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Diebold Admits ATMs Are More Robust Than Voting Machines
An anonymous reader points out a story in the Huffington Post about the status of funding for election voting systems. It contains an interesting section in which Chris Riggall, a spokesman for Premier (formerly Diebold) acknowledged that less money is spent making an electronic voting machine than on a typical ATM. The ironically named Riggall also notes that security could indeed be improved, but at a higher price than most election administrators would care to pay. Also quoted in the article is Ed Felten, who has recently found some inconsistencies in New Jersey voting machines. From the Post:
"'An ATM is significantly a more expensive device than a voting terminal...' said Riggall. 'Were you to develop something that was as robust as an ATM, both in terms of the physical engineering of it and all aspects, clearly that would be something that the average jurisdiction cannot afford.' Perhaps cost has something to do with the fact that a couple of years ago, every single Diebold AccuVote TS could be opened with a standard key also used for some cabinets and mini-bars and available for purchase over the Internet."
Polotics and money, what a great parallel. We should just combine the two. "Would you like an extra $5 to vote for candidate X?"
ATM's are also inherently more secure then voting machines. In recent years some of the voting machines that have been used there have been noted various security issues.
Politicians love to say one thing and then pay for another.
Voting is important, the security of the vote is important, unless that money can be used to buy votes elsewhere. It also becomes a great issue to underfund so when a politician loses they can blame voting machines for it because no one wants to admit they lost a popularity contest
* Winners compare their achievements to their goals, losers compare theirs to that of others.
A permanent installation which holds tens of thousands of dollars in a public place is well protected.
A voting device used only once or twice a year, under direct supervision, is less protected. And there has to be several of them per voting place, and they have to be cost effective.
I hate to play devil's advocate, but an ATM is an extremely complicated mechanical device. It doesn't shock me in the slightest that they're more expensive to produce than an electronic voting booth.
Of course, their voting products do suck, although I don't think that cost has terribly much to do with it.
-- If you try to fail and succeed, which have you done? - Uli's moose
This is just a travesty. That we put our democracy in the hands of for-profit, Republican-supporting companies like Diebold is beyond belief. The fact that they are required to make ATM machines better is a sign of how out of touch Americans are with our voting process. ATMs are more robust because people demand it. People DON'T (yet) demand the same amount of robustness in their voting machines because they are UNAWARE of how crappy the machines are. That really stems from our politicians who WANT to keep the sorry state of the voting machines secret.
Riggall? That's rich. Yeah, mod me offtopic, I just Felten urge to post this.
Oh, yeah, it's not easy to pad these out to 120 characters.
Everyone wants bad ass, but no one wants to pay the cost of bad assery.
My twitter
ATMs are very secure because if just one breaks, it can mean the loss of thousands of dollars. If an exploit is made public, it can easily mean significantly more money lost prior to it being fixed (imagine a group of blackhats using an exploit to empty out a group of ATMs all at the same time one night).
That being said, there's no reason that over time a voting system cannot have a similar level of security and accuracy. Open code review and structure review of the devices will allow security experts to fix problems before production, if done right (with cooperation with independent security experts).
Help! I'm a slashdot refugee.
The spokesperson of (ex-)Diebold is called Riggall! Maybe they just want to make it clear to their 'customers' that even though they changed their name their complex vote "counting" algorithm is as good as ever..
And when you gaze long enough into the code, the code will also gaze into you.
As usual, cost isn't the question.
It's science -- bad science -- of two types:
1. Bad application of technology, including massive security holes.
2. Bad management science, leading to sloppy security and confused product design.
An ATM should be more expensive than a voting machine; the ATM has to dispense cash and be used 24-7 to do so.
A voting machine however should be secure, have an audit trail, and a clear interface so the average person can understand what they're voting for.
technical writing / development
'Cause election jurisdictions can afford to buy entire systems they have to throw away once they're discovered to be inadequate.
No institution other than one that can compel funding and compliance could ever operate with the sort of gross incompetence and lack of priorities that government frequently has. A few obvious examples:
1) The Bush Administration has $500B to spend on prescription pills for the elderly, but cannot find $100M to fund 10,000 new border patrol agents on the southern border.
