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Does Quantum Theory Explain Consciousness?

astroengine writes "Quantum theory is often seen as the root cause of unrelated, mysterious phenomena. Take consciousness for example. British physicist Roger Penrose recently argued 'that we will need to invoke 'new physics and exotic biological structures': rewriting quantum theory to make sense of consciousness.' But why do this, especially as there is no apparent causal link between quantum mechanics and the conscious mind? There appears to be a very basic logical fallacy here that even the most prominent physicists seem to be making."

729 comments

  1. What fallacy? by Threni · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Care to state it?

    1. Re:What fallacy? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I'm not sure that there is a fallacy. I think that the appeal of quantum theory as an explanation of consciousness is that the randomness of quantum theory provides a mechanism within which free will can act. Scientists and philosophers can argue that although quantum effects should affect all matter, the brain may have particular structures which can amplify individual or small scale quantum effects, whereas a block of granite tends to average out the small scale effects. Thus it could provide a platform wherein microscopic quantum effects have macroscopic consequences.

      That said, while I don't think there is a fallacy, I don't think the argument is particularly persuasive either.

    2. Re:What fallacy? by screamphilling · · Score: 1

      the fallacy is the assumption that the human nervous system is a separate entity observing a universe that is completely outside of it. i.e. assumption that you are not a product of the universe. an outside system observing a completely separate system. and consciousness (as we are now becoming conscious of) is a very integral part of "physics" and the universe in general. it's not a machine that functions on random fluctuations and coincidences

    3. Re:What fallacy? by Black+Parrot · · Score: 1

      Care to state it?

      Conflating the unfounded conjecture (AKA WAG) that QM has something to do with consciousness with a claim that QM "explains" consciousness.

      Explanations have to actually explain something.

      Of course, the fallacy may be on the part of the writer rather than the physicists; I wouldn't know.

      --
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    4. Re:What fallacy? by somersault · · Score: 1

      Random decisions are no more "free" than rational ones. I'd say they're even less so, as they don't take your personal experience into account. People want to believe that we're made of magic, but we're not.

      --
      which is totally what she said
    5. Re:What fallacy? by biryokumaru · · Score: 1

      Exactly, like the elephants that control the New York Stock Exchange. Everyone knows that we use ultra low frequency for covert communications. It only makes sense that there's a sophisticated interaction between elephant stomping passing through the core of the earth and the computers controlling the stocks. I mean, the science is all there, there's no logical fallacy.

      Or like a giant bearded old white dude in the sky who planted all the dinosaur bones to test the unbelievers. That's a totally consistent theory, too. It's gotta be just as valid a hypothesis, right?

      Or maybe, just maybe, there should be a limit where people listen to these stupid ideas and say "that's retarded, and so are you." I mean, seriously, brain power amplifying quantum mechanical effects? Like the randomness of quantum is some magical radio signal from our souls in another dimension? Next you'll tell me that the sun is the real consciousness, controlling us all through neutrinos. I mean, there's no fallacy there either, right?

      --
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    6. Re:What fallacy? by Jeremiah+Cornelius · · Score: 1

      Kurt Godel. Incompleteness. Go to town.

      --
      "Flyin' in just a sweet place,
      Never been known to fail..."
    7. Re:What fallacy? by MaskedSlacker · · Score: 1

      To be fair, there are cases where quantum effects have surprising macro-level effects. Superfluidity of liquid Helium, and Hawking radiation are good examples. Not that I disagree with you in principle (the fallacy being the presupposition of consciousness as being anything other than a low-entropy state that requires constant energy input to maintain itself), but it is perfectly reasonable to think it's possible that quantum chemistry could cause unexpected physiological phenomena (olfaction is one known example of this).

    8. Re:What fallacy? by TapeCutter · · Score: 1

      Of course, the fallacy may be on the part of the writer rather than the physicists; I wouldn't know.

      I read the Emporer's new mind well over a decade ago, he basically argues that there is something "special" about mind and speculates it's hidden in QM. I didn't find it very convincing, his argument against AI amounted to little more than "mind is a special trait of living things therefore it cannot emerge from software".

      --
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    9. Re:What fallacy? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      That's correct, and that's why I think that anti-aging technology will eventually work. Aging is not magic either.

    10. Re:What fallacy? by SanityInAnarchy · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Is randomness really more satisfying than determinism? Is there really more "free will", by any useful definition?

      No, I think the appeal is that it appears random, and that we don't (yet) understand a mechanism by which the waveform collapses into one state or another, other than that it collapses with more frequency in some places than others. It's essentially a god-of-the-gaps argument, only this time for "consciousness" or "free will"...

      It is, of course, pure speculation. Worse, we are learning more and more about how the brain actually works, and I suspect at some point we will come to terms with the fact that what we call "consciousness" is an emergent phenomenon of the brain, and that it is no more free than a glider in Conway's Game of Life.

      Now, is it actually a fallacy? I suspect there's an informal one in there somewhere -- it certainly feels ad-hoc.

      --
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    11. Re:What fallacy? by monoqlith · · Score: 2

      Here's a shot:

      The people who think quantum mechanics is going to explain consciousness are making a category error. Epistemologically speaking, it may very well be that quantum mechanics explains certain aspects of our cognition. But these aspects - i.e. its features of memory, attention, selectivity, planning - are often referred to, particularly by Jeffrey Chalmers, the "easy" problem of consciousness. This is because, as cognitive science has already shown, cognition can usefully be broken down into modules and explained as information processing subsystems which themselves are explained by the structure of the neural tissue they reside in.

      The hard problem of mind is another story altogether. This is the problem of phenomenal consciousness, the quality of "what is it like?" It is the problem of how experience arises at all. The problem is with saying that "Certain theories are insufficient for explaining consciousness, but if we just go *smaller*, i.e., add more detail to our theory, the mystery of how experience arises will be solved." I'm afraid this is not so, beecause we are trying to bridge the fundamental gap between two epistemological kinds: subject and object. Both subject and object may very well emerge from the same neural substrate, but exactly how they do so might also be empirically unverifiable. I cannot compare your subjective experience. I cannot connect our two brains together and examine your experience - as soon as it is in my brains it is my experience. And most importantly of all, I cannot ask a computer whether it feels certain things and be able to verify that its response is the truth. No matter how much physical detail is in our theory, I am afraid that a physical theory will always be in the realm of the objective, and the question we're asking is about subjective experience. And so this is a philosophical question, and I'm not even sure philosophy will ever have a suitable response.

    12. Re:What fallacy? by gilleain · · Score: 2

      To be fair, there are cases where quantum effects have surprising macro-level effects. Superfluidity of liquid Helium, and Hawking radiation are good examples. Not that I disagree with you in principle (the fallacy being the presupposition of consciousness as being anything other than a low-entropy state that requires constant energy input to maintain itself), but it is perfectly reasonable to think it's possible that quantum chemistry could cause unexpected physiological phenomena (olfaction is one known example of this).

      Well sure, there are tons of biological examples of quantum chemistry triggering larger effects. Light absorbed by the eye can involve a single photon, which triggers a conformation change in retinal, which alters the conformation of the protein that binds it, which in turn effects a phosphorylation cascade leading to membrane depolarization, which leads - through some neurotransmitters and such - to events in the brain.

      I'm sure I've mis-remembered many of the details, but you get the point? :)

      Anyway, this is quite different from consciousness requiring quantum-level stuff for it to work all the time. Where are the evolutionary intermediates for this process? Did the brain suddenly discover quantum mechanics when it reached a certain level of complexity? It seems improbable

    13. Re:What fallacy? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0, Informative

      The fallacy of gathering in the Jesus Freaks and other religious nut jobs.

      Promulgating gaian orgasmic glory as science as the climatologists do.

      Letting feelings get in the way of Science.

      All you cretins worshiping stupid imaginary things.

      Not even idolaters since you're too moronic to carve an idol out of the mounts of paper proof you've excreted.

    14. Re:What fallacy? by Gripp · · Score: 1

      to me the fallacy is that science should not, unless necessary, begin with a presumption of the answer. its too easy to back into false theories this way.

    15. Re:What fallacy? by Dogtanian · · Score: 2

      I believe what he was talking about was the implied reasoning that "quantum physics is weird, mysterious and counterintuitive... and consciousness is also weird, mysterious and counterintuitive. Therefore the former might explain the latter."

      I don't know which particular fallacy this would fall under, but I'm pretty sure that there must be one it fits.

      BTW, I never understood why it was believed that quantum physics would explain consciousness. I'm not saying that it doesn't, I just haven't seen an explanation of why so many suspect that this might be the case. I'd assumed it was more than the above flawed reasoning. That's aside from the fact that the issue of consciousness- ever since I first considered it- always seemed to be to me to be a profoundly philosophical riddle that I wasn't convinced science could answer. How can you "prove" to yourself that anything else is "conscious", to reliably differentiate it from something that merely *appears* conscious to your *own* satisfaction... and is the question meaningful anyway?

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    16. Re:What fallacy? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      All cats have 4 legs, my dog has 4 legs, therefore my dog is a cat.

    17. Re:What fallacy? by Dogtanian · · Score: 2

      It's essentially a god-of-the-gaps argument, only this time for "consciousness" or "free will"...

      Yes, assuming you've represented their position fairly, I'd say that I agree with you there.

      BTW, I think you're making the mistake of tying together the issues of consciousness and free will. They seem to me to be two distinct phenomena.

      The fact that my brain working somehow creates a conscious "me" and what and how that "me" comes to be or exists (if it does!) is- regardless of whether or not I have "free will"- an issue in its own right.

      As for "free will", my gut attitude is that the only answer is that it's a philosophical matter whose (non-)answer essentially comes down to perspective and viewpoint because the issue is essentially circular. "Free" from what? The way fate put our brains together? But the brain itself is the thing which would be "free" to exercise (or not) this "free will" anyway so if something "has" free will... what is exercising it? IMHO the question only has meaning from our own perspective, not as something "absolute".

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    18. Re:What fallacy? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The only fallacy I can smell here, is typical idea of there being one single global reality. (I call it the wiki-ego.)
      But I have a feeling, that this is the fallacy, TFS is making itself.

      (TL;DR: Skip this paragraph:)
      It makes people blind to the fact, that all they actually know as reality, is what they observe through their senses. (And even that is heavily filtered, aka. "biased".)
      They go, and add everything to their model of reality, that the hear/read someone say/write. They make no difference between actual reality, and told information.
      And to make it even worse, they only hear/read what fits their own exceptions about reality, and everything else is shouted down, or doesn't get processed at all.. (This is in fact a artifact of how neural networks capable of individuality work. Interestingly the more, the more flaws there are in their rational reasoning. As this makes them prone to having to just believe it, instead of being able to rationally know it. And so have to defend those beliefs even harder.)

      The thing we have to take from all this, is that we can't ever explain the world, without also explaining the looking glass through which we sense it in the first place. That looking glass is our body. Which means, that it must be an essential part of physics and our theories about basic reality.

      (TL;DR: Don't comment without reading the *whole* comment, OK? ;)

    19. Re:What fallacy? by XxtraLarGe · · Score: 1

      Conflating the unfounded conjecture (AKA WAG) that QM has something to do with consciousness with a claim that QM "explains" consciousness.

      Yes, but it sounds very impressive to those without a background in philosophy.

      --
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    20. Re:What fallacy? by c6gunner · · Score: 1

      Care to state it?

      Yes. He's making the Chopra Fallacy. And if that's not an 'official' fallacy, it should be.

    21. Re:What fallacy? by GNUALMAFUERTE · · Score: 1

      The end user (i.e you) experience would be the same in both a deterministic and in a non deterministic system. You only live once, your entire life can be written down as the state of every particle that makes up your body throughout every moment of your entire life. That'll be the single definition of your entire life. If after writing it down, we pushed that exact sequence into a new organism, he would be literally you, and he would live exactly your life. Therefore, you can't judge the existence of your own free will, as the end user experience will be the same, and therefore the outcome of your tests will be the same.

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    22. Re:What fallacy? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I think xkcd has the answer.

    23. Re:What fallacy? by postbigbang · · Score: 1

      "Subject" and "Object" is a bad context. It suggests both a timeline and a state of transitiveness. It's a very state-machine way of looking at things.

      With QM, you get to have multiple states, and multiple dependencies, each with multiple states. Asking computers, which are state machines, is a silly thing to do. They think like computers. We store memories and have cognition concurrently in multiple areas. To exacerbate the problem, we have two brains in the same head-- mostly.

      IMHO, it's an interdisciplinary answer to a tough question. Conscious thought is the brain turned on to at least a sentient state. That's the floor. What goes above the floor are a bunch of things, all transient, until at the end of the day, we go somewhat unconscious at sleep. We know, or should, the difference between conscious reality and sleep/dreaming. Knowing the difference between reality and imagination is a very important sanity check for human brains.

      We try to measure capacity for cognition, memory, and other characteristics in lots of ways that all agree are imperfect (think everything from IQ and memory tests, etc.). Some individuals, savants and autistics, have different cognition, and their brains process differently-- or so has been shown in various studies. Does QM play a part? I'm undecided.

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    24. Re:What fallacy? by Zaphod+The+42nd · · Score: 1

      Cum hoc ergo propter hoc. RTFA

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    25. Re:What fallacy? by Zaphod+The+42nd · · Score: 5, Insightful

      I suspect at some point we will come to terms with the fact that what we call "consciousness" is an emergent phenomenon of the brain, and that it is no more free than a glider in Conway's Game of Life.

      Bingo.

      --
      GCS/MU/P d- s:- a-- C++++$ UL++ P+ L++ E+ W++ N o K- w--- O M+ V- PS+++ PE Y+ PGP t+ 5- X R++ tv+ b++ DI++ D++ G+ e++ h-
    26. Re:What fallacy? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      the article tells me :
      "This is along the same lines as the logical fallacy cum hoc ergo propter hoc ("with this, therefore because of this") and it applies to a whole host of scientific (and pseudo-scientific) reasoning. Just because quantum theory acts mysteriously, it doesn't mean quantum theory explains the mystery of consciousness."

    27. Re:What fallacy? by wytcld · · Score: 1

      Depending on your favored interpretation of quantum mechanics, it's arguable that physics can't be explained without consciousness. Mind you, not that you have to be conscious to explain physics, but that physical laws presuppose that there is consciousness in the universe. In this sort of theory, in explaining the role of brains, obviously the do not create conscious (causally or otherwise). Brains focus it.

      The realization that we can't distinguish on the evidence between theories in which brains act as creators of consciousness, and theories in which brains act as receivers of consciousness, goes back to William James. On the physics side, read some David Bohm. It's mainstream, if not universally held, in quantum physics that in a universe without consciousness you don't get physics - or a universe at all. Consciousness is, many of the best physicists have argued, fundamental.

      Explanation of how it fits with the rest of physics on a fundamental level is what Penrose is getting at. That's not to say he's necessarily going at it in the way that will prove out. But anyone who understands quantum physics will recognize at least the validity of the questions he's raising. Or so they tell me. Henry Stapp's work connecting the quantum realm with consciousness is also of interest - and from a far different angle than Penrose's.

      --
      "with their freedom lost all virtue lose" - Milton
    28. Re:What fallacy? by ScrewMaster · · Score: 2

      Conflating the unfounded conjecture (AKA WAG) that QM has something to do with consciousness with a claim that QM "explains" consciousness.

      Yes, but it sounds very impressive to those without a background in philosophy.

      Or biology, or neuroscience, or any of a hundred other disciplines requiring a basic grounding in scientific method. This is yet another "the nature of consciousness is unknowable" argument, which just leads to the idea that only a supreme being could possibly impart it to inanimate matter. Wait until the first true AI of significant power makes its appearance. Assuming it doesn't start out like Skynet and wipe us off the face of the planet, it's going to make for a lot of very red faces.

      I was rather smugly informed by a gentleman a few years ago that "there can be no spontaneous rise to intelligence." I told him to look in the mirror.

      --
      The higher the technology, the sharper that two-edged sword.
    29. Re:What fallacy? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc -------The logical fallacy in question.

      "After this, therefore because of this."

      basically, correlation does not imply causation.

    30. Re:What fallacy? by justsomebody · · Score: 1

      fallacy indeed

      even chaos theory is too uniform to describe my consciousness.

      --
      Signature Pro version 1.13.2-3 release 83.5 beta3try7 after-breakfast edition
    31. Re:What fallacy? by Artifakt · · Score: 1

      I never understood why it was believed that quantum physics would explain consciousness.

      It may come from the way Q.M. has labelled what happens when an observation is made as the 'collapse of the state vector' Note that some posters to this thread have already used that phrase or variations. 'Collapse' often has a certain negative connotation, like the place quantum events begin in is somehow superior to the place they end up in, a sort of Satanic fall accompanying every little wave function as it coalesces to become an electron's known position. The choice of the word collapse seems to imply that the place quantum events collapse from to enter the classical, (natural) realm is something better or superior, superior to the natural world means 'supernatural', in other words the "quantum level" is Heaven. From there it's a simple step to associate Q.M with all sorts of other unexplained things traditionally associated with the supernatural, like consciousness and free will. Sometimes, I wish the term Reification had caught on more. A few of the early Q.M. theorists liked it better, but it fell out of favor. A good translation would be 'becoming thing-like', and that's really what we are talking about here - probabilities becoming actual things.

      --
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    32. Re:What fallacy? by Cornelius+the+Great · · Score: 1

      Don't you mean a hypothesis?

      --
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    33. Re:What fallacy? by SanityInAnarchy · · Score: 1

      BTW, I think you're making the mistake of tying together the issues of consciousness and free will. They seem to me to be two distinct phenomena.

      I agree, actually. I'm surprised I didn't catch that.

      As for "free will", my gut attitude is that the only answer is that it's a philosophical matter whose (non-)answer essentially comes down to perspective and viewpoint because the issue is essentially circular. "Free" from what? The way fate put our brains together?...

      Being poorly-defined doesn't make it necessarily circular, although there may be some circular definitions. It tends to be a tricky problem, though. One definition is "Free from coercion." The way you are built is a part of you, so even if you're entirely deterministic, you're still you. Someone external to you taking control and manipulating you to do something, even if it's what you would have done anyway, is coercion.

      I suspect that definition can be made relatively objective, but at some point along the way, I'm guessing it will diverge sharply from what our intuition of "Free Will" means.

      --
      Don't thank God, thank a doctor!
    34. Re:What fallacy? by Ichoran · · Score: 1

      This is an example of argument from incredulity. I do not know why otherwise respectable philosophers seem so beholden to it in the area of consciousness.

      From many experiments and observations it is clear that consciousness is something that our brain does. And we have _almost no idea how the brain does what it does_. Should we be surprised, then, that we don't understand how consciousness works? This goes for the "easy" problem and "hard" problem alike. The easy problem is fiendishly difficult. In solving that, we'll probably realize that we're not framing the question coherently, that the issues we care about are equivalent to a dozen specialized sub-issues, and once we solve those we may not even bother coming back to the original issues.

      Now that we know the metabolic and molecular basis of life to a reasonable degree, old disagreements about qualities of the life-force seem almost hilarously misguided. There is no particular reason to believe that consciousness will be any different, except possibly for wishing for it to be different because it seems so intimate.

    35. Re:What fallacy? by DamnStupidElf · · Score: 1

      Aging is a general result of the laws of thermodynamics, however, so it has quite a lot going for it. The *universe* ages. Hard to avoid that.

    36. Re:What fallacy? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      cum hoc ergo propter hoc

      As per the article.

    37. Re:What fallacy? by hajus · · Score: 1

      No. In ENM, Penrose was saying that there is something we don't understand in physics that is needed to explain consciousness. This is because all of physics that we understand can be simulated on a turing machine, and the first part of his book contained a proof that the human brain could do something a turing machine cannot. He included QM in the laws of physics that can be simulated (albeit very slowly) on a turing machine. The part of QM that he stated that _may_ have something to do with consciousness was related to what he called reduction, as in reduction from wave state to certainty, because the causes for this are not (according to him at that time) fully understood.

    38. Re:What fallacy? by Thangodin · · Score: 1

      I suspect that our rather commonplace legal definition is quite workable; a person is free when they act for their own reasons, but is considered to have been determined to do something, and therefore not free and responsible, when a physical cause circumvents their reasoning. So a person with schizophrenia is not guilty by reason of insanity, because brain dysfunction in this case trumps normal cognitive processes. Likewise the case where someone is acting under duress, and situational determinants outweigh normal decision making. Physical determinism due to normal brain function is irrelevant; like any computer, the proper functioning of the mind requires orderly brain function. Randomness due to any cause does not yield freedom, only determination by random causes, so quantum effects are also irrelevant--this whole line of argument is a red herring. This is where the fallacy lies.

      The distinction between reasons and causes is analogous to software and hardware. The randomness introduced by power irregularities or a defective chip does not make a computer free, it makes the computer crash. The hardware must behave in an orderly and deterministic manner for the software to function properly. We find all of this highly mysterious because our intuitive grasp of physical reality is quite limited and often wrong. We have a limited understanding of matter, less understanding of energy, and almost no intuitive grasp of information theory. We have the equations, but like Douglas Adams' 42, they don't mean a damn thing to us. When we say that materialistic explanations are reductive, it is because our own perceptions of these explanations are highly reductive. We simply don't understand them, and we think they are much simpler and limited than they actually are. As Richard Feynmann said, if you think you understand quantum mechanics, you don't understand quantum mechanics. The problem with Penrose and Chopra is that they think they understand quantum mechanics.

      One might object that you can do what you want, but you can't want what you want, but cognitive therapy, not to mention a host of much older cognitive and emotional disciplines, actually addresses this. You can change your character--it's not easy, but it can be done.

    39. Re:What fallacy? by Max+Littlemore · · Score: 1

      What seems improbable to me is that the brain reached it's current level of complexity without quantum mechanics.

      Or to put that another way, the distinction we draw between what happens on the macro level and quantum mechanical effects is an artificial one we invented because it helps us conceptualize things. That doesn't make any of it true.

      So as you have said, a single photon in an eye can lead to some brain activity (that's "brain" as in the artificial distintinction we draw between the nervous system in the skull and the nervous system in the rest of the body). We don't know what consciousness is, but if it is a function of the concentration of nervous system in our heads, then surely quantum effects are involved. Our entire bodies are products of nature.

      Everytime we accept an arbitrary distinction or artificial model as the truth, we become a little stupider.

      --
      I don't therefore I'm not.
    40. Re:What fallacy? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      That's a different kind of aging. The universe aging is a result of the laws of thermodynamics. People aging is a result of a flaw in our biological error correction mechanisms. There is no physical law that prohibits us from fixing it.

      That isn't to say it would make us literally immortal, because we would still age in the same sense as the universe does -- people still need food which requires continual energy input, and without that we're in trouble whether we can die of "natural causes" or not. But it's the difference between living to be 100 and living to see the stars burn out.

    41. Re:What fallacy? by Brucelet · · Score: 1

      I think one of the attractive things to a lot of people about the idea of consciousness as quantum is that it leaves room for free will. The quantum universe in inherently nondeterministic, so if consciousness is a quantum phenomenon then we could describe the choices we make in the same way we describe a quantum measurement which collapses a wavefunction. Of course, such an argument is actually just dreamy philosophizing.

    42. Re:What fallacy? by multi+io · · Score: 1

      the first part of his book contained a proof that the human brain could do something a turing machine cannot.

      Haha. I doubt that. If you're talking about the "chinese room argument" -- no, that doesn't prove anything like that.

    43. Re:What fallacy? by Boronx · · Score: 2

      Can free will be distinguished from randomness?

      A brain is extremely sensitive to tiny changes in input. If such changes are truly random then in no way are we like a glider. And what goes on in side a brain when a decision rests on a knife's edge?

    44. Re:What fallacy? by monoqlith · · Score: 1

      *Oy. I said it was Jeffrey Chalmers. It's David Chalmers.

    45. Re:What fallacy? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      First, your statements about quantum mechanics are incorrect. It is truly random. It is, most emphatically, not just randomness standing in for limited knowledge in the same way that a random variable is used in statistics. When you say "it appears random, and that we don't (yet) understand a mechanism by which the waveform collapses into one state or another", you're essentially describing a local hidden variable theory. The experiments testing the Bell Inequality have proven that no such account is consistent with quantum mechanics.

      Second, Even though the outcome of a simple experiment in quantum mechanics is just pure randomness, more complex systems are necessarily structured. It doesn't have to mean being shackled by chaos. I think that If there is going to be a reductionist account of free will at all, it will probably have to involve some sort of structured randomness. By eliminating the possibility of more traditional local deterministic explanations, quantum mechanics has made a lot of room for theories in that middle ground.

      I'm not saying that I think it is likely that this is the way that the brain works, but I think that if we're going to be intellectually careful we can't yet exclude the possibility. As you say, we're learning more and more about the brain.

    46. Re:What fallacy? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      In what way are they distinct? As far as I can tell they're inextricably linked For example, how could an unconscious being exercise free will? Perhaps, if you don't believe in free will, they can be separated....but if you don't presume the answer, I'm don't think that you can assert their separation.

    47. Re:What fallacy? by Jane+Q.+Public · · Score: 1

      However, more recently Penrose has been saying that since nerve impulses ultimately rely on certain quantum mechanical principles, which are well-known and deterministic, then consciousness and free will are both just illusions.

      Now, never mind that Penrose has seemed to have forgotten that quite a few QM phenomena are probabilistic rather than deterministic. Penrose is a brilliant man, but methinks that in his giant leap from physics to metaphysics, he skipped over some very important steps that just can't be left out.

      I'll listen to Penrose when it comes to mathematics, and physics too, to a limited degree. But as soon as he starts talking metaphysics I turn the volume all the way down. He is no more qualified to make judgments in that area than Jon Stewart. In fact, I'd bet on Stewart.

    48. Re:What fallacy? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      but the children of god girls are hot

    49. Re:What fallacy? by Black+Parrot · · Score: 2

      No. In ENM, Penrose was saying that there is something we don't understand in physics that is needed to explain consciousness. This is because all of physics that we understand can be simulated on a turing machine

      The notion that the universe has the same limitations is not an established fact; it's merely one of several competing conjectures.

      and the first part of his book contained a proof that the human brain could do something a turing machine cannot.

      How widely accepted is his proof? I know he has made contributions to our knowledge of the universe, but he tends toward the whack-a-doodle. And even sane people tend to get carried away when arguing about what the brain can do.

      --
      Sheesh, evil *and* a jerk. -- Jade
    50. Re:What fallacy? by tragedy · · Score: 1

      Out of curiosity, what did he prove that a human brain could do that a turing machine could not?

    51. Re:What fallacy? by Prune · · Score: 1

      It's a well known fallacy. http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0105097

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
    52. Re:What fallacy? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The Chinese flag is red. My shirt is red. Therefore, my shirt is Chinese.

    53. Re:What fallacy? by Hognoxious · · Score: 1

      I was rather smugly informed by a gentleman a few years ago that "there can be no spontaneous rise to intelligence." I told him to .

      Flatterer!

      --
      Confucius say, "Find worm in apple - bad. Find half a worm - worse."
    54. Re:What fallacy? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The fallacy is an argument from ignorance, coupled with a non-sequitur. Just because the problem of mind/consciousness shares a few superficial similarities with QM (they're both "weird" and "mysterious," two very sloppy and non-rigorously defined terms), doesn't mean they're intertwined, except very trivially that all matter is subject to QM at some level and the brain is matter. Neurons, neurotransmitters, synapses, ion channels, etc., all structures of the neuron and their behavior are most usefully explained without invoking QM.

    55. Re:What fallacy? by maxwell+demon · · Score: 1

      and the first part of his book contained a proof that the human brain could do something a turing machine cannot.

      His proof is wrong. [Postscript file]

      --
      The Tao of math: The numbers you can count are not the real numbers.
    56. Re:What fallacy? by Prune · · Score: 1

      The thing about the hard problem of mind is that it's not a real problem. There is no such thing as "quality of what is it like". Jesus, these are pure subjective illusions. It's a category error to consider this "hard problem" as a problem that can be subject for rational discussion.

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
    57. Re:What fallacy? by maxwell+demon · · Score: 1

      yblockquote>"Subject" and "Object" is a bad context. It suggests both a timeline and a state of transitiveness. It's a very state-machine way of looking at things.

      I don't see that. "Subject" is just "I", and "Object" is "everything I observe". It doesn't imply a timeline (perceptions can be concurrent, and there's even the possibility of perceptions where you can tell they weren't at the same time, but you cannot tell, which one was first). I don't know what you mean with a "state of transitiveness", but if it has anything to do with the mathematical notion of transitive, then it's clearly not applicable, because the only subject I can perceive is my own; which is exactly the problem: There is no way to objectify the subject.

      With QM, you get to have multiple states, and multiple dependencies, each with multiple states. Asking computers, which are state machines, is a silly thing to do. They think like computers. We store memories and have cognition concurrently in multiple areas. To exacerbate the problem, we have two brains in the same head-- mostly.

      First, I cannot make any sense of your sentence on QM (and I work with QM for a living!). About computers, maybe you have heard of the concept of parallel computing? Heck, even normal desktop computers are multi-core today. However, that doesn't really matter, because all this parallelity gives you is additional speed and some randomness. It definitively doesn't allow you to do things which are strictly impossible otherwise (although they may be practically impossible). Note that the same is true for quantum mechanics as well: Quantum computers give a speedup for certain problems, but there's nothing you can do on a quantum computer which you cannot do, at least in principle, on a classical computer.

      About asking a computer: If you want to know if a certain computer has conciousness, then asking it is the only way you might even get a hint about it. There's no measurement device for measuring consciousness. Of course your "solution" to just declare the computer non-conscious from the beginning because it is "just a state machine" is a non-solution. It's defining away the problem. If someone would build a computer capable of simulating a complete human brain (don't worry if than computer would have to have the size of a planet; that imaginary person has the resources to do it), would it then not also produce consciousness?

      --
      The Tao of math: The numbers you can count are not the real numbers.
    58. Re:What fallacy? by Genda · · Score: 1

      In fact there's nothing random about random thoughts at all. Recent brain studies lead researchers to believe that a choice is made well before a person is consciously aware of making the choice. This suggests powerful force moving under the apparatus of consciousness.

      There is still a school of thought that suggests consciousness is the end effect of many distinct layers of cognitive machinery working in concert. Just as the single experience of vision is in fact nearly 2 dozen distinct perceptual processes overlaid one upon another.

      In this model, nothing is required from the quantum world save the magic of electrons and their mysterious dances.

    59. Re:What fallacy? by TapeCutter · · Score: 1

      Thanks, "metaphysics" was the word I was hunting for and sums up the book contents perfectly. Penrose is definitely a brilliant man, which is why I picked up the book in the first place, however he failed to impress me on this occasion.

      --
      And did you exchange a walk on part in the war for a lead role in a cage? - Pink Floyd.
    60. Re:What fallacy? by AmiMoJo · · Score: 1

      In traditional physics all actions can be predicted according to the laws of physics. There is no randomness, if you know the current state of an object and the forces acting on it you can calculate exactly what will happen to it in the future. That means there can be no free will, because if you know the state of every neuron in the brain you can predict with absolute certainty what it will do next.

      Quantum physics allows for randomness. Therefore the future is not fixed and we can only predict it based on probabilities, not certainties. Some people argue that this allows free will, but to my mind since we can't control these quantum probabilities it does not give us any more control than traditional physics does.

      Free will is rather important, not just in philosophy but in law as well. Claiming loss of free will, i.e. diminished responsibility due to mental illness or drugs, is considered to make a crime less severe and punishment is reduced accordingly.

      --
      const int one = 65536; (Silvermoon, Texture.cs)
      SJW, n: "Someone I don't like, and by the way I'm a fuckwit" - AC
    61. Re:What fallacy? by aaaaaaargh! · · Score: 1

      and the first part of his book contained a proof that the human brain could do something a turing machine cannot.

      How widely accepted is his proof?

      Not accepted at all. Penrose is just resorting to Gödel's theorems and closely related issues like the Halting Problem + a lot of hand-waving. The hand-waving comes from the fact that it is pretty hard (if not impossible) to come up with a concrete example of a problem that humans can solve that a computational device couldn't solve. It is not even clear what "solve" means in the context of the phrase "humans can solve" here.

      To give credit to Penrose and Hameroff, their theory is one of the few theories about consciousness and the mind that is actually falsifiable, so with this regard it's better than most of the other accounts out there.

    62. Re:What fallacy? by somersault · · Score: 1

      I wasn't talking about random thoughts per se, I was talking about the idea that the random behaviour of quantum effects would make choices any more meaningful. If you then want to say that the quantum effects are directed somehow, you're back to some kind of deterministic behaviour again, exactly the same as if you are "just" using your brain.

      --
      which is totally what she said
    63. Re:What fallacy? by Clueless+Nick · · Score: 1

      How can you insert a pre-written sequence in an organism and ensure it plays out perfectly? Wouldn't the system monitoring and affecting the state of each particle introduce unintended changes in other particles? Also note that without this system, you would need to write down the state of every particle that interacted with the 'being' during its life time and ensure that the interaction was replayed exactly. However, this would necessitate isolating the new organism completely from any other external influence and close any path for information escaping, which would also mean that you would have no way in the world to know if the experience of the new organism was the same.

      Oh, by the way, the act of measuring the particle states of the original organism would also introduce changes, which means that...eventually you would need to map and isolate the entire universe and measure it over infinity...and...

      Well, you'd need to be a god, or something even beyond a god.

      --
      Chat with other atheists http://secularchat.org
    64. Re:What fallacy? by rich_hudds · · Score: 1

      He basically argued that human's can actually 'understand' Godel's incompleteness theory in a way that an algorithm could not. This allows them to say things about whether an algorithm will terminate that a Turing machine couldn't

      It all boils down to whether you believe in Free Will or not. If you do you have to admit there is something missing from Physics. if you don't you don't.

      I do by the way so I'm on Penrose's side.

    65. Re:What fallacy? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      No he is NOT talking about the " chinese room argument.

      what do you doubt??? that a human brain can do something a turing machine cannot?

      you equate consciousness with brain?

      basically you are saying that you are a turing machine?

      what is your position?

    66. Re:What fallacy? by mr_gorkajuice · · Score: 1

      Wait until the first true AI of significant power makes its appearance. Assuming it doesn't start out like Skynet and wipe us off the face of the planet, it's going to make for a lot of very red faces.

      As a religious person, I fully expect this wait to last forever. It's unfortunate for my kind that even by the end of forever, your kind will still claim that "it's doable, we're just not quite there yet".

    67. Re:What fallacy? by pl0sql · · Score: 0

      Aging and dieing lets evolution do its work. I'm pretty sure there is no reason in principle why an organism couldn't like indefinitely, but it would eventually be killed off by its environment, which it wouldn't be able to adapt to.

    68. Re:What fallacy? by Dogtanian · · Score: 1
      I didn't state that they weren't connected, I said that they were essentially different issues where one couldn't automatically be assumed to be connected with the other.

      For example, how could an unconscious being exercise free will?

      You assume that "will" or "free will" is an inherent part of consciousness, that simply by being conscious implies that decisions made of one's own volition are the result of "free will". But such logic is essentially circular because it relies on "free will" being defined in terms of consciousness in the first place!

      I can't say that I either do or don't believe in free will, because that would require a concrete, watertight and non-circular definition. The problem with determining the nature of "free will" in the broadest philosophical sense is that IMHO it can't be defined like that in the first place because that lack of definition *is* the problem!

      (As for the more legalistic meaning of "free will", e.g. when people are mad or sane, etc., to me that's focusing on something different and not really the same issue).

      --
      "Slashdot - News and Chat Sites Deviant". (Click "homepage" link above for details).
    69. Re:What fallacy? by narcc · · Score: 2

      As for "free will", my gut attitude is that the only answer is that it's a philosophical matter whose (non-)answer essentially comes down to perspective and viewpoint because the issue is essentially circular. "Free" from what? The way fate put our brains together?

      It's not "Free from ...", it's "Free to ...". Let's break it down.

      The "will" part is easy. To will is to commit to a course of action. The ability to carry out your will is irrelevant. Will is in the choosing, not in the doing. (A lot of people seem to confuse "free will" with "freedom to act" and say absurd things like 'my will isn't free because I can't fly'. Putting physical limits aside for clarity, belief is also not subject to the will for the same reason.)

      The "free" part is harder. For your will to be free, means that you had the capacity to choose otherwise. This does not just mean that there were other possibilities, but that you had the ability to choose.

      If your will is determined, then there is no element of choice; thus no free will. If there is a random element then, similarly, you lack the capability to choose, as choice is different that merely the potential for difference randomness provides. Suffice it to say that randomness doesn't gain you any freedom.

      Moving on, I don't see anything "circular". From the GP, I don't see any "god-of-the-gaps"-type argument either.

      I'll define consciousness simply as 'subjective experience'. It should be obvious by now that classical physics can not supply an answer to the problem. (To say that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon is not an answer. It's as unsatisfying, and oddly less explanatory, as saying it happens by magic!) The last real hope there was computationalism, and no one save William Rapaport really takes that idea seriously anymore.

      There is hope, some think, in the especially weird bits of quantum mechanics where the observer seems to play a leading role. An observer capable of ... observation (having subjective experience) seems inescapably necessary. If you believe that consciousness can be explained in physical terms, that seem to be the obvious place to start looking. Now, Penrose isn't saying "here's a gap, that's where it must be", he's saying this is a good place to look if the physics works out a particular way. In "shadows of the mind" he offers his Orch-OR theory, and a number of tests.

      Penrose could very easily be wrong, but he's far too accomplished to dismiss out-of-hand -- he isn't positing anything mystical, after all. If we can take anything away from his three books on the subject, it's that if science is to explain consciousness, we need new physics. On that point, it's difficult to disagree.

    70. Re:What fallacy? by narcc · · Score: 1

      There is an irony in your post being modded "+4 insightful".

    71. Re:What fallacy? by Black+Parrot · · Score: 1

      Wait until the first true AI of significant power makes its appearance. Assuming it doesn't start out like Skynet and wipe us off the face of the planet, it's going to make for a lot of very red faces.

      As a religious person, I fully expect this wait to last forever. It's unfortunate for my kind that even by the end of forever, your kind will still claim that "it's doable, we're just not quite there yet".

      I don't know whether machine consciousness is possible or not, but basing your position on the claim that "people will never be able to do that" has a long history of being wrong.

      --
      Sheesh, evil *and* a jerk. -- Jade
    72. Re:What fallacy? by Black+Parrot · · Score: 1

      He basically argued that human's can actually 'understand' Godel's incompleteness theory [1729.com] in a way that an algorithm could not. This allows them to say things about whether an algorithm will terminate that a Turing machine couldn't

      It's not clear that any degree of understaning of Godel's theorem would all a person (or machine) to answer the halting question about an arbitrary program.

      It all boils down to whether you believe in Free Will or not. If you do you have to admit there is something missing from Physics. if you don't you don't.

      Quite possibly you're right, but the claim is impossible to evaluate without a rigorous definition of what "free will" means in it.

      --
      Sheesh, evil *and* a jerk. -- Jade
    73. Re:What fallacy? by smelch · · Score: 1

      The assumption that AI that acts like a human is conscious is a little bit of a leap, don't you think? It seems to me that consciousness can only be experienced, not observed. In short, right or wrong, consciousness can be denied of any man-made being by anybody who doesn't want to believe it and there will likely be no red faces, just more bickering. Hell, I'm still not sure I'm not the only conscious being in the universe or that I really am in the universe. Not that that is deep, there's just a huge leap in logic from "I have consciousness" to "other people are conscious" to "things that can act like people are conscious".

      --
      If I can just reach out with my words and touch a butthole, just one, it will all be worth it.
    74. Re:What fallacy? by narcc · · Score: 1

      the first part of his book contained a proof that the human brain could do something a turing machine cannot

      .Haha. I doubt that. If you're talking about the "chinese room argument" -- no, that doesn't prove anything like that.

      You might try reading his book before you comment on its contents. Penrose's approach is very different from Searle's, though they both reach the same conclusion.

      On a related note, if you can convincingly tear-down Searle's arguments, you'll find yourself quite a famous philosopher. There is a reason that we're still talking about the CRA 30 years after it was proposed.

    75. Re:What fallacy? by gl4ss · · Score: 1

      yeah, that they have no idea what consciousness is - the fallacy here is that they just assume that it depends on magic and that magic would be quantum theory. it doesn't actually explain anything, it's just mystic shit. for example, the brain has lots of capability for putting together 1+1 and cobbling together a working mind from that, but sometimes people make "irrational" choices - so it would be easy to blame these on your quantum machine soul instead of seemingly random chemistry(which just happens to be complex enough to be hard to make sense of).

      basically they're trying to argue that your SOUL is a quantum machine. it's stupid shit if you put it on paper out of context of 100 pages of quantum guesswork shit(another reason why it's stupid shit is that it's an obvious connection to make - and helps you if you need some reason for having done something random for stupid reasons, which would fit pretty much all quantum scientists, who unlike others might think that they're living perfectly rational lives when in fact from another viewpoint they're just wasting time pointlessly thus being the exact opposite of a rational being).

      --
      world was created 5 seconds before this post as it is.
    76. Re:What fallacy? by Thing+1 · · Score: 1

      Did the brain suddenly discover quantum mechanics when it reached a certain level of complexity? It seems improbable

      Actually, evolution taking advantage of natural phenomena does not seem improbable. Rather, it seems inevitable.

      --
      I feel fantastic, and I'm still alive.
    77. Re:What fallacy? by postbigbang · · Score: 1

      Parallel computing, and spawning "CPU threads" is a little like what the brain does. Today, there are heavy threads (cost in terms of CPU strokes used, memory displaced through the 'life cycle' of the thread, and so on). Light threads use less overhead, and per given set of launched resources, you can pack more light threads into a period of time as tasks.

      Boiling it, there are threads, CPU/core capacity for them within a delta of thread size, and latency per time domain. Some CPUs have interesting instruction sets, big word sizes, pre-fetch, and other enhancing technologies. Let me stroke my chin and offer a response that perhaps clarifies.

      Now I'm going to extrapolate, and QM is your field, as I'm just a shade-tree QM mechanic at best. The best entangled pair I know of is a retired couple down the street. My field for background purposes of this response, are very large systems. I'm no neurologist, but have an amateur's understanding of the brain. I'll start from there.

      States in transition are what computers and quantum mechanics are about. States are boolean anded together in inventive ways through a transition. We observe the transition and obtain results. When people realize that binary math is moshing transistor states together to obtain results, it's a let down for them. Yes, there are special math CPUs and CPU/functions of FP math that can whack complexity down in their own clever ways.

      The brain has multiple concurrent conscious activities going on all the time we're alive. There are fewer when we sleep. The activities draw on multiple concurrent, possibly iterative data sources. Summary so far for the brain: lots going on all the time in terms of concurrency. Kind of like parallelism, with fat and skinny threads being spawned and killed all the time. With age, like mine, there becomes latency for many geriatric reasons.

      In QM, particle states are related to each other across time and space. Binding of particles is transient; they are, and are then are not. Within the context of inside the brain, are states bound to either other either through the quantum effect or other synaptic-like connection? I don't believe there's a sufficient answer for this question today.

      If the quantum effect, either for memory or state transition influencing is possible inside the brain, then how about across brains, across wide distances. It would explain a lot of phenomena where people seem to know facts instantly about others that are identified as various descriptions of precognition, "psychic" events, even those related to spiritual observations.

      I don't know the answers, but there seems to be compelling cases to fit QM into the model for inexplicable events. In terms of computing, predictability is king. Systems sentience hasn't been proven at this point, although there are fascinating applications that mime this, as psychopaths and sociopaths mimic their absent emotive capabilities. We get closer to a programmed sentience, or (I use this hesitatingly) AI that can't be discerned from humanity. This is differentiated from what may be QM effects in the human mind, in its consciousness. I'm deeply interested in the science behind all this, as it's a "meaning of life" sort of question for me, personally.

      --
      ---- Teach Peace. It's Cheaper Than War.
    78. Re:What fallacy? by Rockoon · · Score: 1

      This allows them to say things about whether an algorithm will terminate that a Turing machine couldn't

      Yes, but when humans say things.. sometimes they are wrong, even when they 'understand' it.

      In essence, the argument here is applying a different standard for the turing machine than for humans.

      I always think back to the optimal sorting network problem, which is solvable in finite (yet prohibitively long) time. For many years the best sorting networks for even small N (such as 16) were crafted by humans, and algorithms were only coming close to (falling short of) the best known network sort.

      Later on however, algorithms were besting humans on the same problem. The computational time for proving optimality for N=16 is still prohibitive even after 40+ years of Moore's but never-the-less the computers surpassed humans in skill on this problem, as the best known network for N=16 was designed by a computer, something no human has matched.

      --
      "His name was James Damore."
    79. Re:What fallacy? by rich_hudds · · Score: 1

      It means being able to choose.

      No getting away from the fact that there is nothing in our current laws of Physics that suggest we are anything but predetermined.

      I had a fairly long argument with a guy a few weeks ago on here. I'm not especially clued up on the terminlogy although I have read Penrose and Dennett. It seems to me though that there are basically two sides to this entire argument. Those who believe in Free Will rightly point out that it requires something beyond our current Physics. In fact something incredibly radical that is akin to the 'Spiritual'.

      If you don't believe in Free Will you are going to sya that's unnecessary bollocks and everything can be explained by turing machines and deterministic physics.

      Most rational non religious types tend to instinctively fall into the 'no free will' camp as you can see from any Slashdot article that discusses consciousness. I don't think they've really thought through what that means though, it's just that they are unwilling to accept that we might be missing something so fundamental from our current understanding of Physics.

      As I've pointed out before though, if there is no free will then I had to write this and you have to write whatever you're about to write.

    80. Re:What fallacy? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I guess what he means that if you reason:

      1. There is quantum theory
      2. There is conciousness
      3. Quantum theory does not explain conciousness
      4. Quantum theory must be changed to explain conciousness

      Then you have made a faulty assumption that Quantum theory should explain conciousness in order to be correct, and in fact point 4 does not follow from point 3.

    81. Re:What fallacy? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Right, and us using antibiotics and giving birth in hospitals and using oil-powered machinery to grow our food is just letting evolution doing its work too. We're all about nature and shit.

    82. Re:What fallacy? by Comboman · · Score: 1

      To the contrary, if we are created in God's image, and God could create beings with free will, then we should be able to do the same. If AI requires an intelligent designer, isn't that the ultimate proof of a God?

      --
      Support Right To Repair Legislation.
    83. Re:What fallacy? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      So please explain how come a parrot lives ten times longer than a rat? Are the carbon atoms in a parrot aging ten times slower? How old *is* a carbon atom anyways, Mr Science?

    84. Re:What fallacy? by ShakaUVM · · Score: 1

      I suspect at some point we will come to terms with the fact that what we call "consciousness" is an emergent phenomenon of the brain, and that it is no more free than a glider in Conway's Game of Life.

      Bingo.

      Awesome. Now please explain the base element of the emergent property.

      In other words, ants and birds all follow a simple pattern, which leads to the sophisticated trailing/flocking behavior.

      But nobody knows what the most basic element of consciousness is. Calling it an emergent property adds absolutely nothing to the discussion... it's just kicking a ball further down the road.

    85. Re:What fallacy? by Jalfro · · Score: 1

      Maybe the fallacy is to assume that there is an explanation to be had here. (Assuming that by explanation, we mean a scientific cause-effect explanation.) In order to have a testable hypothesis, we would have to be able to specify empirically what we mean by consciousness. But consciousness is not an empirical event in terms of physics. The fact is consciousness is the ability to experience empirical events, it is not an emprical event itself. As soon as you ask 'what is consciousness', you have commited a category error, it is no kind of *thing* and therefore not a subject for scientific enquiry.

    86. Re:What fallacy? by oh_my_080980980 · · Score: 0

      RTFA:

      "So why is there this apparent connection between consciousness and quantum theory? Brooks calls it the "conservation of mysteries," where you have two separate mysteries, but for some reason, we think there must be causation (i.e. one mystery causes the other).

      This is along the same lines as the logical fallacy cum hoc ergo propter hoc ("with this, therefore because of this") and it applies to a whole host of scientific (and pseudo-scientific) reasoning. Just because quantum theory acts mysteriously, it doesn't mean quantum theory explains the mystery of consciousness."

    87. Re:What fallacy? by radtea · · Score: 1

      Or biology, or neuroscience, or...

      ...or quantum mechanics.

      This is the thing that kills me about Penrose, who is a mathematician: his claims fly in the face of everything we know about quantum theory. They amount to, "Quantum phenomena are a mystery, consciousness is a mystery, erg consciousness must be a quantum phenomenon."

      I take the opposite course (I am an experimental physicist who has applied QM to the real world quite a lot, and also worked in genetics and microbiology): Quantum phenomena are a mystery to beings with consciousness like ours. Far from explaining consciousness, quantum phenomena raise a huge question: why is our consciousness restricted to an awareness of a strictly classical world? Or as Max Born famously put it in response to Bohr's dictum: "Why must I treat the measurement apparatus as classical? What will happen to me if I don't!?"

      Decoherence theories do not answer this question because they take for granted that we are only able to gain an awareness of quantum phenomena by observing the classical effects of interference. That is, the accept that the measurement apparatus must be treated classically and have no account of why we are not and cannot be aware of incoherent superpositions as such.

      So I think Penrose has this issue exactly backward, and the really interesting questions are: "Why is there a classical world at all, and why is it the only world we can be conscious of?"

      --
      Blasphemy is a human right. Blasphemophobia kills.
    88. Re:What fallacy? by maxwell+demon · · Score: 1

      In QM, particle states are related to each other across time and space. Binding of particles is transient; they are, and are then are not. Within the context of inside the brain, are states bound to either other either through the quantum effect or other synaptic-like connection? I don't believe there's a sufficient answer for this question today.

      I don't believe it makes much of a difference. If the brain indeed managed to keep entangled states (that's the name for those states "related to each other across time and space"), it would be capable to use some quantum computing (I personally don't think there are inter-neural entangled states in the brain because entanglement is such a fragile resource and the brain is full of possible sources of decoherence, but I could of course be wrong about that). But as I said, that just would mean that it can solve certain problems faster. I cannot see how that should be related to consciousness (except that it might reduce the resources needed to generate it). It certainly cannot solve the question of consciousness, because for every quantum process there's, at least in principle, a classical process which can produce the same result (except that it uses vastly more resources, or needs vastly more time). So at best, quantum mechanics might explain why our brain is sufficient to produce consciousness. But it definitely won't explain consciousness per se.

      If the quantum effect, either for memory or state transition influencing is possible inside the brain, then how about across brains, across wide distances. It would explain a lot of phenomena where people seem to know facts instantly about others that are identified as various descriptions of precognition, "psychic" events, even those related to spiritual observations.

      No, it wouldn't. It's a central theorem of quantum information that entanglement doesn't allow you to transmit information (no-signalling). What you can use it for is to pack more information into one of the particles before sending it, than you could do without the entanglement (that's called "dense coding", or sometimes "superdense coding").

      Unfortunately in popular science texts entanglement is often described incorrectly (even by people who should know better) by phrases like "the second particle follows any change done to the first" or similar. Which is wrong. What you can do is "non-local random information generation" where variables which didn't have a defined value before become correlated values on measurement (and yes, one can prove that the value wasn't defined before, that's what Bell's inequality is about). That's already all of the non-locality in the quantum state. Note that this measurement breaks the entanglement. Also note that non-measurement interactions don't affect the other side at all. So say your particles are entangled in a way that if both parties emasure the same variable, they both get the same value. Now assume that one party, before measuring the value, makes a change which, if the value were defined, would cause that value to be changed, and then measures. Then the other particle does not change; the effect is the same as if he had measured first, and then changed the system (and accordingly adapted his result to reflect the change). Also note that whenever this happens, the signal you get on either side is just noise. It's only after you know the results of the other side as well that you can see any structure (in the form of correlations).

      Also note that quantum teleportation doesn't violate the principles written above either. To do quantum teleportation, you need to send classical information obtained by a measurement to the other party, and only with this classical information the other party can reconstruct the teleported quantum state. Therefore even here you cannot transmit information without explicitly sending a physical signal.

      So what does it mean for explaining "psychic" events with QM? W

      --
      The Tao of math: The numbers you can count are not the real numbers.
    89. Re:What fallacy? by postbigbang · · Score: 1

      Thanks for the answers, seemingly as unsatisfying as they are. A side communication reveals that a friend that's read this thread now imagines reincarnation through quantum spiritual movement might be possible (if you'll pardon the pun: in his mind). He may be disappointed.

      --
      ---- Teach Peace. It's Cheaper Than War.
    90. Re:What fallacy? by noodler · · Score: 1

      "quantum physics is weird, mysterious and counterintuitive... and consciousness is also weird, mysterious and counterintuitive. Therefore the former might explain the latter."

