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Evoting in India, Maryland
Anonymous Coward writes "EVMs are back in the news again. The BBC is reporting on the use of over a million Electronic Voting Machines (EVM) in India for Parliamentary elections in April. With a billion people and an electorate of 668 million, it is by far the largest democratic election exercise in the world. A picture of an EVM is provided." And Kierthos writes "An article on Yahoo! News mentions that Maryland's voting terminals will be wrapped in tamper proof tape, which 'just protects that malicious code physically', according to computer scientist Avi Rubin. Also mentioned are California's ongoing system of e-voting, as well as a point on whether Diebold should be banned in California after using uncertified software in last October's election."
If the "tamper proof" tape is what I think it is, that would only show if someone broke the seal. If this happens, does that mean all votes on that machine are thrown out as unreliable? That sure creates the possibility of someone, not liking how pre-election polls are showing their favored candidate, intentionally breaking the seal to throw a wrench as it were into the election. I must be missing something there.....
As far as the overall debate on e-voting, I like how they do it here in Alaska. It's the old "fill in the bubble" tests like you used to take in school. You fill in the bubble on the ballot, which the ballot itself is very well laid out, then when you're done you feed the ballot into an electronic counter which keeps a tally there on the spot. When the polls close, an election worker connects the machine to a phone line, the machine then dials out and reports the results for that precinct. Results are all in w/in ~2-3 hours of the polls closing, and there is defiantly a paper trail that can be followed, if need be.
Oh riiighht. All you have to do to prevent tampering with an on-line computer is to "wrap it in tamper-proof tape." Sure. Uh huh.
Everybody talks about electronic vote - just look at Brazil. I'm 30 years old, have been voting for 12, and have never voted on paper. They've been doing this for a long long time there, and did so in the last presidential election 2 years ago.
t acao_na_urna_ele.htm
This is how we vote in Brazil (google translate from portuguese):
http://www.tre-mg.gov.br/eleicoes/simulacao_de_vo
Somehow, none of the articles ever mention that the Wisconsin State Elections Board decertified unverifiable touchscreen systems after I convinced them a year ago. Too far ahead of the curve, I guess.
The Executive Director's report
Ben Masel: 51,282 votes for US Senate in the Wisconsin Democratic Primary
...everything's secure when you use Duct Tape!
Each party has a symbol e.g. Elephant, Lotus, wheel etc. If you want to vote for the ruling BJP, you press the button next to the Lotus. That's how they have electronic voting even with the illiteracy problem.
After everything we've heard about Diebold in the past few months - thier ties to Bush, uncertified software, etc - does anyone really trust them to accurately count and record the results of the votes?
Maybe the states that are still using Diebold machines know something I don't, but I really don't see why you'd want to take such a risk with something as important as voting.
Twenties Retirement
This provides identical results at greatly reduced cost and time.
In the Netherland we already do it for years.. What's so new about this?
http://www.congress.com/
We need to think carefully about this tech but we also need to embrace it. We already let automation run our reactors, manager all of our money, keep us from running into each other at intersections, etc.
Going a few links into that site, we find a list of how each person voted on roll call votes at http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2004/index.asp
(ironically enough, the list is as tallied by the electronic voting machine)
Twenties Retirement
I wonder how long it will take this to become politicized as "those Indians are stealing our jobs, now they are trying to teach us how to run a democracy".
[Set Cain on fire and steal his lute.]
1) A custom OS WILL have bugs. All new software does. Do you want to vote on buggy software?
2) Part of the outcry (at least here) against e-voting is exactly that - that nobody can see the source, which means we have no way of knowing if it's correct, if it has backdoors, etc.
3) Nothing is 100%, expecially when people are involved.
Twenties Retirement
Who's to say the source doesn't contains election-rigging code, and locking it up so no one can review it. Even if it was "open source", someone at each poll location would have to review the source and compile it there in front of a few officials just to make sure no one loads a malicious binary. That may not even prevent a code snippet:
while(1)
{
voteRepublican();
}
from being sneaked in to the source undetected.