2) New Orleans had plenty of money to waste on welfare programs and such, but didn't have any money to spend on getting its own fixes for the levies, even if they were only gradual repair contracts.
3) All of the pork barrel spending that goes on in Congress.
4) The congressional hearings over steroid use in professional sports. I don't agree that it is the state's business at all, but isn't this what we have the DEA for?
5) Doing things like setting up honeypots to catch people who might have a passing interest in child porn when there are still people getting away with the actual production of the same in U.S. territory, child molesters and Americans flying overseas to do the same.
6) Passing and enforcing drug laws when there isn't even enough room due to the War on Drugs to guarantee that someone who commits 1st degree murder will get life in prison. Same thing for how the WoD has made it much easier to argue that the system just cannot handle the burden of locking up dangerous criminals permanently.
And shoddy/insecure design... As something they can't afford to do without?
I call BS. The customer has an expectation of the manufacturer doing a good job of designing their devices and not selling defective product lines: there would be no sale if the manufacturer were honest and told the product was not robust. There can be no excuse for letting a generic key open the device, when individualized locks are easily purchased.
The customer would keep going until they found a vendor that told them the product was robust and stable, and offered them the lowest price.
Cost of the result is something the manufacturers get to compete over. If you can't design a product well and robust enough at the price point the customer wants to get you the amount of profit you want, then you get two choices (1) don't make it, or (2) tell the customer about the weak design up front. Option (3) ignore defects and admit them later is highly dishonest.
Voting terminals may not be as proven as ATMs, since they are a newer technology, but there is no reason for the design to be weaker.
ATM makers already have robust ATM designs that can be used as a basis for the design of voting terminals and other products.
There is really no excuse for a new voting terminal design to not be as robust as a new ATM design.
The design will cost more, but that cost is supposed to be absorbed by the manufacturer. The high price that state governments pay for these terminals is plenty to justify proper design.
Due to the nature of software, it can be understood that there may be some aesthetic or annoying bugs early versions of terminal software that QA couldn't find.
But they should not be because of non-robust design, QA adn testing should verify the critical elements of the application are bug-free, and later versions should eliminate bugs without adding features that risks incorporating more bugs.
No need to spend millions in campaign contributions, you need only spend 19.95 plus 6.95 s&h for a mini bar key. Or put another way you can yell all you want about how security stinks, just get yourself a key and ensure that johnJacobojinglehimerschmit or mickey mouse wins every position in your next election, including yes or no propositions. Nothing gets changed until everyone can see just how broken something is ... sometimes not even then.
If it's too expensive to make a secure electronic voting machine, then maybe that's the wrong solution? Nah, let's just make an insecure one that's cheap enough... gotta love that logic!
stuff |
Can't we just modify slot machines to also record votes for the American people? That way everyone knows that the more money you put in, the better chance you have of actually accomplishing something. All the while knowing that everything is rigged regardless.
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1. Take a standard PC, probably running Windows (to be as insecure as possible). 2. Enclose it in a crappy wooden box with a diebold logo on it, that can be opened with a minibar key. 3. ? 4. Profit
ATMs found to be more secure than electronic voting machines = not news
Electronic voting machines found to be more secure than ATMs = news
See?
I'm not sure this is a valid conclusion. The same people aren't making decisions in each case. And while we like to think we place a high value on the integrity of our voting system, it's hard to put a dollar figure on that, which is what the people running the budget need.
Banks, on the other hand, can easily place a dollar figure on the value of their ATMs' security, and show their decision-makers that X dollars spent on securing them will easily pay for itself.
I'm not happy with the situation, but I don't think you've got a single set of people saying "transactions are more important than votes."
Security depends both on the voting / counting process and on the technology (this is true for paper ballots as well). The problem is when the technology can easily be changed in a hidden way that is unverifiable by elections officials.
A simple machine, that has been tested and verify can be sealed with stickers with signatures of election officials.
A machine (think diabold) with all kinds of inputs (think keyboard plugs) and complexity (think OS, DB etc...) cannot be easily sealed and verified by election officials.
I found two interesting articles about India's EVM
The two things I found interesting:
1) EVM cost = $230 (hard to tamper with, and relies on election officials to keep secure)
2) Diebold cost = $3300 (easier to tamper with, and relies on election officials to keep secure)
This points out two things: voting systems don't have to be complicated or expensive to work well, and that security depends both on the machine and the voting process.