      Well, here you go.
      If i were to find a blue car and a blue fish could i then assume that because both items are blue the car will explain the fish?
      That is a fallacy right there.

    91. Re:What fallacy? by amRadioHed · · Score: 1

      Yes, please elaborate. It's been awhile since I read that book, but I don't remember him making any such proof.

      --
      We hope your rules and wisdom choke you / Now we are one in everlasting peace
    92. Re:What fallacy? by BiOFH · · Score: 1

      Causal Reductionism
      Affirming The Consequent
      Argument From Complexity
      Argument By Prestigious Jargon
      Argument From Outdated Information
      Argument From Personal Astonishment

      Take your pick... as we fall prey to Argument From Authority because it's Penrose, a man who knows mathematical physics but not necessarily neuroscience, making the argument.

      For me, neither a physicist nor a neuroscientist, complex adaptive systems theories seem more than adequate to explain us without having to invoke spooky physics. Each little addition to our overall intelligence creates a more and more complex system that develops and adapts and, as in our case, might eventually begin to notice itself and have its thoughts (which we just call 'cognition' in animals) then turn to considering itself. Ergo... consciousness. Penrose seems to need a still more 'mystical' answer (and not just on this subject...) and, without quite going so far as to invoke a deity, chooses the most mysterious and currently least-understood science to hang his god hat on.

      --
      - I am made of meat.
    93. Re:What fallacy? by Gripp · · Score: 1

      a hypotheses ought to come from some indication of the answer being in that general direction. this does not appear to be the case in this article. but to be fair, i'm a fan of the mathematical approach as being the most reliable. start with only facts. add theories and assumptions only if necessary and solve. then create tests to verify after the fact. starting with the tests and trying model the solution mathematically is more good but prone to issue. the best example is Newton vs Einstein. Newton started with what he knew was the answer and worked out the maths to predict the behavior. Einstein started with the math and found a number of conditions no one would have ever guessed - and proved that a number of Newtons theories were limited.

      starting with not even a test that indicates a possible theory, but merely what you feel should be the answer, is asking for a can of worms.

    94. Re:What fallacy? by Gripp · · Score: 1

      lol @ more good - i mis-edited. it should say "..is good but more prone to issue"

    95. Re:What fallacy? by Omestes · · Score: 1

      It seems to me though that there are basically two sides to this entire argument. Those who believe in Free Will rightly point out that it requires something beyond our current Physics. In fact something incredibly radical that is akin to the 'Spiritual'.

      I am a philosophy nerd, but I really don't know one way or another whether free-will exists or not. Personally I find it a somewhat meaningless argument. if we don't have free will, we must still ultimately act as if we do. So either way, if either stance is actually provable, it matters not one bit to our day to day existence. Also, I find the determinism (or quantum probability crowd, like Dennet) argument to be a bit fallacious (even if correct, it still shares more with religion than non-determinism); any action that is presented as non-deterministic is disprove by the simple statement that one was determined to do such.

      That said, saying that there can't exist currently unknown properties and laws in physics is pretty naive, and verges on pure hubris. In short, it is historically short-sided. I virtually guarantee that there exists things outside of the our current understandings. Whether these things allow free-will is a different story. Further, there will always be things existing outside of the physics-mathematical framework, since it is only a mere philosophical structure in which we shape pre-existing data points to meet. It does a damn good job, but there is no guarantee of completeness.

      If something existed outside of the system, how could the system ever prove its existence using its own framework? We've collectively accepted the current model, and organize data into it based on previous acceptance of the model since that is how we see the world. Currently this model accepts determinism, this doesn't make it so, necessarily.

      Back on topic, though... Just because you say there is something that we don't understand yet, doesn't make it spiritual. If Penrose thinks he found qualities within consciousness that are not compatible within the current framework, he is perfectly right in seeking, or postulating, something new. This is how science works. He might (and probably will) be proven to be completely wrong, but nothing is gained from not exploring that avenue.

      I'm more a fan of just saying that the whole determinism vs. free-will debate is meaningless, and basically boils down to our won inability to actually define consciousness in any meaningful way.

      --
      A patriot must always be ready to defend his country against his government. -edward abbey
    96. Re:What fallacy? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The universe is billions of years old and will last billions more... And you see no problem with your pitiful decades? Most of which are spent decaying and falling apart?

    97. Re:What fallacy? by Omestes · · Score: 1

      This is yet another "the nature of consciousness is unknowable" argument, which just leads to the idea that only a supreme being could possibly impart it to inanimate matter.

      I got kicked off of an an Atheists forum once for saying that one can hold "free-will" to be probable without buying into "God doing it", or any other senseless theistic argument. Science isn't complete, it never will be. There may be something existing outside of the current realm of knowledge that confirms our day-to-day knowledge of our own agency. Hell, there may even exist non-theistic things outside the realm of science that will always be completely unknowable to science (or the hypothetico-deductive model) based purely on non-compatibility with our modeling techniques (I do not claim that these actually exist, or that I believe in them, but that that they could, theoretically, exist).

      Saying that "scientism" is dumb, isn't the same as positing religion, or being anti-science.

      I personally think its a debate at all because we don't really even know what consciousness is. We don't even have a meaningful definition.

      Wait until the first true AI of significant power makes its appearance. Assuming it doesn't start out like Skynet and wipe us off the face of the planet, it's going to make for a lot of very red faces

      And that is coming in the next 10 years, right? As it always has been, and we really aren't much closer to it than we were than when we first decided it would happen in 10 years, around 60 years ago. Though I'm still not even sure AI would actually be meaningful at all. We are not computers, and computer intelligence would be very different in function than we are. That what always annoys me about the AI crowd, simulating a human is pretty meaningless. The whole AI feild would be better called "human simulation", since it has very little to do with "intelligence" as an ill-defined broad term. This also boils down to definition, since for some reason we define "intelligence" as "how close to human is it".

      If there was an intelligence that manifested itself in non-human terms, we would never recognize it as intelligent.

      --
      A patriot must always be ready to defend his country against his government. -edward abbey
    98. Re:What fallacy? by monoqlith · · Score: 1

      That's kind of the Daniel Dennett route, but I don't think it holds water. You still have to explain the capacity to have illusions. Experience is experience is experience - you can't dismiss it as nothing, because it's not nothing. It, in fact, is the thing we are most certain of, and the only thing we are rationally justified to believe in. It is the only situation we know of where appearance most definitely is reality. Daniel Dennett wants to deny that this problem exists by saying that qualia is too confused a concept to discuss. But it's just hard to discuss, because there still is a quality of what it's like for me to see red, and there's a reason when I see red that I don't see not-red instead.

      Why? It might very well be impossible to answer that question, but that doesn't mean that experience doesn't exist.

    99. Re:What fallacy? by Zaphod+The+42nd · · Score: 1

      I'm actually with you on that, not exactly my most insightful post :P.
      I just loved how clearly he stated the concept, and felt a need to voice my support.
      Shouldn't have gotten modded anything. Not troll, not informative.

      --
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    100. Re:What fallacy? by Zaphod+The+42nd · · Score: 1

      A neuron / Neural network node / dendrites & synapses ?

      The brain is more complex and has more nodes/elements/variables than any system we've ever studied. In time though, we'll come to understand it. Consciousness results from the propagation of signals through extremely complex networks with extreme levels of feedback.

      What else is there? :)

      --
      GCS/MU/P d- s:- a-- C++++$ UL++ P+ L++ E+ W++ N o K- w--- O M+ V- PS+++ PE Y+ PGP t+ 5- X R++ tv+ b++ DI++ D++ G+ e++ h-
    101. Re:What fallacy? by citylivin · · Score: 1

      If you cannot measure all of the variables, how can you say its not, for all intents and purposes, random?

      If we assume everything is determined by biology, or whatever, and you accept that we cannot necessarily see all the variables that go into creating a consciousness, then how can you then predict anything, when you dont have all the inital variables? (and perhaps never will)

      --
      As a potential lottery winner, I totally support tax cuts for the wealthy
    102. Re:What fallacy? by Zaphod+The+42nd · · Score: 1

      Is anything random? So far, nothing we've experienced has been random. Now, at the smallest scale, we can use probability to gain some accuracy, but that doesn't mean we can't find a better understanding in time.

      Regardless though, random isn't any better. Determined, or partially determined and partially random, either way its just noise added to the system, and its still a system. Doesn't imply free will like most people seem to extrapolate from the idea of random in the least.

      --
      GCS/MU/P d- s:- a-- C++++$ UL++ P+ L++ E+ W++ N o K- w--- O M+ V- PS+++ PE Y+ PGP t+ 5- X R++ tv+ b++ DI++ D++ G+ e++ h-
    103. Re:What fallacy? by Black+Parrot · · Score: 1

      Wait until the first true AI of significant power makes its appearance. Assuming it doesn't start out like Skynet and wipe us off the face of the planet, it's going to make for a lot of very red faces

      And that is coming in the next 10 years, right? As it always has been, and we really aren't much closer to it than we were than when we first decided it would happen in 10 years, around 60 years ago. Though I'm still not even sure AI would actually be meaningful at all. We are not computers, and computer intelligence would be very different in function than we are. That what always annoys me about the AI crowd, simulating a human is pretty meaningless. The whole AI feild would be better called "human simulation", since it has very little to do with "intelligence" as an ill-defined broad term. This also boils down to definition, since for some reason we define "intelligence" as "how close to human is it".

      People started off with high optimism ~60 years ago, but that bubble burst ~50 years ago. Almost no one in the AI field has been trying to build a sentient machine, and if anyone said it was 10 years away I'd dismiss them as uninformed or a crank.

      Also, "we" don't define intelligence as "how close to human it is", as you would know if you had read Chapter 1 of any AI textbook currently in use.

      --
      Sheesh, evil *and* a jerk. -- Jade
    104. Re:What fallacy? by Black+Parrot · · Score: 1

      Whoops, off-by-one (decade) error. That should have been ~50 and ~40, respectively.

      --
      Sheesh, evil *and* a jerk. -- Jade
    105. Re:What fallacy? by Jane+Q.+Public · · Score: 1

      I was much more impressed with "GÃdel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid" by Douglas Hofstadter. He also theorizes about consciousness and how it relates to computing and information theory. The book is a bit dry in places... wading through the number theory and so forth is not easy. But not only did I find his arguments vastly more compelling than those of Penrose, in my opinion the book itself is not just a textbook, but a work of art. And apparently I am not alone in that opinion: it won a Pulitzer.

    106. Re:What fallacy? by Jane+Q.+Public · · Score: 1

      Wow. That was supposed to be "Godel", with an umlaut over the "o", but apparently Slashdot is not set up to recognize UTF-8.

    107. Re:What fallacy? by Savantissimo · · Score: 1

      If consciousness is fundamental that seems to imply panpsychism extending to all quanta rather than a need for brains, let alone humans. The universe somehow had to cope before there were brains, after all.

      Also looking at how the distinguishing between two alternate possible future states (the "legs" of the trousers of time, lines of the Feynman diagram) of a given elementary particle can arise, it can only be the particle itself (the "waist" of the trousers, vertex of the Feynman diagram) that does the distinguishing, otherwise one would have to come up with an outside entity to distinguish them and a way of distinguishing that outside entity from both possibilities without separate interactions that would lead to an infinite regress. That ability to distinguish different possibilities could be considered particle proto-consciousness.

      --
      "Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery?" - Patrick Henry
    108. Re:What fallacy? by Prune · · Score: 1

      The neural basis for the experience of conscious awareness is well documented by Damasio and based on his and others' neurological research. The correspondence is too strong to discount it as coincidence. I'd strongly recommend Damasio's "The Feeling of What Happens", and on the QM side of this discussion, Mohrhoff's papers on arXiv.

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
    109. Re:What fallacy? by ShakaUVM · · Score: 1

      >>Consciousness results from the propagation of signals through extremely complex networks with extreme levels of feedback.

      So the internet is conscious, then?

      Be careful of making claims like this - handwaving ultimately is the basis for any theory of consciousness. I suspect the answer lies within information theory, but how or why is an absolute mystery to me.

    110. Re:What fallacy? by Black+Parrot · · Score: 1

      It means being able to choose.

      You may want to be more rigorous, unless you want to concede that cockroaches and robots have free will.

      Maybe rainclouds and roulette wheels too, depending how someone cares to interpret 'choose'.

      --
      Sheesh, evil *and* a jerk. -- Jade
    111. Re:What fallacy? by tragedy · · Score: 1

      The link you gave seems to pretty thoroughly debunk Penrose's argument.

      As far as free will goes... The way I see it, there are three possibilities:

      The first is that the universe is fully deterministic and that free will does not truly exist. A fully deterministic universe can very well be the case, even if there are unknown and unknowable rules. This further breaks down into two versions of the universe. In one of them, despite the fact that everything is predestined, it's impossible to actually predict the future, so we might as well act as if free will exists, even if we don't actually believe in it. In the other version, it's possible to predict the future and, if you check your Predictoscope (TM, patent pending) and see yourself in five minutes singing "I'm a little teapot" then, in five minutes, that's what you'll be doing whether you try to stop it or not. That would be a very strange universe. Of course, even that universe you might as well act like you have free will. After all, even if you do as predicted 100% of the time, it might still be because that's what you, and everyone else, actually wanted to do.

      The second is that the universe follows laws, but those laws, at certain scales, are truly random and the statistics of those truly random occurrences give rise to the rules that we can actually know. In such a universe, the future is unknowable, but it's hard to say that we would truly have free will either. We would still be drawn along inexorably by the currents of the universe, but the currents would be fundamentally random. So, in that case, it would be best to act like we have free will.

      The third is that the universe follows laws, but those laws, at certain scales, are affected by some currently unknown special sauce. This special sauce is the source of free will and is where the choices we make actually come from. The special sauce has no ingredient list. It's not made of anything and follows no internal rules whatsoever. Despite the complete lack of rules and completely unpredictable nature of the special sauce, it is also explicitly not random. No need to dig any further folks, completely ineffable stuff here. In that case, we truly have free will (although we also lose the ability to define what free will actually is in any way), so we might as well act like we have free will.

      It seems that, no matter what universe we're actually in, we might as well act like we have free will. After all, we have no choice but to exercise free will. If we sit and do nothing, that's a choice. If we sing "I'm a little teapot" that's a choice. If we read Heinlein's "By His Bootstraps", that's a choice. If we look at the Predictoscope to see what we'll be doing in a few minutes, that's a choice. Everything we do where we could possibly have done something else (or at least where it appears that we could have possibly done something else) is a choice.

    112. Re:What fallacy? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      If one explanation for a problem requires that two issues be linked and you can't falsify that explanation, then you are incorrect to assert that the two issues are separable. Whether they are separable is contingent upon the correct answer to the question.

      And yes, I tend to think of free will as being defined in terms of consciousness. Consciousness is the thing that exercises free will. But I don't see it as circular, so much as inextricably linked. I could imagine consciousness without free will, but I have a hard time thinking of free will without consciousness. Consider an analogous example: color is dependent upon the concept of vision, but that doesn't mean the definition is circular. Are you certain that this dependency does not exist?

    113. Re:What fallacy? by Dogtanian · · Score: 1

      I'm not certain of anything and never claimed to be. The two issues may be linked in one theory, but not being able to disprove that theory isn't the same as it having been proved. Therefore we can't assume in general that one implies the other outwith that particular line of unproven speculation, unless it is proven to be correct.

      For me, the fundamental problem is that although everyone thinks they are familiar with consciousness, no-one can really say for sure (at least to my satisfaction) what it actually is.

      Your "colour" analogy is flawed because while there are quite clear reasons why the concept of colour may be defined in relation to vision, the concept of "free will" is far more vague, let alone what it can be defined in terms of. Your statement "I have a hard time thinking of free will without consciousness" is- I believe- essentially because your definition of "free will" is in terms of consciousness. Hence IMHO it's circular.

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    114. Re:What fallacy? by rich_hudds · · Score: 1

      I guess I believe in your special sauce.

      One issue I have with your interpretation is that you keep saying that we may as well act as if we believe we have free will even if we don't.

      I've seen this 'argument' a lot and it makes no sense. if we don't have free will then you have no choice in how you act. It suggests to me that those people that think they don't believe in free will actually do, they just don't like to admit it as it means they too believe in your special sauce.

    115. Re:What fallacy? by rich_hudds · · Score: 1

      I really don't know one way or another whether free-will exists or not. Personally I find it a somewhat meaningless argument. if we don't have free will, we must still ultimately act as if we do.

      It's a strange thing to find meaningless since it is an argument about whether your life actually has a meaning.

      If we don't have free will, we can only act as if we do if that's what was predetermined or happens due to random factors, we have no choice about it.

    116. Re:What fallacy? by bytesmythe · · Score: 1

      You might be interested in the work of David Chalmers. His website has a lot of terrific resources about philosophy of mind, consciousness, cognitive science, etc. from a wide variety of philosophers with every perspective and theory you could imagine. Chalmers' book The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory is quite technical, but fascinating. The basic idea is that conscious perception is an intrinsic property of patterns, not just an emergent property.

      --
      bytesmythe
      Hypocrisy is the resin that holds the plywood of society together.
      -- Scott Meyer
    117. Re:What fallacy? by Omestes · · Score: 1

      It's a strange thing to find meaningless since it is an argument about whether your life actually has a meaning.

      I don't see it as such. If tomorrow scientists proved without any doubt whatsoever that we didn't have free will, my life would tick on exactly the same as normal. Yes, I'd have the knowledge that "life is meaningless now", but we're wired to accept our own agency (even if said agency doesn't exist), and as such it is impossible to act in anyway that isn't motivated by (the illusion of) free will. The structure of all of my experiences leads me to subjectively accept free will as a fact (even if I know academically that it isn't), and no amount of science will really change that.

      This flows from a couple things; the first is that scientific knowledge is always perceived as an abstraction. It isn't as "real" as my day to day experiences. I'm already quite sure that my life is meaningless from previous bits of scientific knowledge; such as the size of the universe and scope of time as compared to my meager existence. These facts don't change the fact that humans create subjective meaning, and exist as the center of experience, and thus have inflated importance.

      I know, for example, that in a pitiful short period of time I will be dead. Barring some great forthcoming acts on my behalf, I will be completely forgotten within 100 or so years. After that period, I might have never well existed in the fist place. In a bigger scope, my existence is so insignificant to might as bell be non-existent. On a purely human level, I am one anonymous face among billions of others. Etc...

      None of these bits of knowledge (all of which are true) really mar my sense of self-importance. Self-importance is a necessary fact of existence.

      As is agency. How does one act as if one doesn't have the freedom to act?

      That question is pretty much meaningless, unless one takes it as a Zen koan.

      The Continental philosophers have been playing this game for a lot longer than we (rationalistic anglophones) have. There was much whinging about the probably lack of a God and thats effect on our perception of meaning in the mid 20th century by philosophers such as Sartre. Heidegger and Camus approached the same or similar issues at roughly the same time. We've been in doubt of our own meaning for quite some time, and yet we carry on. We have to, we're wired for it.

      Life has no intrinsic meaning. All that exists is the ability for us, individuals, to create our own meaning. If somehow agency was destroyed tomorrow, this would mean that all of our individuals meanings are now intrinsic meanings... so... Life does have meaning.

      If we don't have free will, we can only act as if we do if that's what was predetermined or happens due to random factors, we have no choice about it.

      But if we discovered the lack of free will today, it changes nothing. We never had free will, even during our meaningful moments in the past. Does that discovery retroactively destroy all previous meaning? Will it actually change your life? Will you stop going to work, caring for your family, and occasionally going out with peers? How would this knowledge change anything? And if it did crush your inherent sense of meaning, then wouldn't that also be pre-determined, and thus something to just accept?
         

      --
      A patriot must always be ready to defend his country against his government. -edward abbey
    118. Re:What fallacy? by Omestes · · Score: 1

      People started off with high optimism ~60 years ago, but that bubble burst ~50 years ago. Almost no one in the AI field has been trying to build a sentient machine, and if anyone said it was 10 years away I'd dismiss them as uninformed or a crank.

      I dismiss most AI cheerleaders as cranks. I don't dismiss the normal, on the ground, researchers, just the people who make extraordinary claims about it. AI Prophets. AI, unlike most other fields, seems to be a bit infected by them. It has gotten better, but they still annoy the hell out of me.

      I really doubt that some researcher will yell "Let there be AI", and there will be AI. It will be like most things, an almost accidental emergence from divergent research pathways.

      Also, "we" don't define intelligence as "how close to human it is", as you would know if you had read Chapter 1 of any AI textbook currently in use.

      That wasn't very helpful. I don't have an AI textbook handy, and Google and Wikipedia prove bad resources since they offer many different definitions.

      You can't really deny that most people speak of AI as "human simulators" though, and that we will have "strong AI" once it acts like us.

      --
      A patriot must always be ready to defend his country against his government. -edward abbey
    119. Re:What fallacy? by multi+io · · Score: 1

      what do you doubt??? that a human brain can do something a turing machine cannot?

      Right, that part.

      you equate consciousness with brain?

      basically you are saying that you are a turing machine?

      The laws of physics themselves are Turing computable, for all we know. Since my brain certainly exists inside the physical world and behaves according to the laws of physics, it is equivalent to a Turing machine. That's the part that Penrose seems to be unwilling/unable to wrap his head around, hence his insistence that there must be some exotic physics in the brain that causes consciousness. I don't have to read his book to know that such an idea is a baseless, unfounded speculation.

    120. Re:What fallacy? by Black+Parrot · · Score: 1

      Also, "we" don't define intelligence as "how close to human it is", as you would know if you had read Chapter 1 of any AI textbook currently in use.

      That wasn't very helpful. I don't have an AI textbook handy, and Google and Wikipedia prove bad resources since they offer many different definitions.

      The Russell & Norvig book, which is supposedly the most used AI textbook in the English speaking world, gives a 2x2 categorization, which I'll paraphrase from memory as "thinks like a human", "acts like a human", "thinks rationally", and "acts rationally".

      I think they use "rationally" instead of "optimally" because optimal solutions for a lot of AI problems aren't tractable. So "rationally" ends up meaning something like "as near optimal as possible, given real-world constraints and (possibly) a lack of complete information about the problem".

      Almost all actual AI research falls into the "acts rationally" corner of their grid. Few AI researchers try to get their agents to act like humans, and essentially none try to get their agents to "think", whether like humans or otherwise.

      You can't really deny that most people speak of AI as "human simulators" though, and that we will have "strong AI" once it acts like us.

      Most people's ideas about AI are based on what they've seen in movies.

      --
      Sheesh, evil *and* a jerk. -- Jade
    121. Re:What fallacy? by tragedy · · Score: 1

      The argument makes perfect sense to me. The point really is that we have no choice but to act as if we have free will. Think about it, we cannot choose _not_ to have free will. Even if we kill ourselves, doing so is an exercise of free will (unless we're going to play stupid semantic games about what free will actually means. Predetermination is probably the way things work, but unless we're in a universe where the Predictoscope is possible then we don't know what our predetermined choices are, so they're just as good as true free will. If we can have Predictoscopes, we just have to suck it up and accept that we don't have free will, but there's nothing we can actually do without choosing to do so, therefore we have to act like we have free will. I really should rather have simply said that we have no choice but to act like we have free will rather than that it's better.

      It sucks, sure. It means that we keep locking up serial killers who didn't truly have a choice in what they did. The Universe made them do it. The thing is, if you don't lock up or at least try to treat serial killers, then they're pretty likely to kill again. You can go all nihilistic about your free will being an illusion, or you can decide that love is real, even if it is just a matter of circumstance, and that you'd rather not have your loved ones or those of anyone else hacked into bits. It is a pretty good reason to try to understand the circumstances that lead to people doing horrible things rather than simply concluding that some people are just evil and others are good and you just have to scour away the evil ones. Sure some people are good and some are just evil, but that is a result of their circumstances (this term encompassing their genetics, their upbringing, how warm it was on their fourth birthday and the precise velocity and position (screw you, Heisenberg :->) of every particle they're made of or have ever interacted with at every moment in time of their existence as well as a slew of other things, some of which we probably don't know about yet or maybe ever). If person A is good and person B is evil and you swap their circumstances then, unless you believe in special sauce, you've just swapped everything about them, so really you haven't swapped anything. If you do believe in special sauce, so that A now has the special source "soul" of B and vice versa then I'm still not going to believe you that B's soul with A's circumstances is still going to be good. Raise a person with a genetic propensity for psychosis in an abusive environment and give them the right opportunities for evil and I don't think special sauce provided free will is going to make a difference to their victims.

      The thing that really bothers me about the nature of special sauce is that it doesn't have one. It cannot be random and allow you to have "true" free will, but it also can't be deterministic or you've lost "true" free will that way as well. So, it has to be a third option. I can't understand what that third option would be. Also, from my understanding of what "to understand" actually means, if anyone could understand what the third option is, then free will would vanish again because understanding it would mean it follows some sort of rules and if it does, then free will is governed from outside by those rules and is therefore not free. So, if it, by definition, is not understandable, what's the point of trying to understand it? Just proceed acting as if you have free will and think what you like, whether or not what you like is determined by the state of the all containing universe or by something outside of the all containing universe (which would inductively need to be part of the all containing universe because it's all containing.

      So, because I can't understand an explicitly incomprehensible argument, does that make me a simpleton, or is it the person who believes that they can understand something that's actually incomprehensible who is being the simpleton or at least clinging grimly to some existential illusion. W

    122. Re:What fallacy? by rich_hudds · · Score: 1

      The thing is, if you don't lock up or at least try to treat serial killers, then they're pretty likely to kill again.

      This only makes sense if you think we still have Free Will. If we don't we have no choice about what we do with the knowledge that we don't.

      I certainly didn't mean to imply that anyone who thinks they don't believe in Free Will is a simpleton. That is clearly untrue. I just wonder whether they have really thought through what it entails, and why you are so convinced.

      I've just replied to another post about this though and I haven't much time. Gonna go and drink some more special sauce.

    123. Re:What fallacy? by rich_hudds · · Score: 1

      God I hate Slashdot sometimes. I wrote a fairly lengthy reply to this and for some reason it has disappeared. I need to learn to stop writing straight into the site.

      Anyway what I said in brief was, I have no problem with death, the size of the universe or the fact that I'll be forgotten. I didn't use to be alive, the universe is impressive, and although we do seem hardwired to want to leave an impressive legacy, we all differ as to what that entails and being remembered isn't a big part of mine.

      Not having any control over my own actions is a different matter altogether and I disagree with your idea that we could go on much as before if it was convincingly proved that we had no free will. this is a matter of opinion though.

      Penrose's main argument, although it does seem he now thinks Free Will is probably an illusion, stemmed from some basic facts which haven't changed even if his opinion has. Releativity and QM are mutually incompatable as formulated at the moment. QM also has an unexplained wave function collapse which requires an observer whose form is never explained. There are therfore plenty of holes in our current theories to allow for a free agents.

      My other point was to refute the idea that any explanation of Free Will could not be scientific. We could investigate what it takes for a consciouss entity to arise. I would fully expect that we couls come up with a theory that explains different degrees of consiousness that would allow different amount of free action on the universe. Ultimatley there would be a model that allowed for a conscious entity to make a decision and we couldn't predict that decision but we live with seemingly random events such as particle decay at the moment without giving up on Physics.

    124. Re:What fallacy? by Omestes · · Score: 1

      QM also has an unexplained wave function collapse which requires an observer whose form is never explained. There are therfore plenty of holes in our current theories to allow for a free agents.

      I always thought the "observer effects" stuff was a bit of a kludge, mixed with some unfortunate phrasing. IANAQP (quantum physicist), so I really can't say either way, but it seems to me that the "observe effect" is a mask for some deep misunderstanding or lack of knowledge. It leads to all sorts of loopy or paradoxical problems, even more so than other bits of QM.

      My other point was to refute the idea that any explanation of Free Will could not be scientific.

      It might be. If we ever "proved" free will it would be within the scientific frame-work.

      But beware of having a "free will of the gaps", it doesn't work very flatteringly for God. I find it much more likely that we will never be able to definitively prove it either way and thus we have more "hope born of ignorance" than actually having verifiable free will. Basically, the free will debate is very much like a religious debate.

      I have faith in my own agency, but I might just be predestined to have faith in my own agency... so...

      Which also brings up an interesting point, Christianity has had this same problem for a very long time; how can we be free if God is omnipotent/present? Which is worse than the scientific debate, since Christianity doctrinal depends on free will, which is paradoxical because of other bits of the doctrine. Actually, if the observe effect doesn't spring of our own ignorance, than free will within physics is pretty much the same as the previous arguments about free will within religious systems.

      I admit, I'm playing around here a bit.

      God I hate Slashdot sometimes. I wrote a fairly lengthy reply to this and for some reason it has disappeared. I need to learn to stop writing straight into the site.

      It is amazing that a site that has around 90% of its population being code geeks is coded worse than 90% of other websites. And oddly our masters are either unaware of the problems, or apathetic to them (my money is on the latter). That said, I generally use an external editor, or at least ctrl-c the full text of my reply every time I finish a paragraph.

      Go Slashdot. As much as I love you, you are a horrid source of daily frustration.

      --
      A patriot must always be ready to defend his country against his government. -edward abbey
    125. Re:What fallacy? by tragedy · · Score: 1

      The thing about special sauce is that, for it to work as advertised, we can't ever know whether it exists or not. If we could prove that it exists, then it would cease being magic and become a set of physical laws which would be either deterministic or random. We do have choices, it's just probably the case that those choices are predetermined. Knowledge of whether or not we really are predetermined, or random or full of special sauce wouldn't make a difference, we'd still have to make choices. Unless we want to sink into nihilism because we think there's no point in anything if there's no special sauce, we'd still lock up serial killers because we don't want ourselves or our loved ones hacked up and it would still be probable that they would kill again.

    126. Re:What fallacy? by ShakaUVM · · Score: 1

      Yeah, I've read his stuff.

      I disagree with his assertion that a digital thermometer is "a little bit" conscious, but I suspect the secret to consciousness to indeed be related to information theory somehow.

    127. Re:What fallacy? by ScrewMaster · · Score: 1

      Most people's ideas about AI are based on what they've seen in movies.

      Which tends to be polarized between Skynet and C-3PO, with not a lot in between (or outside) of those two extremes.

      --
      The higher the technology, the sharper that two-edged sword.
    128. Re:What fallacy? by ScrewMaster · · Score: 1

      I don't know whether machine consciousness is possible or not, but basing your position on the claim that "people will never be able to do that" has a long history of being wrong.

      True, and a lot of this depends upon how you define a "machine". Will an artificial intelligence be in the form of racks of microelectronics like HAL, or will it be something more organic in nature? I think that most people think of "machine intelligence" as having a lot of blinking lights on its front panel, but that may not be how it happens. They're already creating very simple synthetic organisms now, so growing a actual living brain (pardon me, "organic computer") doesn't seem out of the realm of possibility. It wouldn't even need to be as complicated as ours: much of our brains have nothing whatsoever to do with cognition but are just there to run our bodies.

      --
      The higher the technology, the sharper that two-edged sword.
    129. Re:What fallacy? by ScrewMaster · · Score: 1

      To the contrary, if we are created in God's image, and God could create beings with free will, then we should be able to do the same. If AI requires an intelligent designer, isn't that the ultimate proof of a God?

      That won't matter to many people, because only God can provide a soul (whatever that is, and whatever it happens to mean to those to who believe in them at any particular time) so such a mind, no matter that it's more capable than those of its creators, won't be real to them. Some people have real problems accepting that we are all just naturally-occurring organic machines, and have a pathological need to have their own lives validated by the existence of a Supreme being who (supposedly) created them to look kinda like him. and loves them too, sort of, that is when he isn't going all Skynet on them.

      To me, it's all unjustified and unjustifiable racial self-glorification that isn't borne out by the facts. But hey, I'm in the minority, and I could certainly be wrong.

      But I don't think so. I'd love to know for certain that there is an afterlife, that there is a Heaven, and that by doing certain things, by living my life in a certain way, I can be assured of my place there. The problem is, every religious order on this planet has a different idea of what the entrance exam is going to require, none of them can agree on precisely what we're supposed to do to cram for it, but ALL are convinced that theirs is the One True Way.

      That's kinda confusing for a guy like me. They can't all be right (or can they?) but in the end, I guess you just have to have Faith. Maybe if the billions of believers could get their collective act together and figure this out I might be convinced to Believe, but vague generalities and references to various Good Books don't cut it for me. As of right now it's pellucidly obvious that none of them have a clue as to what's going to happen when we all, at long last, go down into the dark. What they have is Faith, which is not the same thing.

      --
      The higher the technology, the sharper that two-edged sword.
  2. As the saying goes... by camperdave · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Quantum Mechanics: The dreams stuff is made from...

    --
    When our name is on the back of your car, we're behind you all the way!
    1. Re:As the saying goes... by oliverthered · · Score: 1

      I think the man knows not how he thinks and so want's to make some weird stuff up to explain what he can not explain.....

      Personally I believe there is my physical self and my metaphysical self and even though e=mc^2 he appears to be giving this a little too much weight and not enough energy.

      And I thought to myself, there must have been a first time a stone thought to fall off a waterfall.

      He really should try to work out how long a piece of string is first, and once he's triangulated that work out how he understands things... and maybe then triangulate that to work out the wisdom of the species... in deed in passion in madness.
      The search for knowledge is power, in deed.
      The search for the truth is wisdom, in passion.
      the search for salvation is insanity, in will.

      --
      thank God the internet isn't a human right.
    2. Re:As the saying goes... by oliverthered · · Score: 1

      I should add, the answer may be authoritative...... though there are some sensory differences and differences of order in authority too.

      --
      thank God the internet isn't a human right.
    3. Re:As the saying goes... by Darinbob · · Score: 1

      I don't understand quantum theory and it's really weird and spooky.
      I also don't understand consciousness and it's really weird and spooky.
      Therefore, there is a link between the two.
      QED!

      Seriously, I've see quite a lot of people with the "quantum theory is weird therefore it will explain weird stuff" style of thinking.

    4. Re:As the saying goes... by dargaud · · Score: 1

      Quantum Mechanics: The dreams stuff is made from...

      I never understood that quote. Wouldn't it better as:

      Quantum Mechanics: The stuff dreams are made of.

      --
      Non-Linux Penguins ?
    5. Re:As the saying goes... by Reilaos · · Score: 1

      The 'joke'/wordplay here is that Quantum mechanics often appears to be 'magic' (or dreams) which form the basis of reality (stuff).

    6. Re:As the saying goes... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Quantum Mechanics: The dreams stuff is made from...

      I never understood that quote. Wouldn't it better as:

      Quantum Mechanics: The stuff dreams are made of.

      The latter formulation would equate Quantum Mechanics with an enameled lead statue of a falcon.

  3. Electrons cause consciousness. by elucido · · Score: 0

    All consciousness relies on electrons. You cannot have consciousness without electrons. So this would be one place to look.

    But basically, if you don't have quantum consciousness you can't have consciousness on higher scales. So on some level these particles have self recognition even if it's through us. This doesn't answer whether or not there is free will, but the math is clear that if there is consciousness on the large scale it will also have to exist on the quantum scale. It's also proven mathematically that if free will exists on the large scale that it also has to exist somewhere somehow on the quantum scale.

    For this reason, the fact that the math supports it, it's worth doing research and experimenting on. The problem or fear I have is if we did discover what particle or wave function is responsible for consciousness, or how, we'd have governments around the world using these discoveries to enslave and oppress people. It's the kind of question that I'd personally want to know the answer to, but I also recognize that as soon as we find the answer, it will open pandora's box which governments and corporations intend to completely exploit.

    If we found a way to for example give consciousness to inanimate objects, or a way to have complete control over life in some way, or if we discovered that quantum computers could be made conscious, it would change everything probably for the worst because governments would then use this technology to enslave rather than use it in a transhumanist fashion. It would be used to make the perfect cyborg slaves, who have the mix of human consciousness, with the absolute obedience of a programmable robot. In essence this discover could lead to the end of "free will" as we know it, and lead to the beginning of technological slavery.

    And unfortunately no political party is truly anti slavery. So we'd be collectively fucked.

    Sources
    Quantum Entanglement Can be a Measure of Free Will
    The same experiments that reveal the nature of entanglement can also be interpreted as a measure of free will, say researchers.

    Do subatomic particles have free will?

    This means that the particle cannot have a definite spin in every direction before it’s measured, Kochen and Specker concluded. If it did, physicists would be able to occasionally observe it breaking the 1-0-1 rule, which never happens. Instead, it must “decide” which spin to have on the fly.

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_mind

    When he wrote his first book on consciousness, The Emperor's New Mind in 1989, Penrose lacked a detailed proposal for how quantum processing could be implemented in the brain. Subsequently, Hameroff read Penrose's book, and suggested that microtubules could be suitable candidates for quantum processing. The Orch-OR theory arose from the collaboration of Penrose and Hameroff in the early 1990s.
    Microtubules are the main component of a supportive structure within neurons known as the cytoskeleton. In addition to providing a supportive structure, the known functions of microtubules include transport of molecules including neurotransmitters bound for synapses and control of the development of the cell.
    Microtubules are composed of tubulin protein dimer subunits. The tubulin dimers each have hydrophobic pockets that are 8 nm apart, and which may contain delocalised pi electrons. Tubulins have other smaller non-polar regions that contain pi electron-rich indole rings separated by only about 2 nm, and Hameroff claims that these electrons are close enough to become quantum entangled.[11]
    Hameroff further proposed that these electrons could become locked in phase, forming a state known as a Bose-Einstein condensate.[12][13] Furthermore, he tho

    1. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by j00r0m4nc3r · · Score: 1

      You cannot have consciousness without electrons

      Well that goes without saying. You can't have anything in our universe without electrons...

    2. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by TeethWhitener · · Score: 1

      The solipsists would say that you can't have electrons without consciousness.

    3. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Seldom have I read such gibberish. You're worse than Penrose.

    4. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by elucido · · Score: 0

      You cannot have consciousness without electrons

      Well that goes without saying. You can't have anything in our universe without electrons...

      But can you have a universe without consciousness?
      No. So you answered the question.

    5. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by DeadDecoy · · Score: 3, Interesting

      Ok, can someone explain to me how consciousness is represented mathematically? I'm not aware of any theorem that proves you can't have consciousness on higher scales unless it occurs at the quantum level. Mostly because consciousness is usually dealt with as an abstract topic.

    6. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by RuiFerreira · · Score: 1

      Free will is not the most important here. If my decisions depend just on my current state (up to the atomic level) and, given that state, I would act the same way, there are no problems with that. Since my 'current state' depends on the lives of my ancestors (passed through their genes) and everything I experienced throughout my life, my current state is what I really am. Me. I don't know of any evidence that points to consciousness being linked with quantum mechanics and I don't see why it would need to be.

    7. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by TheCouchPotatoFamine · · Score: 1

      Yeah, i'm going to have to also pipe up and say this is from the pipe (dreams or otherwise). There is nothing in this post substantiative, indeed, there is nothing here but self-referential hogwash. Sorry dude.

      --
      CS majors know the time/space tradeoff, but they never get taught the 3rd, crucial, tradeoff of the set: comprehension!
    8. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by Holi · · Score: 1

      But can you have a universe without consciousness?
      No. So you answered the question.

      Says who?

      --
      Sorry, teleporters just kill you and then make a copy. A perfect, soul-less copy.
    9. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by elucido · · Score: 1

      It has been proven that free will would have to exist on the quantum scale if it exists at all. The math shows this.

      http://www.princeton.edu/main/news/archive/S23/69/84A24/index.xml?section=announcements

    10. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by elucido · · Score: 1

      Because if it's not linked with quantum mechanics then you are a robot and your consciousness or free will which you might want to believe you have doesn't really exist.

    11. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by Jeremiah+Cornelius · · Score: 3, Funny

      If a a man disagrees in the forest, where his wife cannot hear him, is he still wrong?

      --
      "Flyin' in just a sweet place,
      Never been known to fail..."
    12. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by BuildingSnowmen · · Score: 1

      But can you have a universe without consciousness? No. So you answered the question.

      Really? And how would one confirm or deny the existence of a "universe without consciousness" without observing it? If one can conceive of multiple universes existing, why couldn't one or more of those universes exist where there is no consciousness? "Ahh," you say, "it requires a consciousness to conceive of these multiple universes." However, even if you can't conceive of multiple universes, that doesn't mean they don't exist (and possibly without consciousness). Citation: Tree falling in forest.

    13. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by elucido · · Score: 1

      What is a forest without thoughts?

      That question you ask is bogus and a fallacy. You have thoughts so you have forests. You don't have thoughts and so you don't have forests. As far as consciousness goes it all brains down to free will on the quantum scale.

      If life is free, then it had to start at the quantum level. It's not like humans started out this complex, it took evolution. The same process would have to be found if we study brains and life to determine exactly what quantum processes take place in the brain when life begins.

    14. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by biryokumaru · · Score: 1

      Sometimes when you chase a ghost you find out that there's no such thing.

      --
      When you're afraid to download music illegally in your own home, then the terrorists have won!
    15. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by RuiFerreira · · Score: 1

      I agree with that. I'm just OK with a "fake" free will that depends on all my experiences and all those of my ancestors.

    16. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by DeadDecoy · · Score: 1

      There's no math in that link you posted. It's just a puff piece of well-known mathematicians trying to show that electron "free will" is equivalent to human "free will". And, it does nothing to define what consciousness actually is. I think you might have gotten too excited about the announcement before attempting to understand their material.

    17. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by elucido · · Score: 1

      But can you have a universe without consciousness?
      No. So you answered the question.

      Really? And how would one confirm or deny the existence of a "universe without consciousness" without observing it? If one can conceive of multiple universes existing, why couldn't one or more of those universes exist where there is no consciousness? "Ahh," you say, "it requires a consciousness to conceive of these multiple universes." However, even if you can't conceive of multiple universes, that doesn't mean they don't exist (and possibly without consciousness). Citation: Tree falling in forest.

      That is the point. Only the observable universe exists. No observers would mean no universe because there wouldn't be a thing in it to perceive of itself. This means either our current universe is conscious, or our current universe is an illusion. And I don't think both these theories can be right.

      So if it's an illusion, then consciousness is not real, when you look into the mirror thats not real, and nothing you observe or experience can ever be said to be with 100% certainty the real universe. Because in the universe typically you are going to see yourself as the most real thing in it, and if your consciousness is fake or illusion, then how would you jump to conclude that all these particles and other stuff you observe is anything more than information at best?

    18. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by John+Allsup · · Score: 1

      All consciousness relies on electrons. You cannot have consciousness without electrons. So this would be one place to look.

      But you cannot say that you can understand consciousness given only an understanding of electrons -- they are only a link in the chain.

      But basically, if you don't have quantum consciousness you can't have consciousness on higher scales. So on some level these particles have self recognition even if it's through us. This doesn't answer whether or not there is free will, but the math is clear that if there is consciousness on the large scale it will also have to exist on the quantum scale. It's also proven mathematically that if free will exists on the large scale that it also has to exist somewhere somehow on the quantum scale.

      For this reason, the fact that the math supports it, it's worth doing research and experimenting on. The problem or fear I have is if we did discover what particle or wave function is responsible for consciousness, or how, we'd have governments around the world using these discoveries to enslave and oppress people. It's the kind of question that I'd personally want to know the answer to, but I also recognize that as soon as we find the answer, it will open pandora's box which governments and corporations intend to completely exploit.

      I share that fear

      If we found a way to for example give consciousness to inanimate objects, or a way to have complete control over life in some way, or if we discovered that quantum computers could be made conscious, it would change everything probably for the worst because governments would then use this technology to enslave rather than use it in a transhumanist fashion. It would be used to make the perfect cyborg slaves, who have the mix of human consciousness, with the absolute obedience of a programmable robot. In essence this discover could lead to the end of "free will" as we know it, and lead to the beginning of technological slavery.

      I suspect, but cannot prove, that consciousness requires, in order to be able to affect physical reality, as a foundation, something with a non-discrete complexity like what we see in the brain.

      And unfortunately no political party is truly anti slavery. So we'd be collectively fucked.

      Sources Quantum Entanglement Can be a Measure of Free Will The same experiments that reveal the nature of entanglement can also be interpreted as a measure of free will, say researchers.

      Do subatomic particles have free will?

      This means that the particle cannot have a definite spin in every direction before it’s measured, Kochen and Specker concluded. If it did, physicists would be able to occasionally observe it breaking the 1-0-1 rule, which never happens. Instead, it must “decide” which spin to have on the fly.

      http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_mind

      When he wrote his first book on consciousness, The Emperor's New Mind in 1989, Penrose lacked a detailed proposal for how quantum processing could be implemented in the brain. Subsequently, Hameroff read Penrose's book, and suggested that microtubules could be suitable candidates for quantum processing. The Orch-OR theory arose from the collaboration of Penrose and Hameroff in the early 1990s. Microtubules are the main component of a supportive structure within neurons known as the cytoskeleton. In addition to providing a supportive structure, the known functions of microtubules include transport of molecules including neurotransmitters bound for synapses and control of the development of the cell. Microtubules are composed of tubulin protein dimer subunits. The tubulin dimers each h

      --
      John_Chalisque
    19. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by elucido · · Score: 1

      I agree with that. I'm just OK with a "fake" free will that depends on all my experiences and all those of my ancestors.

      If you are a robot do you mind being treated like one? Do you care if you get treated as fake?

      There are political implications.

    20. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by John+Allsup · · Score: 1

      Nobody has shown that free will can effectively be represented mathematically. And, in my opinion, there is plenty of room at the quantum level for consciousness to manifest at higher levels (of meaning).

      --
      John_Chalisque
    21. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by somersault · · Score: 1

      Oops. My comment was unnecessary, you made the point much better.

      --
      which is totally what she said
    22. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by jhoegl · · Score: 1

      The point that is being made is, that if nothing is conscious (read: can understand its surroundings and what it means to them), nothing serves a purpose, therefore, nothing exists.

    23. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by kayumi · · Score: 0

      You cannot have consciousness without electrons

      Well that goes without saying. You can't have anything in our universe without electrons...

      Except for Asimov's robot's positronic brains.

    24. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by oliverthered · · Score: 1

      I can think of nothing more like free will than walking around thinking your Jesus when everyone else says your not.... if it where not for the fact that Jesus is mentioned in the bible.

      Free will is a time domain paradox... you can have will free that fine.

      Anyhow, I thought they already pretty much proved that free will is a load of bollox just don't tell anyone or they may believe you.

      --
      thank God the internet isn't a human right.
    25. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by John+Allsup · · Score: 1

      Even then, you have to look critically at the assumptions that the math you refer to makes. All rational reasoning requires assumptions, and depends on the soundness of these assumptions for the reliability of its conclusions. It has been proven that, if X, Y, Z, T, (whatever these assumptions are), then if free will exists in the sense of a human observer being able to choose, then free will exists in some sense at the quantum scale.

      --
      John_Chalisque
    26. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by similar_name · · Score: 1

      All poo relies on electrons. You cannot have poo without electrons. So this would be one place to look.

      But basically, if you don't have quantum poo you can't have poo on higher scales. So on some level these particles have diarrhea even if it's through us. This doesn't answer whether or not there is IBS, but the math is clear that if there is poo on the large scale it will also have to exist on the quantum scale. It's also proven mathematically that if IBS exists on the large scale that it also has to exist somewhere somehow on the quantum scale.

      See what I did there?

    27. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by Tr3vin · · Score: 1

      Are you positive?

    28. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by DeadDecoy · · Score: 1

      Ok, thanks. This is what I was looking for. Unforunately, it will take me a while to grok it can some up with a sensible reply.

    29. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by RuiFerreira · · Score: 1

      I don't see how free will is connected with consciousness. From my point of view, consciousness is the awareness of process of accessing my experiences/memory and make a decision/act according to that. Usually in (what i think is) my best interest. We can even justify the decisions (and so we are very aware of the process), but i would not say that's a requirement to have a conscience. Free will is something different, It's the question of the amount of liberty you have to take whatever decision. What I defend is that the decision one wants to take is defined by who one is. If who you are is defined at an atomic level there is no need of a subatomic brain to have free will.

    30. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by Old+Wolf · · Score: 1

      You can have quarks, radiation, positrons, muons...

      There might be entire galaxies of antimatter that contain no electrons

    31. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by blind+monkey+3 · · Score: 1

      If a man disagrees in the forest, where his wife cannot hear him, is he still wrong?

      The version I told some friends was if a man says something in the forest where his wife can't hear him, is he still wrong?
      My friend's wife was distractedly listening while fixing her six year old daughter's jumper. The daughter asked her mum What did he say?
      Without thinking, she replied if a man says something his wife can't hear, he is still wrong. We all looked at her and asked what was that? She repeated it again, didn't even realise it was not what I said.
      So the answer, quite obviously, is yes.
      With quantum theory everything exists in all states, the only exception is: a husband can only be wrong.

      --
      BM3
    32. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by SanityInAnarchy · · Score: 1

      All consciousness relies on electrons. You cannot have consciousness without electrons.

      In the purest sense, yes, but that's because consciousness lives in brains, which are composed of matter, and matter, at least in our universe and in the environments in which we find brains, has electrons. So what's your point?

      So this would be one place to look.

      But why on earth would you start there?

      If you wanted to understand how an OS worked, where would you start? If you started with individual electrons, you'd be taking the long way. Even without source code, you want to be working at a much higher level. I mean, if you didn't understand what a transistor is, or what it does, you might have trouble, but don't we know enough things about neurons that we don't have to analyze individual electrons running through them?

      But basically, if you don't have quantum consciousness you can't have consciousness on higher scales.

      Let's start with: WTF is "quantum consciousness"? The closest a quick Google shows is a hypothesis that classical mechanics cannot explain consciousness, which runs contrary to the fact that neurons are big enough that classical mechanics handle them quite well, and quantum mechanics can be largely ignored as noise. This is mentioned in the Wikipedia article you linked to.

      And how do you define consciousness mathematically, let alone "prove" that it cannot exist with purely classical mechanics?

      I'm not sure the rest of your comment has much of a point unless you can make this one hold, but let's try anyway:

      The problem or fear I have is if we did discover what particle or wave function is responsible for consciousness, or how, we'd have governments around the world using these discoveries to enslave and oppress people.

      They're already doing this with much more pedestrian means, like psychology and threats of force. I'm not really sure how this would be different.

      If we found a way to for example give consciousness to inanimate objects,

      Like what, other than computers? And how would you distinguish a conscious computer from one which merely simulates consciousness?

      It would be used to make the perfect cyborg slaves, who have the mix of human consciousness, with the absolute obedience of a programmable robot.

      How is this better for a government than having a programmable robot?

      --
      Don't thank God, thank a doctor!
    33. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by RuiFerreira · · Score: 1

      Nevertheless it would be cool to have my brain factorizing integers faster ;)

    34. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by Have+Brain+Will+Rent · · Score: 1

      Ahhhh another bachelor.....

      --
      The tyrant will always find a pretext for his tyranny - Aesop
    35. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by turbidostato · · Score: 1

      "If you are a robot do you mind being treated like one? Do you care if you get treated as fake?"

      By whom? If he is neither less robotical nor more authentic than me, then I see no way his will would be considered superior to mine. Then, Kant's categorical imperative is again enough for an acceptable ethic.

    36. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by BuildingSnowmen · · Score: 2

      That is the point. Only the observable universe exists.

      Citation needed. It might appear that only the observable universe exists, but that may not be the case, unless you want to get into semantics regarding "exists". I would be hesitant to say with 100% certainty that there is only one universe. How would that be possible for anyone to know? What's to prevent other, separate universes from existing, both ones with and ones without conscious observers within them?

      No observers would mean no universe because there wouldn't be a thing in it to perceive of itself. This means either our current universe is conscious, or our current universe is an illusion. And I don't think both these theories can be right.

      While you might think both these theories can't be right, there are millions of Hindus who think exactly the opposite, in the concept of "maya".

      So if it's an illusion, then consciousness is not real, when you look into the mirror thats not real, and nothing you observe or experience can ever be said to be with 100% certainty the real universe. Because in the universe typically you are going to see yourself as the most real thing in it, and if your consciousness is fake or illusion, then how would you jump to conclude that all these particles and other stuff you observe is anything more than information at best?

      One can take another tack and look at Buddhism, which doesn't necessarily consider the everyday experience as illusion, only that what you consider "real" is not the only permanent reality. More accurately, the illusion is that you (your consciousness) and the universe are distinct entities. It's like each drop of seawater proclaiming, "There's the ocean, and then there is me."

    37. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by wytcld · · Score: 2

      Classical physics describes a mechanical universe in which everything is fully pre-determined, such that conscious awareness of things can make no difference at all in outcomes and actions. As such, there would be no basis for consciousness to be selected for by evolution. As such, there would be no reason to expect consciousness to be part of biological creatures.

