Look-Alike Tubes Lead To Hospital Deaths
Hugh Pickens writes "In hospitals around the country, nurses connect and disconnect interchangeable clear plastic tubing sticking out of patients' bodies to deliver or extract medicine, nutrition, fluids, gases or blood — sometimes with deadly consequences. Tubes intended to inflate blood-pressure cuffs have been connected to intravenous lines leading to deadly air embolisms, intravenous fluids have been connected to tubes intended to deliver oxygen, leading to suffocation, and in 2006 a nurse at in Wisconsin mistakenly put a spinal anesthetic into a vein, killing 16-year-old who was giving birth. 'Nurses should not have to work in an environment where it is even possible to make that kind of mistake,' says Nancy Pratt, a vocal advocate for changing the system. Critics say the tubing problem, which has gone on for decades, is an example of how the FDA fails to protect the public. 'FDA could fix this tubing problem tomorrow, but because the agency is so worried about making industry happy, people continue to die,' says Dr. Robert Smith."
This reminds me of the sort of problem that Michael Cohen addressed in a slightly different medical context (winning a MacArthur Foundation grant) a few years ago.
..that's just a series of tubes, then
Donte Alistair Anderson Roberts - hi son!
Karma: Chameleon
Color codes and making it impossible for two of the wrong type of 'tubes' to ever be connected. size/shape/connector...
Send me my check now...
We should have the tubes manufactured by the same companies that produce battery chargers for mobile phones. Problem solved!
My first program:
Hell Segmentation fault
No?
On the other side of the coin...
I could see such a system leading to patient deaths because of their complicated color system. If a locking head needs to attach to a patient line now, i'm sure that comparing colors could add unneeded time to compare and contrast a color scheme.
I guess the real question is: What do nurses think?
“This is a deadly design failure in health care,” said Debora Simmons, a registered nurse at the University of Texas Health Science Center who studies medical errors. “Everybody has put out alerts about this, but nothing has happened from a regulatory standpoint.”
At least one nurse from TFA agrees that there is a problem to be solved. Who would know better than someone in the trenches?
"because the agency is so worried about making industry happy, people continue to die"
I say bullshit.
Industry would be more than happy to sell new tubes to every single hospital in the country !
How about using color codes?
Or incompatible sizes or connections?
Damn... this is so easy to fix.
In chemical industry, and in labs, color codes have been used for the last 15 millennia or something. It's completely standard. Just a sticker or some tape at both ends of a tube, indicating it can only be used for that gas or liquid. And in the case of non-standard liquids/gases, standard labels (you know, those with text on it) are used to indicate what it's used for, and what is in it.
Whatever has happened to personal responsibility? Why is this such a problem? If a nurse is doing their job, then they will follow the tubing back to the source to ensure that they are connecting the right ones. Why is this so hard? If you're a nurse at a station and you want to ensure that you have the correct tubes. Take a moment and label them yourselves if you are that busy.
Another poster stated that maybe color coding tubes would help, and I think this is a good idea, if the dyes don't cause problems in the tubing. My greater concern is that we have busy nurses asked to perform a lot of tasks and they usually get nothing but grief from patients, so they just want to get in get out and move on to the next person. Personally I've watched nurses double check tubelines and it takes all of 2 seconds. They are also tend to be the nurses who've been a nurse for more than a couple years.
Life takes interesting turns, but the most interest is when you're off the beaten path.
you would think the industry would be behind a massive tube upgrade programme - my guess it is just the usual lazy, incompetence we see every day across all sectors.
It sounds to me like if these people get their way, insted of a few incidents of some idiot nurse not paying attention and hooking up the wrong tube we'll get double (or more) the amount of deaths/injuries because they won't be able to find the right tube for the connection. Brilliant! Heres a simple solution, COLORCODE THE STUPID THINGS, a couple bucks of colored electrical tape and some new procedures would solve most of the problems.
Of course there is huge a cost if tubes for different purposes are incompatible with each other, not only at the vendor level, but also at the local level for acquisition and storage. And of course health care professionals will have to be trained to the point of automaticy to use the proper tubes for each purpose.
It may be that the solution is to simply hire more nurses and the like and to cut down on the overtime that lead to the mistake. Again, it will cost more on the front end for labor, but at least the lawsuits will decrease.
"She's a scientist and a lesbian. She's not going to let it slide." Orphan Black
Sounds like they're in need of a Poka-Yoke project.
These problems have been going on since at least the 1970s.
And:
Their deaths were among hundreds of deaths or serious injuries that researchers have traced to tube mix-ups.
Hundreds of deaths in the past 40 years doesnt sound like a really big problem.
My son has spent a lot of time in hospitals, he had a broviac catheter (venous) and during his frequent and long stays this has never been a problem. As a layman it was painfully obvious which tube went where.
A much larger issue, in my mind, was actually receiving the proper meds in the proper dose.
Color coding and incompatible connectors are probably good ideas. However, there is a serious issue that probably plays into problems like this. Nurses normally work 10-12 hour shifts. There is no way you are still on you "a-game" after working for the past 11 hours. As you tire, it is easy to start making simple mistakes like these. I'm surprised this hasn't been regulated already. I understand people want long shifts so they can have more days off, but this is probably not a field that should have the option.
From the excerpt above:
How can an operating room be made 100% safe? Nurses go to school to learn how to work in such an environemnt. If, after years of training and working in the field they can't be relied on to know what they are doing, then what was the point of all that expensive training?
If an operating room is to be brought down to the level that anyone can assist the doctor, then nurses are irrelevant - if every pill has to be a different color, shape or size, if every tube, connection, and device needs to be a size incompatible with anything else in the room, and if all the sharp pointy tools need to have safety guards, then what have we accomplished?
