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Airlines can have a monopoly on a certain route, ie. Hawaiian and Aloha airlines are the only airlines that fly interisland in Hawaii (src). Also, airlines used to be a government granted monopoly (src), but have since been deregulated, to a point.

In the end, if you had $100M dollars and wanted to start an airline that didn't check IDs, could you?

Please point out where the constitution gives the federal government the power to tell private airlines that they have to require ID of everyone.

The Congress shall have Power to... provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;

As but one example (having to do with landmark litigation in the history of radio, as it turns out), Justice Benjamin Cardozo -- one of the most respected legal minds of the early 20th century -- blundered badly in writing the majority opinion in the suit between Armstrong and De Forest in 1934. Read Tom Lewis' excellent Empire of the Air, or see Ken Burns' documentary, to see the overwhelming disdain with which the engineering community at large viewed the Court's decision (most believed it to be factually wrong, and wrote the Court and the papers saying so).

So, yeah, when it comes to technology, SCOTUS can be a bunch of irrational fanboys.

-HJ

So, after Mickey Mouse and Sonny Bono have had their pokes, and the DMCA has been enacted... NOW they decide "no more changing the copyright legislation"?!

Isn't this a little LATE?!

It's bullshit, I don't see how any of you can think this is a good ruling!? If I own a domain name, I can do *WHATEVER* I want to do with it. If someone has a problem with it, they should have bought the domain name before I did. If you want to "settle" it, then bring out the pocketbooks because it will be one hell of a pretty penny.

However, this is a bad ruling because it confllicts with at least one other case where a domain name (Lucas Nursery) taken out to criticize someone using the name of the party being criticized is a valid First Amendment use and they have no right to stop you from using that domain name (with their name as part of it) to do so.

This is the sort of issue - courts in different circuits giving different results on identical issues - that makes the issue ripe for the U.S. Supreme Court to take on the issue. That may happen. And if it does, I suspect that Falwell will lose. It wouldn't be the first time Falwell has lost in the Supreme Court over someone saying something about him that he didn't like.

"Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized community. The risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life in a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press." Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967). [page 34]

...

What the majority avoids--perhaps because of the all-toopredictable result--is to ask the question basic to any review questioning the validity of governmental action under a rational basis analysis: were the webcasts reasonably related to the purpose of deterring public behavior that could result in pretrial detention? The answer clearly is Yes. [page 35]

Since we have this notion of someone being "innocent until proven guilty," I can see why having a webcam on while someone is being *booked* can be a problem.

Actually, that's an especially good time for it. Arrests must be public. Yes, it's horribly embarrassing to be arrested, and I will feel ashamed if I am ever arrested, but secret arrests are tyrannical.

Your signature reads "The cure for 1984 is 1776." Well, why does the fourth amendment to the US constitution prohibit unreasonable seizures? It's because the british used arbitrary and secret arrests to lock up troublemakers (arguably they did so as well against the IRA). How can you have habeas corpus (or look here -- warning pdf) if you don't know who was arrested? (sorry, another pdf)

Once you've been convicted (or even once you're booked) it seems unreasonable though I agree with the poster who said he'd like it for his own protection!

If we dropped some of the stigma around the Constitution, it could be _changed_ and actually be a living document that helps the US develop into the future.

Furthermore, it's not the "the Constitution from 225 years ago". The Amendments from 1804 (12th, electoral college), 1865-1870 (13th-15th ending slavery and granting equal protection), 1913 (16th, allowing income tax), and 1920 (19th, women's right to vote) were all quite deep rooted changes-- the 1860's ones altering almost the fundamental character of the constuitution. When an issue creates sufficient public awareness that there may be a fundamental flaw in the basic working principles represented by the constitution, someone invariably suggests we amend it. It's probably a good thing this usually just results in brief sound and fury as with the 1920's child labor amendment (legislation largely fixed it) and the 1970's ERA (regarded by many as redundant due to the Article 14 "persons" equality), and often does not even get so far as going to the states for ratification, given some of the stupid things that people want enshrined in the constitution, I'm just as glad.

When we're fairly sure a change will be an improvement, we change it (although we've been wrong before). If we're not sure it's broke, we don't try to fix it. It's not a perfect system, but it's not bad.

"Caution is the eldest child of wisdom." --Victor Hugo.

Please, go read that. We'll wait.

Got all that? I didn't think so.