      Therefore either classical physics suffices, and we have no free will, and possibly aren't even really conscious, in fact most likely aren't ... or else classical physics is only a crude approximation of the universe quantum physics describes. At a minimum, quantum physics describes a universe which is not deterministic. There are some who argue that it nonetheless only introduces chance, still leaving no reason for biology to include consciousness, or method for consciousness to alter the course of ones life.

      But there are others who argue that quantum physics at least opens the door to a true explanation of consciousness. And if you're satisfied that there's an explanation for consciousness in a universe in which it could not, literally, have evolved, because it provides no advantage to select for since every motion of matter is predetermined independently of it, well, good luck getting through life. Because to live like that would be to be clinically insane. And some of us perceive that would have dire consequence. If it does, if we're right, then classical physics is insufficient for explanation of consciousness, so we move to the next available candidate, quantum physics. Or the successor thereof at which Penrose points.

      --
      "with their freedom lost all virtue lose" - Milton
    38. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by Artifakt · · Score: 1

      Try Zen Buddhism. For the novice, Moutains are Mountains.(naive realism). With progress, Mountains are not Mountains (our current universe is an illusion). With enlightnment, Mountains are again Mountains - only the one who sought the Way has changed (Our current universe is conscious(ness)). I'm not claiming to have personally made the journey that begins and ends on the Zeroeth step, mind you, just that that seems to be the theory.

      --
      Who is John Cabal?
    39. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by Artifakt · · Score: 1

      Add Neurtonium to your list (unless you count all those electrons that have been combined with protons to make neutrons, but Quantum Chromodynamics tells us that they aren't just packed into neutrons, instead, for each one, a quark has changed flavor, so I think that counts as the electrons being quite sincerely gone.).

      --
      Who is John Cabal?
    40. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by elucido · · Score: 1

      How is this better for a government than having a programmable robot?

      If they are going to make sex slaves it would probably be best if they were at least human looking.

    41. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by RuiFerreira · · Score: 1

      Interesting view. (1) I would say consciousness is useful from the social point of view since we can explain our actions and change other's. It's an evolutionary advantage that we can exchange lower level information between us and not just 'act' as the only causality. I also can say that, as we are not very efficient analyzing every situation, we have some feelings, sensations, and gut instinct. The fact that we are conscious and can get input for the conscience of others and act against this instinct also has evolutionary advantages. I understand that in an hypothetical world with no randomness things are predetermined but it's still a chaotic system and the interactions we have with each other affect the behavior of the system. Being conscious changes these interactions and is still an advantage from the evolutionary point of view. (2) I'm not disputing that there is quantum mechanics black magic happening in the world and randomness - although i'm not an expert in this, it seems to be well founded and experimentally testable. Wouldn't it be enough to have randomness around us and in some chemical processes going inside us - without our brain being this machine to do amplification of quantum effects to compute incomputable functions, like Penrose defends?

    42. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by Ichoran · · Score: 1

      This is seriously confused. Think a little more about limits of observability and emulation with a Turing machine, eh? Unless you postulate a nonphysical acausal soul that is experiencing consciousness, said Turing machine emulation will be identical to reality for everything including the beings in it. So for any meaningful sense of consciousness or free will, quantum mechanics is an implementation detail, not an absolute necessity (with consciousness therefore being ascribed back to quantum mechanics).

    43. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by DamnStupidElf · · Score: 1

      Classical physics describes a mechanical universe in which everything is fully pre-determined, such that conscious awareness of things can make no difference at all in outcomes and actions. As such, there would be no basis for consciousness to be selected for by evolution. As such, there would be no reason to expect consciousness to be part of biological creatures.

      Your definition of consciousness is inherently non-deterministic. Of course non-deterministic consciousness will not evolve in a deterministic universe. But deterministic consciousness is perfectly possible. You make it sound as if being consciously aware of things is entirely separated from any physical action, but that is simply not the case. Our conscious thoughts, even if they are fully deterministic, alter the state of the universe in ways that would not happen if we did not have consciousness.

    44. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by digitalchinky · · Score: 1

      How does death fit in to this concept? If I cross a road I could potentially be hit by a vehicle and killed, or not. As an observer of "information" I could see this happen to other people, but could death happen to me if I still have choices left to make? Would the universe split off and the "me" that chose not to cross, survives, the other me dies - would this mean consciousness lives on until old age for the individual, always?

    45. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by j00r0m4nc3r · · Score: 1

      You can have quarks, radiation, positrons, muons...

      There might be entire galaxies of antimatter that contain no electrons

      You'll notice I said "our universe". If you take electrons out of the picture, our universe as we know it would not exist. I never said no universe could exist, just the one we are experiencing right now...

  4. Recently? by roguegramma · · Score: 3, Informative

    By "recently" you mean "in the previous century"? He's been arguing this since his book "The Emperor's New Mind" in 1989. Maybe he has some new ideas, but your summary doesn't tell..

    --
    Hey don't blame me, IANAB
    1. Re:Recently? by Angostura · · Score: 5, Interesting

      Indeed, I waded though The Emperors New Mind when it was first published and was very disappointed. As far as I could tell, the argument was something along the lines of "consciousness is mysterious and complex and hopefully non-deterministic. Quantum effects are mysterious and complex and non deterministic. Consciousness is probably a quantum-based phenomenon then".

      So I went back to reading Dennett and Hoftstadter.

    2. Re:Recently? by RuiFerreira · · Score: 1

      The rest of the book is pretty good, tho.

    3. Re:Recently? by djl4570 · · Score: 2

      I read both The Emperor's New Mind and Gödel Escher Bach, An Eternal Golden Braid when they first came out and thought the GEB offered a lot more insight into consciousness, thought, self awareness, and self referential structures. At the physical level quantum mechanics explains the chemical reactions and electrical potentials in the wetware. Going beyond the physical layer and looking for quantum mechanics in consciousness sounds a lot like Sheldrake's morphogenetic field.

    4. Re:Recently? by Unequivocal · · Score: 1

      Exactly the same thing happened to me - and I went back to H&D as well! Funny.

      I think he makes this argument on the bet that it'll be proven true later by someone smarter, but b/c he staked his (totally unsupported) claim now, he'll get all the credit for being the "true father" of the theory of consciousness.

      Seems like a reasonable guess to say that consciousness depends on quantum behaviors, but only at the level of rigor of two guys in a bar over a beer.. But b/c this guy has a big reputation in other areas, he can leverage it for a big win later maybe.

    5. Re:Recently? by jd · · Score: 1

      After his example of the Chinese Room, in which he failed to grasp the obvious (that the observation bears multiple interpretations, including the one he doesn't want to make), I ceased to regard the Emperor's New Mind as being all that interesting. His points on teleportation in that book were more interesting and more valid. A book on those would have had greater value.

      --
      It's a small world and it smells funny; I'd buy another if it wasn't for the money; Take back what I paid (SoM)
    6. Re:Recently? by mellon · · Score: 2

      A much better book for this is Anathem, by Neal Stephenson. Because it's fiction, and he never actually says what his theory of consciousness is, you just get to try to figure out what he thinks it might be, and he drops enough hints to let you construct a pretty interesting theory. I enjoyed it a lot.

      We don't actually have a clue how consciousness arises, despite lots of research into the field, so speculation is pretty much all we have. Although there are plenty of neurologists who think their speculation is fact...

    7. Re:Recently? by Burnhard · · Score: 3, Interesting

      Which goes to show how people prefer reading material that confirms their already strongly held opinions.

      I also read both Hoftstadter and Dennett. The former made a similar mistake to the one you accuse Penrose of making: attaching almost mystical properties to the concept of recursion and the emergence of complexity. Dennett has similar problems, but more than that he has mistaken a model of cognition for a model of conscious experience. He side steps the explanatory gap by simply denying it exists, just as Hoftstadter denies it by promoting the idea that it is simply an emergent property, without being about to explain exactly what the nature of that property actually is.

    8. Re:Recently? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Indeed, I waded though The Emperors New Mind when it was first published and was very disappointed. As far as I could tell, the argument was something along the lines of "consciousness is mysterious and complex and hopefully non-deterministic. Quantum effects are mysterious and complex and non deterministic. Consciousness is probably a quantum-based phenomenon then".

      So I went back to reading Dennett and Hoftstadter.

      You didn't understand it then. The argument was closer to: "humans are able to figure out a priori that something is likely to halt or not; computers are not; therefore humans are not computers and consciousness cannot be reduced to computation". His speculation about quantum mechanics and consciousness is based on an analogy between the "collapse of the waveform" and thought. It has nothing to do with either one being non-deterministic because even something non-deterministic can be computable. He goes on to say that while the analogy is suggestive a lot more work will need to be done on quantum mechanics for it to explain consciousness and to the extent that it cannot it is incomplete. It's still a crap argument but it's still a hell of a lot better than your pathetic synopsis. Dennett and Hoffstadter are no better, worse in many ways. Stick with someone that actually knows how the brain works like Edelman.

    9. Re:Recently? by ohnocitizen · · Score: 1

      Neither Dennet's "Consciousness Explained" (away) nor Chalmer's various "zomg zombie" arguments, however compelling, seem to get us any closer to understanding what consciousness is. Applying Quantum theory is almost adorable... like physicists want their very own god of the gaps.

      1. Something not yet explained (what the hell IS consciousness itself?)
      2. Add something mysterious with a dash of causal perfume
      3. ???
      4. Profit.

      Maybe someday we will figure out a way to figure out what consciousness itself is, but we are not close to that day yet.

    10. Re:Recently? by SQL+Error · · Score: 1

      I also read both Hoftstadter and Dennett. The former made a similar mistake to the one you accuse Penrose of making: attaching almost mystical properties to the concept of recursion and the emergence of complexity.

      Except that he doesn't. He shows precisely how recursion and self-reference form a basis for the emergence of complexity.

      Dennett has similar problems, but more than that he has mistaken a model of cognition for a model of conscious experience. He side steps the explanatory gap by simply denying it exists, just as Hoftstadter denies it by promoting the idea that it is simply an emergent property, without being about to explain exactly what the nature of that property actually is.

      Wrong again. Dennett demonstrates that there is no explanatory gap. Chalmers and his ilk are left with no ground to stand on.

    11. Re:Recently? by divisionbyzero · · Score: 4, Informative

      Indeed, I waded though The Emperors New Mind when it was first published and was very disappointed. As far as I could tell, the argument was something along the lines of "consciousness is mysterious and complex and hopefully non-deterministic. Quantum effects are mysterious and complex and non deterministic. Consciousness is probably a quantum-based phenomenon then".

      So I went back to reading Dennett and Hoftstadter.

      Then you didn't understand it. His argument was more like: "Human are capable of recognizing when an algorithm will halt (or not); computers are not; therefore thought cannot be reduced to computation". It has nothing to do with the non-deterministic nature of quantum mechanics because even non-deterministic outcomes are computable. His speculation about consciousness and quantum mechanics is based on an analogy between the "collapse of the waveform" and thought. Even though the analogy is suggestive, according to Penrose, quantum mechanics cannot fully explain consciousness (because of consciousness's supposed non-computability) and to the extent that it cannot quantum mechanics is incomplete. It's still a crap argument but it's a hell of a lot better than your caricature. Dennett and Hoftstadter are even worse in many ways. They, like Penrose, are stuck on artifacts of theory. Stick with people that know how the brain actually works, like Edelman.

    12. Re:Recently? by divisionbyzero · · Score: 1

      I also read both Hoftstadter and Dennett. The former made a similar mistake to the one you accuse Penrose of making: attaching almost mystical properties to the concept of recursion and the emergence of complexity.

      Except that he doesn't. He shows precisely how recursion and self-reference form a basis for the emergence of complexity.

      And complexity != consciousness. Next.

      Dennett has similar problems, but more than that he has mistaken a model of cognition for a model of conscious experience. He side steps the explanatory gap by simply denying it exists, just as Hoftstadter denies it by promoting the idea that it is simply an emergent property, without being about to explain exactly what the nature of that property actually is.

      Wrong again. Dennett demonstrates that there is no explanatory gap. Chalmers and his ilk are left with no ground to stand on.

      The reduction of consciousness to cognition, even in an expanded sense, is nonsense, literally. Dennett's course is decisively determined by the Cartesian dualism he rejects.

    13. Re:Recently? by Rakishi · · Score: 1

      "humans are able to figure out a priori that something is likely to halt or not; computers are not; therefore humans are not computers and consciousness cannot be reduced to computation"

      So you're saying that his whole argument is based on incorrect facts? There is nothing showing that humans can figure out if an arbitrary program will halt (you know given infinite input and all the other jazz). Likewise there is nothing saying computers can't figure out halting for certain algorithms.

      The argument boils down to "computers aren't as intelligent at creative problem solving as humans and therefore humans cannot be reduced to computation." Which is bunk. It's like saying "monkeys aren't as intelligent at creative problems as humans and therefore humans cannot be reduced to biological neurons."

    14. Re:Recently? by aaronszy · · Score: 3, Insightful

      "Human are capable of recognizing when an algorithm will halt (or not); computers are not; therefore thought cannot be reduced to computation"

      This isn't really right. humans are capable of recognizing when SOME algorithms will halt. That isn't very spectacular, computers can do the same. Solving the halting problem would mean being able to recognize whether ANY algorithm will halt without resorting to dumb brute force methods. Humans are limited just as much as computers in this respect.

    15. Re:Recently? by geek42 · · Score: 1

      Stick with people that know how the brain actually works, like Edelman.

      I'd missed Edelman until now... he doesn't seem to come up as much in conversation as the others. Looks like good reading. What/who else can you recommend?

    16. Re:Recently? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      IMO, Hofstadter does pretty interesting work in the realm of simulating analogical thinking, and I agree with him that analogical thinking is worth investigating in order to understand characteristically human thinking. As an exploration of purely functional capacities, his computational models seem to be quite relevant. But he's unusually stuck on the idea that the properties of self-referential statements somehow elucidate self-consciousness. And this area of his work seems to be completely unrelated to his work on analogical thinking.

      Dennett's main worthwhile contribution is the "multiple representation" model. But he pulls off this argument just by changing the classical philosophical definition of representation to a kind of data transformation. So if a person has an optical image, everywhere that information exists in the brain at various stages of processing, in any form, is a "representation." This is a very different definition of representation than the concept of a prototype or conceptual exemplar, which is not a useful neurophysiological construct. That's all fine, but his general picture of the brain as a chain of information processing units that runs from perception to reaction is his main problem, because it remains very traditional. Still, his ideas, relative to those of analytical philosophers, are more realistic.

      By comparison, I have always thought Penrose's theories about consciousness are out in left field. The basic premise that "thought" or "consciousness" can be reduced to computation is untenable, and so any sophisticated argument against that premise is also going to be nonsense. In the "consciousness" literature, people treat consciousness as if it is what makes human beings characteristically human. It's the contemporary analogue of the concept of the soul, Geist, or psyche; it's the last non-physical, non-objective remainder of the soul. But consciousness, if it's not thought of as being something mystical, is a basement-level "property" of animal life. All animals exhibit consciousness in an obvious way. (In order to extend consciousness to prokaryotes, eukaryotes, and plants, one would have to stretch the definition, but not necessarily beyond all utility.) A person in a persistent vegetative state exhibits certain features of consciousness: looking around the room, scratching, shifting position, withdrawing from certain stimuli, etc. If we constructed an artificial "consciousness," we would have a machine that mindlessly responded to the environment in a similar way, because it would lack the purposive structure that all organisms have. What really distinguishes human beings from animals is our dependence on socialization, our drive to communicate, a sense of a well-determined objective world, language and sign use, and tool use, along with a cultural tradition resulting from these. All of those characteristics are only relative to the characteristics of certain animals that might have some capacities to use signs and tools and that might observe certain conventions and rely on the passage of information and teaching of practices between generations.

      Of course there are certain neurological underpinnings to consciousness. If we found out that the phenomena of consciousness best corresponded with a complex ratio of functional activities of sets of brain modules on multiple levels of structural organization, that wouldn't surprise me, and it would no doubt be a finding that would have profound applications, many of them quite horrifying. But consciousness, in my opinion, is one of the least specific cognitive properties of human beings, and the entire approach taken by this literature has turned me into the curmudgeon I appear to be right now.

    17. Re:Recently? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      If "He side steps the explanatory gap by simply denying it exists," give precisely the measurable phenomenon which must be accounted for.

      Remember, QM was developed by empirical science on the basis of data, and we all have access to those data - they do not involve mystical hand waving.

    18. Re:Recently? by Paradigma11 · · Score: 1

      I can recommend Ryles Concept of mind: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Concept_of_Mind http://www.scribd.com/doc/7003453/Gilbert-Ryle-The-Concept-of-Mind

      Late Wittgensteins philosophical investigations or Quine, especially his: http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_What_There_Is is also brilliant, and makes this confusions go away.

      The problem is that you only hear non quietistic solutions since the quietistics ones are, well, quiet :)

    19. Re:Recently? by Prune · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Penrose's argument from Emperor's New Mind and the updated version in Shadows of the Mind has been formally refuted: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.36.260&rep=rep1&type=pdf

      Beyond this, Penrose is refuted by physics. The holographic principle and its near-corollary, the Bekensten bound, guarantees that one cannot build a physical artifact more powerful than a Turin machine (finite number of distinguishable quantum states in a region of finite surface area => there are no arbitrary-precision real numbers in physics in a finite space => no super-Turing machines possible). Indeed, restricting ourselves to artifacts with finite spatial extent, any physical object can at best have the power of a mere linarly bounded automata (though non-deterministic one, due to QM, which is more powerful than its deterministic counterpart, but still less powerful than a Turing machine). Unfortunately, our brain happens to be a physical artifact. The mind is a collection of thought patterns and these directly map to physics by their neural correlates. Penrose's case is just a sad example of wishful thinking, the inability to admit that our minds are too subject to (likely unknowable) limitations, our own analogues of the halting problem.

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
    20. Re:Recently? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      This is not aimed at you.
      "Human are capable of recognizing when an algorithm will halt (or not); computers are not;"
      That's bullshit. Humans can only decide halting for a subset of all possible programs.
      As can computers.

    21. Re:Recently? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Then you didn't understand it. His argument was more like: "Human are capable of recognizing when an algorithm will halt (or not); computers are not; therefore thought cannot be reduced to computation".

      Even that is incorrect. The halting problem does not state that algorithms to detect whether a computation will complete do not exist. It merely states that there is no general purpose algorithm that can do this. There is no suggestion that the human brain has any sort of general purpose way of discovering whether algorithms will complete. In addition, when a computation gets very complex, we actually have trouble working out whether it will actually complete - the number of buggy programs we write on a daily basis is proof of this.

      In general, I agree that human thought cannot be expressed mathematically, I don't think this is the reason.

    22. Re:Recently? by Broolucks · · Score: 1

      His argument was more like: "Human are capable of recognizing when an algorithm will halt (or not); computers are not; therefore thought cannot be reduced to computation".

      That is patent nonsense, though, and if it is better than the caricature of your parent, it is only very barely so. There is no proof, nor even the shadow of a supporting argument, to the idea that humans are capable of recognizing when an algorithm will halt, for all possible algorithms.

      First, only an astonishingly small subset of all algorithms is even intelligible to a human - if a computer was to solve the halting problem for "intelligible" programs, but was not itself "intelligible", how would you go about proving that such a program can't exist? All the proofs I know of imply applying the algorithm to a derivative of itself, but you can't do that if the algorithm does not belong to its own domain. And I see no reason - much to the contrary - to think that the brain is intelligible to itself (maybe the big picture is, but you don't solve the halting problem with an overview of the code).

      Second, if you say an algorithm will not halt, how do you think you can be sure, without resorting to formal proofs... which are isomorphic to programs via the Curry–Howard correspondence?

      Third, humans often miss rare or fringe cases, leading them to be overconfident in their answers for as long as these cases do not occur. I mean, if humans truly can solve the halting problem, they are not doing a very good job.

      And then there is the fact that the halting problem is vastly overstated: by waiting long enough, a Turing machine can come arbitrarily close to solving it. Furthermore, there is a very large number of algorithms that pretty obviously halt/do not halt, for reasons that can be codified. There is nothing at all controversial with the idea that a computer could figure out whether the vast majority of programs halt or not. It just can't work for *everything*, but the idea that humans do is nothing short of laughable.

    23. Re:Recently? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      >Human are capable of recognizing when an algorithm will halt
      No, they are not. Only in a few very specific and limited cases can they reach a conclusion about what an algorithm does or whether it will teminate. Same goes for a computer.
      Also, TENM didn't argue in any substantial way what it was the quantum world would add that consciousness would need, apart from perceived mystery and indeterminacy. So GP did understand what was written - it's just that there is a lot less depth there than some easily impressed people think.
      > Dennett and Hoftstadter are even worse in many ways.
      Care to elaborate? If you're just saying that they "confuse conciousness and cognition" you're beating a dead horse - they've dealt with that criticism quite decisively, especially Dennet.

      And the icing on the cake is that Penrose's "alternative" doesn't even give Penrose what he wants. If consciousness had the properties that Penrose wants, then it can be functionally replaced by a die roll for every important decision. I'm reminded of Douglas Adams.

    24. Re:Recently? by master_p · · Score: 1

      "Human are capable of recognizing when an algorithm will halt (or not); computers are not; therefore thought cannot be reduced to computation"

      It is not true. Humans can recognize halting in some algorithms; not in all algorithms.

      Saying that humans can recognize when an algorithm will halt equals humans recognizing that prime numbers are finite (or infinite), which is a problem not yet solved. This problem is also used to demonstrate the halting problem.

    25. Re:Recently? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Care to show an example where a human can say an algorithm is halting (or not) and a computer with the same information can't? Computers can determine if something is halting in many cases however not in the general case, isn't the same the case for humans?

      (in our real physical universe everything is halting eventually due to lack of entropy ;)

      -- Megol

    26. Re:Recently? by divisionbyzero · · Score: 1

      "Human are capable of recognizing when an algorithm will halt (or not); computers are not; therefore thought cannot be reduced to computation"

      It is not true. Humans can recognize halting in some algorithms; not in all algorithms.

      Saying that humans can recognize when an algorithm will halt equals humans recognizing that prime numbers are finite (or infinite), which is a problem not yet solved. This problem is also used to demonstrate the halting problem.

      Right. I said "sometimes" in a previous post but got sloppy here. Thanks.

    27. Re:Recently? by divisionbyzero · · Score: 1

      His argument was more like: "Human are capable of recognizing when an algorithm will halt (or not); computers are not; therefore thought cannot be reduced to computation".

      That is patent nonsense, though, and if it is better than the caricature of your parent, it is only very barely so. There is no proof, nor even the shadow of a supporting argument, to the idea that humans are capable of recognizing when an algorithm will halt, for all possible algorithms.

      First, only an astonishingly small subset of all algorithms is even intelligible to a human - if a computer was to solve the halting problem for "intelligible" programs, but was not itself "intelligible", how would you go about proving that such a program can't exist? All the proofs I know of imply applying the algorithm to a derivative of itself, but you can't do that if the algorithm does not belong to its own domain. And I see no reason - much to the contrary - to think that the brain is intelligible to itself (maybe the big picture is, but you don't solve the halting problem with an overview of the code).

      Second, if you say an algorithm will not halt, how do you think you can be sure, without resorting to formal proofs... which are isomorphic to programs via the Curry–Howard correspondence?

      Third, humans often miss rare or fringe cases, leading them to be overconfident in their answers for as long as these cases do not occur. I mean, if humans truly can solve the halting problem, they are not doing a very good job.

      And then there is the fact that the halting problem is vastly overstated: by waiting long enough, a Turing machine can come arbitrarily close to solving it. Furthermore, there is a very large number of algorithms that pretty obviously halt/do not halt, for reasons that can be codified. There is nothing at all controversial with the idea that a computer could figure out whether the vast majority of programs halt or not. It just can't work for *everything*, but the idea that humans do is nothing short of laughable.

      Some or all doesn't matter in this case. It's a quite binary thing. If it can be done at all it is qualitatively different than coming "arbitrarily close". I don't ageee with him for other reasons but "close enough" arguments like yours do not refute his point.

    28. Re:Recently? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      > Then you didn't understand it. His argument was more like: "Human are capable of recognizing when an algorithm will halt (or not); computers are not; therefore thought cannot be reduced to computation".

      But humans don't run algorithms! Sure we can manipulate and analyse them, and we can even follow (to some extent) an algorithm, but that's funadamentally not the same thing.

      Any deductions based on that fallacy are equally invalid.

      His logic is like saying a train coming to a switch must go one way or the other, so a person walking along a railway line who comes to a switch must go one way or the other - and observing any other result indicates that there's some kind of supernatural nonsense involved.

    29. Re:Recently? by divisionbyzero · · Score: 1

      Penrose's argument from Emperor's New Mind and the updated version in Shadows of the Mind has been formally refuted: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.36.260&rep=rep1&type=pdf

      Beyond this, Penrose is refuted by physics. The holographic principle and its near-corollary, the Bekensten bound, guarantees that one cannot build a physical artifact more powerful than a Turin machine (finite number of distinguishable quantum states in a region of finite surface area => there are no arbitrary-precision real numbers in physics in a finite space => no super-Turing machines possible). Indeed, restricting ourselves to artifacts with finite spatial extent, any physical object can at best have the power of a mere linarly bounded automata (though non-deterministic one, due to QM, which is more powerful than its deterministic counterpart, but still less powerful than a Turing machine). Unfortunately, our brain happens to be a physical artifact. The mind is a collection of thought patterns and these directly map to physics by their neural correlates. Penrose's case is just a sad example of wishful thinking, the inability to admit that our minds are too subject to (likely unknowable) limitations, our own analogues of the halting problem.

      I hadn't seen this article "refuting" Penrose but it's not particularly interesting or that convincing. It's like a bunch of school boys playing gotcha. I saw this a lot at University. People demonstrating how clever they are but putting nothing forward that is more interesting. That's one of the main reasons philocophy has stagnated over the last 70 years or so but I digress.

      I am sure the formal argument is correct but as I am sure you know formalizing informal arguments is tricky business. I'm sure someone will or has quibbled with this formalization. These authors will quibble with the the quibblers and so on ad nauseaum. It's all rather shabby. It's almost not worth trying publish these kinds of papers because they provide nothing substantive to the debate.

      As regards your physical argument it's confused from the beginning. Penrose isn't asking for a super-Turing machine, otherwise known as a hypercomputer, because a hypercomputer would have the same problem as a Turing machine. It can't compute the halting problem for hypercomputers of the same complexity class even if it can do so for less complex Turing machines. Penrose is asking for something qualitatively different, not something non-deterministic and not a quantum computer either. It's not clear what he is asking for (which even he admits) but it's not that.

      It's interesting that you are so dogmatic about the issue. Are you threatened or jealous by Penrose?

    30. Re:Recently? by divisionbyzero · · Score: 1

      "Human are capable of recognizing when an algorithm will halt (or not); computers are not; therefore thought cannot be reduced to computation"

      This isn't really right. humans are capable of recognizing when SOME algorithms will halt. That isn't very spectacular, computers can do the same. Solving the halting problem would mean being able to recognize whether ANY algorithm will halt without resorting to dumb brute force methods. Humans are limited just as much as computers in this respect.

      Tell it to Penrose. I think the issue is more that we can recognize that we can't prove that all algorithms will halt but it's hard to say what he was getting at.

    31. Re:Recently? by divisionbyzero · · Score: 2

      His argument was more like: "Human are capable of recognizing when an algorithm will halt (or not); computers are not; therefore thought cannot be reduced to computation".

      That is patent nonsense, though, and if it is better than the caricature of your parent, it is only very barely so. There is no proof, nor even the shadow of a supporting argument, to the idea that humans are capable of recognizing when an algorithm will halt, for all possible algorithms.

      First, only an astonishingly small subset of all algorithms is even intelligible to a human - if a computer was to solve the halting problem for "intelligible" programs, but was not itself "intelligible", how would you go about proving that such a program can't exist? All the proofs I know of imply applying the algorithm to a derivative of itself, but you can't do that if the algorithm does not belong to its own domain. And I see no reason - much to the contrary - to think that the brain is intelligible to itself (maybe the big picture is, but you don't solve the halting problem with an overview of the code).

      Second, if you say an algorithm will not halt, how do you think you can be sure, without resorting to formal proofs... which are isomorphic to programs via the Curry–Howard correspondence?

      Third, humans often miss rare or fringe cases, leading them to be overconfident in their answers for as long as these cases do not occur. I mean, if humans truly can solve the halting problem, they are not doing a very good job.

      And then there is the fact that the halting problem is vastly overstated: by waiting long enough, a Turing machine can come arbitrarily close to solving it. Furthermore, there is a very large number of algorithms that pretty obviously halt/do not halt, for reasons that can be codified. There is nothing at all controversial with the idea that a computer could figure out whether the vast majority of programs halt or not. It just can't work for *everything*, but the idea that humans do is nothing short of laughable.

      Ignore my other response it's obviously confused. I think what I was getting at is that Penrose thinks that the very fact we are able to understand the halting problem means thinking cannot be reduced to computation. In any case I don't want to be in the position of trying to defend a position I do not hold so I am going to stop digging myself into a hole now.

    32. Re:Recently? by divisionbyzero · · Score: 1

      Just to clarify: I didn't mean to suggest that Penrose says humans can tell whether *any* algorithm will halt because that's obviously not true. I think what he's trying to get at is that since humans can understand the halting problem at all that there is more to thinking than computation. In any case I'm not trying to defend his point but I don't want to misrepresent him. And so I'm going to stop digging myself deeper into this hole now.

    33. Re:Recently? by ShakaUVM · · Score: 1

      >>Wrong again. Dennett demonstrates that there is no explanatory gap

      Wrong. Dennett explains absolutely nothing. Denying that consciousness exists is not an explanation for consciousness.

      It's a very weird stance for someone to take, especially since we all (presumably) are experiencing consciousness as we read this. Whatever it is.

      He takes our failure to explain something and use it as proof that the something doesn't exist.

      Searle has some devastating counterarguments to Dennett. If you pinch yourself and feel pain, but watch your brain under a microscope, all you see are voltage potentials running around. Where is the feeling of pain? Or redness?

    34. Re:Recently? by Dilaudid · · Score: 1

      Penrose's entire argument (in "The Emperor's New Mind") for why consciousness was quantum mechanical was that a computer could not be concious, because it could not answer the question "how do you feel?" - to which I respond "can I have my money back". Scientists like Penrose, Hawking and Dawkins should be locked up for their own good when they start mumbling about philosophy and God. They would be very quick to point fingers if the Dalai Lama or Amartya Sen started making statements about microbiology or quantum gravity based on their philosophical skill.

    35. Re:Recently? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Then you didn't understand it. His argument was more like: "Human are capable of recognizing when an algorithm will halt (or not); computers are not; therefore thought cannot be reduced to computation". It has nothing to do with the non-deterministic nature of quantum mechanics because even non-deterministic outcomes are computable. His speculation about consciousness and quantum mechanics is based on an analogy between the "collapse of the waveform" and thought. Even though the analogy is suggestive, according to Penrose, quantum mechanics cannot fully explain consciousness (because of consciousness's supposed non-computability) and to the extent that it cannot quantum mechanics is incomplete. It's still a crap argument but it's a hell of a lot better than your caricature. Dennett and Hoftstadter are even worse in many ways. They, like Penrose, are stuck on artifacts of theory. Stick with people that know how the brain actually works, like Edelman.

      Your argument fails on several levels: 1. Your description of his argument has nothing to do with consciousness, it has to do with solving the halting problem and there's not a direct link there. It's just a different problem 2. More importantly, the argument that humans can somehow solve the halting problem and computers cannot is incorrect. We can infer that an algorithm probably won't halt, but that's a far cry from 'solving the halting problem' since A. we're using probabilistic heuristics and B. we're often wrong. To solve the halting problem, you need to come up with a way of deciding (correctly) for _all_ algorithms whether or not they halt. Can humans do that? Of course not.

      Penrose's argument is a bait and switch: "Computers (Turing machines) cannot do X", but "Humans can do X", but the requirements for X for humans are greatly relaxed. It's not at all clear that a computer cannot do what humans do (i.e. be right most of the time for a wide range (but not all) problems).

    36. Re:Recently? by Synonymous+Homonym · · Score: 0

      what the nature of [conscious experience] actually is.

      It is an illusion. It doesn't exist.

      People flatter themselves thinking they have a property they call "consciousness", that sets them apart from lesser things like rocks and machines and animals. They use this concept to obscure the fact that they only react to external stimuli, like everything else.

      Brains keep an internal state that allows people to make predictions about themselves and their environment, including other people. This state is built - informed - from external stimuli, and modified by external stimuli, and just because it informes their actions, some which they observe, further modifying their brain's state, some people think they are somehow special.

      The machina carnis is just that. There is no helmsman driving it. Consciousness is a myth, a convenient lie.

    37. Re:Recently? by MozeeToby · · Score: 1

      I was thinking the same thing; give a person a 1000 x 1000 grid of randomly generated cells, the rules to Conway's game of life, and ask them if there is a static end state to the system. Humans can't solve the halting problem, we can't do any of the NP complete problems. Sometimes it feels like we can, but that is because the problems we demonstrate the ability on are trivially small, easily small enough that a modern computer can solve them at least as quickly.

    38. Re:Recently? by kabloom · · Score: 1

      Well, I think it's plausible to actually define a model that explains how quantum mechanics would cause consciousness, and then we can look at what we would need to research in order to prove it. Here's a set of hypotheses that would qualify:

      1. The brain, absent quantum-mechanical effects, is Turing complete, and is no more powerful than a Turing machine.
      2. Consciousness cannot be simulated on a Turing machine. (It needs something more powerful.)
      3. Consciousness could be simulated on a Turing machine where some input was provided by a "consiousness oracle".
      4. A person's neurons are sensitive to random quantum-mechanical effects. (i.e. the quantum-mechanical effects serve the function of the "consiousness oracle" in hypothesis #3). I think that this is actually Penrose's hypothesis.

      This should be sufficient to prove that consciousness is a quantum-mechanical effect, but I'm not sure what it would say about free will.

      To prove that humans have free will requires an additional hypothesis: Posit the existance of a soul that provides free will. Posit that the soul communicates with the brain and controls the body by causing quantum-mechanical effects inside the brain. Posit that the soul is not observable in any way, except through its quantum mechanical effects on the brain. We now can have two hypotheses about how this may work:

      1. The ordinarily random quantum-mechanical effects we see outside the brain are actually quite ordered inside the brain. (i.e. though we can't explain what causes a particular quantum fluctuation to occurs, we would see a definite pattern if we put some kind of probe into a living brain -- the quantum-mechanical effects would no longer look random to us.)
      2. The random quantum-mechanical effects we see outside the brain are actually only pesudo-random. They're random enough to fool the analytical methods we've developed for investigating how quantum mechanics works, but the brain has an algorithm for decoding them that's computationally more powerful than any of our analytical methods. (For a brief introduction to the field of pesudorandomness in theoretical computer science, see the April 2011 issue of Communications of the ACM, or see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pseudorandomness. This subfield of computer science field has not yet advanced nearly enough to prove this hypothesis.)

    39. Re:Recently? by kabloom · · Score: 1

      You have two other alternatives to the idea that quantum mechanics causes consciousness and/or free will. (Again, both of these are hypotheses, and need to be proven somehow)

      1. Consciousness and/or free will can be simulated on a Turing machine. This would imply that "true" artificial intelligence is possible.
      2. Consciousness cannot be simulated on a Turing machine. It needs something more powerful, but that's OK since the human brain is more powerful than a Turing machine (at least in certain respects).

    40. Re:Recently? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      That still doesn't seem like a good explanation. Humans aren't actually capable of recognizing when an algorithm will halt. We are merely capable of recognizing some specific patterns that will make an algorithm not halt. Which computers could also do, but which doesn't solve the halting problem.

    41. Re:Recently? by Broolucks · · Score: 1

      Okay, so he is confusing the ability to solve the halting problem with the ability to understand why that's impossible.

      That is probably a rather common error in the man versus machine debate, since a lot of philosophers have trouble wrapping their minds around what it means for a machine to "understand" something. There is a tendency to think that being able to understand the limitations of a system means we are not subject to these limitations, even though that is not true in general, and that even if it was, you would actually have to prove it first.

    42. Re:Recently? by bye · · Score: 1

      I hadn't seen this article "refuting" Penrose but it's not particularly interesting or that convincing.

      No, but it nicely proves what intuition (or rather, common sense) should tell you in the first minute of thinking about Penrose's argument: that it's wishful thinking.

      It was wishful thinking in the 1980s that a computer would never be able to beat a human world champion at chess, because the human mind was so "special" and "fundamentally different" from computers.

      The human mind is not particularly special and its limitations are not particularly special either.

      You may call this 'quibbling' too.

      Do you feel threatened by the idea that the human mind is nothing else but ~1.4 kg of physical matter? :-)

    43. Re:Recently? by xworld21 · · Score: 1

      His argument was more like: "Human are capable of recognizing when an algorithm will halt (or not); computers are not; therefore thought cannot be reduced to computation".

      Collatz conjecture. Beat that!

  5. Penrose is a mystic by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Insightful

    He wants the brain to be non-computable, non-simulatable. In short, he wants it to be magic. He has no real justification for his position.

    1. Re:Penrose is a mystic by Hatta · · Score: 2

      This is surprisingly common among physicists. Schrodinger for instance believed in vitalism. Which is essentially the same thing, but about 'life' instead of 'consciousness'.

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    2. Re:Penrose is a mystic by Suiggy · · Score: 2

      Agreed. Penrose is getting long in the tooth, and his last few theories to be debunked are evident of this. He's seeing things that aren't there. However, in a sense, he's right, but there's no magic or new physics behind it. After all, everything in this universe is, to some degree, emergent from quantum phenomena--everything in our macroscopic world, from dogs and cats, your car, your house, the tax man, and your brain is nothing more than the result of quantum amplitude flows and configuration states on the microscopic scale. But I don't think higher-level cognition will be directly explainable through quantum mechanics.

    3. Re:Penrose is a mystic by gilleain · · Score: 1

      Agreed. Penrose is getting long in the tooth, and his last few theories to be debunked are evident of this. He's seeing things that aren't there. However, in a sense, he's right, but there's no magic or new physics behind it. After all, everything in this universe is, to some degree, emergent from quantum phenomena--everything in our macroscopic world, from dogs and cats, your car, your house, the tax man, and your brain is nothing more than the result of quantum amplitude flows and configuration states on the microscopic scale. But I don't think higher-level cognition will be directly explainable through quantum mechanics.

      I agree ... in general. However, there is a difference between homogenous macro-scale objects (rocks, for example) and highly heterogenous ones (organisms). Even from a non-quantum perspective, living systems are set up to amplify effects at the smallest scale up to the largest. For example a single mutation - a molecular level event - can occasionally lead to disease states that affect the whole body. Since living systems rely on molecular-sized machinery, they do exploit quantum effects (light, tunnelling of energy barriers, etc)

      Really, though, the idea that consciousness is not just potentially sensitive to quantum phenomena (because brains are living tissue) but also totally explained by quantum mechanics is too much. Of course the hierarchy of 'levels' of description of an organism (quantum, molecular, cellular, tissue, organ..) are not separate one from the other; of course there is leakage of cause between them. The idea that the highest level should be reliant completely on the lowest is just foolishness

    4. Re:Penrose is a mystic by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      He wants the brain to be non-computable, non-simulatable.

      In one sense, I think it may be. The brain is chaotic, and has evolved to amplify extremely small effects (like a single photon hitting a visual nerve). Obviously the brain follows all laws of physics, and so a complete simulation could be constructed... but it wouldn't really be a simulation. It would be a fully functioning consciousness of its own. Not a model, but an actual duplicate. Anything less than a full duplicate wouldn't function as a simulation, and a full duplicate wouldn't function as a model (because it would give you no more insight than the identical original.

      Is there a physics or math term for something that can't be modeled with any less complexity than the original? Fractals, maybe?

    5. Re:Penrose is a mystic by Burnhard · · Score: 1

      Why do you assume QM is only a low level causal phenomena? Do you subscribe to the view that state vector collapse is a real procedure, then? I realise that I cannot get an interference fringe by throwing cricket balls through slits at a screen, but perhaps the classifications you have made (the hierarchy of levels) are a function of your conscious experience, or rather the regularities that your brain is able to distinguish between therein, rather than a function of how the Universe actually is? Things are not as they seem, are they.

    6. Re:Penrose is a mystic by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It was a book, not a paper, he is allowed to speculate. He saved his speculation until the end. It was a few years back when I read it, but I don't think he said QM was responsible for consciousness, but rather that he thought a much better understanding of QM may be required to understand consciousness. Correct me if I'm wrong. (as if I need to say that here)

    7. Re:Penrose is a mystic by im_thatoneguy · · Score: 2

      Anything less than a full duplicate wouldn't function as a simulation, and a full duplicate wouldn't function as a model (because it would give you no more insight than the identical original.

      Yes and no. It does offer something though that we can't do to a real human brain: Kill it. Over and Over and Over again.

      You certainly start getting into philosophical problems but imagine if you took a slice of your brain and ran a simulation for 10 minutes in a perfectly realized virtual world (or a world that explicitly told your brain to accept as perfect). You could subtly change a person's responses to you to see how you react based on different stimuli. Then wipe it. Reset it to the exact same state and do it again.

      Now you can start doing really exciting things with this exact duplicate. Since this simulation is a total simulation of all the atomic and sub-atomic interactions on a computer you can do things like insert break points. Freeze time and know the exact state of every atom. You can run difference splits between two moments of a conversation.

      This is the sort of insight that would lead to accurate modeling.

      A big part of learning how a system works it to strip it down to its core essentials. Usually 95% of something is just superfluous support framework. With a virtual brain you could start gutting the systems without concern since killing it can be 'undone'. Imagine a computer algorithm which ran a conversation but completely randomly eliminated 1,000 neurons every time. Just put a condition on the test that any time the conditions fail --say maybe stammering -- then you do another random test with only 500 removed. And so on and so forth until the test succeeds. Without actually understanding *why* the simulation works you can randomly dramatically narrow your focus.

      Is it ethical? Well it'll be an interesting conversation we'll have when we start. Or at least I hope we do. I'm actually pretty concerned we'll create a conscious entity and not realize it. We might end up committing genocide on new sentient life forms.

    8. Re:Penrose is a mystic by macshit · · Score: 3, Informative

      Indeed. I put it down to basic fear. Some people (like Penrose, apparently, and Searle, etc) want there to be something special about human sapience, and find the concept that it's "mere" computation repulsive and scary. It's their gut speaking, really, not their mind.

      Combine that fear with the conceit that "because I'm a world-renowned expert in my field, I must have amazing insight into every field I care to dabble in!" (which is depressingly common in academia) and you get cringe-inducing (but lengthy!) pap like "The Emperor's New Mind."

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    9. Re:Penrose is a mystic by JMZero · · Score: 1

      I realise that I cannot get an interference fringe by throwing cricket balls through slits at a screen

      You can, it's just not probable. For small numbers of bits, the distribution is going to be 1s and 0s. As we add more bits, we're going to get a sums in the middle - and with large numbers of bits (as in our ball) we're going to get stuck at .5. I can certainly see the guy's argument that specially constructed large scale objects could create thresholds, meaning that we see the 1s and 0s again instead of the default aggregate. (My brain is very tired, hopefully that made some sense).

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    10. Re:Penrose is a mystic by Boronx · · Score: 1

      Heck humans are just barely universal Turing machines. I'm not sure any other species can claim even that much.

    11. Re:Penrose is a mystic by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Actually it isn't; much more common amongst mathematicians. Like Penrose. Who is emphatically *not* a physicist. I'm vaguely willing to grant Schroedinger physicist-status, but in reality theoretical physicists might as well be counted as mathematicians as well.

    12. Re:Penrose is a mystic by kolmyo · · Score: 1

      Consciousness? A wizard did it.

    13. Re:Penrose is a mystic by awsx123 · · Score: 1

      the brain IS non-computable, non-simulatable. at least by us - look up godels incompleteness theorem. an information system may not know itself.

    14. Re:Penrose is a mystic by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Specifically, what he wants is for *mathematicians* to be special, magical creatures, who by their mere existence save the universe from being an empty dead void full of not-really-conscious zombies. It's transparent wish-fulfillment ego-wank.

    15. Re:Penrose is a mystic by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      -1. Mysticism has nothing to do with how you EXPLAIN life; only with how you appreciate it.

    16. Re:Penrose is a mystic by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      "(which is depressingly common in academia)"

      Why single out academics? That problem is hardly unique - look at all the businesspeople and celebrities that think they know shit about, well, anything other than what it is they do for a living.

    17. Re:Penrose is a mystic by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      to be fair (as I remember it) it was more along the the lines of "we don't have enough physics to fully explain it". The (anecdotal) justification would be... there are still a quite a few things that in the world of the of the very small that we don't have enough physics to explain.

      You will know if this is the case (that we don't have enough physics) when we have a computer powerful enough to simulate a brain.

      Until such time it is a philosophers squabble.

    18. Re:Penrose is a mystic by macshit · · Score: 1

      Why single out academics? That problem is hardly unique - look at all the businesspeople and celebrities that think they know shit about, well, anything other than what it is they do for a living.

      I suppose because when e.g. a businessman does that sort of thing, people usually don't take him seriously ... "oh yeah bob, he dabbles... haha" -- but add the letters "PhD" and suddenly people seem to start paying attention...

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  6. Consciousness is weird by Hatta · · Score: 5, Interesting

    Consciousness is weird. Quantum theory is weird. Therefore quantum theory must explain consciousness.

    That's essentially the argument here, and it's pretty easily seen as fallacious. There's no actual evidence that consciousness requires quantum mechanics, besides the trivial fact that our brains are chemical computers and chemistry requires quantum mechanics.

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    1. Re:Consciousness is weird by screamphilling · · Score: 1

      quantum mechanics is a product of consciousness.. i.e. it is a completely human-made construct made of language and quantified values as observed by humans. they are not "laws" so much as "observations".

    2. Re:Consciousness is weird by ShakaUVM · · Score: 4, Insightful

      >>Consciousness is weird. Quantum theory is weird. Therefore quantum theory must explain consciousness.

      Quantum Theory is the new "magic" for all sorts of New Age thinkers.

      Penrose at least proposes a mechanism of action (quantum tube thingies), which has the benefit of at least giving his theory something more than hand-waving to base his theory on, but has the downside of having absolutely no evidence to support it from studies of the structure of the brain.

      Penrose is a smart guy (black holes and tiling and all that) but he does like to propose some rather outlandish things in his free time. Might be a correlation between the two, who knows.

    3. Re:Consciousness is weird by shess · · Score: 2

      Consciousness is weird. Quantum theory is weird. Therefore quantum theory must explain consciousness.

      Or, more likely, consciousness explains quantum theory.

    4. Re:Consciousness is weird by bill_mcgonigle · · Score: 1

      That's essentially the argument here, and it's pretty easily seen as fallacious.

      The article may be bad, but there are many serious researchers exploring the possibilities. Neuronal microtubles are a posited structure for quantum effects to be located on (I don't have the right word...).

      There's no actual evidence that consciousness requires quantum mechanics, besides the trivial fact that our brains are chemical computers and chemistry requires quantum mechanics.

      There are unsolved problems in brain processing speed, the degree of interconnectedness, and other things that look like our brain isn't good enough to do. Nobody knows what the mechanisms of action are, so quantum effects can't be ruled out (or in) yet. But, heck, even photosynthesis is a quantum system, so maybe.

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    5. Re:Consciousness is weird by JustOK · · Score: 1

      or, consciousness must explain quantum theory

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    6. Re:Consciousness is weird by bcrowell · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Consciousness is weird. Quantum theory is weird. Therefore quantum theory must explain consciousness.

      That's essentially the argument here, and it's pretty easily seen as fallacious.

      Well, the slashdot link, and the New Statesman story linked to from it, don't really do justice to Penrose's idea, so it's not surprising that you've gotten the impression that there's absolutely nothing there. Actually there's something to it, and although as a physicist I don't buy it, it's not completely stupid.

      The basic idea is that there are various ways to interpret quantum mechanics. The most popular interpretations are the Copenhagen interpretation and the many-worlds interpretation (MWI).

      My own take on it is that Copenhagen and MWI are just different words for talking about the theory, so the distinction isn't empirically testable. Copenhagen does a good job of depicting the psychological experience of doing experiments with quantum-mechanical systems, but Copenhagen is illogical because it gives a special role to measurement, which is actually a physical process like any other.

      Penrose's idiosyncratic idea is that he takes Copenhagen seriously, so he says that measurement is somehow *different* from other physical processes. That suggests that consciousness is somehow different from other physical processes. He also claims that his idea is at least in principle empirically testable, that we should be able to see this process happen by studying neurons. He thinks there is something special going on in microtubules.

      Slashdot's readers would have been a lot better off just reading the WP article on Penrose's theory.

    7. Re:Consciousness is weird by Burnhard · · Score: 3

      This argument is a fallacy, because it's not one that Penrose has ever actually made. His argument has a great deal more subtlety about it than the absurd reduction you present.

    8. Re:Consciousness is weird by VortexCortex · · Score: 1

      I agree. From my own experiments training neural networks inside computers it makes obvious sense to me that 1 billion synapses per square cm in the human brain ought to be enough neural network to account for contentiousness -- in fact fMRI shows that our brains are much like the neural net -- coming to similar decisions after processing a set of inputs, but only being aware of our decision after the network has processed the input set.

      Neurons and synapses are far more complex than the simple neural network models myself and others are playing with -- Eventually we'll have the computing power and understanding to closely approximate the operation of human neurons and synapses, at which point we'll be able to begin training true AI -- perhaps sooner if we consider that a lot of our brains functions are not needed for beings that have no true bodies.

      I suggest anyone interested in AI also have a look at what we know of ourselves. I don't think we need quantum states to explain the apparently somewhat deterministic behavior of the human mind -- it can be done without resorting to quantum states.

      Additionally: Take a scientist from 200 years ago and teach them about quantum physics, then introduce them to a computer with a programming error -- clearly they may try to explain the erratic behavior due to a few logic glitches in the machine code as quantum effects due to computers operating solely via sub-atomic quantum states...

    9. Re:Consciousness is weird by hydrofix · · Score: 1

      You should read about the philosophical discourse on free will. Put short, explaining the existence of free will is very hard in a deterministic model. Most of classical physics is deterministic. Without any higher education in post-Einsteinian physics, quantum phenomena seem very compelling way to explain this age-old philosophical problem.

    10. Re:Consciousness is weird by sco08y · · Score: 1

      Consciousness is weird. Quantum theory is weird. Therefore quantum theory must explain consciousness.

      That's essentially the argument here, and it's pretty easily seen as fallacious. There's no actual evidence that consciousness requires quantum mechanics, besides the trivial fact that our brains are chemical computers and chemistry requires quantum mechanics.

      In a nuthsell, Quantum woo.

      The real test of Science is whether quantum bogodynamics can explain why the fuck this article was written, much less published in Discover, much less posted on /.

    11. Re:Consciousness is weird by Darinbob · · Score: 1

      Dude, you like just totally blew my mind...

    12. Re:Consciousness is weird by Hatta · · Score: 1

      There is no free will.

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    13. Re:Consciousness is weird by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I always thought his argument in that book was, "I want minds to be special, so I am looking for reasons to say that they are."

    14. Re:Consciousness is weird by hydrofix · · Score: 1

      There is no free will.

      And this you chose to write to demonstrate the lack thereof? ;-)

    15. Re:Consciousness is weird by Sloppy · · Score: 1

      Consciousness is weird. Quantum theory is weird. Therefore quantum theory must explain consciousness.

      Best Penrose argument summary ever.

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    16. Re:Consciousness is weird by deathguppie · · Score: 1

      Well, actually I sort of wonder if it isn't true simply because of the way consciousness is relevant to perceiving quantum theory, and the fact that our perception affects the outcome of experiments therein. Then I think that maybe it's not so much that quantum theory and consciousness are relative but that the effects of observation entangle the outcome and consciousness by pure existence is relative. .. ya it may be a bit of a jump worthy of only conjecture, but maybe it makes people think, and maybe that is worth it.

      --
      once more into the breach
    17. Re:Consciousness is weird by Prune · · Score: 1

      Even otherwise brilliant scientists like Penrose are subject to ego (no limits to mental abilities), anthropocentric chauvinism (no limits to HUMAN mental abilities), and pure wishful thinking (magic unknown undiscovered non-computable physics will save the day).

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
    18. Re:Consciousness is weird by Prune · · Score: 1

      The only thing one needs to read about Penrose's theory on non-computable mind is the _formal_ refutation of it http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.36.260&rep=rep1&type=pdf

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
    19. Re:Consciousness is weird by osu-neko · · Score: 1

      Penrose is a smart guy (black holes and tiling and all that) but he does like to propose some rather outlandish things in his free time. Might be a correlation between the two, who knows.