Just like with paper ballots the election officials need to ensure security of the voting and counting process.
In Canada we have some electronic voting at the municipal level in some cities (mostly optical scan machines).
A comparison of EVM and Diebold
http://techaos.blogspot.com/2004/05/indian-evm-compared-with-diebold.html
Wikipedia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Voting_Machines
The issue is not about cost. The issue is crappy design, and politics in the selection of voting machine vendors.
----- "Profanity is the one language that all programmers understand."
The obvious solution. Banks reload their ATM software for voting on election day. The candidates can buy your votes all the more easily -- cash comes out of the slot.
Fiat Lux.
...a watch that cost me £5 that's more robust the the Diebold Voting Machines.
You feel sleepy. Close your eyes. The opinions stated above are yours. You cannot imagine why you ever felt otherwise.
Well, of course! Money always seems to be more important than democracy so it's not a big surprise where the companies like Diebold put their best engineering effort.
CUR ALLOC 20195.....5804M
Although an ATM does indeed demand more hardware and more engineering due to the particular task that it intends to fulfill (dispense the exact amount of money, continually exchange information with a central server, work 24/7, exposed to the elements, resist vandalism, etc...) that is absolutely no excuse for it to be more robust than a simple, straight to the point vote counting machine. In fact, it proves the exact opposite. An ATM has multiple subsystems which must work perfectly 24/7 and must be flawlessly integrated and a voting machine includes only a very restricted subset of those very same systems. So how come a less complex system that needs to perform an incredibly simple task ends up being less engineered and more prone to failure? There is absolutely no excuse.
Slashdot, fix your code or at least hire someone who is competent at it to do it for you.
unsecured ATM = loosing money
unsecured voting machine = gaining money.
Yea I've noticed the Diebold logo on many an ATM and they do actually work very well, not to mention seem solid. After all these are boxes of cash we are talking about, they had better be secure and work correctly given how often they are used.
But as for voting machines -- why are people foaming at the mouth to use them anyway? What was so horrible about paper ballots? I can't figure out a good reason to be switching to voting machines at all... so what if it takes longer to count the votes? At least it's done properly! I'll never use a voting machine or any voting system that doesn't involve writing an X on a piece of paper. I wouldn't consider my vote to count otherwise.
there is a simple major reason why I trust them more. They have a paper trail.
I can check with the bank statement.
I don't know what it's like in the USA, but in Europe many shops have a small hand-held devices that connect to banks via phone to do card transactions. They are both very secure and relatively cheap. The excuse that a properly secure device would be too expensive is just rubbish.
There's already a lot of ATMs. Why couldn't a voting machine function be added to existing ATMs? People could identify themselves by swiping a card (like you do for getting boarding passes on an airplane). You could vote anywhere, anytime, not just in your precinct on a specific day. Hell, they'd even have paper receipts!
Obviously, some people are not going to want to or be able to identify themselves with a swipe card. That doesn't exclude the election commission from operating centrally located polling places that run old skool. Not necessarily in every precinct, but near public transportation centers, and serving multiple precincts.
Web 2.0 == Giant Blogspam Circle Jerk
Why is this news? ATMs don't have a reputation for being insecure devices, and considering the amount of money they handle on a regular basis there is a strong incentive to break into them. Further, any single ATM is in service every day out of the year, whereas voting machines are in service once or twice a year.
Diebold's voting machines have a deservedly bad reputation for bad security as well as major screwups (not necessarily security-related) but I don't recall anyone claiming they were built to be as secure as ATMs, or anyone expecting them to be so, for that matter.
"Riggall" You can't make this shit up.
According to the article, the government did spend a lot of money on the overall project (4 billion on the voting act of 2002), but I can guarantee that the entire 4 billion did not go towards purchasing the voting machines. Considering how many voting machines are needed and how important they are, the government needs to rethink how much money is being spent on these machines and their choices in this project.
Of course they're more robust--many ATMs run OS/2!!!!111
Voting machines most certainly do NOT have to cost as much as an ATM to be appropriatly secure!