Medical mistakes happen, and they always will happen, because of the humans in the process - people have bad days, make mistakes, get tired, get bad instructions, etc - but I for one, am not ready to submit myself to a CNC-style surgical machine without a human operator controling the blade, dosing me with medications from a spreadsheet, or making diagnosis via an online questionaire - I want people in the process, mistakes and all. Besides, I think the number of preventable human errors looks huge, until you realize how many times things go right - for every procedure with tens or hundred of errors per year, I suspect there are thousands or tens of thousands of similar procedures that are performed without incident - daily.
How many times do nurses manage to find the right receptical for the hoses? Gather and dose the proper medication in the proper amount? On a global scale I suspect it is on the order of billions of times a week...
Ken
"killing a 16-year-old who was giving birth"
I bet that saved the state a lot in welfare payments.
Looks like the medical community should take a page from the computing industry. Or gas stations.
In recent years, computer cables work on one basic principle: if the plug fits in the jack, it should work. Or worst case, it shouldn't blow up. Didn't used to be like this -- remember ps/2 mouse/keyboard ports?
Gas stations work the same way: it's pretty much impossible to accidentally fill a gasoline car with diesel fuel, because the diesel filler tube is too large to fit in an unleaded tank's opening. (Doesn't work the other way around, of course, but diesel users are in the minority, and can be assumed to be paying attention.
Easy enough to do this with medical tubing. Make oxygen tubing always a specific diameter, tinted a specific color, and with a special fitting on the end that only plugs into oxygen-specific devices. Same with IV tubing, different diameter, different color, different fitting.
You don't even need the FDA to take charge to make this happen. It's not like the government regulated the USB spec, after all. All you need is a consortium of major medical equipment manufacturers to get together to agree on a standard. What incentive do they have to do this? Well, once they set a standard, EVERY HOSPITAL IN THE COUNTRY needs to buy all-new tubing, plus all the devices designed to connect to that tubing. Small manufacturers can make a fortune just selling backwards compatibility adapters.
The Connector Conspiracy. It's a beautiful thing.
Having all of the tubes be plain transparent plastic does present an issue. It's not a huge deal when a person just has one tube, such as an IV drip, but multiple tubes can get confusing. Think of the rat's nest of power plugs behind your computer desk or entertainment center, especially if all of the power cords are the same color 3-prong connections.
My first thought it to have pale shades of color for the different kinds of tubes. However that presents a problem because the color of a tube might obscure the compound a little since it's not as transparent. Plus there are only so many colors they could use without dealing with color-blindness or some other near-color issue (is this blue or purple). And lastly, since there are only so many colors they can use, then confusion can still occur and be worse if you're dealing with a pink fluid going through a pink tube... which is which.
The other thing I can think of is different kinds of connections/slots. However then you have an over-engineered tube instead of a plain cylinder-into-cylinder tube which is easier to maintain and doesn't need replacing as much.
So it's not a no-brainer fix, since the fixes themselves aren't perfect and introduce other issues.Though I agree, something more should be done since during emergency or stressful times even an experienced nurse can make a mistake if there are enough tubes around.
All places I fill up my car have colour coded hoses for lead-free petrol and diesel. Computers are colour coding sockets. Simple, and pretty fault tolerant (though remeber the colour blind).
And don't think it will fix everything. On an aircraft, a non-return valve in a fuel line had different threads on the two sides so that it could not be installed wrong - supposedly, Until some idiots get out the taps and retaps the socket to take it backwards, resulting in a crash. But it seems to be a cheap mechanism for a 98% solution, just requiring someone to take the lead.
Consciousness is an illusion caused by an excess of self consciousness.
It's called Poka-yoke from the Lean manufacturing world: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poka-yoke
Just this week - news in Sydney, chlorhexidine as an epidural, shudder the thought >.
http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/how-could-this-happen-hospital-blunder-turns-a-familys-joy-into-heartbreak-20100820-138xw.html
Human error it seems, not following correct procedure - and yeah, she's fucked up.
This is the definition of Murphy's law, right?
Make clips with RFID tags in them, and labels on them, which clip on to the tubes as soon as they're inserted into a patient. Put sensors in the things the tubes connect to, any time one of the RFID tags gets close enough to something it wasn't intended to be connected to, sound an alarm.
Wanna fight ? Bend over, stick your head up your ass, and fight for air.
Hmmm I wonder if this Dr. Robert Smith fellow has... The Cure... to such problems...?
Here is a very good book that covers many of the same issues. The human factor: revolutionizing the way people live with technology By Kim J. Vicente
At one hospital I know, a nurse gave a patient kaopectate intravenously.
In a bit of foot-in-mouth disease only I am capable of, one night I told this story at a party only to discover later that the hospital admin who'd been in charge at the time was one of my listeners.
As a sibling of a couple of physicians, I get to hear a lot about the quality of personnel in small and rural hospitals. In general, the advice I have been given is that unless I am about to expire, I am to head for the nearest large city and a hospital therein. Why? The spectrum of support staff at smaller, more isolated hospitals tends to the lower end in skill. It is unfortunate intersection of cost (cannot pay as well in small cities/hospitals) and availability of better trained staff. As an outsider, I see this as partly due to the increase of turning many formally well trained support positions into ones held by what the human resources want to term as 'technicians'. Nothing wrong with being a tech, but the push is for the lowest training and therefore lowest cost. After all, the machine cannot make a mistake and anyone can hook up the tube/insert the sample/draw the blood/distribute the medicine, etc. However, complete ignorance of the meaning of test results/medical weights an measures/meaning of standards, etc. leads to some funny results (deadly, not ha ha). In essence, if you or an advocate (family or friends) are not on duty 24/7, you can be at the mercy of mistakes through ignorance, negligence or simply chance. YMMV.
If you have to have a zillion different tubes at hand and also of different lengths, you are bound to be out of one of the necessary ones each time. Now this can be life-threatening. Also, the time it takes to search for each of them could easily kill a few patients as well.
Nae king! Nae laird! Nae yurrupiean pressedent! We willna be fooled again!
