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Somehow I don't think they're going to run into a lot of Republican judges in the U.S. District Court in San Francisco.

But feel free to review their records here: http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/cand/judges.nsf/

And of course part of, "A well regulated militia" I am sure you just forgot that part.

No, I didn't forget it, I simply understand it, and you don't. Would you like to understand it? Here, read what the US Court of Appeals has to say. Isn't it fascinating?

You've never read the Second Amendment, have you, dear child?

I am quite familiar with it.

You see, the first clause...

Ok, here we go with the argument from the prefatory clause, ignoring the operative clause. Rather than debunk your position myself, I'll let the United States Court of Appeals do it for me. Suffice it to say that your argument begins to fail with your misunderstanding of what the authors of the 2nd amendment meant when they wrote "milita", and that I concur with the majority opinion.

As for self-defense, any competent self-defense instructor will tell you that facing an armed opponent who has the drop on you is foolish.

Look at the URL at the top of my posts. Do you think that might be a hint as to my bonafides? I've been teaching martial arts for many years. And your contrivance isn't what we're talking about here. We're talking about one armed person - with pistols - facing over thirty people, and as a reasonably competent instructor, my input is, if everyone can shoot back, a lot fewer people will be likely to die, but one of them will almost certainly be the perp. Therefore, my input is also that everyone should be trained and armed.

I'm not sure if I could kill a man -- and I challenge you to prove that you are capable of doing the same. None of us will ever know unless we're put in that situation, and Odin willing, none of us ever will be.

As for killing, I spent a while (two tours) in Viet Nam doing exactly that. It wasn't pleasant, but then again, it beat hell out of being killed, and having (more of) my friends killed. As should be obvious even to someone like yourself, if less than 30 of these kids had died, the outcome would have been better by the only metric that counts. Finally, these kids were put in that situation, and like almost everyone, they would likely find that when the choice comes down to letting the perp kill the kid next to you or shooting him now, it's not all that tough a decision. It is one hell of a lot harder to reconcile the idea that you didn't act when you could have. Of course, these kids never had that opportunity: because the law and the school rules ensured that they were unarmed victims.

If you're so smart, then please feel free to quote the portion of Article V which supports your claim.

The entire thing supports my claim. Section 5 describes the procedure we are required to follow to (a) change its previous meaning, in which case any reasonable person would expect the change(s) to be described (and indeed, this is precisely what we find in those places where the changes were competent) or (b) add new meaning, in which case any reasonable person would expect no effect upon, and be unwilling to presume effects upon, other parts of the constitution. Things would be fine if either one of those was what they did, but that's not the case here: They did something else entirely: they added contradictory text. Which makes it nonsensical, not somehow magically valid because it is dependent upon non-intuitive parsing rules that aren't even in the document. No one can possibly interpret section 5 as authority to add random text to the constitution. If added text doesn't comply with the mechanism described in the constitution to precisely delineate a change, or to create an addition of new, non-interfering concepts, then it must be meaningless. "Changes" that don't describe what they change are the work of incompetents. In the case of this very important constituting authority, we the people have every reason and authority to ignore such works of imprecision and unreason, just as we have every reason to ignore laws that have no authority underlying them, and take remedial action against those who would attempt impose such laws upon us.

It didn't have to. It was just a convenient way of returning to the status quo ante Prohibition.

Such an approach would also be a "convenient" (cough) way to indicate which portions of other declarations no longer apply. Documents that contain no directions as to how to parse contradictory material, and contradictory material, are well along the road to becoming meaningless. You, as a lawyer, may indeed be aware of some method of parsing them that can twist them around to make sense to you, but each level of invisible implication that a law or the constitution requires to be meaningful degenerates its usefulness as a tool that a citizen can be made to understand without knowing the hoops and pitfalls that legal tacticians use to turn black into white and night into day. That is part of what is wrong with the entire legal system today, and to use it to argue that the 16th is "right" is purest drivel.

