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I would hope they would be supporting our right to copy information that is made public.

This is not the first case of its kind, the first circuit court of appeals have upheld similar on another case EF CULTURAL TRAVEL v. EXPLORICA, INC

Lindh is considered a citizen because the government chose not to exercise its right to hold him as an unlawful combatant, just as the government routinely chooses which crimes to prosecute, and what charges to bring.

For a summary of Supreme Court cases concerning the renunciation of citizenship, see this page at the State Department, which cites a number of cases. The cases themselves should be easy enough to look up on FindLaw.

You may note that nowhere does this amendment specifically guarantee a "right to privacy". For some interesting commentary on this issue, you might read some of the comments made by the Supreme Court, in which they discuss the implications of the ninth amendment to the Constitution.

This is what got Arther Anderson [...]

You might find this interesting. Careful voicing your opinion on impeaching Ashcroft in public though, or you might become an enemy combattant.

Those people stole more money than anybody else in the history of the world.

IANAL and I hate to beat a dead horse, but:

• The courts have found that there is an implied right to privacy written into the first ammendment (sorry, don't have my copy of CyberLaw with me).
• The list of rights in the constitution and its amendments is not enumerative. Please see amenment IX - " The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people"
• This has been covered on slashdot many times before.

not me. get a court order, then no problem.

Three cheers! One of the *first* things to remember when the police come knocking is you do not have to answer any of their questions. Don't do it! You never know when a seemingly minor bit of information will damage you or a friend.

Knowing your rights, and following the letter of the law in regards to them, is crucial to maintaining a free society. It keeps everyone honest, keeps you free.

• Your rights and police powers: Here
• FindLaw, Police Questioning issues: Here
• Some good legal advice on questioning: Here

Remember, the police have plenty of ways to legally get information from you if they need it for an investigation. If they need your help, they get it through the proper channels.

We've got a use tax here in Michigan, but I've never paid it, simply because I think it's unenforceable. Only Congress has jurisdiction over the taxation of interstate commerce. Maybe these states should become familiar with Article 1, Section 6 of the Constitution.

So you think the DEA wouldn't want to know who's reading about pot? Then check this out, my anonymous friend.

In my biased opinion, this article has one major flaw, which is that it seems to totally ignore the role of law libraries - particularly academic law libraries and court libraries. I can only speak for the academic law library where I work. Although we mainly exist to serve our students, faculty and alumni, we never turn anyone from the public away who needs help with legal research. We are trained to help people find what they want or need without crossing over into the area of unauthorized practice of law. At the risk of blowing the profession's own horn too much, I say that the the assistance of a good law librarian - who is armed with a standard collection of printed materials and the resources available on the "free web", including the Legal Information Institute, West's FindLaw and LexisOne - will usually do a much better job for the pro se patron than free access to LexisNexis or Westlaw. The printed sources aren't all bad. They are very strong with the older materials, which Ms. Barr uses as an example, and they make it more difficult to full into the full-text infoglut trap - where the few pearls are hidden in a tonne of garbage.

Law libraries should do a better job of communicating all this to public libraries. I know that some of the professional associations, including the Minnesota Association of Law Libraries are already doing some work in this area.

None of this is to say that I don't have my issues with LexisNexis or Westlaw - or think that they're perfect, altruistic companies. But now there are more free electronic alternatives (or cheap ones, like VersusLaw) available for legal research. They don't have the all the fancy bells & whistles of Westlaw or Lexis, but they still offer the public access to primary legal materials that would have seemed unthinkable 15 years ago.

I would argue differently: When you can no longer buy computers without Windows, the market for computers without Windows is too small/unprofitable for a company to take advantage of. I love it when people say, "Microshit is junk/sucks/etc." I always respond that Microsoft must be doing something right, because 90%+ of desktop computers around the world run Windows. There's a obviously a *market* for Windows software and with 90%+ of market penetration, I'd say that Windows is excellent (there's not many products and industries with marketshare like that).

You took a nap during the entire anti-trust trial, didn't you?

The reason that Windows runs on so many systems is, in part, because it came pre-installed. For a long time it came pre-installed because if a computer manufacturer shipped computers without Windows, the price they paid for Windows jumped so high as to erase the savings of not purchasing as many copies. IBM tried to make another OS available (OS/2), Microsoft denied IBM access to Windows 95 long enough that IBM was late to enter that market and lost a great deal of money. For doing something as innocent as shipping an alternative web browser companies Windows also dominates because it enjoys the network effect. The most popular operating system draws developers targetting the biggest market, which increases the value of the operating system, increasing its popularity. This has nothing to do with the quality of Windows, just the old adage that the rich get richer. Any possible competitor faces very stiff barriers to entry.

My local phone company has a market share in that area, but it similarly has nothing to do with quality and value and everything to do with having a (state-sanctioned in this case) monopoly.

At one point Microsoft did have to compete for operating system share and customers had real choices. Even with IBM effectively handing Microsoft a monopoly on PC operating systems they had to fight for their position. Unfortunately that was a long time ago. The claim that Microsoft continues earns their position is naive.

Perhaps you should review the findings of fact from the recent anti-trust case. These findings remain the court's official judgement on Microsoft's behavior. While it focuses on web browsers, it does document their monopoly power and willingness to abuse it.

I would argue differently: When you can no longer buy computers without Windows, the market for computers without Windows is too small/unprofitable for a company to take advantage of. I love it when people say, "Microshit is junk/sucks/etc." I always respond that Microsoft must be doing something right, because 90%+ of desktop computers around the world run Windows. There's a obviously a *market* for Windows software and with 90%+ of market penetration, I'd say that Windows is excellent (there's not many products and industries with marketshare like that).

You took a nap during the entire anti-trust trial, didn't you?

The reason that Windows runs on so many systems is, in part, because it came pre-installed. For a long time it came pre-installed because if a computer manufacturer shipped computers without Windows, the price they paid for Windows jumped so high as to erase the savings of not purchasing as many copies. IBM tried to make another OS available (OS/2), Microsoft denied IBM access to Windows 95 long enough that IBM was late to enter that market and lost a great deal of money. For doing something as innocent as shipping an alternative web browser companies Windows also dominates because it enjoys the network effect. The most popular operating system draws developers targetting the biggest market, which increases the value of the operating system, increasing its popularity. This has nothing to do with the quality of Windows, just the old adage that the rich get richer. Any possible competitor faces very stiff barriers to entry.

My local phone company has a market share in that area, but it similarly has nothing to do with quality and value and everything to do with having a (state-sanctioned in this case) monopoly.

At one point Microsoft did have to compete for operating system share and customers had real choices. Even with IBM effectively handing Microsoft a monopoly on PC operating systems they had to fight for their position. Unfortunately that was a long time ago. The claim that Microsoft continues earns their position is naive.

Perhaps you should review the findings of fact from the recent anti-trust case. These findings remain the court's official judgement on Microsoft's behavior. While it focuses on web browsers, it does document their monopoly power and willingness to abuse it.

I would argue differently: When you can no longer buy computers without Windows, the market for computers without Windows is too small/unprofitable for a company to take advantage of. I love it when people say, "Microshit is junk/sucks/etc." I always respond that Microsoft must be doing something right, because 90%+ of desktop computers around the world run Windows. There's a obviously a *market* for Windows software and with 90%+ of market penetration, I'd say that Windows is excellent (there's not many products and industries with marketshare like that).

You took a nap during the entire anti-trust trial, didn't you?

The reason that Windows runs on so many systems is, in part, because it came pre-installed. For a long time it came pre-installed because if a computer manufacturer shipped computers without Windows, the price they paid for Windows jumped so high as to erase the savings of not purchasing as many copies. IBM tried to make another OS available (OS/2), Microsoft denied IBM access to Windows 95 long enough that IBM was late to enter that market and lost a great deal of money. For doing something as innocent as shipping an alternative web browser companies Windows also dominates because it enjoys the network effect. The most popular operating system draws developers targetting the biggest market, which increases the value of the operating system, increasing its popularity. This has nothing to do with the quality of Windows, just the old adage that the rich get richer. Any possible competitor faces very stiff barriers to entry.

