If you want to be a patent attorney, you should check whether your undergraduate degree meets the requirements. Mine didn't: for CS only, your degree must be from a school with a specific accreditation, which my highly prestigious/snobbish Ivy League school didn't have. I suspect this is because they think somebody out there is giving "computer science" degrees for how-to-use-Microsoft-Word courses.
Anyway, as a result, I'm now a corporate lawyer instead. You don't need to be a patent attorney to do litigation, or trademarks and copyrights and other soft stuff, but, if you're a techie on the inside, you want it.
If your school's not properly blessed, see if you can cram in some extra chemistry or physics to meet the hour minimums.
Ah, but what if people can be invited by more than one person? Now you need reference counts.
And what if people can retroactively invite someone already there? Now you need friend garbage collection. "OK, everybody, line up for the old mark-and-sweep."
In my field, the canonical example is the degree from Princeton Law School. A Google search turns up several references that are not obviously jokes or fictional -- like this or this (though those are not resumes).
Then people would just have an incentive to get to a hopeless trial, just to avoid paying their opponents' costs, so the problem of frivolous trials would just get worse.
Despite what the Jargon File may think, "verbage" has been around at least since 1787, not long after "verbiage" arrived in English, making it a suboptimal choice for deliberate verbicide.
Such situations are annoying, aren't they? I think that practically everyone who uses "flounder" as a verb really meant to say "founder," but, since they're invariably speaking metaphorically anyway, they end up accidentally making sense.
I don't get it. "Verbiage" is the common form; "verbage" is a rare (obsolete?) variant. Is that what you were aiming for? If so, "verbiagerie" is more colorful.
What you say makes sense, but I don't think excess religiosity is, in general, a particularly bad problem for a society to have. (Obviously, many here disagree with this.)
To the extent that people think prayer is the only thing that works, and so don't go to doctors, then, clearly, there's a problem. But while there are Christian Scientists and equivalents in other faiths, they're a pretty small part of the picture: religious people do not (in my experience) seek less of the medical care they need than others, on average. And believing any wrong thing might have that effect: I worry more about people who skip the doctor to go for some ineffective (and, conceivably, dangerous) new age "treatment." Or those who falsely believe in the efficacy of any old thing that happened to work once -- a nonsensical medical, business, military, or other strategy that happened to work out the first time, say.
It's true that people who overcome their problems, and think God deserves all credit, in fact deserve credit themselves. But, again, in my experience, these people don't, in fact, feel so bad about themselves.
AA members who believe that God's intervention is needed to keep them sober may be wrong, but they probably are better off than if they believed (even correctly) that it was a matter of willpower (and so having a few drinks wouldn't be a problem). Likewise, according to an NBER-published study I'll dig up if anyone's interested, among Christians, Jews, Moslems, and Hindus alike (though there's some evidence Buddhists are different), around the world, more religous people tend to be more successful. (Of course, reverse causation is a big problem there, but the idea that more religious people would be more trusting, say, and so more likely to form efficient contracts does make sense.)
In conclusion, I don't think this is any worse than any other waste of time.
A drive of higher capacity in the same physical dimensions will have a higher linear data density. If this drive were compared to one with the same layout, spinning at the same speed, with half the data density, the actual read component of total read time would be only half as much for this drive. This makes little difference, of course, because, for small reads, latencies dominate.
Making drives faster is basically a losing proposition financially. They get faster at a reasonable price only very slowly. Caching makes effective read times tolerable; journaling file systems can do that for writes.
If having a larger drive means you keep bigger databases or do other more complex calculations, then, yes, that could take more time, but, then, you might slow down even with a larger but much faster drive, too, so you can't blame the drive for that.
There happens not to be a "formal" definition. A court is to decide whether a mark is famous by considering "factors such as, but not limited to" these.
Largely, though, they amount to whether it is "famous" in the ordinary sense of being well-known and widely identified in the target market with the senior user's goods or services, which E-Pass obviously is not.
No, because the "E-Pass" mark is not "famous" (under the original use, anyway). That just leaves trademark infringement, but they can't make that out because there's no likelihood of confusion.
I have almost never seen a page with a "printable" version that did NOT look much better. I use Privoxy to take me to them on every site that has them and that I visit regularly. Since then, I've been enjoying the web a lot more, and squinting less.
Yes, this means crap like WinModems which may be the only choice for the new standard paint buyers further into a corner, as manufacturers could give a care less as they try to compete in a highly commoditized market.