For example, I've watched your peer group try for literally years to argue based on similar external invisible implications only they could imagine that the prefatory clause of the 2nd amendment somehow limited the operative clause; it was all sophist nonsense, of course, but it took until this decision before someone actually pointed out in detail what anyone with any sense already knew - the language of the document itself - the constitution - is more important than any "implicit" hoop jumping lawyers are wont to do by their very natures.

note how the 12th and 17th Amendments totally rewrite how the President, Vice-President, and Senators are elected, yet don't even bother to refer to, much less repeal, the portions of the Constitution that they replace.

That simply makes them illegitimate, it doesn't magically make them sensible. This is no surprise; the government routinely ignores those parts of the constitution that it hasn't bothered to cause to be contradictory (commerce clause, inconvenient portions of the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th 10th, and 14th amendments, ex post facto punishment, etc.) - why should it be any news that it is being unforgivably and incomprehensibly sloppy about how it attempts to implement changes? You see, you argue from the premise that the laws and the mechanisms in place ar

(i) Conditions for eligibility. (1) Accommodation of technology. The limitations on liability established by this section shall apply to a service provider only if the service provider-- (A) has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and account holders of the service provider's system or network of, a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider's system or network who are repeat infringers; and (B) accommodates and does not interfere with standard technical measures. (2) Definition. As used in this subsection, the term "standard technical measures" means technical measures that are used by copyright owners to identify or protect copyrighted works and-- (A) have been developed pursuant to a broad consensus of copyright owners and service providers in an open, fair, voluntary, multi-industry standards process; (B) are available to any person on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms; and (C) do not impose substantial costs on service providers or substantial burdens on their systems or networks.

The ruling already spoke to this. (Has anyone read it?)

Just as requiring a warrant to investigate potential student drug use would disrupt operation of a high school, see T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 352- 53 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment), requiring a warrant to investigate potential misuse of the university's computer network would disrupt the operation of the university and the network that it relies upon in order to function.

[...]

The district court was entirely correct in holding that the special needs exception applied.

[...]

Once a court determines that the special needs doctrine applies to a search, it must "assess the constitutionality of the search by balancing the need to search against the intrusiveness of the search." Henderson, 305 F.3d at 1059 (citing Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78). The factors considered are the subject of the search's privacy interest, the government's interests in performing the search, and the scope of the intrusion. See id. at 1059-60.

[...] although Heckenkamp had a subjectively real and objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer, the university's interest in maintaining the security of its network provided a compelling government interest in determining the source of the unauthorized intrusion into sensitive files. The remote search of the computer was remarkably limited given the circumstances. Savoy did not view, delete, or modify any of the actual files on the computer; he was only logged into the computer for 15 minutes; and he sought only to verify that the same computer that had been connected at the 117 IP address was now connected at the 120 IP address. Here, as in Henderson, "the government interest served[ ] and the relative unobtrusiveness of the search" lead to a conclusion that the remote search was not unconstitutional. Id. at 1061. The district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress the evidence obtained through the remote search of the computer.

[...]

The district court also did not err in denying the motion to suppress evidence obtained during the searches of Heckenkamp's room. Assuming, without deciding, that Savoy and the university police violated Heckenkamp's Fourth Amendment rights when they entered his dormitory room for nonlaw- enforcement purposes, the evidence obtained through the search was nonetheless admissible under the independent source exception to the exclusionary rule.

Under the independent source exception, " 'information which is received through an illegal source is considered to be cleanly obtained when it arrives through an independent source.' " Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 538-39, (1988) (quoting United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 739 (1st Cir. 1986)). Therefore, we have held that " '[t]he mere inclusion of tainted evidence in an affidavit does not, by itself, taint the warrant or the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant.' " United States v. Reed, 15 F.3d 928, 933 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782, 788 (9th Cir. 1987)). In order to determine whether evidence obtained through a tainted warrant is admissible, "[a] reviewing court should excise the tainted evidence and determine whether the remaining untainted evidence would provide a neutral magistrate with probable cause to issue a warrant." Id. (quoting Vasey, 834 F.2d at 788).

