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You are correct. There is nothing more to it than that. The case number (on appeal to the 11th Circuit, at least) appears to be 11-cv-12426. Here is the 11th Circuit's opinion itself which makes things pretty clear: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/11-12426/11-12426-2012-02-27.html

Good thing the US has no such laws

Here:

http://patents.justia.com/inventor/HENRYYUNICK.html

U.S. Patent Number 5,645,368
A race track is disclosed having a tri-oval banked, racing surfacesurrounded by a barrier support material delineating a race barrier support surface at a

U.S. Patent Number 5,515,712
An apparatus and a method for testing internal combustion engines aredisclosed. In the preferred arrangement the apparatus includes a test module supporting an electric

U.S. Patent Number 5,246,086
An internal combustion engine oil change system including an oil filtersupplied with a check valve fill fitting. During an oil change, new oil is

U.S. Patent Number 4,862,859
A method and apparatus for operating an electric ignition, internalcombustion engine that substantially improves the fuel efficiency by utilizing heat normally discharged to the

U.S. Patent Number 4,637,365
A method and apparatus for operating an internal combustion engine thatsubstantially improves the fuel efficiency by utilizing heat normally discharged to the ambient to

U.S. Patent Number 4,592,329
A method and apparatus for operating an electric ignition, internalcombustion engine that substantially improves the fuel efficiency by utilizing heat normally discharged to the

U.S. Patent Number 4,503,833
A method and apparatus for operating an electric ignition, internalcombustion engine that substantially improves the fuel efficiency by utilizing heat normally discharged to the

U.S. Patent Number 4,467,752
An internal combustion engine having a cylinder 16, a cylinder head 10, anda piston 12 slidably mounted within the cylinder for reciprocating movement towards

U.S. Patent Number 4,068,635
A valve is interposed between spaced valve seats of a conduit having end portions communicating with the ends of an internal combustion engine valve

I guess I have to repeat the link posted above by someone else since some people still don't seem to get the point:

Regarding the motion to seal potential evidence at trial, the Court has made clear to the parties that all evidence introduced at trial will be open to the public, with the narrow exception of “exceptionally sensitive information that truly deserves protection.” Order at 2, ECF No. 1256 (citing Oracle Am. v. Google, Inc., No. 10-CV-03561-WHA, at ECF No. 540). With a July 30, 2012 trial date, this case has reached a stage of the proceedings where “the presumption of openness will apply to all documents[,] and only documents of exceptionally sensitive information that truly deserve protection will be allowed to be redacted or kept from the public.” ECF No. 1256 at 3.

Read: "in the discovery stage", the discovery stage being the time during which both parties can enter exhibits into evidence. The only real "too late" in discover is when it's over, though a judge can, as Koh did in this case, disallow evidence if it is brought in near the end of discovery.

I believe you're reading poor journalism as if it's factual. First, it wasn't actually Koh that disallowed the evidence, but Judge Grewal, the magistrate judge who presided over the discovery phase. Second, the discovery period was over... It wasn't merely "near the end", but expired. All of the documents are available here.

However, this is only supposed to be done if it is wholely new evidence, completely unknown to the other party, which the other party would require time to investigate. Since Samsung's filing was in response to Apple's filing regarding the F700, Apple was clearly aware of the F700 and this was not wholely new evidence, therefore it should not have been barred.

Nope, the internal documents regarding the design of the F700 were entirely new. That Apple was aware of the existence of the phone is irrelevant, if they were unaware of the internal documents. Plus, it still fails to answer the question of why didn't Samsung release these during the discovery phase?

iPhone, btw, not iPad)

Thanks for the correction. What Samsung is trying to claim is that they independently designed the F700 without copying Apple's design... but they can't use their documentary evidence, because they withheld it from discovery.

Its not what Apple is trying to claim. Apple is trying to claim that Samsun dependently designed the F700 they are alleging copying.

Actually, no... Here's the trial motions. The most recent is Apple's response to Quinn's declaration and motion for sanctions. Apparently, the only thing they claimed about the F700 was that it was a slide phone.

Now they know that to be false because of the dates. As far as I understand it the dates make Apple's claim impossible and Samsung's evidence shows this. Once Apple claims something they know to be false based on the excluded evidence that opens the door. Apple cannot freely perjure because Samsung got sanctioned. I think at this point, Apple has opened the door. Because of Samsung's late filling Apple had the right to ignore the F700 entirely. They don't have the right to lie about the dates various events occurred.

However, they can certainly describe the F700 factually, without discussing any of the design dates.

