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WPA Encryption Cracked In 60 Seconds
carusoj writes "Computer scientists in Japan say they've developed a way to break the WPA encryption system used in wireless routers in about one minute. Last November, security researchers first showed how WPA could be broken, but the Japanese researchers have taken the attack to a new level. The earlier attack worked on a smaller range of WPA devices and took between 12 and 15 minutes to work. Both attacks work only on WPA systems that use the Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) algorithm. They do not work on newer WPA 2 devices or on WPA systems that use the stronger Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm."
So we'll be able to get more free wireless now?
Slashdot sucks, eat my shorts.
(Haha, we broke into your WPA v1, in less than a minute - Japanese Researchers)
A return to the old wardriving days of yore?
No sig for the moment.
I wonder how long it will take for this to be integrated into Back|Track?
Die First, Then Quit
TFA lists AES. I'm curious what else is considered useful. Anybody using hacked routers to run tomato and the like are very welcome to discuss their security thoughts.
"Common sense will be the death of us all"
where can I procure this to give it a test drive myself?
Lucky for me, I use WEP, so I'm safe.
The question is can anything be secure in the long term if an attacker can monitor the conversation between alice and bob 24/7? Sometimes a bit of obscurity can go a long way. Good luck trying to sniff my shielded network cables. Yes, I've heard the tempest stories but I'm jumping to the conclusion that those techniques are only available to big $$ governements institutions and are not used by the random drive-by hacker (yet..)
So, does this mean it's time to start working on whatever the replacement will be for WPA2? WPA is broken. . . but at least we can use WPA2 (for now). I'm guessing WPA2 will someday be broken, so we need to have something to replace it which has not (yet) been broken. Seems like wireless security rests on a never-ending game of move the goal, before the goal is reached (where the 'goal' for crackers is to crack the 'current' security protocol).
Although, thinking about this more, it makes me wonder - does anyone ever 'record' encrypted traffic from targets of interest, in the hopes that, maybe right now they can't crack it, but maybe in 2 or 3 years, they'll be able to crack it, and if they have a 'recording' of the cyphertext, which they can later decrypt, they can get possibly interesting info/data (data could very easily still be useful and interesting 3 or 5 years from now, particularly things like state/corporate secrets, but even more mundane info like people's social security numbers, answers to online password 'reset' security questions, etc).
I suppose that if I could think of it, someone else already has, and already is doing it.
So, from that standpoint, even if the security researchers stay 'ahead' of the blackhats, the blackhats can still get useful info within a relatively useful amount of time. Just because you've upgraded to WPA2 or WPA+AES, doesn't mean you're completely protected, if someone snagged encrypted traffic in the past which was 'secured' by TKIP.
So, TKIP broken, not AES. Wonder if the WEP AES implementation is broken somehow ?
That's why I don't even bother with passwords on my wireless at ... Hello Friends! Please to hand over your credit and debit card informations at this time, I am thanking you not a lot. My name is Desmund Boutrous-Boutrous Gali Johnson IV and I have some news of the not so happy sort. Your uncle, and my business mentor and/or friend, McGuyver has been known to be passed away at this time going forth.
Please to send me monies by any means as possible soonest.
Wamerst thoughts and heated Regards, BBGIV
(that's about how long it would take to crack it. Damn.)
Sent from your iPad.
But what if I want to provide free AND secure wireless in a user friendly way? What about the people who want to provide free wifi that doesn't allow users to eavesdrop on each other's traffic?
WiFi security is pretty dismal.
There's nothing at the level of https - where users can have confidential connections without messing about too much - no need even for "username and password".
With WiFi, either users have zero security, or they have to enter a username and password (and possibly jump through other hoops).
I'd love to know if there's an existing way and I'm missing something. Forcing users to use IPSEC does not count as "not jumping through hoops".
Yes I know, https users still have to beware of MITM attacks, but at least fix WiFi to the https level.
And the most important piece of information comes at the very end of the summary (just not to diminish the sensation or prevent FUD):
They do not work on newer WPA 2 devices or on WPA systems that use the stronger Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm.