Yeah, right - the FDA is simply a rubber-stamp for the mdical industry... You have to be painfully ignorant of the medical field to make such statement.
We really want the FDA to regulate the size, color, and style of connecotrs on all medical devices? Seriously? We can't trust doctors with surgical tubing any more?
That sounds expensive, especially when you factor in the cost of all the CYA expenses to protect hospitals/medical providers from federal fines and penalties...
Ken
'FDA could fix this tubing problem tomorrow, but because the agency is so worried about making industry happy, people continue to die,' says Dr. Robert Smith."
As someone who works in the medical device industry, let me say, that statement is preposterous. The FDA is not worried about "making the industry happy." First, to the extent that FDA has a bias, it is staffed with anti-corporate zealots who believe that making a profit from the sick and dying is unethical and are out to make the industry unhappy. Secondly, there is no reason whatsoever that this initiative has to come from the government. Just like 802.11, firewire, bluetooth and every POSIX did not come from a government agency, neither would a tubing standard. Third, selling specialized tubing products to hospitals would be more, not less profitable than commodity tubing products. Fourth, if the industry did create a standard, the barriers to developing and deploying that would be the FDA. Rule of thumb is that the cost of bringing a product to market is about 10X under FDA regulation than not and delays in FDA approval can be several years.
Ceci n'est pas une signature.
Whatever has happened to personal responsibility?
Well of course, but since we humans have control over our situations and our lives, we can prepare our situations so that the risk of errors is minimized.
Example: due to a poor user interface, a pilot programs the autopilot to fly into the side of a mountain (yes this really happened). Of course it is a user error, but the designers of the autopilot STILL took the effort to redesign the user interface.
And as far as "personal responsibility" goes, well the pilot is dead, so good luck teaching them a lesson.
I work on the manufacturing end of the medical devices industry. It would take a massive change to alter this. Most of the parts we make are interconnect-able by design, so that individual valves, fittings, and devices can be assembled into the set that is needed. These systems are not as pre-engineered as everyone thinks they are. Some sets are standard, but many are custom made according to the hospital's requirements. And these are still just components of a larger system assembled on-site. Most tubing sets are terminated with a luer-taper (wikipedia) connection (the standard connection on the end of a syringe - not the needle). This allows interconnection with other devices. Even if you were to change the end connections, a side port with a luer taper connection would always be required by hospitals so that a syringe could be used to access the line. Color coding could possibly help. The best solution would be to leave the sets as-is and at the hospital tag each with an obvious colored label as it is installed/assembled.
At some point these medical manufacturers need to organize themselves into standards bodies or else the government will do it for them. Perhaps the problem is that the medical equipment manufacturers don't have the same cultural view that their counterparts in the computer industry have (Apple excluded, of course) that standards are beneficial to their business. I'm not exactly sure why this is, perhaps others closer to the medical equipment industry have better insight. But I suspect that it isn't as easy to fix as many of us slashdotters (read computer geeks) dismissively suggest because it is more dependent on culture and politics, not technology.
Nurses should not have to work in an environment where it is even possible to make that kind of mistake
Speaking as a physician, it's your responsibility to know exactly what you're doing. Blaming "the environment" is just making excuses for gross negligence. Just like it's wise to double-check the medication you are dispensing, double-check the dose you are administering if it's a substance with dangerous side effects, and screen your patients before surgery (instead of doing it the way we used to pre 1980's, when a significant number of patients died on the table because they had unknown underlying conditions we would find out about in the autopsy), you should make sure that you're performing a procedure correctly. If you don't do that, I suggest another line of work.
Seven puppies were harmed during the making of this post.
dude have you never swapped the ps2 keyboard and mouse cables and wondered why neither works?
interesting how that rj-11 phone plug goes right into the ethernet jack. I wonder what happens when the phone rings?
why on earth do i need a sata/e-sata adapter?
please make a list of all the USB connectors and their purpose
go on find a new power supply for your external drive enclosure
the computing industry is VERY POOR at good connector design
The computer industry figured out how to make my USB plugs incompatible with my ethernet jack. More importantly, they did this without the government telling them to. They did it while operating on much narrower profit margins, and without a large number of human lives hanging in the balance.
The idiots running the health care industry should have resolved this on their own a long time ago. The government should not have had to get involved at all.
>Nurses should not have to work in an environment where it is even possible to make that kind of mistake,'
>FDA could fix this tubing problem tomorrow, but because the agency is so worried about making industry happy, people continue to die
Ok first off, if I am a nurse and know that there are too many tubes, just like when you are a network admin and have to run cable along, they are not going to make all sorts of different cables for you, YOU have to sort them out, usually with permanent marker or with color tape etc...etc... so if you know some nitwit is working for you not able to first off check which line she is working with by actually making sure where each end meets what.....then you could color code the tubes yellow means blood, green means iv, blue means etc...etc..
Seriously, let's put all the onus on others instead of ourselves, that is so much easier. Instead of owning up to your own mistake, you would think the first death related to this, the nurses would go to the office supply store and buy those stickers and stick them on ALL the tubes to sort them out...
As for the FDA being in someone's pocket, guess what your own President is in someone's pocket, and yet you still vote for them,
we still put up with the media cover up for what BP did, when was the last time we heard anything about THE BIGGEST OIL SPILL IN HISTORY, if I was Obama, I would be talking about this everyday for the next 4 years. Yet he is bought off, the media is bought off....my point is we can only rely on ourselves....so for this situation, the nurses need to just accept the FDA are turds, and they need to step up, and come up with their own system, after all THE NURSES are the ones giving the care, and liable not some tubing company.