Now if you are right and the F700 were in fact late enough that it could have been after the images of the iPhone then this whole gets tricky but I suspect the result is the same. Because Apple is still alleging events that occurred inside of Samsung i.e. they are making positive claims that Samsung employees committed torts which evidence shows they did not commit. I think they have to make a positive case for copying and that's going to be impossible not to trip over Samsung's internal documents. So again I don't see how to have the kind of one sided sanction you are pushing for without holding Apple to a very high standard.

There is two ways to look at this. F700 is either fundamental or not. If Quinn is telling the truth and the entire defense is going to based on that both Apple and Samsung were copying Sony, I'm sorry Koh cannot exclude the core of entire defense that's simply too harsh a sanction. We do not sanction defendants for minor errors without automatically losing cases.

Well, except that if their entire defense is based on that, then they shouldn't have withheld it during discovery. The rules are impartial and require both parties to disclose evidence in a timely manner... Samsung doesn't get a pass just because they'd lose.

Similarly if the F700 is key to Apple's case that Samsung was copying then everything related to it is important. If it is a side issue than Apple should have the right to decide whether to just avoid it, or lose the sanction.

So I disagree pretty strongly. Once Apple makes claims about anything that happened inside Samsung the evidence of what really happened comes in. Regardless of what Samsung did during discovery. Samsung's misbehavior at discovery never gives Apple license to perjure or mislead the court.

No, I agree, Apple can't make any misleading or factually incorrect statements... But they don't have to ignore the existence of the F700 completely, particularly when it was disclosed during discovery. It was only the design documents that were withheld, so it's only those documents that are excluded.

disruption of the proceedings through poor behaviour, or publication of material deemed likely to jeopardize a fair trial.

none of this took place in court so it was not disruptive, and none of the material was "DEEMED" (by order) likely to jeopardize a fair trial

From the Judge's finding: http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/california/candce/5:2011cv01846/239768/1269/0.pdf?ts=1342862765

Regarding the motion to seal potential evidence at trial, the Court has made clear to the parties that all evidence introduced at trial will be open to the public, with the narrow exception of "exceptionally sensitive information that truly deserves protection." Order at 2, ECF No. 1256 (citing Oracle Am. v. Google, Inc., No. 10-CV-03561-WHA, at ECF No. 540). With a July 30, 2012 trial date, this case has reached a stage of the proceedings where "the presumption of openness will apply to all documents[,] and only documents of exceptionally sensitive information that truly deserve protection will be allowed to be redacted or kept from the public." ECF No. 1256 at 3.

and from your previous comment:

An open trial only means that the public can assist it, not the public can have access to all the information related to it.

This is where you're wrong. See the quote above.

Those who seek to maintain the secrecy of documents attached to dispositive motions must meet the high threshold of showing that ‘compelling reasons’ support secrecy” while a showing of good cause will suffice at earlier stages of litigation. Id. . .

Similarly, this Court explained at the June 29, 2012 case management conference that “the whole trial is going to be open.” Hr’g Tr. at 78. In light of the Ninth Circuit’s admonition in Kamakana regarding the presumption of openness and the high burden placed on sealing documents at this late, merits stage of the litigation, it appears that the parties have overdesignated confidential documents and are seeking to seal information that is not truly sealable under the “compelling reasons” standard. As one example, the parties have sought to redact descriptions of trial exhibits that will presumably be used in open court.

. . .the parties are ORDERED to carefully scrutinize the documents it seeks to seal. At this stage of the proceedings, the presumption of openness will apply to all documents and only documents of exceptionally sensitive information that truly deserve protection will be allowed to be redacted or kept from the public. Nearly all of the documents which met the lower, “good cause” standard do not meet the higher, “compelling reasons” standard for trial.

Please show me anywhere where the judge rules that all documents are to be public. She was responding to yet another request from Samsung (and probably directed at Apple top) that they should only seal documents for specific reasons. But she did not rule all documents to be unsealed.

Yep. Usually, they just spend it, of course. In fact, they're usually in debt, and spend the beginning of the term trying to pay off those debts before they can run again. Hillary Clinton is still trying to pay down the debt from her campaign, so the "Hillary Clinton for President" committee still exists.

If there's anything left over, they usually end up giving it to somebody else's campaign or to the national committee. Charitable donations are also legal.

http://law.justia.com/cfr/title11/11-1.0.1.1.21.0.1.2.html

It specifically forbids personal use (where the previous section gives a lengthy description of what constitutes "personal use", to the point where they have to say explicitly "yes, it's OK if you wear campaign tee-shirt".)

I didn't ignore it, though the address was implicit rather than explicit.

That take on the Establishment Clause fits the definition of the redundancy of non-right assertion I described earlier. If it meant that they were to have a place neither above nor below the exercise of a non-right it would not fit with the spirit of the Bill of Rights, which was intended quite clearly to specifically enumerate certain things over which Congress should have no power (or specifically limited power).

