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Call me crazy, but I expect privacy while in my car. I don't expect to have to buy expensive counter-surveillance equipment (or use a mylar bag) to protect my privacy. I don't want even aggregate data about my whereabouts or preferences being known. Not because I have anything to hide, but because I don't.
ref: The Fourth Amendment

According to the current screwed up Supreme Court precedent, no, because intrastate commerce "affects" interstate commerce. "The seminal case, of course, is Wickard v. Filburn, sustaining federal regulation of a crop of wheat grown on a farm and intended solely for home consumption. The premise was that if it were never marketed, it supplied a need otherwise to be satisfied only in the market, and that if prices rose it might be induced onto the market."

The defendant always has the right to trial by jury for a criminal case.

In the United States, the defendant has a right to trial by jury in a civil case as well. The seventh amendment: "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."

Even better, you can find a lawyer with ease when you get arrested for stalking!

Ok, i don't care what they told congress at the time, what the lifespan + 70 (or whatever it si now) guarantees is that Mickey Mouse doesn't fall into the public domain.

The leftist judge would not argue freedom of religion with respect to gay marriage. They would argue equal protection. Equal protection was spelled out in the 14th ammendment, thus it is pointless to argue original intent, as the constitution was ammended to overrule that intent.

On the other hand, the intellectual rights clause of the constitution has never been ammended, so original intent should certainly apply.

The supreme court jesters set that precedent almost 2 years ago.

Wrong. How would the black box be any different than keeping a journal? As I said before, the car is your property (just like the journal) and is protected via the same rights.

You might want to check with former Senator Bob Packwood or Unabomber Ted Kaczynski before you boldly state that the U.S. legal system will respect the privacy of your journals. Today the court system barely even recognizes your right to keep private records; your odds of keeping private the data collected by a "flight recorder" attached to your car are, precisely, zero.

Your Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights have been withering away for almost a century. If they were enforced as the Founders intended, it would be impossible for the IRS to collect income tax; the government's search and seizure powers were reinforced in every major 20th century court decision on the subject, and by now your right not to hand over information to the government is barely even recognized, much less enforced by the legal system.

Keeping a black box would not be any different than keeping a journal; your error is to believe that your journal is somehow protected. It's okay if you want to believe that -- but I wouldn't count on it, and I certainly wouldn't expect a U.S. court in this day and age to acknowledge my right to withhold the data recorded by a "black box" on my car.

because people have the right to timeshift all of the tv they watch, not just the programming the broadcasters want. There is already caselaw substantiating this.

The MPAA tried shenanigans like this in '00 attacking RecordTV.com suceededing in shutting it down.

If PVRs were in every house instead of VCRs, there would be no chance of this getting by, but since this wont directly impact people for several years it will be too late to complain once the new generation of flag obeying goods arrives, and everyone will probably just accept that now, you have to PAY to record TV and watch it at a later date. Or this will kill the adoption of PVRs; once people realize that you cant record whatever you want with a flag-crippled PVR.

because people have the right to timeshift all of the tv they watch, not just the programming the broadcasters want. There is already caselaw substantiating this.

The MPAA tried shenanigans like this in '00 attacking RecordTV.com suceededing in shutting it down.

If PVRs were in every house instead of VCRs, there would be no chance of this getting by, but since this wont directly impact people for several years it will be too late to complain once the new generation of flag obeying goods arrives, and everyone will probably just accept that now, you have to PAY to record TV and watch it at a later date. Or this will kill the adoption of PVRs; once people realize that you cant record whatever you want with a flag-crippled PVR.

• (a) At any time after the commencement of the case but before confirmation of a plan, on request of a party in interest or the United States trustee, and after notice and a hearing, the court shall order the appointment of a trustee - (1) for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement of the affairs of the debtor by current management, either before or after the commencement of the case, or similar cause...

• Conspiracy of U.S. Nationals
• Conspiracy to Provide Material Support & Resources to Foreign Terrorist Organizations (2 counts)
• Providing Material Support & Resources to Foreign Terrorist Organizations (2 counts)
• Conspiracy to Contribute Services to al Qaeda
• Contributing Services to al Qaeda
• Conspiracy to Supply Services to the Taliban
• Supplying Services to the Taliban
• Using and Carrying Firearms and Destructive Devices During Crimes of Violence

He most certainly was not tried for treason. If he had been convicted of treason, which is very difficult because it requires two witnesses to view the actual act of committing it (and affiliation alone is not an act). If he had been convicted, the only sentence possible is death (check your copy of the Constitution, as far as I can remember it's the only punishment spelled out directly in there). That will remain true unless an amendment is passed, and I don't think there are a lot of people ready to stand up for that cause.

