Slashdot Mirror

You know that GPG keys are identified and signed by their MD5 hashes?

I vaguely remember that the short key ID used a flimsy hash, but to avoid that you only had to verify the key length.
Looking around, MD5 looked dubious in 1997, and alternatives - like SHA1 and RIPEMD-160 - got incorporated to PGP.
So. I don't buy this. PGP.com knows about it.

Are you a relative of Phil Zimmerman the creator of PGP???

see the article PGP Identity Management: Secure Authentication and Authorization over the Internet at http://www.pgp.com/resources/ctocorner/identitymgm t.html

You can check out the commercial version at http://www.pgp.com/, but I would also seriously consider PGPckt 6.58, a forked and free version that works just fine under WinXP (and previous versions of Windows). That's the version I've been using.

A solution to stopping spam is outlined here:

http://antispam.yahoo.com/domainkeys

I picked up this link from here:

http://www.pgp.com/resources/ctocorner/cryptoandsp am.html

This was a discussion about how pgp alone will not stop spam but how yahoo domain keys might. Due to domainkeys ability to actually verify the domain the e-mail is being sent from.

Mathematics is not a crime. -- James Turpin (789479)

Mr. Turpin's signature was likely commenting on the right and ability to use 'strong encryption' to secure ones 'thoughts and posessions' at all times.

Here in America, encryption is treated like a weapon instead of a digital envelope. Added to that, 'real encryption' in its purest form is nothing more than grade-school math applied to very large numbers.

So I guess Mr. Turpin is 'asking':

Is it a crime to use math (via strong cryptography) to have privacy and security?

Just 'ask' PGP creator Phil Zimmerman about his experiences with cryptography and the United States Federal Government....

From the review, seems like the book goes a long way to giving a good introduction for keeping yourself secure, but does it really leave out keeping communications secure?

It wouldn't take more then a few pages to discuss the need for being able to sign or encrypt things and a short tour of PGP/GPG and how they can use it in their everyday life.

That was Network Associates. The commercial arm of PGP got spun-off into their own company, PGP Corporation.

For PGP/GPG to be widely used, major clients must:

* Support automatic key downloading.
* Support automatic encryption/signing.
* Support opportunistic encryption.
* It should be much more transparent than it is today.

You mean like this?

"PGP Universal. . .shift[s] the burden of securing email messages and attachments from the desktop to the network in a way that is automatic and entirely transparent to users."

* Two-way policy enforcement
* Automatic and transparent
* Comprehensive and self-managing (automatic key generation)

PGP

Don't forget...gmail currently doesn't require personally identifiable information, such as address, zip code, name of first born, social security number, size of anatomy elements. Spymac requires all info, including demographic information, and if I remember correctly phone number. At least if gmail doesn't ask in the future, that means my ISP still remains the 'bottleneck' for any real identity linking. I could still just use transparent anonymous proxies who don't care who I am to access gmail...which makes that even nicer. All someone in the government would have to do is send one email to spymac.com, and if they cave...it means exactly one thing: The government gets everything in about 75 miliseconds. ;p Of course, this is just a Big Encouragement for encrypted emails that the email service can't really touch, like GnuPG and PGP. It's not a matter of gmail linking 'certain information' with 'other certain information' if it becomes harder than it's worth to track you down for exercising your right to free speech.

OpenPGP is a standard implemented by a few programs including PGP (non-free), and GnuPG (aka GPG) (Free). GnuPG support is either integrated into or supported via plugins on Kmail, Eudora, Mutt, Outlook, and many other clients. See http://www.gnupg.org/(en)/related_software/fronten ds.html for more details. There are a couple of Mac related links there. About the last two, GPG's privacy lies in the key, and thus you wouldn't want anyone else to be able to use your key -- they could sign messages as you otherwise. A hackish way to use GPG with these would be to manually use gpg to sign (and possibly encrypt a message) on the commandline, and then pasting them in. Someone could write client side code for dealing with webmail (Browser plugins that allow one to replace the current contents of a text input field with a signed message, but they could easily be security holes if not written correctly).

PGP does this. (information is from the PGP Help File)

Start PGPmail.

Click the Wipe Free Space button in the PGPmail window. The PGP Free Space Wiper Welcome screen appears.

The PGP Free Space Wiper prompts you to select the volume you want to wipe and the number of passes you want to perform.

In the Volume box, select the disk or volume that you want PGP to wipe. Then, select the number of passes that you want PGP to perform.

As many as 28 passes can be made to ensure no spurious magnetic domains exist.