That is a very Constructionist view on the Establishment Clause, wherein it is a reading of semantic exactness absent any context. From such a view follows that no law may mention an establishment of religion, nor may a religious argument be used as a defense in any matter. As a result, what further follows is that any religion may be outlawed, or any other religion may be supported, by careful crafting of legislation absent particular key words. This was clearly not the intent, and the Absurdity Doctrine should be used liberally when such a view is taken. A good read on that particular subject is United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, 74 U. S. 486 (1868). While it does not address absurdity in the strict reading of legislation in religious terms, it may be generally applied to any strict reading of legal wording and why such interpretations should be viewed, at best, with suspicion.

I believe your views on religion have clouded your perspective to the same degree that a Christian fundamentalist, who would argue for the Establishment Clause not allowing the promotion of a particular brand of Christianity, but allowing for the promotion of Christianity in general as it is not a "particular religion."

I am not saying that religious rights should overrule legitimate issues of public safety, as I've said before, because that does not violate the neutrality principles of doing the least harm in the pursuit of protecting the rights of all. However, when specific behavior is targeted which was not previously illegal, it amounts to using the legislature to pressure the religious to change their practices to satisfy societal mores. It is an undue burden, even if a religion is not specifically mentioned, and has no compelling societal interest which mandates those people give up a previously legal practice. If you eliminate the undue burden test, it becomes trivially easy to play religious favorites with legislation, and runs directly counter to the concept of neutrality.

No, it was actually a result of New Hampshire attempting to force Dartmouth College to become a public institution after the president of the College was deposed by its trustees.

Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819)

This is a common and incorrect understanding of entrapment.

One shared by the Supreme Court Of The United States.
They incorrectly claim that the prosecution must overcome a "subjective test" by showing the defendant had a predisposition to commit the crime in any event, even if the law enforcement operatives had not been present.

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/287/435/case.html
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/503/540/case.html

I think you need to go teach these justices the errors of their ways.

This is a common and incorrect understanding of entrapment.

One shared by the Supreme Court Of The United States.
They incorrectly claim that the prosecution must overcome a "subjective test" by showing the defendant had a predisposition to commit the crime in any event, even if the law enforcement operatives had not been present.

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/287/435/case.html
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/503/540/case.html

I think you need to go teach these justices the errors of their ways.

Sure. The text is here: http://law.justia.com/cfr/title31/31-3.1.1.1.14.2.1.4.html

"the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply" Only one of those words requires that the item is sold. Note the use of the word "or".

Thanks for the link and the clarification.

The refused buyer said she was "from Iran" in Farsi. She did not say that she was going to ship the device to Iran.

I'm afraid you're taking the woman's claim as reported by the journalist as the entirety of what was said. As we haven't got the other side of the story, we need to read between the lines to make the report make sense.

She WAS intending to supply it to a relative in Iran, and that is what the Apple policy (based on the relevant law) prohibits. The clerk isn't a mind reader. Hence she obviously mentioned either to the clerk, or the person she was with, the fact that she was intending to send it to Iran.

Note the policy obviously DOES NOT prohibit supply to Iranian-Americans or people who can speak Farsi. That doesn't even make sense.

All that said, no one (at least I haven't seen it on this thread) has produced the text of the embargo law that specifically restricts this technology from being *given* to anyone. AFAIK, the sanctions are specific to companies that knowingly *sell* restricted technologies to foreign governments or the agents thereof. I could be wrong on that -- please correct me if I am.

Sure. The text is here: http://law.justia.com/cfr/title31/31-3.1.1.1.14.2.1.4.html

"the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply" Only one of those words requires that the item is sold. Note the use of the word "or".

Yes, it is.

Read it.

http://law.justia.com/cfr/title31/31-3.1.1.1.14.2.1.4.html

That, to me, says a lot about the people defending these activities.

That they are right and you are wrong.

I am not convinced this is actually the law.

Well it is.

"Â 560.204 Prohibited exportation, reexportation, sale or supply of goods, technology, or services to Iran.
Except as otherwise authorized pursuant to this part, including Â560.511, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to May 7, 1995, the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States, or by a United States person, wherever located, of any goods, technology, or services to Iran or the Government of Iran is prohibited, including the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply of any goods, technology, or services to a person in a third country undertaken with knowledge or reason to know that:
(a) Such goods, technology, or services are intended specifically for supply, transshipment, or reexportation, directly or indirectly, to Iran or the Government of Iran; or
(b) Such goods, technology, or services are intended specifically for use in the production of, for commingling with, or for incorporation into goods, technology, or services to be directly or indirectly supplied, transshipped, or reexported exclusively or predominantly to Iran or the Government of Iran."
http://law.justia.com/cfr/title31/31-3.1.1.1.14.2.1.4.html

Try to not use your real name when posting on tech forums. You come across as insecure and not knowing.

