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British MoD Stunned By Massive Data Loss
Master of Transhuman writes "Seems like nobody can keep their data under wraps these days. On the heels of the World Bank piece about massive penetrations of their servers, the British Ministry of Defense has lost a hard drive with the personal details of 100,000 serving personnel in the British armed forces, and perhaps another 600,000 applicants. This comes on the heels of the MoD losing 658 of its laptops over the past four years and 26 flash drives holding confidential information. Apparently the MoD outsources this stuff to EDS, which is under fire for not being able to confirm that the data was or was not encrypted."
Hardly 3 hours since the last post on /. about
UK Govt wanting to spy.
No. EDS lost a hard-drive, belonging to the MoD. Had to get that in before the "Government is intrinsically incompetent" posse got here. EDS, a privately owned and run subsidiary of Hewlett-Packard, subcontracting to the MoD, were responsible for the security of this drive, and they, not anyone at the MoD did the losing here.
Athletic Scholarships to universities make as much sense as academic scholarships to sports teams.
As if that question makes an appreciable difference. Encrypted or not, data loss is data loss. It's bad security practice. Having the data encrypted will do just a tiny bit to save face, but it will hardly stop anyone who wants in.
Admit it. You post strawman arguments as AC so you get modded Insightful for refuting them, rather than Troll
Enough said.
I can confirm that the data was or was not encrypted.
Fleur de Sel
What they fail to say is that this hard drive will self destruct in 5 seconds. 4 3 2 1.............
this is the reason why the brits have to spy more....'cuz it's about quantity.....if u have more data coming in.....than that is going out (aka losing)...then u'r golden.
(I don't think it's a coincidence that this was posted after the bit about the brits needing to spy more)
Update from MOD http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/DefencePolicyAndBusiness/ModIssuesUpdateOnMissingEdsHardDisk.htm
The only time I have ever lost a device is when I was mugged and my phones were taken from me and I'm just any other person.
It should be interesting to see what the ratio of laptops lost to all laptops provided is. Maybe this cynicism is because I live in India where corruption is rampant and entire flyovers can be 'lost', but I'm a bit suspicious about this whole thing.
Also, if they're losing laptops with information at such a high rate, at what rate are they losing paper files? Surely it's harder to keep track of the 20 binders with 100 sheets in them than it is to keep track of one hard drive?
I find it hard to believe that these people are really that incompetent. Hanlon's Razor doesn't always apply.
It wasn't.
Quite who EDS are sleeping with in the Blair/Brown government I don't know but why they keep getting contracts which they persistently fall to deliver on time and on cost i do not know.
...of why we shouldn't be outsourcing critical/sensitive data handling. Yes, Government departments can cock-up enough without external help, but so many of these data loss issues at the moment seem to be the fault of a private company they've outsourced to.
Also, I worry about the outsourcing of anything relating to our Country's security. When you give the job to the lowest bidder, what can you expect but a barely adequate service?
I wonder if it is technically possible to create a system that is able to ensure that data are deleted after a certain time. (e.g. application forms for companies, ISP data, surveillance recordings, ...) in a form that outsiders can confirm it. So that you can be sure there aren't any copies around either.
NB: The message above might reflect my opinion right now, but not necessarily tomorrow or next year.
Information wants to be free.
Don't fight for your country, if your country does not fight for you.
Cause => Effect
Just because you're paranoid doesn't mean there isn't an invisible demon about to eat your face
.. or haven't you used a Zune? (wise move if you didn't btw).
No, I'm not kidding. I have seen MS trying to sell the MoD DRM, casually omitting answers to interesting questions like who would have the root key and how this would stand up in theatre where almost anything can fail and a lack of information can result in blue on blue (aka fratricide).
You could also promise to put any further perpetrators and their directors in stocks on the nearest square and made it compulsory for every object thrown at them to either stink or have been rotting for days. Or both. Nothing else seems to help.
Nothing new here, EDS has been going from bad to worse for the better part of two decades.
They're a high gloss outfit where image is all (hence beloved by PHBs), with little interest in technical competence nor care of workforce or of customers. As long as the money is rolling in and they get their colossal markup, it's all smart ties and "Yes sir", while the substance can go to the dogs for all they care.
I'm not at all surprised by this latest event, it's par for the course for EDS.