Version 8.0.3 is the latest freeware. Be sure you qualify for the freeware version

PGP Freeware

http://www.pgp.com/products/sourcecode.html

Fifty bucks.

Perhaps PGP Freeware would fit the bill for the budget-minded slashdotter. (Also integrates with popular mail clients.)

I haven't found any good drop-in PGP (or gpg) plugin for Outlook Express

That's odd, since according to this page, PGP Personal "includes the personal versions of PGP Mail and PGP Disk, which integrate with mainstream email applications (Outlook, Outlook Express, Eudora, Entourage, and Apple Mail)...."

It would seem your search is at an end, grasshopper.

PGP

gnuPG

Who would issue the certificates?
Would it be a central authority (VeriSign?)?
Would a certificate holder need to provide extensive personal info to the issuer or pay a periodic fee to the issuer in order for the certificate to remain valid?

How are certificates better than signing with PGP/GPG/OpenPGP?
PGP signing is an easy, effective way of identifying a sender that relys on an established web of trust rather than a commercial agreement. It allows for persons to remain anonymous if they need to while providing information on who it is that has signed the senders key as being authentic. The same technology also provides for very effective encryption (using the recipients public key)that can be automated to ensure the maximum level of available privacy without being unneccessarily difficult to implement.

How is this better than rejecting emails that do not originate at a mailserver that has a mx reccord in dns?
Emails can be sent through your providers server using smtp_auth, smtp_after_pop, etc. from anywhere on the internet. This would not prevent you from sending when you are on an unfamiliar network such as when you are traveling. Rejected emails could be bounced back to the sender explation of why it was rejected and asking the sender to contact their provider or system administrator if they have any questions.

I get very wary of certificate based solutions, as I tend to prefer decentralized systems over central authorities. The recent behavior of VeriSign is a good sign of what can happen to any company that is permitted to set itself up as an "official authority", and I cannot help but believe that there will be certificate issuers that abuse their position. Also, I do not like the idea of requiring registration with centralized databases of users personal information, when it is entirely unneccessary for sender identification.

It will be taking your keys when its twenty!

There is an article by PGP Corporations CTO Jon Callas about it. His tagline is "Do we need another version of digital timestamps?"

What he has to say looks like plain common sense to me:

• requires Windows xP/Office 2003 - expensive
• requires purchasing a certificate, which is not really necessary for a timestamping service
• the price seems high

His conclusion: "To me, this seems like a solution in search of a problem." He even mentions open standard file formats. Nice read.

PGP.Com products are notoriously overpriced, but I bet North Korea could negotiate a nice discount on a 22,000,000 seat license with A.T.M. Networks Inc, the South Korean sales agent...

One hitch -- I tried completing the "free download" form with "N.Korea" as the country code, and got this popup:

'In accordance with current US Export restrictions, PGP 8.0 products may be downloaded by individuals throughout the world except those in the following countries: Cuba, Libya, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. If you are in one of these countries, you may not download PGP software'."

Ah well, GPG doesn't have these petty restrictions!

I can't imagine people really trust PGP anymore. No longer open source, no longer affiliated with Phil Zimmerman... and his statement when he left was scary.

Phil Zimmermann is on the "Technical Advisory Board", along with Bruce Scheier and others.

What statement are you referring to?

• Phil Zimmerman Profiled
• Philip Zimmermann's personal response to the ADK bug,
• 2003 Defcon interview
• Phil Zimmermann & Associates LLC

For those who don't know, Phil stated when he left that every PGP product released while he was there contained no hidden back doors. Knowing that companies like PGP were being pressured, it makes me think the creative differences were them wanting to build something in that he thought shouldn't be in.

It seems to me that if Zimmermann felt that way, he wouldn't be on the PGP.Com technical board, and he wouldn't be reselling their products on his web site.

To quote Phil Zimmermann, "There is no backdoor in PGP. Get a life."

A satisfied PGP customer.

Granted, I don't have GB sized files, but I do maintain some of my own files on my work computer that I DO NOT want some random admin to have access to, especially if I were to be "let go" one day without warning or time to backup/wipe said files.

I use PGP - the 'freeware' version - because I'm only securing personal files, not work files. For work files I'm sure you'd need an enterprise license or some such thing, but I've found it to be really easy to use. I also haven't tested out how actually secure it is, but it's Good Enough for my purposes. Plus, if you needed to, you can assign different 'trusted' sources when you encrypt your files, allowing other engineers to access those special files without involving the IT dept's help.

The spam can't be scanned while in PGP form, and according to their diagram it won't be decrypted until AFTER hitting the mail server.