And with your name, you should consider changing it, because prospective employers like to google names, and find things like
Spamming: http://luni.org/pipermail/luni/2010-July/027748.html
Drug charge: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/914/1527/243231/
Alleged wifebeating and stabbing attempt: http://on-suicides-deaths.blogspot.com/2009/04/nh-man-killed-in-lakes-region-crash.html

Those might not be you, but a prospective employer might not spend the extra time on finding out.

I figured someone would take exception to that line. Your reasoning is extremely sloppy, similar to the person I was replying to originally. You really have no idea what you're talking about.

The Supreme Court's current position on obscenity is Miller vs. California. The Miller Test is...

(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient [lustful; sexual] interest
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

"patently offensive" is also determined by "community standards" since, 'The jury may measure the essentially factual issues of prurient appeal and patent offensiveness by the standard that prevails in the forum community, and need not employ a "national standard."' So, to "block [pornography] everywhere" on the internet, we would need...

(1) Under the current system, state legislation to outlaw it, completely changed community standards that call all internet pornography "patently offensive" (I myself am not at all offended by most depictions of sex acts on the internet), an amendment to Oregon's state constitution which according to State v. Henry allows no state obscenity laws in Oregon, a radically altered understanding of internet-based obscenity and indecency censorship as discussed in Reno v. ACLU, the ability to somehow block those outside the US generating pornography from letting US citizens view it, ....

(2) An extraordinary overturning of the Miller test which also overturns several other protections while simultaneously making the Court into the legislature. Honestly if that happened in a climate anywhere near the current one, we would impeach them for astounding judicial activism. Their decision would almost certainly be reversed through their replacements or through the a constitutional amendment. It's just not going to happen.

(3) A constitutional amendment that's certain to be wildly unpopular. Even ostensibly popular ones like the DC Voting Rights Amendment don't pass.

Sexual obscenity prosecutions in the US traditionally deal with extremely hard core acts like simulated rape and abuse, unsolicited hard core materials distributed as advertising, or the distribution of materials to minors. Adults looking up regular porn online fits into none of those categories. The only attempts at restricting online porn I'm aware of try to restrict access to minors and not adults. In all, to "block [pornography] everywhere" on the internet would require extraordinary changes in the Supreme Court, society in general, the state legislatures, and probably Congress. It is not going to happen.

I figured someone would take exception to that line. Your reasoning is extremely sloppy, similar to the person I was replying to originally. You really have no idea what you're talking about.

The Supreme Court's current position on obscenity is Miller vs. California. The Miller Test is...

(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient [lustful; sexual] interest
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

"patently offensive" is also determined by "community standards" since, 'The jury may measure the essentially factual issues of prurient appeal and patent offensiveness by the standard that prevails in the forum community, and need not employ a "national standard."' So, to "block [pornography] everywhere" on the internet, we would need...

(1) Under the current system, state legislation to outlaw it, completely changed community standards that call all internet pornography "patently offensive" (I myself am not at all offended by most depictions of sex acts on the internet), an amendment to Oregon's state constitution which according to State v. Henry allows no state obscenity laws in Oregon, a radically altered understanding of internet-based obscenity and indecency censorship as discussed in Reno v. ACLU, the ability to somehow block those outside the US generating pornography from letting US citizens view it, ....

(2) An extraordinary overturning of the Miller test which also overturns several other protections while simultaneously making the Court into the legislature. Honestly if that happened in a climate anywhere near the current one, we would impeach them for astounding judicial activism. Their decision would almost certainly be reversed through their replacements or through the a constitutional amendment. It's just not going to happen.

(3) A constitutional amendment that's certain to be wildly unpopular. Even ostensibly popular ones like the DC Voting Rights Amendment don't pass.

Sexual obscenity prosecutions in the US traditionally deal with extremely hard core acts like simulated rape and abuse, unsolicited hard core materials distributed as advertising, or the distribution of materials to minors. Adults looking up regular porn online fits into none of those categories. The only attempts at restricting online porn I'm aware of try to restrict access to minors and not adults. In all, to "block [pornography] everywhere" on the internet would require extraordinary changes in the Supreme Court, society in general, the state legislatures, and probably Congress. It is not going to happen.

I am not even convinced that Google copied those 9 lines.

Then you might want to try reading at least the text of the link I posted if not the linked court documents themselves.