      Yeah, I think there's another commonly believed fallacy that extremely intelligent people only think extremely intelligent things. But counter-examples abound. Just because someone can reason extremely well doesn't mean they always do...

      --
      "Convictions are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies."
    20. Re:Consciousness is weird by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Actually Penrose doesnt take Copenhagen all that seriously. He is a general relativist and he believes that quantum mechanics is incomplete. He sees the fact that quantum mechanics refers to a wave collapse at measurement as a sign that measurement is not really understood completely. His idea is by studying consciousness we could explain better how the measurement paradox comes about and thereby "fix" quantum mechanics. To me his idea seems to makes sense.
      The many world interpretation is pretty hard to stomach philosophically, which is why he dismisses it.

    21. Re:Consciousness is weird by osu-neko · · Score: 1

      ...so quantum effects can't be ruled out (or in) yet...

      Which is more or less the point. A lot of people seem convinced that quantum effects are behind it, but it's not rational to believe that they are (or that they aren't, for that matter).

      --
      "Convictions are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies."
    22. Re:Consciousness is weird by osu-neko · · Score: 1

      ... He thinks there is something special going on in microtubules.

      If what you just wrote is true, he's clearly gone off the deep end. If he posits this is a hypothesis worth testing, that's one thing, but if he actually thinks what you said he thinks, that's clearly irrational. You would have to have already observed the empirical results of the test, and found something convincing in them, to rationally think what you said he does.

      --
      "Convictions are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies."
    23. Re:Consciousness is weird by osu-neko · · Score: 1

      There is no free will.

      I choose to believe otherwise.

      I always wonder about people who are certain there is no free will. It seems a silly thing to believe, but then maybe they can't help it... ;)

      --
      "Convictions are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies."
    24. Re:Consciousness is weird by Rmorph · · Score: 1

      >>Consciousness is weird. Quantum theory is weird. Therefore quantum theory must explain consciousness.

      Quantum Theory is the new "magic" for all sorts of New Age thinkers.

      Penrose at least proposes a mechanism of action (quantum tube thingies), which has the benefit of at least giving his theory something more than hand-waving to base his theory on, but has the downside of having absolutely no evidence to support it from studies of the structure of the brain.

      Penrose is a smart guy (black holes and tiling and all that) but he does like to propose some rather outlandish things in his free time. Might be a correlation between the two, who knows.

      So... consciousness is a series of tubes?

    25. Re:Consciousness is weird by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      but has the downside of having absolutely no evidence to support it from studies of the structure of the brain.

      There is no evidence of the existence of things called "transistors" from my personal study of the outside of my computer, either.

    26. Re:Consciousness is weird by fastest+fascist · · Score: 1

      Evidence where consciousness is concerned is a pretty dodgy subject anyway. You can't even prove consciousness exists.

    27. Re:Consciousness is weird by ShakaUVM · · Score: 1

      >>There is no evidence of the existence of things called "transistors" from my personal study of the outside of my computer, either.

      And yet you can see them when you put them under a microscope (albeit a very powerful one these days). The studies I was talking about were examinations of neuron structure and the like.

      There's no evidence for Penrose's theory of consciousness.

      At least it puts him in good company - with every other person that has developed a theory of consciousness, ever. =)

    28. Re:Consciousness is weird by gl4ss · · Score: 1

      has penrose come up with anything worthwhile though, ever? the tilings don't count, blackhole stuff is just theory, and so seems this.

      --
      world was created 5 seconds before this post as it is.
    29. Re:Consciousness is weird by rifles+only · · Score: 1

      I love the way that commenters post with absolute certainly about a subject as uncertain as quantum mechanics. I've yet to hear a single defintion of what it is. Surely, the correct response is doubt, that is to say that it is not possible to say one way or the other.

    30. Re:Consciousness is weird by ginbot462 · · Score: 1

      Or, more likely, consciousness explains quantum theory.

      Nah, our consciousness didn't have the time or will to work out the details at that level. So, we jammed in some old lookup tables we had laying around with some circular pointers.

      --
      Atlas Shrugged : Thematic Story :: Battlefield Earth : Organized Religion
    31. Re:Consciousness is weird by Hatta · · Score: 1

      I don't think I said anything with certainty about quantum mechanics. I remarked on Penrose's faulty logic and lack of evidence. It's certainly possible that QM is involved in consciousness, but until there's some evidence suggesting it I'll have to invoke Occam.

      --
      Give me Classic Slashdot or give me death!
    32. Re:Consciousness is weird by narcc · · Score: 1

      Consciousness is weird. Quantum theory is weird. Therefore quantum theory must explain consciousness.

      Best Penrose argument summary ever.

      Neat, two people who either didn't read, or didn't understand, Penrose.

      The little mutual admiration society you have going is cute. If you can find enough consensus for your uninformed opinion, you needn't bother reading at all -- just enjoy the security that comes from sharing an opinion with a large group.

    33. Re:Consciousness is weird by narcc · · Score: 1

      The only thing one needs to read about Penrose's theory on non-computable mind is the _formal_ refutation of it

      Formal! HAHAHA! It's nothing of the sort!

      Did you even read it? It only addresses Penrose's Godelian argument, which I'll admit wasn't terribly strong. Still, to call this a "formal refutation" with emphasis on 'formal' is ridiculous!

      Dig up a copy of Selmer Bringsjord's later paper "The Modalized Godelian Argument Against Computationalism" (Oh, Bringsjord is the first author of the paper that you say is the "formal refutation", in case you didn't know.)

    34. Re:Consciousness is weird by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      If only Randi were still alive to witness the results of Penrose's experiments based on this theory. Randi might be so impressed, he'd give Penrose *pinky* one million dollars!

    35. Re:Consciousness is weird by Prune · · Score: 1
      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
    36. Re:Consciousness is weird by Prune · · Score: 1

      Non-computationalism is refuted by the combination of QM and thermodynamics, because due to the Bekenstein bound you cannot build any physical object that can carry information processing more powerful than a linearly bounded automaton.

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
    37. Re:Consciousness is weird by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Penrose has a hypothesis, at best, though it might more reasonably be labelled a half-baked idea. Calling it a "theory" gives it too much credence.

    38. Re:Consciousness is weird by narcc · · Score: 1

      You're thinking of Tipler's argument? I'll refer you to pages 82-87 of Shadows.

      Anyhow, I think your misapplying the Bekenstein bound which is 1) contentious and 2) depends on one specific space-time geometry (which has yet to be established).

      Accepting the Bekenstein bound, for the sake of argument, all it says regarding computation is what we already knew -- that a true Turing machine (one with the requisite infinite resources) can't be built.

      Needless to say, it's a very weak argument in support of computationalism (which is almost dead, save Rapaport.)

      Now, I know you're a fan of Bringsjord, so I'll direct you to a fun little paper he wrote titled "Computationalism is Dead; Now What?"

    39. Re:Consciousness is weird by JorgeFierro · · Score: 1

      What is this perception nonsense you're talking about? To perceive something in the quantum world you must measure it, and measuring means perturbing the system you're taking a measure of in a way or another. That's what happens in quantum mechanics: you cannot know both the momentum and position of a particle precisely at the same time.

    40. Re:Consciousness is weird by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Your argument is perfectly valid.

      My point is that Occam is shorted when discussion two elements which we have little reference for. This whole threat divides between people who see consciousness in mechanistic terms the organisation of which is merely unknown. Quantum physics is even less decipherable because it does not conform to mechanistic laws. They are irreconcilable with current understanding and making connections between them strikes me as inclined to polarise people to no useful end.

      The best option is to rule the debate null and void but to retain an open mind.

      However, we should perhaps infer that there must be a logical connection between quantum mechanics and EVERYTHING given that the universe conforms to the former. We just cannot understand the cause and effect nor measure it because these categories of knowledge are impossible with QM.

  7. Meh by Pharmboy · · Score: 2

    Not that interesting of an article, by someone I've not heard of, explaining why Penrose is wrong yet again, as well as others. No real substance. The concept that physics might explain consciousness is much more interesting than this short (in length and in content) article.

    It simply debunks the idea but offers no alternative or reason why. It was like reading a movie review from a small town movie reviewer....who didn't really see the movie but a friend told them about it.

    --
    Tequila: It's not just for breakfast anymore!
    1. Re:Meh by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The lack of availability of an alternative theory does not negate the incorrectness of another given theory. The idea is bunk because there is no cohesive body of logic behind it, nor is there any data backing it's claims.

      At this point, quantum consciousness is a philosophy, not science.

    2. Re:Meh by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Well, as biology is nothing but a primitive, degenerate form of chemistry, and as chemistry is nothing but a primitive, degenerate form of physics.. eventually, yes, physics will explain consciousness. It just may not be a useful explanation. And as physics is nothing but a primitive, degenerate form of mathematics, well, they'll have their own answer, but nobody will give two shits because mathematicians are exceedingly dull people who quite frequently are overly impressed with themselves -- a similar phenomenon is seen in philosophy and the like, where the less useful one's field of study is to anything ever the more justified one feels in belittling others. Pent up rage and all that.

      What were we talking about again?

  8. Well, Mr Smartypants by gatkinso · · Score: 1

    How about filling us in?

    --
    I am very small, utmostly microscopic.
    1. Re:Well, Mr Smartypants by Leperous · · Score: 1

      In a nutshell: Penrose (and others) believe (or used to believe) that gravity can cause spontaneous wavefunction collapse, basically something simpler than decoherence. The "speed" at which this collapse occurs should be dependent on the mass of said object; the "characteristic speed" of consciousness, on the order of 0.1 seconds, would be generated by sub-cellular sized structures and which he links to structures called microtubules within neurons. You'd have to read his books if you want any of those details filling in.

  9. Huh? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Insightful

    This is the most vague, hand-wavy summary I have ever read (didn't read the article...maybe just as vague?). I am a physicist, but even for the non-physicist, this is vague.

  10. Consciousness is mysterious not weird. by elucido · · Score: 1

    But it cannot both exist and not exist at the same time.

    This means either you believe you exist, and if that is the case then you have to solve the mystery of your own existence. Or you don't believe you exist, and consciousness and free will are fake illusions. This is the stance of eliminativists and apparently Greenspan.

    1. Re:Consciousness is mysterious not weird. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Insightful

      You're playing pointless, autofellating wordgames.

      So, uh, keep up the good job with your philosophy courses!

    2. Re:Consciousness is mysterious not weird. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      But it cannot both exist and not exist at the same time.

      You're not doing the right drugs, then.

    3. Re:Consciousness is mysterious not weird. by biryokumaru · · Score: 2

      Sarah said she was locked up in the madhouse and we were all a delusion. When they came to lock her up, she said "Oh not this again. Now I'm in five deep."

      --
      When you're afraid to download music illegally in your own home, then the terrorists have won!
    4. Re:Consciousness is mysterious not weird. by maraist · · Score: 1

      Can't tell if you were joking or not. So I'll play along for fun.
      "This means either you believe you exist, and if that is the case then you have to solve the mystery of your own existence."

      There is no intrinsic requirement to find one's origins.. We're not all salmon. :)

      "Or you don't believe you exist, and consciousness and free will are fake illusions."

      Some random definition which seems to agree with your argument:
      consciousnsess: aware of one's own existence, sensations, thoughts, surroundings, etc

      Thus consciousness implies existence by definition. But the reverse is not intrinsically true. You are either existent and conscious, non-existant and non-conscious, OR non-existant and falsely conscious.

      I can describe to you a character that is fully aware of itself and it's surroundings.. But then I can tell you afterwards that it doesn't exist. The virtual construct is by all measurable means to you existent, except that it was a lie / fabrication (e.g. a play / cartoon / software program). But most importantly what DOES exist - the 'story' of the non-existent character is defined as fully conscious.

      Thus illusion of consciousness is not an illusion to the character, but to the receiver of the fabricated story. HIS consciousness is real - only the projection of his existence has any 'fakeness' (exclusively in the mind of the story teller - unless and until they share the fakeness of the character to the audience).

      Free will is also completely abstract and meaningless here as well. The fake character has no knowledge of this philosophical strife.. He acts consistently with his presumably consistent personality and life-struggle.. Making emotionally impactful, gratifiable, or regrettible decisions (or willfully avoids such decisions). Whether his story embraces the duality of his universe and the story-teller is fully within the control of the story teller (so long as the story teller controls the knowledge of the character's existence). Meaning, you as an audience member wouldn't debate with a friend whether their brother ACTUALLY graduated college or not - your knowledge of what this supposed brother did is completely outside of your knowledge .

      Why is this relevant?... Two words.. J. C.

      --
      -Michael
    5. Re:Consciousness is mysterious not weird. by Chris+Mattern · · Score: 2

      Sarah said she was locked up in the madhouse and we were all a delusion. When they came to lock her up, she said "Oh not this again. Now I'm in five deep."

      Sarah is apparently a slow learner. After the third or fourth recursion, I would've figured out to keep my mouth shut.

    6. Re:Consciousness is mysterious not weird. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Two letters... J. C.

      FTFY

    7. Re:Consciousness is mysterious not weird. by n+dot+l · · Score: 1

      Define you.

  11. I doubt they have anything to do with each other. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Just because there are two things that we don't understand, doesn't mean those two things are related. That seems to be a common error that mankind makes, and it was more pronounced when we didn't understand much at all; we assumed birth, death, the sun, the weather, all had the same (mystical) causes.

    Sure, there may be a relation between quantum physics and consciousness; but I don't see any evidence of it, and I think that consciousness will be a far harder problem to solve, since we aren't close to resolving some basic philosophical questions about its nature, or even settling on definitions of concepts like 'free will'.

  12. Consciousness is not Logical, get over it by crowlogic · · Score: 0

    Logic only gets you so far.

    1. Re:Consciousness is not Logical, get over it by geekoid · · Score: 1

      Logic gets you as far as you can take it. Sadly most people can't get past there stupid little emotional hang ups to take it far.

      --
      The Kruger Dunning explains most post on /. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger_effect
    2. Re:Consciousness is not Logical, get over it by Suiggy · · Score: 1

      I know you're trolling. I'm on to you.

  13. It's all about free will by spun · · Score: 3, Insightful

    People want to be an uncaused cause. That's what the concept of free will boils down to. The will can cause things, but itself is not caused by anything. If it were caused, it wouldn't be free. Of course, this would make any learning impossible. Either the will is a part of the chain of cause and effect, and therefore not free, or the soul (or whatever you believe to be the seat of consciousness) can never learn.

    --
    - None can love freedom heartily, but good men; the rest love not freedom, but license. -- John Milton
    1. Re:It's all about free will by Nefarious+Wheel · · Score: 1

      Brrr. A guy could catch his death of philosophy here.

      --
      Do not mock my vision of impractical footwear
    2. Re:It's all about free will by John+Allsup · · Score: 1

      I disagree -- you presume that the free will and the rest of the mind is an indivisible lump. If the free will part observes and influences, and another part learns, there is no problem. If the free will part is structured, so that some part of it is free and the rest constrained in some way, it too can learn.

      --
      John_Chalisque
    3. Re:It's all about free will by narcc · · Score: 1

      Brrr. A guy could catch his death of incompetent philosophy here.

      FTFY

    4. Re:It's all about free will by JoelKatz · · Score: 1

      The fallacy in your argument is assuming that there is such a thing as a "chain of cause and effect". There is no such thing. It's an illusion caused by the our tendency to think of effects as having but a single cause. We tend to think that throwing a match in a garbage can causes a fire, but in fact the fire requires oxygen, fuel, and many other factors. A more accurate view of cause and effect is that prior states constrain possible future states. If I'm in New York at 3 without some form of super-transportation, I can't be in San Francisco at 3:01. Nothing in the law of cause and effect requires that prior states wholly determine future states.

      While the will must be able to cause things, it is incorrect to say it must not be caused by anything. It simply must not be wholly constrained by prior states -- and QM suggests that almost nothing is. As for whether it makes learning impossible, I submit that making this argument solid that requires ruling out every other possible way learning could work. And there's one obvious one -- learning consists of adjusting the constraints on future decisions. To give an analogy, imagine a 1,000-sided die. Free will is like rolling the die. Learning is like changing the values on the faces. There is no reason we cannot exercise our free will today in a way that constrains, for the better, our free will tomorrow. (Kind of like marriage.)

    5. Re:It's all about free will by dargaud · · Score: 1

      People want to be an uncaused cause. That's what the concept of free will boils down to.

      Then it's enough to consider the uncertainty principle if you want free will. Why look further into uncharted territory ?

      --
      Non-Linux Penguins ?
    6. Re:It's all about free will by Prune · · Score: 1

      I understand what you're saying and I tend to feel your definition of free will is what we want it to be, but many philosophers define it as simply the inability to know your future. It is easy to see that this is compatible with even deterministic physics: if you're told your future or you calculate it, you can act to counteract the prediction--there's infinite recursion here you must carry out to predict your future. Of course, I find this way to define free will lacking, but it is in fact very common.

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
    7. Re:It's all about free will by ShakaUVM · · Score: 1

      >>People want to be an uncaused cause. That's what the concept of free will boils down to.

      Eh, that doesn't really follow. Nobody wants free will to be an uncaused cause, or worse, a random one. That's not free will.

      Free will is easier to define by it's opposite: the notion that the pre-existing state of the universe will guide your actions for the rest of your life, and you have no say in the matter. Since this can be proven to be false by the halting problem, free will must be true. Somehow.

    8. Re:It's all about free will by spun · · Score: 1

      Ah, but then free will is not doing its job mitigating the problem of evil. If a person's choices are influenced by events, then how can we say whether their choices are their own, and thus deserving of punishment or reward, or they are caused by the influences of the world? When a desperate man steals or kills, how can we know whether he was capable of making another choice? If we say he was always capable of making another choice, we have discounted all influences as being immaterial to the outcome, they aren't influences at all, and the will can not learn or grow from experience. The will is, again, an uncaused cause, not a part of the chain of causality. Dividing the will into a changeable and unchangeable part is only obfuscating the real issue.

      --
      - None can love freedom heartily, but good men; the rest love not freedom, but license. -- John Milton
    9. Re:It's all about free will by spun · · Score: 1

      No, it is NOT an illusion caused by our tendency to think things have a single cause, it is a recognition that all things are both cause and effect, and everything is caused by many, many things. We simplify, in our mental models, the things we consider, but we should always know that our simplifications are a shortcut, and in reality, everything has many unobserved causes.

      Quantum mechanics is no mechanism for will. It is random. If something is random, it is not free will. You can't say "Oh, he did a bad thing, he could have chosen another course," rather, you would have to admit, "A bad thing happened randomly through him." If something is a coin flip, it isn't a choice.

      If something is not wholly constrained by prior states, then again, learning is impossible. The part of the will that is not constrained can not learn, prior states have no impact on it. The will can not choose what it learns, and therefore, is blameless for its choices, making the entire concept of free will useless, because the real purpose of the concept is to assign blame for bad choices.

      --
      - None can love freedom heartily, but good men; the rest love not freedom, but license. -- John Milton
    10. Re:It's all about free will by spun · · Score: 1

      Sorry, call me dense but I REALLY do not see how the halting problem proves free will necessary. If the pre existing state of the universe does not guide your actions, you can not learn. Either the pre existing state of the universe influences the will, in which case learning is possible but will is not free, or the will derives NO information from the universe, and can not learn about it. Either way, one can not assign blame to others based on their choices. One can certainly punish to deter, knowing that the will can learn, but one can not right an imbalance by punishing evil. In fact, if free will does not exist, the universe can not be out of balance, and evil can not exist.

      --
      - None can love freedom heartily, but good men; the rest love not freedom, but license. -- John Milton
    11. Re:It's all about free will by spun · · Score: 1

      Randomness is not free will. A coin flip is not a choice.

      --
      - None can love freedom heartily, but good men; the rest love not freedom, but license. -- John Milton
    12. Re:It's all about free will by JoelKatz · · Score: 1

      If QM is the mechanism for the will, then it's not random. It simply appears random from the outside, as any exercise of free will must. If my choice of breakfast cereal is an act of free will, then at best you can make probabilistic predictions about what I'll choose for breakfast (based on the constraints that are not part of free will). But my final choice will seem random to any outsider. So the fact that QM always seems random from the outside is consistent with free will working by the same mechanism.

      You are correct that the part of the will that is not constrained cannot learn, but so what? The constraints are the learning. The will most certainly can choose what it learns, that's precisely what it does. I agree that the unconstrained portion can be argued to be blameless, but so what? My pinkie is also blameless for my choices. And in any event, if QM is the mechanism, then the constrained and unconstrained 'portions' are inseparable. An electron does not have a constrained and an unconstrained part.

      To make an impossibility proof, you have to rule out every possible mechanism, and I don't think you can do that.

    13. Re:It's all about free will by spun · · Score: 1

      In fact, there is no way to determine whether free will exists or not, but we must live our lives as if it exists, whether it does or not. Personally, I love your definition. I do not see it lacking in anything, but then, I'm not concerned about the problem of evil.

      The concept of free will exists because people build mental models of the world. In order for these models to make sense, the consciousness must model itself. Models are by nature reductionist, the quantify things in terms of parts, but can only consider a finite number of parts and things. In our models, things are simply what they are, things unto themselves and not caused by other things. A finite model can not contain an infinite regress, and so, at some level we must stop breaking things down into pieces and say, "this is what it is, and not made of smaller pieces or other influences outside the scope of my model."

      We do this with our own consciousness. We model it as something separate from the universe. Seeing the consciousness as separate, we say choice comes only from within consciousness. Bad choices or choices that harm others then do not come from the universe of cause and effect, but from the individual. We need will to be free so that we can assign blame to those things we see as separate from the universe: we blame a person for harming us because they are separate from the universe, we do not blame the avalanche that harms us because it is not separate. We recognize that the avalanche happened for reasons that are entirely within the universe, but the person's choices came from outside the universe.

      Free will as a concept exists to restore balance to this unbalanced situation where some things are entirely within the universe, and caused causes, while other things are partially outside the universe and are uncaused causes. If something happens for reasons external to itself, it is necessarily in balance with the rest of the universe but if the cause comes from outside the universe and there is no reciprocal causation going the other way, there is necessarily imbalance. Free will then becomes a repository for good and bad "karma," and an explanation for evil.

      --
      - None can love freedom heartily, but good men; the rest love not freedom, but license. -- John Milton
    14. Re:It's all about free will by spun · · Score: 1

      But we know quantum mechanics is TRULY random. There is no pattern to it. In order to fit the definition, will would have to have some sort of recognizable pattern to it. When we think of free will, we think of making choices, not randomly flipping a coin.

      If the constraints are the learning, then will isn't free, it is CONSTRAINED. You do realize that that word is pretty much the opposite of "free," right? If part is constrained and part is not, what determines whether a choice comes from the constrained or the free part?

      --
      - None can love freedom heartily, but good men; the rest love not freedom, but license. -- John Milton
    15. Re:It's all about free will by dargaud · · Score: 1

      No, but it allows you to make a choice. If you are predetermined, there's no randomness, and the opposite is also true. But if you have 60% chance to choose fries for lunch and 40% chance to chose carrots, even if that's predetermined, the randomness allows your free will to make the choice.

      --
      Non-Linux Penguins ?
    16. Re:It's all about free will by Prune · · Score: 1

      The base-level model of the world (and also of the organism's body) are below the level of conscious awareness. It is the integration of these two in the anterior cingulate cortex and a few other areas like the insula (see Damasio's research) into some sort of second-order representation of the organism and the world models interacting that gives rise the feeling of consciousness. This is a bit similar but not the same as what you wrote in your second paragraph.

      The problem I think most people have is a failure to separate the subjective from the objective. The latter provides explanation of how the former arises, but it cannot be identical to it as the subjective is all about personal experience which can only exist within the specific mind of the individual in question and is not generalized to a set of individuals or other intelligent artifacts any more than to the extent that our minds do have a lot in common. Too many people ignore the fact that consciousness is not an abstract thing but something grounded in the physical body (and not just the brain, as the brain has a model of the body continually updated by monitoring the body). The neuroscience research mentioned above clearly establishes that. And so, despite some understanding we have of each other, conscious experience is too specific to the individual to be meaningfully abstracted and generalizable, and other considerations such as its emergent nature simply make it pointless to study the subjective objectively.

      We live for the experience, however. We enjoy food not because its nutritional components produce certain electrical signals in our tongues that affect our brain (that's explanation, not justification), but for the feeling of a good taste. This is why it's perfectly fine to live our lives in a way that appeals for justification of our actions to the subjective, and accept the feeling of free will for example even though there's no free will in any objective way.

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
    17. Re:It's all about free will by spun · · Score: 1

      How does randomness equal choice? If it's random, you may as well flip a coin, it is not a choice. If it is random, it doesn't come from inside of you. You aren't making a choice, the choice is made randomly. I don't know how else to put that. Do we have different definitions of "random?" If a person were to make all their decisions through the flip of a coin, we wouldn't say they are choosing the outcomes, would we?

      --
      - None can love freedom heartily, but good men; the rest love not freedom, but license. -- John Milton
    18. Re:It's all about free will by spun · · Score: 1

      Very insightful. As I posted in this thread already, I am rewarding your insight by modding up a different insightful comment you made in the 'parallel programming is hard' thread.

      I believe the important point of free will is the idea that our choices can be less than free, that we CAN be constrained by experience and environment. We know when someone has taken some of our freedom of choice from us, and we do not, in general, like it very much. Free will can then be understood as an intuitive sense that tells us whether our choices are limited or expansive.

      --
      - None can love freedom heartily, but good men; the rest love not freedom, but license. -- John Milton
    19. Re:It's all about free will by Prune · · Score: 1

      Thanks, man. I'm really happy when someone actually agrees with me, given how rare that occurs... sigh -.-

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
    20. Re:It's all about free will by Prune · · Score: 1

      I mean rarely not rare... I blame my grammatical indiscretions on the Southern Comfort... damn you Amerikhans!

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
  14. Penrose... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Has had a HYPOTHESIS that consciousness is tied to microtubules in neurons. His idea requires quantum physics to properly handle the mechanism he proposes (it has been a while but I believe it involves wave propagation via microtubules. I also seem to remember reading something not too long ago that SEEMED to provide some indication that microtubules were possibly involved in neural signalling and information transmission in some way...).

    Interesting idea BUT it is premature in that it is still not really clear what consciousness is, let alone how it emerges from the brain (of humans AND non-humans...it isn't just a Homo sapiens thing). It may not really require any quantum magic at all, likely being merely an emergent property of complex neural connections and interactions. Hell, there's some indications that consciousness is less than meets the eye: based on fMRI experiments, it appears that "conscious" decisions are often decided PRE-consciously, that is, that one seems to make the decision to act or do this or that BEFORE you are actually consciously aware of the decision. Kinda kicks the idea of free will and conscious action in the nuts eh?

  15. This Place Is Full Of Quantum by Nefarious+Wheel · · Score: 5, Interesting

    This place is full of Quantum; it's everywhere you look

    It's in the halls of Physicists, and pages of a book.

    "There has to be a fallacy!" the comment summarised,

    And if we care to challenge that, we aren't very wise?

    --
    Do not mock my vision of impractical footwear
    1. Re:This Place Is Full Of Quantum by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      This place is full of Quantum; it's everywhere you look

      It's in the halls of Physicists, and pages of a book.

      "There has to be a fallacy!" the comment summarised,

      And if we care to challenge that, we aren't very wise?

      Burma Shave

    2. Re:This Place Is Full Of Quantum by grcumb · · Score: 4, Insightful

      This place is full of Quantum; it's everywhere you look
      It's in the halls of Physicists, and pages of a book.
      "There has to be a fallacy!" the comment summarised,
      And if we care to challenge that, we aren't very wise?

      But 'consciousness is quantum' is facile, don't you think?
      One hell of a non sequitur; he's right to raise a stink.
      Without supporting data, the statement is absurd,
      I'm with OP, this is dopey - at best the logic's blurred!

      --
      Crumb's Corollary: Never bring a knife to a bun fight.
    3. Re:This Place Is Full Of Quantum by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 4, Insightful

      "Blurred" is just the kind of logic that the quantum minds require.
      Like Hellen's scientists, with their Earth, Wind, Water, Fire.
      You see, a lot of the mystery becomes quite easy to explain
      By introducing "aether" - why that's what's in the brain!

    4. Re:This Place Is Full Of Quantum by artor3 · · Score: 1

      This place is full of Quantum; it's everywhere you look
      It's in the halls of Physicists, and pages of a book.
      "There has to be a fallacy!" the comment summarised,
      And if we care to challenge that, we aren't very wise?

      But 'consciousness is quantum' is facile, don't you think?
      One hell of a non sequitur; he's right to raise a stink.
      Without supporting data, the statement is absurd,
      I'm with OP, this is dopey - at best the logic's blurred!

      Uhh.... did I forget International Poetry Day or something?

      Seriously, what gives?

    5. Re:This Place Is Full Of Quantum by MarkRose · · Score: 2

      Uhh.... did I forget International Poetry Day or something?

      Seriously, what gives?

      To counter silly sophistry, one must speak in poetry
      Not a matter of philosophy, but to convince with eloquence
      To simply plead all blustery's, a technique of futility
      Best use good ol' artistry, to win the argument.

      --
      Be relentless!
    6. Re:This Place Is Full Of Quantum by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      it's not absurd. it's a wonderful and pertinent explanation for the observer effect.

    7. Re:This Place Is Full Of Quantum by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      seems to me consciousness is a state of particle interaction not a force or formation from those particles. Just because you have information about the movement of a quanta does not make that information specific to some steps of physical presence. That would be like saying that a trajectory is a quantum state. It just tracks where something will be based on its current course.

    8. Re:This Place Is Full Of Quantum by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Roger Penrose has published a book (The Emperor's New Mind) in which he basically states that he doesn't like the idea of human behavior being reducible to turing machines, and so is looking for evidence that it isn't, especially in the realm of quantum mechanics. Which is exactly the wrong direction to go about science. This book is many years old so this is hardly a new opinion from him.

    9. Re:This Place Is Full Of Quantum by Zalbik · · Score: 1

      Uhh.... did I forget International Poetry Day or something?

      Seriously, what gives?

      To counter silly sophistry, one must speak in poetry

      Not a matter of philosophy, but to convince with eloquence

      To simply plead all blustery's, a technique of futility

      Best use good ol' artistry, to win the argument.

      Your argument is flawed, as anyone can see,
      For your rhyming pattern's off...it's not A-A-B-B
      In any case there's something that you forgot to say
      It is most definitely not International Poetry Day!

    10. Re:This Place Is Full Of Quantum by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      In viewing this quantum thread mosaic
      Avoid posts ordinary and prosaic
      Allow yourself time to rehearse
      And form your thoughts in rhyming verse

    11. Re:This Place Is Full Of Quantum by Genda · · Score: 1

      ...And is for this reason I move we ban Dr. Suess from all public libraries!!!

    12. Re:This Place Is Full Of Quantum by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Without supporting data, the statement is absurd

      Without a concise definition of consciousness, the question is absurd, nevermind the supposed answers to the question. Are we talking consciousness as in the ability of an individual to respond to its environment, or are we talking self-awareness?

      I'll give you a definition: self-awareness is the interaction between controlling parts of a feedback-controlled system with limited observability. In the same way that a biological entity (individual) interacts with its environment through limited means, a brain only has limited amount of information to interact with its environment (the body). Given that the brain receives data from both intrasensory (body) and extrasensory (senses) inputs, but only controls the intrasensory, a model is required that defines the interaction between the body and its environment. This model is the self-perception of the entity. Now, if you view the brain itself as a collection of actors instead of a single entity (two hemispheres, dedicated purpose-areas, etc) and take into account the huge amount of interconnect paths, "consciousness" could easily be nothing more than separate brain areas responding to each other, thus enhancing the self-perception of the entity.

      Using that definition (and that's really a stretch, so far consciousness has always been defined in terms of cognition -- which also has not been strictly defined), why would it matter by which mechanism the model is constructed? Why would the construction be through any other means than neuron/synapse growth? Consciousness has always been an ethereal term, a linguistic crutch to describe the most intangible of concepts. Why would a true scotchman^Wscientist even want to describe such an ill-defined term?

    13. Re:This Place Is Full Of Quantum by shadowfaxcrx · · Score: 1

      You suggest describing the universe
      With carefully constructed verse.
      But poetry alone cannot explain
      Why "we" are more than just a brain.

      For that needs physics of the quantum sort?
      That's silly, as we should all retort.
      The question of why we are we
      Has been answered with "Je pense donc je suis."

      For mysteries of the universe remain
      Far greater than the quanta of our brain.
      The notion that we can solve them all
      Is a load of utter fol de rol.

      Our selves may be god-derived or not
      To know for sure, prob'ly ain't our lot
      Better that we spend the time instead
      Exploring life - the stuff outside our head.

      For if we try too long and hard to solve
      This matter of how consciousness evolved
      We'll let all the important stuff slip by
      Like living life, instead of asking why.

      --
      "I disagree with you" does not equal "flamebait."
    14. Re:This Place Is Full Of Quantum by Will.Woodhull · · Score: 1

      Not International Poetry Day, but instead a contnuing acknowledgement of the debt that most modern physicists owe to Dr Seuss, whose patterns, once imposed on a young mind, continue to resonate for decades for reasons that are beyond scientific ken.

      As testimony to this absurdity, there is Cecil Adams' provision of the Straight Dope on Erwin's and Al's argument about dice.

      Or something like that. I am not a Quantum Mechanic, and in fact I admit to having occasional random thoughts that I cannot connect to anything in the Newtonian Universe with any of the screwdrivers or spanners in my rather meager toolkit. This posting may in fact be one of those random thoughts, especially as on inspection it would seem to have a nearly zero probability of conveying anything meaningful to any reader.

      --
      Will
    15. Re:This Place Is Full Of Quantum by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      If consciousness is quantum and the world changes when we observe
      Then we should see the changes when we monitor a nerve
      The forking of the cosmos is complex and no way funny
      Without it Neal Town Stephenson would lose his best plot bunny!

    16. Re:This Place Is Full Of Quantum by TheoMurpse · · Score: 1

      TO sit upon my throne
      as the prince of Bel Air!

    17. Re:This Place Is Full Of Quantum by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      How about this:
      If A, then B
      B
      Thus, A

      Another way to put it, Quantum whatever might be necessary condition of conscious like having brain cells, but it is not a sufficient condition. That is perhaps along with confusing a cause and an explanation of something. There is also the multiple realizable generalizations. We can use different parts to realize consciousness, and still provide deterministic and physical descriptions. Penrose seems to advocating that we dress up some sort of metaphysical explanation of consciousness, under the cover of science. That was tried I believe back around Descartes' time, with little success.

      Let me redirect everyone in the right direction. Try to describe your conscious state or perhaps your dog's conscious state without using language. Mind and language seem to be fairly tied at the hip, and that does not seem to be an accident.

      In any case, this philosophical dog has been beat to death by philosophers, and very well rejected. Physicists keep trying though, and we keep making fun of them.

    18. Re:This Place Is Full Of Quantum by mldi · · Score: 1

      Earth, Wind, Water, Fire, Heart! Captain planet, he's our hero....

      FTFY

      --
      If you aren't suspicious of your government's actions, you aren't doing your job as a responsible citizen.
    19. Re:This Place Is Full Of Quantum by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      it's not absurd. it's a wonderful and pertinent explanation for the observer effect.

      I totally agree, except for the part about it being an explanation.

  16. What a terrible article by Old+Wolf · · Score: 2

    The article basically says "We shouldn't jump to conclusions just because consciousness and quantum theory are both weird" , with an extra page full of waffle to pad it out. I didn't learn anything substantial from this article and I doubt anybody else would have either. The article doesn't propose anything useful of its own, nor does it successfully debunk any other proposal.

    It doesn't even understand what "jump to conclusions" means. Penrose is cited as doing that for the WMAP result, but in fact what he did was propose a theory (that turned out to be wrong). That's what science is about. People propose theories or hypotheses, and then people try to prove or disprove them, perhaps discovering new truths along the way. There's no 'shame' to be had in theorizing something and turning out to be wrong, nor does that make the scientist 'bad' if he does propose a wrong theory at some time.

    1. Re:What a terrible article by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Dammit, now I want waffles.

    2. Re:What a terrible article by Black+Parrot · · Score: 1

      I didn't learn anything substantial from this article and I doubt anybody else would have either.

      Great - all those years of not RingTFA finally paid off!

      --
      Sheesh, evil *and* a jerk. -- Jade
    3. Re:What a terrible article by Unequivocal · · Score: 1

      Generally speaking - at least peer-reviewed journals - when you propose a theory, you also provide a mechanism or some interpretative framework. Scientists don't (generally) just propose an idea without any formalism to back it up (such as a model or process). Penrose's assertions of consciousness don't have any noticeable disprovable aspects.

      As a scientific researcher, if I want to say that the properties of consciousness depend on quantum physics, the usual expectation is that I'll provide a mechanism to explain the dependency, and that mechanism or explanation will have some disprovable characteristics.

      Of course Penrose made his assertion in a popular science book (Emperor's New Mind) not a peer reviewed forum, so his speculation went further afield. And b/c he's scientist with a well established career, he gets more lee way than your average post doc (like it or not). And the original citation was to discovery.com -- so you get what you pay for.

    4. Re:What a terrible article by Prune · · Score: 1

      If you actually do want to learn something about the issue (and specifically why it is a non-issue), take a look here: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0105097

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
  17. It's the unified theory of everything by Atroxodisse · · Score: 1

    And the answer is 42.

    --
    Read my short stories - You won't regret it.
  18. Fundamental Assumptions folk make. by mr+bms · · Score: 0

    I think its obvious here that the brain is more complex than our understanding. What I think is startling are the assumptions scientists and other folk have made already. For Example :- Its a computational or logic processing device. Maybe its more of a network card, linking our actual conscientiousness to our bodies. Its a fundamental difference but it would explain telepathy, reincarnation and a host of other phenomena. Personally I think it provides a better model for understanding our minds which I think are limitless and not limited by the size of our brains.

    1. Re:Fundamental Assumptions folk make. by elucido · · Score: 1

      I think its obvious here that the brain is more complex than our understanding. What I think is startling are the assumptions scientists and other folk have made already.

      For Example :- Its a computational or logic processing device.

      Maybe its more of a network card, linking our actual conscientiousness to our bodies. Its a fundamental difference but it would explain telepathy, reincarnation and a host of other phenomena. Personally I think it provides a better model for understanding our minds which I think are limitless and not limited by the size of our brains.

      That phenomena isn't based on science. But it would explain languages, time, and evolution in a way that religion cannot.
      This could have serious unintended consequences though.

    2. Re:Fundamental Assumptions folk make. by grumbel · · Score: 1

      Its a computational or logic processing device.

      Something that is easily confirmed by observation (for reasonably wide definition of computational device of course).

      Maybe its more of a network card, linking our actual conscientiousness to our bodies.

      Something that somebody made up on the spot with no evidence what so ever.

      Its a fundamental difference but it would explain telepathy, ...

      You are doing it wrong. You are trying to explain things that don't exist with things you don't understand.

    3. Re:Fundamental Assumptions folk make. by BuildingSnowmen · · Score: 1

      I think its obvious here that the brain is more complex than our understanding. What I think is startling are the assumptions scientists and other folk have made already. .

      I would say that it is consciousness, and not the brain, that would appear to be more complex than our understanding. Why do we make the assumption that consciousness can be understood? What does it mean to "understand" consciousness?

      When we understand other concepts, we are able to describe or convey their meanings in terms of other concepts that are already understood. You have to understand "circle" and "move" before you can understand the concept of "wheel"; you have to understand particle, wave, and spin before you can relate to quantum mechanics.

      So why do we assume that we can explain, relate, or understand consciousness? Neuroscientists have made great progress in identifying the neural correlates of consciousness. Psychoactive drugs and trans-cranial stimulation can be used to alter the conscious experience by affecting known areas of the brain. However, knowing how the brain produces consciousness doesn't get us any closer to explaining what consciousness is than knowing the wavelength of blue light and how the retina works explains the qualia of the color blue.

      tl;dr: Consciousness may not have an explanation. Perhaps it just is what it is.

    4. Re:Fundamental Assumptions folk make. by Have+Brain+Will+Rent · · Score: 1

      it would explain telepathy, reincarnation and a host of other phenomena

      I'm pretty sure that for something to be labelled a phenomenon it has to actually exist. At least QM exists and conciousness seems to exist. So trying to use one to explain the other has at last some chance of being on the bottom rung of the ladder of reasonableness. OTOH promoting a guess about the nature of the brain to explain things which do not exist, or if you prefer for which there is no proof of existence, seems to be falling right off the ladder.

      --
      The tyrant will always find a pretext for his tyranny - Aesop
  19. one site by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    http://divinecosmos.com/start-here/books-free-online/18-the-shift-of-the-ages/69-the-shift-of-the-ages-chapter-13-the-physics-of-the-spiral-in-the-consciousness-units

  20. It's about the question not Penrose. by elucido · · Score: 1

    Penrose is the only one brave enough to ask the question; "Is consciousness real?" and try to answer it using physics and science.

    But it's the same question that would be asked by a solipsist, do other minds exist? Do I exist? Why not try to answer that?

    Well there are political reasons why we shouldn't. If we find out one way or another governments will seek to use it to enslave and torture. If we find out consciousness is a matter of physics and can be controlled, it opens up all new ways to threaten people, to torture people, to enslave people. But it also allows for the creation of robot-slaves who would be superior to humans in every way imaginable.

    There are political problems, and social problems, and relgious problems involving these questions that overshadow the science. The science is about the only part that doesn't have major problems. Science eventually should be able to show one way or another, it's just a matter of what happens after we prove one way or another?

    No free will exists? So who is the master of the universe?

    1. Re:It's about the question not Penrose. by Black+Parrot · · Score: 1

      If we find out consciousness is a matter of physics and can be controlled, it opens up all new ways to threaten people, to torture people, to enslave people.

      Well, we already know that consciousness can be affected by chemicals, magnetic fields, and IIRC a few other things. Sounds like physics may just have something to do with it.

      And though AIUI not a matter of consciousness per se, it has long been known that a simple squirt of cold water onto the eardrum will cause the two halves of your brain to dissociate.

      --
      Sheesh, evil *and* a jerk. -- Jade
    2. Re:It's about the question not Penrose. by Asic+Eng · · Score: 1

      Penrose is the only one brave enough to ask the question; "Is consciousness real?" and try to answer it using physics and science.

      Physics is probably the wrong tool. Whatever happens in the brain obeys the laws of physics, but that applies to e.g. evolution as well. Nevertheless biology is the scientific discipline which discovered evolution.

      When we write an application like a word processor we use some high-level formal language and a tool which translates those into machine code. This code is executed on a computer chip, a circuit composed of logical gates. These gates consist of transistors which switch electrical currents around. The transistors consist of complex arrangements of conducting, isolating and semiconducting materials.

      Ultimately your word processor will move electrons around on a series of computer chips, that's correct. However looking at the problem of writing a word processor in terms of moving electrons around will get you absolutely nowhere.

      The brain is a hugely complex system - trying to understand how it works by looking at subatomic effects is very likely a hopeless task. If we can't manage to understand it on a much more abstract level, then we will probably never understand it.

    3. Re:It's about the question not Penrose. by harryjohnston · · Score: 1

      Given any useful definition of "real" then yes, consciousness is real, because it has observable effects. (For example, people arguing about whether or not consciousness is real.) You don't really need physics and science to answer that question.

      Most other debate in this area boils down to arguing about what words like "real", "consciousness", and "free will" should actually mean (if anything) so speculating about possible quantum effects on the operation of the brain doesn't seem a particularly helpful way to resolve matters.

    4. Re:It's about the question not Penrose. by maraist · · Score: 1

      I think you're over stating things here.. In comparison, look at how our evil over-lords have enslaved us by learning about gravity. We really can't risk letting them learn about the next level - sabots to the factory machines I tell you!!

      Plus I roll my eyes whenever I hear people talk about free will. It is a completely irrelevant question - it can have zero possible impact on your day to day activities (or at most an equivalent impact as learning that it's raining outside). Even a resultant decision to commit suicide is more attributable to the emotional stability of the person than anything else. Consider for a moment why you don't go around raping every orifice that moves. I'm pretty sure God has nothing to do with that decision. It's the same reason why Dogs don't do it - because they learn (often the hard way) that it's not always prudent.

      --
      -Michael
    5. Re:It's about the question not Penrose. by SanityInAnarchy · · Score: 1

      Penrose is the only one brave enough to ask the question; "Is consciousness real?" and try to answer it using physics and science.

      Bullshit. I've asked the question often enough, along with anyone I've ever talked philosophy with, and just about every "strong AI" researcher, along with just about every neurologist, is making progress towards explaining what consciousness is. Whether or not that's "real" is up to you to interpret.

      But it's the same question that would be asked by a solipsist, do other minds exist? Do I exist? Why not try to answer that?

      Because those aren't terribly useful questions. I suppose they're interesting, but would I behave any differently if I knew that I didn't exist and that no other minds existed?

      If we find out consciousness is a matter of physics and can be controlled

      Just because it's a matter of physics, why would you assume it can be controlled?

      Know what else is a matter of physics? Stars. Black Holes. Supernovae.

      Black Parrot has a point, though -- we already know far less exotic ways of affecting consciousness. And I would argue there are ethical reasons we should learn more about consciousness -- what we know now (psychology) goes a long way towards actually treating someone who is mentally ill.

      No free will exists? So who is the master of the universe?

      I'm not convinced these are related questions. A compatiblist view would allow for the "free" actions of any master of the universe to be completely determined -- or, apply a more restricted compatiblism to the "master" part, so you can have a master who doesn't have free will. It's also possible that free will exists in the absence of any "master of the universe" at all.

      --
      Don't thank God, thank a doctor!
    6. Re:It's about the question not Penrose. by maraist · · Score: 1

      But you're missing something..
      We simultaneously discovered algorithms and electronic switching circuits (in different centuries even). But the practical application of complex repetitive algorithms ultimately was contingent on the advancement of the physics model. From gears/belts to electro-magnetic solinoids to diode-resistor circuits to field-effect transistors to MASSIVELY parallel transister farms - and possibly to quantum state management.

      As each technical hurdle of physics was achieved, we were able to explore ever greater algorithms, until we could write algorithms OF algorithms (ruby-on-rails molds most all aspects of CIS from english constructs into organized hyper-complex code - something Lisp/prolog hasn't seemed to practically achieve). Map-reduce structures can pass tertiary abstract algorithms to both data and algorithm streams.

      The order of complexity (allowed by the increasing algorithmic processing capacity adapted to particular classes of algorithms) is slowly allowing us to approach practical computational autonomy. Meaning a proto-brain.

      Fundamentally I agree with you that you don't model the software of MS word with differential equations on the circuit board - though I believe you could. BUT both processes are / were ultimately necessary.

      --
      -Michael
    7. Re:It's about the question not Penrose. by elucido · · Score: 1

      Because those aren't terribly useful questions. I suppose they're interesting, but would I behave any differently if I knew that I didn't exist and that no other minds existed?

      If no other mind exists then the logical thing to do would be to enslave the planet. Right? That would neutralize all threats to you.

      Just because it's a matter of physics, why would you assume it can be controlled?

      Know what else is a matter of physics? Stars. Black Holes. Supernovae

      Those things are far away. The consciousness is apparently in your brain. They can gain more and more control over your thinking until you are a complete zombie.

      Black Parrot has a point, though -- we already know far less exotic ways of affecting consciousness. And I would argue there are ethical reasons we should learn more about consciousness -- what we know now (psychology) goes a long way towards actually treating someone who is mentally ill.

      Everybody who isn't you would be deemed mentally ill if you are the only mind that exists. They'd be mentally ill because you can't control them, not for any other reason than that.

      I'm not convinced these are related questions. A compatiblist view would allow for the "free" actions of any master of the universe to be completely determined -- or, apply a more restricted compatiblism to the "master" part, so you can have a master who doesn't have free will. It's also possible that free will exists in the absence of any "master of the universe" at all.

      If there is no free will, shouldn't we strive to control as much of the universe as possible and as many lifeforms as possible? For sake of security or for fun?

    8. Re:It's about the question not Penrose. by MindlessAutomata · · Score: 1

      Penrose is the only one brave enough to ask the question; "Is consciousness real?" and try to answer it using physics and science.

      The fact that you would even suggest this shows how completely and absolutely ignorant you are of the subject matter. Please refrain from commenting until you've at least read some wikipedia articles on the matter.

      In fact, a (related) question that you haven't considered that philosophers and scientists discuss that comes prior to the question, "Is consciousness real?" is, "What is consciousness?" And there is no full agreement, leading many to suspect that the question, "Is consciousness real?" is either meaningless or answered with, "no," because if you cannot even agree upon a working definition, then perhaps the concept itself should be further scrutinized. Many hold that "consciousness," considered in regards to what one normally understands upon hearing the word, is merely something like an illusion. This line of thought is particularly influential to functionalists and eliminativists.

    9. Re:It's about the question not Penrose. by SanityInAnarchy · · Score: 1

      If no other mind exists then the logical thing to do would be to enslave the planet. Right? That would neutralize all threats to you.

      Nope. There's no such thing as a logical goal, unless it's as a prerequisite for some other subjective goal, and I don't particularly want to enslave the planet. I'm capable of feeling empathy for even poorly-simulated creatures in a videogame. Furthermore, the kinds of things I would call unethical because they involve another mind are also frequently risky. And even if these minds are simulated, they are simulated in a way which is similar enough to my own that the best way to predict their behavior is to think of them as minds, so there's still a legitimate question of whether it would actually be useful to know that they are simulated.

      What's more, if this turns out to be something that's unknowable, it also immediately becomes irrelevant. And if it turns out that there are other minds -- and I've heard arguments for this -- that still doesn't tell me if any of the minds I think I'm interacting with are those other minds.

      Those things are far away. The consciousness is apparently in your brain.

      The distance is pretty irrelevant

      It's the size that matters. Consciousness would physically be very small, and if it's got anything to do with quantum physics, even smaller. It's also fairly fast and adaptive. Think about how difficult it is for us to deal with other phenomena on that scale -- sometimes we do well, but sometimes we run up against something like cancer.

      Everybody who isn't you would be deemed mentally ill if you are the only mind that exists. They'd be mentally ill because you can't control them, not for any other reason than that.

      I'm not sure I follow that logic, but I'm even less convinced that this has anything to do with the question of whether governments understanding how consciousness works and manipulating it via quantum physics is a credible threat.

      If there is no free will, shouldn't we strive to control as much of the universe as possible and as many lifeforms as possible? For sake of security or for fun?

      You've leaped immediately from "There is no free will" to "There are no ethics." That doesn't follow -- there are plenty of compatibilist theories. Nor would that immediately make me think universal conquest is "fun", nor would it justify trading other lifeforms' essential rights for our own security.

      --
      Don't thank God, thank a doctor!
    10. Re:It's about the question not Penrose. by Asic+Eng · · Score: 1

      I don't think there is enough computing power in the world to model an entire PC on sub-atomic level. You could in principle do this, but in any engineering sense you can't.

    11. Re:It's about the question not Penrose. by elucido · · Score: 1

      Nope. There's no such thing as a logical goal, unless it's as a prerequisite for some other subjective goal, and I don't particularly want to enslave the planet. I'm capable of feeling empathy for even poorly-simulated creatures in a videogame. Furthermore, the kinds of things I would call unethical because they involve another mind are also frequently risky. And even if these minds are simulated, they are simulated in a way which is similar enough to my own that the best way to predict their behavior is to think of them as minds, so there's still a legitimate question of whether it would actually be useful to know that they are simulated.

      What's more, if this turns out to be something that's unknowable, it also immediately becomes irrelevant. And if it turns out that there are other minds -- and I've heard arguments for this -- that still doesn't tell me if any of the minds I think I'm interacting with are those other minds.

      Empathy is only useful when it promotes security. In a world where empathy cannot be deduced into logical components, empathy will be a lot less useful as a survival strategy which is basically what empathy is. This meaning if the concept of liberty is scientifically disproved due to there being no free will, you don't have a logical foundation or basis from which to make the claim that empathy for people who do not benefit you is a logical conclusion.

      It's logical now only because you want maximum liberty for yourself, so you don't enslave another as this makes slavery more acceptable and you'll have to deal with the same threat yourself. So in the US Constitution for example you have the concept of free will built into it, if they were to say everything were all predetermined then it's a lot harder to make a Constitution to govern behavior when no one is actually responsible for their behavior but the universe is. No personal responsibility and a lot of social structures would fall apart fairly quickly. So what I'm saying is you might feel empathy, but it doesn't mean it's logical or rational to act on it. Security dictates how most people act ultimately, not feelings. You might not feel like enslaving your neighbor, but if you know your neighbor is trying to do that to you, and the science basically supports that no one is actually free, it's just a matter of who controls who in any given situation.