My local phone company has a market share in that area, but it similarly has nothing to do with quality and value and everything to do with having a (state-sanctioned in this case) monopoly.

At one point Microsoft did have to compete for operating system share and customers had real choices. Even with IBM effectively handing Microsoft a monopoly on PC operating systems they had to fight for their position. Unfortunately that was a long time ago. The claim that Microsoft continues earns their position is naive.

Perhaps you should review the findings of fact from the recent anti-trust case. These findings remain the court's official judgement on Microsoft's behavior. While it focuses on web browsers, it does document their monopoly power and willingness to abuse it.

First, federal law requires me to keep tax records for a minimum period of time, and to produce them on demand.

Where is this law? What statute?

(IANAL)

OHHHH ... so you DON'T know the law.

FYI, there IS NO law that requires INDIVIDUALS to keep records. If you file a tax return, you are giving up your 5th Amendment rights, and if questioned, then you have to produce the documentation to prove it. Kinda backwards, huh?

Oh ... wait a sec ... the IRS agents that conduct audits have NO AUTHORITY TO DO SO! They have to be given a "Delegation of Authority" by the Director of the Treasury, but never have done so.

Hmmm ... maybe this case may shed some light ... specifically:

Whatever the form in which the Government functions, anyone entering into an arrangement with the Government takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the Government stays within the bounds of his authority. The scope of this authority may be explicitly defined by Congress or be limited by delegated legislation, properly exercised through the rule-making power. And this is so even though, as here, the agent himself may have been unaware of the limitations upon his authority.

Check here for details

West is vigorously and creatively responding to the new world enabled by the Web. For example, in January 2001, West acquired FindLaw www.findlaw.com, the leading legal information portal on the Web. By providing a wealth of legal information, related analyses, and legal data without charge, FindLaw attracts businesses and individuals seeking legal advice and directs them to appropriate legal professionals. Recent statistics indicate that FindLaw traffic is five times that of its nearest competitors as measured by its user base

Findlaw is a great resource and you can (or used to) be able to pull up all sorts of case law and analysis (for free). There were paid parts of the service as well, but free went a long way.

In my Regulatory class in grad school, we were expressly told to use Westlaw for our case analysis and research. That meant treking over to the library in the middle of winter (it gets cold in Indiana) to use the clunky and unintuitive Westlaw client. Instead, I stumbled onto Findlaw and did all my research there. With cases being categorized nicely and hyperlinks abounding in the texts (case histories and such having hyperlinks to other cases), I did the majority of my research on Findlaw (and linked information sites). Of course, then I had to trek over to the library to find all of my Westlaw reference numbers... but it was still easier and took a lot less time.

The news that West has acquired Findlaw is a bad omen in my book. Findlaw was built for and from the Web. Hopefully they don't mess up a good thing.

Interstate commerce is not within the domain of the states and includes lots of things that are naively intrastate.

See Wickard v Filburn for a good summary.

http://www.findlaw.com

http://www.law.cornell.edu/

http://www.lib.uchicago.edu/e/law/

Well, we're obviousy getting our propaganda from opposite ends fo the spectrum.

Propaganda? Those were terse statements of simple facts. Nobody can dispute them. I leave open the question of why one "end fo the spectrum" hides from those truths. Don't like cannabisnews? There's plenty of other places to back up that claim. Do you find the BBC more worthy of trust? Someone wanted sources, I just gave the top few Google hits. 10 minutes there will get you a flood of consistent claims. (Some more links, for those too busy to search on their own)

Justbecuase we gave the Taliban money doesn't mean they complied very quickly or effctively.

Oh, so paying the Taliban for doing nothing is a lot better? The reasons Clinton called them evil in 1999 didn't go away.
(But they really did destroy the drug. Quite possibly the largest drug interdiction that has ever happened. Ask any street-level narc what's happening to the price or heroine these days- it's dropping steeply after the 2001 hikes.)

My understanding is that the Taliban was a loose conglomerate of several groups.

Not "loose", at least not relative to what preceded and followed them. The Taliban was the most strongly unified government in Afganistan for more than a decade.

Also, realize that it's an execute order, not a law.

Yeah, it sounds like a violation of US separation of powers, huh? Nevertheless, there are laws which declare it is illegal to violate an executive order. Regarding "emergency foreign relations", the President can nearly write his own laws. In 2002, an American citizen was prosecuted under them.

In the case of direct and specific requests of the President conflicting with previus executive orders,

Then the President should revoke that order. (This has often happened) To do otherwise is the baldest hypocracy. In a free society, the set of actions which only the government is allowed to do must be kept as small as possible.

(Note- I'm not being partisan. Clinton is similarly guilty. In November 1998 he violated Executive Order 12333 Section 2.11, leading to costly repurcussions)

18 USC 641 disagrees with you. That's what you'll be charged with if you keep Shuttle pieces, as The Smoking Gun has cheerfully shown us in the cases of Merrie Hipp and Bradley Gaudet.

You'll note there's no exception in there for "salvaging" it from your front yard. If it says "U.S. Government Property" on it, I suggest you return it -- but IANAL, so you're free to disregard my advice.

Martin Niemöller:

First they came for the Communists, but I was not a Communist, so I said nothing. Then they came for the Social Democrats, but I was not a Social Democrat, so I did nothing. Then came the trade unionists, but I was not a trade unionist. And then they came for the Jews, but I was not a Jew, so I did little. Then when they came for me, there was no one left to stand up for me.

Personally, I don't plan to sit around and do nothing while my rights (not to mention those of my children) get slowly chipped away. I'll be writing my Senator (Feinstein) and my Representative (Harman), I'll be giving money to the ACLU and the EFF, I'll be trying to persuade others to do the same and I'll be voting against the current bunch of bastards every chance I get.

As far as your question, well, you've already lost your Fourth Amendment right:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

There are currently a number of United States citizens being held in violation of the Sixth Amendment:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

Heh, not to mention the Tenth Amendment, which is in tatters, these days:

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

So, are you going to sit around and do nothing, or are you going to exercise your rights before they are all lost?

• "Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 and 106a, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include -

• "(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;

• "(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;

• "(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
• 
  
  "(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
  
  "The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors."

• "Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 and 106a, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include -

• "(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;

• "(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;

• "(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
• 
  
  "(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
  
  "The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors."

You could challenge that. The scores are fact. Factual information cannot be copyrighted. What CAN be copyrighted is the method of compilation or presentation of said fact. Check this out for more information. --Jon

I did a small amount (2 minutes worth) of research on your behalf, and came up with this. Basically, in summary, employers can refuse to hire you for any stated reason that does not pertain to age, sex, race, or religion (disliking a person is a legally valid reason to not hire that person) -- and there is no legal protection against an employer using your credit history against you. You are entitled to a free copy of the report they obtain as well as the name, telephone number, and address of the credit agency that provided the report, but the only right you have outside of that is to try to correct any errors in your report.

They are busy with their demands that Verizon
provide the name of a user who may have downloaded some music which may be
copyright and they are busy with their allegations about KaZaA music service,
a company which has the good sense to challenge the operation of the RIAA.

In the same manner it used in the Napster trial,
the RIAA is making wild assertions that gullible media, public and even legal
authorities appear to be accepting as fact. So far at least, it has managed
to give the impression that everyone apart from its members are to blame
for a slump in music sales. It can't be them - it must be those evil people
using the Internet.

No doubt the RIAA was emboldened by the judgment
against Napster and this gives it the feeling it can flex its muscles at
the world at large.