Absolutely, yes. When the government stops serving us, we have the right to remove them. I have always accepted that as a legitimate reason for owning a gun. I'm just not sure how far it extends. Can I have a pistol? Can I have a sawed-off shotgun ? Can I have an automatic rifle with attached grenade launcher? Can I have a rocket launcher? Can I have a cruise missile? At what point does this go beyond "arms"?

I understand that the Amendment says "...shall not be infringed," and that's clear; no questions there. But, again, and I think this is an important question -- what is an "arm"? Does it extend to any weapon that I can get my hands on, or is it limited to what I would need if I were to join the militia?

Don't try to apply the 21st century definition of Militia to a doccument written in 18th century.

OK, let's talk about the 18th century definition of militia (though I'm not so sure why it's different from the definition I gave earlier). Militias in Revolutionary America were organized, trained groups of citizens who didn't fight professionally. They were farmers or silversmiths or brewers or whatever, but, once a month or possibly more frequently, they all got together and practiced maneuvers and did some target practicing and so forth; they trained as a normal group of soldiers would. I guess the modern National Guard is similar, but AFAIK they are part of the national armed forces, which means they're under Federal control and no good for our purposes. Most towns in the eighteenth century required their male citizens to not only be armed, but show up periodically for training.

Two quotes for you, from the case that I linked to above:

"The defense and safety of the commonwealth depend upon having its citizens properly armed and taught the knowledge of military duty.' 'All free male persons between the ages of eighteen and fifty years...shall be inrolled or formed into companies.' 'There shall be a private muster of every company once in two months." -The General Assembly of Virginia, 1785 (emphasis added)

Finally, if Noah Webster thought a bunch of ordinary civilians who go to the shooting range with their M-16s every Saturday is going to be superior to a trained squad of professional soldiers, simply because they are fighting for their freedom, he's watched Braveheart a few too many times. The militia needs to be organized and learn how to use those arms, whatever they are.

Isn't there already a legal precedent that specifically allows one to make fun of Jerry Falwell?

If he wants to spend the money to send spam, let him. I see banning it as against the first amendment (speech).

Bzzzt. Thank you for playing!

The First Amendment (as common interpretation seems to hold these days, at least), was intended to protect a number of things, but the "free speech" aspect of it as relates to commercial purposes enjoys only qualified protection (at best). There are a number of areas that First Amendment protection has been tried on and denied with respect to commercial-vs.-political/artistic expression. Current thought would seem to fall along the lines of certain commercial speech is not entitled to protection.

Don't worry, the 9th Circuit Court will declare those unconstitutional soon enough.

And no, I'm not trolling, I know that "under God" isn't in the Constitution.

Where are the voices advocating political freedom?

from page 3 of the ruling:

The relevant portion of California Education Code 52720 reads:
In every public elementary school each day ... there shall be conducted appropriate patriotic exercises. The giving of the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America shall satisfy the requirements of this section.

Just about every post in this thread is concerned with details of religious freedom. Doesn't the word patriotic worry anyone in the U.S.? It surprised me that such political brainwashing is actually prescribed by the State; but it shocked me that practically no-one sees this as a Bad Thing.

Don't you guys even suspect that something may be amiss?

:nullstr

The source of this was "All Things Considered", the afternoon news program on NPR. I can't remember who the comentator was.

OK, here's my source:

http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/conlaw/newdowus62 602opn.pdf

Ex Parte Quirin.

Citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not relieve him from the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because in violation of the law of war. Citizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, [317 U.S. 1, 38] guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts are enemy belligerents within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war. Cf. Gates v. Goodloe, 101 U.S. 612, 615, 617 S., 618. It is as an enemy belligerent that petitioner Haupt is charged with entering the United States, and unlawful belligerency is the gravamen of the offense of which he is accused.