$cat
I'm impressed by the fact that they clearly have technically literate judges in India. As a mere engineer, I would be very hesitant to proclaim an electronic system tamper-proof. Clearly Indian judges are experts in electronics, cryptography and the law. Very impressive.
flossie
Write now. Defend liberty
They should know that there's no such thing as "tamper proof" anyway! Only "tamper resistant".
- Murphy's Corollary: - It is impossible to make things foolproof because fools are so ingenious.
And we all know that bringing the deadline forward to meet changing customer requirements is the best possible way of ensuring that software is bug free ...
flossie
Write now. Defend liberty
The specs for the Indian EVM. This is definitely going to be the most widely deployed and used e-voting machine in the history of mankind. Seems pretty secure, except for the lack of a paper trail. But with 600 million eligible voters, I guess the lack of a paper trail means a lot of forests have been saved. Besides most attacks against the election system tend to be pretty unsophisticated , ie, boot-capturing and voter initimidation.
Looks like this machine will definitely go a long way in ensuring the fairness of Indian elections. Maybe I'll even vote next time.
more about me
Gerrymandering? (More on this via google)
Recently the election board or whoever was in charge of all that had at least one operatiopn recruiting tech people to get these things in shape and deployed. I wouldn't touch it with someone elses ten foot pole. Their whole opration seemed to be on a very last minute frame of mind. They were using timelines that gave only a few days from date of hire (date of job posting actually) to setting up machines in the field. I got no indication that any sort of security checks were being done on these people, and while I'm not a fan of adding more security clearance required jobs, should just any shmoe be able to get one of these jobs without being checked out? Seems fairly untrustworthy to me, and from my perspective, I would not want to be the one who signed off on a machine where something went squirrely.
And whats so difficult about having a printed voter verifiable receipt anyway?
I was in a Maryland high school the other day, and there was a pile of black containers labeled "Diebold" addressed to the voting board, sitting unattended in the cafeteria.
Each case was held closed by a wire lockout, available only to those elite groups who receive electrical supply catalogs.
I of course chose not to mess with them. Any come-from-behind victory I make on Tuesday will be purely coincidental.
I am interested in setting up a panel in NYC (New York, New York, USA) somewhere between July 9 and July 11.
:
Some topics that color my view of e-voting systems briefly follow
My concern is that any system be appropriately thought out, formally and precisely defined, using rigidly designed systems (not necessarily off-the-shelf), made to precisely and verifiably conduct voting tansactions, without being able to disclose, leak, or bleed any information that is not supposed to escape the system.
The Johns Hopkins study is an excellent reference and resource on the issues that have to be addressed.
I am personally interested in setting up a panel in New York in Mid-July (not much - just about an hour to an hour and-a-half), but at an interesting venue. I am not offering funding, but there could be some visibility.
I would welcome hearing from anyone who is doing interesting work in this area - in the US or overseas, that would be interested in participating on such a panel, to include related topics on technology-and-democracy.
Thank you,
Sam Nitzberg
sam@iamsam.com
http://www.iamsam.com
I don't think online voting is a good idea, not necessary for security reasons but for political reasons. If voting is as easy as "pointing and clicking", we are going to get a lot more votes from people who have done little to nothing to follow the election. If someone is willing to register to vote and then take time from their busy day to actually vote, it's much more likely that they've at least studied a little about the candidates; e.g. they aren't just randomly at their computer clicking on a "Vote Now!" link.
See my site on the issue in Canada, including international reports: Paper Vote Canada.
Everyone interested in this issue should take a look at the VerifiedVoting Website.
Electronic voting needs to solve two problems: Guarantee that every vote is counted exactly and guarantee that everyone can trust that result.
As Schneier points out, there can be no trust without a paper trail for verification. So it is quite important to support legislation mandating such a paper trail.
