've seen lately on the subject have not mentioned either "RSA" or "SecurID", just talking about "devices" or "tokens" or perhaps "two factor authentication".

      SecurID is just a clunky authentication system using a hardware token to display numbers used for the authentication (although, they do also offer software tokens. there is nothing magical about the hardware)

      Why not go to a modern smart card system? It can store full certificates, and tie directly into really strong security/crypto. Tie the smart card / cert into the autentication of your system, and into IPSec, SSL, etc.

      SecurID offers only the authentication piece, based on a completely closed algorithm.

      The SecurID hardware token has two primary advantages over smart cards, and most other authentication tokens:
      • RSA has patents on time-based tokens, this allows for a simple sealed hardware token without any buttons.
      • No additional hardware or software or drivers are needed to authenticate. Just the token and (optionalyl) a user selected PIN.
      While smart cards have their place, they are not so great for handing out to remote users. For example, does anybody actually use the card reader that was distributed in the American Express "Blue" promotion a few years back?
    2. Re:SecurID vs. Smart Cards by tji · · Score: 1

      Yes, at the user side there is nothing directly needed to support SecurID authentication. But, on the application server side it needs to be built into the app using RSA's API. But, since SecurID is so broadly deployed, pretty much all security related applications implement SecurID auth.

      For corporate uses, it's much easier to dictate Smart Cards, and integrate a bunch of different corporate applications - multiplying the benefit of the card.

      But, thinking about the problem a bit more.. I guess that clunky two factor authentication processes solve some real problems. They protect against worms/viruses reading all the stored passwords on a users's system. They also minimize the risk of the phishing scams, because the passwords only last 60 seconds. Although, they don't totally eliminate the risk. A phishing site could ask for the SecurID code, then connect out to the bank site in real time to authenticate and do what they want.

  50. "Bloated" security? by mr.+methane · · Score: 2, Interesting

    RSA dongles seem like a step in the right direction, but it sure is a pain. Just for my work, I need to carry one RSA dongle, two "swipe cards", and remember (best guess) seven passwords, have a list of codes, lock combinations, and several plain old keys. It's a pain.

    Biometrics - thumbprints and the like - seem like the best alternative, but the few examples I've used so far have been very finicky, and mostly used as a second layer of authentication with an access card or code.

    One thing that is going to make this move quickly is the financial incentive - a few million per month in credit fraud, and some congressman getting ID theft is a pretty strong incentive to be creative.

    1. Re:"Bloated" security? by ticktockticktock · · Score: 1

      Could this RSA secureID stuff be in little programs that run on existing cellphones out there?

  51. Bank One Seems To Not Care by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I've emailed Bank One several times about this and can't even get the courtesy of a response. I'm even willing to pay for a token!!!

  52. Re: Why the mods give points to NYT ripoffs by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
    Because most of us don't WANT to have to contribute our DNA just to read the freaking article.

    Funny, because you've already given at least as much information to Slashdot to post your comments as the NYT asks for, Bill. Or do you prefer Will?

  53. Re:For those who don't want to register: by thephotoman · · Score: 1

    Or better yet:

    http://www.bugmenot.com/

    That works quite well.

    --
    Haec merda tauri est. Ceterum censeo Carthaginem esse delendam.
  54. One digital key should be enough by vlad_petric · · Score: 1

    Just program the "doors" with your public key, and have them "challenge-response" the private one.

    --

    The Raven

  55. RSA Keys versus RSA Tokens by eldub1999 · · Score: 1

    So, an RSA Key would be an asymmetric cryptographic key. An RSA (or SecurID) token would be the little key fob with the changing number. Methinks this is referring to the token, not key.

  56. Why no open source secure-id implementation? by Tracy+Reed · · Score: 1

    Around 5 years ago I was looking for a way to have a secure-id sort of solution without having to buy the proprietary software and hardware without any success. I even looked into building my own (I know a little about microcontrollers for the hardware device portion) but was not able to come up with any suitable algorithm. It seems like the security of our Linux systems and other systems which require authentication could really benefit from something like this.

    1. Re:Why no open source secure-id implementation? by blackhedd · · Score: 1

      The SecurID algorithm's claim to fame is that the user experience is non-disruptive, since there is no C/R (some posters consider this a disadvantage), and there are no buttons to press. The algorithm has been hacked, and in any case consists of a simple hash transformation of a secret code (NOT the device serial number, as a lot of people seem to think) and the current time. The device secret is 64 bits wide and is also known to the ACE server, and that's how you set it all up. There is some straightforward intelligence on the server to deal with clock drift on both the token and the server. The hash algorithm used is proprietary ("Brainard") but SHA-1 is plenty strong enough for me.
      There is no real magic on the ACE server, and you could easily implement something functionally equivalent. There are some patent encumbrances regarding the use of a time-driven token but other vendors do something similar, so not sure that's a real problem. Here's the thing: who is going to make the devices? Any ideas, guys? RSA's tokens are extremely expensive, around $50 in large quantities. Can anyone think of a way to do the same thing for $10 or less?