There is little doubt that Napster was guilty
of copyright infringement but only directly in so far as they themselves
copied music; that Napster had knowledge that users were infringing copyright
but only in so far as they could ascertain that copyright applied to certain
tracks; that they were guilty of contributory copyright infringement but
only in so far as they encouraged users to infringe copyright, and that they
were guilty of vicarious copyright only in so far as their income was dependent
on the use of copyrighted material.

That they themselves copied music from CD into
digital form is not clear. That they knew users were making illegal copies
is true, but the means of policing such action was beyond them if they had
no list of copyrighted works or any other means of checking. That they encouraged
others to infringe copyright is also probably true, but again the exact extent
of this and its influence on users is impossible to gauge. That its income
was dependent on copyright infringement is an accepted fact but again the
exact extent of this is impossible to determine.

For the record, Napster did not store music
on its own servers - it simply held the databases of music tracks that could
be accessed from users' own systems. The software they offered for peer-to-peer
copying between systems was also standard, although some minor enhancements
were made to improve the copying of large MP3 files. Providing something
as a legitimate use means it cannot be banned on the basis of possible
illegal use.

Findlaw.com has an archive of documents related to the trial and they
make very interesting reading. Time and time again, there are assertions
that Napster caused a slump in record sales but none of the many witnesses
- and there were many because the RIAA has deep pockets - presented any more
than circumstantial evidence.

How bad were the lies and distortions? The
response by Peter S Fader of the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania
provides an interesting rebuff to many of the witnesses. (You can find it
here.)

For example, one music storeowner near Syracuse
University in New York attributed a steep decline in music sales to the use
of Napster. He forgot to mention that in the time period to which he referred,
he had changed his emphasis from CDs to vinyl records and had moved to a
new store which was outside the main local shopping area. He later reluctantly
agreed that perhaps these were significant factors in his drop in income
and that perhaps he was making an assumption about Napster.

In a survey commissioned by the RIAA, the results
to open-ended questions (i.e. those with no specific choices) were interpreted
with a strong bias towards that association. This survey also concentrated
on college and university students then attempted to generalise the results
and paint a grim picture. More thorough surveys by other researchers indicated
that these "financially challenged" students were not typical Napster users
because more than 50% of users were over 30. Scattered through the various
submissions are all kinds of assertions that Napster was taking large numbers
of customers away from legitimate enterprises. Not one of these submissions
produced any incontrovertible evidence that showed a direct connection between
the use of Napster and a decline in music sales.

Several musicians who had been either ignored
or badly treated by record companies saw Napster as highly beneficial. Some
submissions are included in the Findlaw archive but other such as Janis Ian,
with 25-years in the recording business, chose to make their own public statements.
Janis's two postings can be found here.
She notes that Napster created a lot of interest in her work, far more than
before Napster arrived on the scene.

Other artists also commented on this phenomenon,
a point that dovetails nicely with numerous surveys - including some from
the RIAA itself - that showed consumers used Napster for sampling different
music. A shock horror tale in one pro-RIAA trial submission was that only
25% of the surveyed users went out and bought the CDs for at least 1 in 4
of the tracks they downloaded. Oddly enough, that corresponds well to the
idea of sampling. What a pity the same survey did not ask about deletions
of downloaded music too, because a large number of deletions within a few
days of downloading would further confirm this sampling.

Various surveys also supported these claims.
A survey by Jupiter Communications in July 2000 concluded that Napster users
were 45% more likely to have spent more buying music than non-users. This
survey was of 2200 online music fans and it found that the only people who
were not likely to increase their music purchases were 18 to 24 year old
"cash-strapped, computer-savvy users".

Jupiter Communications was certainly not alone
in these findings. The consensus was that Napster let people listen to music
that they would not otherwise made the effort to consider. As a result, musical
tastes spread. Another report mentioned that it made it easy to rediscover
artists or to find additional material by them. Both cases meant an increase
in sales of CDs and of vinyl records. There were several comments - of course
from people outside the RIAA - that Napster looked far more likely to increase
music sales than diminish them.

Another reason that students used Napster was
that it let them access one or two good tracks on an otherwise forgettable
CD. I am sure that we all have CDs that fall into that category. The attitude
of the RIAA seems to be that consumers must buy the rubbish in order to get
the few small jewels.

The fact that music sales were declining just
as the use of Napster was increasing presented the RIAA with the perfect
scapegoat, so absolving the music industry of blame and saving it the effort
to think there might be other reasons behind the slump.

After Napster died, the RIAA spouted the same
assertions about online music, whether or not such opinions were false, ill-founded
or unrepresentative.

Here's a typical pronouncement published by DC.Internet during February 2002. "The
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) is blaming online piracy
and CD burning as the major culprits for a 10.3 percent slide in 2001 music
sales. According to RIAA data, total U.S. shipments dropped from 1.08 billion
units shipped in 2000 to 968.58 million in 2001. ... Coinciding with the increase
in copying music, the study found that ownership of CD burners has nearly
tripled since 1999: in 2001, two in five music consumers owned a CD burner
compared to 14 percent who owned one in 1999."

At the same time the RIAA declared the rise
in sales of blank CDs was further proof of music piracy, and that blank CD
sales should be curtailed.

Let's dispose of this whole nonsense about CD
burners and blank CD sales quickly and then move back to the more important
issues.

Computer security is not something that the
RIAA is very familiar with, judging by the number of times its own Web site
has been hacked.

Blank CDs are used to back-up computer data.
When one blank CD costs about the same price as one diskette but stores
about 460 times the amount of data, is faster to record and takes far less
space than the equivalent thousands of diskettes, it would be stupid not
to use CDs for backups. The RIAA was quite adamant that the 10% drop in
CD sales in the USA in 2001 as compared to sales in 2000 was purely due to
music piracy but this assertion has to be very seriously questioned.

Firstly, if the RIAA is correct, it would follow
that the general interest in music was unchanged and that attendances at
concerts would be about the same as previous years. They weren't. According
to MTV's reports on the web, concert attendances dropped off by about 15%
in 2001 and revenues were down. The average ticket price rose by about 7%
during the year but as usual it is difficult to say if this deterred ticket
buyers or generated the best possible revenue in a bad situation.

An article in the Miami Herald of March 2002 provides a more balanced
commentary about the slump in music sales than the RIAA's rants. It attributes
a lot of problems in the industry to the fact that the record companies were
under attack from many directions - the government was threatening investigations
into payola, the companies were suffering the excesses of the technological
boom and bust, costs were rising and recording artists were in revolt about
the terms and conditions of their contracts with the record companies.

The terms and conditions are normally that artists
are contracted to produce a certain number of CDs in a certain time - but
it is the companies which dictate what music is acceptable to be marketed
and the manner in which a CD will or won't be marketed. For all this, the
artists receive 10 to 20 percent of the profits of the sale, but only after
the record companies charge them for promotional and marketing costs. Janis
Ian has in fact described the situation as being like indentured slavery,
and it is therefore no wonder that some artists were very pleased with using
Napster to get their music more widely known.

According to the same Miami Herald report,
sales of Latin music were up by 9% in 2001 but "In Latin America itself,
riddled with economic hardship and rampant piracy, mid-2001 sales fell about
20 percent." At least someone made the connection between personal wealth
and piracy.

For a further commentary about issues within
the music industry that were contributing to its slump, try this article
which also provides a far better analysis of the situation that the RIAA's
allegations. This gives an indication of the tone of the piece: "Given the
slight dip in CD sales despite so many reasons for there to be a much larger
drop, it seems that the effect of downloading, burning, and sharing is one
of the few bright lights helping the music industry with their most loyal
customers. "

One obvious factor that seems to have been ignored
by the RIAA is the nature of the music being released by the record companies.
Let me throw some names at you ... Sex Pistols, Rolling Stones, Pink Floyd,
Rod Stewart, Moody Blues, Brian Ferry, Genesis, Elton John and Cliff Richard.
If you are old enough to remember them you will probably like some of them
but dislike others. That is not the point; the point is that they co-existed
on the music charts in the late 1970s and this kind of variation is a far
cry from the kind of music that has been dominating the charts.

