The technology behind James, who looks like a professional pool player, is the same Microsoft uses for its paperclip office assistant.>
It looks like you want to hit a ball. Do you want me to...*Ahem* I really don't spend that much time with clippy so anyone want to continue on from there?
something that someone else is likely to have caught, without viewing at levels 2, 1, or perhaps 0, to see that someone else, who can only post at one of those levels, might have already posted on it.
so even if the logo does not represent Microsoft in its entirety, it it still Microsoft's and Microsoft still chose it. Care to explain where I'm wrong?
I'd try webmaster@cartoonnetwork.com This search yields some interesting results- cartoonnetwork@cust-help.com privacy.adultswim@turner.com are two examples
simply because I've got all the DVDs of NGE
The series
Death and Rebirth
and
The End of Evangelion
Suncoast had a deal where I got "The End of Evangelion"'s poster free.
Forget Batman and Superman, I want to see how the Z fighters(Dragonball Z) would stack up against him. Of course, their powers change over time, so I'd like to know at what points in the timeline they become more powerful than Superman, as well as comparisons to the different Superman incarnations. Now, that would be a study!
What he is saying seems to reflect the concept that college educations as they now stand, are more value to current employers that it is to the student that is getting the education, and furthermore, that the employer doesn't care about the degree half as much as the notion that having gone to college, the perspective employee comes with a little bit of insurance that he can do what he says he can.
I seem to see the problem everywhere. Colleges teach what will make the students tools for employers, not what they might want to know. In my Cisco class, they tell you to do things a certain way just because if you don't "it might not work." Don't bother to tell you why. I doubt that any given engineer would know how to buid everything from cars and can openers to nucler recators and space stations, at least these days. A group of engineers, maybe.
Americans consider corporations single entities, while Britain considers them collective, or something like that. Actually it may not be a language issue but a mentality issue.
Salary Fixed compensation for services, paid to a person on a regular basis.
When you are on a salary, there is no clock, so working until 1 AM would not necessarily be a bad thing in this case. WagePayment for labor or services to a worker, especially remuneration on an hourly, daily, or weekly basis or by the piece.
Working off the clock on a Wage is a bad thing, but I prefer Salaries myself.
Autism doesn't make you not want to be around people half as much as it makes you want and practically need your interactions with other people to follow carefully crafted scripts, which is not a feature of this society, and therefore autistic people interact less with other people, despite a desire to do so.
An increase in people with autistic traits should lead to features in society that such people want and need.
A question I've been wondering is whether most people with autistic features (not the severly autistic) can function better in a society with such features than non-autistic people do in this one.
This is a partial summary- I may contiue it in a future post. My comments are in parentheses.
A justice brings up the possibility that they are at a risk of disrupting previous copyright extensions, a process that seems have begun with the first act.
Lessig says that due to common law and the law of the individual states, the first act did not extend copyright more than it curtailed copyrights existing under prior law.
It is then pointed out by a justice that there have been several extensions since, even if the first act does not.
Lessig admits that in 1831 and 1909, Congress extended terms in a way that is inconsistent with the strongest possible interpretation of the Constitution that would aid him in winning his case. He then says that those extensions were never challenged in any court, apparently to suggest that since it had not withstood a real challenge, it might not be that sound, but a Justice point out that the reason that they were never challenged is that there might not be a basis for it.
Lessig points out that due to modern communications technology the circumstances has changed from that of previous copyright law which affected mainly commercial publishers so there was less of a need for scrutiny, even if there was a basis, and that this is the first time where the Court has been pointed to changed circumstances as a reason to reaffirm the Framers' values. He further attempts to show basis by bringing up that it's not the case that the earlier extensions were not questioned on constitutional grounds, citing an academic challenge, causing the Justice to clarify himself, that he was talking about court challenges, not academic challenges.
A justice says that regardless of changed circumstances or not, Lessig's basic theory, which on his argument would have been appropriate at any time historically, is that there at least has to be the possibility of a kind of a causal connection between the extension and the promotion or inducement for the creation of some subsequent work, and asks why does that interpretation of the Promotion Clause make more sense than an interpretation that says the Promotion Clause requires that there be a general scheme in place, which overall tends to promote or induce, and part of that scheme can be that at the discretion of Congress the period of protection is extended from time to time?
Lessig says that under the other interpretation of the Promotion Clause there is no limit to the ability of Congress to extend subsisting terms.
Then a justice asks whether the same thing applies to change of scope- whether Congress can decide to change the size of the net that catches derivative or resembling works of a copyrighted work, so to speak.