As a physician, I can say that the summary is extremely misleading (surprising for Slashdot, I know). For instance, there is absolutely no way to connect a blood pressure cuff line to an IV line - they are completely different connections. The same goes for enteral feeding and IV tubing, ditto for oxygen tubing, etc. Also, as someone who works in an ICU, one of the first things that nurses do in any situation where the patient has multiple lines going into their body is label each line. Now obviously if you are determined and stupid, you can physically make two different connections fit (a poster above mentioned a nurse using tape to connect to incompatible lines), but that isn't a problem that will be fixed by color coding the connections.
I read the article and came across the same thing I see over and over where someone kills or harms someone due to negligence. In order to get a settlement the harmed party needs to agree to never tell anyone about what happened. This type of secrecy needs to be OUTLAWED! How can people make good market decisions when the facts about quality of care are hidden. Some incompetent quack can merrily go on his way killing or harming person after person as long as he pays his malpractice insurance. The quality of care and many other products and services would improve greatly if people knew that mistakes they make will follow them forever. I would favor a national database freely accessible over the internet of every damage award and the details surrounding it. You go looking for a Dr or a Lawyer or a car mechanic you can at least check to see if they have had problems. Now its tough to know. I also do not understand why the insurance companies are not actively involved in pushing for things that would save them money in claims like the infection stopping check lists or simple color coded tubes and noninterchangable connectors. Stuff we have been doing in the automotive industry for years. Not because some government agency told us too but because it saves money.
But the connectors should be incompatible regardless of the hours and stress nurses are subjected to.
Many airport related problems are due to the conflicting mission of the FAA as regulator and promoter of aviation.
Shouldn't the free market have already addressed this problem?
Please if you are going to go with something to differentiate tubing please go with a simple pattern along with a color coding, considering the 'costs' of what these things cost, I think a 0.1cent cost per tube would be negligible when you consider you might cut nearly 10% of the male population out of the career.
There have already been pushes to make colorblind people ineligible for medical careers, the last thing we need is yet another profession that is barred to us. Colorblindness does NOT count as a disability according to the US Federal Government, but if I have another potential career cut off from me it better damned well be considered a disability.
Out of modpoints but really liked a post? 1BDkF6TtmmeZ3yqXbz9yhdYVqRYnwFoXDj
If the FDA mandated special-shaped connectors for each category of tubing that ALL hospitals across the USA then had to buy from Industry how would that NOT make industry happy? Are you sure it's Industry that they want happy or is it hospitals with limited budgets that would have to replace all their equipment and thus move funds away from other patient care areas?
I was a Medic in the Navy, and I can tell you that most of these errors are due to training problems. Individuals that just graduated from schools are pushed out onto the wards too soon without proper training on the equipment that is in place and accidents like this happen in high stress situations. As others have stated, a majority of the interfaces of the different tubes are already different, a lot of times they are already color coded, if they're not color coded, they sometimes have colored tape/flex tape on them to differentiate them. Often times people take a 2 year nursing course and don't know shit from shinola. In my 14 weeks of Hospital Corps training at Balboa Hospital and my 5 week Field Med School at Camp Pendleton I've learned more efficiently, faster, and better than most civilian practitioners. My 6-months On-The-Job training when I got to my first command made me more comfortable and proficient at all the things I learned in Corps School. Hell... I diagnosed my wife with Pleurisy without major tests and deductive reasoning when some Doctor intern/resident thought my wife had Adult Onset Asthma... gee... They put her on an inhaler and the breathing pain goes away (even though minutes before, they gave her Demerol before the inhaler treatment). Dumbasses. To hold the FDA responsible for something like this is like saying that Ford/GM/Toyota is at fault for the owner putting gasoline into the oil port or transmission fluid into the Radiator... it comes down to training and being aware. It's training people that's at fault here... not the FDA. The whole article in general is garbage because of that.
Computers stopped dying for this kind of reasons a while ago!
Why not put... stickers on the connector ends and around syringe injection points? The tubing stays clear to see the liquid/gas going through it, no change in chemical composition to satisfy the FDA, but it's still clearly marked: hey, green sticker, this is going into a vein so don't pump air into it. oh, this bad boy has a red sticker, better be an intrathecally administered drug because this is going into someone's spinal cord! If you wanted to up the ante, you could even use certain shapes on the stickers to also indicate their usage, for anybody that happens to be colorblind. The solution seems stupidly simple: better labeling. A lot of people seem to be stonewalling on the color of the tubing, though. There are other ways of labeling the tubing besides coloring the tubing itself.
Sounds likes something a little training and general competence should solve.
And I am guessing no matter how similar they are they are put in separate containers that are clearly labelled.
and since they are deadly if used interchangeably then and I also guessing that they are not all that similar to begin with?
Troll is not a replacement for I disagree.
These errors also occur not just because of stupidity or human error but because of the left or right handedness of the room. Like hotel and dorm rooms, older designed hospitals have the wet/mechanical walls back to back making patient rooms flip flop as they went down the hall. Consequently the medical gases and and electronics flip flop from one side of the patient bed to the other. Believe it or not, this causes errors.
Now, health organizations realize that the cost of litigation and damages out weigh the savings of building common wet/mech walls. So new hospitals are increasingly being built with identical rooms that do not flip. The extra upfront costs of construction and M/E/P installation will all be recovered from reduced errors like these.
It may be that the solution is to simply hire more nurses and the like and to cut down on the overtime that lead to the mistake. Again, it will cost more on the front end for labor, but at least the lawsuits will decrease.
Many parts of the US (and I suspect other parts of the world as well) are facing significant nursing shortages. Even if you have the money to hire more nurses, they simply aren't there to be hired. This problem is then magnified by the fact that nurses make more money as nurses than as nursing educators, so nursing schools around the country are unable to expand their classes due to lack of qualified instructors.
Damn_registrars has no butt-hole. Damn_registrars has no use for a butt-hole.
So the nurses themselves are taking the fall. In the eyes of the industry, "problem solved."
So ironically, a reform of the regulations to make new products safer than old one will also delay the approval and deployment of the new, safer products.