For those too sane to try that exercise, here's a representative sample:

(2) PHYSICAL SEARCH- Section 304(d)(1) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1824(d)(1)) is amended by--

(A) striking `forty-five' and inserting `90';
(B) inserting `(A)' after `except that'; and
(C) inserting before the period the following: `, and (B) an order under this section for a physical search targeted against an agent of a foreign power as defined in section 101(b)(1)(A) may be for the period specified in the application or for 120 days, whichever is less'.

Say what you like about Michael Moore, he's got a point. That is a MESS. Fourty-five whats just became ninety whatevers? Would it not have been easier to read if they had just rewritten the entire phrase they're amending? It goes on and on like that, 402 pages of it, all of it modifying the existing code in these oblique ways. If you submitted a kernel patch like that, Linus would have rejected it out of hand!

Now, I'm not saying they did anything untoward in this machination. I don't know! What I do know is that they made a lot of hey when the Abu Gahrib story broke about everything they did being "100% legal". I don't doubt it! I bet they could enter my house without a search warrant or look at what I've checked out at the library without my knowledge too!

Maybe you're too young to remember the Cold War, but that was what we were told happened in the Soviet Union!

And yes, I will eat my hat and promptly admit I was wrong *IF* this election is monitored by the UN and when he loses the popular vote AGAIN he leaves quietly. Happily.

People who say minors can't contract (in the US at least) simply don't know what the hell they're talking about.

That's a bit overdramatic. Saying whether or not minors can form contracts is a bit dependent on what you consider a "contract". Enforceability is probably what the seller is interested in, and since there is no guarantee that a contract with a minor can be enforced, it might as well be the same thing as minors being unable to enter contracts in the first place from the seller's perspective.

This land is your land, this land is my land.
From California to the New York Island
From the redwood forest to the Gulf Stream Water
This land was made for you and me.

These stanzas and the illustrations simply retell the Simpson tale. Although The Cat NOT in the Hat! does broadly mimic Dr. Seuss' characteristic style, it does not hold his style up to ridicule. The stanzas have "no critical bearing on the substance or style of" The Cat in the Hat. Katz and Wrinn merely use the Cat's stove-pipe hat, the narrator ("Dr. Juice), and the title (The Cat NOT in the Hat! ) "to get attention" or maybe even "to avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh." Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1172. While Simpson is depicted 13 times in the Cat's distinctively scrunched and somewhat shabby red and white stove-pipe hat, the substance and content of The Cat in the Hat is not conjured up by the focus on the Brown-Goldman murders or the O.J. Simpson trial. Because there is no effort to create a transformative work with "new expression, meaning, or message," the infringing work's commercial use further cuts against the fair use defense.

This land is your land, but it once was my land
Before we sold you Manhatten Island
You pushed my people to the reservation
This land was stole by you from me.

As I went walking the oil filled coastline
Along the beaches fishes were choking
The smog kept on rolling. the populations growing
This land was made for you and me.
--Country Joe McDonald

The publishers of this song, who have the difficult job of collecting royalties for its use and seeing that it is not misused are probably wincing by now. I am certainly not making their job any easier. Let me say simply that all of the verses printed in this article are copyrighted by the same company that copyrighted the original song. And I suggest that if you make more changed yourself, you should send them into the company so at least they'll have a complete list of all the good new verses. Here's their address...

Interested people can read the decision here.

and this parody strikes me as a straightforward protected usage

It absolutely isn't. Parody is only immune to copyright infringment if the infringed material is itself the subject of parody!.

In the USA, this has been clearly established by the Cat Not In The Hat case. Because the parody was about OJ Simpson, and not The Cat In The Hat, the use was unprotected. (This ruling also applies to cases like PA v American Greetings)

Why is it a worse crime if I kill him because he's black (hate crime) than if I kill him because he bumped into me (some pointless reason, this is normal murder).

Because statistical sociology has found "hate crimes" to be a greater risk to the public at large. However, your example of a "bump crime" is not realistic. That type of thing is insigificantly rare- a different comparator would be required to discuss it seriously.

More accurately, crimes committed against a category of people ("I hate blacks" "I hate cops") present a greater risk to the public than do crimes against a known individual ("I hate Tommie Simmons"). In the latter case, the victim probably had some chance to anticipate the attack and take precautions.

It's not really "hate crimes" vs other crimes, but random or impersonal crimes versus others.