Lenz Blog
Before diving in to what kind of design we should be using, I think some time needs to be spend deciding the design parameters. The solution should probably:
The Nevada Gaming Board has been cited as a good example of the kind of extremely paranoid testing and auditing that needs to go into a system this important. However, for a voting system we've added some new and challenging criteria- anonymity, ease of use, and fairness. None of these individually are difficult, but when combined with the testabilty and auditability become particularly challenging. How do you ensure that individual votes are getting properly registered while still maintaining the anonymity of the votes?
Personally, I don't see how all of these criteria can be met in a "remote" (e.g. web) voting system. However, I think these problems are all solvable with our current technology, if we are careful. In fact, I think that if a system were designed carefully, we could even come up with a system where we can, if necessary, confirm (validate) a region or even nation's voting results by storing individual voting results on voter-owned smart cards.
Assume we set up a system where every voter is issued a voting smart card that they retain possession over. When you go in to vote you stick your smart card in the voting machine. You then vote, and it records your choices on the card. Audits could then take place after an election by having randomly selected voters come in and stick their smart cards into a seperate vote validation system that retallies the results and allows voters to confirm their vote selection. Using statistics, you can set a threshold for when the error level is too suspiciously high, and require revotes in the regions with anomalous results. By using different vendors to provide the voting machines, smart cards, and vote auditing system, you can greatly increase your assurance that no entity has tampered with the voting results. Apart from the influences of the media... and politicians... and education system... and religions.....
On second thought, forget the whole thing. :)
This is a motivation issue.
The problem is that everyone in the system has incentives to distort the vote some way. You should evaluate any proposed technology by how much easier or harder it makes miscounting the vote.
Electronic voting. Lemme see. No paper trail. Software that nobody audited. Internal data and communication that nobody admits to having access to. Does that sound easier or harder to get away with shenanigans with than paper voting?
The other things that you mention all have the huge advantage that the people who build the system aren't expected to have huge financial incentives (ie bribes) for messing up. Except for finance, where (in the USA at least) a legal system that makes any doubtful outcome be ruled in the customer's favour makes banks be very concerned about getting things right.
Unless you know what problem technology is supposed to solve for you, you can't hope to evaluate whether technology will have a chance of solving it. Electronic voting doesn't have a hope in hell of improving visibility and accountability in the system.
Although the Baltimore Sun, our local oracle, is strangely silent on the voting-systems aspect of the primary, the Maryland Board of Elections is not. They've developed a special website to inform the citizenry of how "Easy...Accurate...Secure" the new voting system will be.
Peruse the training film (wmd only), download a registration form, see a sample screen. Above all, don't miss the FAQ. My nomination for Best FAQ is:
Q: How do I know the system will work properly on Election Day?
A: Each piece of equipment is prepared for the election by election staff and a public test is held to verify this process. Before this process and after the public test is completed, all equipment is sealed and secured until being opened by a bi-partisan team of election judges in the polling location on Election Day.
In addition to the Website, we've been favored by bus posters, billboards, and even a few commercials on local cable.
I am oh, so pleased to see even more of my tax money being squandered on these systems--this time just to tell me how wonderful they will be. I'm going to vote when the polls open Tuesday (it is a Democratic and Republican primary here), then leave immediately for a trip. I feel sure other Maryland Slashdot readers will have volumes to say about the experience.
Anne
DUCT TAPE: The Election Supervisors' Secret Weapon
If it is a vote for an elected official, at least one can judge on what that person has said to them - via personal, radio, and TV appearences. Not perfect, but something.
What about other issues? What does an illertarte really know? At least the literate can read the text of a ballot measure [not that many do].
In the end, what is the value of an uninformed vote?
If radio/TV ads are as deceptive in high-illeteracey democracies such as India, as they are here in the US - it the perfect argument against illiterate voters.
I don't have an answer, most alternatives are also wrong. Just a question...
This issue is a bit more complicated than you think.
In the end, what is the value of an uninformed vote?
George W. Bush will be happy to tell you.