And maybe this 9 lines of code don't seem like a big deal? What about the other hundreds of lines that were decompiled and copied? There's no story about that? This filing has some more information. http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/california/candce/3:2010cv03561/231846/1157/

The most interesting point is if Bloch did work on the code for OpenJDK and also worked on Andriod code, doesn't that throw the whole "cleanroom implementation" out the window?

Where did he work first ? Second Sun does not own openjdk, a lot of files in Open JDK were clean room implementation too, or pulled from Red Hat's iced tea implementation.

I am not even convinced that Google copied those 9 lines.

Then you might want to try reading at least the text of the link I posted if not the linked court documents themselves.

And maybe this 9 lines of code don't seem like a big deal? What about the other hundreds of lines that were decompiled and copied? There's no story about that? This filing has some more information. http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/california/candce/3:2010cv03561/231846/1157/

The most interesting point is if Bloch did work on the code for OpenJDK and also worked on Andriod code, doesn't that throw the whole "cleanroom implementation" out the window?

It really would depend on the quantity and how the attorneys presented it. Having a cache filled with months of CP and no alternate explanation for how it got there is unlikely to be looked on favorably by a judge and/or jury. Several federal cases have tried to use a similar defense (see http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/305/1193/593156/) without success, but all I've seen had evidence of the defendant manipulating the files in the cache so they really couldn't claim ignorance.

The court asserted that there must be some deliberate action to save/store said images, not just a transitory download via a browser.

Actually, that's not completely accurate. The court said that the prosecution failed to prove that Kent knew about the browser cache. At least two previous cases (here and here) left open this possibility but those cases had clear-cut cases of the defendant accessing and using the browser's cache. The transitory download is still illegal if you know about it.

Not sure but I think this is not a filing over how it's done but rather a filing over whether or not the performance is a copy of or derivative of Teller's 1983 copyrighted description. I don't know how this trick works but I'm guessing if Bakardy had chosen a different flower, a different cutting device, a different setting, etc and changed it just superficially enough so that the mechanic is still relayed to the viewer he might escape the copyright. But it seems Teller has written this out like a play and it will be up to the courts to decide if Bakardy is infringing on that copyrighted material. You'll notice that this is about copyright and performance, not a patent and methodology.

If this lawsuit is over how it's done, I agree with you. I see it similar to software patents where I see a program that does something -- say manages all ID3 tags of your library through HTML table interactions -- and I want to make something behave the same way. Even though I don't have the source code, I figure it out one way or the other. Maybe it's the same way your patent describes, maybe it isn't. It doesn't matter, I've never seen your source code and I'm not infringing on the graphics and layout so why should you be able to sue me when I write something that does (perceptually) the same thing? People who are smart enough to figure out their own solutions shouldn't be prohibited from employing that intelligence ...

Federal law makes it illegal to bring a loaded weapon to the airport for any reason, unless you are law enforcement personnel on duty, and ordered to go to the airport. The law has been in place for some time. It doesn't matter if they post that sign or not, they can still arrest you for bringing a loaded or concealed (on your person, not your luggage) firearm to the airport. I think they started posting those signs as a courtesy for state laws. Just to remind people that you should not do so.

Incorrect. There is no federal law that bans bringing firearms to airports, that's badly misinformed FUD you're peddling. Firearms control in the general access of airports is left to the state-specific laws; any firearms past the posted security checkpoints can happen with either a) you being law enforcement with special dispensation or b) you check your firearm in the luggage according to FEDERAL law and some airlines' regulations.

Gee. There are federal laws telling citizens how they can fly on a plane with their firearms but, according to you, they can be arrested simply for showing up to the airport?

As to you living in Florida, that's fine -- each state has their own firearms laws in general, but you're so wrong you're not even wrong when it comes to the federal firearms law.

I said loaded weapon. I emphasized it for you again. You cannot, by federal law, bring a loaded weapon to the airport. Just walking in to the terminal building of any airport with a loaded gun is a violation. It doesn't matter where you have it, whether it is your luggage, or on your person. Yes you can travel via airplane with a firearm but it cannot be loaded. Please see 49 CFR 1540.111. I'll even provide you a link, so you don't even have to use Google: http://law.justia.com/cfr/title49/49-9.1.3.5.8.2.10.6.html

Oracle's PL/SQL is an extension of SQL which, would be copyrighted by someone from the long long ago.

Actually, probably, Oracle. Oracle started when Larry Ellison took ideas embodied in an IBM whitepaper (the "R" DBMS) and implemented them; Oracle v2 (there was no v1) was the first commercial implementation of SQL anywhere. (IBM internally had a version called SEQUEL that differed in many respects from Oracle (then "Relational")'s SQL, and though I'm not certain, I'm pretty sure IBM's internal use didn't constitute "publication" required for copyright protection at the time).