An ATM must be tamper proof. That implies heavy steel construction all around. It has to be larger because it has to hold a store of cash. That sort of construction is where bug costs come in. They are generally unattended for most of the day and they contain cash!
A voting machine just has to be tamper evident. Heavy ABS plastic construction (for durability) with unique keys would be adequate there. They are generally either secured away or attended by election officials. They contain nothing all that valuable to someone who would break in. (the only value to be had requires breaking in without leaving visible evidence) Tamper evident design is quite sufficient.
The card readers on those things are just plain excessive. You'll note when you push the card in, there's a rather solid clunk as it locks in. That speaks of a heavy mechanism with an oversized solinoid and spring. That in turn implies heavy relays and a big power supply. A mechanism more like the floppy drives on an old Mac would have been more appropriate to the problem and considerably cheaper.
Those savings could have gone towards uniquely keyed locks, better software, and perhaps a POS style receipt printer.
This is precisely why we need a citizen-backed voting platform. The Open Voting Consortium provides this. They're our votes. We should do everything in our power to protect them.
Have you driven a fnord... lately?
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ATMs are typically full of cash and left completely unsupervised, frequently outdoors, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
Voting machines are generally used for one day a year, indoors, surrounded by people, and are not full of a delicious currency filling.
I'm not saying security shouldn't be a priority, I'm just saying that you have to plan security practically around each application.
-c
"I hope I don't make a mistake and manage to remain a virgin." - Britney Spears
Technology is beneficial at times. This is not one of them. My precinct has never had trouble with optical scanning ballots (fill in the circle with a little marker, feed it into the machine). In terms of speed of counting, security and cost, these voting machines are inferior to techniques as simple as the ones that graded your history test in 8th grade.
What's the problem? One has *my* money, the other has *your* vote.
Never argue with a man carrying a water buffalo
It doesn't surprise me that voting machines are not built as well as ATMs. ATMs are filled with thousands and even tens of thousands of dollars. It would be a rich target for all potential thieves. The voting machine electronics must be protected from all sorts of assaults. Voting machines only contain vote totals, so fewer people would be after them. After all, if you smash an ATM, you still get the money. You smash a voting machine, and you simply lose the votes.
The problem is we're stuck on machines vs. voting procedures. New York and New Jersey had voting machines that did not produce a paper trail for almost 100 years, and this was by design. The voting fraud problem in the Northeast was ballot stuffing. Voting machines, by eliminating paper ballots were designed to eliminate this type of voter fraud. The voting machines were designed around voting procedures. A voter had to register before hand. They had to sign in. Their signature was compared to their signature on their original application. The voter was handed a ticket. They handed that to a poll worker who would place the ticket in the voting machine, and pull a big lever which unlocked the machine. The voter would enter the machine, pull another lever to close the curtains and vote. When they finished, they pulled the lever to open the curtains. This cast the ballot and locked the machine. Poll watchers oversaw the whole process.
This machine/procedure combination eliminated ballot stuffing. The voter could only vote a single time before the machine locked up. The poll worker couldn't unlock the machine without the poll watchers noticing. Voter counts were taken from the machine totals, the tickets on the machines, and the sign in list. Since the voting machines were purely mechanical, they were trusted by all parties. All parties could watch the machines being setup and make sure there were no problems. Poll watchers would run tests before the polls opened to verify the machines. This didn't kill the political machines which simply switched tactics, and it didn't entirely eliminate voting fraud, but it certainly helped.
What we need to do is set a procedure up to ensure that elections are fair. Ballots must be secured and watched over by all parties. In Zimbabwe, they counted the votes locally at the polls and posted the results at each poll. This prevents the ruling party from manipulating the ballots. You could go from poll to poll, and add up the election results yourself. We also must ensure that each voter votes only once, and that each voter's vote is totaled as they intended. That was the issue in Florida with the punch card system.
So, we need to think beyond the "technology" aspect of the voting. It isn't paper ballots are simply better. It's about ensuring that we have confidence in the tabulation of the votes and whether it truly reflects the view of the populous. So, think of how you'd secure the paper ballots, how they would be counted. Who would oversee the procedure? How would the ballot boxes be protected from additional votes being added? How do we ensure that voters only vote once and not sneak in additional ballots? How do we verify the ballots? How can we ensure the entire procedure is fair?