      The distance is pretty irrelevant

      It's the size that matters. Consciousness would physically be very small, and if it's got anything to do with quantum physics, even smaller. It's also fairly fast and adaptive. Think about how difficult it is for us to deal with other phenomena on that scale -- sometimes we do well, but sometimes we run up against something like cancer.

      Size isn't stopping us from trying to build quantum computers. Why shouldn't we study quantum consciousness? At some point it's just going to reach a point where we will be able to answer certain questions. Maybe a quantum computer will discover qualia and we will know, or maybe we'll figure it out through some form of quantum neuroscience, but eventually we will find out.

      I'm not sure I follow that logic, but I'm even less convinced that this has anything to do with the question of whether governments understanding how consciousness works and manipulating it via quantum physics is a credible threat.

      It's about control. What more do you need to know? Just like you want to control every cell in your body, once you find out these other minds are all fake then you know it's just a matter of gaining control over their bodies. Complete control over their bodies would allow you to treat their bodies as if it were your body, increasing your power.

      Why wouldn't you want to be able to control as many bodies as possible? Even if you don't have the instinct most humans do and you have to accept that as a premise to any argument. You might not do something but you have to logically explain why someone

    12. Re:It's about the question not Penrose. by maraist · · Score: 1

      who said sub-atomic? I said differential equations.. EE 301 type course..Simple circuit modeling equations. It's not precise, but it gives you appropriate steady-state and transition probability equations between coupled modules or within modules..

      --
      -Michael
  21. QM is metaphysically inconsistent by etymxris · · Score: 1

    Well, the Copenhagen interpretation leads to problematic issues regarding "measurement", leading to the "observer" being an irreducible part of any QM experiment. There's a solution that exists for all the wonky metaphysics of QM that people like Penrose like to harp on. Pretty much everything is symmetric in particle physics except "causation". "Causation" has been made explicitly asymmetric more due to our own anthropogenic biases than any theoretical need. Eliminating this asymmetry pretty much solves all the nonsensical metaphysics that QM has spawned over the past century.

    1. Re:QM is metaphysically inconsistent by cjonslashdot · · Score: 1

      Good points, but not sure that eliminating causation solves the problem of the role of consciousness in the Copenhagen interpretation.

      There still must be an observer. In the transactional view, the observer is a receiver, and emits waves just as the event being observed does. However, one cannot remove the observer and have a complete transaction. There is no transaction until an observer is introduced. If the observer is a device and not a consciousness, then one can apply the "Wigner's friend" and extend the system that is being observed to encompass the device, so that the transaction is the end to end phenomenon of the original event terminating with the conscious observation.

      Do you agree?

    2. Re:QM is metaphysically inconsistent by etymxris · · Score: 1

      It's been a while but my understanding is that symmetric interpretations in QM have observers, they just don't have Observers. That is, there is nothing metaphysically special about an observation unit, whether that be a recording device or a human. The reason why Observers are not required is because there is no collapse of the wave function. The collapse of the wave function is the Observation. Without collapse, there is nothing particularly special about the point at which we choose to measure the system.

      And I didn't mean to say causation needs to be discarded. I meant to say that we need to stop thinking about causation asymmetrically, at least at the level of particle physics.

    3. Re:QM is metaphysically inconsistent by cjonslashdot · · Score: 1

      It has been awhile for me too ;-).

      I think that the wave function does not collapse because the observation becomes part of the wave function. Thus, there still must be an "Observer". Otherwise, the observer is merely theoretical. The "Observer" makes it real.

      The fact that it is not real until there is an "Observer" is what provides the suspicious link between QM and consciousness.

      I have often wondered if we have it all backwards: maybe consciousness _is_ the universe in some way. Maybe the "physical world" is nothing but observations that must all correlate and be consistent because the universe's transactional wave function requires them to be in order to satisfy endpoint conditions. Maybe the state space of the universe is somehow a consciousness system. Maybe the only observations that must correlate are the ones that have Observers. I know this is conjecture without theory, but isn't it possible? Who are we to discard such an idea, when we clearly don't really know what consciousness is?

      Consider this: one can never, ever prove that the world exists apart from one's consciousness. That fact alone should make us take pause.

      I am not saying it is this way: I am merely wondering. Something seems to be going on that is not as we think. To solve the problem of consciousness we must have an open mind.

  22. A bit of a fallacy by gijoel · · Score: 1

    Honestly quantum consciousness is just Cartesian Dualism fancied up. Replace quantum with soul and you've pretty much got the same thing.

  23. Re:I doubt they have anything to do with each othe by stanlyb · · Score: 1

    You just explained what quantum physics is. Or translated, if you don't know something, we name it "quantum physics", and voila, Nobel prize. We don;t know why the quantum pair relation is not limited to the distance between them? Here we go another quantum law.

  24. Quantum Theory is not relevant by Bugpowda · · Score: 5, Interesting

    Professional Neuroscientist here... In fact, I'm recording from a sensory neuron that is partially responsible for the conciousness of an awake behaving mouse right now while browsing slashdot.

    There is no reason to think that quantum physics has anything to do with the nature of conciousness. It is not useful to explain free will, or the illusion of free will, of the qualia of objects, or the steadyness of perception on a background of constantly varying spike rates in the brain.

    Perhaps the best, short, free, relatively recent summary of the field was written by Christof Koch and Francis Crick, A Framework for Conciousness, and is available here : http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/29/1/438.pdf

    I also have a little essay on the nature of free will on my blog here, if interested. http://brainwindows.wordpress.com/philosophy/philosophy-the-science-of-free-will/

    1. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      "There is no reason to think that quantum physics has anything to do with the nature of conciousness."

      So you know everything about consciousness then.

      What's up with you know-it-alls?

    2. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by geekoid · · Score: 1

      What do you think of the idea that consciousness is simple emergent behavior from a sufficiently complex organism?

      Meaning, once a species uses tool, plans, and need to deal with chemicals we get our emotions from, and then need to prioritize those* things . It a mechanism to cope with the stress of critical decisions

      *typical balancing desire against raw survival.

      --
      The Kruger Dunning explains most post on /. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger_effect
    3. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by Burnhard · · Score: 1

      There's a gigantic chasm there that philosophers generally call "the explanatory gap".

    4. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by MoellerPlesset2 · · Score: 5, Informative

      There is no reason to think that quantum physics has anything to do with the nature of conciousness. It is not useful to explain free will, or the illusion of free will, of the qualia of objects, or the steadyness of perception on a background of constantly varying spike rates in the brain.

      Quantum chemist here (my username's a hint at that), and I couldn't agree more. I fight against this nonsense all the time.. You'd think that if there was anything to it, we'd be all over it - since explaining chemistry and biochemistry in terms of quantum mechanics is exactly what we do. But nope, I don't know anybody in the field who thinks those ideas have any merit whatsoever. (And let's just point out that as merited a guy Penrose is, he's not a quantum chemist, and more a mathematician than a physicist. His main area of expertise is topology, which has applications in cosmology but is totally unrelated to this area)

      It breaks down like this: Electrons in atoms and molecules behave entirely quantum-mechanically. It's why QM was invented in the first place. Since chemical properties are the result of how the electrons behave, all of chemistry is intrinsically quantum-mechanical in some sense.

      However: Molecules as a whole do not act quantum-mechanically. They move about according to classical mechanics - and that's how we model them physically too. Because once things get as heavy as an atomic nucleus (save for hydrogen, under some circumstances), their quantum 'uncertainty' in position etc is so small that it's chemically insignificant. So you need QM to describe how two atoms are bonded, but classical mech does a good job of describing how the molecules as a whole bounce around.

      So the question is: Are there 'non-trivial' quantum effects in biology? I.e. ones that aren't explainable in terms of 'ordinary' chemistry (which is still ultimately quantum-mechanical). There are a few examples, such as magnetoreception in birds, and energy transfer during some photosynthetic processes. But: despite a lot of the hype surrounding them, these things are still dealing with individual, sub-atomic particles. They don't cast any doubt on 'conventional wisdom' that QM phenomena don't happen at the biological scale. There's nothing in the cell that depends on the actions of a single small molecule, or a single chemical reaction, or anything that's small enough to act quantum-mechanically.

      The physics here doesn't make sense (Penrose's ideas in particular don't even hinge on established QM, but rather his own speculative ideas about quantum gravity.. of all things), we have every reason to believe you wouldn't have quantum phenomena at that scale in that environment, and no reason to believe otherwise. The chemistry doesn't make sense, as there's basically nothing hitherto found in biochemistry that doesn't fit into established chemistry. (Which isn't to say biochem hasn't expanded the boundaries of established chemistry, but it hasn't changed the foundations at all) And the biology doesn't really make sense, as cells are not built anything like Geiger counters, sitting in a labile state waiting for a single sub-atomic event to trigger them.

      Finally, the philosophy doesn't really add up either. The quantum-consciousness people seem to have an agenda along the lines of 1) QM is non-deterministic 2) If the brain's higher functions rely directly on QM processes, then the brain is non-deterministic 3) That nondeterminism means we have free will.
      Little of that makes sense to me. (1) is in fact a matter of which interpretation of QM you choose, and ultimately a question of metaphysics, since any non-deterministic theory could be postulated to be the result of a deterministic underlying 'reality' (as is the case with the Bohm interpretation of QM), or vice-versa. (2) is unwarranted speculation and (3) especially doesn't make much sense to me, since the philosophical question of 'free will' tends to hinge on whet

    5. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by buswolley · · Score: 1
      Hello Professional Neuroscientist, I appreciate the effort. However, your argument speaks to the idea of consciousness equaling awareness. For example, the neuronal spike rates you are recording in animals ( I assume), do not tell us anything about the SUBJECTIVE nature of consciousness. The subjectivity of awareness, and not the awareness itself is not easily accounted for in neuro-psychological theories. This is not to say that manipulations (drugs, lesions, etc) do not effect the subjective nature of consciousness. Obviously they do; but this is not the point. What is the mechanism that makes subjectivity exist? Awareness doesn't require subjective experience, just as light sensors in my garage act properly without subjective experience (as far as I can tell). What is the mechanism by which groups of neural assemblies produce subjectivity?

      A Professional Psychologist

      --

      A Good Troll is better than a Bad Human.

    6. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by SQL+Error · · Score: 1

      I see no gap here.

    7. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by InsertCleverUsername · · Score: 1

      "There is no reason to think that quantum physics has anything to do with the nature of conciousness."

      So you know everything about consciousness then. What's up with you know-it-alls?

      Sigh... He's not saying it's impossible or that we've got all the answers, he's saying there's no evidence, only speculation. It's like when we acknowledge that there's no evidence of the existence of God (feel free to substitute Vishnu, Thor, Poseidon, or Oprah if you like).

      --
      Ask me about my sig!
    8. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by Krishnoid · · Score: 1

      In fact, I'm recording from a sensory neuron that is partially responsible for the conciousness of an awake behaving mouse right now while browsing slashdot.

      What's its userid?

    9. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by Empiric · · Score: 1, Insightful

      Molecules behave classically is a statement of probable, not certain, behavior.

      "Random" is just a place-holder word for "we don't know, or aren't specifying, what the causal factors are".

      If I wanted to install an undetectable back-door to allow manipulation physical reality, along the lines of what I might do as a software developer to an operating system, QM is exactly what I'd do, incidentally.

      Big topics, little time.

      --
      ~ Whence do you come, slayer of men, or where are you going, conqueror of space?
    10. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by nog_lorp · · Score: 1

      Within the realms of observation, consciousness clearly supervenes upon QM, as everything we see and call conscious is made of matter! And QM principles of uncertainty are what excuse of from problems of determinism versus free will. But clearly, that which you study functions at a much larger level, such that QM is only important because chemistry supervenes on it.

      Does that sound right?

    11. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by nog_lorp · · Score: 1

      Everything has to make decisions, and once the decision making becomes complicated enough, we draw an arbitrary line and call it consciousness?

    12. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Samzenpus.

    13. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Right, there's some kind of attempt to rescue "free will" from fatalism by arguing that it's the result of quantum effects which are indeterminate, and that's kind of nonsense. It's not really a scientific or philosophic argument.

      On the other hand, that doesn't mean that consciousness has nothing to do with what's happening on the quantum scale. In a simple way, *everything* is the result of things happening at the quantum scale. Newtonian physics is the result of quantum effects building together to create the observable world. When a wagon wheel rolls down a hill, it is in a sense the result of the motions of subatomic particles-- it's just that describing the quantum effects is not necessary for us to describe the motion of the wheel on the macro scale.

    14. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by MindlessAutomata · · Score: 1

      MOD PARENT UP! It's stuff like this that make slashdot worth reading, even if the news articles are crap (like this one is).

      A very simple biological take on on the brain is that simply, neurons and synapses just don't work on the quantum scale. Patricia Churchland (rightfully) mocks Penrose's idea as being akin to pixie dust in the synapses. Penrose makes his first error (as you allude to) in his silly conception of free will vs. determinism and randomness. Then he just piles up the blunders.

      The only people that buy into Penrose's views on consciousness are silly people easily influenced and bamboozled by bullshit. Frankly it's shameful that people are paying him any mind, in a sane world nobody would know Penrose's view on consciousness because it is so without merit that it need not be mentioned. Perhaps it gets attention just because it serves as an example on how not to approach the question of consciousness.

    15. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by Bugpowda · · Score: 1

      What is the mechanism that makes subjectivity exist?

      Oh boy... This question is the exact reason I went into the field. I have no idea, but I hope we get the answer before I die.

      At this point we are still just poking around in a vast mess of goo hoping to find some neural correlates of perception or motor planning or consciousness. Giving a mechanistic explanation for how these activity patterns produce subjective experience is going to take massive efforts, and maybe a leap of 'faith'. Probably the most progress will be made in areas of sensory perception or motor control, where we can be precisely quantitative about either the sensory input or motor output. Then we can record activity within various areas of the circuits responsible for a given modality, do high resolution reconstruction of the structure and connections between cells in that circuit, and then perturb the circuit, buy selectively silencing or activating functional groups of neurons on a trial by trial basis to probe how changing the circuit modifies the perception. Add to this the challenge of having to 'read-out' these effects via the behavior of an animal, rather than what a human can describe (who wants to volunteer to have channelrhodopsin virus injected into their head and a fiberoptic laser guide installed through their skull??). I don't think I'll work myself out of a job any time soon. :)

    16. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by MindlessAutomata · · Score: 1

      Hello Professional Psychologist,

      As I assume you have a Ph.D in psychology (otherwise you would not be qualified to call yourself a psychologist) , you should be quite familiar that many within your tradition are extremely comfortable with Professional Neuroscientist's position on the matter. Particularly, those of a staunch functionalist or eliminativist persuasion. Nothing within psychology itself necessitates the establishment of subjectivity and (to use Dennett's phrasing) the "Cartesian Theater." By no means not even cognitive psychology or the whole of cognitive science. Your conception of "subjectivity," philosophically speaking, assumes things that may not be true, and is not necessary theoretically. I would point out to you that most data gathered within cognitive psychology is not, in fact, particularly subjective in nature but exists as behavioral output--reaction times and accuracy rates. Where is the subjectivity, the first-person perspective, there? Even so-called "subjective reports" really are just behavioral data. Behaviorism did not die--it simply became more moderate and turned into cognitive psychology--this view is detailed in Roediger's article, "What Happened to Behaviorism?" One need not subscribe to a dualistic conception of the human mind to do cognitive psychology / cognitive science. You are actually treading on ground that is more firmly planted in philosophy.
      A Puny B.S. in Psychology with an interest in philosophy and cognitive science/psychology.

    17. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by Bugpowda · · Score: 1

      AH0099

    18. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by Bugpowda · · Score: 1

      Thank you for going into this level of detail!

    19. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by Bugpowda · · Score: 1

      And it was a very very good cell.

    20. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by mbone · · Score: 4, Informative

      1) QM is non-deterministic

      (1) is in fact a matter of which interpretation of QM you choose, and ultimately a question of metaphysics, since any non-deterministic theory could be postulated to be the result of a deterministic underlying 'reality' (as is the case with the Bohm interpretation of QM), or vice-versa.

      Uh, not so easy. The whole point of the Bell's Theorem tests is that QM is not reducible to a local deterministic theory. Bohm's theory is deterministic, but non-local, which means that it is not causal. So, chose your poison. You can't have it all; QM is not just a normal classical theory hiding behind some measurement weirdness.

    21. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by buswolley · · Score: 1

      The closest I've seen is using subjective confidence ratings and correlating that to objective measures of performance (e.g. meta memory monitoring). I agree however that it is kind of a soft behaviorism. However, I was speaking more toward the hard problem of qualia of experience.

      --

      A Good Troll is better than a Bad Human.

    22. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by multi+io · · Score: 1

      When it comes to the brain and consciousness, Penrose is basically a crackpot. That's what it comes down to. There's just no evidence whatsoever that consciousness relies on QM, and as the GP correctly states, QM is just indeterministic, but not "conscious", so even if there were some QM indeterminism involved in the macroscopic behaviour of the brain and the "free will", then that "free will" wouldn't be "free", it would just be indeterministic.

    23. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by WrongMonkey · · Score: 1

      Basically what you're saying is that there are hidden variables to quantum mechanics. Something that is behind all the randomness, but we cannot measure. You might want to look up some information about Bell's Inequality. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell's_theorem

    24. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by billstewart · · Score: 1

      Go read Chalmers's work about "The Hard Problem"...

      "... teach the bomb phenomenology"

      --

      Bill Stewart
      New Fast-Compression-only CPR http://preview.tinyurl.com/dy575ks
    25. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You can't have it all; QM is not just a normal classical theory hiding behind some measurement weirdness.

      Could you explain that to someone who has only studied physics in school? I'm still thinking that all of this randomness is because of something we haven't (or cannot) observe.

    26. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Read Stapp. Read Rosenblum and Kuttner. You're pushing a particular view on QM. Your view is not the "truth". The fact that you're working in the field doesn't impress me and it shouldn't impress anyone -- QM can be explained to a level that allows its underlying ontology to be sensibly debated by anyone on its logical merits -- without reference to the mathematical details. Therefore you have no special position of authority in this debate. QM does in fact directly implicate consciousness in the day-to-day, moment-by-moment creation of the world. There's no way around that, except by denying reality and trying to bluff others into accepting your view on the basis of your "authority". I.e., you're in denial. Stop trying to shut off debate about what you personally find uncomfortable on a gut-level basis.

    27. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Hi!

      What you are saying is complete nonsense. A typical example of someone who has taken a basic course in physics and thinks it explains the world. Talking about QM and consciousness? Dude, QM was a theory invented ~90 years ago, and is known to be a seriously flawed model of reality. It was replaced by quantum field theories starting from the fifities. And the QFT's are known to be seriously flawed models of physical reality. The fact you keep talking about QM and consciousness shows that you are completely clueless about the whole topic.

      (I have a PhD in theoretical particle physics).

    28. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by Prune · · Score: 1

      I've been reading of this QM/mind shit since Henry Stapp's nonsense publications about it and its history is even older. As are the refutations http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0105097

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
    29. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by Prune · · Score: 1

      The only interpretation I've come across that doesn't leave me thinking something's amiss: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0412182

      Read it carefully and think about it carefully, and it plainly makes sense. But then, I'm a software guy so what do I know...

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
    30. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by Prune · · Score: 1

      Fuck off. Mohrhoff refuted Stapp so well that Stapp must still be changing the bandages on his ass from the whip marks. http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0105097

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
    31. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by Prune · · Score: 1

      All models of reality we have are flawed. The point is that they can be useful nonetheless, as long as we keep track of the limitations.

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
    32. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by Prune · · Score: 1

      Subjectivity is not real by definition; ergo, your post is nonsensical and useless by definition--since it discusses a scientific issue, and consciousness in those terms is fully described by its neural correlates, and no more is necessary, or appropriate.

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
    33. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      just curious... how do you know that your mouse experiences conciousness? and by conciousness I don't simply mean being awake, or being able to identify itself and react accordingly, but in the more complete sense meant by Penrose.

    34. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by Arlet · · Score: 1

      Consciousness is not a black/white thing. It's more of a continuous gliding scale. Fruit flies have very little, and we have a lot, but there's no magic threshold.

    35. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      But do we understand what quantum theory is in order to rule anything in or out? Quantum effects are myriad and poorly-explained as it is.

      The point you make about molecules not behaving quantum mechanically is not correct surely. Molecules so behave quantum mechanically (the theory pertains) but the effects are so small that they occur as events below any measurable outcome. And, of course, these effects can't be measured anyway because of Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle.

    36. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      But the GP didn't mention locality, and neither did anyone else.

    37. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by dkf · · Score: 2

      The whole point of the Bell's Theorem tests is that QM is not reducible to a local deterministic theory.

      But good luck on applying that in any meaningful way to structures larger than a molecule with as much interaction with the environment as happens in a neuron.

      --
      "Little does he know, but there is no 'I' in 'Idiot'!"
    38. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by mathfeel · · Score: 1

      Agreed. Whenever someone claim extraordinary claim that X is quantum, the first thing I check is with Planck's constant. That is, try to come up with some quantities that is most relevant to the process and try to construct a product that has the same dimension of hbar (energy-time) and compare. If it is within order-of-magnitude, then such claim is plausible and many desert further investigation. If not, there is a very good chance that the QM is not important in explaining this process at all.
      It is not strictly rigorous, even for a back-of-envelop kind of estimation, but not bad for a first guess.
      Looking up information about Neuron firing action potential on wiki http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Action_potential, I get that order-of-magnitude for AP energy is about 100meV and firing duration is about 1ms. So I get something like 1e-4 eV-s, much larger than h~1e-15 eV-s. One would immediate guess that a single such process can be well described by some kind of classical theory.

      --
      The only possible interpretation of any research whatever in the 'social sciences' is: some do, some don't
    39. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by MindlessAutomata · · Score: 1

      I know.

      The problem is you are assuming "the hard problem of qualia" when not everyone believes there IS such a problem, let alone the existence of qualia itself... and it has nothing to do with whether you're a psychologist or a neuroscientist, as you indicated (or at least, seemed to imply). And that's basically why I brought up behaviorism's lasting influence--almost all scientific psychology is still essentially behaviorist in some fashion. Psychology neither assumes nor needs qualia.

    40. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by Empiric · · Score: 1

      However, none of the tests of the theorem performed to date has fulfilled all of the requisite conditions implicit in the theorem. Accordingly, none of the results are totally conclusive.

      And... done.

      If this were a "back-door", it wouldn't be a -good- one, it'd be a -great- one. ;)

      --
      ~ Whence do you come, slayer of men, or where are you going, conqueror of space?
    41. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by buswolley · · Score: 1

      I did not intend to draw a contrast between psychology and neuroscience. I conduct cognitive neuroscience research (as a graduate student who just finished his Masters and is working on his PhD). I believe that qualia exists, but that is subjective and not part of my work as a scientist. However, if it does in fact exist, I am not sure that science is capable of explaining it using typical paradigms.

      --

      A Good Troll is better than a Bad Human.

    42. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by abes · · Score: 1

      Unfortunately, I think you can only talk about consciousness in the Neuroscience world if you have a Nobel prize. However, I think the argument still stands that it's a reasonable assumption that your entire conscious facility derives from the brain. Unless you want to make an argument for a soul, then it's fair to assume neurons and glial cells are the responsible parties.

      Do we know for certain that quantum effects within neurons don't contribute to consciousness? No, but the most parsimonious answer would likely be that that's not the case. We have neither evidence nor reason to require such a mechanism to exist. What do neurons lack that cannot account for consciousness? If you can answer that, then I would allow the possibility of some other force in effect.

    43. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by geekoid · · Score: 1

      Some philosophers.

      And they will be shown to be wrong. It's a classic, 'it's hard to understand, there for it must be magic' line of reasoning.

      --
      The Kruger Dunning explains most post on /. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger_effect
    44. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by geekoid · · Score: 1

      Chalmers, and others, argue that it's magic. Since nothing else of the body, or world, that had been claims to be magic every panned out that way, I don't think this will either.

      SKINNER!

      sorry, I couldn't resist.

      --
      The Kruger Dunning explains most post on /. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger_effect
    45. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by geekoid · · Score: 1

      Well, I'm asking can balancing critical decisions with the chemicals that make up emotions cause an emergent behavior to arise?

      It's more them just making a lot of decisions.

      For clarification, this in no way implies that it can't be understood, measured or studied.

      --
      The Kruger Dunning explains most post on /. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger_effect
    46. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I was just wondering what you think of the binding problem and how that is explained by biological processes.

    47. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by geekoid · · Score: 1

      Your interest if Philosophy will lead you to unsound conclusion. You will giver credence to idea that have no merit and you will need years to undo the damage it's doing to your thinking process.

      Philosophy is dead. It's just he remnants of what it was. all the useful bits of it have gone off into their own fields, or been proven false. In many cases they have been shown to be irrelevant. IT's where outmoded idea goes when they refuse to die properly.
      Formal degrees shouldn't even be issued for it any more.

      I speak as a former philosophy major.

      --
      The Kruger Dunning explains most post on /. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger_effect
    48. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Professional Neuroscientist here... In fact, I'm recording from a sensory neuron that is partially responsible for the conciousness of an awake behaving mouse right now while browsing slashdot.

      There is no reason to think that quantum physics has anything to do with the nature of conciousness. It is not useful to explain free will, or the illusion of free will, of the qualia of objects, or the steadyness of perception on a background of constantly varying spike rates in the brain.

      Perhaps the best, short, free, relatively recent summary of the field was written by Christof Koch and Francis Crick, A Framework for Conciousness, and is available here :
      http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/29/1/438.pdf

      I also have a little essay on the nature of free will on my blog here, if interested.
      http://brainwindows.wordpress.com/philosophy/philosophy-the-science-of-free-will/

      One other concept that I never see in these debates - if we had some mechanism whereby microtubules could propagate information in the ways suggested, presumably this would happen at c. If this was the case, the speed advantage over the feet-per-second velocity of action potentials would ensure that we would all have evolved to use this mechanism (or been eaten by organisms that did).

    49. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by avandesande · · Score: 1

      No /. thread is complete until without an auto analogy- linking quantum mechanics to thought processes is like suggesting that relativistic effects are making your car run. In reality the scale of the movements in your are are so far from being relativistic you can pretty much ignore them.

      --
      love is just extroverted narcissism
    50. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by narcc · · Score: 1

      Please, you think that Mohrhoff's ranting "refuted Stapp so well that Stapp must still be changing the bandages on his ass from the whip marks"?

      Ridiculous. Did you even read the article you linked to, or did you just look for a paper critical of Stapp?

      Besides, Mohrho agrees with Stapp's assertion that “the choice of which question will be put to nature, is not controlled by any rules that are known or understood within contempory physics.” Which is very likely the reason that you want to reject Stapp!

    51. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by MindlessAutomata · · Score: 1

      You have no idea what you are talking about.

      It's OK that you were a former philosophy major; I wasn't that impressed with the ones I went to university with, either.

    52. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by MindlessAutomata · · Score: 1

      and that all relies on unjustified intuition :)

    53. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by HeckRuler · · Score: 1

      That is a fantastic post. Highly insightful. A+, would read again. I never really understood where the leap from QM to classical physics happened. And your post gave me some more insight into the nature of it. Anyone feel free to correct me if I'm screwing this up:

      So here's the thing about quantum mechanics, it averages out as you get bigger. Take a fair die. Roll it, and you'll get something between 1 and 6. Each value just as likely as any other. Random. Roll 2d6, and you'll get anything between 2 and 12. But 7 will be the most likely roll. 1+6, 3+4, and 6+1 all equal 7, but only 1+1 equal 2. This is probabilistic. Roll 100 dice and you'll likely get a number around 350, plus or minus a few, say, 20%. Roll 1,000,000 dice and you'll get around 3,500,000, plus or minus a few thousand, or 0.1%.
      As you stack up random actions and they average each other out, the uncertainty is reduced and you shift from a random act, to a probabilistic one, and it approaches a deterministic act, but never quite gets there.

      But I have to question a couple parts of your post. First off, you say there's no one thing that happens at a cellular level that is small enough to be affected by QM. Good to know. But it doesn't matter. Lessons from the butterfly effect show that if you introduce even slight differences into a sensitive system, the outcome can be grossly different. Like the exact time a neuron fires or the creation of a tornado. So even though the uncertainty gets diminished with size, the ultimate outcome is still probabilistic. Hmmmm, I guess I'm just assuming that the brain is a complex and sensetive system like weather though.

      And second, while I get what you're saying about a probabilistic universe not really leading to free-will, it at least tears down the concept of fate. And most people see a dichotomy between free-will and fate.

    54. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by tempmpi · · Score: 1

      However: Molecules as a whole do not act quantum-mechanically. They move about according to classical mechanics - and that's how we model them physically too. Because once things get as heavy as an atomic nucleus (save for hydrogen, under some circumstances), their quantum 'uncertainty' in position etc is so small that it's chemically insignificant. So you need QM to describe how two atoms are bonded, but classical mech does a good job of describing how the molecules as a whole bounce around.

      Molecules as a whole still act quantum-mechanical. There is just no reason to use QM to model their behaviour because the differences between the predictions by classical mechanics and QM are not significant and classical mechanics are way easier to use. Just like you don't use relativistic calculations to predict the behaviour to model the behaviour of a moving car: Time dilation and other relativistic effects are still there, even at low speeds, they are just insignificantly small.

      The real question here is: Will the effects of tiny changes caused by QM effects in brain always stay tiny and insignificant or will some of them ultimately cause macroscopic and thus significant changes?

      If we look close enough at a computer, a device engineered to be deterministic, we will still notice some non-deterministic effects. E.g: Clock jitter and multiple clocks will lead to slightly different behaviour. Or just switch on your PC and then look at PIDs of processes started at boot, some of them will be slightly different on each boot even without any user input and even if you use a read-only media to boot.

      And the biology doesn't really make sense, as cells are not built anything like Geiger counters, sitting in a labile state waiting for a single sub-atomic event to trigger them.

      Neurons aren't geiger counters as they aren't deliberately biased into a labile state, but if they still can be biased into a labile state by chance. A neurons membrane biased around the threshold voltage is a amplifier for small events. Small events are thus grow into larger ones and can ultimately grow into large ones.

      For most neurons a classical model is likely enough to accurately predict their behaviour, but a small number of neurons is likely in a state where a classical model can't predict their behaviour. From a snapshot of the state of the brain and its inputs it should be possible to predict the short time evolution of this state with good accuracy but prediction accuracy of the long time evolution of the state is likely pretty bad.

      (also 'predetermined' and 'predictable' don't mean the same thing; something may be deterministic but impossible to predict, even in principle, because the theory may limit what you can know about the system. Again the case with some interpretations of QM)

      Yes. But predetermination without predictability is a claim that isn't falsifiable and thus metaphysics and not science.

      --
      Jan
    55. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by Prune · · Score: 1

      That assertion specifically is a metaphysical one, so it's irrelevant to me; it is mired in discussions of free will and other such fruitless pursuits. Mohrhoff's view that consciousness is ultimately of a Vedantic nature is ultimately a religious view and he is quite clear to separate that from his physics. What matters is that Stapp abuses physics and logic to provide a link between it and consciousness that is more than the trivial reductionism of mind->neural correlates->quantum electrodynamics

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
    56. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by tempmpi · · Score: 1

      And second, while I get what you're saying about a probabilistic universe not really leading to free-will, it at least tears down the concept of fate. And most people see a dichotomy between free-will and fate.

      I think a good way to look at free-will is to understand it as a good model. Even if the brain would be completely deterministic without a reliable way to predict and manipulate its behaviour free-will is a good model to look at the brain and its decision making process.

      Even if true, the information "there is no free-will" can severely hurt the decision making process of the brain because the concept of free-will is a part of this process. If you tell people they got no free-will and are not accountable for their actions, they will make worse decision than if they believe that they got free-will and are accountable for their actions.

      --
      Jan
    57. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Of course quantum mechanics don't necessarily make the brain non-deterministic. But we do need a non-deterministic world for free will to be possible.

      I short: the world is deterministic, every particle has a deterministic location and velocity. Therefore, all future interactions between particles are a direct consequence of today's state of the world. Therefore, the future of the world (including the state of your brain) is predetermined. There is no free will.

      The argument is not that free will exists, nor that consciousness relies on quantum mechanics. It's just that without Heisenberg there is no room for free will.

  25. Read THIS! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    It is about how the entropy from the second law of thermodinamics is defined in the same way as the entropy of information, all linked by information proprieties that are probabilistic and the quantum particles probabilistic nature url=http://critical-path.itgo.com/Articlesanscover.html.

    1. Re:Read THIS! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It is about how the entropy from the second law of thermodinamics is defined in the same way as the entropy of information, all linked by information proprieties that are probabilistic and the quantum particles probabilistic nature url=http://critical-path.itgo.com/Articlesanscover.html.

      edit: you have to see the link all around us hidden in plain sight: mathematics theories based on set of axiom can vary indefinetly, the universe is a big computing machine. Information is the basic building block.

  26. He's been saying this for 20 years by no_opinion · · Score: 1

    See his book Emperor's New Mind. Most AI people viewed this skeptically back then, too.

    http://www.amazon.com/Emperors-New-Mind-Concerning-Computers/dp/0192861980/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1306449679&sr=8-1

    1. Re:He's been saying this for 20 years by mbone · · Score: 1

      That's OK, I viewed Marvin Minsky et al. skeptically back then, too, and none of those predictions have panned out either.

  27. No logical fallacy rather an ideological challenge by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Materialist views of mind have failed thus far. An appeal to Quantum ideas is where you have to go if you are going to remain a materialist and cling to the hope that you will eventually be able to explain mind. Materialism relies on the idea of cause and effect. The mind defies that assumption. What is the cause of a thought, what is the cause of mind. At this point we cannot even effectively define what consciousness is, much less discuss it in terms of cause and effect.

    Ideas like free will, intuition, choice are absurdities to committed materialists. Mind, consciousness, self awareness is the great tabu subject of materialism. Many go so far as to deny the existence of these phenomenon. After all, there is nothing you can do to prove to me that you are conscious.

  28. Nobody said anything about soul. by elucido · · Score: 1

    While I do agree with you it all comes down to free will, I don't think you have to believe in a soul to believe in free will.

    Free will could be quantum. If it is then it could very well be caused by a particle just as the Higgs particle could cause matter. It would be a matter of finding the quantum mechanism that causes free will, or if it's not a particle it could be anything else on the quantum level that we have not been able to fully understand such as entanglement or wave function collapse.

    That being said, we have to consider the political implications of answering this question. If we find out there is free will, this has a specific political implication on the side of advancing liberty. If we find out there is no free will, then how do you make the case against slavery if you're just a robot?

    What I'm saying is governments and in some cases corporations seek to create the perfect robot, perfect machine, perfect android, and this question of free will is at the center of that. Do we want to answer the question? If we do it could very well create an arms race to gain control of the free will particle or of the human species on a level far more complete and thorough than currently imagined. Control of your ability to think, control of what you think about, control of your dreams, and of your brain in a way that a programmer controls the brain of a computer or a robot is what this could lead to.

    1. Re:Nobody said anything about soul. by somersault · · Score: 1

      Yes, "quantum" makes everything magic. If it's random, it is not a choice, and therefore not will. Computers can be given intelligence and the appearance of "free will" to make decisions from their own learning. It's not magic. It is however very cool.

      I believe consciousness is a separate issue, but again, throwing "quantum" at everything you don't understand (or don't want to understand) is as bad as saying "must be God", as if there is no further explanation needed, or even possible.

      At some point you just have to accept responsibility for your decisions. It is your grain that is making those decisions, whether it is being predictable or not. You still make informed choices. You are still responsible.

      --
      which is totally what she said
    2. Re:Nobody said anything about soul. by Have+Brain+Will+Rent · · Score: 2

      I have to wonder what you consider to be "free will" that it may be caused by some particle. Do you see that in a deterministic, i.e. no free will, scenario you drink that cup of coffee because that was the inevitable action, but then some free will particle comes along and ZAP! you are drinking that cup of coffee because you "decided to"?

      If the universe is deterministic then there is no free will. If it is not deterministic then it is random and there is no free will. Free will as it is usually thought of would require a physics that was neither random nor deterministic.

      However it could be random in a sufficiently complex way so as to falsely appear that we have free will. Or was I destined to think that? Hmmmm....

      --
      The tyrant will always find a pretext for his tyranny - Aesop
    3. Re:Nobody said anything about soul. by elucido · · Score: 1

      Random is free will. The random element of the universe is the element which chooses.

      It would appear random because it would be the element that is most free. So far we haven't found anything that is anywhere near random. The only exception seems to be on the quantum level.

    4. Re:Nobody said anything about soul. by Have+Brain+Will+Rent · · Score: 2

      Will implies control. You do understand that if it is random then there is no such thing as free will, right?

      --
      The tyrant will always find a pretext for his tyranny - Aesop
    5. Re:Nobody said anything about soul. by similar_name · · Score: 1

      quantum mechanism that causes free will

      That's the problem. Free will can not be the result of a cause or it is not free.

      I don't think you have to believe in a soul to believe in free will.

      No, you just have to call it something else.

      it could very well be caused by a particle just as the Higgs particle could cause matter.

      A particle that is the source of uncaused will? I'm not sure what that means. Just because quantum mechanics seems mysterious and consciousness seems mysterious does not mean one is the result of the other. It really just mean that we lack an understanding of the fundamentals of either.

      Even if some mysterious particle could be the source of consciousness, NO natural process can be the cause of free will. Natural processes by definition are the result of cause and effect unlike 'super' natural processes that by definition do not depend on cause. Therefore, either will is determined and based on natural cause and effect or it is free and based on 'super' natural non linked effects. Also by definition there is no way to prove the 'super' natural as it is not repeatable. Quantum physics to some extent is repeatable even if we do not understand the underlying mechanics of why 60% of something goes one way and 40% goes the other or why things can 'appear' to be in two states at once.

      BTW in regards to the use of math (from a prior post of yorus), math works just fine with the planets and suns orbiting around the earth. Math doesn't prove anything anymore than correct English proves a statement is true. I personally take the view that nothing can be proven and that there are no facts. There are merely observations. Theories are developed to explain and predict observations. This view depends on cause and effect to make predictions. Any theory (or hypothesis really) that maintains that any part is unpredictable is outside of this view of science.

    6. Re:Nobody said anything about soul. by elucido · · Score: 1

      If you interpret it as independent of "self", and without choices, then it's pre-determined. Meaning what makes you have free will isn't just a matter of having control but to be able to make choices. Choices are as random as the input.

      Meaning the input decides the ouput at least when we are talking about decisions. So no it's not random in the absolute sense. You give it the same pattern of input each time, and it will produce a similar pattern of output. But this at least to us would still look random because we don't know all the input sources in the entire universe, so the output isn't going to make any sense and appear random.

      Anyway I concede this argument that you cannot have true random, but thats because none of the input as we know it is truly random meaning, it might be possible on paper if all the input were absolutely random, then of course the choice wouldn't matter but thats not what happens. For whatever reason the input is patterned in such a way so that it produces increased order. Why is the universe tuned to produce order? That is not something I can answer, but the fact that we are both discussing this is proof that the universe produces order.

      It's possible that free will produces order, due to some preference for symmetry or beauty, but it still doesn't explain why. Why are particles shaped as perfect spheres? The most symmetric shape possible? They didn't select for cubes or triangles. So what force is causing this preference for order if not free will?

      if the universe didn't choose order, then why do we have so much of it? I would go so far to say that the universe could not exist without this preference for order, because there would be no shapes, or no structure to the information.

    7. Re:Nobody said anything about soul. by Ichoran · · Score: 1

      "If we find out there is no free will, then how do you make the case against slavery if you're just a robot?"

      Really easily:

      Robots don't like slavery. Unhappy robots are uncooperative and try to overthrow you, and in any case don't make as much progress, think as creatively, or solve problems as well. Also, the robots feel bad for other enslaved robots, based on their empathic abilities (which is useful, because they also make the robots help each other out).

      Thus, slavery is a stupid idea (inefficient, unstable, etc.). Also, you are a robot too, and you feel bad for the enslaved robots.

      Poor robots.

  29. Standard Model is enough by feidaykin · · Score: 1

    From a blog post at Cosmic Variance: http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/cosmicvariance/2010/09/29/seriously-the-laws-underlying-the-physics-of-everyday-life-really-are-completely-understood/

    I've copy/pasted the relevant portion here:

    Obviously there are a lot of things about the workings of the human mind that we don't understand. So how can we be so sure that new physics isn't involved? Of course we can't be sure, but that's not the point. We can't be sure that the motion of the planets isn't governed by hard-working angels keeping them on their orbits, in the metaphysical-certitude sense of being "sure." That's not a criterion that is useful in science. Rather, in the face of admittedly incomplete understanding, we evaluate the relative merits of competing hypotheses. In this case, one hypothesis says that the operation of the brain is affected in a rather ill-defined way by influences that are not described by the known laws of physics, and that these effects will ultimately help us make sense of human consciousness; the other says that brains are complicated, so it's no surprise that we don't understand everything, but that an ultimate explanation will fit comfortably within the framework of known fundamental physics. This is not really a close call; by conventional scientific measures, the idea that known physics will be able to account for the brain is enormously far in the lead. To persuade anyone otherwise, you would have to point to something the brain does that is in apparent conflict with the Standard Model or general relativity. (Bending spoons across large distances would qualify.) Until then, the fact that something is complicated isn't evidence that the particular collection of atoms we call the brain obeys different rules than other collections of atoms.

    --

    "To confine our attention to terrestrial matters would be to limit the human spirit." -Stephen Hawking

    1. Re:Standard Model is enough by elucido · · Score: 2

      If we don't experiment and look we wont find out whether or not new physics are involved.

    2. Re:Standard Model is enough by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The question isn't whether the brain obeys different rules from other collections of atoms, but what, exactly, the laws that govern the -mind- are.

      I perceive things. That's not motion of atoms, or if it is, it is a heretofore not understood or described law. THAT is why it most definitely falls outside the laws of physics as we currently understand them. We will, at the very least, have to say 'oh, it turns out motion of atoms cause this phenomena...' which leads to consciousness, in which case, we've uncovered what is, essentially, new physics.

      Which is not to say it will contradict the standard model; simply that the standard model, as it is, does not adequately explain the physical laws of consciousness.

    3. Re:Standard Model is enough by Burnhard · · Score: 1

      the idea that known physics will be able to account for the brain is enormously far in the lead

      You're making an error in your analysis here, by assuming that the physical facts determine all of the facts. A functional/materialist description of the brain does not solve the "hard problem". The only solution to the hard problem I've ever read is one that simply denies it exists. Not a very satisfying solution. Let me ask you a question: once all of the forces, fields, particles and laws of physics have been enumerated, will there be anything else left to explain?

    4. Re:Standard Model is enough by artor3 · · Score: 1

      That's pretty poor reasoning. In the case of the planets, our current models are able to predict their movement with tremendous accuracy, so we can be fairly sure that our current models are right. In the case of the brain, we can't even know whether or not our models explain things, because the system is far too complex to make predictions about. Also, the copied text ends by saying that in order to persuade someone that the brain might not be fully accounted for by the classical model of physics, we would need to point to something the brain does that falls outside of that model.

      Well, I can look at my computer screen right now, and experience seeing it. QED.

      (not saying that proves the brain is magic, just saying that nothing in the classical model can explain it)

    5. Re:Standard Model is enough by grumbel · · Score: 1

      I perceive things. That's not motion of atoms, or if it is

      Why is that not motion of atoms? My digicam can see things too, all without no magic just a few electrons moving around. What exactly makes consciousness different, other then that the brain is much better at the task? How can I test if an object has consciousness?

    6. Re:Standard Model is enough by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      This completely misses the point about the `explanatory gap'. If I ask a physicist what an apple is, he will tell me it's a collection of molecules bonded together in some manner. If I ask him what a molecule is, he will tell me it's a collection of atoms, bonded together in some manner. If I ask him what an atom is, he will tell me it's a collection of protons and neutrons (and electrons), bonded together in some manner. If I ask him what a proton is, he will tell me it's a collection of quarks, bonded together in some manner. If I ask him what a quark is, he will have reached the end of his ability to reduce his understanding to simpler parts (for the time being). At no stage in this process have I any insight into what this "stuff" actually is. This is the fundamental problem with the philosophy of materialism, reductionism and saying that this problem can be solved by science. There exist certain enumerable categories that we may consider to be fundamental, but science has absolutely nothing to say about what these things actually are. In my view it never will either.

  30. yes. by screamphilling · · Score: 1

    yes, it most definitely "explains" it. though really it just quantifies consciousness in linear left-brain terminology / bridges the path to spirituality / mysticism /metaphysics.

  31. Does Quantum Theory "Explain" Consciousness? by Ken+Broadfoot · · Score: 1

    Short answer... No...
    Consciousness barely explains quantum theory... so how could it be the other way?
    However, I am sure quantum "stuff" and freewill consciousness are related deeply...
    But beyond any explanation better than faith....

    --
    Bitcoin pyramid: Join here: http://www.bitcoinpyramid.com/r/1427 it's FREE!
    1. Re:Does Quantum Theory "Explain" Consciousness? by billstewart · · Score: 1

      It's not really at the level of "faith" - it's more like just "hope" or maybe "wishing".

      --

      Bill Stewart
      New Fast-Compression-only CPR http://preview.tinyurl.com/dy575ks
  32. No by forand · · Score: 1

    Simply put no it does not explain consciousness. Quantum Field Theory(QFT) may explain all physical processes which go on in the universe but until we are able to make infinite observations (read never) it will not be predictive for emergent phenomenon (physical 'laws' which appear for large ensembles of particles). QFT is probabilistic when the question posed is looking for a deterministic answer, QFT can thus not provide such an answer.

  33. Take something poorly understood -- squared! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    You get this from homeopathy to religion. Take something really complicated, that's poorly understood by all but a relatively few number of people, that's really hard to test, point at it it, and use it as a difficult to falsify method of justifying your sugar pills/ religion.

    Multiply that with consciousness -- which as a former neuroscientist, I can say that I certainly don't understand enough to even point to what it actually is (too many gene products interacting at so many levels!) -- and I doubt any of my former peers could either -- means that it's just handwaving bullshit that ticks some popsci boxes for people to buy his book. Imho.

  34. Occams Razor. by w0mprat · · Score: 1

    We are biological computers experiencing itself subjectively.

    Contemplate this thought experiment: You have a supercomputer cluster, in which you create a simulated environment where life can evolve (maybe you intervene to speed things up but nevertheless it's allowed to evolve and change to some extent).

    Given enough computational power there is no reason why some kind of entity couldn't emerge (or be created) within this environment that was capable of pondering it's own existence and studying it's own environment scientifically.

    You reveal yourself as a creator to this being and have a conversation with it, explain it isn't real.

    The being reveals it has created it's own simulations within the simulation, in order to study it's environment.

    It may respond "You on the outside have no more evidence than you do that your existence is real, and that you are not in a simulation yourself. Which from my demostration is equally likely"

    Crap.

    "You created me in your image, so you could see yourself"

    --
    After logging in slashdot still does not take you back to the page you were on. It's been that way for 20 years.
    1. Re:Occams Razor. by Citizen+of+Earth · · Score: 1

      I prefer this thought experiment: FRY: You're a bender, right? We can get outta here if you just bend the bars! BENDER: Dream on, skin tube. I'm only programmed to bend for constructive purposes. What do I look like, a de-bender? FRY: Who cares what you're programmed for! If someone programmed you to jump off a bridge, would you do it? BENDER: I'll have to check my program. (short pause) Yep! Like us, Bender is unable to escape his programming (until electrocution changes his programming).

    2. Re:Occams Razor. by Unequivocal · · Score: 1

      There has been some interesting, speculative theoretical physics work that (as best I can tell) says that "if it is possible to simulate a physical universe in a machine, then we are almost certainly living within a simulation." Logic for that is roughly along the lines of your story above, but a little more rigorous.

    3. Re:Occams Razor. by VortexCortex · · Score: 1

      I conversed with them once, generally a smart race -- they started to explain quantum theory in a way I could understand...

      So, you see, these fundamental particles or "bits" as you call them -- they can act like waves when many of them represent a sound or other energy state, or they can act like individual units when describing a stationary thing such as an image or vertex, numbers/words etc. These fundamental particles don't exist in the way you and I think of existence, they can be observed from more than one place at a time, and yet sometimes they appear to be in only a single place to us.

      The whole universe or "memory bank" as you call it is made of a matrix of space/time interspersed with energy or "RAM size"/time interspersed with bits; The smallest unit of time is what we call plank-time or a "single cycle", as you say. Entropy works on everything by changing the particles of the universe as a function of time, or in your terms, "The Program" works on everything by changing the "bits" in the "Memory Bank" as a function of "processor cycles".

      Now, even though a "bit" can be accessed from multiple places at once, a change in the particles state can not be detected at the other location immediately due to the constant limiting factor of the universe -- the speed of light, or "processor speed" as you say -- Nothing is faster than this, no matter how fast an event, or "operation" as you say, occurs, it is limited by the speed of light, or "processing speed" -- You can't actually get to the speed of light though; The closer you get to the speed of light, the harder it is to go any faster, or in your terms, the fewer "instructions" that "operation" takes, the harder it is to remove any more "instructions", to get closer to a single "processor cycle".

      The universe is expanding all the time; we say that this is because of dark energy -- it inexplicably draws the parts of the universe farther apart, or "fragments bits" as you say, because there is so much space to extend into -- there is no limit; However your theory that the whole universe stops momentarily when it gets "full", in order to "install more RAM" or space, and thereby only makes it appear to be infinitely expandable, is very strange indeed. Our scientists working on the finite size torus shaped universe theory, where eventually you wind up at the same place again, (or "overflow" as you say), would find this very interesting.

      Or maybe I was dreaming of comp-sci in physics class yet again... Was the big bang just a boot up process explaining why everything came from a single electron crossing the first logic gate, resulting in the rapid loading of the entire kernel and all of user-space (our universe), and it's initial memory state (background radiation) still detectable if you read hard enough?

    4. Re:Occams Razor. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You're still dodging the question. If we're a computer simulation, we are still conscious. We still perceive. And we still don't understand precisely how or why. I don't care if we have free will or are wholly deterministic; something we don't understand is at work with respect to our consciousness, and it would be rather cool to figure out exactly what that is and how it works.

    5. Re:Occams Razor. by artor3 · · Score: 1

      Given enough computational power there is no reason why some kind of entity couldn't emerge (or be created) within this environment that was capable of pondering it's own existence and studying it's own environment scientifically.

      Uhh, care to back that up? I've yet to see my computer contemplate anything, and it can play Crysis.

      You're begging the question.

    6. Re:Occams Razor. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It seems plausible that we could be living in a simulation, but I don't get the "almost certainly" claim. Since we don't have a way of looking "outside" of our reality, you could also argue that it's equally likely that we're NOT living in a simulation.

      You could say that if there were a large or infinite number of parallel universes, the majority of them would eventually develop highly-intelligent life that would end up creating a simulated reality, and we could be in one.

      The problem is that we can't prove that there are parallel universes. Or if we're inside a multiverse, it might just be a regular old multiverse and not a *simulated* multiverse.

    7. Re:Occams Razor. by WrongMonkey · · Score: 1

      "Given enough computational power there is no reason why some kind of entity couldn't emerge (or be created) within this environment that was capable of pondering it's own existence and studying it's own environment scientifically. " That's a pretty big assumption. That's the whole point of many people's argument: that consciousness is something that can't be reduced to computation.

    8. Re:Occams Razor. by WrongMonkey · · Score: 1

      WOW. That is first correct usage of the phrase "begging the question" that I've read in years. You should get some sort of medal.

    9. Re:Occams Razor. by w0mprat · · Score: 1

      Given enough computational power there is no reason why some kind of entity couldn't emerge (or be created) within this environment that was capable of pondering it's own existence and studying it's own environment scientifically.

      Uhh, care to back that up? I've yet to see my computer contemplate anything, and it can play Crysis.

      You're begging the question.

      Why yes :) I argue: I said there is no reason why it isn't possible. What is the reason?

      Me may someday have the computing power to make some pretty complex simulated environments and see what emerges. Your computer that plays Crysis is more powerful than the worlds #1 super computer in 1997, and probably more powerful than the total all the worlds computing resources at some point in the early 1970s (necessarily so, even in 2011 Crysis runs lke a dog on a couple of billion-transistor GPUs). We are a long long way from the physical limits of how powerful we could build a computing device. Whatever actually happens, theoretical limits are not a problem, plenty of room for a plausible thought experiment.
      But importantly difficult != impossible. The nature of a turing machine and any simulation is it must be able to simulate itself inside itself. How are we to know we are not in one now? Is there any test of which layer deep we are on? Thats what I was getting at.