The current number of "revivals" or modern versions
of old songs suggests that the music from the 60s, 70s and 80s had something
that is seriously lacking in modern music. Perhaps the record companies
should spend time figuring out just why this is so.

The RIAA's claims that piracy has caused a worldwide
slump in music sales are questionable. By virtue of its population size,
the figures for the USA distort the total picture. The claims also ignore
the fact that US music sells across the world - so if US music is unappealing,
sales will be down everywhere.

To refute the RIAA's claims, CD sales in the
UK actually increased by 5% in 2001 and in France by a similar amount. (The
BBC News report here has the usual comment about piracy but mentions
this very important point only as a final comment.) I would not be at all
surprised if the influence of US music on the UK and French was somewhat
less than for other countries - or that the locally produced music in 2001
was rather more appealing than US music.

To label all US music as unappealing is quite
unfair. Latin and Country music sales have been quite good - probably because
they offered variety, positive energy and far broader appeal than mainstream
pop.

The possible causes of a decline in music sales
go further than these reasons.

Potential music consumers today have far more
choice in their form of entertainment than just listening to music. They
also have other things on which to spend their money and in many cases, they
have less money to spend than they did a few years ago.

Computer games continue to improve and they
are a big leisure activity. Games cost money that might otherwise be spent
on music. Further, games have audio and there is little point playing a
CD if the game's audio will drown out the music.

DVD sales continue to be good and the availability
of "home cinema" systems with DVD player and high quality audio has made
this a popular pastime. Entertainment has become more visual, at least for
those with time to sit and enjoy it. Music videos themselves have increased
the emphasis on the visual aspect of music.

In the USA the price of movie tickets compared
to CDs shows a dramatic difference, with movie tickets reportedly less than
half the price of a CD. Recent reports also say that movie attendance figures
are very high.

Finally, mobile telephone use is on the increase
especially among teenagers who might otherwise buy music CDs. Music might
be aimed at this demographic but most of them are still reliant on pocket-money
and probably have to pay their own mobile phone charges. Little wonder then
that they cannot also afford CDs when some of them rack up bills equivalent
to the GDP of a small country.

The RIAA is under threat from a number of directions
and it is fighting, on behalf of its members, for continued monopolistic
existence. They are under attack from increasing diversions in entertainment
and for the would-be music buyers' money. And they are also under attack
from a new medium that threatens to drastically change the way that music
is distributed and to reduce their control.

They are also seriously concerned about copyright
law and fear that as copyrights expire they will lose significant profits
and, even more importantly, their control over music distribution.

Since the RIAA started raising a fuss with Napster,
the US copyright laws have been changed and the period for which copyright
applies has been extended. Depending on your source you will find that this
is either the eleventh or fifteenth extension of copyright period in about
forty years. One report also indicated that many of these extensions have
occurred as various Walt Disney characters were nearing the end of their
copyright. (For more details see here).

Those with an interest in extending copyright
are more organised and have much deeper pockets than those opposed to change,
and so can finance a greater amount of pro-extension lobbying than those
who are opposed.

In 1998, an extension to the copyright laws meant
that period would last 70 years after the death of the creator, while works
owned by corporations were extended to 95 years. The RIAA is pleased with
this decision because we would otherwise been nearing the time when certain
music from about the early 1950s - the early days of rock and roll - would
have moved to the public domain. Anyone would have been free to publish
it and equally free to take the profits.

This 1998 extension to copyright period was
challenged but in mid-January of this year (2003) the court upheld the earlier
ruling and the RIAA and its cohorts were able to relax in the comfort that
their various treasure chests would not be released to the public. Don't
forget though, when the RIAA was fighting Napster, this outcome was far from
certain.

Cynics among us look at the notions behind the
copyright law and shake our collective heads. The US law was first introduced
in 1790 for a 14-year period with the aim of encouraging creativity and ensure
that the artists or thinkers could enjoy the profits of that creativity.
Extension of the copyright period is only in the interest of groups like
the RIAA because it means they can rely on older material and can minimise
any efforts to find new talent.

The battle for copyright is not yet over because
European authorities do not kowtow to American interests quite so easily.
EU copyright protection lasts only 50 years, as opposed to 95 in the US,
and so music recordings from the 1950s are becoming public domain in Europe.
The 1950s were a boom in popular music with rock and roll exploding and a
big jump in the number of records being released. Elvis Presley's first
record appeared in 1956 and Chuck Berry's first just two years later.

US music distribution companies have indicated
that they will start to fight CD imports, declaring that the import of European
CDs would be an act of piracy and that customs agents have the authority
to seize these imports.

Make no mistake, the RIAA is under attack from
many different directions, some legislative, some social, some from their
artist "slaves" and others from technology. Loss of control of the music
business would mean a dramatic loss of profit for these companies and it
is for those reasons they are currently embarking on a scare campaign about
music piracy around the world.

Again, European authorities are not impressed
by this blathering. According to a recent BBC report here, the European Commission has only outlawed commercial
(i.e. for profit) piracy but has decided not to criminalise people who download
music from the Internet for their own use. Needless to say the RIAA, and
its international counterpart the IFPI, are up to their normal tactics and
alleging - on no proven basis - that this will cause losses of 4.5 billion
euros annually.

In the bigger picture, these organisations are
out to police everything on the web that just might be somehow related to
the copyrighted works that they jealously guard.

In July 2002 a bill was introduced to the US
House of Representatives to permit the owners of material under copyright
to hack into any computer that accesses or uses a peer-to-peer file transfer
service to see if it was holding any illegal copies of the material. It
was described as vigilante justice in the 21st century. I think I know how
commercial enterprises such as banks would view such intrusions!

It appears that they need no "due cause" which
is what even the various law enforcement agencies require for any similar
search activity.

Using similar wild claims about piracy destroying
their business, the RIAA and IFPI are embarking on what amounts to a marketing
campaign to protect their backsides. Unfortunately the assertions are getting
lots of press attention, and there is a danger of the old problem that if
a lie is repeated often enough it gets accepted as truth.

In their latest moves the RIAA and other are
trying to persuade legal authorities to hold ISPs responsible for any illegal
material that is stored on their servers. (For example, see this report). I am
not certain if the ISPs will be required to call out the rottweilers (i.e.
the RIAA) or to decide if a music file is public domain, copyright but authorised
or copyright and illegal, and then act as judge and jury to decide the form
of punishment.

As I have argued earlier, the ISPs should not
be held responsible because it is not their problem if a user wishes to risk
prosecution for whatever crime. I am waiting for the day when ISP operations
can be fully automated and there is no need for any middle-person who currently
provides a ready and easy target for legal authorities and those who pretend
they are legal authorities.

Already the RIAA has managed to convince a
US court into demanding that Verizon hand out the personal details of a user
who is supposed to have copied music files. I know of no other legal situation
where a middle party has been obliged to provide these details to someone
who believes that they may have been a victim of some crime.

Fortunately Verizon is already objecting to
this demand

This Verizon case was discussed in an Australian
article, which went on to blame music piracy for a drop
in CD sales (yet again) and make the typical kind of claim that we have already
seen from the neo-Luddites. "The finger of blame is pointed at the internet,
as industry officials cite a corresponding increase in broadband adoption
as proof that increasing numbers of people are stealing music and movies."

The truly sad thing is that the RIAA is not
acting in the interests of consumers or even their musical artists. It is
only protecting its members, but a lot of influential people are swallowing
the story hook, line and sinker.