We, in the electronics industry, solved the problem decades ago by two simple solutions. Color coding and making connectors unique so you cant plug the wrong plug into the wrong connector. You might have to stock more tubing and catheters - but when human life is involved the argument falls flat.
And yet, with human life on the line, the medical industry cant seem to grasp such a simple concept. Very sad, and it makes me worry as I have a daughter that is expecting soon.
Reading about this, it occurred to me that there could be more safety in this area. I have worked in ICUs where the patient had two IVs, a central line, an arterial line, a lumbar drain, and an endotracheal tube: around the patient were crowded a mechanical ventilator, three IV poles equpped with IV pumps, a monitor, and a crash cart. The nurses were helped in this by, for instance, labeling each line with a small tag. Also, generally in ICUs nurses take care of two or three patients max for twelve hours at a time, meaning they can attain familiarity.
At the same time, it would take an awfully ingenious method to get most automated sphygmomanometer air lines hooked into an IV line. That's just completely stupid.
Tenemus pyrobolos atqui jacimus cognitiones.
Make tubes different diameters for different jobs as dictated. Relax in bath of win.
I am an anesthesiologist, so I deal with every single one of those tubes. YMMV.
Anesthesiology as a specialty has made vastly greater steps in safety than any other field of medicine. Part of that is that so much of our job depends on machines; we can design machine systems so that they fail gracefully and safely. Standardized fittings have been part of that safety system, so that tubing made by company A works on company B's machines. The connectors for breathing tubes are all the same.
The problem with the Luer system (which is the connector in the article, although they never named it) is that it's so damned useful. A single connector means that you use another kind of equipment in a pinch. It means that when I dose an epidural, I don't have to hunt down a special epidural needle and syringe. When the cuff on a breathing tube needs to be adjusted, I can use a plain old syringe. I can even use those plain old syringes to fashion an emergency oxygenation kit to keep someone alive when they quit breathing and we can't get a breathing tube in place. (If you're interested, and in a hospital, take a 3 mL syringe. Remove the plunger. Stick a 7.0 ETT connector into the back of the syringe. Perform needle cricothyrotomy with the largest IV catheter you can get, attach the syringe to the catheter, stick an Ambu bag on the ETT connector, crank up the O2 flow, and start squeezing. And get a surgeon working on the formal trach right away, because you might oxygenate with this but you sure won't clear any CO2.)
That said, it's the right thing to do.
...or bothered to examine the actual nature of the problem?
If you're connecting an air hose to an IV, there is something really wrong. Any nurse who does something like this is purely incompetent. I know several RNs and talk to a few on a daily basis. It is a somewhat stressful and fast-paced job, but you cannot ethically exceed your working pace. Every nurse should physically trace each tube to its receptacle. If there are two tubes in the vicinity but not even in proximity, extra care should be taken to trace the tube tactilely. The government-protectionist tone here ("Critics say the tubing problem, which has gone on for decades, is an example of how the FDA fails to protect the public.") is absurd and gives you NO excuse to shed the responsibility for your actions.
Now there are plenty of circumstances where standardization is called for, and I am for it. Some nurses are overworked and have to work long shifts, and there are plenty of times when the medical staff have only minutes to save a patient. There is also the case that everyone makes mistakes at some points, even after a single check, double check, or triple check unless someone else is there for an extra set of eyes. Standardization would really help here, and I am for it. I, however, am NOT going to rely solely on the FDA to "protect" me from someone's mistakes. Those in the medical field are going to have to regulate themselves as much as possible because federal bureaucracies sure as heck aren't going to set regulations quickly enough for changing industries, and they SURE as heck aren't going to know every little problem that can occur.
In a 24 bed icu. I've read the official reports associated with many of the incidents listed in the summary.
The BP cuff was a family member forcing together two incompatible connectors in an attempt to be helpful.
Enteral feedings into venous catheters involved kluges on the part of the nurse (forcing a connection) or the doctor (using venous tubing for a non-venous site)
As an engineer (BSME) and a nurse, I say there is room for improvement. But the situation is not as dire as the summary claims.
Bah. The FDA (government) cannot and will not "fix" anything. They'll come up with ridiculous and expensive "solutions" that won't actually solve the problem. The "correct" way to resolve this is to work appropriate AAMI and ANSI standards. Having such standards actually reduces vendor risk, increases vendor efficiency, and makes things safer. Easy button.
by James P. Carter, M.D., Dr. P.H.
"The thing that bugs me is that the people think the FDA is protecting them. It isn't. What the FDA is doing and what the public thinks it's doing are as different as night and day".- Dr. Herbert Ley, Former FDA Commissioner, 1970
The FDA was created at the beginning of the century by government, with input from the AMA, to govern the safety of foods, drugs and cosmetics. It had no legal power to test drugs for safety, however. The following account of the history of the FDA's role has been taken from a talk entitled "The Rise of the Cult of Pseudoscience," given by Dr. Charles Harris, a pathologist, to the American College of Advancement in Medicine a few years ago.
In 1927, the FDA became a separate agency required to test drugs for safety. In 1959, Senator Estes Kefauver (D-Tenn.) launched an investigation into the pharmaceutical industry which had already been accused of gouging the public. In the midst of the investigation, the thalidomide tragedy occurred. Some historians say this tragedy was significant in that it slowed the development of new drugs, because of the additional bureaucracy which resulted. (Actually, thalidomide remains a useful drug in the treatment of leprosy; it also stimulates the immune system. Instead of teaching doctors how to use thalidomide properly, as it did in the case of the new acne drug Acutane, the FDA prohibited the use of thalidomide altogether.) Also during this time, unethical medical research was uncovered in New York City. Cancer cells were being inoculated into nursing home patients to determine what would happen to them, unbeknownst to the patients or their relatives.