Petitioners, and especially petitioner Haupt, stress the pronouncement of this Court in the Milligan case, 4 Wall. page 121, that the law of war 'can never be applied to citizens in states which have upheld the authority of the government, and where the courts are open and their process unobstructed'. Elsewhere in its opinion, 4 Wall. at pages 118, 121, 122, and 131, the Court was at pains to point out that Milligan, a citizen twenty years resident in Indiana, who had never been a resident of any of the states in rebellion, was not an enemy belligerent either entitled to the status of a prisoner of war or subject to the penalties imposed upon unlawful belligerents. We construe the Court's statement as to the inapplicability of the law of war to Milligan's case as having particular reference to the facts before it. From them the Court concluded that Milligan, not being a part of or associated with the armed forces of the enemy, was a non-belligerent, not subject to the law of war save as-in circumstances found not there to be present and not involved here-martial law might be constitutionally established. The Court's opinion is inapplicable to the case presented by the present record. We have no occasion now to define [317 U.S. 1, 46] with meticulous care the ultimate boundaries of the jurisdiction of military tribunals to try persons according to the law of war. It is enough that petitioners here, upon the conceded facts, were plainly within those boundaries, and were held in good faith for trial by military commission, charged with being enemies who, with the purpose of destroying war materials and utilities, entered or after entry remained in our territory without uniform-an offense against the law of war. We hold only that those particular acts constitute an offense against the law of war which the Constitution authorizes to be tried by military commission. Since the first specification of Charge I set forth a violation of the law of war, we have no occasion to pass on the adequacy of the second specification of Charge I, or to construe the 81st and 82nd Articles of War for the purpose of ascertaining whether the specifications under Charges II and III allege violations of those Articles or whether if so construed they are constitutional. McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 , 55 S.Ct. 24.

By universal agreement and practice the law of war draws a distinction between the armed forces and the peaceful populations of belligerent nations7 and also between [317 U.S. 1, 31] those who are lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful.

By a long course of practical administrative construction by its military authorities, our Government has likewise recognized that those who during time of war pass surreptitiously from enemy territory into our own, discarding their uniforms upon entry, for the commission of hostile acts involving destruction of life or property, have the status of unlawful combatants punishable as such by military commission. This precept of the law of war has been so recognized in practice both here and abroad, and has so generally been accepted as valid by authorities on international law12 that we think it must be regarded as [317 U.S. 1, 36] a rule or principle of the law of war recognized by this Government by its enactment of the Fifteenth Article of War.

Section 2 of the Act of Congress of April 10, 1806, 2 Stat. 371, derived from the Resolution of the Continental Congress of August 21, 1776, 13 imposed the death penalty on alien spies 'according to the law and usage of nations, by sentence of a general court martial'. This enactment must be regarded as a contemporary construction of both Article III, 2, and the Amendments as not foreclosing trial by military tribunals, without a jury, of offenses against the law of war committed by enemies not in or associated with our Armed Forces. It is a construction of the Constitution which has been followed since the founding of our government, and is now continued in the 82nd Article of War.

Ex Parte Quirin.

Citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not relieve him from the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because in violation of the law of war. Citizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, [317 U.S. 1, 38] guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts are enemy belligerents within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war. Cf. Gates v. Goodloe, 101 U.S. 612, 615, 617 S., 618. It is as an enemy belligerent that petitioner Haupt is charged with entering the United States, and unlawful belligerency is the gravamen of the offense of which he is accused.

Petitioners, and especially petitioner Haupt, stress the pronouncement of this Court in the Milligan case, 4 Wall. page 121, that the law of war 'can never be applied to citizens in states which have upheld the authority of the government, and where the courts are open and their process unobstructed'. Elsewhere in its opinion, 4 Wall. at pages 118, 121, 122, and 131, the Court was at pains to point out that Milligan, a citizen twenty years resident in Indiana, who had never been a resident of any of the states in rebellion, was not an enemy belligerent either entitled to the status of a prisoner of war or subject to the penalties imposed upon unlawful belligerents. We construe the Court's statement as to the inapplicability of the law of war to Milligan's case as having particular reference to the facts before it. From them the Court concluded that Milligan, not being a part of or associated with the armed forces of the enemy, was a non-belligerent, not subject to the law of war save as-in circumstances found not there to be present and not involved here-martial law might be constitutionally established. The Court's opinion is inapplicable to the case presented by the present record. We have no occasion now to define [317 U.S. 1, 46] with meticulous care the ultimate boundaries of the jurisdiction of military tribunals to try persons according to the law of war. It is enough that petitioners here, upon the conceded facts, were plainly within those boundaries, and were held in good faith for trial by military commission, charged with being enemies who, with the purpose of destroying war materials and utilities, entered or after entry remained in our territory without uniform-an offense against the law of war. We hold only that those particular acts constitute an offense against the law of war which the Constitution authorizes to be tried by military commission. Since the first specification of Charge I set forth a violation of the law of war, we have no occasion to pass on the adequacy of the second specification of Charge I, or to construe the 81st and 82nd Articles of War for the purpose of ascertaining whether the specifications under Charges II and III allege violations of those Articles or whether if so construed they are constitutional. McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 , 55 S.Ct. 24.