    2. Re:Why no open source secure-id implementation? by Tracy+Reed · · Score: 1

      My idea was to implement some algorithm on a cheap microcontroller, connect it to a cheap LCD, add a crystal and a battery and sink the whole works into epoxy. Not pretty but cheap and durable. I'm sure that can be done for less than $10.

    3. Re:Why no open source secure-id implementation? by flibberdi · · Score: 1

      As someone posted earlier, what about cellphones?? Should be easy to do j2me/symbian/etc ports.... There are lots of OpenSource crypto libs out there, so getting it out the door fast should be easy.

    4. Re:Why no open source secure-id implementation? by lachlan76 · · Score: 1

      Less than $10? Where do you get your LCDs and microcontrollers?

    5. Re:Why no open source secure-id implementation? by spikedvodka · · Score: 1

      I don't know if it could be done on a microcontroller, but maybe on a PDA of some sort

      step 1) ensure both PDA, and system to be authenticated with have their time synced via NTP
      step 2) take the output 'date' and discard the second and millisecond portion
      step 3) take a passphrase of some sort (This could be entered into the PDA each time, or stored)
      step 4) concatinate these strings together, and md5sum the resultant string

      As for something to dip in epoxy... my main concern would be clock drift in either my software, or the epoxy-dipped device.
      solution: create 2 idential devices, one with an LCD display, the other with some sort of hardware (USB/Serial/etc) interface to attach to your computer.
      other option: spend >>$10 on a crystal that occilates at a precicely known frequency.

      just my $0.02

      --
      I will not give in to the terrorists. I will not become fearful.
  57. SecurID tokens use AES, not RSA algorithm by Nonesuch · · Score: 2, Informative
    How long before someone finds a fast way of factoring large numbers and we're all screwed?
    There's no direct relationship between the SecurID tokens sold by RSA and the old RSA algorithm. Actually, the latest generation of SecurID tokens use AES, however RSA still ships backlogs of the older tokens which are built around a proprietary hash.

    Like most other response-only tokens, the authentication is based not on large primes like public-key authentication but rather on a shared secret (one embedded in the token, the other stored on the authentication server.

    Much work has been done towards cryptanalysis of response-only tokens, and a well-designed authentication system is very difficult to break blindly, just from observation of a few response pairs. There have been potentially successful attacks proposed against the old SecurID tokens due to a "vanishing differential" problem with certain seed values, but no proof of concept against that has succeeded, and the new AES tokens should not be vulnerable. More on this is available from the SecurID Users group.

    As a counter-example, the old X9.9 challenge-response authentication system was based on DES encryption, and was not well-designed, was fatally flawed. Observation of a handful of challenges and responses cojuld allow an attacker to determine the seed value and compromise the authenticator.

  58. Challenge-response vs response-only by Nonesuch · · Score: 1
    Challenge-response isn't inherently more secure than an auto-updating number based on time. Both are basically implementations of a pseudo-random function. With the auto-updater, the current time is essentially the challenge. And not having to type/scan in an explicit challenge is a lot more usable
    Good point. There are also a number of vendors who have response-only tokens, less expensive competitors to RSA.

    Also, the old X9.9 based Secure Net Key (SNK, aka Axent Defender) implementation of challenge-response was fatally flawed. There are still versions of this floating around, and it is an optional mode for the VASCO, Safeword, and CryptoCard tokens.

    more detail here.

  59. Security is not free for cheapskates by spyware+scams_suck · · Score: 3, Insightful
    I'm willing to admit up-front that being the victim of a security breach or some kind of fraud is distressing to the customer, but given the fact most banks (and certainly any bank I would do business with) have zero liability fraud policies nowadays, the only party for whom such a device would be saving money is the bank.

    First, the consumer pays for every needed cost by a business. That's a fact just like we all pay when a scammer steals someone's credit card or someone gets into an auto accident and all our fees(credit card or insurance) get raised a little. Do you think when you get reimbursed that it's free, that the business has FREE MONEY out there??!! That's crazy. If your bank is NOT losing money because of scammers because of increased security, they save money having to reimburse their customer and they save money not having to man customer support with irate calls from customers who are crying about an account hijack.

    Therefore, why are customers expected to pay $10 for these? Certainly, banks will recoup the costs somehow (through higher fees in general), but isn't the net effect of this type of technology supposed to be a savings?

    The bank can "bury" the fees & pretend to you that it's free, but you (I hope) and me know that's a load of BS. The customer pays no matter what. Any bank who says it's free is lying. We all pay one way or another.