However, given that a computer programming language is, by definition, a definition of a system of instruction -- the definition of a functional process, if you will -- which seems to me like it would implicate Lotus v. Borland and thus be not copyrightable. That is, a clean-room implementation of a compiler that used the language's syntax, but none of the protectable (assuming for the purpose of laziness an Altai Abstraction/Filtration/Comparison test) code from the author's compiler implementation, would seem to me to be A-Okay. (Though I have not researched it in any depth. This is not legal advise, yada yada.)

Just be careful what you say there; Texas has a law against the defamation of beef.

And get arrested for criminal impersonation? From http://law.justia.com/codes/nebraska/2006/s28index/s2806008000.html

A person commits the crime of criminal impersonation if he or she [a]ssumes a false identity and does an act in his or her assumed character with intent ... to deceive or harm another... Criminal impersonation is a Class II misdemeanor if no credit, money, goods, services, or other thing of value was gained or was attempted to be gained.

Ellipsis indicate elision of text that's not applicable to a traffic stop like the GP describes.

> You may not agree, but driving on publicly owned roads is not a right.

Total nonsense.

Are you really _that_ ignorant of case laws and history?

http://law.justia.com/constitution/us/amendment-14/96-right-to-travel.html

i.e.
"The right of the citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, either by carriage or by automobile, is not a mere privilege which a city may prohibit at will, but a common right which he has under the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Thompson v. Smith, 154 SE 179.

Google: Right To Travel

"To have a passport is privilege, it's not entitled to you by citizenship," Priest said

The law disagrees completely - http://law.justia.com/cfr/title22/22-1.0.1.6.33.5.5.1.html. Note there are grounds for denying a passport, but there are also grounds for puttting you in prison - that doesn't mean not being in prison is a priviledge.

Or if you prefer statements made to the public of how the government interpretes the law:

Every United States citizen is entitled to a U.S. passport provided that they, or an adult acting on a child's behalf, comply with all applicable requirements, and that there is no statutory or regulatory reason to deny the passport.

        - http://travel.state.gov/passport/ppi/family/family_864.html

Heck it uses the word "entitled"!

Well, if they overbook the flight too much and no one will take their offers, the airline's involuntarily deny passengers entry and hand them a form detailing 14 USC 250.9 ( link ). The law is a protectionary measure that says, any airline can break our contract with you at any time by handing you a maximum of $200.00 and finding you an alternative flight within 2 hours of your flight, or by handing you $400.00 and telling you to piss off. Though, you can refuse the payment, and opt to sue them in court.

Of course, airlines loathe paying any money back, so they offer you the free flights instead. All-in-all I guess the law works decently well, but I can assure you getting one of those forms and being told your next flight will be available in 8 hours after a red-eye flight from California is not a fun experience. Though, here's a tip, tell them you're refusing the payment and opting to seek compensation in court while booking the first available last-minute ticket on whatever airline is leaving next. In my case, they, amazingly, found me a seat.

It actually holds exactly the opposite! http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/michigan/miedce/2:2009mc50872/241276/4/0.pdf?1269990661 "Accordingly, the Court quashes the subpoena requiring Defendant to testify – giving up his password – thereby protecting his invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination."

quash (kwahsh), vb.1. To annul or make void; to terminate (quash an indictment) (quash proceedings); 2. To suppress or subdue; to crush (quash a rebellion). [Black's Law Dictionary, 8e]

I've shown you repeatedly that the bill does no such thing.

- you have never shown me anything, you have said it every time, but that means zilch.

You never provide sources, and when you do post links they don't say what you claim they say.

- links and quotes and more links.

The President cannot round people up into concentration camps. That's simply not true.

- ACLU and directors of CIA, FBI and National Intelligence say you are wrong and he can.

--

I have MORE information, this time

Part 1

Part 2

This is by Joanne Mariner, a Justia columnist, is the director of Hunter College's Human Rights Program. She is an expert on human rights, counterterrorism, and international humanitarian law.

Her conclusion is that you are WRONG and the provision 1021 of NDAA MUST BE REPEALED.

Of-course Ron Paul introduced a bill to repeal that section of NDAA, we'll see how that goes.

I've shown you repeatedly that the bill does no such thing.

- you have never shown me anything, you have said it every time, but that means zilch.

You never provide sources, and when you do post links they don't say what you claim they say.

- links and quotes and more links.

The President cannot round people up into concentration camps. That's simply not true.

- ACLU and directors of CIA, FBI and National Intelligence say you are wrong and he can.

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I have MORE information, this time

Part 1

Part 2

This is by Joanne Mariner, a Justia columnist, is the director of Hunter College's Human Rights Program. She is an expert on human rights, counterterrorism, and international humanitarian law.