Are you *positive* that the VPN connection is uncrackable? If it's going over wireless, then if someone is recording the cyphertext, they will be able to recover the VPN cyphertext out of the WPA cyphertext. If they then know of a way to recover the 'cleartext' from the VPN cyphertext, then you are still leaking your data. If the VPN system is so secure, why aren't we using it for the wireless connection? That is, make the wireless network a VPN using the same algorithms you use for your VPN?
They have just found a way to decrypt a packet using the WEP chopchop algorithm. Master key can't still be recovered. Move along, this isn't news
Linux forever
Minor nitpick with the article: WPA is a general wireless security protocol[1] which isn't limited to wireless routers. Regular APs (Access Points) use it, as of course do wireless clients.
[1] Actually, to nitpick myself, WPA isn't even technically a protocol, it's a certification program which confirms that particular devices implement the IEEE 802.11i standard
MAC filters are worthless, always have been (it's trivial to change the MAC on a device to a whitelisted one). And I don't see any evidence that WPA2/AES is "fast becoming insecure", as this attack specifically doesn't work against that setup.
---- Den ene knappen er powerknapp, den andre er Bender voice knapp "Bite My Shiny Metal Ass"
I sense a Jerry Bruckheimer movie staring Angelina Jolie. its gone in 60 seconds meets hackers.
-Ours is the wisdom of Solomon, the magic of Merlyn, the fall of Icaris.
So is this a new way to crack the handshake once you've got it or is it to hack straight in?
n/t
Warning: this article may contain humor, sarcasm, parody, and perhaps even irony. Read at your own risk.
After spending some time working with crappy home routers, I've decided encryption isn't worth the hassle. If I want to ensure my communication isn't intercepted by a hostile third party, I'll use a wire instead. If I want to limit access to the internet, I'll use a MAC ACL instead. The routers aren't hefty enough to deal with anything more than light surfing with encryption active.
It's been a long time.
There is always WPA2-Enterprise which requires a RADIUS server. The advantage is that there is no need to worry about one "master" key. The disadvantage is that if a username/password combination is guessed, one can get on the network.
I don't know why people insist on using WEP, WPA, WPA2, etc..
I just made my SSID "Logon for only $3.99 per minute"
Haven't ever seen my neighbors log on even once.
_
TKIP was fundamentally broken, by design. We knew that. TKIP was invented as an intermediate encryption that could run on the same hardware that WEP ran on. It allowed router manufacturers to use something better than WEP without having to beef-up their hardware. It worked well, and bought several years before it was completely broken. Anyone who has a router using TKIP bought at a bad time, and is stuck with something that's only a little better than WEP. The solution is to buy a router that supports WPA2, which has real AES encryption.
Well, you have the same problem with WPA2-Personal, except in that case there's no need to guess a username, only a password. You could say the same for pretty much anything that requires a username and password.
The benefit of using RADIUS is that you can have separate username/password pairs, and thus you can grant or restrict access individually without having to change the password each time.
Because they are transmitted bright and clear all over the place? Whitelisting the authorised MAC addresses assumes that you do not trust the encryption (or there is none). If you assume the encryption is broken, you assume anyone can listen to the network and intercept any and all MAC addresses being transmitted (in [nearly?] every single packet).
TKIP (Timed Key Interchange Protocol, for those who don't know) does have a weak spot. This is that the new key is sent out from the access point on a regular basis. Cisco's implementation (supported by most companies that supply 802.11a equipment) makes two changes. One is that the time value set is a maximum value (the key change interval is actually random). The other is that the new key is sent via the encrypted session. You therefore have to have cracked the old key to receive the new key.
It will be interesting to see if that is discussed when the paper is presented.
And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.
John 8:32(King James Version)
The disadvantage is that if a username/password combination is guessed, one can get on the network.
Isn't that generally a problem with any system?
Still, WPA2 w/RADIUS can be smart card enabled, so that helps.
I don't read AC A human right
MAC address filters are not worthless, as they can add something to the existing security. Firstly, if the attacker is dumb or lazy enough, he doesn't acquire the whitelisted MAC addressses. Secondly, if he manages that, the users of the compromised MAC addresses receive a warning signal when the computer says "IP address is already in use" (or something similar, depending on system and configuration). Thirdly, if all previous points fail to produce a reaction, the administrator can see what's going on from the router's log files.