Rather unfortunate to place this directly above the article on the front page saying that the British Government needs more spies... :)
THE HONOUR OF THE KNIGHTS - CC Licensed Sci-Fi Novel
No matter how much they spend on security most of the times its PEBKAC that does the trick... Like here when a cop forgot his USB stick in an Internet cafe containing PDFs of reports about spying certain people and political groups...Of course someone found it and they spread all over the web... There are numerous examples of situations like this.Security systems are the least responsible for such data losses I guess...
Chuck every hard drive, pen drive, CD, and paper file the government has into a hole, add thermite, and break out the marshmellows.
If someone were to push the spooks and bureaucrats who collected the data into such a fire, I wouldn't object too much either.
If we can put a man on the moon, why can't we shoot people for Apollo-related non-sequiturs?
And specific knowledge begets its own.
Isn't it obvious?
So can anybody explain me why they are storing this kind of data on a "portable hard disk drive"? (I mean, it sounds like a laptop 2.5" drive). Is this kind of a default high security policy. I mean, I always thought, that this kind of data should be on some central secure servers and accessed through some secure forms. Am I missing something here?
Interesting, the MoD site was created with "Microsoft Visual Studio 7.0". Well, that sure is totally unrelated anyway.
Those responsible will be reassigned to the domestic surveillance project!
I love the way this is the next story along from:
'UK Government Says More Spying Needed'
so who do you think has the hard drive?
That first sentence may be the most insightful thing I've read in a week.
Not really. Where I work, any laptop connected to the network is checked at every connection for the presence of active full disk encryption software. If it isn't found (which can happen when computers are being built and the encryption installation hasn't been completed) then an immediate alert is sent to the support staff nearest the machine. In response to that alert, the machine must be encrypted or seized immediately. We're talking same-day action, here, with the consequence of inaction being that someone gets fired.
The result is that when we lose (usually through theft but the method is unimportant in this context) a laptop, we can immediately report that said laptop was fully encrypted and no data was lost or is at risk.
If we need to let a contractor on our network, we set up one of our laptops to meet all security requirements and lend that hardware to the contractor. No contractor is allowed to put their machine on our network.
Finally, when data is written to removable media, it's encrypted. We run a software package (Guardian Edge) that forces all writes to removable media to be encrypted. It's a pain sometimes, but it's the least we can do to keep the publics private data safe.
Frankly, I'm shocked that the MOD would accept less stringent practices on the part of contractors. I know we don't.
When I was in the army people who screwed up like this had accidents.
It made the army and the species stronger.
All of the recent data catastrophes seem to be happening in Britain?
And in the face of this, the UK government is upping the surveillance, too. "Don't worry, nobody except us is ever going to see your private data. You can trust us."
"Slashdot is U.S.-centric. We readily admit this, and really don't see it as a problem. Slashdot is run by Americans, after all, and the vast majority of our readership is in the U.S. We're certainly not opposed to doing more international stories, but only if we're slagging off other countries. Positive stories about anywhere other than the US are frowned upon."
The MOD must demand from it's subcontractors a certain level of service, and be responsible for it. "Well it wasn't our fault, it was that guy" doesn't cut it when it comes to state secrets.
Get better subcontractors next time or DIY, retards.
3laws: No freebies, no backsies, GTFO.
Those of us that remember the British cars and motor cycles of years gone by know the absence of leaks had to be due to a dry sump, a seized engine is waiting when no leak is discernible.
With the automotive industry all but gone from the UK this national obsession with making things leak has been taken to a new industry.
They know what they're doing.
"The likes of Facebook and WhatsApp are free to those whose privacy is of zero value."
It strikes me that the wonderful thing about outsourcing government, from government administration's standpoint, is that nobody is ever really responsible. The contractors can say government didn't properly communicate with them, oversee the operation, or allocate adequate funding. Government can claim that they did and it's the contractor's fault. Perfect. Everybody's happy. Except for the people who are supposed to be served, of course.
From TFA:
"The portable drive contains the names, addresses, passport numbers, dates of birth and driving licence details of around 100,000 serving personnel across the Army, Royal Navy and RAF, plus their next-of-kin details. "
Wow. Just... wow.
The person who finds this and wants to exploit it would become unimaginably rich on stolen identities for pretty much the rest of their lives. I suppose if the MoD have a record of exactly who's details were on the disk, they could re-issue things like national insurance numbers and driving licences to prevent that, but even then the possibilities for other avenues of exploitation using this information would be huge (next of kin, for pity's sake!!).