The problem with the current Diabold style voting machines is that they are mystery boxes and we cannot tell if they tabulate the vote fairly. We would have to ensure the firmware, the software, and hardware has not been tampered with. A paper trail can help since paper is easier to verify. But, paper is easy to duplicate, toss, and manipulate which is why the Northeast went to the mechanical paperless machines to begin with.
Unless you think of the entire voting process, and ensure the voting process is easy to verify, it doesn't matter how voters cast their ballots.
predict you would have a +5 informative post had you instead said:
Or would they instead go with the other manufactures who have less secure, but easily rigged (by those in power) machines.
I work for a bank, and we get audited by both the Feds and the state every two years. Usually they alternate years, so we are either getting ready for an audit, getting audited, or responding to an audit.
There's nothing like having someone over your shoulder saying things like:
"How would this look if I had to explain this to an auditor?"
"If the auditor were to ask about this, what would I say?"
Banks will pay the extra money to secure an ATM because if we don't, we get screwed. Our board of directors finds out that the IT department didn't secure the ATMs, bringing down our overall audit score. Our bosses boss gets questioned. We spend money. We fix the problem. We look at everything else that could go wrong, and try to fix it ahead of time. We test, and prove that we fixed it with documentation.
Meanwhile, independant private auditors that we hire scan our network and tell us things we need to fix. Sometimes what they suggest that we do defies reason. We either have to do it, or explain why we can't. We then have to explain to several layers of management why those suggestions are bunk. Sometimes its easier to go with the suggestions after all.
Now, elections are local matters. City by city, county by county, state by state. Who audits them? Which voting jurisdiction wants to spend the money to have someone point out that the new machines they just bought are vulnerable to such-and-such condition using tin foil and fingerprint molds made of jello? The local officals then look bad, spend more money, and then lose the next election for overspending. The idea of something being "good enough" happens here.
And let's face it, let's say the feds set up a auditing board for state and local elections. Several things will happen:
+ Local government officials may go nuts at having federal officials show up at their local town hall trying to run things.
+ If a bank fails an audit, the Feds will take it over. If it's really bad, they'll shut the doors that day and the bank may never re-open. If the county voting machines don't pass federal muster, what will the Feds do? Invalidate the votes? Shut down the voting? You can always go to another bank, or not bank at all. Where else can you go vote? Voting is a right, banking is not.
Simply put, banks have to compete with each other, and are highly regulated. If the Feds don't like how we do things, we change them. If we can't give the customer what they want, they go elsewhere. You have to vote under your local government, and there is nowhere else to go unless you move. Voting is not regulated by the Feds because of separation of powers between the states and the Feds. So, yeah, ATMs will be more secure than voting machines, and will be for the foreseeable future.
The only fix is to have an enforceable Federal audit, with penalties for mismangement. I beleive that people who tend to think that will happen tend to beleive that we are a government with fifty administrative districts, rather than fifty states that have a common government.
I beleive that if you want to give the Feds the power to regulate elections, you then give the Feds to power to rig the elections. The hue and cry over Florida in 2000 and Ohio in 2004 will be minor compared to the fits people will have when their favorite candidate loses nationally when the "exit polls" said otherwise, and it just so happens that the previous President was of the same party as the "winner". But the Feds said everything was kosher, because they controlled every part of the process, and invalidated votes from places that just happen to be predominantly voting the other party.
There are 51 electoral races in the country, since each state (and the District of Columbia) choose to hold elections for electors instead of the state legislatures choosing them. However, those are state races, not Federal ones. Senators, since directly elected, are statewide elected races, but other than the Constitution requiring them to be directly elected, didn't change them from state selected officals to Federal ones. That's why, in a vacancy, the Governor appoints the replacement subject to that state's rules. House races are Federal in nature, but even those are only quasi-Federal since the state legislature designates the districts.
The sovereign US states possess control over many areas in this matter... the Federal government can put restrictions on Federal money, but that's about it.
Over the Internet - will it never end?
Wtf does the Internet have to do with it?! Stick to what is relevant, in this case, that the item in question is "freely available for sale".