Lessig says no, because unless retrospective extensions are forbidden, it will eviscerate the meaning of "limited Times" which does not occur in the context of the scope of exclusive right, nor in the context of the power to secure.
Then a justice asks if Lessing's theory is true, would that mean that the court would also have to hold the 1976 act unconstitutional. The judge makes the claim that if the 1976 act were to be held unconstitutional, chaos would ensue. (which I doubt), Lessig says that under the theory as it's been advanced, the 1976 act would be unconstitutional. The judge says that maybe they should find another theory
Lessig says that the theory, which would advance the aim of limiting times in a way that is enforceable, is only applicable to the '98 act in the case presented, and would not necessarily be applicable under the '76 act for reasons that had been offered by the Government.
A justice asks if Lessig thinks it's at least arguable that the '76 act had various positive aspects to it in terms of the purpose of the Copyright Clause that this act lacks? Lessig says yes, and also that it fits into a severe disruption exception that had been demonstrated in an earlier case.
A justice says that implicit in all of this is that for all these years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts, and that he just doesn't see any empirical evidence for that.
Lessig says that this is a structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an effectively perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws, so a empirical claim needs not be made.
A justice is confused between this argument and a secondary argument that there is a great First Amendment force that's being thwarted, and that the secondary arguement was the entire underpinning for the case.
Lessig clarifies that it it true that he is asserting, in light of the changed circumstances, that the opportunity to build upon works within the public domain is a fundamental First Amendment interest, and that the First Amendment values, the vital speech interest at stake of this case, is that the public domain be permitted as a source for cultivating work about our culture without unnecessary legal restriction.
A justice states that Lessig wants more than that- he wants the right to copy works verbatim. (which would grant the access required to be a source for cultivating work)
Lessig says that he wants the right to copy verbatim works that should be in the public domain and would be in the public domain but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built into the Copyright Clause.
A justice drawing from the briefs, says that he can't see where "retroactivity-prospectivity" comes in on the First Amendment argument and if Lessig is saying that the time is too long, that the public domain should get this stuff sooner rather than later, would he explain how the "prospectivity-retrospective" line fits into the First Amendment claim?
Lessig says that the prospectivity matter should be deferred until the court decides whether the prospective and retrospective is severable, and we submit it's an easy case to show that it's not.
A justice finally gets that the First Amendment argument and the Copyright Clause argument are independent arguments.
A judge wants to take the First Amendment argument alone, and tie it into the retrospective-prospective distinction.
Lessig says that the strongest First Amendment argument is about the retrospective extension, because of a fundamental change that occurs when Congress extends subsisting copyrights, rather than when Congress legislates prospectively because when Congress legislates prospectively, it has no way to know who's going to benefit from its extension. It is simply evaluating what the term should be prospectively in a way that the Court should presume is legitimate under the First Amendment. However, when it legislates retrospectively, it has the effect of looking at particular authors and estates of authors who are before Congress asking for this extension, and it's choosing between these particular authors and the public at large. Maybe in exercising that choice in this case, Congress made an objective valuation of who would be in the best position to advance the interests of promoting the progress of science...
At this point a justice interrupts, saying that in Lessig's intermediate scrutiny test the Court would not be hypothesizing what might have been in Congress's mind. Lessig's First Amendment test is a stringent one. You have to have an important purpose, and the means that is use is necessarily tied to that purpose. If you take that position, I don't see how you make the retroactive-prospective line work.
My previous post got modded off-topic, probably because the post I was responding to got modded to 0.
I don't exactly have the clearest concept of rights- the American school system barely mentions them, you know.
But some naturalized citizen makes the claim that a person of one country doesn't have the right to talk about another country, and I'm even more confused.
Now the Constitution is merely a piece of paper and does not grant anyone rights, but if I understand correctly, one of the rights it says that Americans SHOULD have is the freedom of speech. Now I believe that everyone should be free to address wrongs, no matter which country the wrong occurs in or which country the person is a citizen of or resides in.
And would somebody please mod xtremex's post back up from -1.
Slashdot Mirror
was what got stolen. If you steal a man's freedom or the like, you are still stealing.
I have yet to see one person who knows how to push buttons to get their agenda pushed forward.
The technology behind James, who looks like a professional pool player, is the same Microsoft uses for its paperclip office assistant.>
It looks like you want to hit a ball. Do you want me to...*Ahem* I really don't spend that much time with clippy so anyone want to continue on from there?
something that someone else is likely to have caught, without viewing at levels 2, 1, or perhaps 0, to see that someone else, who can only post at one of those levels, might have already posted on it.
so even if the logo does not represent Microsoft in its entirety, it it still Microsoft's and Microsoft still chose it. Care to explain where I'm wrong?