Data like this needs to be treated as if it were nuclear waste or a volatile explosive mixture. It would be just about OK to have a list of 100,000 driving licence numbers if these were kept physically separate from, say, names and addresses (eg keying them on a one-time ID), but when certain classes of data are kept TOGETHER like this, it should be every right-thinking person's reaction to scream the house down in panic.
We have to assume that at some point, all data will leak out somewhere. All we can do is to to ensure than when it does, it's not actionable. Oh, and by the way - you can forget encryption. People don't understand it and in most cases those who steal data will steal or otherwise obtain the keys as well.
"And the meaning of words; when they cease to function; when will it start worrying you?"
Frank Shoemaker would call this noise.
This:
is one of the best questions I've ever seen posted on Slashdot. With an election looming, it's a question that every voter should ask themselves. Whoever modded it flamebait is a dufus.
Loss happens, especially portable devices. Question is; are the drives encrypted?
I beginning to wonder if this is deliberate on EDS's part. In the U.S. Navy NMCI contract, they have lost drives and created vast security stand-down efforts while trying to create one big happy Navy network, which, btw, has resulted in a net increase in Networks and domains rather than the intended reduction.
I'm starting to believe this is part of something else.
Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it everywhere, diagnosing it incorrectly and applying the wrong fix.
"The portable drive contains the names, addresses, passport numbers, dates of birth and driving licence details of around 100,000 serving personnel across the Army, Royal Navy and RAF, plus their next-of-kin details. "
Data like this needs to be treated as if it were nuclear waste or a volatile explosive mixture. It would be just about OK to have a list of 100,000 driving licence numbers if these were kept physically separate from, say, names and addresses (eg keying them on a one-time ID), but when certain classes of data are kept TOGETHER like this, it should be every right-thinking person's reaction to scream the house down in panic.
There is a more fundermental problem here in that just because it is possible to combine information together does not mean that doing so is sensible.
e.g. the Army, Navy and Air Force are separate services. So it makes little sense to combine them into one? Do the driving licence and passport details even need to be there in the first place?
UK Government Says More Spying Needed Sat Oct 11, '08 01:32 AM
from the need-to-make-up-for-the-losses dept
--
make install -not war
Larry Wall wouldn't.
It's true I tell you, feller at work's next door neighbour read it in the paper.
This is one of many EDS screwups. Last year they printed Social Security numbers on a mass mailing to 147K State of Wisconsin taxpayers, 6 months later they did the same thing to 440K Wisconsin residents in violation of the HIPPA act. Yet no prosecution for either violation, must have been alot of political grease applied.
BTW the Civil Service preference for large incompetent foreign IT companies with big entertainment budgets over small efficient local ones is well known. Exposing the uselessness of companies like EDS and Capita has a sub-agenda; let's get our IT back.
From scarped cliff or quarried stone she cries "A thousand types are gone, I care for nothing, no not one."
What? Do you really believe a politician made the decision on whom to outsource data management too?
Are you familiar with the concept of a civil service at all? Do you know who runs the day-to-day operations for the MoD?
Clue: Decisions like "Which subcontractor should we hire" are not made by the Secretary of State for Defence.
That's not the main point, I'd suggest the following are key:
1. The data/security paradigm changes when data are moved from hard/paper copy to a machine-readable form. Most people still think of security and access in paper-based terms, not that of electronic data which is a very different animal. Had the records been stored on traditional paper-based record systems then there would have been no breach of security.
2. Data in electronic form acquires a range of new and powerful properties when compared with that of the same records stored on hardcopy/paper. For example, stealing 600,000 plus paper-based records would be nigh on impossible, but this electronic 'loss' is not even theft as far as we know--just incompetence and mishandling. Those handling or using this data do not understand this differences between the electronic data and hard copy paradigms (especially a problem in government bureaucracies). Ipso facto, if they did then this data security breach would not have happened. Unfortunately, this lack of understanding is not unique; even those in the data processing/security game have a very poorly understanding of the problem: for they usually concentrate on specific security issues and technicalities, not why or whether certain facts or information should or should not be committed to electronic storage, or what the implications are if the data falls into unwanted hands.
