This actually has a lot of merit. The providers are currently incentivized to deliver the lowest bandwidth we will tolerate at the highest price we can afford. This is similar to the Netflix problem in that their "best" customers (those who appreciate and use the bandwidth provided) are actually their worst problems, delivering the lowest revenue per resource consumed.
Moving to a usage-based pricing model would correct this inversion. The provider would be incentivized to deliver high-bandwidth, low-latency connections to make it as easy as possible for customers to run up larger bills. There are two big problems with this.
The first is that since the customer base is accustomed to an "all you can eat" model (no matter how unrealistic this is), there would be huge resistance to the change. I can already envision a marketing campaign showing the "all you can eat" provider throttling the connection, and charging for usage while the customer sleeps...
The second problem is that it's not clear that inverting the pricing model would be of interest to the customer. While I'm personally upset with the idea that BT may be throttled, I'd be a lot more upset if I worried about every stream I opened costing me a few Euro. We can hope (and encourage) a race to the pricing-bottom that happened with long-distance, but a real economist would have to show how a base line-charge (say US$10 a month) plus usage adds up to less than the flat-rate now. Drop it onto the usage bell-curve, and show that the high-end users would pay more, but benefit from using their full 100Mbit fiber links to the 'net.
However, the big draw is that being Windows Mobile based, you'll be able to run any software you want on it without having to go through Apple, unlike the iPhone.
Who would have thought that Microsoft was enabling the open platform.
#2 is already in place. CALEA is a law that requires telecom carriers to provide law enforcement with access to call data, including content. Simply put, any encryption that a provider would put in place would have to be made interceptable by law enforcement.
Interestingly, this moves the target for unlawful intercepts from the user communication path to the CALEA intercept equipment itself, which is often very poorly protected.
People love having the hot new thing. The Razr is one example in the phone industry.
Wow, talk about the exception proving the rule. You do know that Motorola is getting its lunch-money stolen right now, right? That it's totally failed to produce a follow-up phone near the success of the Razr? That it's losing market share and will likely declare a Q2 loss? That Carl Ichan appears to be accumulating a stake (not always a good thing for the takeover target)?
I agree that the iPhone will be a hot commodity. Its features will be cloned before you know it and they'll have to roll out new features to keep ahead. The Apple cache' will buy them some time, but the lead time on cell phones is killer. The jury is very much still out.
Say you purchase an audio track - it's watermarked with an identifier tying it to you. If you give it to a buddy, no problems. If you use it in a class, no problems. No one else is likely to see it. If you post it to a P2P site, the RIAA can grab it, see whose copy got free, and come to your door.
What are the problems with this scheme? Dr. Felten's work aside (stripping watermarking), it has a chilling effect on sharing - because you have to trust the recipient to not share it out. You'd be the one getting burned.
We cannot allow "Squirt" to enter our vernacular as a word for sending data wirelessly.
Too late. In fact, common parlance for initiating a transmission from a ground station to a satellite is "squirting the bird", as in "The antenna is locked on the beacon, are we ready to squirt the bird?"
Erm, virtualization is not a panacea. In this scenario, it appears that the Win98 systems have access to sensitive data because of the legacy applications that require Win98 to run. If you virtualize this under (say) MacOS running Parallels (to try and eliminate the host platform as an infection vector), you are still running Win98 in a VM, and Win98 will still have access to the sensitive data. If the Win98 VM has to be on the network, you are almost back to square one. The only improvement here may be to port filter nonessential ports and to set up strict IP filters. This can be most effectively done with firewalls and/or router filter rules.
Admins have access to everything. Or at least they should have access to virtually everything.
Um, no. And no.
The finance industry has had this figured out long ago. Single-person access it permitted up to a certain value level. After that it requires multiple people to perform the same act. That then requires collusion to violate policy (which increases the risks to the perpetrators). Properly designed sensitive systems work the same way. Just because I'm an admin on a payroll system doesn't mean that I get unsupervised access to all the data. If I'm into a record, I'd better have a darn good reason to be there, and I want another body to certify that the correct operations were performed. This is just professional behavior: It covers my risk of doing something wrong (intentionally or not) and if done right should deliver better service (at the cost of time and resources).