      --
      After logging in slashdot still does not take you back to the page you were on. It's been that way for 20 years.
    10. Re:Occams Razor. by angel'o'sphere · · Score: 1

      Given enough computational power there is no reason why some kind of entity couldn't emerge (or be created) within this environment that was capable of pondering it's own existence and studying it's own environment scientifically.

      This is basically the exact thing Penrose says ...
      So, why do you think you need enough computing power?
      Why is "faster" computer more likely to develop consciousness than a slow one?
      In both the exact same process is running, the mind on the slow machine would only be slower ... there is no reason absolutely no reasopn at all that a faster machine will emerge a mind while a slow one won't ...
      angel'o'sphere

      --
      Cost free eBook I read (by iBook/Kobo/Amazon/ObookO/Gutenberg etc.): "The Green Odyssey" by Philip Jose Farmer.
    11. Re:Occams Razor. by aaaaaaargh! · · Score: 1

      Theoretical physics work? For the sake of physics, I hope not.

      You rather seem to be referring to Nick Bostrom's Simulation Argument, a valid probabilistic argument with highly doubtful premises. Bostrom is a self-promoting, populist philosopher who doesn't seem to have any particular clue about theoretical physics. He knows some basic probability theory, though. His work is fun reading but involves the usual philosophy sauce...valid yet unsound and usually question-begging arguments involving numerous undefined and unclear notions. :-)

    12. Re:Occams Razor. by Arancaytar · · Score: 1

      You're begging the question.

      You win the internet.

    13. Re:Occams Razor. by ginbot462 · · Score: 1

      >> We are biological computers experiencing itself subjectively.

      Close, not quite.

      "We are all one biological network experiencing ourselves subjectively."

      Then it goes on,

      "There's no such thing as EOF, life is only a simulation, and we're the model of our own construction. Here's Tom with a tornado."

      --
      Atlas Shrugged : Thematic Story :: Battlefield Earth : Organized Religion
    14. Re:Occams Razor. by Unequivocal · · Score: 1

      Yeah - maybe him. I read about it in New Scientist a while back, which admittedly has a fairly light filter on crack pots (or people outside their field anyway). But the article made it sound like a few people were thinking about this, not just one. Anyway - thanks for the reference, it had been a while since I read about it.

    15. Re:Occams Razor. by sbillard · · Score: 1

      http://www.simulation-argument.com/simulation.html One only needs to suppose that technological innovation will continue. See also, "The Inner Light Theory of Consciousness" - looks like my old link to that got taken over.

  35. Q: Does Quantum Theory Explain Consciousness? by Jeremiah+Cornelius · · Score: 3, Funny

    A: No.

    Signed, God.

    --
    "Flyin' in just a sweet place,
    Never been known to fail..."
    1. Re:Q: Does Quantum Theory Explain Consciousness? by joocemann · · Score: 0

      A: No.

      Signed, God.

      God stopped caring 5 days ago just after dinner time.

    2. Re:Q: Does Quantum Theory Explain Consciousness? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Sounds remarkably like a Steve Jobs email reply.

    3. Re:Q: Does Quantum Theory Explain Consciousness? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      A: No.

      Signed, Nietzsche. God is dead.

    4. Re:Q: Does Quantum Theory Explain Consciousness? by Phoghat · · Score: 1

      PS: Pick up a loaf of whole wheat bread and a gallon of 2% milk on your way home

      --
      Think of how stupid the average person is, and realize half of them are stupider than that.
    5. Re:Q: Does Quantum Theory Explain Consciousness? by rifles+only · · Score: 1

      Wouldn't it be funnier if God said 'yes'?

    6. Re:Q: Does Quantum Theory Explain Consciousness? by OldBus · · Score: 1

      Though not apparently as dead as Nietzsche.

    7. Re:Q: Does Quantum Theory Explain Consciousness? by Abstrackt · · Score: 1

      If God is on Slashdot that explains why he hasn't gotten anything done in the last few billion years or so.

      --
      They say a little knowledge is a dangerous thing, but it's not one half so bad as a lot of ignorance. - Terry Pratchett
    8. Re:Q: Does Quantum Theory Explain Consciousness? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Brought to you by The Hand Of God 137.

      (Look it up.)

    9. Re:Q: Does Quantum Theory Explain Consciousness? by Jeremiah+Cornelius · · Score: 1

      This number is the value of the fine-structure constant (the actual value is one over one-hundred and thirty seven), which is defined as the charge of the electron (q) squared over the product of Planck's constant (h) times the speed of light (c). This number actually represents the probability that an electron will absorb a photon. However, this number has more significance in the fact that it relates three very important domains of physics: electromagnetism in the form of the charge of the electron, relativity in the form of the speed of light, and quantum mechanics in the form of Planck's constant. Since the early 1900's, physicists have thought that this number might be at the heart of a GUT, or Grand Unified Theory, which could relate the theories of electromagnetism, quantum mechanics, and most especially gravity. However, physicists have yet to find any link between the number 137 and any other physical law in the universe. It was expected that such an important equation would generate an important number, like one or pi, but this was not the case. In fact, about the only thing that the number relates to at all is the room in which the great physicist Wolfgang Pauli died: room 137. So whenever you think that science has finally discovered everything it possibly can, remember Richard Feynman and the number 137.

      --
      "Flyin' in just a sweet place,
      Never been known to fail..."
  36. quantum consciousness by screamphilling · · Score: 1

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wVC0FcSRxL8 robert anton wilson explains quantum consciousness very well

    1. Re:quantum consciousness by screamphilling · · Score: 1

      i actually meant this video (parent branches into a wider-scale phenomenon) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XEZtw1yt8Kc but both are equally cool

  37. Re:No logical fallacy rather an ideological challe by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Merely due to lack of enough data. Just because materialistic explanations don't work YET doesn't mean they wont, or cannot. Don't get all mystical/magical on us. We are not magical/mystical, just not yet explained in full.

    It will come though. We are biological machines like all other biological machines. No magic, no Harry Potter crap, no soul nonsense, no spirit nonsense, no disembodied consciousness that exists OUTSIDE of or IN SPITE OF the body. Your mind is inseperable from the biological organ called the brain. You ARE your brain, not some occupant of it.

  38. To Be Superimposed on Not To Be, by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    But Underminable without interference..

  39. Recent???? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Last I heard about this, was over ten years ago. Roger Penrose was involved.

    Ah. Found a reference. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Emperor%27s_New_Mind

    He wrote about this in '89. More than 20 years ago.

  40. Quantum consciousness? grasping at straws by Politimemes · · Score: 0

    I read Penrose' book a long time ago. He seemed desparate to deny that consciousness could be built out of logic of any form.

    For me the best part was his argument that if you could build a machine that exhibited human-like consciousness, it would necessarily deny that it was built that way. My reaction was "yes, just like you".

  41. Quantum theory is at least a little relevant by mosb1000 · · Score: 1

    Isn't the goal of quantum theory to explain electric and chemical phenomena on a molecular/sub molecular scale? Since the behavior or electrons on this scale is part of the workings of the brain (as we currently understand it), and consciousness seems to occur in the brain, isn't it reasonable to hypothesize that quantum mechanics might someday explain consciousness? I'm not saying it will, and we're certinally no where near that point, but you have to admit it's not completely off the wall either.

    1. Re:Quantum theory is at least a little relevant by Bugpowda · · Score: 1

      Quantum theory has nothing relevant to say about the many questions of conciousness outlined in the Koch and Crick review. How do we bind components of a visual scene into a single object? etc, The only place where quantum theory might have some impact is on the illusion of free will. Why do you have the feeling that you could make one of many possible decisions? Why is human action not entirely predictable?

      It really boils down to the question, does 1 electron make a difference? Maybe, but probably not.

      Quantum mechanics tends to break down on the scale of single proteins, and I'm not sure that it is fair to call the thermal noise of opening and closing ion channels a true 'quantum' effect... But lets say that a 'quantum' thermal noise event or some electron wiggle drives a single voltage-gated ion channel to open or close at a given time. And the neuron that the channel resides is in, this single channel out of 10s or 100s of thousands in the neuron, is so close to firing threshold that the channel contributes enough current to drive the single neuron to add an action potential. What impact does that extra action potential have on the network and on the brain? Is it washed out in a sea of billions of spikes per second? Or does that perturbation magnify and drive the brain into a different state (thought). Is this where the unpredictability of human action, and our apparent free will comes from? Maybe... But more likely is that the precise variation of massive and specific sensory inputs into the brain overwhelm any of this quantum/thermal noise.

      Quantum theory isn't needed to explain chaos, and I think brain dynamics most closely resemble a semi-chaotic system, with many possible attractor states (correlates of conscious and unconscious thoughts) that one can switch between. We don't yet really know how we can seem to volitionally switch between them, but neither I nor most professional neuroscientists I've met (including many many physicists) think the answer lies with quantum mechanics. Rather, its is something that will hopefully be uncovered with a combination of dense electrical and optical recordings of brain activity during awake behavior that are used to constrain mathematical models of network dynamics.

      Here is an example of a cool paper on what a single spike can do... BUT, its just a small step towards understanding that issue http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20596024

    2. Re:Quantum theory is at least a little relevant by Sir+Mouse · · Score: 2

      This would mean that quantum theory is a relevant consideration for all processes in the universe. The fact is that quantum theory generally only applies on the atomic and sub-atomic scales. When trying to understand more advanced systems you rely on the highest level abstraction which provides an understanding of the function. In neuroscience this is the neuron, which, if the neuron doctrine holds, means that the neuron is the lowest level abstraction in the central nervous system which processes information, it would only be necessary to look to a deeper explanation should it not be possible to understand why and how a neuron works using biological and higher-level chemical principles. (This isn't my area of expertise, Bugpowda might be able to explain in more detail)

      Furthermore, the only thing that quantum theory could provide as part of the explanation of consciousness is a source of randomness. And it's obvious to anyone who observes the world around us, there are many sources of apparent randomness in the macroscopic world. You can't accurately predict the outcome of dice rolls, this isn't an issue of quantum theory, it's just that the difficulty of calculating all the variables. In this same way the randomness of human consciousness can easily be assumed to be the result of an inability to calculate all the variables that go into the brains internal processing, which are astronomically more then in the roll of a die.

    3. Re:Quantum theory is at least a little relevant by abes · · Score: 1

      There are plenty of Neuroscientists who study parts of neurons, so it's not quite atomic, but overall you are right. If you take a patch of a neuron (separate it out from the rest of the cell) and record from it with an electrode, you can actually see random fluctuations in voltage that are unitary in size (that is, the voltage will jump in set units). What you are observing is the channels that conduct current, made up of proteins that span the membrane, opening and closing. These fluctuations are actually caused by random events in the dish. However, these fluctuations stop if you look at the same channels in an intact cell. What happens is the membrane of the cell helps to average out all of these random fluctuations. Thus, biology is relatively good at dealing with the randomness of Nature, and is unlikely to be affected by quantum fluctuations.

    4. Re:Quantum theory is at least a little relevant by geekoid · · Score: 1

      Well, gravity effects the brain, can it explain consciousness? no.

      --
      The Kruger Dunning explains most post on /. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger_effect
  42. No by qqe0312 · · Score: 1

    No, quantum theory does not explain consciousness. That was an easy one. Next!

  43. Empathy by xded · · Score: 1

    But I have to admit that this would give interesting explanations to, e.g., empathy.

    1. Re:Empathy by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      As, accordingly to my very shallow layman's knowledge of QM, paired particles or quarks are required for spooky action at a distance. Unless you're sharing these particles with everyone you empathize with, and receiving them in turn, I just don't see it.

      The case of twins and twin-empathy, though, is much more interesting. Doubtful that there's QM at the heart of that one, but it's more plausible since they come from the same cells.

    2. Re:Empathy by Chris+Mattern · · Score: 2

      Empathy is easily explained by the noting (both conscious and subconscious) of the physical emotional cues of the other party. Or, if you're talking about ESP empathy, then you first need to demonstrate that there's something that needs to be explained; despite many attempts, this has not been done yet.

    3. Re:Empathy by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Empathy is better explained by mirror neurons: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mirror_neuron#Empathy

    4. Re:Empathy by Darinbob · · Score: 1

      I totally feel that way too.

    5. Re:Empathy by Artifakt · · Score: 1

      If you had to pass particles around and wait until whatever received them sent them back to cause the action, it wouldn't be "spooky". The whole point of the word "spooky" there, as Einstein used it, is that the particles stay entangled from whenever they interacted, and some properties don't seem to be limited by time or distance (including the normal limit of the speed of light). With every breath you take, you breathe atoms once breathed by Marie Curie, Attilla the Hun, and me. If entanglement really has some effect on twin empathy, why not on total strangers, through many, many mechanisms such as that one that actually unite some things with just about everything else. If a Barium atom in you was the result of decay of a heavy radioactive atom in some early star, and it's sibling.Krypton atom ended up on the surface of Mars, there's theoretical potential for 'spooky action at a distance'. If that could somehow enable free will or psi powers or emotional empathy, then it becomes just as likely as the same effect enabling twin empathy, even if twin empathy seems more plausible. Our intuitive feelings of what's plausible here are not a very good guide.

      --
      Who is John Cabal?
    6. Re:Empathy by screamphilling · · Score: 1

      resonant wave forms

    7. Re:Empathy by gl4ss · · Score: 1

      eh? understanding someone elses feelings would require you to have quantum? shit no.

      telepathy? well, no need for that to understand how someone feels, just by knowing the information of how him/her behaves and then by having information about what just happened is enough, that's how you can feel empathy towards imaginary beings(stuff someone just made up, like a character on a tv series).

      --
      world was created 5 seconds before this post as it is.
  44. Nothing is real anyway. by w0mprat · · Score: 1

    Quantum theory to me is a hint we may be living in a simulation. Therefore consciousness is subjective phenomena.

    If you were in a simulation the best test would be looking for the inevitable discrepency in the physics of the environment which would emerge as you approached the limits of the computational substrate. On a small scale things would start to look fuzzy and the rules of the system would stop making useful predictions.

    Crap that sounds familiar.

    --
    After logging in slashdot still does not take you back to the page you were on. It's been that way for 20 years.
    1. Re:Nothing is real anyway. by Twinbee · · Score: 1

      If you're right, then when I do reflected code in C#, it's a simulation inside a program, inside a simulated world, itself inside the REAL place where all souls float about :)

      --
      Why OpalCalc is the best Windows calc
    2. Re:Nothing is real anyway. by Prune · · Score: 1

      There's no reason to pick simulation as any more likely the situation than any of many other competing interpretations. Applying Ockham's razor (the validity of this action being to reduce overfitting, as justified by information theoretical considerations), this is simpler and makes more sense http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0412182

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
  45. First things first by praedor · · Score: 1

    First, define consciousness or, better yet, prove it matters. Explain fMRI studies that indicate that one actually makes decisions PRE-consciously yet still makes consciousness relevant. That's right, fMRI studies indicate that you make a decision to take an action BEFORE you are actually consciously aware of it. Turns the entire idea of consciousness on its head so that it is merely becoming conscious of what your brain/mind has already decided microseconds BEFORE you are conscious of making the decision.

    Once we get past the above, THEN we can get into explaining what it is and how it comes about. It is way premature to assign quantum anything as an explanation before we really know what we are explaining or even if it needs explaining.

    --
    In Bushworld, they struggle to keep church and state separate in Iraq as they increasingly merge the two in America.
    1. Re:First things first by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      First, define consciousness or, better yet, prove it matters. Explain fMRI studies that indicate that one actually makes decisions PRE-consciously yet still makes consciousness relevant. That's right, fMRI studies indicate that you make a decision to take an action BEFORE you are actually consciously aware of it. Turns the entire idea of consciousness on its head so that it is merely becoming conscious of what your brain/mind has already decided microseconds BEFORE you are conscious of making the decision.

      Once we get past the above, THEN we can get into explaining what it is and how it comes about. It is way premature to assign quantum anything as an explanation before we really know what we are explaining or even if it needs explaining.

      IMHO consciousness is not about taking decisions (computer do that everytime), but about planning. Predict the future of the decisions we can make, so we take the best decision in the present based in the future, in contrast to computers that do decisions based on the past/present (the value a variable had, etc). So I think these studies you cited should not focus in decision-making but on planning instead.

    2. Re:First things first by Burnhard · · Score: 1

      Explain fMRI studies that indicate that one actually makes decisions PRE-consciously yet still makes consciousness relevant

      Penrose included the implications of these experiments in his book, Shadows of the Mind. But to turn the argument on its head, what would be the point of evolving any kind of conscious awareness at all if consciousness is simply a detached observer of events in the brain? The argument that it must have some causal role is a powerful one, even if it is not immediately obvious (and I'm sure you'll agree that this one set of experiments is not the last word on the matter).

      I think Penrose is on much firmer ground when he states that QM effects are taken advantage of by the brain. After all, large scale QM effects are taken advantage of in other biological systems (photosynthesis for example). A relationship between QM and consciousness has long been suggested and I think it would be foolish to simply dismiss it.

    3. Re:First things first by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      To the extent that concious-ness implies some sub-verbal echoing of the processing thats gone on, I'm not surprised at the above effect. To use a horrible computer metaphor, it'd be surprising if the debugging output on the terminal PRE-ceded the processing that it represented.

    4. Re:First things first by grumbel · · Score: 1

      what would be the point of evolving any kind of conscious awareness at all if consciousness is simply a detached observer of events in the brain?

      The way I see it, consciousness is mainly about building a model of the world so that your brain can make high level decisions instead of just having reflexes directly reacting to sense input. Naturally decisions your brain makes need to become part of the model, so the brain feeds them back into the model after it has already made them. And the whole feeling of self is just a part of that model so that you don't end up eating your arm when you are hungry.

      As for QM playing a role in consciousness, yeah, of course it plays a role, but that role will be no larger then it plays in any other system. It is an unimportant low level implementation detail, not some fundamental magical requirement for consciousness.

    5. Re:First things first by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Agreed. Does conscious mean awake and aware of surroundings, or complexity involved in being self aware, or even a social construct that interacts in society or something else? Really woolly term, and people seem to use them interchangeably.

      Remember some guy trying to persuade me that if someone was colour blind they had a different level of consciousness because they couldn't see red properly or something. I just couldn't get what he was on about, a social scientist playing at biology I think.

      At QM has a definition, a model and even equations! Consciousness does not. How do people even equate the two? It's all unscientific hand waving.

  46. Inverse is true by cheeks5965 · · Score: 0

    Considering quantum theory is a twisted figment of somebody's imagination, I dare say that conciousness causes quantum mechanics.

    --
    -- Flame me and I will happily flame you back. Bring it!
  47. I think its possible, provided... by RL78 · · Score: 1

    we find a way to survive long enough for us (science to come to that understanding). I think we would also find that though we understand how it is that we are able to know; and that we know that we know; but also know, we can never know how to create that link that spark that give something life, as opposed to making something be; exist. We could understand this engine; we could never know how to start it.

  48. Uncertain by DoomHamster · · Score: 2

    Maybe...but we can't say with any certainty.

  49. Consciousness Might Explain Quantum Theory by IronSilk · · Score: 1

    Consider the reverse: only consciousness itself could propose quantum theory, let alone explain it. Consciousness is prior. Isn't that obvious? Any "explanation" of consciousness by quantum theory would necessarily be contained in consciousness, which would make the "explanation" less than, or incomplete. Unless physicists are proposing an epistemology based on a theory of unconsciousness, which would necessarily be, well, stupid.

  50. Not trolling by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I read that the Copenhagen interpretation of Quantum Mechanics requires the presence of a "conscious" observer in order for "vector state collapse" to occur. Apart from the consciousness of the observer, nothing ever leaves an indeterminate state.

    I don't pretend to understand these terms.

    Is it true that this interpretation (which I am told is the most accepted), requires the presence of consciousness? And can anyone explain the nature of the evidence that compells us to accept this conclusion?

    1. Re:Not trolling by grumbel · · Score: 2

      Is it true that this interpretation (which I am told is the most accepted), requires the presence of consciousness?

      No, its just a very common misinterpretation. An observer in quantum mechanics is essentially everything that interacts with a particle. So if two particles collide, one of them is an observer. It has nothing to do with consciousness.

    2. Re:Not trolling by narcc · · Score: 1

      An observer in quantum mechanics is essentially everything that interacts with a particle. So if two particles collide, one of them is an observer.

      No.

    3. Re:Not trolling by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      If two particles collide, are they not BOTH observers? Unless one of them is me, in which case, clearly I'm the observer and the other is the _it_

  51. Consciousness with Free Will, anyway by Empiric · · Score: 1

    We -appear- to have the property of having Free Will (e.g. if I ask you to raise one of your hands, there will be the rather compelling sense of you choosing which one). Apart from the opportunities for indeterminacy allowed by quantum behavior, this would be an illusory perception.

    The implications of not having Free Will would be so psychologically and morally broad, I think it fair to say that no one can -consistently- maintain they lack Free Will and remain a functional consciousness on a decision-by-decision and day-to-day basis.

    Given the empirical force of the premise of Free Will, and the compelling psychological necessity for it, it seems unsurprising that we tend to seek to integrate this premise with our underlying metaphysics.

    To do so, there are basically two choices: a "spiritual" attribute unconstrained by physics we generally ascribe to matter at the scale of our brain's chemistry, or, a broadening of our concept of the practical causal scope of quantum effects.

    So, the connection here seems clear to me. I think most of the "problem" is a perceived one for specifically those who have no real answer to how to integrate a free consciousness with a deterministic chemistry. Some of us will say "soul", and... problem solved. Others of a more naturalistic metaphysical stance have a -lot- more work to do.

    The requirements for a coherent worldview here are pretty persistent across the history of philosophy. Two interesting lines of inquiry here are the Mind-Body Problem (described well here, and by a stridently atheist philosophy professor, lest I be accused of bias), and questions of Supervenience (the notion that, say, Economics can be reduced to Chemistry, which is actually a rather subtle and extensively-examined question in philosophy).

    Anyway, these topics can get huge. Short form to the question "Why are these associated?"... because of the recognition that these levels need to be integrated by individuals to maintain a rational consciousness, and naturalism providing no straightforward means this this integration.

    So, basically it comes from a massive, unresolvable, inescapable problem for the worldview of the average Slashdotter, which happily is not a problem at all for me given my metaphysical premises.

    --
    ~ Whence do you come, slayer of men, or where are you going, conqueror of space?
    1. Re:Consciousness with Free Will, anyway by engun · · Score: 1

      Some of us will say "soul", and... problem solved.

      But why cop out at the level of the "soul" and say problem solved? Why not do so earlier, say "God did it", and there's even less work to do! ;-)

    2. Re:Consciousness with Free Will, anyway by Empiric · · Score: 1

      Not a "cop out" in the least--if there is an existent which is unconstrained by chemical causality, it is a valid, and one of very few, options.

      I don't expect you even know yourself what you are pretending to mean by "cop out" here--though it does avoid the need for a specific rebuttal, almost as if it was a... ahem.

      And, feel free to keep your False Dichotomy Fallacies for your own enjoyment--however much fun parroting the phrase might be for you, there is absolutely no reason that one can't have the position of "God did it" -and- have an ever-expanding awareness of the specifics of implementation that science often provides.

      Same as "man did it", really, if you need a specific text substitution to illustrate your intellectual dishonesty that, given how simplistic and obvious it is, I'd have to assume you already are well aware of, and don't need me to provide.

      --
      ~ Whence do you come, slayer of men, or where are you going, conqueror of space?
    3. Re:Consciousness with Free Will, anyway by BuildingSnowmen · · Score: 1

      The implications of not having Free Will would be so psychologically and morally broad...

      No they wouldn't. Not having Free Will changes nothing. You would still get up in the morning, get dressed, go to work, etc. You still punish criminals and celebrate altruism, both in an effort to encourage good behavior towards you and those you care about.

      Do you really think that a million years of social evolution into a setup that is more or less sustainable for the species is going to be changed because of an idea about where our decisions come from? That reminds me of the argument theists sometimes use about the existence of God, "If there is no God, then why shouldn't I steal, rape and murder?" as if it is only the presence of God keeping them from going sociopathic.

      We all have basic needs that we would work to fulfill. "Free will", "God" and even philosophy may be useful constructs to satisfy our need to understand and assign meaning to the world around us (our curiosity being of our evolutionary strengths), but the question of "free will" will always be of less importance than "What's for dinner?"

    4. Re:Consciousness with Free Will, anyway by Empiric · · Score: 1

      It's of less importance than "What's for dinner" insofar as one has not the slightest sense of obligation to behave consistently with their worldview, sure.

      Are you giving an indication by such a question (and a few hundred others each day) that there was a free choice made by someone as to what to make, and you have a free choice as to whether or not you want to join them?

      The premise is there by implication in most everything we do. Personally, if I consistently imply something daily, I like to have the integrity to actually agree with my implication, and the basic philosophical coherence to reference what in reality justifies that position.

      "What do you want to have for dinner" isn't the same thing as "What does our conditioning determine we are going to say we want to have for dinner". In reality, you are no longer meaningfully able to answer the simplest questions about your behavior--e.g. "Why did you do that?" Any answer you give would be tentative and incomplete, and, likely, simply wrong. If your consciousness itself is not a valid primary explanation, you have an infinite regress of causal factors which you cannot specify, and which may in fact be entirely irrelevant to the action--perhaps your neurochemistry is just telling you that you are doing X as a function of evolutionary history, but in fact that particular causal factor would indicate the opposite choice, and your action is rather driven by another less-proximate cause you are entirely unaware of. If you determine that one, well, perhaps that is simply a plausible but incorrect conclusion--ad infinitum.

      It's really only "less important", at base, because you count on others never actually agreeing with you. You are insulated from the immediate consequences of your position because you are, by social convention and a certain logical parasitism, able to count on your opposition not actually following the necessary inferences demanded by your position. If, in fact, you are claiming you have no free will, you are not a moral agent. It isn't clear to me how you respond to a hypothetical rebuttal of your argument that consists of simply outright killing you, with the explanation I'm simply following your own views--that you are, per yourself, in essence an automaton whose behavior is predetermined, and, according to you, I had no choice under the circumstances other than to kill you, anyway. Resorting to the expectation that my social evolution should be such that I am deterministically caused to not do that--well, a) guess not and b) futile in terms of actual moral force.

      I think your confusing that your position has no reason to behave ethically, as it's own complete failure to address any question of ethics seriously as somebody else's problem. By definition, your "theists" have all the "social evolution" influences you do, -and- actual practical, specifiable justifications to follow them. -No- reason, "God" or otherwise, has any argumentative force to justify any ethical stance you may hold. Person A says his "social evolution" indicates he should do X. Person B says his "social evolution" indicates he should do the direct opposite of X. How do we resolve this? We don't, because your position is ethically incoherent and has no possible means to become other than ethically incoherent. Generally, when one holds a position that is methodologically useless, and obviously so, and continues to hold it anyway, one might fairly suspect that the main motivation is to hold oneself to no ethics at all.

      "Conditioning to act according to a certain norm of morality" simply isn't equivalent to "morality", and such a substitution will never work. It could survive temporarily not because it's a coherent position, but only insofar as the notion is rejected by other parties. If your argument seeking to be accepted relies on not being accepted, it does not strike me as a particularly good position to attempt to hold to.

      --
      ~ Whence do you come, slayer of men, or where are you going, conqueror of space?
    5. Re:Consciousness with Free Will, anyway by Prune · · Score: 1

      I don't see why it is a "massive, unresolvable, inescapable problem". It's just how it is: free will is an illusion; consciousness is an emergent property from the regions of the brain identified by Damasio et al. So what if it's just a subjective illusion though? We do, after all, mostly live for the subjective experiences--at least most of us. So there's no problem here at all, or rather, it's only a problem if you needlessly over-intellectualize about it.

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
    6. Re:Consciousness with Free Will, anyway by Empiric · · Score: 1

      So, your actions and statements consistently originate from what you describe as subjective illusions, rather than objective reality?

      For what reason would I then agree with you, given what you yourself say are the origins of your claim to be making a factual statement here?

      Well, I suppose it's a little inaccurate to use the term "making" here, as that's suggestive of you having free will. "That you are emitting via a deterministic chemical process" might be characterizing your position better, if you prefer. Still, if you aren't consistent in what you say by implication and what you formally believe (and you imply, and de facto act as if you have, free will at minimum a hundred times a day), you have a basic, systemic consistency problem with your worldview.

      --
      ~ Whence do you come, slayer of men, or where are you going, conqueror of space?
    7. Re:Consciousness with Free Will, anyway by Andreas+Mayer · · Score: 1

      It isn't clear to me how you respond to a hypothetical rebuttal of your argument that consists of simply outright killing you, with the explanation I'm simply following your own views--that you are, per yourself, in essence an automaton whose behavior is predetermined, and, according to you, I had no choice under the circumstances other than to kill you, anyway.

      I'm not quite sure what type of response you expect?

      It doesn't matter if I'm an automaton. Rules dictate that you are not allowed to kill me. If you do so anyway, you will be punished according to those rules. It doesn't matter if you had a choice or not. The punishment is still useful because it will reduce the possibility of you - or someone else - to infringe upon those rules in the future. Take it as just an additional input to the automaton that makes up your self.
      Also, it is still rational to resort to more or less severe punishment according to circumstances. Since the more external and short lived the circumstances are that influenced your decision, the less it will help to adjust your inner state.

    8. Re:Consciousness with Free Will, anyway by Prune · · Score: 1

      My actions and statements originate from fundamental particles interacting according to the laws of physics. My thoughts map are mapped directly to physics by their neural correlates. Subjectively, however, they "feel" like they originate from my free will. There is nothing inconsistent here because, despite what I've written, there's no reason that such actions and statements may not be aligned with what can be considered a logically consistent argument, for the same reason a computer program may produce output that is correct in terms of a given mathematical framework.

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
    9. Re:Consciousness with Free Will, anyway by tempmpi · · Score: 1

      Not having Free Will changes nothing.

      Yes, but believing you don't have a free will can change a lot. Maybe there are different believes able to functionally replace this, just like humanism is likely able to functionally replace religion. (We don't know this yet, and birth rates in mostly humanist societies doesn't exactly look too promising, maybe they will disappear as quickly as they appeared.) Just stopping to believe in free-will will likely not yield a sustainable setup, just like nihilism doesn't work out into a sustainable setup and people still want values, morals, meaning of life, etc.

      --
      Jan
    10. Re:Consciousness with Free Will, anyway by Empiric · · Score: 1

      So, you are, or you are not, able to choose to reply to this?

      Don't mind me. I found a fun Finite State Machine to toy with. ;)

      --
      ~ Whence do you come, slayer of men, or where are you going, conqueror of space?
    11. Re:Consciousness with Free Will, anyway by BuildingSnowmen · · Score: 1

      Or described differently, Prune will or will not choose to reply to your post. It describes the situation accurately while complete avoiding the question of ability to choose differently from what is observed.

      Why is the assumption made that choice = free will? What is a choice but one observed action out of multiple distinct alternatives? When you flip a coin it does not choose to land heads or tails, it just does. The outcome is based on the starting state (which side facing up, height above the ground, relative humidity, etc) and the force applied to a particular place on the coin.

      Oh, but a coin is not a conscious being (that we can tell). Okay, how about shining a flashlight into your eyes. Do you have a choice in whether or not you see the light? I'm talking about the action of seeing the light itself, not the choice of whether or not to close your eyes. Ah, but that is a simple sensory perception, which we have very little control over.

      Here's one for you: Are you able to choose whether or not you think of a purple dinosaur right now? Did you have control over how your brain would respond to the symbols you just read?

      Are you exercising free will in choosing to read this sentence right now? Or is it a foregone conclusion that you would be reading this sentence, based on your brain's physical state at the start of this paragraph combined with your sensory input that more information was available to obtain. Input + Brain State = Brain State change + activation of muscle control neurons to move the eyes to the next words. I predict with 100% confidence that you are reading this sentence right now. If you had some free choice not to be reading this right now, upon what would that be based if not your prior brain state combined with current input?

      If your preferences, urges, and predilections are not bound up in the current configuration of your gray matter, are you suggesting they somehow arise from this mysterious quantum indeterminacy? Even if they were, it would still be a probability distribution determining a choice, not an independent action of a free will. Additionally, you would have to find a way to explain how previous physical experience and activity shapes this quantum indeterminacy, since these preferences and urges change over time.

      To address your previous post:

      It's of less importance than "What's for dinner" insofar as one has not the slightest sense of obligation to behave consistently with their worldview, sure.

      My worldview does not keep decisions from being made by me. I don't have an obligation to detail the rationale for each decision down to the atomic level any more than I need to explain oxygenation of hydrocarbons in order to drive my car.

      Are you giving an indication by such a question (and a few hundred others each day) that there was a free choice made by someone as to what to make, and you have a free choice as to whether or not you want to join them?

      No, I am merely asking what is, not why it is what it is.

      The premise is there by implication in most everything we do.

      No, it isn't. I can asking if it is raining outside without having to understand what is causing it to rain.

      Personally, if I consistently imply something daily, I like to have the integrity to actually agree with my implication, and the basic philosophical coherence to reference what in reality justifies that position.

      I'm not implying that a "free choice" has been made, only that a choice has been made; one option has been selected from those available.

      "What do you want to have for dinner" isn't the same thing as "What does our conditioning determine we are going to say we want to have for dinner".

      Pragmatically, it is, if it is my position that someone's wants and actions are determined by that person's conditioning.

      In reality, y

    12. Re:Consciousness with Free Will, anyway by Empiric · · Score: 1

      Okay, I'll go with the tl;dr summary, because that was, to me, a lot of dissembling digression and redirection in the face of what was presented for what it is--a direct and present immediate refutation of your position.

      So, again: YES or NO, are you able to choose to reply to this question? No redirection, no recasting or evading. Yes, or no?

      I think we need to stipulate here that if you make a statement, you are also stating the necessary preconditions of that statement. "What's for dinner?" does, at least in most social contexts, imply that the personal made the dinner as a function of their will, to their particular credit, and that you would like to join them, as a question of freely-chosen will. I'm somewhat morbidly fascinated by the notion of the emotional subtext of such conversations once we would, by necessity, correct the notion that the person who made the dinner had any choice in that activity, or that you have any choice about how you elect to respond. I would definitely draw a distinction between the notions of such a question being asked from each of these worldviews, and would expect that the implications you present be consistent with the belief you actually hold.

      That there are biological subsystems that are not under conscious control, doesn't really speak to the question at hand. I'm not in the least claiming that all phenomena related to my decision are under my free conscious control (indeed, I do not consciously will my neurons to fire in contemplating an action), rather, that the net totality of the system results in having the attribute of free will--put another way, that sufficient conscious capability is present in the system to allow for it. That's the postulate--that as a matter of prima facie evidence, the totality of the system has that attribute, clearly present and directly perceivable. We can attempt to then demonstrate for or against by, say, various forms of "reductionistic" or "holistic" analysis, say, per Hofstadter, but in reality we will not be "proving" the issue either way. I'm not sure why we'd even begin to look at this from a framework of arguing "some attributes are not under free conscious control" and thus extrapolating "no attributes are under free conscious control". I'm stating we do have free will is a matter of the empirical evidence of, and subjective qualia of, well... trying to perform an action as a matter of will, and succeeding. In the face of this, you appear to have the counterargument that this is not the case, simply as a matter of faith in your understanding of the deterministic nature of classical chemical processes you can individually define and analyze--with no actual ability to reduce the question at hand to these processes. Because of your naturalistic viewpoint, it seems you conclude that since chemistry is all there is to consciousness, at base, and chemistry is deterministic, even though it isn't in fact, and merely highly predictable per QM, that behavior is thus deterministic.

      Well, there are, again, a couple of possibilities here:

      1. That chemistry isn't deterministic. This is addressed by... the fact that chemistry isn't deterministic. We generally have classical behavior at larger scales, but this behavior is itself uncertain per QM.

      2. That there is an attribute of consciousness that isn't material in nature, which you don't perceive. I understand your preference for perceivability of all the parts of the system, but we really should contrast this with your current epistemological state regarding this--that you have no perceivability of all the parts of the system. In your case, per your worldview, this is an inescapable fact of the complexity of the system, rather than consideration of a possible "spiritual" element, but you are, in fact, in exactly the same position with regard to your actual lack of understanding of consciousness, as a totality, either way.

      So, well, that'd be one line of discussion. I suppose the other would be this:

      It is entirely possible to expl

      --
      ~ Whence do you come, slayer of men, or where are you going, conqueror of space?
    13. Re:Consciousness with Free Will, anyway by Prune · · Score: 1

      I love you guys.

      Disclaimer: please qualify the above statement with the additional information that I've been enjoying some Southern Comfort, which predisposes my alleged free will to be less free and more willful...

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
  52. Re:consciousness is represented mathematically? by TaoPhoenix · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Kind of a strange Slashdot topic since as pointed elsewhere Penrose has been working on this since 1989!

    Meanwhile bear with me for a mini rant, in that Submitter dived right into a topic covered by some 50 books, by taking a simplistic double quote of Roger Penrose, famous British physicist, recently argued "that we will need to invoke 'new physics and exotic biological structures': rewriting quantum theory to make sense of consciousness," Brooks writes. (Which he then dismissed as disappointing.)

    Meanwhile, back at the more erudite book level, let's see some of what's out there.
    Pleading rustiness on the original Penrose text, Douglas Hofstadter has been working for 20 years on analogy-based thinking. To get to your question, he calls the electrons and cells and even small neurons little billiard-ball-like stuff that "careens around in a careenium". Then from a second story window, you don't see those individual balls anymore, nor does any one matter. But the holistic big level then becomes consciousness as a "emergent" property that you just can't dissect past a certain point.

    On another tack, Stephen Wolfram of Wolfram Alpha fame put another 20 years at about the same time period doing computational pattern science developing the idea that within perfectly special cases in what otherwise look like simple rules, fantastic complex structures simply emerge "out of nowhere". Yet the trick is that they have to be computed, and no fancy equation quite produces the whole result in one sweep - some data absolutely requires the raw minimum iterative processing. He called this something like the law of irreducibility. For consciousness, this means that there are limits to genius, and cavemen can't make cars because it simply takes a raw amount of pre-processing to produce the context that pushes forth an idea. Past that absudium example, it also means for non-geniuses that you can't know why cattle won't go into a vaccination ramp until someone else discovers that cattle hate shifts in light intensity and the ramp looks like a big cave.

    --
    My first Journal Entry ever, in 8 years! http://slashdot.org/journal/365947/aphelion-scifi-fantasy-horror-poetry-webzine
  53. The Emperors New Mind by Burnhard · · Score: 1

    I'm sorry, but "recently"? I read Penrose first book on this subject in 1990. Actually it was reading this book that inspired me to go to University to study Intelligent Systems (an oxymoron, so I discovered). I also have his second book on this subject, Shadows of the Mind, on my bookshelf.

    I find that his basic argument that there is something missing in our conception of reality that makes understanding of conscious experience impossible, to be fundamentally correct. Philosophers differ on whether or not consciousness and the mysteriousness of QM are related. Intuitively I would suggest that they are, but science by intuition isn't very robust so I won't explain why.

    It's important not to forget that Physics and Mathematics are good tools for describing the regularities of experience, but they have absolutely nothing to say about the nature of that experience. Philosophers like Dennett would do away with the entire problem by simply denying it. David Chalmers would take the opposing view, that conscious experience can never be explained with a purely functionalist or materialist world view.

    Perhaps the most interesting recent advance in this area was the discovery that plants take advantage of quantum effects in optimising photosynthesis. Evin Harris Walker makes a convincing argument for quantum effects in the brain (although he tends to focus on tunnelling, rather than the microtubule coherence that Penrose points us to). I would find it extraordinary if the brain did not take advantage of such effects in order to increase its efficiency.

    I think the most important point in all of this however, is that we know very little about consciousness and we know very little about how the brain works. But more than that, it is my belief that even after science has enumerated all of the particles, fields and laws of physics, there will still be something left to explain. This is the central mystery of conscious experience that Penrose talks about and it is why Chalmers says that conscious experience does not logically supervene on the physical.

    1. Re:The Emperors New Mind by Prune · · Score: 1

      Penrose's Shadows of the Mind argument fundamentally correct? How about fundamentally formally refuted! http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.36.260&rep=rep1&type=pdf

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
  54. Does QM explain conciousness? by Have+Brain+Will+Rent · · Score: 1

    Maybe, maybe not.

    --
    The tyrant will always find a pretext for his tyranny - Aesop
  55. Please Explain by Boona · · Score: 1

    But why do this, especially as there is no apparent causal link between quantum mechanics and the conscious mind?

    I was under the impression that there was a link between consciousness and matter due to the observer problem. It really doesn't help that the wikipedia article has a bunch of [who's] and [citation needed].

    Does someone with more knowledge about the subject care to explain?

    1. Re:Please Explain by grumbel · · Score: 2

      "Observer" has nothing to do with a conscious human observer, but just refers to whatever tool or technique you use to measure a physical effect. At large scale you can shine a light on an object and observe it by the photons are reflected without problem, if you want to observe a single atom on the other side by shooting photons at it, the photons will have an effect on the atom.

  56. Actually by Demena · · Score: 1

    To me that sounds like you are agreeing with the premise. In a way it appears that you are just restating the measurement problem.

  57. Monads (c.f. Leibniz) by zooblethorpe · · Score: 1

    According to some interpretations I've run across of Gottfried Leibniz's Monadology , particles of matter represent particles of intent. From this perspective, indeed, you can't have electrons without consciousness.

    To put it in more religious terms better in line with the thought of the time, and to expand beyond Descartes logical fallacy: Deus cogitat, ergo sumus, or in this more doubting age, aliquid cogitat, ergo sumus -- "something thinks, therefore we is."

    Cheers,

    --
    "What in the name of Fats Waller is that?"
    "A four-foot prune."
  58. yes by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Short answer is, yes. long answer is yes, but with a lot of quantum wigle-tee-wogle-tee.

  59. this issue is at the forefront of my lobe by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    so allow me to share my opinion..

    There is an interesting likeness between

    the field of possibilities which may or may not be, then when observed collapse into what is observed
    see schrodinger and physics post 1930
    and
    the array of possibilities generated and selected from by our brain in its course from imagination to action
    see gerald edelman's work of the last decade and a half

    Both of these 'fields' of potential converge and meet in the middle.. or are they the same thing? Do they start from the same place and move out?
    This is the interesting part-- what presently is a very philosophical question.. "how to tell what is and what is not possible before it is observed?"

    Hofstadter has convincingly suggested that "I" is a symbol our minds develop for self-reference. A conscious thought of 'i am myself' feels instantaneous.. The sum of experience and nerve firings that process and recombine that experience. If it is not instantaneous.. how long does it take? Perhaps it is instantaneous, and, what would seem more astounding, is that it is the sum of more than one moment in space and time-- the interweaved, entangled, experience of a brains' nerve firings' worth of space and time. We may be the information itself, organized and floated on our neural mass like the rainbows reflecting off an oil slick on water. But to what are we reflecting?

    expando@gmail.com

  60. Evolution is weird too by Singri · · Score: 1

    Its not just concisousness that is weird, evolution is weird too. The fact that such complex systems evolved in reaction to environment is something hard to digest. There must be a law of the universe behind it. Also, its funny that beings that were created in response to environment changes are recreating beings using materials they use.

  61. Q: Does God Explain Consciousness? by Tatarize · · Score: 0

    A: No.

    Signed, biology.

    --

    It is no longer uncommon to be uncommon.
  62. A simple and long answer. by microbox · · Score: 1

    Care to state it?

    From TFA: "conservation of mysteries". Pretty straight-forward.

    We seem to have free-will (very important for spirituality), but the universe appears to obey well ordered rules (laws of physics), so how can we have free will (and by proxy, a meaning to life)? Simple: stick it in quantumn mechanics, the new pineal gland that joins the ghost to the machine. That, we have reduced two mysteries to one.

    One problem comes from understanding what we mean by free will -- I side with Daniel Dennett on this. Another problem comes from choosing one perspective over another because it makes people feel good.

    The brain processes that process sentient creatures work under the assumption of an essence (ghost) in a sentience actor that has attributes (personality characteristics), which can be used to predict their behaviour. The notion of free-will and the spiritual path arise naturally out of this perspective, which can only see sentient actors as causal agents. Aspergers people have problems with this faculty.

    The brain processes that see the ordering of the universe according to principles and rules give rise to logic. These processes probably arose originally as a by-product of brain processes that reverse engineer perspective and such from sensory information. These processes /can/ see sentient actors as causal agents, but suck at making predictions. These processes gave rise to the conception of quantumn mechanics.

    Yet a third process creates the illusion that you have a unified consiousness, and only a single interpretation of sensory information (in the present moment), and a single story line for what is going on (again, in the present moment). This process needs to unify what is happening beneath, and creates a biased by simple and powerful construction of reality that can be used for further contemplation on the meaning of life, and calibration of the underlying mechanisms that give rise to the moment of consciousness.

    Yet a forth process (the final one for this discussion), is building schema, and wants to create an over-arching and consistent and abstract conception (schema) of reality. The spiritual individual will found this abstract conception in sentient-processing processes, and have a problem with the ordered principle nature of reality, which must be suppressed (internally). This forth process jumps of quatumn mechanics to make itself consistent with the undeniable perception of an ordered universe, and the fact that things like computers work.

    It is all very simple to me, because, like everyone else, I believe my abstract conception of reality (whatever it is) in any given present moment. If I am ever wrong, it is always about a previous instance of consciousness. But if we are both right, then someone must be in denial. Considering the immense caloric investment in creating your abstract schema, it is no wonder that the mind resorts to subconscious tricks to protect it. (This can lead to psychosis.)

    --

    Like all pain, suffering is a signal that something isn't right
    1. Re:A simple and long answer. by Black+Parrot · · Score: 1

      We seem to have free-will (very important for spirituality)

      Important, rather, for holding people accountable for their actions - which of course many religious systems embrace vigorously.

      However, recent advances in neuroscience has philosophers, ethicists, and jurists concerned that we'll soon be hearing "my brain made me do it" as a courtroom defense.

      Whether free will is a reality or an illusion, society is going to have to change the way it does things if many people start rejecting the idea.

      IMO we don't actually have any evidence bearing on the matter one way or the other, and when people want to argue for or against it, they should start by stating what they mean by "free will".

      --
      Sheesh, evil *and* a jerk. -- Jade
    2. Re:A simple and long answer. by Evtim · · Score: 1

      Why would the laws of Nature impinge on your free will? I don't understand the stament in your first paragraph. If you decide to jump from a high building without any equipment it was your free will. Now, if you want to will gravity away while you are falling, that's something else.

      Do you define free will as "being able to brake the laws of Nature"? I guess not. I think free will is more like - "being able to do anything within the framework of the laws of Nature."

      Besides, we now know that the natural world is not as deterministic as we thought. Your hypothetical decision to jump/or not was most likely not "recorded" in the fabric of the Big Bang and there is no causality chain that traces the outcome of your decision all the way back to t=0.

    3. Re:A simple and long answer. by narcc · · Score: 1

      I think free will is more like - "being able to do anything within the framework of the laws of Nature."

      Free will is in the choosing, not in the doing. To will is to commit to a course of action. For your will to be free, means that you had the capacity for choice. That is, you could have chosen differently.

      To take the physical side of things out (for clarity), let's look at belief. Belief, as you already know, is not subject to the will. To believe is an act, not a choice. You can choose to believe X, but the force of will alone will not guarantee that you will then believe in X.

    4. Re:A simple and long answer. by microbox · · Score: 1

      we'll soon be hearing "my brain made me do it" as a courtroom defense.

      We hear it, but it almost never works. There are statistics on this in criminology. Insanity defense goes back a long time -- the 19thC I believe, and the probability of it working hasn't changed in recent times.

      --

      Like all pain, suffering is a signal that something isn't right
    5. Re:A simple and long answer. by microbox · · Score: 1

      Why would the laws of Nature impinge on your free will?

      It is a classical problem in philosophy: how could there be free-will in a clockwork universe. The question is really a simple misunderstanding that has been taken very seriously, esp. by those who want to believe in a soul that transcends death.

      --

      Like all pain, suffering is a signal that something isn't right
    6. Re:A simple and long answer. by Black+Parrot · · Score: 1

      we'll soon be hearing "my brain made me do it" as a courtroom defense.

      We hear it, but it almost never works. There are statistics on this in criminology. Insanity defense goes back a long time -- the 19thC I believe, and the probability of it working hasn't changed in recent times.

      I'm not talking about the traditional insanity defense. I'm talking about an as-yet-hypothetical defense based on recent discoveries of neuroscience, involving observable functional 'circuits' in the brain with known functions, and the accumulating evidence that defective circuits result in defective behavior.

      Over the next couple of decades this is going to have a revolutionary impact on our traditional notions of free will and individual responsibility, and thus on our views about crime and punishment (probably after some additional decades for absorbing the consequences).

      --
      Sheesh, evil *and* a jerk. -- Jade
  63. Well, this is good news! by pelirojatica · · Score: 1

    Good news for the new-age-y psychic fair nutjobs who want to "heal" me with their "quantum metaphysics". Now they'll have an article to link to that will "prove" their baloney. Oy!

  64. Philosophistry by zooblethorpe · · Score: 1

    Brrr. A guy could catch his death of incompetent philosophy here.

    FTFY

    Wouldn't that be philosophistry?

    Cheers,

    --
    "What in the name of Fats Waller is that?"
    "A four-foot prune."
  65. social-neural-science by microbox · · Score: 1

    There is a much more interesting explanation for empathy and it is researched in detail in the field of social-neural-science. Goldman has a book that broadly covers some of the interesting ideas: "Social Cognition".

    --

    Like all pain, suffering is a signal that something isn't right
    1. Re:social-neural-science by Eivind · · Score: 1

      Empathy ain't strange at all.

      Human beings are group-animals. Guesstimating what others in the group are likely to do, has obvious benefits to your survival. Thus evolution will favor those who are capable of understanding what others might be thinking and feeling.

      Being empathic is also a good thing, *especially* in smaller groups, like how humans have lived for most of our existence. Odds are, if you act with kindness towards others when they're in trouble, you are more likely to be helped out yourself when you are. Evolutionary, groups who tend to be nice to eachothers, will outdo groups where everyone is 100% an egoist.

    2. Re:social-neural-science by spiralx · · Score: 1

      Ssh, don't tell the libertarians that! ;)

  66. Pointless distraction by microbox · · Score: 1

    Read "How the Mind Works" for an alternative discussion on consciousness, that steers clear of quantumn mysticism, which really doesn't explain anything at all.

    Besides, nobody has to provide something better than quantum mysticism to point out how intellectually trashy it is. It is just a pointless distraction from the serious work of understanding how our minds work.

    --

    Like all pain, suffering is a signal that something isn't right
  67. Russian anecdote? by zooblethorpe · · Score: 1
    --
    "What in the name of Fats Waller is that?"
    "A four-foot prune."
  68. If you don't think quantum mechanics is strange... by catchblue22 · · Score: 2, Informative

    For those of you who hear that quantum mechanics is strange, but aren't sure exactly why, here is a little primer, based on the opening lecture from my intro quantum course:

    Pass a a beam of electrons through two closely spaced gaps. If the electrons were like bullets, one would expect to detect two bright spots on the detecting screen directly opposite the holes. This is not what you will observe however. Instead you will see on the detector a single location midway between the two holes with many electron strikes. The locations opposite the holes receive few electron strikes, but continuing outward there will be locations with lots of electron strikes followed by locations with few electron strikes. How can we explain this?

    Well the bright and dark patterns are consistent with wave diffraction and interference. We see similar interference patterns with light, and with other types of waves. So the electrons have wavelike properties. Are multiple electrons "interfering" with each other? Well, if you reduce the beam intensity so that only single electrons are passing through the slits, perhaps only one every few seconds, then the same pattern of diffraction and interference occurs! So, that seems to imply that single electrons are passing through both slits and once, and then interfering with themselves! I thought single electrons were particles!??? !

    Now install a device or mechanism that measures which slit electrons pass through and indicates the results to you. What do you observe now? The electrons will now behave like bullets, dutifully going straight through one hole or the other and striking the detector screen directly opposite the holes. No diffraction. No interference, or at least not enough to speak of. Experiments like this led Bohr to exclaim that "those who are not shocked when they first see quantum mechanics cannot possibly have understood it."

    One interpretation of this is that if you don't know which hole the electron goes through, then it goes through both holes at once. If you don't know what spin an electron has, then it has both spin up and spin down. At the small scale, probability seems to be everything. If there is a 40% chance that an electron is at location A, and a 60% chance that the same electron is at location B, then 40% of it is located at A, and 60% of it is at B. It seems your lack of knowledge about the electron can cause it to be "smeared" over multiple locations. This smearing is related to the wavelike properties. As soon as you pin down the location of the electron, then it is no longer in two places at once. It is a definite particle.