By universal agreement and practice the law of war draws a distinction between the armed forces and the peaceful populations of belligerent nations7 and also between [317 U.S. 1, 31] those who are lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful.

By a long course of practical administrative construction by its military authorities, our Government has likewise recognized that those who during time of war pass surreptitiously from enemy territory into our own, discarding their uniforms upon entry, for the commission of hostile acts involving destruction of life or property, have the status of unlawful combatants punishable as such by military commission. This precept of the law of war has been so recognized in practice both here and abroad, and has so generally been accepted as valid by authorities on international law12 that we think it must be regarded as [317 U.S. 1, 36] a rule or principle of the law of war recognized by this Government by its enactment of the Fifteenth Article of War.

Section 2 of the Act of Congress of April 10, 1806, 2 Stat. 371, derived from the Resolution of the Continental Congress of August 21, 1776, 13 imposed the death penalty on alien spies 'according to the law and usage of nations, by sentence of a general court martial'. This enactment must be regarded as a contemporary construction of both Article III, 2, and the Amendments as not foreclosing trial by military tribunals, without a jury, of offenses against the law of war committed by enemies not in or associated with our Armed Forces. It is a construction of the Constitution which has been followed since the founding of our government, and is now continued in the 82nd Article of War.

Background on the Pledge of Allegiance

I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America

And to the republic for which it stands

one nation, indivisible,

with liberty and justice for all

The Pledge of Allegiance was written by a Christian Socialist activist in 1892. Heavily promoted by the magazine The Youth's Companion, at the time one of the largest weekly magazines in the United States (it was eventually merged into the magazine American Boy, which was owned by the Atlantic Monthly), which was also involved in a movement to place American flags over every schoolhouse in the country. By 1905, a majority of the non-southern states had passed laws requiring schools to fly the flag, and it was already customary at that time to require students to recite the pledge daily. Eventually, most states passed laws requiring the daily recitation of the pledge of allegiance. (In some states, students are also required to sing the national anthem).

The wording of the pledge was codified into US law by Congress in 1942; in 1954, the wording of the pledge was changed by Congress, which added the phrase 'under God', making the line 'one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." This modified phrasing was adopted by schools across the country, and has remained intact to this day.

Background on the case

Michael Newdow, an atheist living in the state of California, sued the state on the ground that the California Education Code requirement that each school day begin with appropriate patriotic exercises including but not limited to the giving of the pledge of allegiance, and the school district's requirement that each elementary school class recite the pledge of allegiance daily compels his daughter to "watch and listen as her state-employed teacher in her state-run school leads her classmates in a ritual proclaiming that there is a God," and therefore constituted a state establishment of religion, prohibited by the first amendment (and, by extension through the fourteenth amendment, to states and school districts, which are sub-units of the states). His petition asked the court to order the President to modify the pledge to delete the offending section.

The decision

The 9th circuit analyzed the law establishing the pledge of allegiance using three legal tests used in establishment cases. (The Lemon test, which has mostly fallen into disfavor but has not been explicitly repudiated, requires government conduct to have a secular purpose, neither advance nor inhibit religion, and must not foster government entanglement with religion. The "coercion test" requires that government conduct not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise. The "endorsement test" requires that government not endorse a religion and "send a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders".). The court ruled that:

• The inclusion of the phrase under God in the pledge is an endorsement of religious belief.
• Reciting the pledge as it is currently codified is to swear allegiance to monotheism.
• The pledge as currently codified fails the coercion test.
• The inclusion of the phrase under God was *explicitly* done to promote a religious purpose, and therefore the pledge as currently codified fails the Lemon test.