(ignoring the fact that the politically correct "person" in that statement is pointless as with the exception of Governer Arnold, there are few pregnant men)

A point that biotechnology will make obselete within 50 years. In 20 years lesbians will start to bear each other's children- gay men will take a while longer (and realistically, most will use external incubation-tanks)

The point of the law is to make killing a pregnant women two counts of murder, instead of one. I think that's a great idea.

It's "Laci". And that's not quite what the law does. It doesn't say "killing a pregnant woman is two murders" (although that is what Pres Bush and others have claimed) but instead says "causes the death of, or bodily injury to, a child, who is in utero at the time the conduct takes place, is guilty of a separate offense"

So harming a pregnant woman can be 1 assault and 1 murder. This means that if you trip a woman who's 1 month pregnant, and she later miscarries, you can face life imprisonment.

If a law was passed allowing for heavier penalties for attacking a pregnant woman on the grounds that it harmed HER more than a typical assault, that's one thing (the US Congress considered such a law, sponsored by Feinstein D-CA, but ignored it because the Republican majority wanted something that would undermine RoeVWade). But declaring that the fetus is a separate victim is inconsistent with the idea that abortion is legal.

The legality of abortion rests on the idea that the fetus is a body part, without any rights of its own, and only existing for the mother (as her property, in a way).

An inconsistent position has been created:
If a 6-month old child is killed, it is murder regardless of whether the attacker was a stranger, or her own mother. But killing a 6-month old fetus is legal if the mother does it, but murder for anyone else.

The law has declared "Fetuses are people with rights- except that their mothers can kill them".

That's true for the criminal case. However, he was found guilty in the civil one.

If only the right of the consumer to add hardcore content to movies was recognized... Unfortunately, the act is written in such a way as to only free up censors.
The report of the the registrar of copyrights is interesting, inasmuch as she asserts the existence of moral rights, deploring a recent Supreme Court decision, Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., which ruled that the Lanham Act does not prevent the unaccredited copying of an uncopyrighted work.

I'd suggest googling for Henry VI, but without having read the play in its entirety, you'll not understand the context (and hence, meaning) of the phrase you quoted.

Would it kill you to at least try to give a sketch of the context? On the other hand, that would possibly give you less opportunity to feel superior.

Here: this guy seems to be up to the task. Exceedingly brief summary: Shakespeare seemed to feel that a strong state (hence, laws and lawyers) was necessary to keep the essentially low nature of mankind under control. The character who suggested killing all the lawyers was a member of the aforementioned unwashed masses, and an obvious nit besides.

[U]sability is a relatively new matter for us. How we react [ ] is similar [ ] to phenomena we didn't understand. Lightning was explained by Thor's Hammer, the plague was a punishment from God, and so forth. In our case, we replace "God's will" with "Companies", "Reports" and "Experts." We don't understand usability, so we push responsibility for it onto someone else.

- Frans Englich, Open source usability is a technical problem we can solve on our own

I have reached the conclusion [ ] limited to hard-core pornography. I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it...

Paul Robinson <Postmaster@paul.washington.dc.us>

The problem isn't corporatism, or "Big Government".

The problem is that our government has become overly centralized: the federal government has too much power.

If you study US History you notice that the federal government has continually usurped power from local governments. Originally the federal government had limited power and could not really interfere with the affairs of states. In fact its only real power over local government was the power to regulate interstate commerce and the extremely vague "necessary and proper" clause (US Constitution - Article I, Section 8).

From that, (and a few amendments such as income tax) the federal government has blossomed into the chimera we know today. As the federal government expanded its power, the states were slowly mushed together, and with the states no longer having any real meaning, all commerce becomes interstate commerce. And since then the federal government has yoked america with the purse strings.

How does it feel to know that a group of strangers thousands of miles away is dictating the way you live your life? The vast majority of people making decisions about you don't even represent you, and even those that do feel your interests dilluted by those of millions of others.

A strong national government is a farcical democracy -- it's just King George all over again.

How about we go back to america the way it was originally intended.

Local power means that your vote counts -- 1 in a few thousand, not one in a few billion.

Let the federal government handle national defense and foreign policy, but let the decisions that most affect our lives be made by those who most represent us.

Can you provide sources or are you just repeating conventional wisdom? I'm not trolling, but I've heard this a lot, but I've never been able to find anything to back it up.

For one thing, they're all "honorary." Tim Berner-Lee's knighthood isn't anymore real than anyone else's, these days. And for another, what's the logic in making someone a Knight of the British Empire, but being particular over a thing like whether they can use the title or not?