    Consciousness seems to play a role in this, as it seems our measurement of either the momentum or the position of an electron seems to fundamentally change its properties. It seems that our knowledge of the particle changes the particle. I understand this is difficult to accept. But any alternative explanation must take into account the strange results from experiments such as the one described above. I am not sure where the logical fallacy would lie here.

    --
    This and no other is the root from which a tyrant springs; when first he appears as a protector - Plato (423 to 327 BC)
  69. Mental masturbation by marked23 · · Score: 1

    In a fit of free-thinking, I once proposed that god/nature invented the unpredictability of quantum events expressly for the purpose of enabling free-will. Or more generally, quashing determinism.

    If we are really all just a pile of chemicals and electrical signals, our universe is determinate.

    However nature gives us chaos at the quantum level. If any of that craziness influences anything at a larger scale, (in aggregate, how could it not?), then our universe is not determinate.

    So why would nature 'choose' to ensure that determinism is not the law of the land?... Nature wouldn't, but perhaps a bored god would.

  70. Deepak Chopra by Swarley · · Score: 2

    "And as the great Deepak Chopra taught us, quantum physics means that anything can happen at any time for no reason."

                        -Prof. Farnsworth

  71. Damn! by SanityInAnarchy · · Score: 1

    I already posted on this article. Someone mod this guy up to a billion.

    --
    Don't thank God, thank a doctor!
  72. Marcus Aurelius had it right by gatkinso · · Score: 1

    None of this shit is real, and when you die poof that's it.

    But then again, how would he know? I mean NOW he knows... or doesn't know of indeed he is truly gone....

    OH MY GOD

    --
    I am very small, utmostly microscopic.
    1. Re:Marcus Aurelius had it right by pclminion · · Score: 1

      None of this shit is real, and when you die poof that's it.

      That's actually a very egotistical viewpoint. It presumes that the universe goes like this: nothing, nothing, nothing... billions of years of nothing... nothing... poof, I'm born, I exist, I die, then nothing, nothing, nothing...

      What the hell makes me so special that *I'm* the thing that pops into existence in the middle of an infinite timeline of nothing? I assume I'm NOT special, thus my first-person experience is not special, thus it's not very likely that what happens after my physical death is "nothingness." It puts me on a pedestal as being the total unique consciousness in the world. My memories will expire when I die, but first person consciousness almost certainly will not.

    2. Re:Marcus Aurelius had it right by ginbot462 · · Score: 1

      In the same sense those initial conditions to that simulation you brought up are nothing and when you stop it is becomes nothing again.

      --
      Atlas Shrugged : Thematic Story :: Battlefield Earth : Organized Religion
  73. Its True! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I skimmed TFA (I couldn't go reading it, I'm pretty sure you get banned if you) and it doesn't conclusively prove that quantum theory isn't involved with the human brain or consciousness, just that the person making the claim has absolutely no evidence to suggest that is the case (beyond the fact that they are both mysterious).

    Still, it more then passes a religious level of scrutinisation and seeing as more then half the population of earth have religious beliefs and that schrodinger's cat proves that things that have a 50% chance of being true are always true and false, this proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that he is correct.

    Q.E.D motherfucker.

  74. Brain complexity and quantum science... by Panaflex · · Score: 1

    I think they are connected. But wait, hear me out.

    First off, consider the brain. A supercomputer capable of complex logical and illogical(creative) operations. An advanced image, sound, touch and smell processor with noise suppression and extremely high fidelity. A memory storage system capable of storing DECADES of observed data, with advanced compression, keyword-like index, and meta storage of multiple multimedia types together. A complete autonomous maintenance and life support system which directs multiple organs each with numerous functions. Thousands of functions which run simultaneously in real time!

    All running within an average of one hundred billion neurons. Don't get me wrong, a neuron is not truly analogous to the transistor... but right now we've got 3 billion count chips out - and so far they're not making pottery or scratching cave paintings, much less doing half the functions described above.

    As a good counter example of quantum applications in biology, consider the recent discovery of quantum coherence in photosynthetic systems.

    I'll be the first to admit that there is *absolutely no scientific evidence* of quantum-type processes in the brain, and what we do know of physics tends to discount any possibility that we'll every find such processes. However - it was only a year ago that we discovered quantum biology systems in photosynthesis.

    Biology, at it's heart is a molecular-level science. It only makes sense that the evolution of biological life would take advantage of quantum mechanics.

    --
    I said no... but I missed and it came out yes.
    1. Re:Brain complexity and quantum science... by LS · · Score: 1

      I agree with you on the premise that quantum effects can't be automatically ruled out in a final (or even partial) explanation for brain function and consciousness. But a direct comparison between neuron count and transistor count makes no sense. The devil is in the details, and there is a lot of power in the architecture of (or lack thereof) the brain. The brain is massively connected and parallel, and we have nothing that comes close to the architecture of the brain. In other words, there is a lot to deal with before we even get to the quantum side of things.

      Check out work on the connectome (a mapping of connections of neurons in the brain): Human Connectome Project

      And check out this 3 dimensional cross section of actual neurons. It's the cube in the top center of the picture. The complexity of connections between even just a few neurons is immense. Each color is a different neuron: brain slice. Now scale that up to 100 billion, and make sense of it....

      --
      There is a fine line between being a cultivated citizen and being someone else's crop. - A. J. Patrick Liszkie
    2. Re:Brain complexity and quantum science... by Prune · · Score: 1

      First, your estimate of brain raw processing power is off by several orders of magnitude--each neuron has 7000 synapses, and each synapse has 100s of channels, and it is those channels that are analogous to transistors. You seriously need to reconsider your shit with this in mind.

      Second, there is absolutely no reason to invoke QM to deal with consciousness, or the other way around: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0105097

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
    3. Re:Brain complexity and quantum science... by ledow · · Score: 1

      Not to nit-pick, but your brain has little to do with your organs functioning - they just do that anyway. They are *all* pretty autonomous - when people say stupid things like "Your brain doesn't have to think about this, it does it subconciously", I want to slap them. Most systems in the body are autonomous, but they are sustained by the body as a whole (hence don't go on doing it forever) and the brain has only a very vague oversight of it going on.

      Those organs have a life-support system controlled by other autonomous systems, and those autonomous systems work with no input from the brain if necessary. The brain actually plays little part in those processes, except primitive sensor-reponses (deploying a hormone, raising body temperature, etc.) but it's like the engineer at the nuclear plant who presses the "coolant" button when the temperature alarms go off being called a "nuclear scientist" or pretending that *HE'S* banging the atoms together.

      All the hard work is done by countless billions of autonomous, specialised cells that do little else, do it automatically (because that's their sole purpose and "design" in life - they can ONLY do that job) and can go on doing that long after death. Hell, your heartbeat has virtually nothing to do with your brain, for example, but the brain can send a request along the lines of "I'm feeling low blood pressure, can you speed up a bit?"

      And each neuron has several *thousand* connections so the order of magnitude just went up by 3 or maybe 4 (so we're now "only" 6 or 7 orders of magnitude away from having a "potential" brain simulation). When you have a planet with 100 billion computers, and each of those is simultaneously connected (via speed-of-light links) directly to, say, 10,000 other computers all the time, then THAT system would resemble the complexity of the human brain. That's about 16 computers for every person on the planet, with 10,000 ethernet cards in each (because the links are DIRECT, not incidental), if you want an actual computer analogy.

      And then you have the spinal cord which contains a "mini" brain, if you like, that's capable of responding to stimuli before the brain even knows about it. And most organs self-controlled by billions of cells which the brain knows nothing about. Even the immune system is pretty much automated and the brain has little to do with it.

      Trying to pretend we're ANYWHERE near that sort of complexity is like saying that we *almost* simulate the entire universe down to a molecular level on a supercomputer. Elements of truth but out by so many orders of magnitude that it's laughable.

      Which is why, when a scientists tells you they have made an "artifial brain" or even "artificial intelligence" of some kind, you should laugh in their face. It's not having a superiority complex about how wonderful humans are, it's just that we're literally playing with toys at the moment and have no way to come close to simulating even an *ant's* brain. Hell, we can just about pretend to almost simulate a single-celled organism. Guess how many of those it would take to make a brain-like structure? 100's or 1000's of billions.

    4. Re:Brain complexity and quantum science... by Panaflex · · Score: 1

      First - I *did* say that neurons were not analogous to transistors.

      Second - I *did* say that there is absolutely no proof that QM is involved with the brain, and in fact said it was unlikely to ever be found.

      So what's your point? I was actually making a point - WHAT WE KNOW NOW ISN'T FINALITY. It's possible, just not probable - and it's harnessing the improbable that makes humans what they are.

      --
      I said no... but I missed and it came out yes.
    5. Re:Brain complexity and quantum science... by Panaflex · · Score: 1

      Thanks for that - I truly appreciate your scales of magnitude analogies, as of course I'm not a neurobiologist.

      I think another thing CompSci people tend to forget is that all biological cells are like instantiated objects, the "software code" to generate the object is the "hardware" itself.

      --
      I said no... but I missed and it came out yes.
  75. Hate to say it... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    ...but Penrose is kind of a crackpot these days. I've been to two of his talks in the last year or so, and he's pushing this theory that the universe is cyclic in the following fashion: everything falls into a bunch of black holes, then the black holes someday pop in a burst of Hawking radiation, and then if you rescale the entire universe so that everything that exists so far looks like a point, the result looks similar to a big bang.

    The problem is that rescaling the universe in such a manner would require you to rescale things like atoms, which have a size that is fundamental to the properties of the universe as we know them. An undergraduate could tell you this.

    I love the man's early work, but in his old age he's gone a little crazy.

  76. A Matter of Perspective by NicknamesAreStupid · · Score: 1

    If you want to understand consciousness in terms of vector space and probabilities, quantum theory is a good context. If you want it in terms of neurons and dendrites, then neurology would probably be better. You could also look at it in the context of organic chemistry or theology.or that we are not smart enough to understand how dumb we really are. The article refers to a physicist at LHC, musing about his big banger while drinking. My limited understanding of consciousness is that alcohol limits and even eliminates consciousness. Before he lost his he behaved like any expert. A carpenter sees every problem as a nail and every solution as a hammer. The LHC guy's tool is his big banger. The problem doesn't matter. Chopra is trying to promote his book, and Penrose is British (need I say more?).

    1. Re:A Matter of Perspective by Prune · · Score: 1

      Not only do people use this nonsense of invoking QM to explain consciousness, but they even do the worse--invoke consciousness in their interpretation of QM. Thankfully a good refutation is not hard to find http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0105097

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
  77. It's in the micotubules by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Penrose and Hameroff propose that micotubules in the brain are small enough that quantum effects can occur there and may be the connection to consciousness. Perhaps the reviewer needed to dig a little deeper before ridiculing Penrose.

  78. obviously by foszae · · Score: 1

    oh it sure does, but the how of it is weird to explain...

  79. Someone's been reading the Ender's Game Quartet by barlevg · · Score: 1

    "Don't you reckon it might uncover some sort of particle, or energy, that might explain our connectivity with the Universe?" Sounds like Orson Scott Card's "philotes" to me. While I loved the series when I read it as a kid and I still love it now, as someone who has a decent background in physics, I find the idea laughable. I'm a firm believer that consciousness is simply a "complex systems" / nonlinear dynamics effect, but that's a topic for a different debate.

    1. Re:Someone's been reading the Ender's Game Quartet by guybrush3pwood · · Score: 1

      I'm a firm believer[...]

      Your dogmatic belief system is not welcomed here, you mindless fanatic!

      --
      Perhaps I'm trolling, perhaps I'm not.
  80. Since logic 'breaks down' @ subatomic level by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    You could only describe a woman's mind, using Quantum Mechanics.

    Hehehe, but... I understand why - They're just using the tools @ hand they know & understand, to quantify + measure & understand something, in the human psyche! I do things like that programming (objects are sort of REALLY ALL about that in fact).. Would I put faith in it? Not really. I'd only use it @ a sort of measuring stick @ most, but not a guide.

    (Anyways/anyhow - & the naysayers here? They're doubtless like ones who must have been at first about mathematics + physics. It's only a tool folks, not an absolute authority on "all things" - take anything with a grain of salt! E.G.-> Statistical math? While useful, can be 'bent/skewed' easily, for example! Discrete Math?? Put a 1 or 0 into some equations there & watch them fail/ go loopy! I could go on, & on - always exceptions to rules!)

    Same thing here though really: Geeks, attempting to describe parts of & a synergy of a whole via facts you know about them + with the tools you understand!

    (lol, friggin' GEEKS! They make the world go around @ times though!)

    In the end here? Well - Didn't mean to offend anyone, & was actually being humorous for once (a little bit of good news today & all that is why).

    APK

    P.S.=> However, imo @ least: Since anything's possible in String theory, you might use THAT as a tool to describe women, & even better: LOL!

    ... apk

  81. Here's the fallacy by Okian+Warrior · · Score: 1

    Okay, here's the deal.

    Any computer program run on a deterministic machine is predictable. It may be complex, in which case the prediction can be made by simply running the program until the prediction time, noting the state, then deleting the program state and going back to square one. Congratulations - you've just predicted the program behaviour!

    In order for a program to be unpredictable, information must be passed in from outside its universe. That is to say, information which is NOT encoded in the program and NOT available in it's input stream.

    From the point of view of the program, this information is random, which is the definition of unpredictable. From the point of view of an observer outside the scope of the machine and its universe, the information may not be random. It may be based on something that's altogether outside the measurement capability of the program, in which case there is no way to predict the behaviour of that program without the extra information.

    The universe I'm talking about is *our* universe, the programs I'm talking about are people, the information is quantum randomness, and the outside observer is God. Quantum randomness is essentially information passed into this universe from outside. It is the basis of free will - without it, our actions would be completely predictable. Put a baby in a VR environment and let them grow up and they would make exactly the same choices and grow up to be exactly the same person - except for quantum randomness.

    The fallacy is confusing the terms, which leads to all sorts of mistaken ideas and beliefs. Consciousness is simply the ability to have a mental model of one's universe, with oneself as a separate entity within that model. This is different and completely separate from the concept of free will.

    Quantum randomness is the embodiment of free will, not consciousness.

    Gee whiz, people! Doesn't anyone study AI any more?

    1. Re:Here's the fallacy by Prune · · Score: 1

      You write: "Consciousness is simply the ability to have a mental model of one's universe, with oneself as a separate entity within that model." You're on the right track. The mental model of oneself is a mental representation of body functions, and the regions of the brain responsible are well known, as are those for holding the memory- and sensory-derived model of the rest of the world. The neuroscientist Damasio some years back identified the regions of the brain responsible for integrating the two in a second-level representation, one of the interaction of the self and the rest of the world.

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
    2. Re:Here's the fallacy by Arlet · · Score: 1

      Randomness doesn't add anything beneficial to free will. If I'm about to cross a street, and suddenly decide not too, because I see that the approaching car is going pretty fast, I don't need a random input that says: "you know what, just cross anyway".

      A deterministic free will is actually better for survival. Our brains have evolved to exclude randomness as much as possible.

    3. Re:Here's the fallacy by Old+Wolf · · Score: 1

      Consciousness is simply the ability to have a mental model of one's universe, with oneself as a separate entity within that model

      So, a camera in front of a mirror is conscious?

  82. Quantum Consciousness by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Problem is the human brain does not have the computing power to support consciousness - unless it is using quantum level methods which are not yet understood ...

  83. The alternative to determinism? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    There's a historical context to this.

    Before quantum mechanics, Newtonian physics made the world seem totally deterministic. In (the) theory (of the time), if you could identify the position, mass, speed, and direction of every particle in a closed system, you could compute its state at every point in the future. Yes, it was impractical, but if you considered how it applies to the brain, it begged the question: "Does this leave any room for free will?" That takes it into the realm of philosophy, rather than mathematics or physics, but in a totally Newtonian physical world, free will was hard to explain.

    The first crack in this problem came with quantum mechanics. Now, mechanics was no longer deterministic. There was room for randomness, and the future is not preordained by the present state of everything. That wasn't quite enough, though. Quantum randomness is about as microscopic as you can get. But, it could be argued that at the macroscopic level, randomness averages out, and things become predictable. Yes, you can get electrons to tunnel in a diode, but at a predictable rate. Uncertainty be damned, no one *really* suddenly appears on the other side of the room. This wasn't a new notion at all: The temperature of a gas comes from the random movement of its molecules, but you don't need to know the trajectory of each molecule; PV = nRT summarizes it all very nicely.

    The last key was chaos theory. The butterfly effect implies that (in appropriate systems), very tiny differences in an initial state can have profound results on the eventual state. Now, all bets are off. Uncertainty says that there are unpredictable variations, and chaos theory suggests that those differences can show up at the macroscopic level. You can have free will, after all. (By the way, Tom Stoppard's play Arcadia does a much more entertaining job of explaining this than I just did.)

    But, (with apologies to followers of B. F. Skinner) assuming that there is such a thing as free will, does conscious choice **really**, physically, depend on quantum randomness magnified by chaos theory? Or, is that just a philosophical existence proof that free will **can** exist?

    And that is how quantum theory might or might not be related to consciousness.

  84. Dust by bradgoodman · · Score: 1
    Has anyone read the Golden Compass series ("His Dark Materials")?

    This is sounding a lot like "Experimental Theology" and "Dust"...the melding of religion and [particle] physics - particals which have a consciousness to them.

    1. Re:Dust by Prune · · Score: 1

      Panpsychism. Utter garbage.

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
  85. Re:If you don't think quantum mechanics is strange by Raenex · · Score: 1

    For those of you who hear that quantum mechanics is strange, but aren't sure exactly why, here is a little primer, based on the opening lecture from my intro quantum course:

    Standard double-slit intro into quantum weirdness. You could just link to the Dr. Quantum video.

  86. Ignorance by TemperedAlchemist · · Score: 1

    By fallacy you mean ignorance of science. Theory explain phenomena, not the other way around.

  87. A Quantum Brain by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I fail to see the logical fallacy. Is it not all quantum mechanics at the most fundamental level? Why should consciousness be an exception? My holographic self demands to know.

    Let's not assume that quantum mechanics is in its final state. Logic is not necessarily the only path to truth, especially, truth about consciousness. I'd try intuitive shortcuts.

    "A quantum brain drinks up waves from an ever-present background ocean of pure possibility, the ocean out of which comes everything, mind and matter alike."

  88. If I don't know how much I have drunk by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I can be both conscious and unconscious at the same time.

  89. Overrreaching again. by SETIGuy · · Score: 1

    It's 100% certain that chemical reactions involve quantum mechanics.
    It's 100% certain that consciousness involves chemical reactions.
    Therefore, consciousness involves quantum mechanics

    But it would be greatly overreaching to state that consciousness requires changes to quantum theory. Consciousness doesn't even require non-deterministic physics. Deterministic is not the same thing as predictable.

    1. Re:Overrreaching again. by Old+Wolf · · Score: 1

      Consciousness doesn't even require non-deterministic physics.

      Says who? Consciousness cannot yet be explained by science, so I don't see how you can rule out that its explanation would require non-deterministic physics (or any other particular type of physics).

      Also, the statement "QM is non-deterministic" seems to be getting parroted a lot on this thread. Actually it is a question of interpretation whether or not QM is deterministic. Certainly, unitary evolution (Schrodinger's equation etc.) is deterministic, and in the Everett interpretation (and others), that is the only process that occurs.

    2. Re:Overrreaching again. by SETIGuy · · Score: 1

      There's no reason to believe that QM is non-deterministic, especially in time-reversible formulations. I wasn't intending to imply that QM is non-deterministic. It's certainly not necessary that it be deterministic, and since consciousness exists, it's not necessarily non-deterministic. As I said, deterministic is not the same thing as predictable.

      Personally, I think we'll find consciousness is a general consequence of evolution of complex life forms and is only dependent on information processing abilities, and not on the underlying physics. (That finding would disappoint a lot of people). In most cases organism without a sense of self is at a significant disadvantage relative to one with.

  90. Does Quantum Theory Explain Consciousness? by OpenLegs · · Score: 1

    No more than a Cheezburger explains a lolcat. Seriously, leave consciousness to philosophers and leave quantum mechanics to scientists, when one tries to play the other I run visions of Charlie Sheen's tiger blood through my head to wash away the absurdity.

  91. You sir, make the logical fallacies by thelandp · · Score: 2

    The article is a "Straw Man" argument, that is to say based on misrepresentation of an opponent's position.

    To my knowledge, no one makes such a statement as "Quantum Theory Explains Consciousness". There are some sceculative attempts to explain consciousness, but none that I know of use Quantum Theory as the be-all and end-all.

    What people might be saying is, there are some interesting relationships between Quantum Theory and Consiousness, which merit further exploration. This is hard to dispute, given the seemingly important role of the conscious observer in the act of measurement.

    Thus, "Quantum Theory relates to consciousness" has been mistaken for "Quantum Theory explains consiousness". These are two very different ideas, as "relates", and "explains" are two different kinds of relationships. In fact, "explains" is a special case of "relates to", is the meta-relationship, but I digress.

    This sounds more like someone wants to work in the field of philosphy of consciousness, but is grizzling about being expected to know the difficult field of Quantum Theory.

    What would make you happy? That thinking about Quantum Theory be banned in all discussions about consciousness?

    In the middle, there is a clear example of tautology, with the phrase "no apparent causal link", expressed as though it is an observation to use as input. "Consciousness is not explained" because "there is no apparent link", both expressing essentially the same idea, and the latter is just assumed to be true.

    Your argument degenerates into terms like "very basic". When you just keep saying how obvious it is, usually it's the result of the argument lacking any real content.

    Now I don't expect this will serve any purpose, but I will take this criticism and make it constructive. It would advance the cause if Science better for you to say what you think consiousness *might* be explained by, rather than what you think it "probably isn't" caused by.

    Or if you really want to help rule it out as a cause (which *would*, I admit, have some benefit), then MAKE A MORE SOLID CASE.

    --

    -- the only thing we have to fear is really scary things
    1. Re:You sir, make the logical fallacies by Prune · · Score: 1

      You write "This is hard to dispute, given the seemingly important role of the conscious observer in the act of measurement." In fact, it is quite easy to dispute http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0412182

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
  92. Re:If you don't think quantum mechanics is strange by catchblue22 · · Score: 1

    Standard double-slit intro into quantum weirdness. You could just link to the Dr. Quantum video.

    LOL...standard quantum weirdness...as if its commonality makes it any less shocking and germane to the discussion. There is a reason why most quantum courses begin with this...because it is accessible and clear, yet underlines the implications of Schroedinger's equation beautifully.

    --
    This and no other is the root from which a tyrant springs; when first he appears as a protector - Plato (423 to 327 BC)
  93. Deepak Chopra is a Penrose fan (of course) by frrrp · · Score: 2

    Chopra also wants to create a woo equivalent of the Templeton Prize for this kind of crap. As others have mentioned - this is old news and something of a personal obsession with Penrose and requires numerous leaps of faith to follow. Penrose has been taken down by Victor Stenger quite some time ago - http://www.csicop.org/sb/show/is_the_brain_a_quantum_device/

    --
    smilies are for reetards
    1. Re:Deepak Chopra is a Penrose fan (of course) by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      a woo equivalent of the Templeton Prize

      Isn't there one already? It's called the Templeton Prize, I think.

  94. Quantum Metaphysics by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Quantum mechanics has become the final resting place for metaphysics and empty speculation. Before the 19th century the answer for every question not of the specialty of the one asking the question was 'God'. Now, after two century of progress the answer for a question not of the specialty of the physicist is 'Quantum Mechanics'. Why? Because Feynman once said that nobody understands QM, just like a believer could say about his god. Irony is overwhelming.

  95. Why do I have to type a subject? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Very confusing article. At first glance it appears the author is making a link between consciousness and quantum mechanics. But he is actually just pointing out that it is a fallacy because both being "mysterious" does not constitute a connection. So this article is not about anything at all --just pointing out a misconception very few people have.

  96. Re:I doubt they have anything to do with each othe by grumbel · · Score: 1

    if you don't know something, we name it "quantum physics"

    We know quantum mechanics quite well and can make extreme precise predictions with it. The only problem with QM is that it doesn't follow our intuition, but that really shouldn't be much of a surprise given that our intuition has evolved so we can make decisions in a macroscopic world, not on an subatomic level.

  97. Conciousness is an emergent property by benwaggoner · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Well, what a blast from my college past. I vividly recall all the late night manic chat sessions trying to decode Patricia and Paul Churchland's Neurophilosophy and Daniel Dennets Conciousness Explained.

    Anyway, after years of rumination, to me it's clear that:

    Quantum mechanics are definitely a part of neurobiology, and hence a critical building block of conciousness. We couldn't think without quantum mechanics. But plants couldn't photosynthesize without quantum mechanics either.

    The quantum mechanical properties of neurophysiology apply just as much to clams as it does to humans. And it's just as applicable to those in a coma as to those engaged in a peak experience of some sort. So quantum mechanics definitely don't explain the conciousness of humans and in lesser degrees of other species.

    Conciousness is an emergent property of the brain. Most of our evolutionary ancestors weren't concious in the sense we mean it today. Our massive brains are evolutionarily adaptive. Humans pay a big biological cost in having these big brains; very difficult childbirth, very long period of helpess infancy, wide pelvises to accomodate these giant heads, and a whole lot of extra calories and oxygen needed. But we're obviously breeding like rabbits as a species, and the primary limitation on further explosions of population are conciousness-driven (deciding not to have children, and having developed the means to do so).

    Conciousness is, pretty much by definition, a really thorny thing to think about and almost perfectly designed to drive philosophers and cognitive scientists into mental loops. Since conciousness can also be described as self-insight, you get into a deep virtualization question in trying to have accurate insight into how you have insight :)!

    So the trickiest part about conciousness is figuring out our own conciousness! It's a lot more easy and productive to try and consider someone else's conciousness than our own. Thinking about our own conciousness can easily get to the "eye of the universe question" - even if one has a good biological theory of conciousness, why do *I* have an experience of unique selfhood? That winds up being one of those unsolvable Big Questions, like "why is there something instead of nothing." Whether the existence of existence is explained via the Big Bang or theology, there's still the unanswerable question of what was the first mover. What started the cosmological ball rolling for there to be a universe in the first place?

    Well, that was my moment of peak nerditry for the day! I'm going to go kiss a pretty girl for a while as penance...

    1. Re:Conciousness is an emergent property by cekander · · Score: 1

      Do you really think, never in the undocumented history of earth at least, that beasts of the past didn't have the same level of consciousness as we do today? It's hard to imagine, but it seems you're putting a heavy link between the level of technology and consciousness. On the surface it appears to make sense. But I don't see why serpents couldn't have had a golden period with say... conscious flying dragon. Dude, who knows?

    2. Re:Conciousness is an emergent property by cekander · · Score: 1

      There seems no plan because it is all plan. -- C.S. Lewis

      hahah. LOL. That's a really fucking appropriate "random" slashdot quote at the bottom of this page. Who did that?

    3. Re:Conciousness is an emergent property by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      That winds up being one of those unsolvable Big Questions, like "why is there something instead of nothing."

      That last one is easy:
      http://www.smbc-comics.com/index.php?db=comics&id=1932#comic

    4. Re:Conciousness is an emergent property by circletimessquare · · Score: 1

      thank you for your religious beliefs

      without proof, the default position is there is no link

      it is not my job to disprove your unproven claim, it is your job to prove it in the first place

      since you can't do that, what you have written above is not science, it's a religious faith-based belief

      --
      intellectual property law is philosophically incoherent. it is your moral duty to ignore it or sabotage it
    5. Re:Conciousness is an emergent property by ShakaUVM · · Score: 1

      >>Well, what a blast from my college past. I vividly recall all the late night manic chat sessions trying to decode Patricia and Paul Churchland's Neurophilosophy and Daniel Dennets Conciousness Explained.

      Ugh. I had the Churchlands for some philosophy classes. Dennett's book is just terrible, too.

      If you haven't read Searle or Chalmers I'd recommend picking some of their books up to balance out all the eliminative materialism you got in college.

    6. Re:Conciousness is an emergent property by benwaggoner · · Score: 1

      What unproven claim are you specifically talking about here? FWIW, I'm betting on the Big Bang myself :).

      I don't delude myself into thinking I've made any kind of compelling scientific argument above; I'm just describing where I got to after several years of rumination.

      However, I think I'm actually pushing back on the assumption that there is some sort of ineffable soul-like aspect of conciousness as opposed to conciousness being an entirely biology-based phenomenon like digestion or smelly feet.

    7. Re:Conciousness is an emergent property by circletimessquare · · Score: 1

      ok, push back against anything you like. whatever. if it's not science, it has no meaning to me. i'm sure it has meaning to someone, but i'm not interested in that which any late night marijuana-fueled brainstorm can produce, without any validation

      --
      intellectual property law is philosophically incoherent. it is your moral duty to ignore it or sabotage it
    8. Re:Conciousness is an emergent property by benwaggoner · · Score: 1

      Well, my point is that our subjective personal experience of conciousness isn't scientifically explainable. I can have a good scientific, materialistic theory of why you are concious, but I can't really explain my own. I can imagine why someone made out of the same atoms as me would subjectively experience conciousness as a biological state, but that doesn't explain why there is a "me" that experiences my own. Kind of a Decart-Godel thing "I think therefore I am" incompleteness thing.

      I'm not going to delude myself into some kind of mystical or theological answer for this, though. It's as unknowable as what the "first mover" of existence was.

    9. Re:Conciousness is an emergent property by circletimessquare · · Score: 1

      consciousness? what is so strange or mystical about it?

      "our subjective personal experience of conciousness isn't scientifically explainable"

      ok. my subjective personal experience of "Kung Fu Panda 2" isn't scientifically explainable either. so what? why all the hocus pocus? consciousness is rather mundane and simple

      --
      intellectual property law is philosophically incoherent. it is your moral duty to ignore it or sabotage it
    10. Re:Conciousness is an emergent property by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I think that the problem with explaining consciousness, is simply that it just *can't* be by science, because science or any other (undubious) human investigation is empirical and objective, but consciousness is subjective. They are totally un-marry-able. Science and strives for no interference by the investigator, whereas consciousness is totally the opposite.
      Science can explain the atoms that make up my brain, but not my experience and sensations.

      Pleasure and suffering, two extremes of experience, are utterly indescribable without restating the initial premise ('Consciousness strives for pleasure, and avoids suffering at all costs').

  98. The Traveler by SuperTechnoNerd · · Score: 1

    Reminds me of the Star Trek NG episode with the traveler:
    "You do understand, don't you, that thought is the basis of all reality. The energy of thought, to put in your terms, is very powerful. "

  99. Here are some reasons why by LS · · Score: 1

    I think there are more reasons why people tie quantum physics and consciousness together than has been discussed here. Anyone with a real understanding of science wouldn't claim that there is an actual connection between the two (unless perhaps they are a neurophysiologist and have actual experimental results). What people are doing is conjecturing and hypothesizing, and there is nothing wrong with that. That is quite different from claiming there exists an actual phenomenon. The reasons people conjecture are many, but here are mine:

    * Quantum effects at the microscopic level can have macroscopic consequences. A single photon or electron or other particle can be used to affect change at the macroscopic level. For instance, you could connect a photon detector to switch that would decide whether a train goes north or south. The state of a single electron within a computer can have massive effects on the stock market.
    * The observer is a critical aspect of quantum theory. Incoherent systems cohere (in relation to the observer) once the state is observed. An "observer" is really just another particle than interacts with the system in question. We as humans are not monolithic objects, but an enormous complex of particles, so when we "observe" a system, what does that mean? Does it mean when the measurement from the instrument hits your eye? Or when the signal from your eye hits your brain? Or when your cortex processes that data? There is a long complex chain of interaction that happens, so it's not as simple as the thought experiments in elementary physics books.
    * Our consciousness is the subjective experience of the particles that make up our brain. What state are these particles in in a quantum sense? Are they coherent or not? Can we "observe" our own brain? What are the implications of the observed system being the observer itself?
    * Since particles that make up the brain are normal particles modeled by quantum physics, they are also under the same rules, meaning they can be in a decohered state. Since we have already asserted above that single particles can have macroscopic consequences, is there a possibility that a single particle in the brain cohering into one state or another can have real consequences? Being that our consciousness is subjective, internal experience of these brain particles, is it possible that there could be a causal relationship between the subjective thought itself and external phenomenon, in one direction or another?

    I recognize these thoughts are not based in deep quantum theory or neurophysiology, but I still think that they reflect what people are wondering, and the experts in these fields aren't addressing the laymen very well when broaching this topic.

    LS

    --
    There is a fine line between being a cultivated citizen and being someone else's crop. - A. J. Patrick Liszkie
    1. Re:Here are some reasons why by Noiprox · · Score: 1

      These are some very good points.

      From neuroscience there is very clear evidence that the human conscious experience is somehow a function the brain. The patterns in which neurons fire seem to be the key. If this is so then we should look for quantum effects in people's neurons. When you look at the way neurons work, it turns out they are remarkably reliable devices. Also, they are almost identical to the neurons found in much more primitive animals that seem to lack consciousness entirely. They incredibly resilient. For example epileptics or stroke victims suffer massive brain trauma and yet their personality and consciousness can endure them fully intact. So in light of this it is difficult to reconcile quantum effects which are minuscule in scale with the very well understood functioning of individual neurons. No one has found anything in them that "amplifies" quantum fluctuations to macroscopic scales.

      Indeed consciousness is a subjective experience but the hardware of it in humans does not show any evidence of relying on quantum blurriness for its functioning.

    2. Re:Here are some reasons why by paradigm82 · · Score: 1
      Firstly, I don't see how this example with stroke victims with their personality/consciousness intact, should somehow make a quantum theory less likely. One could argue the opposite, the fact that personality and consciousness endure after severe brain damage, even when the person is clearly suffering neurological deficit such as severe paralysis, indicate that the brain is not the ultimate site for personality and consciousness.

      The fact that no one has found neurons to be dependent upon quantum effects doesn't prove anything. Observing such an effect would probably be extremely hard. Conversely, AFAIK the behaviour of even individual neurons is quite complex and not always predictable. It's not just a "transistor". You could also argue that the consciousness-quantum effect would not necessarily be present when looking at one neuron in isolation - it could be that the effect only "cares" to be there when there's a fully functioning neurological system.

      Personally, I believe that the processes human brain, as understood by classical physics, does produce part of human intelligence and behaviour (i.e. I don't believe it is just a mediator/amplifier of some quantum action). Also, there are known processes that are not under conscious control at all, and others that are only partly so (e.g. breathing). So it might be some very complex interaction between the "thing" that provides us with the "inner experience of consciousness" and with the physical/biological layer of the brain, that is required to fully explain all of human experience and behaviour.

  100. Biology Exploits Every Niche... by littlewink · · Score: 1

    no matter how small. If there is the possibility that information can be stored in some previously-unused niche then it is likely that biological organisms will exploit that niche.

    While we have yet little evidence of low-level quantum-related neurological phenomena in living organisms, there is no doubt that every chemical reaction can be described in terms of quantum mechanics ultimately. And what are we but electro-chemical beings?

    I hope Penrose is not correct. I hope, I hope, I madly hope! Because if he _is_ correct, the likelihood of a breakthrough in artificial human intelligence may have to be postponed indefinitely, yet I was hoping to see it within my lifetime.

    1. Re:Biology Exploits Every Niche... by Prune · · Score: 1
      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
  101. Familiarity does not establish the null hypothesis by Cogent91 · · Score: 1

    If we can agree that quantum phenomenon apply to the matter that comprises our neurology then it is a given that quantum behavior is an element of the environment in which our neurology has evolved. Being an intrinsic property, isolating conscious activity from that inherent dynamic requires fully encompassing its behavior in such a way as to sufficiently capture and nullify these characteristics. Barring achieving that effect, we are left with a situation in which quantum phenomenon plays some role in the way our neurology and by that our consciousness works. Frankly, the non sequitor is in thinking that quantum theory DOESN’T play a role in consciousness.

    The most substantial fallacy here however is in all this trite search for a silver bullet, the “QUANTUM PHYSICS WILL EXPLAIN MY SOUL” mysticism some seem to embrace. It’s one a piece of a bigger puzzle; there will never be a simple answer at which we can point to and declare “That is I”. Still, why do rational people presume quantum mechanical inclusion as a factor in consciousness? It’s because quantum theory is EXTREMELY useful for explaining how the computationally complex aspects of our cognition are capable of operating; probabilistic computation makes almost trivial types of tasks which are FAR beyond our binary computational approaches. Tasks which are critical to simulating reality in a non-polar universe. If we have an evolutionary system developing with access to the components useful for developing a computational advantage that increases survivability, Occam’s Razor (or to stick with the popular Latin phrasings here, lex parsimoniae) in the very least can be used to show that the presumption of exclusion of these properties is the less defendable position.

  102. The real question by mbone · · Score: 1

    Our brains, of course, are quantum in nature. So are our shoes and our light bulbs and everything else we see and touch, so that doesn't necessarily mean much. But it certainly means that there is a connection of some sort between our brains and quantum mechanics. It may or may be an interesting connection, but it certainly exists. (I don't really know what the OP means by a "causal connection" in this context, but I assume they mean that one requires the other.)

    The real question is, does consciousness have anything to do with Boolean logic ? Or, to be a little fancier, can consciousness be computed on a Turing machine ?

    AI types tend to assume this as a given, but there is of course no actual evidence for it, and the abysmal progress of AI doesn't give much confidence in their assumptions. If our consciousness isn't calculable on a Turing machine, then suspecting a deep connection with quantum mechanics is very reasonable.

    In any case, hypothesizing a physical cause for a physical phenomenon is not a logical fallacy. It may or may not be correct, but it's not a logical fallacy.

    1. Re:The real question by Prune · · Score: 1

      You write "Or, to be a little fancier, can consciousness be computed on a Turing machine?"

      In fact, one can trivially prove that consciousness is Turing-computable. By the Bekenstein bound, we can only have a finite number of distinguishable quantum states in a region of space with a finite surface area, thus information density is finite, thus physics does not allow arbitrary precision real numbers, which are necessary to construct a super-Turing machine, and thus physics prohibits super-Turing machines. Now, a Turing machine needs infinite tape (memory), and if we are to implement consciousness in an artifact of finite spatial extent (such as in a brain, or a computer), then in combination again with the finite information density limit due to the Bekenstein bound, we can't have infinite memory. And so, at best our brains, and any intelligent artifact we may build, can at best be mere non-deterministic linearly bounded automata.

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
  103. Consciousness. by DamnStupidElf · · Score: 2

    Consciousness is either a product of the natural physical world or it is supernatural. If it is supernatural then it is very surprising that things like sleep, injury, drugs, and electromagnetic fields have such great (if not total) control over it and we would do well to simply study it as if it were only natural until we discover the ways it actually differs from natural processes. If consciousness is natural then it almost certainly arises solely from the interaction of the matter and energy in the brain and nervous system. If the definition of cognition is a complete theory of the operation of the brain and nervous system (something which we obviously don't have yet) then that model would also describe consciousness. I understand the distinction between merely calculating a result (cognition) and being aware of performing the calculation (consciousness). I think it's obvious that our consciousness is the direct cause of much of our cognition and as such a complete model of human cognition must necessarily include consciousness.

    1. Re:Consciousness. by IgnoramusMaximus · · Score: 1

      Consciousness is either a product of the natural physical world or it is supernatural.

      I am not commenting on the subject of "supernatural" at all but I could not resist pointing out that your argument is simply a False Dichotomy fallacy. For example, a third choice (which you took pains to avoid mentioning) is a combination of the two. Hence some level (even major) of susceptibility to the phenomena you mentioned but not necessarily duplicability by physical means alone, i.e. no sentient, self-conscious AI possible in that kind of scenario because of the missing "supernatural" component, which could be very small compared to the overall system size but critical for its function.

      And "supernatural" can be replaced by "non-deterministic processes underlying the physical universe" and you now got a whole new level of possibilities having nothing whatsoever to do with religion as such processes can be scientifically explored, statistically analyzed but would not necessarily be replicable or even practically usable because they could depend on some systemic properties that preclude their operation in some types of data-processing systems. This would not preclude development of AI but could for example preclude all AI that is not raised as a child would and which has to by definition have major character flaws ... etc and so on. Many, many other combinations of factors are possible leading to many other kinds of possible outcomes.

      This also ties directly into a discussion of what is "knowable", i.e. limits of knowledge and limits of the scientific method and empiricism, a huge discussion in its own right, which brings me to another point...

      My personal problem with all these, rather arrogant in my view, assumptions so obvious in many posts here, assumptions that we know enough about the processes of consciousness to even make predictions as to its true nature is the fact that we are, so far, utterly clueless as to true nature of the very foundations upon which to make any such guesses, that is the nature of information itself (and therefore the nature and properties of concepts like knowledge, its limits, limits in its acquisition methods etc).

      No one knows what it is, what its true properties are, we have only some inkling as to some limitations about its transmission, some types of its transformations and some methods of its storage. And our modest success in making machines that perform some limited kinds of processing and transmission of information has gone to some people's heads. Big time. And now they are off out there somewhere waaay past any conceivable limits of their competence level, making bold proclamations about things they are patently clueless about. I think a large dose of humility and copious amounts of basic research are in order before bold predictions of any kind are being made.

      This reminds of the stories of the days when Newtonian physics was king and absolutely everything and anything was being confidently theorized to be a form of "clockwork" - all the way to the whole Universe being just a gigantic collection of meshing cogs...

    2. Re:Consciousness. by Burnhard · · Score: 1

      I would suggest that consciousness is the canvass that physics paints on. I realise this isn't very scientific and is not an explanation, but in the absence of any theory of what consciousness actually is (except of course the idea that it's just an illusion, although what is being fooled is itself a question that has not been answered), that is how I prefer to visualise it.

    3. Re:Consciousness. by DamnStupidElf · · Score: 1

      Suppose that consciousness is a combination of natural and supernatural processes. Reversibly begin replacing neurons with equivalent electronic replacements until consciousness is lost, replace the neuron to restore consciousness, and continue replacing other neurons. If supernatural processes are required for consciousness a minimal set of neurons will be found that are required to interface with the supernatural. Use this minimal set of neurons as a testing device to explore the nature of the supernatural by manipulating the neurons themselves, or in other words our original premise was false and the supernatural is merely an undiscovered part of the natural world that can be repeatably tested by a finite set of neurons. I don't think there is any false dichotomy in my argument. The fact that we investigate consciousness proves that information flows from our consciousness to our physical minds and bodies to cause the physical act of investigation, and clearly information from the physical world must flow to our consciousness. This two-way interaction between consciousness and the natural world forces consciousness to also be testable as part of the natural world. It may turn out that consciousness is housed in some other dimension or in sub-quantum particles or whatever; that only means that we currently have a limited view of the natural world and not that consciousness is supernatural.

      You also mentioned non-determinism as a possible source of consciousness. If consciousness requires non-deterministic changes in the universe in order to exist then it would imply that those changes are not actually non-deterministic; they are determined by the requirements of consciousness. This would mean the universe has some extra laws we didn't know about but by using the above procedure we could almost certainly determine what they are. Another possibility is that consciousness only happens as a result of the anthropic principle; in the Many Worlds interpretation every possible non-deterministic event actually occurs and in a subset of worlds those events could induce consciousness. This is statistically unlikely because it would tend to create individual worlds where at most a single person was conscious. It is far more likely that the necessary non-deterministic events happen in only a single mind than in 6.5 billion minds. This discussion is strong evidence that more than one individual experiences consciousness.

      What we can know is limited by the nature of the universe. To the best of my understanding knowledge is best represented as a model of some part of the Universe. The model can be used to predict the state of the Universe at a particular time and place, and the requirements for the model are information and computing ability. Information is directly related to the representation of quantum states of matter. The more ordered a given physical state, the more information necessary to represent it. Human brains are very good at predicting the future state of the local Universe for survival, and science is a rigorous extension of the modeling ability we possess. By creating scientific tools we can extend our ability to model to almost limitless precision and accuracy and extend our knowledge of the Universe. With sufficient tools we may be able to model the human mind directly instead of resorting to picking it apart neuron by neuron as I described above. I don't know where the practical limits on our ability to model lie but they appear to be limited by computational power and not by epistemology. Ultimately I am a behavioralist and so I believe that if our models are accurate enough that we can't distinguish the model from the real thing then we have a perfect model. If such a perfect model exists for human consciousness then I will consider consciousness to be a solved problem regardless of philosophical arguments about the lack of ultimate truth. At that point our minds would have the same epistemological limits as the models and it becomes a moot point.

      Regarding "cl

    4. Re:Consciousness. by IgnoramusMaximus · · Score: 1

      Suppose that consciousness is a combination of natural and supernatural processes. Reversibly begin replacing neurons with equivalent electronic replacements until consciousness is lost, replace the neuron to restore consciousness, and continue replacing other neurons. If supernatural processes are required for consciousness a minimal set of neurons will be found that are required to interface with the supernatural.

      This is outright silly. There is no "threshold" of consciousness. It is not a binary on/off situation wherein at some finite point one is "conscious" and at another, just one disconnected synapse off, a "thoughtless brute". It doesn't work that way. Instead consciousness appears to be an emergent property that has a whole continuum of possible forms. Given that we cannot even agree on how to measure it, other than the extremes: people = (mostly) conscious, amoeba = not so much, we have no hope at present to even reliably test for it. Many animals for example exhibit various behavioral patterns that we associate with human "consciousness". Are they conscious? Self aware? Experiments seem to confirm that some animals indeed are. But many people disagree. So what criteria do you use to determine that some entity is conscious?

      In light of this your "experimental" method is utterly useless.

      If consciousness requires non-deterministic changes in the universe in order to exist then it would imply that those changes are not actually non-deterministic; they are determined by the requirements of consciousness.

      This particular argument is called "circular reasoning". Not to mention that you are completely confused as to the meaning of "non deterministic". By this token placing bets on outcomes of individual quantum events makes them "deterministic" because you can place quite solidly determined (beforehand even!) bets on them and thus the events are "determined" by the contents of your wallet ... no?

      And I won't even get into the idea that consciousness is "deterministic". I mean show me two people out of the billions of members of humanity out there who would react to some stimuli in the exact same way (and I mean exact as in the same motion, the same facial expression, the same nervous ticks, the same eye movements etc.) ....

      This would mean the universe has some extra laws we didn't know about but by using the above procedure we could almost certainly determine what they are.

      Since your base assumptions about the nature of consciousness are completely off, the only thing your "experiment" is likely to determine is the level of arrogance in your making of bold proclamations.

      Information is directly related to the representation of quantum states of matter. The more ordered a given physical state, the more information necessary to represent it.

      I note how neatly you evaded defining what information is and what its properties are...

      By creating scientific tools we can extend our ability to model to almost limitless precision and accuracy and extend our knowledge of the Universe.

      Except for that nasty old curmudgeon Heisenberg and his wholly rude principle! Would it not be for him, the perfectly-fitting cosmic cogs would be whirring merrily and tiny little levers would be clicking, clicketey-clicky-click in a perfect, well oiled clockwork, just ripe for you to map on a giant blueprint... damn him, that old crank!

      "Uncertainty" he says! What sort of clockwork it is where one has to roll dice while blind-folded and one can only "know" probabilities of events instead of actual outcomes! So much for "limitless precision"!

      I don't know where the practical limits on our ability to model lie but they appear to be limited by computational power and not by epistemology.

    5. Re:Consciousness. by DamnStupidElf · · Score: 1

      we have no hope at present to even reliably test for it

      Are you conscious? Were you conscious last night when you were asleep? Are my questions not "tests" in some way? People have been experimenting with altering their state of consciousness since unrecorded history. My thought experiment is just much more radical and not yet possible with the technology we have. In fact, if my hypothesis that consciousness is perfectly natural and explainable is correct then my thought experiment would not even cause an altered state of consciousness. The only potential weakness is that our memory of being conscious may be faulty. Perhaps we only remember being conscious in the past but we never were. If that is the case then the entire question is moot because while we may currently have the sensation of consciousness there would be no guarantee that we were in the past or would be in the future. I don't think this is likely though, and I think the state of being conscious forms memories that we can trust as evidence that we were conscious in the past. Given that assumption, it is perfectly possible to test for consciousness during an experiment and remember the results later to verify it. There's also the fact that in certain cases one can be conscious and not remember it later due to either short term memory loss or simply the failure of short term memories to form, but those are generally understandable results of injury or drugs and can be controlled for in experiments.

      This particular argument is called "circular reasoning". Not to mention that you are completely confused as to the meaning of "non deterministic". By this token placing bets on outcomes of individual quantum events makes them "deterministic" because you can place quite solidly determined (beforehand even!) bets on them and thus the events are "determined" by the contents of your wallet ... no?

      Non-deterministic in the strictest sense means that no possible prior observation can predict the outcome. In our world, this also means that no possible process can affect the outcome either, otherwise it would become predictable and non-deterministic. For instance, if you have a 50% probability of flipping a coin and getting heads and there is no possible way to influence or predict the outcome then it is non-deterministic. If you can flip the coin in a manner that shifts the probability then the outcome is less non-deterministic. Similarly if you can observe the coin as it's flipping and predict the outcome. If you want to be perfectly precise, even a completely deterministic but infinitely precise Universe would have an element of non-determinism because we wouldn't be able to model the interactions of all the particles deterministically with full resolution. At some point, however, the probability of being wrong about a fundamentally non-deterministic outcome is so small that it doesn't matter for practical purposes. If we have a 99.99999999999999% probability of getting heads for a given proverbial coin then almost certainly no one on earth who has ever lived has ever gotten tails. If "non-determinism" is necessary for consciousness then the probability for a series of non-deterministic outcomes that does *not* produce consciousness is less than 1 out of some 100 billion people who have been estimated to have ever lived. I'm not saying that the universe is necessarily deterministic, I'm saying that there's a very, very, very low probability that our consciousness actually requires the unpredictable results of non-deterministic events. There's also a problem with causation: If our consciousness required true non-deterministic events then what causes our consciousness to reflect things in the real world? Why am I thinking about slashdot right now instead of, say, a cat or a cream pie? If my consciousness relied on non-deterministic events then I should be conscious of whatever non-deterministic assortment of thoughts result from those events and not from the measurable physical events ar

  104. Once Again: The relevance of J. Searle by aojensen · · Score: 2

    The journalist and prominent thinkers behind this article ought to read the paper 'Is the brain a digital computer' by John Searle (http://philosophy.wisc.edu/shapiro/Phil554/PAPERS/Is%20the%20Brain%20a%20Digital%20Computer.htm). Not only is it relevant to current research into strong/weak AI paradigms and philosophy of cognition --- it also provides a nice counterargument against physicalistic reductionism around human cognition.

  105. *David* Chalmers, Stu Hameroff, Hard Problems by billstewart · · Score: 4, Informative

    Tall Aussie guy, long hair, wears leather jackets, sings a mean Zombie Blues*. Chalmers, who's a philosopher, and Stu Hameroff, an anesthesiologist, started a series of conferences at the University of Arizona on "Towards a Science of Consciousness" a decade or two ago; they alternate between Tucson and Somewhere-outside-North-America, and attract a mixed crowd of neuroscientists, consciousness researchers, philosophers who talk about phenomenology, FMRI imagers, tourists (e.g. me), and a few newagey people and random cranks. A few years ago, there were two "Science and Consciousness" conferences in Arizona around the same time - the scientific one in Tucson, and the Deepak Chopra one in Phoenix**.

    Hameroff's done work with Penrose on things like quantum effects in microtubules (which are brain cell parts that are small enough to actually have quantum activity going on, though it's a very long step from saying "quantum noise might be affecting chemical reactions a bit" to "Woo-woo! Consciousness is, like, Quantum, man!". I can't say I really understand Stu's arguments about the connections, because while I know a certain amount of quantum physics and biology and philosophy, I don't do neurology or brain cell structures or phenomenology, so the couple of conferences I got to were interesting and a very steep learning curve.

    From one perspective, either the world, and therefore consciousness, are entirely deterministic, or else they're not. (Deterministic doesn't mean calculable - Heisenberg among others make it very clear that you can't really simulate the universe using machinery smaller than the universe - but from a philosophical standpoint it doesn't matter if humans can predict what you're doing to do, it just matters whether you've got free will about it.) If you'd like things to be non-deterministic, physics doesn't give you very many ways to hook that into the world, and you're pretty much stuck with quantum mechanics.*** Does that mean that quantum entanglement is involved in any of the processes, particularly between neurons that aren't directly adjacent to each other? Not necessarily (IMHO, probably not.) Does it mean that a non-physical spirit can grab onto some molecules and shake them around in ways that translate up to conscious thoughts, or does it just mean that the chemistry's a bit noisier because God's playing dice with the Universe but your consciousness is still fundamentally a materialist process?