Future steps

The decision is only binding in the area covered by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals - California, Arizona, Nevada, Washington, Oregon, Alaska, and Hawaii - but would require school districts in that area to cease reciting of the Pledge of Allegiance. It is expected that the school district will appeal, in which case the decision will most likely be heard by the US Supreme Court sometime next year. A copy of the opinion is here.

I think there's much more money than that at stake.

Consider who is pushing for these copyright extensions: large corporations with a lot to lose if their intellectual property enters the public domain. Check out this interesting article.

In our view the copyright statutes, while protecting the owner of the copyright in his right to multiply and sell his production, do not create the right to impose, by notice, such as is disclosed in this case, a limitation at which the book shall be sold at retail by future purchasers, with whom there is no privity of contract. This conclusion is reached in view of the language of the statute, read in the light of its main purpose [210 U.S. 339, 351] to secure the right of multiplying copies of the work,-a right which is the special creation of the statute. True, the statute also secures, to make this right of multiplication effectual, the sole right to vend copies of the book, the production of the author's thought and conception. The owner of the copyright in this case did sell copies of the book in quantities and at a price satisfactory to it. It has exercised the right to vend. What the complainant contends for embraces not only the right to sell the copies, but to qualify the title of a future purchaser by the reservation of the right to have the remedies of the statute against an infringer because of the printed notice of its purpose so to do unless the purchaser sells at a price fixed in the notice. To add to the right of exclusive sale the authority to control all future retail sales, by a notice that such sales must be made at a fixed sum, would give a right not included in the terms of the statute, and, in our view, extend its operation, by construction, beyond its meaning, when interpreted with a view to ascertaining the legislative intent in its enactment.

Yup, that's the case that established first sale doctrine. 1908.

The case.

In the German sub case, there were two subs. One landed in New York, the other landed in Florida.

But they weren't citizens.

One of them claimed US citizenship. He was born in Germany. He moved to the US when he was five. His parants became naturalized citizens. He later returned to Germany. He claimed that he never lost his citizenship.

The Government, however, takes the position that on attaining his majority he elected to maintain German allegiance and citizenship or in any case that he has by his conduct renounced or abandoned his United States citizenship.

The court never resolved the issue, instead claiming that:

Citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not relieve him from the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because in violation of the law of war. Citizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, ... guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts are enemy belligerents within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war.

Haupt never disputed that he took orders from the German High Command.

There is also the fact that congress had already declared war on Germany.

Finally, there is the issue that the USA PATRIOT act only allows for military tribunals of non-US citizens.

The USA-PATRIOT act specifically requires the Attorney General or President to declare someone an enemy combatant. One of the restrictions is that the person must not be a US citizen.

The 1942 case involved persons who worked for an enemy that congress had declared war on. Congress has not declared war on Al Queda.

To deny the civil rights of a certain class of people amounts to a Bill of Attainder. The constitution specifically prohibits bills of attainder.

All the protections in the constitution are worthless if they can be eroded with a simple accusation. Even if one supports military tribunals for enemies of the state, the state should be required to prove, in open court, that the defendent is indeed an enemy of the state. In the 1942 case, the defendents did not dispute that they took orders from the German High Command.

Should you lose your right to a public jury trial if a member of Al Queda claims that you work for them? What burdon should the state have to meet before taking away someone's right to a public jury trial?

indicate that these types of restrictions will be unenforcable. The recent Adobe case indicates that, on its face, the true nature of a transaction involving the purchase of software is that of the purchase of a copy of a copyrighted work. Cases reaching back as far as Scribner v. Straus (1908) indicate that attempting to case a sale as a license will not get around the first sale doctrine.

Under Federal Law, when you purchase a copy of software, you already have the right to install it and use it in the way it was designed to be used. You may remove the software from PC A and install it on PC B. A contract of adhesion which purports to abrogate this right is unlikely to be found enforcable.

Now, I don't agree with those who think that all EULAs are unenforcable. Terms such as limitation of liability and perhaps even forum selection terms require very little notice. Small print on the back of a cruse ship ticket was found to be sufficient notice for a limitation of liability. But the majority of unconscionable terms will never be raised in an actual court case becuase the companies know that they are out on a limb here and will never get them enforced.