This is the first post I've ever seen that quoted "All your base are belong to us" in which that wasn't even the most bizarre sentence. A mixed metaphor, a mangled cliche interbred with another cliche, a conclusion that simply does not follow from the antecedent, and an example with no logical connection to the assertion being demonstrated -- all in 39 words.
It would appear that the judge issues such a harsh injunction because of RIM's egregious violation and attitude.
Don't be silly. You win a patent infringement suit on a still-alive patent, you get an injunction that says the defendant can't infringe that patent. Every single time.
There are a few possibilities, but typically, a "fair" royalty rate on past sales and an injunction against new ones. You can, of course, then license the patent (and injunction) to the defendant for as much as you can agree on.
Dang it, I knew it sounded like "Yahoo!," but not quite.
My sincerest apologies.
The Eleventh Amendment really did need to be about that long, though, to unambiguously repeal the Constitution's grant of jurisdiction over states. For real wordiness, try the first sentence of (former) Internal Revenue Code sec. 341(e)'s first sentence:
(e)Exceptions to application of section
(1) Sales or exchanges of stock
For purposes of subsection (a)(1), a corporation shall not be considered to be a collapsible corporation with respect to any sale or exchange of stock of the corporation by a shareholder, if, at the time of such sale or exchange, the sum of -
(A)
the net unrealized appreciation in subsection (e) assets of the corporation (as defined in paragraph (5)(A)), plus
(B)
if the shareholder owns more than 5 percent in value of the outstanding stock of the corporation the net unrealized appreciation in assets of the corporation (other than assets described in subparagraph (A)) which would be subsection (e) assets under clauses (i) and (iii) of paragraph (5)(A) if the shareholder owned more than 20 percent in value of such stock, plus
(C)
if the shareholder owns more than 20 percent in value of the outstanding stock of the corporation and owns, or at any time during the preceding 3-year period owned, more than 20 percent in value of the outstanding stock of any other corporation more than 70 percent in value of the assets of which are, or were at any time during which such shareholder owned during such 3-year period more than 20 percent in value of the outstanding stock, assets similar or related in service or use to assets comprising more than 70 percent in value of the assets of the corporation, the net unrealized appreciation in assets of the corporation (other than assets described in subparagraph (A)) which would be subsection (e) assets under clauses (i) and (iii) of paragraph (5)(A) if the determination whether the property, in the hands of such shareholder, would be property gain from the sale or exchange of which would under any provision of this chapter be considered in whole or in part as ordinary income, were made -
(i)
by treating any sale or exchange by such shareholder of stock in such other corporation within the preceding 3-year period (but only if at the time of such sale or exchange the shareholder owned more than 20 percent in value of the outstanding stock in such other corporation) as a sale or exchange by such shareholder of his proportionate share of the assets of such other corporation, and
(ii)
by treating any liquidating sale or exchange of property by such other corporation within such 3-year period (but only if at the time of such sale or exchange the shareholder owned more than 20 percent in value of the outstanding stock in such other corporation) as a sale or exchange by such shareholder of his proportionate share of the property sold or exchanged, does not exceed an amount equal to 15 percent of the net worth of the corporation.
This really is great news -- though there were some parts of UCITA that were much less objectionable than those highlighted here, few should mourn the loss of this stinker.
I wonder how the UCITA supporters in Virginia and Maryland will feel about their triumph. It reminds me of the story of the Wazoo land grab scandal of 200 years ago in Georgia, which inspired the Eleventh Amendment: some shifty types bribed a majority of the state legislature to just give away a huge amount of land to them, but, for whatever reason, one innocent legislator went along with the crowd and voted in favor of the scheme.
That's either the least educated comment I've read around here in a while, or the best-crafted troll. In any case, I'll bite:
Do you have any idea how little raw CPU power (not that they call them CPUs) a traditional mainframe has? They said mainframe, not supercomputer!
Yes, yes, they have lots of fancy I/O processors and whatnot, and some modern big iron is different, but there should be no problem running simple software on an IBM mainframe simulator, if one exists and you don't actually intend to support many users on it.
Real utilitarians and economists, unlike the liberals' model of them, always recognize such factors, and there is no barrier whatsoever to including them in an economic analysis. If the population is really just outraged by the existence of something -- price discrimination, cocaine use, interracial dating -- then it will be economically efficient to prohibit it. But I have a rather hard time believing that the population really cares very much about these things, compared to the amount it cares about wealth, the distribution of wealth, health, children, etc.