    Isn't it the bank's responsibility (and liability) to make sure their customers' accounts are secure (assuming a reasonable amount of due diligence by said customers)?

    True, but the bank doesn't have direct control over every computer in the world who can easily keylog any of their customers and stick their password and username into their bank website. They give warnings, but when the THIRD WORLD has EASY ACCESS to every first world nation customer's account & law enforcement in those countries are corrupt, you expect the bank to still provide security in said countries??!! The bank's response would be: Don't do anymore banking online. Go directly to your bank where they can put a camera on you and talk to you and see your bank account pass book.

    Isn't the savings in reduced fraud and security breaches supposed to outweigh the cost of the security devices? If not, why does the technology exist?

    In the long run, the costs go down.

    It sounds great and all, but unless offered as a free service, I'll sit this one out.

    I don't mind if you sit it out and my cousin who works in the bank doesn't mind if you leave for another bank because you pay no matter what. Also, those BANKS with the BEST SECURITY REPUTATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO GAIN THE CUSTOMERS, especially the ones who understand there is a big problem with keeping 3rd world scammers & anonymous computer user scammers away from their accounts and WHO just want to BE COMFORTABLE DOING BUSINESS ONLINE.

    --
    * weedshare.com 50% to artists, webjay.org iuma.com CDBaby.com Epitonic.com ampcast.com
  60. Open source securid-like tokens. by Nonesuch · · Score: 2, Informative
    Tracy Reed writes:
    Around 5 years ago I was looking for a way to have a secure-id sort of solution without having to buy the proprietary software and hardware without any success.
    The first "open" standard for authentication tokens was part of ANSI X9.9, and was broken (and subsequently retracted) back in 1999. The old X9.9 algorithm is still available as an optional authentication method in several hardware tokens offered by competitors of RSA/SecurID.

    Have you looked at GNU SASL (Simple Authentication and Security Layer framework)?

    I even looked into building my own (I know a little about microcontrollers for the hardware device portion) but was not able to come up with any suitable algorithm. It seems like the security of our Linux systems and other systems which require authentication could really benefit from something like this.
    An open source implementation of the SecurID time-based authentication algorithm is not possible because RSA holds several patents covering their whole time-based authentication scheme. The closest solution in the open-source world might be OPIE (formerly S/Key). OpenBSD and other operating systems include S/Key support in the base OS.

    There are OPIE calculators for MD4/MD5 in Java and for most handhelds, but it is tough to find a SHA-1 or RMD-160 implemention, and I have yet to run across any dedicated hardware device that does nothing but handle OPIE authentication. With the uncertainty about SHA-1, You might plan to implement only RMD-160 (160 bit Ripe Message Digest). Tokens would need a bit more CPU power to handle a few hundred rounds, but at least there is a good chance that RMD will still be a viable hash, long after SHA-1 falls.

    1. Re:Open source securid-like tokens. by fille · · Score: 1

      Seems to me that you can easily store a list of passwords and challenges on a small device with an lcd-screen. Since OPIE passwords do not depend on the time or date, you can just use a list, no? You just have to renew it after some time (e.g. 100 logins) but that's not a major problem.

    2. Re:Open source securid-like tokens. by Nonesuch · · Score: 1
      fille writes:
      Seems to me that you can easily store a list of passwords and challenges on a small device with an lcd-screen. Since OPIE passwords do not depend on the time or date, you can just use a list, no? You just have to renew it after some time (e.g. 100 logins) but that's not a major problem.
      I guess the idea has always been that the token device always just stores your seed value XOR'd with your PIN, so somebody who walks off with your token doesn't have access to any useful stored data. Soring pre-calculated respinses goes against this concept.

      Another interesting alternative would be for the token to have a one-level look-ahead cache. After you use a tokencode, the device pre-calculates the next resppnse code and stores it encrypted against your PIN, then goes to sleep.

      This cuts down on the risk and exposure, requires less storage memory, and gives faster startup time than if the response is only calculated at the moment you need it.

  61. 5 keys? by pdbogen · · Score: 0

    How long before everyone needs to carry around 5 different RSA keys just to perform daily task?

    I have five real keys that I use on a daily basis (house, office, building master, car, garage)- If I replaced a couple of these with RSA keys and added some more, I personally think it'd be really cool.

    1. Re:5 keys? by pdbogen · · Score: 1

      Hm, looks like Tepples beat me to this staggering flash of insight.

  62. Smart Card with LCD? by Nonesuch · · Score: 1
    Temporal writes:
    I've always thought that what we really need is devices like this with an LCD display that tells you what, exactly, you are signing.
    I agree 100%. Too bad somebody like RSA is probably already sitting on the patent.

    I'd like to see something that can do the same for digital signatures on non-financial documents. Something like a security-hardened tablet PC so you can review and sign a contract in a secure digital form?