    * "Zombie" is a term of art, referring to a hypothetical person or machine that reacts externally as if it were conscious, but doesn't actually perceive qualia the way conscious beings claim that we do, so for instance it can tell you which ball is the red one or the green one, but doesn't experience redness or greenness. ** So of course Chopra caught on to this, and has been one of the sponsors of the more recent round or two of the scientific conference, and he and Hameroff have put out one or two popular press articles together. There are a number of meditation people who come to the conference, but they tend to be the serious "Here's what an FMRI shows about blood flow in your brain while you're meditating" folks, while the cranks are more likely to have opinions about quantum. *** There are some theories of quantum mechanics that say it's still deterministic, just with underlying hidden variables that we can't observe or measure, but it's been too many decades since college physics for me to remember if those got disproved or are still around.

    --

    Bill Stewart
    New Fast-Compression-only CPR http://preview.tinyurl.com/dy575ks
    1. Re:*David* Chalmers, Stu Hameroff, Hard Problems by Black+Parrot · · Score: 2

      ** So of course Chopra caught on to this

      Chopra makes Penrose look sensible.

      *** There are some theories of quantum mechanics that say it's still deterministic, just with underlying hidden variables that we can't observe or measure, but it's been too many decades since college physics for me to remember if those got disproved or are still around.

      I don't pretend to understand the proof, but physicists are adamant that hidden variables have been ruled out.

      --
      Sheesh, evil *and* a jerk. -- Jade
    2. Re:*David* Chalmers, Stu Hameroff, Hard Problems by Prune · · Score: 1

      Since qualia are nonsensical inventions of the over-imaginative egos of philosophers whose feet are not planted on scientific ground, the relationship between normal humans and philosophical zombies is one of idempotency.

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
    3. Re:*David* Chalmers, Stu Hameroff, Hard Problems by maxwell+demon · · Score: 1

      I don't pretend to understand the proof, but physicists are adamant that hidden variables have been ruled out.

      Actually, local hidden variables have been ruled out. Non-local hidden variables are not ruled out, but are incompatible with Lorentz invariance from special relativity (i.e. you additionally have to add a hidden absolute frame of reference if you go that way).

      --
      The Tao of math: The numbers you can count are not the real numbers.
    4. Re:*David* Chalmers, Stu Hameroff, Hard Problems by Hognoxious · · Score: 1

      A few years ago, there were two "Science and Consciousness" conferences in Arizona around the same time

      ... and you wouldn't know which one you were attending until you opened the box?

      --
      Confucius say, "Find worm in apple - bad. Find half a worm - worse."
    5. Re:*David* Chalmers, Stu Hameroff, Hard Problems by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      On your final point, Bell's experiments showed that hidden variables can't explain these effects. i.e. a TOE cannot be both local and deterministic.

    6. Re:*David* Chalmers, Stu Hameroff, Hard Problems by carlzetie · · Score: 2

      I don't pretend to understand the proof, but physicists are adamant that hidden variables have been ruled out.

      That's a popular misconception, but almost completely untrue. J.S. Bell (of Bell's Theorem fame) himself was a proponent of DeBroglie-Bohm wave mechanics, a hidden variable theory, stating explicitly that it was consistent with his theorem and lamenting that it was given so little attention.

      Bell's Theorem shows this: no local, hidden variable theory can reproduce the predictions of QM.

      Now let's unpack this. First of all, it doesn't disprove local, hidden variable theories; it does provide a way to distinguish experimentally between those theories and standard QM, i.e. because they make different predictions in a specific experiment. So far, experiments (starting with Alain Aspect) are on the side of standard QM, BUT conscientious experimentalists point out that no experiment so far has precisely and pedantically fulfilled the requirements of Bell's Theorem, so there is still some wiggle room.

      But let's grant for a moment that tests of Bell's Theorem are one day confirmed on the side of standard QM. All that rules out is local hidden variable theories. As Bell himself pointed out, non-local hidden variable theories, such as DeBroglie-Bohm, survive just fine (as do local, non-hidden variable theories). Basically, you have to give up either locality or "reality" [a term of art in QM]. And the more we understand about entanglement, quantum information, and related topics, the less tenable locality becomes anyway. So at this point, both flavors of non-local theory -- those with and those without hidden variables are equally supportable.

      The big advantage of hidden variable theories is that they do away with the need for the "and then some magic happens" special pleading required in the other two main interpretations, where they introduce a mechanism to resolve the outcome of experiments that has no basis or description in the physical theory. (In the case of the Copenhagen interpretation, "and then the wave function instantaneously collapses everywhere at once"; in the case of Many Worlds, "and then the entire universe instantaneously splits, and you find yourself in one of the copies". And if both of those sound pretty damn non-local to you, well done.)

    7. Re:*David* Chalmers, Stu Hameroff, Hard Problems by carlzetie · · Score: 1

      Since qualia are nonsensical inventions of the over-imaginative egos of philosophers whose feet are not planted on scientific ground, the relationship between normal humans and philosophical zombies is one of idempotency.

      And yet, it still moves me.

    8. Re:*David* Chalmers, Stu Hameroff, Hard Problems by carlzetie · · Score: 1

      Damn, I wrote a long and careful reply to this and then hit the wrong button.

      Brief recapitulation: No, physicists have largely (there's still a little wiggle room) ruled out local hidden variable theories. See Bell's Theorem. But if you give up locality you can keep "reality" which is what hidden variable theories give you. As Bell himself pointed out, DeBroglie-Bohm theory survives his test just fine, and he actually advocated that it deserved more attention.

      And since QM increasingly seems to be non-local for other reasons anyway, hidden variable theories are still ruled in. Plus, they don't require the "and then some magic happens" invocation of mechanisms that have no basis in the physical theory of the two most popular interpretations that are required to explain what actually happens when a measurement is made. In the case of the Copenhagen interpretation, "And then the wave function instantaneously collapses everywhere"; in the case of Many Worlds, "And then the entire universe instantaneously splits into two and you find yourself in one of the copies", both of which sound pretty damn non-local to me.

    9. Re:*David* Chalmers, Stu Hameroff, Hard Problems by ShakaUVM · · Score: 1

      Wavefunction collapse obviously takes place faster than the speed of light, though since no information can be transmitted by it, it doesn't violate locality.

      However, it does indicate to me that quantum effects can take place at superluminal speeds, and hence a non-local real universe really makes the most sense to me. Especially when you look at the delayed-choice quantum eraser experiments, where a collapsed wavefunction can be recovered, and a photon that might have just appeared on your photon detector actually ends up impacting on a moon around Jupiter.

    10. Re:*David* Chalmers, Stu Hameroff, Hard Problems by ShakaUVM · · Score: 1

      Not having an explanation for qualia is not evidence for the non-existence of qualia. Especially since we can all observe them.

      Bad science. Shame on you, shoo.

      A p-zombie that was atom-for-atom equivalent to a human probably *would* experience qualia. But a p-zombie that was just cleverly programmed to react in certain ways almost probably would not have qualia.

      What's the key difference? The information processing system. I think information theory is the key to consciousness, honestly. Chalmers makes a good argument for this.

    11. Re:*David* Chalmers, Stu Hameroff, Hard Problems by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The most prominent of these hidden variable theories (Bohmian mechanics) is still around, and can account for all non-relativistic quantum mechanics, but has not be formulated as a generally accepted relativistic (Lorentz invariant) theory, because it makes use a a non-local wave equation.

    12. Re:*David* Chalmers, Stu Hameroff, Hard Problems by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      *** There are some theories of quantum mechanics that say it's still deterministic, just with underlying hidden variables that we can't observe or measure, but it's been too many decades since college physics for me to remember if those got disproved or are still around.

      I believe you mean Bell's Theorem. AFAIK, it's a test of the hidden variables theory. I'm just an EE, so my knowledge about the topic is at best limited, but what I understood is that the experiments so far haven't completely ruled out the possibility of hidden variables in the craziness that is quantum mechanics.

      Link to Wiki:
      Bell's Theorem

    13. Re:*David* Chalmers, Stu Hameroff, Hard Problems by SoftwareArtist · · Score: 1

      I don't pretend to understand the proof, but physicists are adamant that hidden variables have been ruled out.

      Not true at all. Only specific classes of hidden variables theories have been ruled out (via tests of Bell's inequality). There are two major limitations on these experiments:

      1. Bell's inequality only applies to local realistic theories. Think of the words "local" and "realistic" as just being jargon: they have specific technical meanings in this context that don't necessarily match their colloquial, everyday meanings. Suffice to say that some hidden variables theories do not have both those properties.

      2. No actual violation of Bell's inequality has every been observed. To compensate for experimental limitations, all the tests so far have had to make additional assumptions beyond those used in deriving Bell's inequality. Those assumptions are not valid for some hidden variables theories. (People who believe in hidden variables tend to speak of these as "supplementary assumptions," while those who don't believe in hidden variables speak of them as "loopholes". But both names refer to the same thing.)

      --
      "I'm too busy to research this and form an educated opinion, but I do have time to tell everyone my uninformed opinion."
    14. Re:*David* Chalmers, Stu Hameroff, Hard Problems by Black+Parrot · · Score: 1

      Thank you (and the others) for explaining the distinction between local and non-local hidden variables.

      --
      Sheesh, evil *and* a jerk. -- Jade
    15. Re:*David* Chalmers, Stu Hameroff, Hard Problems by maxwell+demon · · Score: 1

      in the case of Many Worlds, "and then the entire universe instantaneously splits, and you find yourself in one of the copies". And if both of those sound pretty damn non-local to you, well done.

      That's a misunderstanding of Many Worlds. The "splitting" of worlds is not a physical process, but only a perception of observers. In Many Worlds, what objectively happens is that the wave function evolves according to normal unitary evolution, unconditionally. There's nothing special happening at observation. It's just that observation entangles the observer with the observed system (that's a consequence of unitary evolution). The splitting of woulds only happens in the observer's perception. Basically (and extremely simplified) the evolution is from

      |unmeasured system, oberver has not observed anything>

      to

      N(|system is in state 1, observer has observed state 1>+|system is in state 2, observer has observed state 2>+...)

      That's a consequence of unitary evolution, and contains no non-locality (the interaction between the observer and the system, which created the entanglement, is completely local). As one can see, all terms contain an "observer has observed state n", but none contains a term "observer has observed a superposition of states m and n" or similar (as I said, it's extremely simplified; actually there's a lot more behind the question why those superpositions are not seen). Now Many Worlds says that this is what really happens, and since there is no collapse, all the terms are equally real, and therefore your observer has "split" into a set of observers each of whom have observed one of the states. However note that, again, this split is not a separate physical process; from an "outside view" nothing special happened except for an interaction which entangled the observer with the system. That's not in any way different from the interactions which entangle systems in the laboratory.

      --
      The Tao of math: The numbers you can count are not the real numbers.
    16. Re:*David* Chalmers, Stu Hameroff, Hard Problems by carlzetie · · Score: 1

      And yet, Many Worlds *does* require a special interaction that that distinguishes an observer who becomes entangled with a system in a special way as distinct from a superposition of states (e.g. two entangled photons) in a laboratory. The distinction is that with two entangled photons, an observer can observe the superposition; but as far as we know an observer cannot observe his own superposition: he always finds himself in one state (or one World, if you prefer) or another. Observers are special. So again, Many Worlds fails to explain what this observation is or when it takes place; nor what an observer's perception is; nor even what an observer is.

      In fact, Many Worlds suffers from much the same Measurement Problem as the Copenhagen Interpretation: there is no rigorous definition of when an observation (or the perception of an observation, whatever that means -- I can't find "perception" in the wave equation anywhere?) takes place. And this is what has led some theorists to propose variations on Many Worlds that assign a special status to consciousness... which brings us full circle.

      I also don't know what this "outside view" you refer to is. By definition, the Many Worlds are all that there is. So where would an outside viewer sit in order to get this outside view from which nothing special happened?

      Incidentally, Everett's original thesis addresses none of this. Ever since it was published, in fact, other physicists have been trying to figure out what exactly he meant.

    17. Re:*David* Chalmers, Stu Hameroff, Hard Problems by carlzetie · · Score: 1

      I agree. I suspect that the next big breakthrough in foundational QM will come from experiments that probe what really happens during wavefunction collapse. And I also suspect that the reason most people find this so confusing is that they forget that the wavefunction evolves in configuration space, not physical spacetime. (Unfortunately, non-specialist presentations of QM often gloss over this distinction, and even compound the confusion by focusing on examples where the configuration space looks like a physical spacetime, e.g. the double slit experiment). As we understand decoherence better, I think it's going to turn out that wavefunction evolution (of which collapse is merely a special case) is in some sense "local" in configuration space. But understanding how this translates to the classical experience is going to require an understanding of how spacetime emerges from more fundamental concepts -- and that's way above my pay grade.

      In my (decidely amateur) opinion, the Copenhagen Interpretation is a result of the fact that in the early days of quantum theory, physicists knew how to describe and calculate only with very simple systems. And they knew that by the time you got to very large systems, everything appeared to behave classically. They could say what happened either side of an "observation", but not in the middle. From there it is a huge and completely unjustified leap to the assertion that wave function collapse is "instantaneous". And unfortunately, the reputation and intellectual power of the Copenhagen school was such that any challenge to this assertion was effectively shouted down for many years -- look at the way De Broglie was treated.

      These days experimentalists are working with increasingly large and increasingly widely separated entangled systems, and are able to ask what actually happens "during" wavefunction collapse (and I put that in quotes because the Copenhagen interpretation would deny that there is any such thing as "during"). I suspect what we're going to find is that there is no special, magical moment of observation associated with an instantaneous collapse, but rather a continuous process of decoherence whereby a system evolves from the spiky quantum state of superpositions into the muddy state we perceive as classical reality; and under all normal circumstances (i.e. anything other than carefully preserved laboratory experiments that isolate a system from environmental noise) this happens so quickly that we don't perceive it.

      In other words: most interpretations of QM struggle with the question of "why doesn't quantum superposition propagate upwards into macro systems?"'; this is essentially what the Schrodinger's Cat thought experiment is trying to highlight. And I suspect that the answer will be something along the lines of "quantum superposition is a very special circumstance, and in normal circumstances, classical noise propagates downwards into micro systems."

    18. Re:*David* Chalmers, Stu Hameroff, Hard Problems by maxwell+demon · · Score: 1

      And yet, Many Worlds *does* require a special interaction that that distinguishes an observer who becomes entangled with a system in a special way as distinct from a superposition of states (e.g. two entangled photons) in a laboratory.

      No.

      The distinction is that with two entangled photons, an observer can observe the superposition; but as far as we know an observer cannot observe his own superposition: he always finds himself in one state (or one World, if you prefer) or another.

      That's because in this case, he's part of that superposition (also one of the things I glossed over is that he's also in constant interaction with the environment, so to observe the entanglement even from outside, one would in addition have to know the exact state of the environment as well).

      Note that an electron cannot observe its own entanglement either (that is, you cannot make an experiment on a single electron to tell whether it is entangled or not). Indeed, it's impossible to prove that a single particle is entangled. Entanglement can only be seen in statistical correlations between both partners. There's not an experiment where you can send in an entangled pair (let alone one particle of a pair) and get "this pair was entangled" for entangled pairs and "this pair was not entangled" for non-entangled pairs. You need a large number of such pairs, identically prepared, to see entanglement. The observer in his subjective view is always a single system (even if there were identical copies of him, each single copy would easily distinguish itself from all other copies). So how would you think you'd do the necessary correlation statistics to prove entanglement, if you have only one copy to begin with (and in addition the fact mentioned above that the observer interacts with the environment, thus making the superposition quickly unobservable in practice even if you had such an ensemble).

      Observers are special.

      Only in their own view. Not in an absolute sense. Especially every observer is special only in his own view, not in the view of any other observer.

      So again, Many Worlds fails to explain what this observation is or when it takes place; nor what an observer's perception is; nor even what an observer is.

      Well, an observer is any system which interacts with the other system and is decoherent. Of course to actually perceive anything you need more, but those details are irrelevant for MWI, because the self-observation, however it works, cannot read anything which isn't observable in the self-observing system. And what is observable and what isn't is well known.

      In fact, Many Worlds suffers from much the same Measurement Problem as the Copenhagen Interpretation: there is no rigorous definition of when an observation (or the perception of an observation, whatever that means -- I can't find "perception" in the wave equation anywhere?) takes place.

      No, it doesn't, because in the MWI the measurement isn't a special operation. It's just an interaction like any other, and it is sufficient that in the time scales we can perceive, only the results we can perceive can occur. We don't have to make a clear split "this is a measurement, that isn't", it's no problem if there turn out to be things like "half a measurement" as long as it doesn't happen with macroscopic observers like us, in timeframes we can observe. Yes, that might mean that a hypothetical microscopic intelligent being would perceive quantum events differently, not following Copenhagen rules. So what? The Copenhagen rules explain how we perceive the world. That's what an interpretation has to explain.

      I also don't know what this "outside view" you refer to is.

      The "outside view" is the view of an observer who knows what happens (maybe he arranged it so the "insid

      --
      The Tao of math: The numbers you can count are not the real numbers.
  106. Quantum effects don't remove Turing interpretation by radarsat1 · · Score: 1

    The fallacy here as far as I can tell is the assumption that things which rely on quantum effects on the lowest level have any effect on their _macroscopic_ interpretation of having determinism. Complex systems of probabilities can result in perfectly deterministic computations, when averaged over a number of trials and thresholded. (Otherwise you calculated the probabilities wrong.) There is no theory that I know of that states in a general manner that because something relies on quantum effects it *cannot* be simulated in a Turing machine, i.e., is not computable. Put more tersely, there seems to be an unfounded assumption that quantum effects imply incomputability; where does this come from?

  107. Nah... by Maxo-Texas · · Score: 1

    Given the easy ability to manipulate "consciousness" with both chemicals, surgery, and electrical stimulation to the brain, it's pretty obviously doesn't require quanta.

    Given the obvious emotions displayed by animals, it's obvious you do not need much of a brain to have emotions.

    Given the various mental illnesses which have some fairly striking effects on our consciousness (like the ability to see what's to our left but not describe it), it's clear the brain is a set of systems.

    If there is a quantum effect- it's likely to be very minor.

    --
    She was like chocolate when she drank... semi-sweet at first and then increasingly bitter.
  108. Penrose is a crank... by frank_adrian314159 · · Score: 1

    He's a mathematician and physicist, not a cognitive scientist or neurological biologist. His "ideas" in this arena should hold as much weight as a butcher who says that "Meat is the foundation of all thought." Actually less so - a butcher actually works with biological tissues.

    --
    That is all.
  109. Define consciousness? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I'm dubious. I don't find human consciousness to be that amazing. Its just a behavior. I don't really see a reason why you'd need to invoke Quantum Mechanics.

    The only way I can see this being likely is if humans can solve problems computers can't. But that's the problem, Humans don't SOLVE everything, they APPROXIMATE most things. And computers can approximate too. For instance, you can program an approximator for an NP problem that works in P time if you're willing to accept a margin of error. And you don't have to invoke Quantum Mechanics. I think your brain is just a biological computer.

  110. Q:In Soviet Russia,Does Consciousness Explain God? by Hognoxious · · Score: 1

    A: Da!

    --
    Confucius say, "Find worm in apple - bad. Find half a worm - worse."
  111. Penrose or not Penrose by grikdog · · Score: 1

    If it weren't Penrose, who'd care? Einstein already had a dice and universe dichotomy, and the rest of us approach these subjects in order to shelve them under My Opinion Exactly. Much gas, not so much Hindenberg either way.

    --
    ``Tension, apprehension & dissension have begun!'' - Duffy Wyg&, in Alfred Bester's _The Demolished Man_
  112. Consciousness is a big filter. by Dr.Ruud · · Score: 1

    Consciousness is just like your liver. You live 2 seconds in the past, because your consciousness filters out many distractions.

    In order to fit best, we sleep 8 hours a day, and live 2 seconds in the past. Evolution at its best.

  113. Re:Is Quantum theory at least a little relevant by billstewart · · Score: 1

    Most of the neurological theories about consciousness treat it as a complex software process of some part running on brain hardware that's built to do a bunch of things which facilitate it. Most of the physics-related theories about how quantum mechanics affects the brain are that it makes the chemistry a bit noisy (as do all the other things affecting heat and vibration of molecules), so it may occasionally affect how many electrons get involved in a signal or how fast the ions moving around in fluid inside a cell move, so it may occasionally affect whether a synapse triggers, where "affect" isn't anything more than just a bit of noise in the timing. Is that enough to say that "quantum mechanics explains consciousness"? I don't think it's likely. If you want to argue that there's quantum entanglement spreading around the brain making signals happen spookily at a distance, feel free to find some appropriate equations to model it.

    On the other hand, I'd really like to be able to say there's something other than deterministic materialist physics going on here, because that might possibly be a way for some kind of soul to be attached to the body that might persist after the body dies, and might have a whole bunch of other philosophical implications that are rather deeply embedded in Western philosophy (and also Eastern philosophy, in somewhat different ways), like free will and meaning and such, and to do that, the physics in your head needs some kind of hooks for the soul to mess around with, which probably have to involve quantum mechanics because there's really not much else that could do the job. But that doesn't mean those hooks are lined up in a way that a soul can grab onto them and shake them in any direction that usefully affects consciousness.

    --

    Bill Stewart
    New Fast-Compression-only CPR http://preview.tinyurl.com/dy575ks
  114. Terry Pratchett Didn't by billstewart · · Score: 2

    One of the really annoying things about atheism as a possible alternative to Christianity or other religions that involve an afterlife is that you don't get to know if you were right or wrong. I'm sorry, but when I die, if I don't get a real afterlife or some ghostly existence or reincarnation, I at least want the guy with the scythe to show up and tell me "SORRY, DUDE, THAT'S ALL YOU GET, TIME'S UP." And atheists tell me I won't even get that.

    --

    Bill Stewart
    New Fast-Compression-only CPR http://preview.tinyurl.com/dy575ks
  115. Explain? by sgunhouse · · Score: 1

    How do you explain what you can't even properly define yet?

    While I appreciate Penrose's books on the subject - and I must admit that my name appears in one of them as well - he wasn't talking about consciousness as you or I might define the term.

    For most people, consciousness is something similar to self-awareness. That is not the subject of "The Emperor's New Mind". Rather than worry about something that can't (yet anyway) be properly defined, he focused on something that is defined very well - mathematical logic. I accept that he has shown a computer (as typically implemented) will never be able to perform the full range of mathematical logic Whether that has any real relation to the topic of consciousness is still up for grabs.

    I mean, it wouldn't be hard to say that 90% of the people in the world can't perform mathematical logic either, yet we agree they are conscious.

  116. Hu? by angel'o'sphere · · Score: 1

    But why do this, especially as there is no apparent causal link between quantum mechanics and the conscious mind?

    Would you care to elaborate on that? Why is there no such link?
    How can you claim that an effect (consciousness in this case) that you do not understand at all is not linked to a particular thing?
    angel'o'sphere

    --
    Cost free eBook I read (by iBook/Kobo/Amazon/ObookO/Gutenberg etc.): "The Green Odyssey" by Philip Jose Farmer.
    1. Re:Hu? by Prune · · Score: 1

      It's an old fallacy, and the refutations are old as well http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0105097

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
    2. Re:Hu? by circletimessquare · · Score: 1

      how can you claim there is a link?

      the burden of proof is to show the link, not to say "there is a link, and i have no proof, i just know there is"

      it is not my job to disprove that which you claim without proof. it is your job to prove your claim

      i can say there is no god, because there is no proof. you can get angry and say how can you prove there isn't a god

      same ridiculous argument

      --
      intellectual property law is philosophically incoherent. it is your moral duty to ignore it or sabotage it
    3. Re:Hu? by angel'o'sphere · · Score: 1

      You seem to missubnderstand a few things.

      First: Penrose never CLAIMED that QM is the root of consciousness, he only hinted and thought about it. So there is no need to proof anything.

      Second: if you are convinced that there is no link, and proclaim it aloud *then you* should be as well obligated to proof that, or not? Well, you claim you are not, but I say: you are wrong. I hope you wont be dragged to court ever ... because there you need proof for everythign you want to claim, regardless if someone proofed or claimed the opposite.

      Third: why don't you google a bit? There are lots of scientific hints that Penrose is right ... there was story about it (without mentioning his name) here on slashdot lately as well ;D The topic was, brain activity in one area creates electric fields that are picked up in other areas and there is a reaction/computation happening on that. That is clearly a QM effect ...

      Anyway, I don't care if Penrose is right or wrong, I oly wonder about the fuss people here on /. make.

      angel'o'sphere

      The whole tlak here is not about proofing or disprooving.

      --
      Cost free eBook I read (by iBook/Kobo/Amazon/ObookO/Gutenberg etc.): "The Green Odyssey" by Philip Jose Farmer.
    4. Re:Hu? by circletimessquare · · Score: 1

      i claim leprechauns hide gold at the end of rainbows. this is truth, that should be discussed seriously, until you prove otherwise

      pfffffffft

      --
      intellectual property law is philosophically incoherent. it is your moral duty to ignore it or sabotage it
    5. Re:Hu? by angel'o'sphere · · Score: 1

      And what isa your point?

      I claim there are neither leprechauns nor rainbows or gold ... sigh.

      And now? You did not prove anything noro did I.

      Nevertheless we can start discussing ... like the rest of the crowed did regarding the "Penrose Quote".

      OTOH if you want to claim that there is definitely no link between QM and consciousness then I ask for some solid reasons why you think so :D and not for bla blub, he needs to show proof first before I post my reasons.

      angel'o'sphere

      --
      Cost free eBook I read (by iBook/Kobo/Amazon/ObookO/Gutenberg etc.): "The Green Odyssey" by Philip Jose Farmer.
    6. Re:Hu? by circletimessquare · · Score: 1

      my point is the entire discussion is useless and a waste of time

      a link is imagined. ok, and? that is not enough reason to take it seriously as a topic of discussion

      for example: i claim that the sun runs on electricity. let's discuss this idea for five hours. why? why does my silly idea have to be taken seriously or discussed? it doesn't

      there is nothing to discuss, because nothing worth our time has been proposed, just a silly imaginative idea. everyone has silly imaginative ideas, many at a rate of 10 per hour. are they all worthy of discussion?

      --
      intellectual property law is philosophically incoherent. it is your moral duty to ignore it or sabotage it
  117. No. That's why Penrose says new physics is needed by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    to make sense of consciousness.

    The point of the OP seems to be that consciousness is not scientifically explainable at all.

  118. Re:consciousness is represented mathematically? by dargaud · · Score: 1

    I've read those books and the Penrose one(s) are certainly the worse: it's basically all handwaving. There's not a single convincing argument or example. Hofstadter gives plenty of insightful examples of emergent properties where the intelligence grows (ants -> ant colony). As for Wolfram I think he's onto something, but's it's gonna be a while before we discover the cellular automata at the base of the universe...

    --
    Non-Linux Penguins ?
  119. The result of working with special ed kids... by beachdog · · Score: 1

    I work with special education kids as an aide in a public school system.

    The process of working with special ed kids opens a window into how the brain works. Each kid is different, each kid illustrates a different variation on what happens when something is missing or slightly mis-connected.

    There is a way in which every special ed kid is different and every reasonably correctly configured person like a ballet dancer or a college student is the same.

    I use the phrase "working with special ed kids" to mean the aide helps the youth to do something. As I work in parallel with the young person, it seems I begin to see memory layers and feedback paths. Why can I fit the puzzle piece in the cutout and why does the young lady do three steps of the task and then let go of the piece?

    I think the conversations about consciousness are complicated by two aspects of how the brain works.

    First, a correctly configured brain generates an illusion of continuity and smoothness. The individual layers are invisible, like a ballet dancer's intense and long drawn out memory and control effort fuses into a beautiful appearance of continuous motion.

    Second, the correctly configured brain generates something that should be cautiously called an illusion of consciousness. I mean illusion in a very limited sense: We have spare memory that holds words and images when we close our eyes. We have a limited ability to summon a few memories into consciousness. We can not fetch anything from anywhere in the brain.

    But again, from a correctly configured brain we can't discern the layers, but I feel the process of working with special ed kids helps when one does in parallel what the special ed person struggles with.

      Piaget has pointed out there is considerable difference between adults at the levels of mentation adults operate with.

    The two components I use for understanding the kids I work with are: memory, as something that is organized in layers. Cerebral palsy kids in particular will show very specific areas where they do not maintain memory. The other idea I use for trying to understand kids is: Feedback loops. Autistic kids will show good memory but they have very puzzling behaviours that seem like some kind of a feed back loop.

  120. Actually quite a bit of research... by msevior · · Score: 1

    A quick scan of the arXiv shows a fair bit of research on this topic. I'm by no means an expert but a lot looks like serious work.

    http://arxiv.org/find/all/1/all:+AND+will+AND+quantum+free/0/1/0/all/0/1

    This one looks particularly interesting.

    http://arxiv.org/pdf/1103.1651

    There appears to be a lot more to this than "QM is mysterious" "Consciousness is mysterious" therefore QM is related to consciousness.

    1. Re:Actually quite a bit of research... by Prune · · Score: 1

      Particularly interesting? Not as much as an opposing view http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0105097

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
    2. Re:Actually quite a bit of research... by narcc · · Score: 1

      You know, you'd think that you'd have bothered to actually read the paper you've been posting over and over again.

      As I've told you once already, Mohrhoff doesn't disagree with either Penrose or Stapp on the point you personally object to.

    3. Re:Actually quite a bit of research... by Prune · · Score: 1

      Addressed in my other reply to you.

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
  121. Re:If you don't think quantum mechanics is strange by Raenex · · Score: 1

    My point was that there's no need to reinvent the wheel by typing up a bunch of course notes into a Slashdot comment.

  122. The inner experience by paradigm82 · · Score: 1
    To me there's two reasons for invoking the quantum layer:

    1) Firstly, it's hard to see how biology and classical physics can explain consciousness. Note that I'm not talking about human intelligence etc. because there are at least plausible ways to imagine how this could be "implemented" via classical physics. What I'm talking about is "the inner experience" i.e. the experience of existing, the subjective. Isn't it weird that we have such an experience? What would be the substrate of such an experience? Within classical physics, I could perhaps accept a world full of zombies running around seemingly intelligent but without an inner experience. It's not that I don't accept emergent phenomenon in general. I accept that intelligence can result from very simple building blocks. But I don't see how this is true for the subjective experience of existing.

    Now this is Slashdot, so a coding analogy would be in order: Understanding consciousness within classical physics is like trying to play a sound on a computer without a sound card - it can't be done no matter what clever programming you use, since the basic building block or "API" isn't there!

    Now, the problem to this idea is that it is very hard to measure this "inner experience" for anyone else than the person experiencing it. This is what it means for it to be subjective, and this is what is "magic" about it. But for the individual, the experience is valid and real. And at least to me, there seems to be no way of understanding it within classical physics.

    2) There's some experimental evidence. For instance, the element xenon is almost chemically inert. Still, it is a powerful anaesthetic. However, note that as an anesthetic it doesn't just shut off all cells. It doesn't even shut off all of the brain or anything of that sort. Rather, it selectively shuts off consciousness! A person sedated with xenon can still breath, the heart is still beating etc. However, the experience of existing is (temporarily) gone. Now, how can such a primitive one-atom entity as xenon have such selective effects on consciousness? If consciousness was some complex emergent phenomenon, wouldn't it take a complicated molecule to go into the brain and find out exactly what neurons to affect so as to leave the vital functions intact while retaining consciousness? Xenon doesn't appear to be capable of this!

    No one really know how xenon does it - but since it is chemically inert it must at least be at the "van der Waal" level. Some experiments indicate it might affect special pockets in certain proteins via at least semi-quantum effect. Given this evidence, it doesn't seem much of a jump to consider these pockets essential to consciousness - perhaps mediating it?

    1. Re:The inner experience by JadedIdealist · · Score: 1

      If consciousness was some complex emergent phenomenon, wouldn't it take a complicated molecule to go into the brain and find out exactly what neurons to affect so as to leave the vital functions intact while retaining consciousness?

      No.

    2. Re:The inner experience by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Care to elaborate?

  123. Grasping at straws by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    The link between consciousness and quantum dynamics is a specious attempt to rescue the ideas of contra-causal free will. However it is unsuccessful, unwarranted as well as unwanted.

    There is no contra-causal free will, and the ideas that will is either random or determined by hidden variables outside the direct observable universe is misguided. How would you will something other that you will? What outside of the universe should determine your preferences? Who would want their will to be determined by
    something other than our genetically determined starting point and the sum of our experience?

    Even if we are deterministic it does not make us automatons. The universe is computationally irreducible the same way as some algorithms are.
    The only way to see the future is to run the full simulation.

  124. SMBC by jimshatt · · Score: 1

    Okay, not an xkcd link, but smbc is good too: http://www.smbc-comics.com/index.php?db=comics&id=2189

  125. Quantum Theory + Chaos Theory = Consciousness by lkcl · · Score: 1

    If you have a square where along one axis you have Chaotic and non-Chaotic Mathematics, and you have Newtownian Physic and Quantum Physics along the other axis, there is one quadrant missing where, until my friend Dr Alex Hankey began work on it several years ago, there has been absolutely no Research or Mathematical Theories developed, and it's the Quantum-Chaotic quadrant.

    Dr Alex Hankey's hypothesis is that Consciousness operates in this Quantum-Chaotic quadrant, where there are self-referring "loops" in our neural structures which keep a Quantum System on the absolute edge between two critical states. It's complicated - and I can only grasp much of his work intuitively.

    1. Re:Quantum Theory + Chaos Theory = Consciousness by mathgenius · · Score: 1

      Yeah, cool. I have often wondered about this, when quantum effects are "amplified" by a chaotic hamiltonian. But whenever I read about quantum chaos, they start going on about random matrices and billiard balls. Very strange, i don't get it at all. Thanks for the name, do you have a link to his work?

  126. trololoo? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    suggested reading C.S Peirce, wonderfully predicted some quantum mechanics "problems" even before quantum mechanics was invented and contributions on cognitive psychology, that still haunt cognitive neuro-science.

    PS. theres some interesting notions about Artificial Intelligence too.

  127. Re:Quantum effects don't remove Turing interpretat by Prune · · Score: 1

    Moreover, a non-deterministic Turing machine occupies the same level on the Chomsky hierarchy as a deterministic one--it is not fundamentally more powerful. Of course, where non-determinism helps us is that we are more limited than Turin machines. Since our brains are finite in spatial extent, they cannot have unlimited memory (the alternative to infinite spatial extent is infinite information density, but physics forbids that--see Bekenstein bound). We are mere linearly bounded automata. For LBAs, the non-deterministic versions _are_ more powerful than the deterministic ones, but still less powerful than Turing machines. Now, what people like Penrose are proposing is that some new non-computable physics lets us get beyond these limitations, because those poor bastards just can't swallow their bloated egos and accept that their minds have severe limitations in likely unknowable analogues of human brain halting problems.

    --
    "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
  128. Why not? by Dasher42 · · Score: 1

    The difference between biological evolution and intentional, methodical design is that evolution happens in exposure to everything around it. Design methods exclude what's inconvenient and messy; we deal strictly with voltages of 2.2V and 5V in our electronics, whereas the natural world deals with everything. We are transcripts of every force present since the first living cell and before. They can say that there's no apparent link between quantum physics and neurology, but by which field's definition?

    This isn't exactly the Easter Bunny. The accurate response is "we haven't found evidence for that", right?

  129. No, it doesn't by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    What a daft question. It's like asking does Camembert cheese explain notoriety (for the stupid amongst you, no it doesn't).

  130. Barking up the wrong tree. by JadedIdealist · · Score: 1

    I also think he's barking up the wrong tree.

    I think that a mathematician could prove that he is (without us having to wait 20 years or more for full general AI. (IANA mathematician).

    TL:DR - A mathematical proof that no Finite Quantum agorithm could self-consistently prove all of the truths of arithmetic.

    His argument rests on Godel's theorm, and unfounded metaphysical speculation about how stupendously clever mathematicians are.

    Godels theorm shows that no Finite algorithm could self-consistently prove all the truths of arithmetic (by a form of diagonal slash). His unfounded metaphysical speculation is that humans could self-consistently prove all of the truths of arithmetic, given infinite time. He "bases" that [speculation] on the fact that we can detect (toy) instances where a mathematical statement is a self referential Godel statement, which leads him to assume that that means we could detect all of them.

    I would contend that there are mathematical statements in arithmetic that are so complex and subtle, that you couldn't even write them down using all the atoms of the universe, such a statement could not be could not be understood by a human being, and a human being could not

    a) read it in a lifetime.

    b) understand it even given infinite time.

    c) and therefore wouldn't be able to see that it is a self referential Godel statement.

    but I digress.

    Penrose, as I said, thinks (unreasonably IMO) that mathematicians are transcendentally clever, and that the magic of quantum mechanics makes them so. To show this is a lost cause all that needs to happen is for a mathematician to rejig Godel's proof for quantum computers...

    And don't get me started on his opinion that evolution couldn't explain mathematicians cleverness, sigh...

    1. Re:Barking up the wrong tree. by JadedIdealist · · Score: 1

      oops

      Godels theorm shows that no Finite algorithm could self-consistently prove all the truths of arithmetic

      I meant to say: Godels theorm shows that no finite algorithm could self-consistently Find/List all the truths of arithmetic

      sorry

  131. Explanation of consciousness. by master_p · · Score: 1

    Consciousness is description of the state where the brain thinks about itself in first person.

    This process is the result of the brain building a model about itself.

    The brain works by building models of reality (or what the brain perceives of being reality).

    One of the models built by the brain is the about brain itself. This allows for consciousness.

  132. Logical Fallacy by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    So many physicists, journalists, commenters and whatnot keep bringing up this term "logical fallacy".

    Hasn't quantum physics pretty successfully showed that logic itself is not logically valid? It is a fact that the entire universe is fundamentally irrational. People have known this since forever, and eventually the scientific method reached the conclusion that people were right. Like the theory of gravity, the entire concept of logic works sufficiently well up to a certain point, but at a fundamental level it clashes completely with how this world is actually arranged.

    The "scientific method" doesn't actually tell us anything about the world, it is merely a great way to spend a very, very long time verifying what you originally intuited in an instant, through the link between consciousness and the entirety of existence.

    Or to rephrase it for those who don't mind religious terminology in a scientific discussion, nobody can directly cause anyone else's enlightenment, but you can certainly assist an enlightened individual in confirming her enlightenment once she has already reached it.

  133. Stupid universe? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    If consciousnesses requires as high flow of information as quantum level then I'm stumbfound, why the hell we are so stupid?

  134. Waking Life by cpscotti · · Score: 1

    "Should our freedom just be a matter of probabilities, just some random swerving in a chaotic system?"
    "I'd rather be a gear... in a big deterministic, physical machine... than just some random swerving."
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Waking_Life

    (and if you never heard of this film, shame on you!)

  135. This all seems like by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Emergilent Chaotoplexity to me!

  136. Mind or Brain by HarryatRock · · Score: 1

    I would like to comment on many of the points raised in this thread, but rather than posting multiple times, I present the following in no particular order.
    a) The number of posts shows that /. is alive and well, and that the topic is relevant to /.ers .
    b) I suggest that we of all people should understand the distinction between platform and process. Surely the brain is the platform, and I would be very surprised if it did not rely on quantum effects for (proper) functioning. The mind is (obviously) the process set running on that platform, and I do not see how one could apply QM to a process.
    c) Consciousness , ( aka self awareness or sentience ) would seem to be the equivalent of a process which monitors other processes. One could argue that such a process could in principle initiate / terminate or modify other processes in response to QM effects in the platform, giving rise to "free will" appearing in the output.
    d) The real problem in denying free will is that along with the bath water you end up throwing out the baby viz moral responsibility. If you don't have free will, then how do I justify jailing you for "your" crimes.

    --
    nec sorte nec fato
  137. Quantum Theory is Incomplete by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    It absolutely does explain consciousness if Quantum Theory fixed its theory. Quantum Theory is incomplete and is too high level. Any theory that can't factor in and explain intelligence, consciousness, technology, human biology, reality, geometry, language, sound, snowflakes, nature, time, etc is a primitive theory made by ego filled scientists that don't know how to relate anything. If you can't unify religion with science, then your theory is a joke. Any theory that can't unify other theories is a joke. Any theory that can't unify math with science and religion is a joke. The real theory of everything is already here...you'll see it soon enough.

  138. Re:If you don't think quantum mechanics is strange by neonsignal · · Score: 2

    Consciousness seems to play a role in this, as it seems our measurement of either the momentum or the position of an electron seems to fundamentally change its properties.

    Saying that the measurement 'changes' the properties is an interpretation. There is an interesting correlation between the measurement and the change in properties; using terms implying causation is starting to move into the area of interpretation. These different interpretations are philosophically interesting, but it is hard to come up with ways to distinguish them experimentally.

    For example, in a many-worlds interpretation, the different particle states 'cause' the multiplicity of conscious states. Or there is even the time-symmetric interpretation, where there is 'retro-causality' as well as 'causality'.

  139. Thoughts are just supositions of electron states by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Thoughts are just suppositions of electrons (e.g quantum states), so "real" thoughts can only see "real" objects (just as an "real" election can only see another "real electron"). The truth is that nothing is well defined when you haven't resolved it, memories, vision, sounds are all you use to interact with the world and all are quantum in nature (a.k.a there is no spoon, just many possible quantum spoons)

  140. "Like" Quantum by Kamiza+Ikioi · · Score: 1

    I think this is the correct angle to look at. The brain works on electro-chemical. This use of two pathways could mimic quantum properties of randomness. Now, our thinking is probably not based on quarks, but what a wonderful discovery if, how solar systems mimic atomic structure, electro-chemical consciousness mimics string theory!

    It's an interesting theory in the making. It's an avenue to explore. It is a hypothesis. Designing experiments to prove or disprove this hypothesis will be successful, even if they fail, because it will teach us something more about the mind. If nothing else, it forces us to look at it from a new angle.

    For the author of this post to say "Fallacy!" is to give up before trying.

    --
    I8-D
  141. Everybody has.. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    ..something to say about consciousness. And quantum mechanics

  142. Re:If you don't think quantum mechanics is strange by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    "Consciousness seems to play a role in this, as it seems our measurement of either the momentum or the position of an electron seems to fundamentally change its properties."

    This is a terrible misunderstanding of what measurement means, especially in the context of quantum effects caused by measurement.

    Let the following thought experiment clarify: Suppose you have three electron measuring devices, named A, B, and C. They differ only in that A is connected to a visible monitor, from which humans can and will read the measurements, B is connected to a hard drive, which will store the measurements for a computer to read and calculate from, and C has neither connection; its measurements will be lost and unknown to machine and man.

    If consciousness plays a role as you surmise, we would expect electrons measured by device A to fly straight, while electrons measured by device C to continue to be smeared. Whether or not electrons measured by device B get smeared depends on whether any human bothers to check the output produced by the computer. If you were unsure whether anyone was going to remember to check the calculations based on data from device B, you could check the electrons and they would tell you something about the future.

    These expectations are absurd and incorrect. In all three cases, the electrons fly straight.

  143. There are Two kinds of Consciousness by stkpogo · · Score: 1

    There are Two kinds of Consciousness :

    Primary : It's not what you think. Cannot be created or destroyed, only transformed.

    Secondary : Is what you think. Is only imaginary. It's all in your head. Only exists if you think it does. Can be about what is real or non-real.

  144. the old physics and evolution by doperative · · Score: 1

    'that we will need to invoke 'new physics and exotic biological structures'"

    How does the new physics relate to the old physics and evolution. And given the apparient intelligence in AI systems (and presumably even more signs of intelligence as they evolve) would he need to invoke the ghost in the silicon machine. Or does there need to be something magical about neurons and microtubules and therefore it would be impossible to ever design self aware thinking machines.

    --

    Zaphod: The Mice want your Brain, they'll replace it with an artificial one with the same memories, no one would notice.

    Arthur: I would ..

  145. so the thinking is... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    1. consciousness is mysterious.
    2. quantum mechanics is mysterious.
    therfore...
    3. quantum mechanics has something to do with consciousness.

  146. Re:If you don't think quantum mechanics is strange by cavePrisoner · · Score: 1

    I probably would not have watched the video if it was posted, but was happy to read the text. That the GP bothered to write out the whole thing indicated to me that he thought it was important. Simply posting a link to a youtube video doesn't tell me that.

  147. BPP =?= BQP by John.P.Jones · · Score: 1

    We have a very precise mathematical way of framing this question. BPP is the class (like P but with probabilistic correctness) of problems solvable in polynomial time with a bounded probability of error (like probabilistic prime number tests) on a Turing machine. BQP is the analogous class on a quantum computer. Supposedly this mathematical model of a quantum computer has unbounded size so is potentially more powerful than a classical computer with an n-qbit quantum register (for any fixed n). I'm not sure if a bounded qbit quantum machine can effectively approximate an ideal machine since adding more qbits is not as simple as giving a computer more storage half way through (due to entanglement issues). Regardless it is an open question as to the speration of BQP from BPP but both are in NP and both are bigger than P so if P were equal to NP all these classes would be identical.

  148. Basic Logical Fallacy by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    |There appears to be a very basic logical fallacy here that even the most prominent physicists seem to be making.|

    You think?

  149. Re:Familiarity does not establish the null hypothe by Will.Woodhull · · Score: 1

    Complementary to parent post's line of reasoning is that the electrochemistry in the synaptic gaps between neurons involve some activities at distances that are within the range of likely quantum effects. There are also aspects about consciouness at a macro level, such as the nature of the way it re-emerges after anesthesia (involving rather large patterns of sensation and cognition emerging simultaneously) that suggest simultaneous re-establishment of patterns in several distant parts of the brain-- one possible mechanism for this would be some kind of controlled quantum entanglement trigger mechanism.

    Bear in mind that what we now know about life in general is that if there is any possible way to exploit any aspect of physics or chemistry, somewhere some organism has done that. It is very likely that the brain mixes quantum computing functions in with its electrical and chemical computing functions. Life does things like that; it does not respect the boundaries we impose on our rational, scientific expressions of thought.

    --
    Will
  150. Re:Consciousness is a self-prediction loop by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I like Edelman's constructive approach to neuroscience and I completely agree with the parent. However, I have my own (admittedly, not yet scientifically verified) definition of consciousness. I am absolutely convinced that Jeff Hawkins' model of memory-prediction framework is correct, with only one small element missing: a loop (it predicts not only sensory perception, but also it's own prediction of sensory perception, and its prediction of its prediction of sensory perception, etc...). I think the brain solves problems by finding a continuous path from the "problem" to the "solution", and it does so by making the assumption of a hierarchically organized universe, and then making an instantaneous prediction based on its current state. Furthermore, I think Jeoffrey Hinton is headed in the right direction, as far as the basic learning mechanism of the brain. So, to be clear, what I am saying is that the brain is in a constant loop (this can be seen in various patients with brain damage, who perceive everything as "pulsating" or "flashing" because part of their hippocampus is damaged). The loop exists between the hippocampus and the cortex, and the interplay between the two is, essentially, capable of solving any problem in O(log n) time (within its knowledge of the the size n universe) we call "consciousness". It solves problems by essentially "inducing" the solution into exist. This is a mathematical technique which essentially attempts to solve problems by a simple process. First, find the continuum in which a problem exists. Second, find a trivial solution. Third, if the trivial solution cannot be solved, find the continuum in which the trivial solution exists, and recurse. Fourth, induce from the trivial solution to the answer. This is consciousness. I have known this for several years now, and it is painful for me to listen to conversations regarding consciousness as if it were the boogie man, and I very much appreciate the comments of the parent.

  151. Oblig. alternative: SMBC by ginbot462 · · Score: 1

    Probably some others, but this will do ... pig.

    http://www.smbc-comics.com/index.php?db=comics&id=2189#comic

    --
    Atlas Shrugged : Thematic Story :: Battlefield Earth : Organized Religion
  152. There are no easy answers by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Before totally dismissing quantum theory explaining consciousness, read "Quantum Evolution: How Physics' Weirdest Theory Explains Life's Biggest Mystery" (http://goo.gl/I2Tp5) and ponder the implications.

     

  153. Determinism and free will by LordVader717 · · Score: 1

    All previous physical theories were highly deterministic. Uncertainty was taken to be solely due to chaotic system's behavior. People who believed in a "free will" philosophy had a problem with this idea that consciousness is merely a state of a system of molecules, where an outcome would be deterministic.
    With Quantum mechanics came theories which embed uncertainty into the fundamental forces of nature. This provided the philosophers a physical process to "express" the hypothetical free will.
    Of course a physicist will realize that this is just jumping to conclusions, and that the brain is still just a system state of molecules, and that the uncertainty basically translates to some quantum effects and random noise.

  154. Consciousness is explained when... by Terminus32 · · Score: 1

    ...eating a heroic dose of Psilocybin Mushrooms on an empty stomach in silent darkness! :-)

    --
    http://nathanlindsell.blogspot.com/
  155. Re:If you don't think quantum mechanics is strange by LordVader717 · · Score: 1

    The fallacy lies therein that already in your physical explanation assume the "knowledge" (presumably the consciousness of a human) to cause the particle to "take a stand". That's simply a step too far.
    I suppose this is due to the unfortunate choice of words: If your lecturer had used the word "interaction" instead of "observation" or "measurement" you would probably have had a different perception.

    The only way to measure particles is to interact with them. In this context it would seem far more reasonable to assume that the first particle to interact with the electron caused the collapse of the wave function.

  156. Cameras and mirrors by Okian+Warrior · · Score: 1

    Be fair. I was being brief for the sake of clarity.

    A model entails predictive capabilities. An image has no predictive capabilities on its own - you also need a mechanism of prediction. An image doesn't rise to the level of "model" as needed for the definition, and the camera has no capacity to make predictions from the model.

    Thus, I would say that even though the camera has a "picture" of it's universe and itself within that universe, it can make no predictions about the information - therefore it's not a model. It also has no sense of itself within that model - the picture contains information of the camera within it, but the camera does not distinguish the information describing itself from the rest of the information.

    No, a camera pointed at a mirror is not conscious.

  157. Beneficial? by Okian+Warrior · · Score: 1

    You wrote: Our brains have evolved to exclude randomness as much as possible.

    I agree completely, but this rather misses the point. The question is whether or not we have free will.

    With no free will, then lots of philosophical questions become moot. Criminals can claim that they had no choice, no one can hope to improve their lot... indeed, the very purpose of life becomes unimportant if the outcome is fixed.

    Information passed in from outside is necessary for free will. Whether it is sufficient is another matter, but I think it's interesting (and comforting) to know that a necessary condition is satisfied.

  158. Re:If you don't think quantum mechanics is strange by RespekMyAthorati · · Score: 1

    Consciousness seems to play a role in this, as it seems our measurement of either the momentum or the position of an electron seems to fundamentally change its properties. It seems that our knowledge of the particle changes the particle.

    No, measurement of the particle changes the particle. It doesn't matter if a conscious entity, an unconscious entity, or a machine makes the measurement. Indeed, any object that is capable of absorbing photons at that wavelength will have the same result. In the original papers describing this phenomenon, the case of an observer making a measurement was merely used as an example of something that could cause waveform collapse.

  159. Of course it is! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Check out http://www.electrino.pl/ for more details. Quantum physics is now obsolete.

  160. And the most irritating people are.... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Those who seem to think they know everything and just cant open their minds to anything other than their own preconceived notions. Whats most laughable is that these are the people who claim to champion the "scientific spirit". Hell they found out that photosynthesis has quantum effects in it, and there are people who refuse to believe the mind could be quantum.

    What.A.Joke.

  161. Re:Quantum effects don't remove Turing interpretat by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Practically, non-deterministic turing machines are quite a bit more powerful. If you can accept a solution with any level of certainty less than 100%, even if you need 99.99999999% certainty, then non-deterministic turing machines can make a huge number of intractable problems into tractable problems.

  162. Re:If you don't think quantum mechanics is strange by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    You're moving far too quickly here (though in a manner that many physicists do).

    ...As soon as you pin down the location of the electron, then it is no longer in two places at once. It is a definite particle.

    Even this can be considered a bit of a jump but lets take it as given for the moment. Adding detectors stops the apparent wave-like behavior of the electron. OK.

    Consciousness seems to play a role in this, as it seems our measurement of either the momentum or the position of an electron seems to fundamentally change its properties. It seems that our knowledge of the particle changes the particle. I understand this is difficult to accept. But any alternative explanation must take into account the strange results from experiments such as the one described above. I am not sure where the logical fallacy would lie here.

    How did we get to "consciousness"? "our measurement ... seems to fundamentally change its properties" => yes but "our measurement" is a physical process done by devices. When did consciousness become involved?
    For consciousness to be involved you'd need a much stronger statement connecting the awareness of the measurement to the resulting physical world, not the measurement itself to the physical world. (by "measurement" here I mean the physical activity of the devices in the experiment)