It's a parliamentary system. Voters don't vote for the George W. Bush equivalent. They vote for their local Member of Parliament, who could be a member of a political party (usually is), or an independent. They usually do that vote based on how that MP's been performing (he/she's supposed to take care of that constituency) and they know that very well. And at the end of the day, the party with a majority support in the lower house of parliament gets to govern. It works.
Dude,
It cannot be. If the guy/gal is smart enough to write 2 lines of C code he/she cannot be republican.
Cheers
Junk
It is because all people are equal. Cliche aside these people cannot read but they CAN SEE AND LISTEN. They go to meetings, candidates come by to see them and tell them what he/she would do if he/she was elected. They know what a party did when it was in government ...
Cheers
Junk
The Campaign for Verified Voting in Maryland has a website at www.truevotemd.org. If you're a Maryland voter or just want to show your support, go there and sign up. If you're going to vote on Tuesday in Maryland's primary, we're organizing a protest to demand paper ballots.
The problem in Maryland is that the officials at the State Board of Elections are in Diebold's pocket. Realize that San Diego and other California counties are getting voter-verified paper trail equipment from Diebold for free, despite paying only 60% as much for the machines as Maryland. Maryland also bought a much larger order. However, since the SBE officials won't go to bat Diebold is trying to charge big bucks for the VVPT. Diebold is also spending heavily in lobbying and contributing to the Maryland Delegates and State Senators who could pass legislation that would force a VVPT.
Some other good sites if you're interested in this topic:
www.verifiedvoting.org
www.blackboxvoting.org
--Paul
I live in maryland and i'm a unit judge for the election, unless the tape is something they've added in the last week it's not a state wide thing
India has been using the EVMs for about 7 years now. only that this time around, the number of machines deployed is going to be significantly higher than in previous years...
also, since the elections are held in multiple phases across the country, the machines get re-used.
Quebec (Canada) tried this in their 1995 referendum on trying to secede from Canada. Ballots were marked by hand and counted by hand. Each ballot had large circles labeled YES and NO. Only certain symbols were allowed (IIRC, they were an X, a check mark, a straight horizontal line, or filling in the circle completely). Anything else was to be considered "spoiled" (historically, an average of about 1% of ballots are spoiled, often by voters protesting what they see as a poor choice of candidates).
Some election officer took it upon himself to issue written instructions to his counters requiring them to be extremely picky in validating the symbols. For instance, if the check mark were drawn like a V (both strokes the same length), it was to be counted as spoiled. All the districts where he sent the instructions were ones which could be predicted to tilt toward the NO side. In some districts, as many as 12% of the ballots were disqualified.
According to a guy I knew who was an observer (parties get to have observers present at the counting), some counting rooms almost erupted into fistfights when observers loudly objected to the disqualifying of so many ballots.
The referendum lost, but only by a margin which was less than the estimated number of NO votes lost in this manner. (Not that that means anything, except to show how close things were.) The secessionist Quebec government "investigated," decided nothing was wrong, and spent most of their energies trying to sue a student group in Ontario for "illegally subsidizing" the NO campaign by bussing students to a pro-Canada rally in Montreal.
Election Commission of India is proposing Vote for nobody in this election.
Any idea how many democracies in the world give this option to the voters?
The 2000 Election was also the first presidential election in which Diebold machines were used. Florida's Velousa (sp?) County. When the initial results came in they were devastating -16,022 (yes that's a negative number) votes were cast for Al Gore. This massive deficit caused Gore to appear diasterously behind Bush in the polls. It was at this point in the night that Gore gave his first resignation speech.
Later on the "official" counts were reset and a (more belivable) set of (nonnegative) numbers came in from the county in question. Gore then retracted his resignation. However that resignation came back to haunt him during the court case because Kathrine Harris used it to argue that he had already qut the reace and wasn't entitled to a recount.
Notreably, the recounts took place in other counties as Velousa county's machines did not produce paper records and could not be verified.
See Bev Harris's Site Blackboxvoting.org for details. See here for data on Volusia county. See here for internal Diebold memos discussing the -16,022 problem, and see here for more general info on the 2000 election.