    . . .
    The device I described: The LCD screen displays the question "Authorize payment of $59 to Acme Co.? Yes/No". No charge can go through without your device approving it. You only need to trust that your device will ask you to confirm any charge. And you can trust it because the manufacturer knows that if it screws up, they'll get their pants sued off.
    Sounds like Citibank's VAN taken a step or three further.

    There are a couple of new tokens coming on the market which offer both a LCD display and also USB connection, but they only seem to have one line of maybe 6-8 alphanumerics, and just a single push button (for response-only auth token use). Not quite enough output or inputs to implement something like what you describe.

    1. Re:Smart Card with LCD? by Temporal · · Score: 1

      I agree; you should also be able to use the device for signing contracts and verifying identity. Also, I think the device should support multiple identities for the same person. If you use the same public key for everything, companies will be able to use it to track you, profile you, etc. By creating multiple identities, you can prove to one company that you are the same person when you come back later while not allowing that company to collect information about you from others.

      One silly example I think of is web forums. Like, maybe you'd like to use PKI to log in to your Slashdot account, rather than a password. But you don't want Slashdot to know who you are. So, you create your own key pair just for Slashdot. Now you can log in to Slashdot from anywhere as long as you bring your super-smart card with you, and you don't need a password. :)

      Of course, you'd be free to open separate bank accounts under each identity, etc.

      When registering to vote you'd probably have to choose a specific identity to which you want the government to grant voting rights, and it would only grant such rights to one identity per person. Oohh, but you know what's really cool about voting with electronic signature? You can sign your vote and then send it -- along with a voter registration certificate given by the government, certifying your public key as a valid voter -- directly to the candidate for whom you voted. Then, candidates would be responsible for counting their own votes, but could provide cryptographic proof of those counts, free for download on their web sites, such that anyone can personally verify the results. Say goodbye to problems with partisan election officials and rigged voting machines! (And, remember, your vote would still be anonymous, as long as you created a unique identity that you used just for voting. The government-supplied certificate would not identify you by name.)

      I have too many ideas...

    2. Re:Smart Card with LCD? by Kalak · · Score: 1

      "Say goodbye to problems with partisan election officials and rigged voting machines! (And, remember, your vote would still be anonymous, as long as you created a unique identity that you used just for voting."

      Um, you mean the ID *you created*? And what prevents you from having multiple identities if you create them? Though I see some potential here, but some would have to hand out your ID, not self generate it. It's a series of trust relationships, and I know I don't trust you not to create 100 IDs and vote 100 times. With the group you're opening a relationship with (say the bank) issuing the identities, you have this trust established with them - Oh wait! That's what TFA is talking about!

      Using this system for verifying voting might have *something* worth looking at, but then you have your ID locked to the vote (not a problem for banking) and then you have...wait for it...the possibility that the software used to collect and count the votes can be rigged or is buggy. Hey, you're back to the current situation in voting, but with an individual vote tied to the person who caast it. <sarcasm>You may as well have them sign the ballot so we can call them to see if that's really who they meant to vote for.</sarcasm>

      "I have too many ideas..."

      Think about them and they might be useful, or they might have already been done or dismissed.

      --
      I am, and always will be, an idiot. Karma: Coma (mostly effected by .hack)
    3. Re:Smart Card with LCD? by Temporal · · Score: 1

      OK, you obviously don't understand what I was talking about.

      First of all, I explicitly said that the government would only grant voting rights to one identity per person. The same procedures in use today could be used to make sure no one registers twice. That was the whole point of having the government certify identities in the first place.

      Second, regarding the collecting and counting software being buggy: The whole point is, you can use any software you want, because the results can be independently verified. Each political party would probably write their own software for counting, and any bugs in that software would only hurt themselves. And on the user's end, the process would really be pretty trivial and may not even require special voting software. All you do is sign a thing saying "I vote for such and such candidate" then send it to that candidate's web site.

      As for ID's being traceable back to the individual casting the vote... No, they aren't. Once the government issued a certificate for a particular identity, it would not need to keep any record of that identity in its database. The only record it would need to keep is that you, the person, have already registered, and can't register again. I think that's at least as anonymous as the current ad hoc systems.

    4. Re:Smart Card with LCD? by Kalak · · Score: 1

      Second, regarding the collecting and counting software being buggy: The whole point is, you can use any software you want, because the results can be independently verified. Each political party would probably write their own software for counting, and any bugs in that software would only hurt themselves. And on the user's end, the process would really be pretty trivial and may not even require special voting software. All you do is sign a thing saying "I vote for such and such candidate" then send it to that candidate's web site.