These events caused opposition to human experimentation, which became severely regulated. A stronger FDA emerged, which was required to guarantee not only safety, but effectiveness as well. This meant that human subjects had to be involved in order to accomplish this. Otherwise, proof of efficacy would be impossible. The pharmaceutical companies then began to offer medicines and monies to the universities to conduct the necessary clinical trials to show efficacy. The academics began to worship at the altar of clinical trials. The result, tragically, was that the double-blind crossover study became the "double-cross blindover study". . .the real cult of Pseudo-science was born.
The new rules and regulations pushed by the FDA resulted in these disadvantages:
Slower development and delivery of new drugs An intimidated pharmaceutical industry (until they began to win friends and influence people) Medical services that had been offered voluntarily in connection with clinical trials now made mandatory, either executed or enforced by the FDA Refusal to look at alternatives Sluggish response times; lost new drug applications; bribery; indifference; promotion of generics leading to a generic drug scandal, and a total lack of flexibility THE AMA CAUGHT RED-HANDED COLLUDING WITH THE FDA
The government-sponsored chelation studies (covered in an earlier chapter) at Walter Reed and Madigan Army Hospitals did not originate from any burning desire for scientific inquiry on the part of the FDA, academia or pharmaceutical corporations. What, then, motivated them to help design and approve a controlled study to evaluate the safety, effectiveness, and dose-response curve of EDTA in the treatment of peripheral vascular disease?
The answer lies in the comments of Stuart Nightingale, Asst. Commissioner for Health Affairs of the FDA, when he went on record at a meeting of the House of Delegates of the AMA in Honolulu, Hawaii, seven or eight years ago, telling AMA delegates, "We can't put these chelation doctors out of business by ourselves. We have to work closely with you, the AMA, and other groups, to put them out of business."
It happened that a leading chelation doctor, Garry Gordon, was in the audience intending
The medical industry should have an independent commission like the one over the airline industry. The air one regularly generates recommendations to the FAA, which the FAA often ignores, regarding changes and additions to FAA regulations which would make the air safer and more reliable.Setting up such a commission for the medical industry would be quick, simple, easy. Just go to the big university medical schools, approach the doctors and deans of medicine, get them to focus on a slashdot-like blog that has discussions about medical issues. Get them started on an Medical engineering task force which takes RFCs (Requests for comment) and produces RFCs (standards) for the medical industry (hospitals, doctors, med schools, medical equipment manufacturers). Currently the AMA acts to some extent in this way, and some of their standards are crap,. But they carefully avoid many areas which would "hurt" some incompetent doctors and hospitals and med equip manufacturers. So a more independent organized effort is clearly needed.
In the above case, simple color coding, with faint coloring of the plastic tubing, in addition to colored stripe patterns, would solve the problem. You know, like the resistor color coding we electronic types had back when resistors were big enough to use the bands. (I know, I am dating myself age-wise).
Or we could just add a medical section to slashdot and do this stuff ourselves.
wake up and hold your nose
...how Edward Murphy died.
Funny you mention checklists in medicine. There's other people, in the medical field, who've made the exact same observation you have. I remember hearing an interview back in January, on NPR, with Doctor Atul Gawande who is trying to encourage the use of standardized medical checklists in hospitals in the U.S. He wrote a book called, _The_Checklist_Manifesto_.
Change takes time, but given the results that guy saw, this is probably going to become standard practice in hospitals and clinics across the U.S. and probably the world. This really needs to happen. Like you say, checklists work to help manage memory and complexity in time-critical situations where the work *must* be done right. I think people resist checklists, because it makes them feel like they've become some sort of cog in a machine, but I for one recognize the limits of my memory and ability to manage complexity in critical situations.
30 hour shifts for interns are legendary! When will the medical industry realize that this is a very bad idea.
When my wife was ill (3 years of constant hospitalization) not once did it ever look like this was even remotely possible. All of the IV tubes were labeled, many of them were different (blood pressure cuff pump to an IV? I call BS on that) and they were never changing more than one at a time. Deaths related to these kinds of mixups are not the fault of IV lines "looking the same". Seriously, fix the million other problems, then think about IV lines.
Whatever has happened to personal responsibility? Why is this such a problem? If a nurse is doing their job, then they will follow the tubing back to the source to ensure that they are connecting the right ones. Why is this so hard?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Murphy's_law
Put simply, no matter how well trained the people are, and no matter how severe the consequences for screwing up are, a nonzero percentage of people will screw up a nonzero percentage of the time.
The only way to defeat it is to make screwing up physically impossible.
Yet occasionally you still get a guy who manages to connect things that can't be and BOOM.
I can see how all tubing being the same could be useful. In an ideal world you would have enough tubing of each type all of the time, but what do you do if all of the IV tubing is used up, and you badly need some, but you have a huge pile of other kinds lying there. Well if each kind has its own connector then you (well, the patient) is screwed. Sure you could have adapters, but then you would have to keep stock of adapters as well, and hope that if you run into that situation that there are adapters left. Not to mention that it adds another link in the chain that can go wrong.
Not that it is better than the alternative I just think everything should be considered.
They do make medical tubing connections with RFID. This allows the equipment to verify a proper connection before delivering anything through it. Also allows traceability of old connections, logging connect/disconnect, etc. http://www.pddnet.com/editorial-jim-brown-colder-products-trouble_free-fluid-connectors-for-medical-devices-052410/ This is mostly a cost issue, as old hardware needs to be replaced / retrofitted.
"Nurses should not have to work in an environment where it is even possible to make that kind of mistake,' says Nancy Pratt"
And once the nurse won't be able to do the mistake, who will be responsible of the accident ? The tube manufacturer ?
If the process in place to avoid the "nurse error" fails, is he person who put the process in place is responsible ??
Raise the nurse salary and make them work under 80 hours a week, maybe they'll be less accident like this.
*switch switch*
All better.
~Vexed and loving it!
If the patient is in a crisis there's no time to take extra care.