I suppose one point up for security, one point down for preventing spam :(

The FAQ has a good amount of information.

While I very much doubt you are Dean's campaign manager, I'll give you two ideas anyway.

1. You could sign your messages with a digital signature (try out PGP). The smart thing to do is to keep a separate machine with the secret key. Keep this machine off of all networks since it will be a major target for crackers. You would type the message on that machine, sign it with the secret key, and transfer it to a networked machine using a floppy or CD. From there, you post the message any place you want.
2. You could use your website to confirm your identity. Suppose you post message A at site WA. When you post the message, you include a link to a page, B, at your own website (page B doesn't actually exist at this point). Right after posting A, you put up page B at your site. Page B includes a link back to message A.

Note that neither approach proves that Howard Dean himself posted the message rather than delegating the task to one of his campaign members. However, it does prove that someone in the Dean campain posted the message. The digital signature approach lasts longer and is more resistant to attacks. The website approach is simpler and easier for the average Joe to understand.

Finally, you could combine the two approaches and simply sign page B.

While I'm posting, has the Governor considered placing his advertisements under a Creative Commons license?

PGP delivers an icq plugin that uses your key-ring to cummunicate pgp-encrypted if your vis-a-vis has installed pgp/icq/that plugin, too.

PGP delivers an icq plugin that uses your key-ring to cummunicate pgp-encrypted if your vis-a-vis has installed pgp/icq/that plugin, too.

incase you idiots forgot to check, PGP sourcecode is available for all to see.
Incase you're a complete dumb idiot that means no fbi back door.

Until this comes out, PGP is a great way to keep your email private and secure. It also deals with forged headers using email signing. MIT has a great client here

It was my understanding that PGP was now owned by PGP corporation, which bought the rights to PGP from NAI... Because of this, I don't believe that your second statement is correct anymore.

Encryption simply protects data in transit from interception and alteration. It dosn't verify the data being sent actually is the data it claims to be.

Public/Private key encryption is an excellent form of authentication. Check out PGP. Or better yet, GPG.

Using fdisk or formatting doesn't overwrite existing data on the disk.
You actually have to wipe the sectors (PGP does that, or use Linux' dd command).

...but there's just no practical way to enforce these laws.

In the meantime, some solutions that actually work (or at least hold back the tide) are SpamNet, a collaborative spam filtering network, and of course the ever-unpopular PGP.

Casual computer users have never laid out much money for encryption. The widespread use of PGP in its original incarnation (during the era of Zimmermann's prosecution for allowing it to be exported) can be attributed as much to its zero-dollars price as to a generalized interest in privacy. Home and hobby users are not cut out from buying Veridis's software -- for about a hundred dollars, you can buy a personal use version of the command-line version. The real money isn't in individuals keeping their tax records private, though -- Zimmermann and Veridis, like NAI (whose PGP-based product is called E-Business Server) are really aiming at commercial and governmental datacenters, and for customers willing to accept a much higher pricetag.

Insurance companies, banks, credit card processing centers, state records -- anywhere financial or otherwise confidential records are exchanged or stored en masse -- these all need encryption which works at the command-line. More precisely, they need crypto software which can work without direct human intervention at all. Instead, massive data centers need tools which can be called by scripts and other programs, so servers, or server farms, can spend their time crunching numbers rather than drawing pictures.

The name is familiar ... The commercial competition FileCrypt faces is familial -- it's the same product from NAI (sold from their McAffee division) that prevents Zimmermann and Veridis from calling their software PGP, even though NAI now labels their product E-Business Server. And though many companies have homegrown cryptographic solutions, Zimmermann says he knows of no other packaged software offering the high-volume encryption that the products from NAI or Veridis do.

And, he emphasizes, what they do is very similar. He says of the Veridis command-line product compared to NAI's, "It's drop-in compatible, identical in operation ... you could run the same perl scripts, the same command-line arguments."

If you want to buy Veridis' encryption software licensed for electronic commerce (not one-person use), hold onto your wallet: the price jumps about 50 times, to a shade under $5000, which Zimmermann describes as a bargain -- at least compared to the competition.

(Prices on the McAfee website show a one-year subscription-based license for E-Business Server starting at $6,875; $14,375 buys a perpetual license, with no included support.) Both sides of that fence. And of competing in this case with a product that originated from his own crypto software (and his own company, PGP Inc.), Zimmermann says "I just don't really think of that as my product any more. It's in the hands of NAI, all the engineers have been fired. I just don't feel psychologically connected to that product." To look and not to sell. Especially when it comes to cryptographic software, code openness is considered not just a virtue but a near necessity. Peer-review and independent auditing, after all, are about the only ways you can tell that software isn't shuttling credit card numbers to the wrong person.