You did know that the right to a "jury of peers" doesn't always apply in civil court cases, didn't you?

Nit: Amendment 7 guarantees Americans the right to a trial by jury.

No, the real REAL problem is that because of Disney, copyright lengths keep getting extended and extended. At the current rate, Mickey Mouse will never be public domain. This is actually unconstitutional, since Congress is enabled to grant exclusive rights for "limited times" only. But it's the way things are.

By him blocking off black voters, who would statistically have voted for Gore, he offset the vote. So no wonder the recount by the media showed that Bush won. Also, since "Dubya" is the media's best friend, I wouldn't trust thier fucking vote recount as far as I could throw it.

Before you go telling people to get over it, why don't you learn the facts.

The idea that privacy is already gone and we should "get over it" is absolute idiocy.

Gee, thanks. :)

My point was different: I think fighting tire chips is silly because the state already has plenty of alternatives. We can't stop it because it's already happened, and making a protest over some token new item is a waste of time; we might as well accept whatever benefits we can get.

The prevalence of video cameras makes me skeptical that law enforcement would bother assembling the database and tearing up all the streets when they already have a great system of tracking -- license plates. It wasn't widely discussed, but the snipers' license plates were run something like 9 times and their plate was photographed by a red light camera in the weeks they were doing their thing. If we had known what we were looking for we would have caught them earlier; meanwhile, law enforcement was apparently running the plates on no specific suspicion (remember, everyone said we were looking for a white truck). So ... how often do average citizens have their plate checked? I bet it's a lot, now that squad cars have computers and constant wireless links. And every time they do, it's a record of where the car was at what time. Next, the cameras will do this work automatically. Screw the tire chips.

The Fourth Amendment is no help, because the Supreme Court ruled 20 years ago that the police could place a tracking device on your care without a warrant (!). I doubt exterior surveillance by camera would raise a constitutional problem, though I do hope that the Supreme Court will at some point look at the aggregate of all these little intrusions and conclude that an overall police state is unconstitutional. However, that would inject them into government in a way the Court does not want; and they've been fairly indifferent to privacy (notwithstanding the surprise thermal imaging decision).

So the effort of privacy advocates must be in legislation. The courts won't do it, and avoiding Michelin tires definitely won't do it. I'm hardly advocating acquiescence, just not tilting at windmills.

Oh, the icepick was a joke. :)

By "originalist," I refer to one who believes that the original intent of the Framers should govern in matters of Constitutional construction. You seem to vacillate between an originalist position (when you argue what the Framers "clearly" expected and what they could not foresee) and a modernist view (when you suggest that your own subjective 21st century notions should govern the inquiry.)

"Limited" can not mean "extended every time it is about to run out". That just isn't limited.

The Court specifically addressed this argument, noting that the worst case scenario you and Lessig envision is not what has happened here. Clearly, life plus 70 years is a "limit," and it is not so lengthy a time so as to devour the term "limited." In your latest reply, you write that "clearly" the Framers expected there might be a need to extend the terms of copyrights, so it is not the extension itself that irks you. Rather it is an extension stacked upon an extension, which you seem to believe swallows the term "limited." Were you comfortable with life plus 50 years? The difference between THAT and the current extension makes the legislation unconstitutional?

The Framers stated that they wanted a limit; they made the mistake of not defining their term and I am mearly suggesting a fix; I don't see that as a contradiction. . . . If the constitution is a legal document, dealing with the limits of the law, then it is entirely reasonable to allow the judicial branch to clear up ambiguities in the language or, more importantly, to prevent abuse of those ambiguities.

Here is the root of your misunderstanding of the Court's opinion. The Constitution is no mere "legal document." Indeed, it is the highest law of the law, and it cannot be amended by federal statute, executive fiat, or even a groundswell of public opposition to a curious copyright extension. The only guidance we have in interpreting the Constitutional are the planing meaning of the words used by the Framers and the centuries of Supreme Court precedent and jurisprudence. You've read the case, so I need not regurgitate the plain meaning argument the Justices advanced by referring to both eighteenth century and twenty-first century dictionaries. Additionally, Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution states that the Legislative Branch "shall have Power To . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . ." This is not an implied power, but an enumerated power granted specifically and exclusively to the Congress.

You seem to fixate solely on the term "limited," which is of course very important. However, you neglect to remember that the Congress has plenary power over copyrights. Furthermore, you don't consider this express grant of poewr in conjunction with James Madison's elastic clause. The last clause of Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution states that "[t]he Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." Remember Chief Justice John Marshall's interpretation of the elastic clause in the famous case of McCullough v. Maryland: " Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional. . . ."

Are you suggesting that Congress, with its plenary power over the issue of copyrights, may not extend the term to that of the Act considering its express grant of power in this area in conjunction with the necessary and proper clause? The Supreme Court doesn't get to merely "clear up an ambiguity" because you or it or Lessig disagrees with the Act. Nor can it graft upon the provisions of Article I, Section 8 a definition of "limited" which is overly narrow. As this is an enumerated power of Congress, and Congress acted pursuant to this express grant and perhaps through the N&P clause, the Supreme Court is going to give some deference to the Congress' definition of limited. The Act is limited, and in enacting it, the Legislative Branch has not done what you say is improper: stringing together a series of extensions so as to effectively make the extensions unlimited. Rather, they have made an extension which is still clearly limited at the lifetime of the copyright holder plus however-many-decades. Perhaps your argument will hold more water when/if the Congress chooses to extend the copyrights again at their next expiration.

But, is that it is also entirely reasonable to allow the people, through their representatives to do that job too. The problem is that the elected representatives are corrupt, which ranges far beyond the copyright issue but, hey, that's politicians for you.

Amending the Constitution by interpreting its terms without reference to history, tradition, or other constitutional provisions is simply wrong. If you disagree with the Court's construction of the term "limited," you can either lobby legislators to amend/repeal the Act, or you can push for an amendment to the Constitution. [This is a bit like the tactics of gun control advocates who disregard the clear history of the Second Amendment in order to argue that it does not bestow a personal right. However, they would rather argue that than simply seek to amend/repeal that amendment, an approach which at least be more intellectually honest than to ignore precedent and plain meaning.] It is far more difficult to mount a grass roots campaign to do that; it is far, far easier to ask a federal court to rewrite the constitution. However, that is not the system we have, nor should it be.

The people haven't a look in.

I don't think that it is so much that as the fact that people toss around the term "unconstitutional" as a synonym for "inconvenient" or "bad." What you seek to do is return to the era of Lochner, during which courts struck down legislation simply because they disagreed with it. (In some respect, Lochner still lives in the social arena, as the courts strike down social legislation with which they disagree.) But the point is: Courts prefer precision, and simply because you or I disagree with public policy, it does not make the law unconstitutional.

By "originalist," I refer to one who believes that the original intent of the Framers should govern in matters of Constitutional construction. You seem to vacillate between an originalist position (when you argue what the Framers "clearly" expected and what they could not foresee) and a modernist view (when you suggest that your own subjective 21st century notions should govern the inquiry.)

"Limited" can not mean "extended every time it is about to run out". That just isn't limited.

The Court specifically addressed this argument, noting that the worst case scenario you and Lessig envision is not what has happened here. Clearly, life plus 70 years is a "limit," and it is not so lengthy a time so as to devour the term "limited." In your latest reply, you write that "clearly" the Framers expected there might be a need to extend the terms of copyrights, so it is not the extension itself that irks you. Rather it is an extension stacked upon an extension, which you seem to believe swallows the term "limited." Were you comfortable with life plus 50 years? The difference between THAT and the current extension makes the legislation unconstitutional?

The Framers stated that they wanted a limit; they made the mistake of not defining their term and I am mearly suggesting a fix; I don't see that as a contradiction. . . . If the constitution is a legal document, dealing with the limits of the law, then it is entirely reasonable to allow the judicial branch to clear up ambiguities in the language or, more importantly, to prevent abuse of those ambiguities.