Yes, the wording was probably meant to convey convenience/low level of effort required. Yes, Slashdotters know it means nothing. But, to many, it implicates the the Internet for making scary keys so easily available when, in fact, the problem is the poor locks were used, open to anybody willing to spend 3 dollars.
What if it had said ".... available at many a DIY/hardware store", or "available through mail-order" or even "could be made at home" (which to the right-thinking, fear-ridden, populace basically means 'by any terrorist').
Oh here we go.
The problem with voting machine has never been the robustness of them. The problem is one of incentives, and worse, political incentives.
Banks have a great deal to lose if their ATMs fowl up and someone loses some money.
Voting machines do not have the same incentive to be accurate - in fact, the incentives are the opposite for the politicians who must pay for these. Politicians have always, and will always try to steal votes. It's that simple. If you make it easier to do, by making stupid machines that are set up at a central location, you are inviting that kind of theft. It's simply too easy for a small number (or even just one) of people to manipulate these things - and there can be no check and balance on them, since you can't look inside them while they are running to be sure they haven't been tampered with (unless you have the ability to look at the running source code - which you don't).
Voting machines can never, ever be made trust worthy - ever.
We really should stop spending all this money on a system that will simply never ever work. If you can't look in the machine and see what it's doing (like with a electronic machine) then you simply can't trust it, unless the incentives are in the right place. And they are most assuredly not in the right place with voting machines.
I guess as we like to do in the United States of America, we will figure this out, and do the right thing in the end - after we have exhausted all other options.
Sheesh.
http://www.unfocus.com/
New Hampshire and several other states use black markers, a scan tron sheet, and just a few scanners at each polling location.
Quite frankly I don't see the need, under any circumstance, to get more complicated than this.
Simple voting procedure, quick electronic counting, and a clear & easily verifiable paper trail.
If you wanted multiple voting reciepts, then it would be a (relatively) simple matter to hook up a printer to spit out a copy/reciept of each ballot inserted- but I don't really think that's necessary either.
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms should be the name of a store, not a government agency.
I am not sure how much one of those tiny little voting machines cost but I am glad that it does not cost as much as a Diebold ATM. I am an IT Manager for a bank that owns 9 Diebold ATM's. We do not even buy the fancy ATM's with all of the bells and whistles and they run us upwards of $40k a pop. From what I understand, the ATM's that can do on the spot check scanning and other advanced features like that cost upwards of about $80k. I would bet that there is 20x more cost in raw materials alone for an ATM than there would be for a voting machine. (I am talking about bank ATM's and not the little corner convenience store ones) The vaults on the ATM's are at least 1/2 if not 3/4inches thick. They have more security sensors on them than the bank building itself has. (IIRC there are around 14 sensors on them that will set off an alarm)
All that to say, if our government spend upwards of 40k per voting machine, I would be hugely pissed off... especially since the paper systems would have worked just as well for a fraction of the cost.
Considering that I've seen diebold banking machines hardlock on customers and my dad had one hard lock on him (though I didn't witness that) I don't have a lot of faith in their banking machines as any better a standard than their voting machines. Managers don't seem to properly grasp the problem of a banking machine that's locked mid transaction, and then you get into the question of lost cards etc..
This is in peterborough Ontario at TD bank.
It's been said many times, here and elsewhere, but I think Ron Rivest (the "R" in "RSA") put it very well in his keynote address at the RSA Security conference a few weeks back: Electronic voting must be software-independent to be secure.
If you have to care what software is or is not running on the hardware, or what kinds of hacks may be in the hardware itself, then the voting system is insecure and must be replaced. Why? For the simple reason that there is no practical way to assure that the hardware and software are untampered. Therefore, to have a secure voting solution, you must design a voting system where tampered hardware or software cannot undetectably modify the results.
And, strangely enough, it's not even very difficult to achieve this.
Note to ACs: I usually delete AC replies without reading them. If you want to talk to me, log in.
Well... ya know.... my Identity is already on file with the credit card company/bank that issues my cards, and ATMs are pretty impressive as far as what their software can do.... why not make it so people can vote at the ATM? I bet it would be more secure, and there would be more voters because they can vote just about anywhere.... bank, arcade, strip club, most gas stations, the laundromat, or a million other places. For people without bank accounts or ATM cards, keep the regular voting centers open as well, but I bet it would cut down on lines, and other issues that come with running a voting location.... think about it, it would be great!