3. It is questionable whether certain forms of sensitive data should actually be transferred into an electronic format, especially if bound into fully collated databases (as here). If electronic records are absolutely essential then the data can be held in multiple parts in distributed databases--one part alone being useless without others. (The fact that this data is not secured and managed in such a way that its loss would be trivial ought to be of great concern. Computer science just hasn't evolved sufficiently to always guarantee security and simultaneously make it easy and foolproof to implement: only electronic encode that which is essential.)
4. Governments, control freaks and penny-pinching accountants etc.--those with a police state mentality--want all records conveniently to hand, often for very questionable reasons including very little practical justification or need. In this instance, not only have they collected and collated vast amounts of sensitive personal data and stored it in an easily 'losable' form but the very act of doing so is one of utter irresponsibility. That such data and on such a grand scale has the potential to be--and has been 'lost' [or stolen etc.] in this way ought to be treated as an act of malfeasance.
4.1 Essentially, what has happened here is that an act of treason has been committed against the 'collective of citizens' [who constitute part of the state]--those who gave their personal data on the understanding that their government would keep it secure but who failed though negligence, inter alia.
4.2 There's little doubt that this incident will be hushed up, and there will be an scapegoat or two or possibly not even that. Moreover, I'll bet it happens again sometime soon, remember this is not the first of such incidents. With Britain going to a universal ID card what would happen if Al-Qaeda or similar organization were to ever get such a file? Even a friendly power such as the USA would be only too happy to snap up such valuable data, no questions asked.
5. Whether relevant or not, Governments, bureaucrats
I'd suggest there are a number of key issues to keep in mind when considering the massive loss of data by British MoD. Here's a few to begin with:
1. The data/security paradigm changes when data are moved from hard/paper copy to a machine-readable form. Most people still think of security and access in paper-based terms, not that of electronic data which is a very different animal. Had the records been stored on traditional paper-based record systems then there would have been no breach of security.
2. Data in electronic form acquires a range of new and powerful properties when compared with that of the same records stored on hardcopy/paper. For example, stealing 600,000 plus paper-based records would be nigh on impossible, but this electronic 'loss' is not even theft as far as we know--just incompetence and mishandling. Those handling or using this data do not understand this differences between the electronic data and hard copy paradigms (especially a problem in government bureaucracies). Ipso facto, if they did then this data security breach would not have happened. Unfortunately, this lack of understanding is not unique; even those in the data processing/security game have a very poorly understanding of the problem: for they usually concentrate on specific security issues and technicalities, not why or whether certain facts or information should or should not be committed to electronic storage, or what the implications are if the data falls into unwanted hands.
3. It is questionable whether certain forms of sensitive data should actually be transferred into an electronic format, especially if bound into fully collated databases (as here). If electronic records are absolutely essential then the data can be held in multiple parts in distributed databases--one part alone being useless without others. (The fact that this data is not secured and managed in such a way that its loss would be trivial ought to be of great concern. Computer science just hasn't evolved sufficiently to always guarantee security and simultaneously make it easy and foolproof to implement: only electronic encode that which is essential.)
4. Governments, control freaks and penny-pinching accountants etc.--those with a police state mentality--want all records conveniently to hand, often for very questionable reasons including very little practical justification or need. In this instance, not only have they collected and collated vast amounts of sensitive personal data and stored it in an easily 'losable' form but the very act of doing so is one of utter irresponsibility. That such data and on such a grand scale has the potential to be--and has been 'lost' [or stolen etc.] in this way ought to be treated as an act of malfeasance.
4.1 Essentially, what has happened here is that an act of treason has been committed against the 'collective of citizens' [who constitute part of the state]--those who gave their personal data on the understanding that their government would keep it secure but who failed though negligence, inter alia.
4.2 There's little doubt that this incident will be hushed up, and there will be an scapegoat or two or possibly not even that. Moreover, I'll bet it happens again sometime soon, remember this is not the first of such incidents. With Britain going to a universal ID card what would happen if Al-Qaeda or similar organization were to ever get such a file? Even a friendly power such as the USA would be only too happy to snap up such valuable data, no questions asked.
5. Whether relevant or not, Governments, bureaucrats and security services have a Nazi-like obsession in collecting vast amounts of data on citizens and there is no obligations on those collecting it to even tell citizens that they are doing so let alone let the citizen see or review the data. Whether storing so much detail about citizens in vulnerable electronic format (such as in single but comprehensive databases) is warranted o