Here, even without the evidence gathered through the allegedly improper search, there is sufficient information in the affidavit to establish probable cause. The affidavit recited evidence that the server intrusion had been tracked "to a campus dormitory room computer belonging to Jerome T. Heckenkamp"; that "[t]he computer is in Room 107, Noyes House, Adams Hall on the University of Wisconsin-Madison"; and that "Heckenkamp previously had a disciplinary action in the past for unauthorized computer access to a University of Wisconsin system." This

Because that would not have been appropriate.

This was. And the 9th Circuit agrees. It probably wouldn't have agreed that murder was an appropriate response, whereas this intrusion for protective purposes was, on balance.

Read the ruling. It's pretty informative.

He did have an expectation of privacy, and the court held that.

It also held that the emergency search fell under the doctrine of the "special needs" exemption to the Fourth Amendment.

These two principles were balanced, and special needs won out.

I really wish people would read the ruling, as it speaks in great detail about the principles of privacy, expectations thereof, why the search was acceptable in these circumstances, and so on.

Except that two courts, including the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, which has a very strong track record on upholding individual rights when warranted and ruling against the interests of the government, already clearly decided that no search warrant was required, and that the "special needs" exemption applied to the situation, and thus no warrant was required.

The ruling answers all of your concerns.

The reason the 9th Circuit gets overturned is because it's a very liberal court that is often seen as out of step with prevailing views.

It also is very protective of personal and individual rights, liberty, and privacy, and does not err on the side of law enforcement or the state. It is probably statistically the most likely court to rule against the interests of the government and for the interests of the individual.

This one's not going to be overturned.

Also, you should really, really read the ruling.

Well, the 9th Circuit (which issued this ruling) is a very liberal court, which routinely sides with privacy, individual rights, and personal liberties, and does not err on the side of the state. So you can rest assured that any appropriate protections afforded Heckencamp were more than duly considered.

You may be interested in reading the entire ruling.

The applicable bit:

Once a court determines that the special needs doctrine
applies to a search, it must "assess the constitutionality of the
search by balancing the need to search against the intrusiveness
of the search." Henderson, 305 F.3d at 1059 (citing Ferguson,
532 U.S. at 78). The factors considered are the subject
of the search's privacy interest, the government's interests in
performing the search, and the scope of the intrusion. See id.
at 1059-60.

[...]

The district court did not err in denying the motion to
suppress the evidence obtained through the remote search of
the computer.

[...]

Here, even without the evidence gathered through the
allegedly improper search, there is sufficient information in
the affidavit to establish probable cause. The affidavit recited
evidence that the server intrusion had been tracked "to a campus
dormitory room computer belonging to Jerome T. Heckenkamp";
that "[t]he computer is in Room 107, Noyes House,
Adams Hall on the University of Wisconsin-Madison"; and
that "Heckenkamp previously had a disciplinary action in the
past for unauthorized computer access to a University of Wisconsin
system." This was sufficient evidence to obtain the
warrant to search "Room 107, Noyes House, Adams Hall."

So, the search warrant exemption applied, and even without the information in question, there was, regardless, already sufficient information for a search warrant.

The second amendment does not apply to normal citizens. It applies to organized militia

You're entirely incorrect. The "milita" is the unorganized collection of armed citizens that were available to call up. Also, the 2nd amendment does apply to "normal citizens." Both of these errors in your position are addressed, exposed, debunked, and disposed of in the following March 9th, 2007 court decision:

Parker v. District of Columbia

That's the actual decision, in PDF. Absolutely required reading for collective right theorists (which is where your ideas are found.) The court explains, very clearly, that the individual rights position is the valid one, and precisely why, including what is wrong with attempting to use the prefatory clause to qualify the operative clause.

I located the actual court decision.

In the case, the ACLU sued in a civil action for an injunction against enforcement of the law on the basis that it was unconstitutional. The government waived a jury trial, and after finding of fact, the judge granted the injunction. The media grabbed the ball and ran with it.

I still want to know what you think the "role" of judges are, though, even if the judge didn't "strike down" the law.