I'd try webmaster@cartoonnetwork.com
This search yields some interesting results- cartoonnetwork@cust-help.com privacy.adultswim@turner.com are two examples
simply because I've got all the DVDs of NGE The series
Death and Rebirth
and
The End of Evangelion
Suncoast had a deal where I got "The End of Evangelion"'s poster free.
When I take over the world, you'll take anime over Futrama any day, and you'll like it!
No, Divas are evil Digimon :)
Forget Batman and Superman, I want to see how the Z fighters(Dragonball Z) would stack up against him. Of course, their powers change over time, so I'd like to know at what points in the timeline they become more powerful than Superman, as well as comparisons to the different Superman incarnations. Now, that would be a study!
What he is saying seems to reflect the concept that college educations as they now stand, are more value to current employers that it is to the student that is getting the education, and furthermore, that the employer doesn't care about the degree half as much as the notion that having gone to college, the perspective employee comes with a little bit of insurance that he can do what he says he can.
I seem to see the problem everywhere. Colleges teach what will make the students tools for employers, not what they might want to know. In my Cisco class, they tell you to do things a certain way just because if you don't "it might not work." Don't bother to tell you why. I doubt that any given engineer would know how to buid everything from cars and can openers to nucler recators and space stations, at least these days. A group of engineers, maybe.
Americans consider corporations single entities, while Britain considers them collective, or something like that. Actually it may not be a language issue but a mentality issue.
Oh, so Capitalism only works when you're not scrapping for cash.
Premise: Capitalism has been around in some form or another since the dawn of time
Conclusion: Capitalism is not short-sighted.
I do not understand how you draw that conclusion from that premise. Care to explain?
Keep the IPs of my most used sites in my hosts file.
Salary Fixed compensation for services, paid to a person on a regular basis.
When you are on a salary, there is no clock, so working until 1 AM would not necessarily be a bad thing in this case.
Wage Payment for labor or services to a worker, especially remuneration on an hourly, daily, or weekly basis or by the piece.
Working off the clock on a Wage is a bad thing, but I prefer Salaries myself.
I'd say Gnome was unstable if it hit Debian.
shouldn't code stones.
Autism doesn't make you not want to be around people half as much as it makes you want and practically need your interactions with other people to follow carefully crafted scripts, which is not a feature of this society, and therefore autistic people interact less with other people, despite a desire to do so.
An increase in people with autistic traits should lead to features in society that such people want and need.
A question I've been wondering is whether most people with autistic features (not the severly autistic) can function better in a society with such features than non-autistic people do in this one.
But if I go to jail, the jail will be in possession of a decryption device in violation of the DMCA, so who's going to arrest the jail?
This is a partial summary- I may contiue it in a future post. My comments are in parentheses.
A justice brings up the possibility that they are at a risk of disrupting previous copyright extensions, a process that seems have begun with the first act.
Lessig says that due to common law and the law of the individual states, the first act did not extend copyright more than it curtailed copyrights existing under prior law.
It is then pointed out by a justice that there have been several extensions since, even if the first act does not.
Lessig admits that in 1831 and 1909, Congress extended terms in a way that is inconsistent with the strongest possible interpretation of the Constitution that would aid him in winning his case. He then says that those extensions were never challenged in any court, apparently to suggest that since it had not withstood a real challenge, it might not be that sound, but a Justice point out that the reason that they were never challenged is that there might not be a basis for it.
Lessig points out that due to modern communications technology the circumstances has changed from that of previous copyright law which affected mainly commercial publishers so there was less of a need for scrutiny, even if there was a basis, and that this is the first time where the Court has been pointed to changed circumstances as a reason to reaffirm the Framers' values. He further attempts to show basis by bringing up that it's not the case that the earlier extensions were not questioned on constitutional grounds, citing an academic challenge, causing the Justice to clarify himself, that he was talking about court challenges, not academic challenges.
A justice says that regardless of changed circumstances or not, Lessig's basic theory, which on his argument would have been appropriate at any time historically, is that there at least has to be the possibility of a kind of a causal connection between the extension and the promotion or inducement for the creation of some subsequent work, and asks why does that interpretation of the Promotion Clause make more sense than an interpretation that says the Promotion Clause requires that there be a general scheme in place, which overall tends to promote or induce, and part of that scheme can be that at the discretion of Congress the period of protection is extended from time to time?