Of course, Diebold produced these machines and I'm not sure that I would want to go on record as defending them. But who defined the specifications? You can't spend more time/money than what the customer wants spent. That is... they couldn't make the machines more secure than the customer asked for as that would cost more. So... did Diebold drop the ball and not produce to the specs... or did the government drop the ball and not spec the machines properly? If Diebold dropped the ball, they are liable to the government. If the government dropped the ball, they are liable to us.
Haven't we already figured out that a broken slinky is more robust than a Diebold voting machine?
ATMs are the target of physical attacks far more often than voting machines are. ATMs are installed in unmonitored locations. Voting machines are not. The object of an attack on an ATM is to get the money out. Leaving evidence of damage behind isn't an issue with an ATM. OTOH, voting machines can be secured with simple tamper seals.
When was the last time you saw a surveillance video of a couple of yahoos chaining a voting machine to the back bumper of a pickup truck and dragging it away?
Have gnu, will travel.
Voting isn't that important, and by extention voting machines...uh, it's only the fundamental backbone democracy. No biggie. (sarcasm meter = 10)
Many of you are taking as true the central statement without even thinking what the "security level" of a Diebold machine actually is. I've been working to secure a large platform of this machines and let me say, (beside the physical security level, which I'll not discuss here) that each one of these are as insecure as a Win XP default installation is. Besides, is almost trivial to capture sensitive information of transactions and do ___insert_here_your_evil_plans____. Happily enough we now are starting to close the most important security gaps with not-so-ellegant solutions and workarounds. Thinking of this, and assuming that the security levels of voting machine are lower than the Security Levels of ATMs, I can only say (no sarcasm here), God help all the countries that delegates their fate on this machines. I Don't see this about a matter that Diebold care more for Banks than it does for government or the people, I see that this is an irresponsible approach of a seller, because it's saying (for what I Read), hey, I can make it more secure, but it will cost more!, HELL!, sell your product complete you Moron!, and HEY Government, don't buy this kind of stuff if it lacks something. Now were going to see semaphores without green lights or tanks without guns, because if they have those, they're gonna cost more money. Hell, I'm pissed again.
HY LOL
The M stands for machines. It's not Automated Teller Machine Machine. I realize this has no bearing on the subject at hand, it just needed to be said.
People are like slinkies; useless but fun to watch when you push them down the stairs
But thank god! I honestly believe my bank accounts are worth a helluva lot more than my vote. Maybe I'm just a little too cynical (or too rich, I suppose - right!), but, honestly, who's really going to try to "steal" an election though the use of electronic fraud? I mean, there are much easier methods to steal an election, like using the court system - right?
I'm honestly pleased that Diebold (Premier, whatever) is putting more effort, money, and focus on securing, developing, and making ATMs more robust than voting machines. It has more impact on the user at the end of the day.
(And, let me be clear - I always vote. I'm not just some loser non-voter who thinks all votes are worthless. I just think that, in comparison, my ATM card is worth more than my ballot.)
"Adventure? Excitement? A Jedi craves not these things."
It's just an amusing coincedence.
When someone says, "Any fool can see
then why can't we just have a bank account for each candidate, and have voters deposit 1 cent to the candidate of their choice?
I mean, if someone could hack their account and change the balance this wouldn't work, but it seems the banks have figured this one out.
Whoever has the most money at the end of the day wins!
"The ironically named Riggall.."
It isn't irony, it's nominative determinism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nominative_determinism)
They have inherently different security requirements. As QuoteMstr mentioned, ballot anonymity is in direct conflict with the detailed logging required for financial transactions. In addition, bank employees are trusted agents (else why did you give them your money) where a voting system should be designed such that elections administrators have role separation and accountability and need not be fully trusted. I wrote about this last month: http://tinyurl.com/5l3vc8
I commented on this in previous posts, but yeah, ATMs make them good money. Voting machines are government contract BS work, where the customer is as likely to bitcvh and sue as be happy. They are more trouble than they are worth.
I'm no fan of Diebold, but I don't envy them. I would have just left that industry rather than tarnish my ATM rep with a non-profitable side business.
-Tom Caudron
-Tom