Take a closer look at the case law. Firstly, it's not companies that are supposedly regarded as people. It's corporations that we're talking about here, and this is a much broader set of entities with a specific definition, i.e. they have been chartered by the state (in this case, a U.S. State). Now the argument is not as to whether corporations are flesh and blood "people", nor can one deny that many of these entities are subject to regulations that an actual person is subject to. However, many of these regulations are imposed for reasons unrelated to their corporate status. For instance, the requirement to publish financial reports is imposed on companies that are publicly traded - it is by virtue of this status that the extra requirement is imposed. Conversely, most privately held corporations have no requirement to publish financial statements to the public. Instead, they do their taxes as an individual must, though they must do their taxes differently by virtue of their corporate nature.

What many people have an issue with (and I get the sense you wish to tar these with you broad brush) is that a corporation are guaranteed the natural rights of a person, most especially those guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment when it says,

All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

That a corporation is eligible for these protections is not immediately obvious; after all, you say that they are obviously not people. However, a little decision by the name of Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad included a "statement of fact" to the effect that a corporation was entitled to fourteenth amendment protections. This has extended to corporate entities those rights that are guaranteed an actual person. That this was the case was not "obvious" at the time, and many people continue to question this now.

By the way, you should realize when you say "[Corporations] are not regarded as people" that the ability of an entity which is not in fact a human being to enter into contracts and act as a party before the law is granted by way of the legal fiction that these entities may in fact be regarded as people for these purposes. The doctrine of artificial personhood is well documented in common law, as well as the recognition that this personhood is artificial. So, I must reply to your assertion by reminding you that whether or not a corporation is regarded as a person is a question of context - a context you failed to establish. That is to say, there are no separate laws for corporations - only circumstances under which a corporation is or is not a person.

That an entity that represents a set of indemnified stakeholders should be entitled to federal protections of speech, of property, or of civil rights (as they are now) is not so obvious to me. Especially considering that it cannot be thrown in prison or otherwise punished in the ways a corporeal person can. Nor is it obvious that the fourteenth amendment should protect corporate charters from amendment or revocation by the very states that chartered them in the first place. It is especially vexing to think of a moral reason for an entity which is effectively immortal, vastly more resourceful than an individual, not subject to the privations of an individual, and that lacks the mortal conscience of an individual to be granted a full set of rights with which to contest those of actual individuals.

As for what is "right"

IAAL; US-centric analysis follows.

http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/064399.P .pdf

In this recent case from the 4th circuit, a spouse consented to having a shared computer seized. The husband had a passwd-protected account on his computer. The forensics guy bypassed that, accessed the files directly on a ghosted drive, and found child pr0n.

His defense? Reasonable expectation of privacy, no warrant, no consent = 4th amendment violation. The government claimed that "apparent authority" existed through the wife, and the 4th circuit allowed the pr0n as evidence.

But. Even with a modest amount of encryption, it becomes a *lot* harder for the gov't to make an "apparent authority" argument with a straight face. If it's transparent for the user to implement, relying on the consent of someone other than the accused will become a lot harder. This has real-world implications.

This says nothing about forensic password breaking or brute force attacks. But to analogize to your front door, a locksmith or battering ram is a far cry from a consent-based search. Expect defense lawyers to make the same argument with respect to files protected with Bitlocker.

The 7th Circuit's Opinion does not "essentially" open the door for such warrantless searches...read the opinion it discusses and answers your concerns...whether it is satisfactory to you, that is another question.

I don't mean to be snippy, but your post is typical /. crap (yeah, I have been here for years and I should not be surprised)...but, as usual, when it comes to legal opinions, 99% of posters do not bother to read the fucking opinion ("RTFO??")....so here...it is amazing how many /.'s fail to ever read a legal opinion from the numerous cases that are posted here. After reading the opinion, then try to refute its logic and legal basis. Furthermore, Judge Posner is far from an idiot and this is not some capricious opinion either... regardless, there is more to this case that what the initial article lets on... enjoy!

Sorry, I screwed up the link. Let's see if this works

http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?caseno= 06-2741&submit=showdkt

Preview says it does.

"No, because you don't get to be a judge if you're an autistic fucktard with an overly literal interpretation of everything that lands in your docket. Grow the fuck up."