Here is the root of your misunderstanding of the Court's opinion. The Constitution is no mere "legal document." Indeed, it is the highest law of the law, and it cannot be amended by federal statute, executive fiat, or even a groundswell of public opposition to a curious copyright extension. The only guidance we have in interpreting the Constitutional are the planing meaning of the words used by the Framers and the centuries of Supreme Court precedent and jurisprudence. You've read the case, so I need not regurgitate the plain meaning argument the Justices advanced by referring to both eighteenth century and twenty-first century dictionaries. Additionally, Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution states that the Legislative Branch "shall have Power To . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . ." This is not an implied power, but an enumerated power granted specifically and exclusively to the Congress.

You seem to fixate solely on the term "limited," which is of course very important. However, you neglect to remember that the Congress has plenary power over copyrights. Furthermore, you don't consider this express grant of poewr in conjunction with James Madison's elastic clause. The last clause of Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution states that "[t]he Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." Remember Chief Justice John Marshall's interpretation of the elastic clause in the famous case of McCullough v. Maryland: " Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional. . . ."

Are you suggesting that Congress, with its plenary power over the issue of copyrights, may not extend the term to that of the Act considering its express grant of power in this area in conjunction with the necessary and proper clause? The Supreme Court doesn't get to merely "clear up an ambiguity" because you or it or Lessig disagrees with the Act. Nor can it graft upon the provisions of Article I, Section 8 a definition of "limited" which is overly narrow. As this is an enumerated power of Congress, and Congress acted pursuant to this express grant and perhaps through the N&P clause, the Supreme Court is going to give some deference to the Congress' definition of limited. The Act is limited, and in enacting it, the Legislative Branch has not done what you say is improper: stringing together a series of extensions so as to effectively make the extensions unlimited. Rather, they have made an extension which is still clearly limited at the lifetime of the copyright holder plus however-many-decades. Perhaps your argument will hold more water when/if the Congress chooses to extend the copyrights again at their next expiration.

But, is that it is also entirely reasonable to allow the people, through their representatives to do that job too. The problem is that the elected representatives are corrupt, which ranges far beyond the copyright issue but, hey, that's politicians for you.

Amending the Constitution by interpreting its terms without reference to history, tradition, or other constitutional provisions is simply wrong. If you disagree with the Court's construction of the term "limited," you can either lobby legislators to amend/repeal the Act, or you can push for an amendment to the Constitution. [This is a bit like the tactics of gun control advocates who disregard the clear history of the Second Amendment in order to argue that it does not bestow a personal right. However, they would rather argue that than simply seek to amend/repeal that amendment, an approach which at least be more intellectually honest than to ignore precedent and plain meaning.] It is far more difficult to mount a grass roots campaign to do that; it is far, far easier to ask a federal court to rewrite the constitution. However, that is not the system we have, nor should it be.

The people haven't a look in.

I don't think that it is so much that as the fact that people toss around the term "unconstitutional" as a synonym for "inconvenient" or "bad." What you seek to do is return to the era of Lochner, during which courts struck down legislation simply because they disagreed with it. (In some respect, Lochner still lives in the social arena, as the courts strike down social legislation with which they disagree.) But the point is: Courts prefer precision, and simply because you or I disagree with public policy, it does not make the law unconstitutional.

By "originalist," I refer to one who believes that the original intent of the Framers should govern in matters of Constitutional construction. You seem to vacillate between an originalist position (when you argue what the Framers "clearly" expected and what they could not foresee) and a modernist view (when you suggest that your own subjective 21st century notions should govern the inquiry.)

"Limited" can not mean "extended every time it is about to run out". That just isn't limited.

The Court specifically addressed this argument, noting that the worst case scenario you and Lessig envision is not what has happened here. Clearly, life plus 70 years is a "limit," and it is not so lengthy a time so as to devour the term "limited." In your latest reply, you write that "clearly" the Framers expected there might be a need to extend the terms of copyrights, so it is not the extension itself that irks you. Rather it is an extension stacked upon an extension, which you seem to believe swallows the term "limited." Were you comfortable with life plus 50 years? The difference between THAT and the current extension makes the legislation unconstitutional?

The Framers stated that they wanted a limit; they made the mistake of not defining their term and I am mearly suggesting a fix; I don't see that as a contradiction. . . . If the constitution is a legal document, dealing with the limits of the law, then it is entirely reasonable to allow the judicial branch to clear up ambiguities in the language or, more importantly, to prevent abuse of those ambiguities.

Here is the root of your misunderstanding of the Court's opinion. The Constitution is no mere "legal document." Indeed, it is the highest law of the law, and it cannot be amended by federal statute, executive fiat, or even a groundswell of public opposition to a curious copyright extension. The only guidance we have in interpreting the Constitutional are the planing meaning of the words used by the Framers and the centuries of Supreme Court precedent and jurisprudence. You've read the case, so I need not regurgitate the plain meaning argument the Justices advanced by referring to both eighteenth century and twenty-first century dictionaries. Additionally, Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution states that the Legislative Branch "shall have Power To . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . ." This is not an implied power, but an enumerated power granted specifically and exclusively to the Congress.

You seem to fixate solely on the term "limited," which is of course very important. However, you neglect to remember that the Congress has plenary power over copyrights. Furthermore, you don't consider this express grant of poewr in conjunction with James Madison's elastic clause. The last clause of Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution states that "[t]he Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." Remember Chief Justice John Marshall's interpretation of the elastic clause in the famous case of McCullough v. Maryland: " Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional. . . ."

Are you suggesting that Congress, with its plenary power over the issue of copyrights, may not extend the term to that of the Act considering its express grant of power in this area in conjunction with the necessary and proper clause? The Supreme Court doesn't get to merely "clear up an ambiguity" because you or it or Lessig disagrees with the Act. Nor can it graft upon the provisions of Article I, Section 8 a definition of "limited" which is overly narrow. As this is an enumerated power of Congress, and Congress acted pursuant to this express grant and perhaps through the N&P clause, the Supreme Court is going to give some deference to the Congress' definition of limited. The Act is limited, and in enacting it, the Legislative Branch has not done what you say is improper: stringing together a series of extensions so as to effectively make the extensions unlimited. Rather, they have made an extension which is still clearly limited at the lifetime of the copyright holder plus however-many-decades. Perhaps your argument will hold more water when/if the Congress chooses to extend the copyrights again at their next expiration.

But, is that it is also entirely reasonable to allow the people, through their representatives to do that job too. The problem is that the elected representatives are corrupt, which ranges far beyond the copyright issue but, hey, that's politicians for you.

Amending the Constitution by interpreting its terms without reference to history, tradition, or other constitutional provisions is simply wrong. If you disagree with the Court's construction of the term "limited," you can either lobby legislators to amend/repeal the Act, or you can push for an amendment to the Constitution. [This is a bit like the tactics of gun control advocates who disregard the clear history of the Second Amendment in order to argue that it does not bestow a personal right. However, they would rather argue that than simply seek to amend/repeal that amendment, an approach which at least be more intellectually honest than to ignore precedent and plain meaning.] It is far more difficult to mount a grass roots campaign to do that; it is far, far easier to ask a federal court to rewrite the constitution. However, that is not the system we have, nor should it be.

The people haven't a look in.

I don't think that it is so much that as the fact that people toss around the term "unconstitutional" as a synonym for "inconvenient" or "bad." What you seek to do is return to the era of Lochner, during which courts struck down legislation simply because they disagreed with it. (In some respect, Lochner still lives in the social arena, as the courts strike down social legislation with which they disagree.) But the point is: Courts prefer precision, and simply because you or I disagree with public policy, it does not make the law unconstitutional.