Price discrimination is sometimes not Pareto dominant over its absence, but it sometimes is: a ban on it might stop the merchant from investing in producing the good in the first place, leaving even the rich consumers, who would have happily paid a high price, worse off along with everyone else. Thus, permitting price discrimination is Pareto dominant over never permitting it.
In any case, stronger notions than Pareto efficiency (i.e., weaker senses of domination) would favor permitting price discrimination not always, but under very wide circumstances.
Selling at a single price is good; selling at several prices can be better, though, even for consumers. I shall give an example.
Suppose I invent a drug which is very useful but not necessary for survival -- say, it doubles your strength. The drug costs virtually nothing to manufacture (though it was expensive to develop). There are 2 types of consumers: those who do lots of heavy lifting, and are willing to pay $1000 a dose, and other people, for whom it's a pure luxury, and are willing to pay just $10.
If I have to set a single price, then, provided there are a decent number of the first type, I'll set the price close to $1000 -- $900, let's say. This price has to be said to be "fair" in any moral sense (IMHO), given the large benefit some consumers get and my costs in development. But then, the ordinary people, for whom the drug would provide a benefit of $10 at no social cost (i.e., no cost to me), will not use it. This is known economically as a "dead weight loss": pricing over cost leading to efficient transactions (sales to common people at a price below $10) not happening.
In contrast, if I can discriminate between the consumers, I'll charge the lifters $900 and the non-lifters $9 (say), and then everyone will use the drug and be better off, in addition to increasing my profits.
Of course, we could get that result if, out of the kindness of my heart, I decided to charge only $9 to everyone in the first place. But that would leave me less eventual profit, which might mean, if I had to do that, that I would never invest in the drug in the first place, which would (relative to the discrimination world) leave me worse off by my net profits, the common people by $1 per dose, and the lifters by $100.
If you think allowing price discrimination is immoral, then you must accept that your notion of morality will sometimes leave everyone worse off (as they would measure their own welfare).
There's a Cuban restaurant in Boston that is widely rumored to have prices about double in its English menu as in the Spanish version. Nobody seems to mind too much.
Slashdot Mirror
If you want to be a patent attorney, you should check whether your undergraduate degree meets the requirements. Mine didn't: for CS only, your degree must be from a school with a specific accreditation, which my highly prestigious/snobbish Ivy League school didn't have. I suspect this is because they think somebody out there is giving "computer science" degrees for how-to-use-Microsoft-Word courses.
Anyway, as a result, I'm now a corporate lawyer instead. You don't need to be a patent attorney to do litigation, or trademarks and copyrights and other soft stuff, but, if you're a techie on the inside, you want it.
If your school's not properly blessed, see if you can cram in some extra chemistry or physics to meet the hour minimums.
Ah, but what if people can be invited by more than one person? Now you need reference counts.
And what if people can retroactively invite someone already there? Now you need friend garbage collection. "OK, everybody, line up for the old mark-and-sweep."
UTC is a pretty complicated system, but it's hardly obscure enough for this purpose. They should use plain UT (which is UTC without leap seconds).
In my field, the canonical example is the degree from Princeton Law School. A Google search turns up several references that are not obviously jokes or fictional -- like this or this (though those are not resumes).
Then people would just have an incentive to get to a hopeless trial, just to avoid paying their opponents' costs, so the problem of frivolous trials would just get worse.
Despite what the Jargon File may think, "verbage" has been around at least since 1787, not long after "verbiage" arrived in English, making it a suboptimal choice for deliberate verbicide.
Such situations are annoying, aren't they? I think that practically everyone who uses "flounder" as a verb really meant to say "founder," but, since they're invariably speaking metaphorically anyway, they end up accidentally making sense.
I don't get it. "Verbiage" is the common form; "verbage" is a rare (obsolete?) variant. Is that what you were aiming for? If so, "verbiagerie" is more colorful.
Sounds more like killing one bird with two stones.
What you say makes sense, but I don't think excess religiosity is, in general, a particularly bad problem for a society to have. (Obviously, many here disagree with this.)
To the extent that people think prayer is the only thing that works, and so don't go to doctors, then, clearly, there's a problem. But while there are Christian Scientists and equivalents in other faiths, they're a pretty small part of the picture: religious people do not (in my experience) seek less of the medical care they need than others, on average. And believing any wrong thing might have that effect: I worry more about people who skip the doctor to go for some ineffective (and, conceivably, dangerous) new age "treatment." Or those who falsely believe in the efficacy of any old thing that happened to work once -- a nonsensical medical, business, military, or other strategy that happened to work out the first time, say.