      If this were a paper ballot, you'd never consider such a thing. "I'm candidate John Smith, and I claim that I have gotten 250M voted in the last election. Prove it? Sure, just look at this list of keys (signatures)." Without connecting the vote to a person (see below) or to a central location (open to bugs), you can't check that this kind of fraud would be avoided under your idea. At least with one source (the poll workers, etc.), you know to look at [insert mfg company/polling place here] to find the source of the latest software problem or fraud, and you do not have trust each candidate to be honest, not to mention the individual tabulation methods of each candidate.

      As for ID's being traceable back to the individual casting the vote... No, they aren't. Once the government issued a certificate for a particular identity, it would not need to keep any record of that identity in its database. The only record it would need to keep is that you, the person, have already registered, and can't register again. I think that's at least as anonymous as the current ad hoc systems.

      How about moving and transferring the identities to another location. OK, you're John Doe from LA, now you're John Doe from NY. That can be about the same as another system, say the one we have in place where people can (not legally though) vote in 2 places. The it works there. Another scenario: How about losing your ID (and people will lose them)? Well, which one needs to be canceled? Yours? How does the issuer tell which one that is if there was no record of it? You have to memorize your key? And I thought learning my SSN as a kid was hard. Currently, you can (in the districts I've voted al least) only claim to be one person on time on voting day. Then after that is checked off, you vote. No point in issuing a cert/identity for that. (They gave me a "voter pass" that was taken by the poller in the latest election.) The could have handed me a smart card, but that serves no real purpose above the slip of paper that I was given and 2 minutes later turned in.

      In short, there's no easy answer here, and it may lie in the direction you're considering, but voting is more complicated than that. Remember that the current systems we have are from centuries of voter fraud, and a quick fix is probably not the answer.

      --
      I am, and always will be, an idiot. Karma: Coma (mostly effected by .hack)
    5. Re:Smart Card with LCD? by Temporal · · Score: 1

      If this were a paper ballot, you'd never consider such a thing. "I'm candidate John Smith, and I claim that I have gotten 250M voted in the last election. Prove it? Sure, just look at this list of keys (signatures)."

      You can forge a signature on paper. You can't forge a cryptographic signature. Not in your lifetime, anyway.

      No, my solution is not complete, but it was meant to be a starting point for building something more complete. I think simple modifications could be applied to solve each of the problems you have, but I'm not going to go into it all here. The fundamental point that I think is important is that the final vote count is verifiable by any third party, with the candidates being in charge of counting their own votes (in an independently verifiable way).

    6. Re:Smart Card with LCD? by Kalak · · Score: 1

      You can forge a signature on paper. You can't forge a cryptographic signature. Not in your lifetime, anyway.

      Think of logging into a computer for the first time via SSH or a self-signed SSL cert. You're asked if you want to trust this key. All your computer says is that it knows this is a SSH/SSL key, but it doesn't know who owns this key, then it asks "Do you want to trust this key?" Trust begins with this question. There is no guarantee that a man in the middle attack isn't starting there w/o having the key tied to an individual, such as the party Verisign issued the key to (with complete info). With voting, you can't answer this question at all, since you can't trust a 3rd party or the candidate with the answer to this question.

      Back to the paper analogy. My real signature is like a crypto key in a lot of ways. It's unique (like a crypto key), but you can't tell who I am from it alone since there is only one readable letter in it. (My handwriting always sucked, and you don't need letters to make it your signature anyway, so I let mine deteriorate ages ago). Like a crypto key, "brute force" is also unlikely to come up with a collision for my signature (in my lifetime), but it can come up with millions of ways to sign a name that looks like my name, or vaguely like my signature..

      One big point here is that I could sign my signature a hundred different ways, and you couldn't tell it wasn't an actual person's identity if you don't ask "Is that really your signature?" I get that question a lot. Then I have to pull out an ID, such as my drivers license with a matching signature on it, or turn to the signature on the back of my credit card which was pre-signed. This is connecting it back to my identity. Your suggestion is the first part of this paragraph, without any ability to match it to another ID, such as my drivers license (or matching it to, say a list of registered voters).

      For banking this is fine, since they can match my signature to the one on file, but this is still the crux of the voting problem. To avoid this, you'd have to tie the identity to the vote, recursing our posts earlier in the thread, or send the key with the vote, and have it be tied to an identity, or have it be forgeable by disconnecting it from the vote. The current check off of registered voters doesn't work if separated in place and time from the vote.

      p.s. If your idea didn't have some potential, I wouldn't invest this much effort in playing devil's advocate.

      --
      I am, and always will be, an idiot. Karma: Coma (mostly effected by .hack)
    7. Re:Smart Card with LCD? by Temporal · · Score: 1

      Think of logging into a computer for the first time via SSH or a self-signed SSL cert. You're asked if you want to trust this key.

      That's only because the key is uncertified. If you buy an SSL certificate for your key from Verisign or some other trusted root, you will not get this message.

      This is where the government voter registration agency comes in. They are the "trusted root". They only have one signature (one public key), and everyone knows it. So, they sign a certificate which says "We have verified that this key belongs to a unique person.".