By "originalist," I refer to one who believes that the original intent of the Framers should govern in matters of Constitutional construction. You seem to vacillate between an originalist position (when you argue what the Framers "clearly" expected and what they could not foresee) and a modernist view (when you suggest that your own subjective 21st century notions should govern the inquiry.)

"Limited" can not mean "extended every time it is about to run out". That just isn't limited.

The Court specifically addressed this argument, noting that the worst case scenario you and Lessig envision is not what has happened here. Clearly, life plus 70 years is a "limit," and it is not so lengthy a time so as to devour the term "limited." In your latest reply, you write that "clearly" the Framers expected there might be a need to extend the terms of copyrights, so it is not the extension itself that irks you. Rather it is an extension stacked upon an extension, which you seem to believe swallows the term "limited." Were you comfortable with life plus 50 years? The difference between THAT and the current extension makes the legislation unconstitutional?

The Framers stated that they wanted a limit; they made the mistake of not defining their term and I am mearly suggesting a fix; I don't see that as a contradiction. . . . If the constitution is a legal document, dealing with the limits of the law, then it is entirely reasonable to allow the judicial branch to clear up ambiguities in the language or, more importantly, to prevent abuse of those ambiguities.

Here is the root of your misunderstanding of the Court's opinion. The Constitution is no mere "legal document." Indeed, it is the highest law of the law, and it cannot be amended by federal statute, executive fiat, or even a groundswell of public opposition to a curious copyright extension. The only guidance we have in interpreting the Constitutional are the planing meaning of the words used by the Framers and the centuries of Supreme Court precedent and jurisprudence. You've read the case, so I need not regurgitate the plain meaning argument the Justices advanced by referring to both eighteenth century and twenty-first century dictionaries. Additionally, Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution states that the Legislative Branch "shall have Power To . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . ." This is not an implied power, but an enumerated power granted specifically and exclusively to the Congress.

You seem to fixate solely on the term "limited," which is of course very important. However, you neglect to remember that the Congress has plenary power over copyrights. Furthermore, you don't consider this express grant of poewr in conjunction with James Madison's elastic clause. The last clause of Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution states that "[t]he Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." Remember Chief Justice John Marshall's interpretation of the elastic clause in the famous case of McCullough v. Maryland: " Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional. . . ."

Are you suggesting that Congress, with its plenary power over the issue of copyrights, may not extend the term to that of the Act considering its express grant of power in this area in conjunction with the necessary and proper clause? The Supreme Court doesn't get to merely "clear up an ambiguity" because you or it or Lessig disagrees with the Act. Nor can it graft upon the provisions of Article I, Section 8 a definition of "limited" which is overly narrow. As this is an enumerated power of Congress, and Congress acted pursuant to this express grant and perhaps through the N&P clause, the Supreme Court is going to give some deference to the Congress' definition of limited. The Act is limited, and in enacting it, the Legislative Branch has not done what you say is improper: stringing together a series of extensions so as to effectively make the extensions unlimited. Rather, they have made an extension which is still clearly limited at the lifetime of the copyright holder plus however-many-decades. Perhaps your argument will hold more water when/if the Congress chooses to extend the copyrights again at their next expiration.

But, is that it is also entirely reasonable to allow the people, through their representatives to do that job too. The problem is that the elected representatives are corrupt, which ranges far beyond the copyright issue but, hey, that's politicians for you.

Amending the Constitution by interpreting its terms without reference to history, tradition, or other constitutional provisions is simply wrong. If you disagree with the Court's construction of the term "limited," you can either lobby legislators to amend/repeal the Act, or you can push for an amendment to the Constitution. [This is a bit like the tactics of gun control advocates who disregard the clear history of the Second Amendment in order to argue that it does not bestow a personal right. However, they would rather argue that than simply seek to amend/repeal that amendment, an approach which at least be more intellectually honest than to ignore precedent and plain meaning.] It is far more difficult to mount a grass roots campaign to do that; it is far, far easier to ask a federal court to rewrite the constitution. However, that is not the system we have, nor should it be.

The people haven't a look in.

I don't think that it is so much that as the fact that people toss around the term "unconstitutional" as a synonym for "inconvenient" or "bad." What you seek to do is return to the era of Lochner, during which courts struck down legislation simply because they disagreed with it. (In some respect, Lochner still lives in the social arena, as the courts strike down social legislation with which they disagree.) But the point is: Courts prefer precision, and simply because you or I disagree with public policy, it does not make the law unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court ruled that it does not violate the double jeopardy clause of the 5th Amendment to try someone at both the state and federal level. It's hard to imagine how they managed to interpret it that way. You can read some about it here. I don't agree with the logic. The Supreme Court seems to be focused on the violation of 'laws', whereas the language in the Bill of Rights is 'for the same offense'. I'd take that to mean that you do one bad thing, you can only be put in jeopardy for it once. If you shoot two people, you've committed two crimes. But in another violation of the 5th amendment, you'll be charged with two counts of murder, possession of an unlicensed firearm, possession of a firearm with intent to cause harm, assault with a deadly weapon, unlawful discharge of a firearm, conspiracy to commit murder, and so on. In fact, the Supreme Court specifically contramands such separate charges unless Congress uses "language which is clear and definite", which to me implies the creation of a judicial mandate to decide the applicability of the 5th amendment.

I detect a distinct note of desperate defensiveness in your replies to me.

No shit? You are an idiot. Of course I dislike you.

You can't attack the post, so you attack the poster.

I did attack the post, dipshit. Go learn to read.

I detect a distinct note of desperate defensiveness in your replies to me.

No shit? You are an idiot. Of course I dislike you.

You can't attack the post, so you attack the poster.

I did attack the post, dipshit. Go learn to read.

I detect a distinct note of desperate defensiveness in your replies to me.

No shit? You are an idiot. Of course I dislike you.

You can't attack the post, so you attack the poster.

I did attack the post, dipshit. Go learn to read.

I detect a distinct note of desperate defensiveness in your replies to me.

No shit? You are an idiot. Of course I dislike you.

You can't attack the post, so you attack the poster.

I did attack the post, dipshit. Go learn to read.

I detect a distinct note of desperate defensiveness in your replies to me.

No shit? You are an idiot. Of course I dislike you.

You can't attack the post, so you attack the poster.

I did attack the post, dipshit. Go learn to read.

I detect a distinct note of desperate defensiveness in your replies to me.

No shit? You are an idiot. Of course I dislike you.

You can't attack the post, so you attack the poster.

I did attack the post, dipshit. Go learn to read.

I detect a distinct note of desperate defensiveness in your replies to me.

No shit? You are an idiot. Of course I dislike you.

You can't attack the post, so you attack the poster.

I did attack the post, dipshit. Go learn to read.

I detect a distinct note of desperate defensiveness in your replies to me.

No shit? You are an idiot. Of course I dislike you.

You can't attack the post, so you attack the poster.

I did attack the post, dipshit. Go learn to read.

There are constitutional issues with any law that would deter an individual from bearing arms of any type. I doubt the Supreme Court would stand for a law that punishes a person for leaving a loaded gun lying around where anyone can pick them up.

Gun registration is required. Background checks are required. Both can deter gun ownership (as a matter of fact, I believe they were intended to deter gun ownership). The Supreme Court has not seen fit to strike down the laws that require either of those. Those who leave loaded guns lying around are typically charged with Negligence if that gun is discharged by someone else and results in bodily injury. The Supreme Court has not seen fit to overturn those convictions.

These constitutional issues do not have any bearing on computers. There's no constitutional right to own a computer or have access to one, or have access to the Internet. As such, it is reasonable to make those who possess computers and maladminister them to the extent that they cause mayhem and real financial damage to third parties, accountable.