The best explanation that I've read, by the BBC, traced the "US citizens can't use the title 'sir'" claim back to Article 1, Section 9, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution.

But why is a type of speech restricted simply because it isn't used to speak out against 'the Man'?

It's not. If we're referring to obscenity, it's restricted because it is believed to have "a substantial tendency to deprave or corrupt its readers by inciting lascivious thoughts or arousing lustful desires" (Commonwealth v. Isenstadt (1945), 318 Mass. 543 [62 N.E.2d 840, 844], or People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal.App.2d Supp. 959, free reg req'd).

There are other classes of speech that typified by GTA, for instance which may also have a substantial tendency to corrupt. Let's identify one such class as 'depictions of violence' for the moment. Now, depictions of violence may have a substantial tendency to corrupt, but because they are often used as vehicles of social or political commentary, are protected under the First Amendment. That's what this case (Video Software Dealers Assoc. v. Maleng, PDF) is about.

Obscenity, by legal definition, is "utterly without redeeming social importance" (Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)). The full context of that quote is as follows:

All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance - unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion - have the full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more important interests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance.

Because the obscenity has "a substantial tendency to deprave or corrupt", it is considered to be bad for society. Now, were obscenity used for social change, then it would be protected under the First Amendment. But it's not, so it isn't. From Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942):

"....There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene.... It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality...."

Now, let's get back to VSDA v Maleng, since that's what this article is about. In the case of depictions of violence, it also may be considered to be bad for society. However, these are frequently works which contain vehicles for social opinion. That means that they merit First Amendment protection. The judge in this case said:

Sexually-explicit materials were originally excluded from the protections of the First Amendment because the prevention and punishment of lewd speech has very little, if any, impact on the free expression of ideas and government regulation of the sexually obscene has never been though to raise constitutional problems. The same cannot be said for depictions of violence: such depictions have been used in literature, art, and the media to convey important messages throughout our history, and there is no indication that such expressions have ever been excluded from the protections of the First Amendment or subject to government regulation.

Contrary to apparent popular opinion, the government doesn't feel that violence is "less profane" than sexual content (which is distinct from obscenity, Roth v. US).

But why is a type of speech restricted simply because it isn't used to speak out against 'the Man'?

It's not. If we're referring to obscenity, it's restricted because it is believed to have "a substantial tendency to deprave or corrupt its readers by inciting lascivious thoughts or arousing lustful desires" (Commonwealth v. Isenstadt (1945), 318 Mass. 543 [62 N.E.2d 840, 844], or People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal.App.2d Supp. 959, free reg req'd).

There are other classes of speech that typified by GTA, for instance which may also have a substantial tendency to corrupt. Let's identify one such class as 'depictions of violence' for the moment. Now, depictions of violence may have a substantial tendency to corrupt, but because they are often used as vehicles of social or political commentary, are protected under the First Amendment. That's what this case (Video Software Dealers Assoc. v. Maleng, PDF) is about.

Obscenity, by legal definition, is "utterly without redeeming social importance" (Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)). The full context of that quote is as follows:

All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance - unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion - have the full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more important interests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance.

Because the obscenity has "a substantial tendency to deprave or corrupt", it is considered to be bad for society. Now, were obscenity used for social change, then it would be protected under the First Amendment. But it's not, so it isn't. From Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942):

"....There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene.... It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality...."

Now, let's get back to VSDA v Maleng, since that's what this article is about. In the case of depictions of violence, it also may be considered to be bad for society. However, these are frequently works which contain vehicles for social opinion. That means that they merit First Amendment protection. The judge in this case said:

Sexually-explicit materials were originally excluded from the protections of the First Amendment because the prevention and punishment of lewd speech has very little, if any, impact on the free expression of ideas and government regulation of the sexually obscene has never been though to raise constitutional problems. The same cannot be said for depictions of violence: such depictions have been used in literature, art, and the media to convey important messages throughout our history, and there is no indication that such expressions have ever been excluded from the protections of the First Amendment or subject to government regulation.

Contrary to apparent popular opinion, the government doesn't feel that violence is "less profane" than sexual content (which is distinct from obscenity, Roth v. US).

But why is a type of speech restricted simply because it isn't used to speak out against 'the Man'?