Assume 30% employment overhead for each staffer, plus 10% risk of doing business (short-term work), plus costs for a development environment (location and equipment).
What I think they're essentially looking for is a university development environment, not a strictly commercial organization.
Depends. You mentioned "I like the fact that I control all my access in one place...". That may be nice from a management perspective, but when the network behind the firewall becomes complex, the firewalls with a complex ruleset typically can't keep up with the load. Also, a firewall with several hundred (or thousand) rules can end up with rule conflicts in subtle ways, making rule integration time-consuming. Adding a separate firewall per subnet may be the answer, but then you end up with a distributed firewall system (requiring centralized management tools that don't suck), and starts to approach 1:1 firewall deployment for a lot of small application server clusters.
Another point about "...slightly different types of weakness in each one...", is that disparate systems will have a variety of weaknesses regardless. Perhaps a better approach is segregating network traffic (using either firewalls or application server rulesets) and performing flow analysis on the networks. (e.g.: Your NIDS screams bloody murder if it sees traffic to the payroll server coming from the webserver subnet.)
If the SEC prosecutes all of these instances, than my faith in the market goes up, not down.
I think he meant the investor confidence in the specific companies, not the market in general. If I hear that the SEC examined a company for this and found nothing my confidence in it is increased. This doesn't help him if his company is found in violation.
I was at the presentations, and the stated reason why details were omitted was that Apple was being given time to fix the problem and release a patch. This is current practice for responsible disclosure.
The demonstration was done via a video, not live, because if it were done live the audience members would have sniffed the traffic and figured out the methodology.
There was no mention of not disclosing because of possible prosecution or arrest.
It is unlikely that even a single cell in cryonically 'preserved' tissue is undamaged.
Your information is out of date. The current process is called vitrification a process that avoids most of this type of damage and has been in use for some time now. This technology comes from the organ preservation world.
Cryonics, like any other experimental technology, tries to make continuous, incremental advances.
What you're missing is that the traffic information has already been captured, so analysis would show that you are the one spreading the information, not your intended victim. That's what the closet is for in the switching center.
Think cruise ships. People moving hither and yon, supplies and equipment stored all over the place. A casino. Interfacing with different ports all the time (and having to onload/offload people, supplies, waste). All while maintaining security, integrity and availability.
Slashdot Mirror
Moving to a usage-based pricing model would correct this inversion. The provider would be incentivized to deliver high-bandwidth, low-latency connections to make it as easy as possible for customers to run up larger bills. There are two big problems with this.
The first is that since the customer base is accustomed to an "all you can eat" model (no matter how unrealistic this is), there would be huge resistance to the change. I can already envision a marketing campaign showing the "all you can eat" provider throttling the connection, and charging for usage while the customer sleeps...
The second problem is that it's not clear that inverting the pricing model would be of interest to the customer. While I'm personally upset with the idea that BT may be throttled, I'd be a lot more upset if I worried about every stream I opened costing me a few Euro. We can hope (and encourage) a race to the pricing-bottom that happened with long-distance, but a real economist would have to show how a base line-charge (say US$10 a month) plus usage adds up to less than the flat-rate now. Drop it onto the usage bell-curve, and show that the high-end users would pay more, but benefit from using their full 100Mbit fiber links to the 'net.
There's my two-cents of bandwidth.
As an aside, for some reason I'm not yet aware of the Japanese basically do not use Bluetooth headsets at all. It's rather weird.
However, the big draw is that being Windows Mobile based, you'll be able to run any software you want on it without having to go through Apple, unlike the iPhone.
Who would have thought that Microsoft was enabling the open platform.
Where are you storing 200GB of data at reasonable rates? From the US that would be over $100/month.
Interestingly, this moves the target for unlawful intercepts from the user communication path to the CALEA intercept equipment itself, which is often very poorly protected.