True, there is no constitutional protection for the ownership of computers (unless one wants to try the argument that they are a means to free speech, but that's another discussion). As such it is possible to punish those who maladminister them. I doubt you would find many who would agree that it is reasonable (especially in the ways you describe).

If I left my car keys hanging on a nail in a bar together with a description of my car in the bar's parking lot, there are few that would argue I bear some responsibility when it's subsequently used by drunks and is driven into an expensive diner across the street, causing thousands of dollars worth of damage.

You would probably be charged with Negligence in that situation, because a jury of your peers would view the combination of actions and conclude that a reasonable person would have seen the danger in them. Actually, those actions might even qualify for Gross Negligence or Criminal Negligence, considering that they almost seem intentional.

However, I think that your analogy is overstated. In my opinion, failing to properly lock down a server is more like leaving your keys in your car or leaving the door unlocked. Neither of those actions would typically result in any charges against you even if the vehicle was stolen and used in a homocide.

It's time we took action.

Yes, it's time we took action. But against those who perpetrate the crimes, not against those who are also victims of them. Yes, it's the job of hired sysadmin to secure a company's servers. But, except on rare occasions, people who don't do their job well are fired, not prosecuted.

http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/google/skgoogle 101702cmp.pdf

http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/google/skgoogle 101702pimot.pdf

http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/google/skgoogle 101702cmp.pdf

http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/google/skgoogle 101702pimot.pdf

Early American charters were created literally by the people, for the people as a legal convenience. Corporations were "artificial, invisible, intangible," mere financial tools. They were chartered by individual states, not the federal government, which meant they could be kept under close local scrutiny. They were automatically dissolved if they engaged in activities that violated their charter. Limits were placed on how big and powerful companies could become. Even railroad magnate J. P. Morgan, the consummate capitalist, understood that corporations must never become so big that they "inhibit freedom to the point where efficiency [is] endangered."

The two hundred or so corporations operating in the US by the year 1800 were each kept on fairly short leashes. They weren't allowed to participate in the political process. They couldn't buy stock in other corporations. And if one of them acted improperly, the consequences were severe. In 1832, President Andrew Jackson vetoed a motion to extend the charter of the corrupt and tyrannical Second Bank of the United States, and was widely applauded for doing so. That same year the state of Pennsylvania revoked the charters of ten banks for operating contrary to the public interest. Even the enormous industry trusts, formed to protect member corporations from external competitors and provide barriers to entry, eventually proved no match for the state. By the mid-1800s, antitrust legislation was widely in place.

"Donated $50 to the American Civil Liberties Union to become a "card-carrying" member. Received an FBI probe for aiding the terrorists."

I understand this is officially to become part of the ACLU membership package! Three cheers for the Fourth Amendment!

I've signed up... Have you?

While treaties bind the federal government (not the states) to cooperate internationally, this power cannot extend into the states of the Union. The force and effect of treaties remain at the border.

However, CONgress can enact legislation that affects only the District of Criminals and the territories and possessions exclusive of the several states of the Union.

For example, CONgress (not 2/3rds of the Senate) can "authorize" the POTUS to enter into international agreements implementing socialist insecurity:

42 USC 433
--cite--
(a) Purpose of agreement
The President is authorized (subject to the succeeding provisions of this section) to enter into agreements establishing totalization arrangements between the social security system established by this subchapter and the social security system of any foreign country, for the purposes of establishing entitlement to and the amount of old-age, survivors, disability, or derivative benefits based on a combination of an individual's periods of coverage under the social security system established by this subchapter and the social security system of such foreign country.
--end--

Such that it is, socialist insecurity is a program that is limited in jurisdiction to federal areas. It has no application within the states of the Union.

You may not be aware of 42 USC 405(c)(2)(B)(i):

It is the law which shows who has to get a social security number [my notes added].

--cite--
(B) (i) In carrying out the Commissioner's duties under subparagraph (A) and subparagraph (F), the Commissioner of Social Security shall take affirmative measures to assure that social security account numbers will, to the maximum extent practicable [This is the key here - "maximum extent practicable" still does not mean "required"], be assigned to all members of appropriate groups or categories of individuals by assigning such numbers (or ascertaining that such numbers have already been assigned):

(I) to aliens at the time of their lawful admission to the United States either for permanent residence or under other authority of law permitting them to engage in employment in the United States and to other aliens at such time as their status is so changed as to make it lawful for them to engage in such employment; [We see here that citizens are not required to get the number for "employment", only aliens. Also, since this is the Social Security Act, the term "employment" is a defined term in the law, and does not have the same meaning as the same term that you and I might want to convey during normal speech.]

(II) to any individual who is an applicant for or recipient of benefits under any program financed in whole or in part from Federal funds including any child on whose behalf such benefits are claimed by another person; and [We see here that someone is getting some benefits. It could be a citizen, it could be an alien, it doesn't matter. Read Ashwander v. TVA and Bowen v. Roy and you will see that someone who receives benefits cannot complain about paying for them.]

(III) to any other individual when it appears that he could have been but was not assigned an account number under the provisions of sub clauses (I) or (II) but only after such investigation as is necessary to establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of Social Security, the identity of such individual, the fact that an account number has not already been assigned to such individual, and the fact that such individual is a citizen or a noncitizen who is not, because of his alien status, prohibited from engaging in employment; [All this does is make the Secretary responsible to find everyone in class I and II above.] and, in carrying out such duties, the Commissioner of Social Security is authorized to take affirmative measures [Notice that it is no longer "maximum extent practicable". Does that mean less than "not required"?] to assure the issuance of social security numbers:

(IV) to or on behalf of children who are below school age at the request of their parents or guardians [This is how most folks got enumerated. Tell your parents, "Shame on you!" from me.]; and

(V) to children of school age at the time of their first enrollment in school. [Which is an important consideration, as many state schools are receiving federal funds and so need to get this number in order to collect. However, schools within the states of the Union are not technically not eligible for these funds.]
--end--

So can it be more clear from this that citizens are not required to get an SSN? It is required of aliens in order to work in the U.S., and of anyone else only in order to participate in a voluntary benefits program.

RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD v. ALTON R. CO., 295 U.S. 330 (1935)

"In final analysis, the petitioners' sole reliance is the thesis that efficiency depends upon morale, and morale in turn upon assurance of security for the worker's old age. Thus pensions are sought to be related to efficiency of transportation, and brought within the commerce power. In supporting the act the petitioners constantly recur to such phrases as 'old age security,' 'assurance of old age security,' 'improvement of employee morale and efficiency through providing definite assurance of old age security,' 'assurance of old age support,' 'mind at ease,' and 'fear of old age dependency.' These expressions are frequently connected with assertions that the removal of the fear of old age dependency will tend to create a better morale throughout the ranks of employees. The theory is that one who has an assurance against future dependency will do his work more cheerfully, and therefore more efficiently. The question at once presents itself whether the fostering of a contented mind on the part of an employee by legislation of this type is in any just sense a regulation of interstate transportation. If that question be answered in the affirmative, obviously there is no limit to the field of so-called regulation. The catalogue of means and actions which might be imposed upon an employer in any business, tending to the satisfaction and comfort of his employees, seems endless. Provision for free medical attendance and nursing, for clothing, for food, for housing, for the education of children, and a hundred other matters, might with equal propriety be proposed as tending to relieve the employee of mental strain and worry. Can it fairly be said that the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce extends to the prescription of any or all of these things? Is it not apparent that they are really and essentially related solely to the social welfare of the worker, and therefore remote from any regulation of commerce as such? We think the answer is plain. These matters obviously lie outside the orbit of congressional power. The answer of the petitioners is that not all such means of promoting contentment have such a close relation to interstate commerce as pensions. This is in truth no answer, for we must deal with the principle involved and not the means adopted. If contentment of the employee were an object for the attainment of which the regulatory power could be exerted, the courts could not question the wisdom of methods adopted for its advancement."