This is an American court we're talking about. You can be a judge in the US with NO special qualifications beyond some well-connected friends.

http://www.uscourts.gov/understand03/content_5_0.h tml

Justices of the Supreme Court, judges of the courts of appeals and the district courts, and judges of the Court of International Trade, are appointed under Article III of the Constitution by the President of the United States with the advice and consent of the Senate. Article III judges are appointed for life, and they can only be removed through the impeachment process. Although there are no special qualifications to become a judge of these courts, those who are nominated are typically very accomplished private or government attorneys, judges in state courts, magistrate judges or bankruptcy judges, or law professors. The judiciary plays no role in the nomination or confirmation process.

So even YOU could in theory become a judge. Just brown-nose Mr. Chimp.

The one where they open the book to Chapter 7.

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/0/ 66b3a352ea33712988256952007578c2?OpenDocument
It was ruled at the appellate level and has more precedence. The appellate court reversed an injunction that Sony won earlier against Connectix. Sony claimed that the emulator would violate their trademark on the playstation, the appellate court disagreed.

masks will be outlawed as soon as technology
Done Deal
PDF

The decision in question, Church of the American Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, upheld a New York state statute prohibiting the wearing of masks or facial disguises in public, other than for masquerade or similar entertainment purposes. The Ku Klux Klan had claimed that its members have a First Amendment right to wear masks during its rallies, but the 2nd Circuit opinion disagreed.

To my knowledge it has never been proved that MS withheld information about an API for anti-competitive purposes.

If you're interested in the issues then I recommend reading the appeal court's ruling.

I just wanted to say thanks for being the first person here (that I've seen), when referring to facts not mentioned in TFA, actually gave a link! Several people now have mentioned that he wasn't in school that day, etc., but never bothered to tell WHERE they were getting that information... gah! It's hard to be on the same page as someone if you don't even know where that page is...

It would seem to a poor Brit here the case is simple. Are the school responsible for the childrens safety?

Was he released from school free to leave to do whatever he wanted or was school still in session and students supervised by teachers while watching the event.

Was he accompanied by his teacher or supervised by his teacher.

Frederick says that students were simply released from school so that they could watch the privately sponsored Olympic Torch being carried through a public street, and a student affidavit he submitted pointed out that the students did not have to obtain parental permission slips to be released, as is the routine for field trips and other supervised events off of the school premises. Principal Morse says that the release was "an approved social event or class trip," noting that the pep band played as the torch passed the school, the cheerleaders were out in uniform to greet the torchbearers, and teachers supervised.

Frederick says (without contradiction) that he had not gone to school that day prior to the banner display, that the banner display was off school property across Glacier Avenue from the campus, and that there were a lot of people, students and non-students, there to watch the torch pass. Other students filed affidavits saying that they were just released, not required to stay together or with their teachers, except for the gym class, and school administrators did not attempt to stop students who got bored and left.

Even though Frederick never got to school that morning, that was only because he got stuck in his driveway because of the snow. School had started and the students were released to watch the Olympic torch pass. And even though supervision of most students was minimal or nonexistent, the school could have supervised them more if it chose to, as it did with the gym class and perhaps the pep band and cheerleaders. Frederick was a student, and school was in session.

It seems to me that this was a school function, at least from reading the CNN version. "They had been let out of classes and were accompanied by their teachers." It was like a field trip, and they probably went back to class afterward. I wish the article made it more clear.

Other students filed affidavits saying that they were just released, not required to stay together or with their teachers, except for the gym class, and school administrators did not attempt to stop students who got bored and left."