Wow, talk about the exception proving the rule. You do know that Motorola is getting its lunch-money stolen right now, right? That it's totally failed to produce a follow-up phone near the success of the Razr? That it's losing market share and will likely declare a Q2 loss? That Carl Ichan appears to be accumulating a stake (not always a good thing for the takeover target)?
I agree that the iPhone will be a hot commodity. Its features will be cloned before you know it and they'll have to roll out new features to keep ahead. The Apple cache' will buy them some time, but the lead time on cell phones is killer. The jury is very much still out.
Say you purchase an audio track - it's watermarked with an identifier tying it to you. If you give it to a buddy, no problems. If you use it in a class, no problems. No one else is likely to see it. If you post it to a P2P site, the RIAA can grab it, see whose copy got free, and come to your door.
What are the problems with this scheme? Dr. Felten's work aside (stripping watermarking), it has a chilling effect on sharing - because you have to trust the recipient to not share it out. You'd be the one getting burned.
Anyone else have some thoughts on watermarking?
Rent "What Lies Beneath".
It seems instead that the war is ruining the U.S. Military. The economy is doing fine.
Too late. In fact, common parlance for initiating a transmission from a ground station to a satellite is "squirting the bird", as in "The antenna is locked on the beacon, are we ready to squirt the bird?"
Erm, virtualization is not a panacea. In this scenario, it appears that the Win98 systems have access to sensitive data because of the legacy applications that require Win98 to run. If you virtualize this under (say) MacOS running Parallels (to try and eliminate the host platform as an infection vector), you are still running Win98 in a VM, and Win98 will still have access to the sensitive data. If the Win98 VM has to be on the network, you are almost back to square one. The only improvement here may be to port filter nonessential ports and to set up strict IP filters. This can be most effectively done with firewalls and/or router filter rules.
Um, no. And no.
The finance industry has had this figured out long ago. Single-person access it permitted up to a certain value level. After that it requires multiple people to perform the same act. That then requires collusion to violate policy (which increases the risks to the perpetrators). Properly designed sensitive systems work the same way. Just because I'm an admin on a payroll system doesn't mean that I get unsupervised access to all the data. If I'm into a record, I'd better have a darn good reason to be there, and I want another body to certify that the correct operations were performed. This is just professional behavior: It covers my risk of doing something wrong (intentionally or not) and if done right should deliver better service (at the cost of time and resources).
Look up examples of the two man rule.
Assume 30% employment overhead for each staffer, plus 10% risk of doing business (short-term work), plus costs for a development environment (location and equipment).
What I think they're essentially looking for is a university development environment, not a strictly commercial organization.
And what they tell you is true. No one has access to the keys except you and the party you're Skyping. Oh, and Skype.
Hmmmmm.
Another point about "...slightly different types of weakness in each one...", is that disparate systems will have a variety of weaknesses regardless. Perhaps a better approach is segregating network traffic (using either firewalls or application server rulesets) and performing flow analysis on the networks. (e.g.: Your NIDS screams bloody murder if it sees traffic to the payroll server coming from the webserver subnet.)
Just some thoughts.
Time to report to carosel.
You may sign up now. Arrgh.
Consider FPGA - the best of both worlds.
I think he meant the investor confidence in the specific companies, not the market in general. If I hear that the SEC examined a company for this and found nothing my confidence in it is increased. This doesn't help him if his company is found in violation.
I'm looking forward to when "surfing the web" becomes cliche'.
Tubing, anyone?
The demonstration was done via a video, not live, because if it were done live the audience members would have sniffed the traffic and figured out the methodology.
There was no mention of not disclosing because of possible prosecution or arrest.
Your information is out of date. The current process is called vitrification a process that avoids most of this type of damage and has been in use for some time now. This technology comes from the organ preservation world.
Cryonics, like any other experimental technology, tries to make continuous, incremental advances.
Tor is your friend.
Think cruise ships. People moving hither and yon, supplies and equipment stored all over the place. A casino. Interfacing with different ports all the time (and having to onload/offload people, supplies, waste). All while maintaining security, integrity and availability.