In industry tanks and tubing are color coded. Oxygen, for instance, is green. When pressurized oxygen comes in contact with grease it explodes spontaneously, so all threaded fittings in oxygen tubing must be scrupulously clean. No one will lubricate the threads if the tube is green.
Hospitals should do likewise, have a color stripe running the length of each hose, making it clear where it should be connected.
are self-serving gimps, only interested in preserving their money-sucking jobs and expanding a job-securing buffer of like-minded gimps around them.
You're so wrong it's a good educational lesson to show why you're wrong.
Any nurse who does something like this is purely incompetent. I know several RNs and talk to a few on a daily basis. It is a somewhat stressful and fast-paced job, but you cannot ethically exceed your working pace. Every nurse should physically trace each tube to its receptacle. If there are two tubes in the vicinity but not even in proximity, extra care should be taken to trace the tube tactilely.
I deal with nurses too, particularly on safety issues. I also deal with government and civilian safety experts, and you're being unfair to them.
You display a fundamental misunderstanding of safety engineering.
You raise some important issues, but you've come to the completely wrong conclusion. Your political bias leads you to depend on "personal responsibility." Engineers have found that depending on "personal responsibility" is exactly what leads to disaster.
In the history of American engineering and industrial development, government "bureaucrats" have done a good job, often better than the industry they're regulating. If you want to see an unregulated pharmaceutical industry, go to China, where the free-market suppliers made drugs like heparin, cough syrup and infant formula that killed people. U.S. government regulators are responsible for dramatically improving the safety of the medical, airline, auto and electrical products industry, to name 4 that I'm familiar with. Even people in the regulated industries know this.
Think of these tubes. Engineers talk about an accident chain -- this includes mechanical factors and human factors. Every step of the chain has to fail for an accident to occur. If you interrupt one step, you stop an accident. You can tell nurses to trace tubes and lecture them about personal responsibility. But according to Murphy's law (the real Murphy's law, not the joke), if there is more than one way to do a job, and one way will end in disaster, then eventually somebody will do it the wrong way. The point is that if you depend on human action -- personal responsibility -- you'll have an accident. If you instead design mechanical fail-safe features, you won't have an accident. My question for you is: Do you want accidents or not?
As the TFA said:
“Nurses should not have to work in an environment where it is even possible to make that kind of mistake,” said Nancy Pratt, a senior vice president at Sharp HealthCare in San Diego who is a vocal advocate for changing the system. “The nuclear power and airline industries would never tolerate a situation where a simple misconnection could lead to a death.”
One nurse told me, "Have you ever been in an operating room?" There are thousands of devices, all of them with safety labeling, most of them with something that can go wrong. It's not humanly possible to check a thousand devices before each operation. You're asking people to do the impossible. If you demand "personal responsibility," you will have accidents. Do you want accidents or not?
What you can do is standard, textbook safety management. Anesthesiologists were having a lot of problems, patients dying, malpractice suits, etc. They adopted accident-prevention methods used by the airline industry. Government studies identified certain design features of aircraft cockpits as responsible for crashes -- for example, cockpit instruments and controls weren't standardized, so pilots would pull the wrong lever. The government ordered them to be standardized. Those crashes stopped.
Anesthesiologists had the same problem. They worked at different hospitals, with different equipment, and that caused mistakes. They standardized equipment, mistakes went down, fatalities went down, insurance premiums went down.
This shows that government can work. At the end of World War II, flying was an adventurous activity limited to people who were willing to risk their lives. T
In SCUBA diving, it's simply not possible to connect the wrong hose to the wrong thing.
Low pressure hoses (140PSI) simply do not fit in (3000PSI) ports. 200Bar regulators do not fit on 300 bar valves.
In fact, this is exactly the reason that household natural gas flexible connector fittings are no longer compatible with plumbing fittings.
There's absolutely no excuse for anything that connects to a human to have the possibility of a fatal mistake.
And modify the connector to have a small writing surface on each part. The nurse can then make random sharpie strokes across the join and later match them up or otherwise label them in any ad-hoc manner that works for that nurse.
Nullius in verba
At the age of 8 my daughter went for dental surgery. We decided to have the procedure performed in the hospital rather than the dental office for safety sake. What could go wrong? To make a long sad story short, she died for 6 to 9 minutes. Nobody is quite sure because....NONE OF THE MONITORS WERE TURNED ON. The only person in the OR was the dental surgeon and he noticed her fingernails turning blue. She was long dead by this point.
As it turns out, the anesthesiologist had mistakenly given her a triple dose of morphine which in turn stopped her heart. Too bad they were all having a coffee prior to turning on the monitors. It was "only" dental surgery after all.
To thier credit (?) they brought her back to life. Around 90% of her brain was dead by that time. She had some stem function but even that was spotty as her body could not control temperature, etc. Stage one coma for a year, vent, etc. So after a year of being told there was no hope we made the DNR decision and pulled the tube. We were taken to a nice atrium (death room) with doctors and clergy present. They pulled the vent, 45 seconds later she gasped for breath and everyone about fell over. They hustled us out so fast it would make your head spin.
Many years and over a million dollars of therapy later, she can function. Had to relearn everthing and I mean EVERYTHING. She will always have a mental age of 12yrs (16 now) very bad motor skills (never drive) blind in left eye (optics fine, neural pathway not fine) and if you saw her on the street you would think she was "retarded". How I hate that fucking word.
So all the fancy procedures, fancy equipment, etc dont mean sweet fuck all if a HUMAN doesnt turn them on.
To finish, yes of course there was a settlement...thats going to give her life back right? Money means fuck all.
I'm sure coloring tubing has been thought of - along with the unitended consequences. Colorizing the tubing material might lead to toxic leaching or other interactions with what is passing through the tubing or induce allergic reactions, along with some colorants possbily not able to stably survive multiple sterilizations. Just coloring the outside of the tubing might even be worse from a wear / tear / transference point of view. Plus is color blindness more or less likely when dealing with transparent pastel colors? Different connector systems for different functions might be worth a look too, but I can only imagine the inventory nightmare and would incompatible connectors save more lives or cause more deaths in absolute panic, code blue situations?