This article refers to changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and as such would applicable to all companies involved in federal litigation. Note that IANAL. You can find a number of articles providing more detail than this one, including:

http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pd f
http://www.lexisnexis.com/applieddiscovery/lawlibr ary/whitePapers/ADI_FS_Top10TipsforFRCP.pdf
http://infogovernance.blogspot.com/2006/08/federal -rules-of-civil-procedure.html

http://informata.blogspot.com/

Since the linked article is light on information, I found the actual amendments (note: PDF)

You might want to read this before claiming the infallibility of judges. Did you ever read the Jackson findings? From a technical perspective, his findings are completely misguided. This Slate commentary offers a history of the appellate court thinking, which overruled much of his findings. I was once party to some hearings where a panel of distinguished judges had their ruling overturned by an act of Congress because it was so poorly formed. Believe me, judges can make incredible mistakes. Most of the time they don't, but when you have a political body levying fines against a foreign enterprise, there is a huge conflict of interest. This is a money grab by the EU. No doubt about it, unfortunately.

Google for Graham v. James , 144 F.3d 229, 236 (2d Cir. 1998). This finding is used in just about every case of copyright violation. For example RT COMPUTER GRAPHICS, INC., vs United States Postal Service. They claimed the post office was violating copyright because they used some of their computer graphics in a stamp. The post office's reply is that they secured a license to use the graphics through a third party. RT Computer Graphics claimed that the use in stamps was not authorized. The post office claimed that matters of contract are null because they don't have a contract with RT Computer Graphics and, as such, RT Computer Graphics can only sue them for copyright infringement, but because the post office has a license, they can't. Post office wins. That's my understanding anyway. Ahh, here's the finding. I'll probably read all this now and find out I'm wrong :)

It should be noted that in the US, one couldn't sue someone that simply downloaded the song. Obtaining a copy is not infringement, copying is. Case-law has already pretty much covered that the upload portion of the equation is infringing, but the download is not (nor is serializing the download from RAM to disk).

+4, Informative? No, -1 Bullshit. I quote A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.:

"We agree that plaintiffs have shown that Napster users infringe at least two of the copyright holders exclusive rights: the rights of reproduction, 106(1); and distribution, 106(3). Napster users who upload file names to the search index for others to copy violate plaintiffs distribution rights. Napster users who download files containing copyrighted music violate plaintiffs reproduction rights."

That is a 2001 case from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Unless you got a conflicting opinion from the Supreme court (or at the very least other circuits) I call bullshit on you.

Take it from a lawyer in Missouri -- the parent post is correct. Federal and state court systems are separate. The U.S. District Courts are federal courts (as are the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Courts of Appeals). The District Courts are the trial courts for the federal court system. Their terrories typically are all or part of the state where the court sits. Missouri has two U.S. District Courts -- the Eastern District (in Saint Louis) and the Western District (in Kansas City). All federal judges, including the U.S. District Court judges are appointed by the President of the United States and are not subject to retention votes. See http://www.uscourts.gov/index.html The State of Missouri has a Supreme Court, Courts of Appeals (in three districts, Eastern, Western, and Southern) and Circuit Courts (the trial courts); the judges of these courts are appointed by the Governor, and many are subject to retention votes under Missouri law. See http://www.courts.mo.gov/ The confusion is that there are several Limbaughs who are attorneys or judges in Missouri. The summary is wrong because it confuses the different Limbaughs who are judges in different courts.

Border search exception to the warrant requirement.

RTFO (read the filed opinion).

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/D4 958BAAF34B2292882571B500580F96/$file/0410648.pdf?o penelement

Funny that this article should come up right around the time the first federal judge addresses the question, and find that they do need to have reasonable suspicion.

law.com article
opinion

Of course, this is not the end of the matter, but highly relevant.

-puk

YouTube is very likely to be judged guilty of vicarious infringement if they do not find a way to keep copyrighted material from appearing in the first place.

and Chapter 9 is Bankruptcy. See for example http://www.uscourts.gov/bankruptcycourts/bankruptc ybasics/chapter11.html and http://www.uscourts.gov/bankruptcycourts/bankruptc ybasics/chapter9.html.

and Chapter 9 is Bankruptcy. See for example http://www.uscourts.gov/bankruptcycourts/bankruptc ybasics/chapter11.html and http://www.uscourts.gov/bankruptcycourts/bankruptc ybasics/chapter9.html.

Kocoras@ilnd.uscourts.gov

found from here: http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/JUDGE/KOCORAS/cpkpage .htm

HTH -q

In the event you would like to express your opinions to his Honor, Judge Charles P. Kocoras, taken from HERE.