Anonymous Coward wrote/flamed:

If you don't like usury, don't borrow money.

Actually, those who are religiously opposed to Usury can't receive interest either, which makes it very difficult for them to get bank accounts, but that's a tangent.

If you don't like the agreement, return your ReplayTV.

Returns are at best annoying, at worst they can be impossible, depending on the store and where you live. Some stores in some states won't accept returns except under very specific circumstances, and "not liking the service agreement" isn't one of them.

Are you deliberately being stupid? So you don't like the fact that they can "actively disable the box that you spent at least $450 to own" - then WHY THE FUCK DID YOU SPEND $450!!! You IDIOT! Who FORCED you to buy, and keep, a ReplayTV!

I am more familiar with Tivo than ReplayTV, I am assuming ReplayTV is similar enough for my argument to make sense. If I go to the store to buy a Tivo, I have a very useful and flexible digital recording device, if I pay for the Tivo service then my digital recording device also knows alot about upcoming shows. If I cancel my service, I still have a useful device it just doesn't know about upcoming shows anymore.

My limited understanding is that older ReplayTV boxes are the same way. This new box with the new service agreement has the added "feature" of, if someone accuses me of copyright infringment, then with no due process I not only have no service, but they've made my device not work as well, no refund. No actual infringement is necessary, just someone accusing you of breaking a civil law against someone unaffiliated with ReplayTV.

My cable provider has no right to destroy my TV, my "Digital TV Guide" provider has no right to destroy my digital recorder. A non-negotiated contract should not be sufficient to give them that right.

Your morals are no basis for forcing anyone to offer you a contract that you like.

My morals are a basis for what I will and won't accept, which is the whole basis of a contract. My morals are also one of the guides I use in deciding which laws I do and don't support.

While Contract Law has a great deal of breadth and power, it is not limitless. This is a Contract of Adhesion (i.e. no negotiation has taken place), and the power of such contracts is even more limited. I feel it is (or if not, it ought to be) Unconscionablefor such a contract, where I am merely purchasing a service, to give someone the right to damage or destroy my property. Actual negotiation for mutually agreeable terms is required before I can accept that I have agreed to give someone the right to destroy my property.

Who says anti spam laws are unenforcible on the Internet?
Try either
State V Heckel # 69416-8 or


State v Heckel : Findlaw .
Same case, different archives.

Washington law applies to out of state
residents. There have been a couple of out of state cases.

Collecting on the judgement is a different question.

Internet Jurisdiction

The Internet is an interstate and international medium. But does operating a Web Site mean that the operator is subject to personal jurisdiction in courts wherever the Site is accessible? The answer obviously is no. This outline describes the types of activity that likely will permit a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over an Internet actor, consistent with the due process clause of the United States Constitution.

For example: http://profs.lp.findlaw.com/netjuris/netjuris_1.ht ml (emphasis added)

Courts generally have declined to assert personal jurisdiction solely on the basis of Web Site advertising. However, courts have exercised jurisdiction over Web Site operation where additional and more active contacts with the forum took place, such as Internet sales to the forum residents, conducting business in the forum state through numerous contacts, or entering into specific dealings with forum residents

Sig: What Happened To The Censorware Project (censorware.org)

Internet Jurisdiction

The Internet is an interstate and international medium. But does operating a Web Site mean that the operator is subject to personal jurisdiction in courts wherever the Site is accessible? The answer obviously is no. This outline describes the types of activity that likely will permit a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over an Internet actor, consistent with the due process clause of the United States Constitution.

For example: http://profs.lp.findlaw.com/netjuris/netjuris_1.ht ml (emphasis added)

Courts generally have declined to assert personal jurisdiction solely on the basis of Web Site advertising. However, courts have exercised jurisdiction over Web Site operation where additional and more active contacts with the forum took place, such as Internet sales to the forum residents, conducting business in the forum state through numerous contacts, or entering into specific dealings with forum residents

Sig: What Happened To The Censorware Project (censorware.org)

I hate to be the one to break it to you, but the US has had a "state religion" for some time now. It is called secular humanism. It is a religion according to the Supreme Court. It is taught exclusively in government schools. A priesthood of humanists has been created and is funded from public monies. And, guess what, the religion of secular humanism supports stem-cell research. Imagine that! Seriously, if the humanists would do what they say they do and question the existing moral authority, they would have to stop believing their own hype.