"The nuclear power and airline industries would never tolerate a situation where a simple misconnection could lead to a death."
I was there when the FAA came in to Boeing following a fatal accident and found the possibility of cross-connecting things like the engine fire switches. Although they did fix things, management continued to mutter under their breath about the costs. Keyed connectors meant additional inventory costs. Extensive functional tests following assembly meant additional labor. There was the feeling that, once the inspectors left the property, things were going to be put back the way they were.
Industry always pushes to minimize costs. And unless they are repeatedly inspected by independent regulators, they'll get their way.
Have gnu, will travel.
Adapters sounds like a lawsuit waiting to happen. It was impossible to hook up an oxygen supply to an IV line, until Killco marketed an adapter to do so.
If you're McGeyver you'll just cut the tubing with your swiss army knife and splice it together with some slightly larger tubing and some candle wax.
“Common sense is not so common.” — Voltaire
....how about people pay attention and VERIFY what they are doing before they do it?
"""but because the agency is so worried about making industry happy""" if you haven't noticed, GREED, aka MONEY is the key to EVERYTHING that happens these days, I wait for the ACTA, and the MPAA/RIAA requests to pass and become law of some sort (the RIAA's recent request to have ISP's and more do filtering/monitoring)... I am not religious, but if their is a "god", then please let 2012 or sometime in my lifetime be the END of the world... or the greed of humanity (i know its a monster that has to be completely killed or it will regrow)... either way I have lost faith in humanity. reading the news online, walking down the street, watching the news on tv, and of course, having someone attempt to car jack me in the front of a walmart parking lot (literally 1 car length from the door) with 5 cameras recording the incident (truck was running, I got away with only a severely sore face), yeah... I cannot wait till the end.. However if you somehow see greed not being our future, and humanity stopping the current path they have been on since the dawn of the human age, feel free to disagree, otherwise, step aside or prepare for them to find something to sue you for and put you in permanent debt, or die because you lack funds (this accomplishes several things, modern day slavery and population control, while at the same time, making the rich richer...
... and I can tell you that this approach - blaming the operator for mistakes - doesn't fly. Sure, nurses shouldn't make mistakes. But they do. Systems should be designed to make mistakes less likely. That's what we do in defense systems, it's what we do in aircraft control systems, and it should be what we do in medical systems.
Catch-22? Johnny got his gun? Or both? I know it seemed like pushing the theme of insanity a little too far to me at the time. But, subsequently, I worked in a hospital in my 20s, and, well....
I call Shenanigans on this story. Having said that I work in Australia, but the tubing cant be that different. The only way you could could a naso gastric feed to an IV line is with duct tape, and we don't use duct tape. The only way you could connect a sphygmo tube to an IV is with duct tape, and as I said, we don't use duct tape. Either that or there is a level of incompetence that is astounding. I work in ICU and it is not uncommon to have 20 lines going into a patient. (not including BP and NG tubes, which don't really count) and part of the routine at the start of the shift is to sort all of those out. It can take over an hour sometimes. I can't comprehend how someone would connect an NG tube to an IV line accidentally, apart from it being a incredibly stupid.
If is a far bigger issue having illegible writing on drug charts. Some of the Doctors writing is less than a squiggle and it is meant to be an order for a drug. We had a doctor with notoriously bad handwriting writing up a chart once and I told him I loved his drug charts and he asked me why. Looking at the lines of completely illegible writing I said that at 3 in the morning when the s**t hit the fan and I need to give something, I looked at his drug chart, found exactly what I wanted to give, gave it and signed for it. He thought it was amusing, but the sad part is you could make out just about any drug name you wanted from his charts.
This is especially true given that it would barely cost anything to fix the problem. You'd have a small initial outlay to design new connectors, some expense to toss and replace existing ones (or not, you could conceivably phase this in as old systems wore out), and then... basically nothing, as it's hard to imagine the tubes would cost much more on an ongoing basis. You'd be saving some lives basically for free.
Speaking as a safety engineer, you don't know what you're talking about. The object of the game isn't to identify who's to blame after a mishap - it's to prevent mishaps from happening. And the fact is that nurses, like other human beings, are going to make mistakes. Period. The job of the system designer is to anticipate the mistakes that humans are likely to make, and design to system to make those mistakes easier to avoid. This is not a problem that can or should be addressed by macho posturing and/or finger pointing after the fact.
I was about to sit for my last session of dialysis before a kidney transplant. When setting up for dialysis, nurses are supposed to prime the return tube with saline, so as to prevent an embolism. The nurse has forgotten to prime the tube, and is about to make the final connection when I notice the problem. I mention it to her and she just laughs it off - "Oh silly me, chuckle, chuckle, chuckle" - and does the priming. She just about kills me and laughs it off, way too easily. This wasn't an issue with tubes getting mixed up. There are two much bigger problems: 1) Some nurses are dumb. Period. There are dumb people in every profession, and health care is no exception. 2) Smart nurses that have to work 10 or 12 hour shifts will be tired and unfocused towards the end of their shifts. An 8 hour shift is really the max you want for the kind of work that they do, and the kind of responsibility they have.
Get with the program, the solution is right in front of your faces. Simply color code the tubes available for purpose. For instance red lines for blood, yellow lines for air and green lines for food. Color coding is used exstensively in hospital settings already for a wide variety of uses and this would mean that it would be far more difficult to mistake tubes. The stripes should be along the tubes, like straws for beverages, and should not make the tubes opaque but help the nurses differentiate purpose. And these new tubes would not need a major revamp of the manufacturing process either as the stripes could be added on the outside and not change the major properties of the tubing.