The business model of selling high-priced crypto software at thousands of dollars per processor doesn't mesh well with gratis software, though. To that end, Zimmermann says the FileCrypt code will be soon be available for download and inspection under terms which he says will be similar to those under which users can download the code for PGP Corporation's version of the PGP-based desktop software. (PGP Corporation's terms are available though their source code page).

Casual computer users have never laid out much money for encryption. The widespread use of PGP in its original incarnation (during the era of Zimmermann's prosecution for allowing it to be exported) can be attributed as much to its zero-dollars price as to a generalized interest in privacy. Home and hobby users are not cut out from buying Veridis's software -- for about a hundred dollars, you can buy a personal use version of the command-line version. The real money isn't in individuals keeping their tax records private, though -- Zimmermann and Veridis, like NAI (whose PGP-based product is called E-Business Server) are really aiming at commercial and governmental datacenters, and for customers willing to accept a much higher pricetag.

Insurance companies, banks, credit card processing centers, state records -- anywhere financial or otherwise confidential records are exchanged or stored en masse -- these all need encryption which works at the command-line. More precisely, they need crypto software which can work without direct human intervention at all. Instead, massive data centers need tools which can be called by scripts and other programs, so servers, or server farms, can spend their time crunching numbers rather than drawing pictures.

The name is familiar ... The commercial competition FileCrypt faces is familial -- it's the same product from NAI (sold from their McAffee division) that prevents Zimmermann and Veridis from calling their software PGP, even though NAI now labels their product E-Business Server. And though many companies have homegrown cryptographic solutions, Zimmermann says he knows of no other packaged software offering the high-volume encryption that the products from NAI or Veridis do.

And, he emphasizes, what they do is very similar. He says of the Veridis command-line product compared to NAI's, "It's drop-in compatible, identical in operation ... you could run the same perl scripts, the same command-line arguments."

If you want to buy Veridis' encryption software licensed for electronic commerce (not one-person use), hold onto your wallet: the price jumps about 50 times, to a shade under $5000, which Zimmermann describes as a bargain -- at least compared to the competition.

(Prices on the McAfee website show a one-year subscription-based license for E-Business Server starting at $6,875; $14,375 buys a perpetual license, with no included support.) Both sides of that fence. And of competing in this case with a product that originated from his own crypto software (and his own company, PGP Inc.), Zimmermann says "I just don't really think of that as my product any more. It's in the hands of NAI, all the engineers have been fired. I just don't feel psychologically connected to that product." To look and not to sell. Especially when it comes to cryptographic software, code openness is considered not just a virtue but a near necessity. Peer-review and independent auditing, after all, are about the only ways you can tell that software isn't shuttling credit card numbers to the wrong person.

The business model of selling high-priced crypto software at thousands of dollars per processor doesn't mesh well with gratis software, though. To that end, Zimmermann says the FileCrypt code will be soon be available for download and inspection under terms which he says will be similar to those under which users can download the code for PGP Corporation's version of the PGP-based desktop software. (PGP Corporation's terms are available though their source code page).

Last spring, Mr. Spitzer sued Network Associates, which has its headquarters in Santa Clara, Calif., asserting that the company's software included an unenforceable clause that effectively violated consumers' free speech. The clause, which appeared on software products and the company's Web site, read: "The customer will not publish reviews of this product without prior consent from Network Associates Inc."

http://www.canarsiecourier.com/News/2002/0221/Othe rNews/018.html
Spitzer's suit also alleges that the clauses infringe upon consumers' and the media's freedom of speech and fair use rights under copyright law. It contends that by informing software users that the speech restrictions are justified under existing "rules and regulations" - even though no such rules or regulations really exist -- the company also committed an unlawful deceptive practice.

What New York Law Says

But are these clauses really illegal under New York State law? And does the attorney general have the right to bring a civil action for money damages and an injunction because of it? Here's where close attention to the laws is vital.

Pertinent provisions of the laws of the State of New York give the state's attorney general broad powers to bring suit for what it perceives to be illegal or fraudulent business practices.

For example, Section 63(12) of New York's Executive Law specifically allows the attorney general to bring suit regarding cases of "persistent fraud or illegality in the carrying on, conducting or transaction of business". The statute says, "[t]he term 'persistent fraud' or 'illegality'... shall include continuance or carrying on of any fraudulent or illegal act or conduct ". In fact, under the section, the term "fraud" includes "any... deception, misrepresentation, concealment, suppression, false pretense, false promise or unconscionable contractual clauses" and does not necessarily require wrongful intent.