      SSL is not vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks when you have a properly certified key.

      The current check off of registered voters doesn't work if separated in place and time from the vote.

      Since it's perfectly possible for someone to find their way to two different polling stations in the same day, this system is already broken. If you manage to be registered in two locations (which, it would seem, is not that hard, though illegal), you can vote twice. The Afghan idea of marking everyone's thumbs with ink would be more secure, really.

  63. Customers expected to [Understand economics] by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    "Bottom line, if the feature is optional with a fee, I'll sit it out (at the bank's expense if my account is hacked, no less). If it's required to open/maintain an account and incurs a fee to obtain, I'll take my business elsewhere. A smart bank will distribute these for free to members who wish to use them, since they should--if they are a valid technology at all--save the bank more money than they cost."

    I really hate having to combat ignorance of business and economics, but you deserve it.

    All costs to operate a business come from the customers. Even profits come from customers. Losses are recovered from someone too.* There is no magic money fairy. The best anyone can do is shift them around, from either one group to another, or pay for it from future revenue. It still comes from customers. Period. No ifs, ands, or buts. What you really ment to say is "I want to shift costs (losses) to someone else, and if I don't get my way. I'm taking my business to another bank that doesn't operate under economic principles".

    *This "someone" can be customers, and in the case of federal insurance. "someone" is the citizentry. Crimminals (unless caught) don't pay. So "zero liability" doesn't mean "I don't pay". I means you have the perception of not paying. Taxes, or higher fees, your choice.

    "save the bank more money than they cost."

    Save YOU money. The bank is just incidental.

  64. better and cheaper solution by jeif1k · · Score: 1

    Using RSA security tokens (of the hardware variety) is unnecessarily expensive. One-time passwords (strikelists) are cheap and proven technology. US banks should start using them--banks elsewhere already do.

  65. Quick! by Gentlewhisper · · Score: 3, Funny

    Lets patent "use of hardware cryptographic device during online banking for additional security"

  66. Re:Lets reword it a little.. by Gentlewhisper · · Score: 1

    The reality is that the RSA key is a godsend for protecting your accounts. Many Americans are simply unaware of the fact that the NSA can now assemble a supercomputer and eat it for lunch. This supercomputer can easily crack the passwords of many accounts at your bank, brokerage, etc. Oh, and it can tell what emails you read and what pr0n sites you surfed and even which route you take to work every day!

    The RSA will help to protect Western bank/brokerage accounts from Big Brother's theft. With the Patriot Act comes the requirement to surrender your wealth unconditionally to The Party. That the majority of stolen credit card numbers end up in the hands of NSA and FBI agents, aided and abetted by Bush, in Washionton should surprise no one.

    Oh wait, they already have more legitmate ways of doing such things.

    Come on! How the heck would thugs gain access to a Supercomputer? Do you see it happening in USA? How about that happening in an even more oppressive society? Unlike in the US, this kind of thing is punishable by death!

  67. My authenticate authenticate day, 8am - 6pm by aardwolf204 · · Score: 4, Interesting

    I know its probably too late for anyone to see this, but here's what my typical day looks like:

    Wake up. Power on computer, wash up while booting. authenticate with windows. Launch Outlook, authenticate with Exchange server. Hibernate computer. Grab cell phone, wallet, keys, etc.. Leave apartment, authenticate with locks on apartment door. Walk to car, authenticate with car door locks. Get in car. authenticate with ignition. Drive to work. authenticate with cell phone, call voice mail, authenticate with voicemail, hit speakerphone and listen to messages. Lock phone. Park at work, lock car.

    authenticate with front door at work. Greet co-workers. Sit down at desk, turn on monitors, authenticate with computer. Launch Outlook, authenticate with Exchange. Call voice mail from work phone, authenticate with voicemail. Listen to messages, hang up.

    Terminal Service to Exchange server, authenticate with server. Launch MMC, check event logs, Exchange logs, IIS logs, backup logs. Check performance monitor. Launch Exchange Anti-Virus. authenticate with Anti-Virus program. Check logs. Minimize terminal service session with Exchange server.

    Terminal service to SQL server, authenticate with server. Launch MMC, check event logs, SQL logs, IIS logs, backup logs. Check performance monitor. Minimize terminal service session with SQL server.

    Launch firefox, browse to sharepoint, authenticate, read messages. Browse to gmail, authenticate, read messages. Browse to online bank, authenticate, check balance. Browse to credit card, authenticate, check balance. Browse to photography community message board, authenticate, check private messages. Browse to Slashdot, authenticate, check headlines.

    Get call from manager, talk about project. Browse to file repository, authenticate, download requirements document. Browse to print server, authenticate, print requirements document. Write notes on project, browse to project worksite, authenticate, upload file.