FindLaw > Legal Subjects > Cyberspace Law > E-Mail > Primary Materials - Laws and Government Documents

Especially Ferguson v. Friendfinder

The California Court of Appeal for the First District has ruled that California's spam statute is constitutional and valid. This means that from now on, spammers must comply with its requirements or face legal liability and/or criminal punishment. Read the decision by clicking here.

The California Supreme Court has refused to review the decision.

Sig: What Happened To The Censorware Project (censorware.org)

See Lovell v. City of Griffin. Which ruled:

The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. These indeed have been historic weapons in the defense of liberty, as the pamphlets of Thomas Paine and others in our own history abundantly attest. The press in its connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.

"You broke the law by having the crop and the evidence should be used to convict you. The fact that the police entered illegaly is a separate violation of the law by the police officers. They should be charged with breaking and entering and violation of the 4th Amendment. That way they'll be encouraged to obtain the proper warrants. But you won't get off free because of their failure to follow the law."

The fourth ammendment acutaly says, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (from Findlaw).

The problem with your approach is that it would still violate the right of the people to be protected from unreasonable search and seizure. Even if, in your scenario, the officers are tried and conviced of breaking and entering, my rights were still violated, and any evidence obtained was a direct benefit of that violation. "SHALL NOT BE VIOLATED" is a long way from "encouraging" the police to follow the rules. Since the police, like everybody else, are fallable, the only choice is to pretend as if the violation never happened, and throw out anything discovered in it. It's inconvenient, but I prefer it to the other options.

But then again, I just re-upped my ACLU membership.

Here here! Post this link wherever you go! I'm going to make it my sig, in fact.

IANAL, this is not legal advice, just my reading of a relatively recent (1989) Supreme Court case.

You have it backward from how I read the supreme court decision.

Work for hire only applies if its work done within the confines of your employment.

As an independant contractor if copyright is not assigned as part of the contract it is yours.

U.S. Supreme Court
COMMUNITY FOR CREATIVE NON-VIOLENCE v. REID, 490 U.S. 730 (1989)

No, more corporate cash did not go to Gore. I think it was about 2/3 to the Republicans.

Excuse me? Please provide a source for the '2/3' number - this is highly dubious, and I suspect you're making it up. Are you aware Al Gore's OIL company just bought one of Enron's interests in the Middle East? The Democrats play the moneygrubbing big-bidness game quite well, thank you.

After the election Gore was trying to get a recount, but the Supreme Court voted 5 to 4 to stop the recount. Those 5 were all Republican appointees.

The supreme court vote to HALT THE RECOUNT was 7-2, the 5-4 vote to decide whether they would adhere to Florida law in requiring all recounts to be completed by December 13th.

Yeah, if someone wants to file a federal lawsuit to stop the count (and it still baffles me that a candidate in a supposedly democratic election actually did this), they have to be really quick about it. ;-)
They'll probably only have a window of a few seconds...

As you are allowed to make backup copies for yourself (this has been deemed legal by the courts) and backup copies for yourself do not hurt the profits of the owner, it IS fair use. Stop trolling, please.

findlaw dictionary

the actual law, which doesn't really define it, as definition has been left up to the court (the findlaw def is current court def) but states that you can't be prosecuted for it especially if its non commerical in nature

I think the 4th admendment says it all.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Secure - Free from the risk of being intercepted by unauthorized persons.

There is too much to discuss about this, but it comes down to word "Reasonable". And this changes from person to person.

You find it "Resonable" to trade Privacy for Security. Patriot ACT on that thought was "Reasonable" to some men and women to combat terrorisism.

I find that "Unreasonable". The founding fathers had to deal with "Unreasonable" searchs under Kings Law, they would have no such repeat.
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The power of accurate observation is commonly called cynicism by those who have not got it. - George Bernard Shaw (1856 - 1950)

Findlaw - Rights Retained by the People

(emphasis added)

The Ninth Amendment had been mentioned infrequently in decisions of the Supreme Court4 until it became the subject of some exegesis by several of the Justices in Griswold v. Connecticut. There a statute prohibiting use of contraceptives was voided as an infringement of the right of marital privacy. Justice Douglas, writing the opinion of the Court, asserted that the ''specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.'' Thus, while privacy is nowhere mentioned, it is one of the values served and protected by the First Amendment, through its protection of associational rights, and by the Third, the Fourth, and the Fifth Amendments as well. The Justice recurred to the text of the Ninth Amendment, apparently to support the thought that these penumbral rights are protected by one Amendment or a complex of Amendments despite the absence of a specific reference. Justice Goldberg, concurring, devoted several pages to the Amendment.