Her conclusion is that you are WRONG and the provision 1021 of NDAA MUST BE REPEALED.

Of-course Ron Paul introduced a bill to repeal that section of NDAA, we'll see how that goes.

You'd have a case that the constitution does not grant the federal government the authority to ban hunting. I can't even see the commerce clause being stretched far enough to cover that one.

http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/615/784/415927/

This appeal by the United States presents the question of the constitutionality of the Airborne Hunting Act of 1971. The appellees were charged with shooting a coyote from an aircraft in violation of the Act. The United States District Court for the District of Montana found the Act unconstitutional as "an impermissible and invalid preemption of a regulatory power plainly reserved to the states," and dismissed the charges. Because it was error to hold the act unconstitutional, we reverse.

The commerce clause of the Constitution, art. I, section 8, clause 3, is fully sufficient to empower Congress to enact the statute and to sustain its enforcement against these appellees.

I admit that they argued the Federal government had the authority here because it was in the airspace. However, I think if they wanted to they'd regulate hunting on the ground too. After all, hunting could affect some sort of interstate fur market, even if it doesn't exist.

Doesn't surprise me much after I read this, "The Constitution of the United States of America including analysis and interpretation of the Constitution with annotations of cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States through June 29, 2004" @ http://law.justia.com/constitution/us/ .
Kinda woke me up to the "Brave New 1984" this place is turning out to be and it's not crap by some nutball, its SCOTUS telling us black is white, 2+2=3 . Frankly, I suspect some of the nutballs are on to something.

... and on that note, this is something you might want to look into then:
We the People, Not We the Corporations

The amendment:

Move to Amend 28th Amendment

Section 1 [A corporation is not a person and can be regulated]

The rights protected by the Constitution of the United States are the rights of natural persons only.

Artificial entities, such as corporations, limited liability companies, and other entities, established by the laws of any State, the United States, or any foreign state shall have no rights under this Constitution and are subject to regulation by the People, through Federal, State, or local law.

The privileges of artificial entities shall be determined by the People, through Federal, State, or local law, and shall not be construed to be inherent or inalienable.

Section 2 [Money is not speech and can be regulated]

Federal, State and local government shall regulate, limit, or prohibit contributions and expenditures, including a candidate’s own contributions and expenditures, for the purpose of influencing in any way the election of any candidate for public office or any ballot measure.

Federal, State and local government shall require that any permissible contributions and expenditures be publicly disclosed.

The judiciary shall not construe the spending of money to influence elections to be speech under the First Amendment.

Section 3

Nothing contained in this amendment shall be construed to abridge the freedom of the press.

Some background (because yes, corporations are made of people, but this does not make them people):

1. Corporate Personhood in a Nutshell

There are two conceptions of corporate personhood. The first simply bestows upon corporations the ability to engage in many legal actions (e.g. enter into contracts, sue, be sued, etc). This is widely accepted and we do not object to this. However, corporate personhood also commonly refers to the Supreme Court - created precedent of corporations enjoying constitutional rights that were intended solely for human beings. We believe this form of corporate personhood corrupts our Constitution and must be corrected by amending the Constitution. Neither the Declaration of Independence nor the Constitution ever mention corporations, which were rare entities at our nation’s founding. But thanks to decades of rulings by Justices who molded the law to favor elite interests, corporations today are granted privileges that empower them to deny citizens the right to full self-governance. For example, the Supreme Court has:

• 
  prohibited routine inspections of corporate property without a warrant or prior permission, even though scheduling such visits may permit a company to hide threats to public health and safety. (Marshall v Barlow’s, 1978)
• 
  struck down state laws requiring companies to disclose product origins (International Dairy v. Amnestoy, [pdf] 1996), thus creating “negative free speech rights” for corporations and preventing us from knowing what’s in our food.
• 
  prohibited citizens wanting to defend their local businesses and community from corporate chains encroachment from enacting progressive taxes on chain stores. (Liggett v. Lee,

The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.

Like it or not, this is clearly a measure "provided for by law" and also "necessary to protect national security [and] public order". The fact that the measures are unlikely to actually be effective at protecting the public is unlikely to cause a court to rule them a violation.

Just earlier this week Slashdot ran a story to the effect that the government should never regulate technology, because they don't understand any of it. Well, more or less for the same reason, judges tend to give deference to the decisions of government bodies that are (theoretically) experts on the subject. The judge is going to take the word of the government agencies saying "we need to do this to increase security" because hey, they're the ones who spend all their time protecting the public.