    Get call from user, walk user through troubleshooting steps, walk user through remote assistance request steps. Launch messenger, authenticate, receive remote assistance request. Initiate connection with VPN server, authenticate. Launch remote assistance application, connect to remote user, authenticate. Troubleshoot problem. Maximize Exchange server terminal service window. authenticate with locked screen saver. Open MMC, reset user password. Disconnect from remote assistance request.

    Browse to network share, authenticate, copy backup files to removable hard disk. Logoff from terminal service sessions and local machine. Grab hard disk and leave office. Lock office door. authenticate with car door, authenticate with ignition, drive home. authenticate with apartment door, turn on computer, authenticate, launch outlook, authenticate with Exchange, read messages. Grab bike and leave house. authenticate with front door. Ride bike to gym. Lock bike in parking lot. Work out. Leave gym, authenticate with bike lock. Ride home. authenticate with mailbox, get mail, lock mailbox. authenticate with front door.

    Its now 6:00 and I've authenticated with something or another 40 times. My day is only half over. I carry 8 keys in my pocket, and about 40 different passwords in my head. I am constantly locking and unlocking various things. My case may be a bit more extreme being a system administrator but trust me you do this too, and its probably just as bad. This was just a quick summary, I'm sure I left off about 100 other authentications. Welcome to Earth.

    --
    Im dreaming ofa big bndwdth, That can resist the /.crowd.May ur days b merry & bright & may al
    1. Re:My authenticate authenticate day, 8am - 6pm by St.+Vitus · · Score: 2, Interesting

      Walk to car, authenticate with car door locks.

      I would argue that this is authorization, not authentication. Two very different things. The car doesn't care who you are. From the car's viewpoint, you have the key, you are authorized to access the inside of the car.

  68. OpenPGP by bwbadger · · Score: 4, Interesting

    I'd like to be able to use just the one key for all the secure sites I go to.

    ... and I'd like that to be my OpenPGP key.

    Surely it must be possible for me to give my public key to a bank (or whatever) and have them authenticate me using that key. e.g. by them sending out a hash, having me sign it using my private key, and then having them check that the signature is good.

  69. Just lock out the account... by WoTG · · Score: 1

    If a phisher grabs the login and races in, you will end up with two sessions open to the same account. If the bank sees this happens, just lock out the account as a precaution. Under most "normal" circumstances two sessions for the same account should not occur - except for possibly automated software like Quicken. For the sake of security, however, I'm sure people won't mind making sure Quicken isn't logging into your bank account when you want to manually login.

    I think this is LONG overdue. I hope Canadian banks don't lag behind on some sort of hardware token. I know I cross my fingers whenever I visit friends or relatives and find their computers spyware and virus infested.

    It's a surprisingly short jump from spyware to keylogging trojan... it's scares me actually.

    1. Re:Just lock out the account... by jawtheshark · · Score: 1
      Two sessions? Block account if that happens? Have you *ever* worked in a bank? In ebanking? Man, let's just say one thing: in my days at working at banks there was exactly *one* bank that did this. With most of the others, we had the arguments in the style of "what if wife and husband are on different computers and want to check balance?".

      You, as a techie can rant all you want about security, but the business guy will not listen. Trust me on that one.

      Oh, come one, I once had a discussion with a business guy and told him it would be sensible to authenticate every transaction with the users password (as my bank does). He thought that was too cumbersome and would stop "spontaneous" transactions like buying shares and the like. Guess how it is implemented? I'll tell you: not the most secure way. :-(

      --
      Ahhh...the great dumpster continuum. Many a free computer will be found there. -- sowth (748135)
  70. Re:For those who don't want to register: by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Use paragraph breaks, you stupid fornicating vagina kharma prostitute.

  71. HBCI and GnuCash by Thorak · · Score: 2, Informative

    German banks use DES and RSA keys on chipcards for years. Together, they developed the Homebanking Computer Interface (HBCI) and the FinTS - Financial Transaction Services: http://www.hbci-zka.de/english/index.htm/

    It works like a charm with http://www.gnucash.org/. I just insert my chipcard into my reader and can do as many transactions as I want without the hassle of PIN/TAN crap and have a fully working financial solution for my everyday need.

  72. Broken as everyone knows by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Informative

    The big players on the field have broken rsa years ago already. The small ones can crack only about 2048 bit keys at the moment. That stuff is really protecting you from the John Does and amateurs only.

  73. WHAT ABOUT CASH!? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Why all this fuzz and crap, why not use CASH?

  74. Re: Why the mods give points to NYT ripoffs by wcdw · · Score: 1

    Actually, I haven't. What information I have provided for /. registration was *my* decision, and is required only to *post* articles, not to *read* them.

    If you can't see the difference, then I can't help you.....