It's not. If we're referring to obscenity, it's restricted because it is believed to have "a substantial tendency to deprave or corrupt its readers by inciting lascivious thoughts or arousing lustful desires" (Commonwealth v. Isenstadt (1945), 318 Mass. 543 [62 N.E.2d 840, 844], or People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal.App.2d Supp. 959, free reg req'd).

There are other classes of speech that typified by GTA, for instance which may also have a substantial tendency to corrupt. Let's identify one such class as 'depictions of violence' for the moment. Now, depictions of violence may have a substantial tendency to corrupt, but because they are often used as vehicles of social or political commentary, are protected under the First Amendment. That's what this case (Video Software Dealers Assoc. v. Maleng, PDF) is about.

Obscenity, by legal definition, is "utterly without redeeming social importance" (Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)). The full context of that quote is as follows:

All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance - unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion - have the full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more important interests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance.

Because the obscenity has "a substantial tendency to deprave or corrupt", it is considered to be bad for society. Now, were obscenity used for social change, then it would be protected under the First Amendment. But it's not, so it isn't. From Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942):

"....There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene.... It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality...."

Now, let's get back to VSDA v Maleng, since that's what this article is about. In the case of depictions of violence, it also may be considered to be bad for society. However, these are frequently works which contain vehicles for social opinion. That means that they merit First Amendment protection. The judge in this case said:

Sexually-explicit materials were originally excluded from the protections of the First Amendment because the prevention and punishment of lewd speech has very little, if any, impact on the free expression of ideas and government regulation of the sexually obscene has never been though to raise constitutional problems. The same cannot be said for depictions of violence: such depictions have been used in literature, art, and the media to convey important messages throughout our history, and there is no indication that such expressions have ever been excluded from the protections of the First Amendment or subject to government regulation.

Contrary to apparent popular opinion, the government doesn't feel that violence is "less profane" than sexual content (which is distinct from obscenity, Roth v. US).

But why is a type of speech restricted simply because it isn't used to speak out against 'the Man'?

It's not. If we're referring to obscenity, it's restricted because it is believed to have "a substantial tendency to deprave or corrupt its readers by inciting lascivious thoughts or arousing lustful desires" (Commonwealth v. Isenstadt (1945), 318 Mass. 543 [62 N.E.2d 840, 844], or People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal.App.2d Supp. 959, free reg req'd).

There are other classes of speech that typified by GTA, for instance which may also have a substantial tendency to corrupt. Let's identify one such class as 'depictions of violence' for the moment. Now, depictions of violence may have a substantial tendency to corrupt, but because they are often used as vehicles of social or political commentary, are protected under the First Amendment. That's what this case (Video Software Dealers Assoc. v. Maleng, PDF) is about.

Obscenity, by legal definition, is "utterly without redeeming social importance" (Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)). The full context of that quote is as follows:

All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance - unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion - have the full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more important interests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance.

Because the obscenity has "a substantial tendency to deprave or corrupt", it is considered to be bad for society. Now, were obscenity used for social change, then it would be protected under the First Amendment. But it's not, so it isn't. From Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942):

"....There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene.... It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality...."

Now, let's get back to VSDA v Maleng, since that's what this article is about. In the case of depictions of violence, it also may be considered to be bad for society. However, these are frequently works which contain vehicles for social opinion. That means that they merit First Amendment protection. The judge in this case said:

Sexually-explicit materials were originally excluded from the protections of the First Amendment because the prevention and punishment of lewd speech has very little, if any, impact on the free expression of ideas and government regulation of the sexually obscene has never been though to raise constitutional problems. The same cannot be said for depictions of violence: such depictions have been used in literature, art, and the media to convey important messages throughout our history, and there is no indication that such expressions have ever been excluded from the protections of the First Amendment or subject to government regulation.

Contrary to apparent popular opinion, the government doesn't feel that violence is "less profane" than sexual content (which is distinct from obscenity, Roth v. US).

hat you likely are referring to is the tenth amendment

No, I'm sure he was reffering to the 9th.

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

I most strongly recomend everyone read Findlaw's annotations on the Ninth Amendment - Unenumerated Rights. The entire Bill of Rights would most likely have been REJECTED in the absence of the 9th amendment. It is fundamental and vital to the very meaning of the Bill of Rights itself.

-

Bottomline? ... Abuse != Torture

I have read through the actual act. It's 132 pages, but it reads fast, so anyone really interested could do likewise in a couple of hours. I have not read all the other laws and regulations it refers to. I have read through the 'Life and Liberty' summary of them though.