It's true that people who overcome their problems, and think God deserves all credit, in fact deserve credit themselves. But, again, in my experience, these people don't, in fact, feel so bad about themselves.
AA members who believe that God's intervention is needed to keep them sober may be wrong, but they probably are better off than if they believed (even correctly) that it was a matter of willpower (and so having a few drinks wouldn't be a problem). Likewise, according to an NBER-published study I'll dig up if anyone's interested, among Christians, Jews, Moslems, and Hindus alike (though there's some evidence Buddhists are different), around the world, more religous people tend to be more successful. (Of course, reverse causation is a big problem there, but the idea that more religious people would be more trusting, say, and so more likely to form efficient contracts does make sense.)
In conclusion, I don't think this is any worse than any other waste of time.
You pronounce "tcp" as one syllable? Sounds painful.
Yes, you are wrong.
A drive of higher capacity in the same physical dimensions will have a higher linear data density. If this drive were compared to one with the same layout, spinning at the same speed, with half the data density, the actual read component of total read time would be only half as much for this drive. This makes little difference, of course, because, for small reads, latencies dominate.
Making drives faster is basically a losing proposition financially. They get faster at a reasonable price only very slowly. Caching makes effective read times tolerable; journaling file systems can do that for writes.
If having a larger drive means you keep bigger databases or do other more complex calculations, then, yes, that could take more time, but, then, you might slow down even with a larger but much faster drive, too, so you can't blame the drive for that.
There happens not to be a "formal" definition. A court is to decide whether a mark is famous by considering "factors such as, but not limited to" these.
Largely, though, they amount to whether it is "famous" in the ordinary sense of being well-known and widely identified in the target market with the senior user's goods or services, which E-Pass obviously is not.
No, because the "E-Pass" mark is not "famous" (under the original use, anyway). That just leaves trademark infringement, but they can't make that out because there's no likelihood of confusion.
I have almost never seen a page with a "printable" version that did NOT look much better. I use Privoxy to take me to them on every site that has them and that I visit regularly. Since then, I've been enjoying the web a lot more, and squinting less.
Yes, this means crap like WinModems which may be the only choice for the new standard paint buyers further into a corner, as manufacturers could give a care less as they try to compete in a highly commoditized market.
This is the first post I've ever seen that quoted "All your base are belong to us" in which that wasn't even the most bizarre sentence. A mixed metaphor, a mangled cliche interbred with another cliche, a conclusion that simply does not follow from the antecedent, and an example with no logical connection to the assertion being demonstrated -- all in 39 words.
It would appear that the judge issues such a harsh injunction because of RIM's egregious violation and attitude.
Don't be silly. You win a patent infringement suit on a still-alive patent, you get an injunction that says the defendant can't infringe that patent. Every single time.
There are a few possibilities, but typically, a "fair" royalty rate on past sales and an injunction against new ones. You can, of course, then license the patent (and injunction) to the defendant for as much as you can agree on.
Dang it, I knew it sounded like "Yahoo!," but not quite.
My sincerest apologies.
The Eleventh Amendment really did need to be about that long, though, to unambiguously repeal the Constitution's grant of jurisdiction over states. For real wordiness, try the first sentence of (former) Internal Revenue Code sec. 341(e)'s first sentence:
(e)Exceptions to application of section
(1) Sales or exchanges of stock
For purposes of subsection (a)(1), a corporation shall not be considered to be a collapsible corporation with respect to any sale or exchange of stock of the corporation by a shareholder, if, at the time of such sale or exchange, the sum of -
(A)
the net unrealized appreciation in subsection (e) assets of the corporation (as defined in paragraph (5)(A)), plus
(B)
if the shareholder owns more than 5 percent in value of the outstanding stock of the corporation the net unrealized appreciation in assets of the corporation (other than assets described in subparagraph (A)) which would be subsection (e) assets under clauses (i) and (iii) of paragraph (5)(A) if the shareholder owned more than 20 percent in value of such stock, plus
(C)
if the shareholder owns more than 20 percent in value of the outstanding stock of the corporation and owns, or at any time during the preceding 3-year period owned, more than 20 percent in value of the outstanding stock of any other corporation more than 70 percent in value of the assets of which are, or were at any time during which such shareholder owned during such 3-year period more than 20 percent in value of the outstanding stock, assets similar or related in service or use to assets comprising more than 70 percent in value of the assets of the corporation, the net unrealized appreciation in assets of the corporation (other than assets described in subparagraph (A)) which would be subsection (e) assets under clauses (i) and (iii) of paragraph (5)(A) if the determination whether the property, in the hands of such shareholder, would be property gain from the sale or exchange of which would under any provision of this chapter be considered in whole or in part as ordinary income, were made -
(i)
by treating any sale or exchange by such shareholder of stock in such other corporation within the preceding 3-year period (but only if at the time of such sale or exchange the shareholder owned more than 20 percent in value of the outstanding stock in such other corporation) as a sale or exchange by such shareholder of his proportionate share of the assets of such other corporation, and
(ii)
by treating any liquidating sale or exchange of property by such other corporation within such 3-year period (but only if at the time of such sale or exchange the shareholder owned more than 20 percent in value of the outstanding stock in such other corporation) as a sale or exchange by such shareholder of his proportionate share of the property sold or exchanged, does not exceed an amount equal to 15 percent of the net worth of the corporation.