    --
    If you're not living on the edge, you're just taking up space!
  75. Re:For those who don't want to register: by Kalak · · Score: 1

    As I read this, and from the postings made by Dave Winer, this is intended to be used by blogs. If /. is CmdrTaco's blog, which it still really is (though it's owned by VA), then /. should be able to use these links to keep the links to the stories permanent, as NYT intends to do with this mechanism. So why don't they? This way, searching the archives of /. won't give you links to stories that don't work!

    If VA needs to work with the NYT to get a partnership with VA as Userland has done, then it makes sense for them to do it. Users might stop Karma Whoring the NYT text, and NYT could keep their advertising revenue. It would benefit all! This is what doing business is supposed to be like.

    (Anyone from VA or /. management care to say if this is in the works, or if it's been tried, ect?)

    --
    I am, and always will be, an idiot. Karma: Coma (mostly effected by .hack)
  76. Windows Based ATM Crash by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I never laughed so much as when I went to get some money from the hole in the wall and saw a windows desktop, a McAfee loading Icon Emblazoned over the centre of the screen and a DOS window which said something about checking system before reboot and was spitting out progress dots.
    I ran home to get my digital camera but the screen had been shut off by the time I returned - Halifax Bank of Scotland (why not Bank of Halifax & Scotland ??)
    If banks R this Lame then I guess RSA is redundant. Will Cyber criminals be uploading password sniffers directly via magnetic cards?

  77. Quantum Computing by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Well in a few years quantum computing will instantly make all currently popular encrypting methods obsolete. All methods based on keys/prime numbers that kinda thing like RSA, or the keys in your browser, they will all be instantly able to be "brute forced" with quantum computers. IBM has already demonstrated some simple versions that were able to figure out periods of functions in 1 step (instead of trying out numbers until it fit).

    So the /. question about are we all going to carry RSA keys is moot.

  78. It's USA by rasz · · Score: 0

    'they are backward people, even Chinese and Russians are more advanced (IIS supply anyone?). USA is great only when it comes to lawsuits and corporate greedy.

  79. Not recommended by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    You can't bet everything on P != NP. RSA and most encryption can only be trusted for the next 6 months at a time, or less.

  80. Mmm... biometrics by adb · · Score: 1

    I've always wanted to have my thumb chopped off so a thief can get into my building.

  81. Go read the GLB by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Sorry, but that's more FUD. I work for a bank and the reason that they might ask you for this is the following:

    Outsource providers.

    Many banks do not handle their own data centers, nor to many handle thier internet systems. They outsource them. There are also other systems (such as wire transfers, ACH, Check processing, etc) that are handled by third parties. Just listing them for my bank would take about a half a sheet of paper (and we arn't *that* big!).

    GLB and *many* other regulations prevent disclosure of confidental information. What's confidential you might ask. Well, to start with, I can't even tell you if company X or individual Y is *even a customer* of our bank. That's in violation of the regs. Now, hmmm where can I continue if I can't even *name* them...?

    Sorry, but this isn't to sell your information it's to protect the bank.

    For those (small number) of Banks that do *large* Credit Card operations what I've said may not be as true, but mostly regarding the Credit Card side of the operations, not the Banking side.

    1. Re:Go read the GLB by jasonditz · · Score: 1

      The average customer shouldn't have to read every single banking regulation to know whether or not the bank can do what it says it's going to do in a letter... here's what the bank's agreement said:

      (The bank) may, at it's option, provide account holder information to third parties for marketing or other purposes unless specifically requested not to by the account holder in writing. If you do not wish your information shared, send a letter to:

      (Address)

  82. HEY DIMWITS by justins · · Score: 1
    Sorry, but that's more FUD.

    Can we please not use "FUD" to describe anything that happens to be untrue? It is an acronym and as such it actually stands for something. Thanks.
    --
    Now before I get modded down, I be to remind whoever might read this that what I am saying is FACT. - bogaboga
  83. Idiot by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Fuck me, some people just blow my mind. Do you seriously think you're being funny by linking to that shit in your sig?

    Bitch!

  84. Mod parent down! by Nonesuch · · Score: 1
    Please mod parent down.

    This claim is bogus, and is a claim about the public key RSA algorithm, which has nothing to do with the actual subject of the article, the RSA "SecurID" hardware token.

    The currently shipping RSA hardware tokens are based on AES, and even the older tokens are not known to be broken.

    There have only been two documented theoretical attacks against the SecurID tokens -- an attack against the software RSA token emulator (the article is about the hardware token only) and a theoretical attack against older RSA tokens, which would only be effective against certain "seed" values and only after observing hundreds of the displayed token values over at least several weeks. When the latter research was published, RSA changed how they generated "seed" values to ensure that this attack would not function in the real world.

    Since the tokens are not renewable, expire in 3-5 years, any older "weak" tokens will eventually be retired.