To answer your other question, it is my understanding that no, the FBI can not obtain library and customer records without a warrant. An investigator can ask but not demand the records without a warrant. There is something called a 'secret warrant' however, which does allow the investigator the ability to obtain the records and prevent the person(s) from whom they obtained the information from disclosing to the party whom they requested the documents on that they obtained the records. This is so that the person being investigated is not 'tipped off' that they are being investigated. It allows the investigator the chance to observe the person being investigated and further their investigation. These types of warrants have been in place at least since the 1970s (the USSC upheld their use in 1979)

There was a Draft proposal that never went before congress that would allow investigators the ability to obtain records without a warrant. That bill never became law and as I read it only applied to foriegners. I've read some very misleading statements on many sites that claim what you thought to be true. In the end, if you read the text and later interpretations of the act, a warrant is still needed. In the past couple of years the USSC has stated that a search of person or other material (read important to a case) is acceptable IF the material found would have been found anyway (such as a library willingly turning over the records upon being asked) or if a warrant would have been issued in any event and to obtained the warrant would have done irreparable and immediate harm to the investigation. In the case of library or customer records this could not be the case as the information would have been available after a warrant was obtained.

6. (S) I find that the intentional abuse of detainees by military police personnel included the following acts:

1. (S) Punching, slapping, and kicking detainees;
jumping on their naked feet;

2. (S) Videotaping and photographing naked male and
female detainees;

3. (S) Forcibly arranging detainees in various
sexually explicit positions for photographing;

4. (S) Forcing detainees to remove their clothing and
keeping them naked for several days at a time;

5. (S) Forcing naked male detainees to wear women's
underwear;

6. (S) Forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate
themselves while being photographed and videotaped;

7. (S) Arranging naked male detainees in a pile and
then jumping on them;

8. (S) Positioning a naked detainee on a MRE Box,
with a sandbag on his head, and attaching wires to his
sfingers, toes, and penis to simulate electric torture;

9. (S) Writing "I am a Rapest" (sic) on the leg of a
detainee alleged to have forcibly raped a 15-year old
fellow detainee, and then photographing him naked;

10. (S) Placing a dog chain or strap around a naked
detainee's neck and having a female Soldier pose for a
picture;

11. (S) A male MP guard having sex with a female
detainee;

12. (S) Using military working dogs (without muzzles)
to intimidate and frighten detainees, and in at least
one case biting and severely injuring a detainee;

13. (S) Taking photographs of dead Iraqi detainees.

8. (U) In addition, several detainees also described the following acts of abuse, which under the circumstances, I find credible based on the clarity of their statements and supporting evidence provided by other witnesses (ANNEX 26):

1. (U) Breaking chemical lights and pouring the
phosphoric liquid on detainees;

2. (U) Threatening detainees with a charged 9mm pistol;

3. (U) Pouring cold water on naked detainees;

4. (U) Beating detainees with a broom handle and a
chair;

5. (U) Threatening male detainees with rape;

6. (U) Allowing a military police guard to stitch the
wound of a detainee who was injured after being slammed
against the wall in his cell;

7. (U) Sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and
perhaps a broom stick.

8. h. (U) Using military working dogs to frighten and
intimidate detainees with threats of attack, and in one
instance actually biting a detainee.

FindLaw, or are you too stupid to look it up?

So I guess those DRM restrictions are just constitutional regulation.

Check out Findlaw for more information about the Second amendment.

(Disclaimer: This isn't how I personally feel, but its something to think about)

All of this, of course, ignores the fact that when the President of the United States decides to embrace the doctrine of preemptive war, claiming that there is an imminent threat to his own nation, the burdern of proof is on him to support those claims. Let's see the evidence of WMDs in Iraq. How about those aerial drones that could be used against the US? An Iraq-Al Qaeda link? Some uranium from Africa? Anything?

If anything the main reason to regulate it is likely to be because long exposures to low levels of radio frequency radiation seems to do bad things to human beings so operating one might require training, care and exposure limits.

Any relationship with Mickey was coincidence

Not at all. Disney heavily lobbied for this extension to get it passed shortly before a bunch of Disney's IP passed into the public domain. These facts are well documented, for example here, and here, and a lot more places like those. Just because the laws in Europe had protection terms of that length doesn't mean that those terms make sense. And just because someone at the USPTO says that the extension "ensures that American creators will enjoy the same term of protection in Europe as is provided to their European counterparts." doesn't mean that that's the real reason the extension was passed.