This really is great news -- though there were some parts of UCITA that were much less objectionable than those highlighted here, few should mourn the loss of this stinker.
I wonder how the UCITA supporters in Virginia and Maryland will feel about their triumph. It reminds me of the story of the Wazoo land grab scandal of 200 years ago in Georgia, which inspired the Eleventh Amendment: some shifty types bribed a majority of the state legislature to just give away a huge amount of land to them, but, for whatever reason, one innocent legislator went along with the crowd and voted in favor of the scheme.
That's either the least educated comment I've read around here in a while, or the best-crafted troll. In any case, I'll bite:
Do you have any idea how little raw CPU power (not that they call them CPUs) a traditional mainframe has? They said mainframe, not supercomputer!
Yes, yes, they have lots of fancy I/O processors and whatnot, and some modern big iron is different, but there should be no problem running simple software on an IBM mainframe simulator, if one exists and you don't actually intend to support many users on it.
Real utilitarians and economists, unlike the liberals' model of them, always recognize such factors, and there is no barrier whatsoever to including them in an economic analysis. If the population is really just outraged by the existence of something -- price discrimination, cocaine use, interracial dating -- then it will be economically efficient to prohibit it. But I have a rather hard time believing that the population really cares very much about these things, compared to the amount it cares about wealth, the distribution of wealth, health, children, etc.
Price discrimination is sometimes not Pareto dominant over its absence, but it sometimes is: a ban on it might stop the merchant from investing in producing the good in the first place, leaving even the rich consumers, who would have happily paid a high price, worse off along with everyone else. Thus, permitting price discrimination is Pareto dominant over never permitting it.
In any case, stronger notions than Pareto efficiency (i.e., weaker senses of domination) would favor permitting price discrimination not always, but under very wide circumstances.
Those aren't price discrimination, they're ordinary discrimination in prices.
Selling at a single price is good; selling at several prices can be better, though, even for consumers. I shall give an example.
Suppose I invent a drug which is very useful but not necessary for survival -- say, it doubles your strength. The drug costs virtually nothing to manufacture (though it was expensive to develop). There are 2 types of consumers: those who do lots of heavy lifting, and are willing to pay $1000 a dose, and other people, for whom it's a pure luxury, and are willing to pay just $10.
If I have to set a single price, then, provided there are a decent number of the first type, I'll set the price close to $1000 -- $900, let's say. This price has to be said to be "fair" in any moral sense (IMHO), given the large benefit some consumers get and my costs in development. But then, the ordinary people, for whom the drug would provide a benefit of $10 at no social cost (i.e., no cost to me), will not use it. This is known economically as a "dead weight loss": pricing over cost leading to efficient transactions (sales to common people at a price below $10) not happening.
In contrast, if I can discriminate between the consumers, I'll charge the lifters $900 and the non-lifters $9 (say), and then everyone will use the drug and be better off, in addition to increasing my profits.
Of course, we could get that result if, out of the kindness of my heart, I decided to charge only $9 to everyone in the first place. But that would leave me less eventual profit, which might mean, if I had to do that, that I would never invest in the drug in the first place, which would (relative to the discrimination world) leave me worse off by my net profits, the common people by $1 per dose, and the lifters by $100.
If you think allowing price discrimination is immoral, then you must accept that your notion of morality will sometimes leave everyone worse off (as they would measure their own welfare).
There's a Cuban restaurant in Boston that is widely rumored to have prices about double in its English menu as in the Spanish version. Nobody seems to mind too much.