Or perhaps set up a rule to forward your new Spam (said sarcastically because I know that makes one no better than the spamming scum -- but you can pretend).

In the event you would like to express your opinions to his Honor, Judge Charles P. Kocoras, taken from HERE.

Or perhaps set up a rule to forward your new Spam (said sarcastically because I know that makes one no better than the spamming scum -- but you can pretend).

See his page here. Opens in a new window.

Scroll down the page. There is an address listed as Proposed_Order_Kocoras@ilnd.uscourts.gov. Whether or not he actually sees these himself or if these are reviewed first is anyone's guess.

There are also phone numbers listed at the top of the page.

The information is there. I take no responsibility for what anyone does with it. Hopefully if anyone here does email or phone, they'll be mature. Doing otherwise won't help Spamhaus.

"The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ordered Wednesday that Spamhaus must pay $11,715,000 in damages to e360insight and its chief, David Linhardt, who sued the U.K.-based organization earlier this year over blacklisting.

Well, the court has granted an injunction against the secret program ("TSA," heh).

According to the Guardian, the NSA plans to appeal, but that doesn't keep the injunction from taking effect. But the NSA has asked for a stay until it has appealed, and the ACLU has agreed to that.

So, despite the injunction, the program continues, and everyone seems okay with that.

But if the NSA does not win its appeal, the injunction really takes effect, right? The injunction orders all NSA employees, and everyone else helping the NSA, to stop using the program and doing wiretaps. If they don't, they (each?) face contempt of court charges, according to Wikipedia. I'm guessing criminal contempt of court, rather than civil.

But I don't see where it is directed that the program actually be removed from the books, or that the program cease being funded. I suppose some Executive branch housekeeping function will eventually remove it?

We must first note that the Office of the Chief Executive has itself been created, with its powers, by the Constitution. There are no hereditary Kings in America and no powers not created by the Constitution. So all "inherent powers" must derive from that Constitution.

Indeed, since Ex Parte Milligan, we have been taught that the "Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace. . . ." Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120 (1866).

quote:

Most of the case documents are not publicly available at this point, and the suit was not highly publicised until now, so it's hard to find any real detail on the charges involved.

For the amount of legal coverage Ars has been producing lately, you should at least have some basic knowledge on how to do some fact-checking in this environment. Any action and its related documents, unless sealed, that are initiated in a Federal Court (as the motion indicates "United States District Court - Eastern District of Michigan") are public. That means that you, me, or anyone with an account with PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records) may find out this information. So instead of firing up google and saying conclusively that the documents "are not publicly available," use some of your subscription funds or ad-revenue to get yourself a PACER account and do some fact-checking. It's easy to use and cheap ($0.08/page, $0.08/search) -- tons cheaper than Westlaw or Lexis.

I did not subscribe to Ars for lazy journalism; if I wanted that I'd go to slashdot.

Here's some of the docket history (easily obtained from PACER searching for "Scantlebury, Larry"), which I downloaded and hosted. For example, take a look at the copyright report which shows what studio holds the copyrights to the materials that were, presumably, found shared by the defendant's IP on a P2P network.