Now UPS can read your hard drive as well as open your packages.

Apparently, the only reason that the specific search in the linked case was questionable was the fact that the UPS employee opening the packages would sometimes allow DEA agents to assist her if they were on site and the package was difficult to open.

Of course, a "Toshiba repair shop" would likely be free to do the same, as they are also a private entity. (Only government entities are "required" to abide by the Bill of Rights.)

It is well established by decisions of this Court that the power to regulate commerce includes the power to regulate the prices at which commodities in that commerce are dealt in and practices affecting such prices. One of the primary purposes of the Act in question was to increase the market price of wheat and to that end to limit the volume thereof that could affect the market. It can hardly be denied that a factor of such volume and variability as home-consumed wheat would have a substantial influence on price and market conditions. This may arise because being in marketable condition such wheat overhangs the market and if induced by rising prices tends to flow into the market and check price increases. But if we assume that it is never marketed, it supplies a need of the man who grew it which would otherwise be reflected by purchases in the open market. Home-grown wheat in this sense competes with wheat in commerce. The stimulation of commerce is a use of the regulatory function quite as definitely as prohibitions or restrictions thereon. This record leaves us in no doubt that Congress [317 U.S. 111, 129] may properly have considered that wheat consumed on the farm where grown if wholly outside the scheme of regulation would have a substantial effect in defeating and obstructing its purpose to stimulate trade therein at increased prices.

Their economic argument (further expounded in section III) is that when he threshed the wheat, he made it "overhang the market", i.e. made it available for sale, increasing interstate supply. That he then consumed it himself thereby deprived other states from its supply, affecting prices on the interstate market. "Believe it, or not!"

IANAL, but I will be one in 3 years.

I wouldn't get too excited. The FCC has authority derived from the interstate commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. Technically they have no authority to govern intrastate radio emissions.

"There is no consistency as to what is acceptable in one region for the ATF that won't be acceptable somewhere else," said Wickman. "The ATF people seem, as a rule, to feel this whole idea of hobby rocketry being regulated by the (government is) a mistake and a waste of time. There's a disconnect between the ATF in Washington and the regional field offices."

What's worse, even though not much has changed about the regulations, they are subject to arbitrary interpretation in the field, said Bundick, of the National Association of Rocketry. "It's a never-ending treadmill to try to pacify the local inspector."

The Justice Department's Nowacki didn't respond to questions about the ATF's perceived inconsistency.

• (1st) free speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion;
  
• (4th) unreasonable searches and seizures;
  
• (5th) freedom from self-incrimination;
  
• (6th) rights to counsel and to a speedy trial
  
• (8th) freedom from cruel and unusual punishments
  
• (9th) rights retained by the people
  
• (10th ) or rights reserved by the States

If substantial infringing use was all it took to shut down a network, why do Kaaza, Gnutella and WinMX still exist?

Because they're decentralized. It's a lot harder to shut down a decentralized network than a centralized one. If it were possible to easily shut those networks down, it would've happened a long time ago.

BTW, you can't copyright a song name. That's silly. The lawsuit was definitely about Napster's utility in pirating music, and the main thrust of the judge's ruling was that the Napster defense had failed to demonstrate "substantial noninfringing use."

Rob

If substantial infringing use was all it took to shut down a network, why do Kaaza, Gnutella and WinMX still exist?

Because they're decentralized. It's a lot harder to shut down a decentralized network than a centralized one. If it were possible to easily shut those networks down, it would've happened a long time ago.

BTW, you can't copyright a song name. That's silly. The lawsuit was definitely about Napster's utility in pirating music, and the main thrust of the judge's ruling was that the Napster defense had failed to demonstrate "substantial noninfringing use."

Rob

Wow, it takes a special brand of smarts to say:

I challenge you to learn a little bit about the law (and not just what you pulled up off the Internet)

and then:

and why don't you go read the actual ruling?

in the same breath.

"2. Deputy Dove demanded that petitioner identify himself under the authority of NRS 171.123, which provides: 1. Any peace officer may detain any person whom the officer encounters under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime. [Emphasis added] * * * * * 3. The officer may detain the person pursuant to this section only to ascertain his identity and the suspicious circumstances surrounding his presence abroad. [Emphasis added] Any person so detained shall identify himself, but may not be compelled to answer any other inquiry of any peace officer."