Lessig says that under the other interpretation of the Promotion Clause there is no limit to the ability of Congress to extend subsisting terms.
Then a justice asks whether the same thing applies to change of scope- whether Congress can decide to change the size of the net that catches derivative or resembling works of a copyrighted work, so to speak.
Lessig says no, because unless retrospective extensions are forbidden, it will eviscerate the meaning of "limited Times" which does not occur in the context of the scope of exclusive right, nor in the context of the power to secure.
Then a justice asks if Lessing's theory is true, would that mean that the court would also have to hold the 1976 act unconstitutional. The judge makes the claim that if the 1976 act were to be held unconstitutional, chaos would ensue. (which I doubt), Lessig says that under the theory as it's been advanced, the 1976 act would be unconstitutional. The judge says that maybe they should find another theory
Lessig says that the theory, which would advance the aim of limiting times in a way that is enforceable, is only applicable to the '98 act in the case presented, and would not necessarily be applicable under the '76 act for reasons that had been offered by the Government.
A justice asks if Lessig thinks it's at least arguable that the '76 act had various positive aspects to it in terms of the purpose of the Copyright Clause that this act lacks? Lessig says yes, and also that it fits into a severe disruption exception that had been demonstrated in an earlier case.
A justice says that implicit in all of this is that for all these years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts, and that he just doesn't see any empirical evidence for that.
Lessig says that this is a structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an effectively perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws, so a empirical claim needs not be made.
A justice is confused between this argument and a secondary argument that there is a great First Amendment force that's being thwarted, and that the secondary arguement was the entire underpinning for the case.
Lessig clarifies that it it true that he is asserting, in light of the changed circumstances, that the opportunity to build upon works within the public domain is a fundamental First Amendment interest, and that the First Amendment values, the vital speech interest at stake of this case, is that the public domain be permitted as a source for cultivating work about our culture without unnecessary legal restriction. A justice states that Lessig wants more than that- he wants the right to copy works verbatim. (which would grant the access required to be a source for cultivating work)
Lessig says that he wants the right to copy verbatim works that should be in the public domain and would be in the public domain but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built into the Copyright Clause.
A justice drawing from the briefs, says that he can't see where "retroactivity-prospectivity" comes in on the First Amendment argument and if Lessig is saying that the time is too long, that the public domain should get this stuff sooner rather than later, would he explain how the "prospectivity-retrospective" line fits into the First Amendment claim?
Lessig says that the prospectivity matter should be deferred until the court decides whether the prospective and retrospective is severable, and we submit it's an easy case to show that it's not.
A justice finally gets that the First Amendment argument and the Copyright Clause argument are independent arguments.
A judge wants to take the First Amendment argument alone, and tie it into the retrospective-prospective distinction.
Lessig says that the strongest First Amendment argument is about the retrospective extension, because of a fundamental change that occurs when Congress extends subsisting copyrights, rather than when Congress legislates prospectively because when Congress legislates prospectively, it has no way to know who's going to benefit from its extension. It is simply evaluating what the term should be prospectively in a way that the Court should presume is legitimate under the First Amendment. However, when it legislates retrospectively, it has the effect of looking at particular authors and estates of authors who are before Congress asking for this extension, and it's choosing between these particular authors and the public at large. Maybe in exercising that choice in this case, Congress made an objective valuation of who would be in the best position to advance the interests of promoting the progress of science...
At this point a justice interrupts, saying that in Lessig's intermediate scrutiny test the Court would not be hypothesizing what might have been in Congress's mind. Lessig's First Amendment test is a stringent one. You have to have an important purpose, and the means that is use is necessarily tied to that purpose. If you take that position, I don't see how you make the retroactive-prospective line work.
My previous post got modded off-topic, probably because the post I was responding to got modded to 0.
I don't exactly have the clearest concept of rights- the American school system barely mentions them, you know.
But some naturalized citizen makes the claim that a person of one country doesn't have the right to talk about another country, and I'm even more confused.
Now the Constitution is merely a piece of paper and does not grant anyone rights, but if I understand correctly, one of the rights it says that Americans SHOULD have is the freedom of speech. Now I believe that everyone should be free to address wrongs, no matter which country the wrong occurs in or which country the person is a citizen of or resides in.
And would somebody please mod xtremex's post back up from -1.
but anyone who wants to try to stop me from talking about anything I please can find me at:
417 S. Manning
Muncie, IN
Being able to send instructions to a computer hardwired to your brain.