As for the US cases you cite, I find nothing in Paul v. Virginia that's even related to this topic. And Corfield v Coryell is a district court ruling, which means it's not precedent. And it isn't in agreement with the actual precedent on the issue of the 14th Amendment (the Slaughterhouse cases) or the right to travel. Gilmore v Gonzales is the case most directly dealing with this issuek, and it's not a Supreme Court ruling but it is binding precedent for part of the country: You don't have the right to any one particular mode of transportation, even if it is far more convenient than any other.

If it were the only available mode of transportation, the constitutionality question would be very different. But in the particular case at issue, you can take a taxi, or a bicycle, or even simply walk.

If I may contribute to your post, here's a link to the Third Circuit United States Court of Appeals ruling which explains Mr. Pozsgai's behavior in detail.

There are a few more details from the case I'd like to point out. Mr. Pozsgai himself stated in that the police came to his property in August 1987 and showed him the EPA order to cease and desist dumping landfill on the property. In December 1987 the EPA sent Mr. Pozsgai an umpteenth letter which, aside from yet again informing him his activities were illegal, also informed him that he could remedy the situation and get permission to proceed with his landfill if he merely obtained a Water Quality Certification from the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources.

But my favorite part is how on August 26 1988 a Court issued a temporary restraining order explicitly ordering him to cease. And how Mr. Pozsgai flagrantly defied that court order two days later, when he was videoed dumping 25 additional truckloads on the property and personally driving a bulldozer leveling the fill.

But of course only a wildly biased treehugger commie liberal would pay any attention to "facts" from the court record. A true conservative will go by the FreeRepublic account.

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The US Supreme Court has found on at least two occasions that collecting fingerprints constitutes a search, and that the government must therefor produce probable cause before being allowed to do so.

Especially when you consider that for kids under the age of 16, attendance at High School is required by law, they are now in the ridiculous position of requiring a search without probable cause for failing to break the law.

The US Supreme Court has found on at least two occasions that collecting fingerprints constitutes a search, and that the government must therefor produce probable cause before being allowed to do so.

Especially when you consider that for kids under the age of 16, attendance at High School is required by law, they are now in the ridiculous position of requiring a search without probable cause for failing to break the law.

Not a lot of detail here:
http://www.rfcexpress.com/lawsuits/copyright-lawsuits/massachusetts-district-court/82641/astrolabe-inc-v-arthur-david-olson/summary/
http://dockets.justia.com/docket/massachusetts/madce/1:2011cv11725/139342/

but appears to be a copyright infringement suit.

http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2011cv02564/377900/49/1.pdf

The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the [copyright] monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.

So does this extension mean the EU has a different opinion on the function of copyright?

There's more here than meets the eye.

One of the charges was"obtaining citizenship by fraud". 8 CFR PART 340 allows USCIS to "reopen a naturalization proceeding and revoke naturalization" within 2 years of granting citizenship, if there's reason to believe the application was based on fraudulent information. Under this process, the woman can be "administratively denaturalized", but only after a full course of hearings and other due process.

I'll bet you dollars to donuts this was part of some bigger deal involving Washington and Beijing. The woman doesn't want to go to Federal prison for 20+ years, Washington doesn't want a diplomatic brouhaha involving a Chinese-born citizen, and Beijing doesn't want to lose face (again). This was a back-door option that worked for everyone.

Forget it - this is asset forfeiture. The feds already raided Gibson once, back in 2009. They took a lot of ebony, but never filed charges. Gibson is still fighting the asset forfeiture case, and the burden of proof is exactly wrong: Gibson must prove their innocence of any wrong-doing. The feds want to keep the stuff; it would be auctioned off, and they would get to keep the proceeds. One of the theories explaining this second raid is that the feds are pissed that Gibson hasn't just rolled over on the first case.

Asset forfeiture is perverse: you aren't charged with anything at all - your *property* is. The Gibson case is entitled "United States of America v. Ebony Wood in Various Forms". There is no presumption of innocence, because your property isn't a person, and anyway isn't being charged with a crime. The fact that this is naked theft is apparently beside the point - it is a very lucrative racket for law enforcement agencies at all levels.

"Basically, you think the cop should be charged exactly the same as a regular citizen would be and that is what I disagree with."

And that is where you are wrong, as the cop is nothing more than an ordinary citizen given more power.

And my suggestion was a MINIMUM.

Here are your sources - YOU do the reading http://www.justia.com/search.py?cx=001017683474852908061%3Aoct7h3tcday&q=accessory&sa=Search+Justia&cof=FORID%3A11&siteurl=www.justia.com%2Fsearch.py%3Fcx%3D001017683474852908061%253Aoct7h3tcday%26q%3Dconspiracy%2Bto%2Bwitness%26sa%3DSearch%2BJustia%26cof%3DFORID%253A11

Oracle don't have a copyright infringement claim against Google?

http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/california/candce/3:2010cv03561/231846/1/