"Requiring a person to identify himself during an investigative stop does not intrude on any legitimate expectation of privacy."

"Of particular relevance, the Court has held that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his voice or handwriting. In United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973), a grand jury witness argued that a subpoena requiring a voice exemplar for identification purposes violated the Fourth Amendment. This Court rejected that claim, holding that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the sound of his voice."

"The principle that a person can claim no Fourth Amendment protection for what he "knowingly exposes to the public" (Katz, 389 U.S. at 351) is readily applicable in this case. "Except for the rare recluse who chooses to live his life in complete solitude" (Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted)), a person routinely exposes his identity to the public. Individuals exchange their names as a matter of course in everyday social interactions, and regularly display their names when using credit cards or checks in commercial transactions. And a person must reveal his name in order to drive a car, obtain a job, open a bank account, or receive mail. In short, disclosing one's identity is an essential part of everyday life."

"'This Court consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties,' Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-744, and 'has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities,' id. at 744 (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, accordingly, officers could have followed petitioner to his home or workplace and learned his identity from his neighbors or coworkers-an entirely lawful practice that most would consider a more significant invasion of privacy than a mere requirement to provide one's name."

"The relevant inquiry is whether the particular item sought by law enforcement implicates a legitimate expectation of privacy, not whether that item might facilitate discovery of other information that implicates a cognizable privacy interest.4"

"The Court held in Terry, however, that when officers form a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, a brief, investigative detention for purposes of questioning the suspect is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 20-23. The Court has made clear that the questions put to the subject of a Terry stop can include a request for the person's name. [Emphasis added] See Hayes,

Some people are just too damn paranoid and shouldn't be out in society (or driving, for that matter).

If something SHOULD be a Right, but its not in the Constitution, its not a Right.

If something SHOULD be a Right, but its not in the Constitution, its not a Right.

In this case, the police officer came upon a domestic dispute on the side of a roadway when Hiibel refused to identify himself. This is a little different from a cop walking up to you and asking for "papers." Under the circumstances, this request for identification (in the majority's view) is not unreasonably intrusive from a privacy standpoint. At this stage, asking for a name is not like patting him down or searching the car, both of which are more invasive and would require some additional justificaiton.

Also, before everyone stampedes for Canada, let's keep in mind that although there may not be any Federal Constituional prohibition against this, the States are all free to find that citizens in their jurisdiction enjoy greater state constitutional protection than the Federal provisions at issue here. That said, there is nothing preventing any individual state from a contrary holding under the exact same circumstances.

Personally, I disagree with the holding, but I am simply offering the rationale. The 5-4 split demonstrates, if nothing else, that reasonable minds can differ on this issue. (Also, the fact that O'Connor again "swings" the Court is interesting..)

Link to recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions here .

that nobody has right to decide have I right to read something or not!

The copyright owner does.

Wrong. The copyright law makes it clear that once you sell a work you have no right to control its future distribution and that the purchaser of a work has every right to the normal use, enjoyment and even resale of that work. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus , 210 U.S. 339 (1908) where the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that once the copyright holder sells a work they lose control of that copy and may not prevent transfer or future resale. If a copyright proprietor has no right to stop resale, it certainly should have no right to determine how or under what conditions you read or use a work as long as you aren't making copies for others.

You probably should read the proposed EU constitution and then reconsider your views. It concerns far more than economic matters.

And even if this new constitution did concern merely economic matters there are two points you ought to consider:
(1) A huge share of Federal legislation in the US is enacted under the commerce clause.
(2) One of the most important lessons learned from political developments in the 20th century was that economic freedom and political freedom are inseparable.

Oh, and just to bring you up to date, lethal force has been available to civilians since this was written:

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed

Note the comma after the word State.

HTH. HAND.

I forgot to mention: there is also 17 USC 110.

One could make the argument (probably more easily than ASCAP could argue that your party were somehow a public performance) that one's campfire sing falls under 17 USC 110(4)(A). Basically, even a "public performance" might not be an infringement if it is without any commercial advantage.

If you are still worried, though, I suggest that there still are plenty of public domain folk songs for you to sing.

Compare and contrast with the culture and legal system of Japan. Here's a story about the former president of Mitsubishi who was arrested on charges of covering up auto defects. I guess you could say that the same thing would happen here under similar circumstances, but I'm not entirely convinced. It's hard not to be cynical under the current pro-corporate administration.