• 11/17/2005 COMPLAINT filed by BMG Music, Arista Records, L. L. C., Capitol Records, Incorporated, Atlantic Recording Corporation, Warner Brothers Records Incorporated, Sony BMG Music Entertainment, and UMG Recordings, Incorporated against Larry Scantlebury; Receipt No: 5870 AA - Fee: $ 250. (Attachments: # 1 Document Continuation # 2 Document Continuation)(JJoh, ) (Entered: 11/17/2005)
• 11/17/2005 COPYRIGHT Report Sent To Washington (JJoh, ) (Entered: 11/17/2005)
• 11/17/2005 STATEMENT of DISCLOSURE of CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS and FINANCIAL INTEREST by BMG Music, Arista Records, L. L. C., Capitol Records, Incorporated, Atlantic Recording Corporation, Warner Brothers Records Incorporated, Sony BMG Music Entertainment, and UMG Recordings, Incorporated.(JJoh, ) (Entered: 11/17/2005)
• 02/07/2006 NOTICE of Appearance in Pro Per by Larry Scantlebury. (JJoh, ) (Entered: 02/08/2006)
• 03/06/2006 ANSWER to Complaint with Jury Demand by Larry Scantlebury.(KGeha, ) (Entered: 03/06/2006)
• 03/15/2006 PROPOSED SCHEDULING ORDER: Final Pretrial Conference set for 12/14/2006 10:30 AM before Honorable Anna Diggs Taylor. Settlement Conference set for 12/14/2006 10:30 AM before Honorable Anna Diggs Taylor. Jury Trial set for 1/23/2007 09:00 AM before Honorable Anna Diggs Taylor. Dispositive Motion Cut-off set for 10/2/2006. Discovery due by 7/31/2006. Signed by Honorable Anna Diggs Taylor. (Refer to image for additional dates)(JCurr, ) (Entered: 03/15/2006)
• 03/28/2006 NOTICE by BMG Music, Arista Records, L. L. C., Capitol Records, Incorporated, Atlantic Recording Corporation, Warner Brothers Records Incorporated, Sony BMG Music Entertainment, UMG Recordings, Incorporated to Modify Scheduling Order (Krichbaum, Matthew) (Entered: 03/28/2006)
• 04/07/2006 ORDER to Extend Time to File Motions to Add Parties re 7 Notice filed by Plaintiffs. Deadline set for 6/15/2006. Signed by Honorable Anna Diggs Taylor. (JCurr, ) (Entered: 04/07/2006)
• 05/04/2006 NOTICE of Withdrawal of Attorney Jonathan D. Rowe by BMG Music, Arista Records, L. L. C., Capitol Records, Incorporated, Atlantic Recording Cor

They are public servants in the end. If you have a problem, raise it at an open forum for the community. If no one listens, educate them until your fingers bleed or find someone who can do it with/for you.

However, I fear this nation's apathy has got the better of us to the point where we don't know what's no longer right or wrong. So much is obscured by agenda that one can pretty much get away with anything when it's in their favor. What happened to: "this government of the people, by the people, for the people" Abraham Lincoln

One last thing. If someone wanted to use that photo for a vendeta they would first have to identify themselves to get that information, therefore incriminating themselves. Considering legal fees and other expenses I doubt anyone would want to make things worse for themselves not to mention an attempt of acting out a federal crime. To get access to a photo of the cops that arrested them seems foolish when they could just get a copy of the arrest warrant listing the names of the officers involved in the arrest. Any legal action is recorded and obtainable by the public. Go to http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/ or your local city hall and pay the fee to get a copy of it.

The F***ing Opinion, for those that don't know acronyms, can be found on this page. Case Number 1:06-cv-2837.

http://www.aci.net/KALLISTE/whodblat.htm

From the LA Times - 1/30/1997

"WASHINGTON--The Clinton administration, acting at the direction of the president and first lady, created a massive computer data system with federal funds in 1994 to keep tabs on as many as 350,000 people, including large political donors, Democratic campaign workers and visitors to the White House."...

Privacy, Schmivacy.

Google WhoDB if you want to know more.

Like how Sheryl Hall (the person reponsible for the develpment of the WhoDB) was fired at the direction of Hillary Clinton when she refused to allow the system to be modified and accessed to accommodate illegal purposes related to Democratic Party fund raising activities....

Official court document:
http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/992665.P .pdf

http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/05 D0847P.pdf
triggers download of the court's decision allowing a private citizen to videotape state troopers he believed were conducting truck inspections in an unsafe manner. He was arrested by the cops for taping them, fined for harrassment, and continued to tape at a later date.

The defendant claimed that he had the right to tape their activities and to speak out on issues of public concern under the First Amendment. The federal court found the defendant was protected by the First Amendment as he videotaped the police. The court also found he was arrested without probable cause. The court awarded him actual damages of $35,000 payable by the troopers jointly for violation of his First Amendment rights and $2,000 from each cop for punitive damages.