My security plan is turtles all the way down!
They're broadcast in the clear.
---- Den ene knappen er powerknapp, den andre er Bender voice knapp "Bite My Shiny Metal Ass"
Defending against idiots is easy.
Except they don't - who said anything about IP addresses? Sure ARP could start getting confused, but it's not hard to monitor traffic for a few days to harvest MACs and then wait for one to go offline before "borrowing" it without anyone knowing. Try it - change the MAC on one of your machines to create a conflict but give it a unique static IP within your subnet (as DHCP certainly gets messed up with a MAC collision). It's surprising how much works...
Now you're assuming an expert admin who actually proactively checks logs and knows how to interpret them. Such a person wouldn't use a MAC filter in the first place :)
---- Den ene knappen er powerknapp, den andre er Bender voice knapp "Bite My Shiny Metal Ass"
Listen until they appear on the network.
note: i'm known as plugwash most places but i screwd up registering that here somehow in the past and now can't register
How is this hard to understand or explain?
Most people don't know that there's a difference between an encryption protocol and an encryption algorithm (somewhat understandable, in the broadest sense both are algorithms). Why don't more people explain? Don't know.
And more importantly, and worse!, why do manufacturers get it wrong?
I blame marketing. :)
The enemies of Democracy are
If your computer is exploitable it could be rooted and then the ssh is pointless.
Why care about wireless security anyway? I mean, if it's important, it should be done over SSL, SSH, or VPN. If not, then why aren't you worried about your ISP (or a dozen routers along the way) reading your non-encrypted packets?
The only reason I see to "securing" wifi is to ensure your neighbours don't torrent stuff over your connection.
"If anything can go wrong, it will." - Murphy
Yeah, you just keep using that setup. Do not worry a thing, it's secure enough. Honest!
If you actually want to see the MAC addresses on a network being broadcast quite clearly try using ethereal. It's also educationamable.
The new right fascists are bilingual. They speak English and Bullshit.
You must be the local Internet Porn Gateway
The new right fascists are bilingual. They speak English and Bullshit.
Yeah you gotta know what you are doing, but if you are in an environment dense enough that an open wireless connection will be mooched off of, even a competent person will not bother you. There is always somebody running an unsecured access point. Why waste time trying to mess with your laptops MAC address when you just connect to "linksys" two apartments over?
In the past, I would whitelist MAC addresses but I stopped for a far better reason than yours--they are a pain in the ass when you've got friends over. Much better to just have an easy to remember password.
Anybody that wants to get into *your* wireless network *specifically* will find a way--MAC whitelist or not. Anybody looking for an open access point to just get on the net will move on if you block based on MAC address even if they are a hard-core nerd.
In other words, security through obscurity does have merit. It weeds out all the casual passer bys. It does not weed out somebody who is targeting you specifically. Course, I'm not sure whitelists are security through obscurity :-)
If TKIP really broken or is this yet another weak-password story.
step 1. setup unencrypted wireless router
step 2. setup linux box running DHCP, IPTABLES, Squid, morgify
step 3. configure linux box using instructions at http://www.ex-parrot.com/pete/upside-down-ternet.html
step 4. ?????
step 5. Profit!!!!!!!!
Nintendo disagrees with you about the Wii - it does support WPA2/AES apparently: http://www.nintendo.com/consumer/systems/wii/en_na/onlineWirelessRouterWEPWPA.jsp
didn't notice this was posted as AC
My beliefs do not require that you agree with them.
I've looked through the comments, and I cannot tell whether anyone has read the paper linked or is commenting on the summary. The summary, derived from news coverage, is incorrect.
The exploit works only to recover a single MIC encryption key which is distinct for each packet. It allows a packet intended for a client to be falsified, but the packet has to be short and mostly known, like an ARP packet. The researchers require that they act as a physical man in the middle, as a relay between an access point and a client, where the client cannot receive signals from the access point.
It's very clever, but it doesn't involve breaking TKIP per se; it has nothing to do with key recovery for network encryption.
Freelance tech journalist for the Economist, MIT Technology Review, Macworld, and others
With news like this, why do we think that the ATM system is still safe? And when will they come up with a better encryption for that?