Sig: What Happened To The Censorware Project (censorware.org)

A direct link to the Complaint:

http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/spiderman/spide rman040902cmp.pdf

Or, find it on FindLaw's Document Archive. The Spider-Man Lawsuit is currently the fourth heading down the page.

http://news.findlaw.com/legalnews/documents/

crib

A direct link to the Complaint:

http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/spiderman/spide rman040902cmp.pdf

Or, find it on FindLaw's Document Archive. The Spider-Man Lawsuit is currently the fourth heading down the page.

http://news.findlaw.com/legalnews/documents/

crib

Authors themselves in the past have tried to kill the doctrine of first sale in order to make more profits. Here's a previous case where the Supreme Court told the authors their control over sale ends at first sale. It's not just the *AAs that want to kill free-market secondary sales at our expense, the authors tried long ago.

...what if book publishers start licensing books to consumers, the same way music, software and movies are licensed.

Correction: It should have been 1908 for the Supreme Court First Sale Doctrine decision. More precisely, it's Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908). See http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?c ourt=US&vol=210&invol=339

VA Tech is a State School. Unlike the security department of a private employer, it's Police are State actors. As such, they are indeed constrained by the 4th Amendment, and any parallel language in the State Constitution.

Justice Scalia, in Krillo, the heat imaging case a year ago, still cites Katz (any relation?) favorably "As Justice Harlans oft-quoted concurrence described it, a Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable."

Widely accepted professional doctrines of Acedemic Freedom, as benchmarks of social expectations, can thus trump the University's Acceptable Use Policies.

VA Tech is a State School. Unlike the security department of a private employer, it's Police are State actors. As such, they are indeed constrained by the 4th Amendment, and any parallel language in the State Constitution.

Justice Scalia, in Krillo, the heat imaging case a year ago, still cites Katz (any relation?) favorably "As Justice Harlans oft-quoted concurrence described it, a Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable."

Widely accepted professional doctrines of Acedemic Freedom, as benchmarks of social expectations, can thus trump the University's Acceptable Use Policies.

I don't know the details of this case; can anyone point me to a link that gives some background? Because I have to admit, given what I've seen on their site, the First Amendment argument seems pretty weak...just like (almost) everyone else here, IANAL, but saying that anonymity is required for true freedom of speech seems a tenuous link at best. As long as you're protected from being censored or censured for your opinions, I fail to see how anonymity is a legitimate requirement for free speech. But, again, IANAL, and there could be loads of legal precedent for this of which I am unaware. Still, I would have thought this sort of thing would fall more under the Fourth Amendment...

Anyhow, the upshot is, I'd appreciate someone pointing me to the background for this story so I can remove the "un"...

That's ghastly! It's like having a wall of Mona Lisas and passing out sharpies to all of the museum-goers.

I'm not (just) being pedantic here. The one original "true" Mona Lisa remains safely in the Louvre, available to all for adulation. Yet the viewer also gets a chance to make a statement. Since the great piece of art is not defaced, I don't see how it is threatened. And of course, maybe, just maybe, new art can be created.

Here's a different analogy: This is like handing out copies of a story and Bic ballpoints to people. They get to go edit the story, modify its order, change its dialog. Horrors of horrors! All that you get from that kind of mucking is... Hamlet. To quote one of many sources,

Shakespeare's Tragedy of Hamlet, Prince of Denmark is based on a 12th century tale by Saxo Grammaticus... the missing link between Saxo and Shakespeare may be an earlier play about Hamlet (called by scholars the Ur-Hamlet), which may or may not have been written by the Ur-Revenger himself, Thomas Kyd, based in turn on François de Belleforest's Histoires tragiques (1570), a free translation of Saxo.

ObPoliticalRant: And that's why recent and proposed copyright law -- giving unprecedented "access control" to copyright holders -- is a disaster of the first magnitude for the arts and for science. The partitioning of the public domain into private little plots threatens our intellectual future and makes a mockery of copyright law as a means "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts" (Article I Section 8 of the US Constitution).