In the Network Associatescase, the claimed fraudulent conduct is that the Censorship Clause refers to allegedly non-existent rules and regulations. Even more so because the actual license agreement inside the box mentions nothing about this clause and otherwise makes clear that the four corners of the license agreement represent the entire agreement with the purchaser. Such conduct is claimed to be "illegal" because it is an "unenforceable covenant, invalid as against public policy," according to the complaint.

In other words, according to the New York attorney general, Network Associates' warning was fraudulent not only because it wrongly referred to non-existent rules and regulations, but also because the plain terms of the license agreement would have excluded such a clause, found only on the box, label or download page of the software, from even being enforceable and because the restriction violated public policy by creating a "chilling effect" on legally permitted speech that would be beneficial to the consumer.

Interestingly, under cited case law interpreting this statutory section, proof that Network Associates actually intended to defraud or mislead isn't necessary. Yet, according to the attorney general, Network Associates has shown this intent anyway.

In its legal memorandum, the attorney general said that Network Associates tried to use the Censorship Clause to kill an unfavorable review of its "Gauntlet" firewall softwareby Network World magazine, allegedly invoking the clause to threaten the magazine with legal action if the review was not taken down from the magazine's web site and otherwise retracted.

Under the terms of this New York State law provision, when the attorney general finds such conduct, it has the right to seek broad relief, including financial damages and injunctions to stop the practice from continuing.

Similarly, Section 349 of New York's General Business Law makes unlawful "[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this State" and allows the attorney general to file suit for an injunction and for restitution, that is, the return of money wrongfully given.

As set forth in the attorney general's memorandum, the disputed Network Associates clauses "unfairly chill the consumer's enthusiasm to enforce" their rights.

What is particularly alarming about this statute, from the point of view of a defendant like Network Associates, is that it also authorizes a private right of action, allowing any individual harmed by the practice to sue for as much as $1,000 and recovery of counsel fees based upon deceptive practices prohibited by the law. So, if New York state were to be successful on this claim, a multitude of individual suits might be in the offing, perhaps even a class action.

Freeware PGP getting a bit old?!?
If you had looked at PGP's website, you would know that there is a freeware version of PGP 8 available for download, for non-commercial use.

Freeware PGP getting a bit old?!?
If you had looked at PGP's website, you would know that there is a freeware version of PGP 8 available for download, for non-commercial use.

As an additional piece of information related to my prior response, I can now get at the license agreement which includes the following tidbit under "What You Can Do":

compile the source code for each PGP software program into an executable code version of the program;

From reading their site, it sounds like they are now using XP like product activation. You enter your license key, then it contacts their servers to validate your license.

I fail to see how the PGP vs. GPG question isn't settled on this very point. PGP won't even run on many platforms, so any ease-of-use claims should be dimissed out of hand on that basis alone. The choice is really between GPG (which is being actively developed) and freeware PGP (which looks to be getting pretty old). That isn't much of a choice.

Go ahead and flame away...

-B

I sure hope the pending SDK has support for the latest version of Java. I have yet to get the latest version of Cryptix OpenPGP to work with the J2SE v 1.4.1.

digital signatures

I didn't realize this would be open source (or have I not been paying attention, and it has always been OSS??)

From The CTO Letter:

First of all continuity - you will be glad to hear that we will publish source code. This is very important to us. It's very important to our investors, too. They understand that one of the main reasons people trust PGP is that its source is available. Our forthcoming source release will be for PGP 8.

The freeware PGP8.0 is scheduled for release in Q4 2002. Can anyone comment about the release date? I see no problems using PGP Beta if PGP freeware will be available to download (at least several days) before the beta expires. In any case, I imagine we can still access our encrypted data using GPG?

On PGP.com's new site, they also have announced that they will be providing a version for OSX this fall! Hopefully it will support many of the OSX mail applications, and it will also give us PGPDisk. Both are features I use quite a bit. On the down side, they also note that the OSX version won't include PGP Firewall or PGP VPN. It looks like those features will be later and as a separate product.

You will! Read the announcement.

'Cause i did.

"Network Associates recently announced the closure of PGP Security business unit"

From pgp.com

Yeah, their poised to take over the PGP world.

The problem is modifying applications to live within the limits of LOMAC-type security. Work is underway to make WU-FTPD work under LOMAC, but somebody needs to do Apache and a mail program.

If you work on any of those apps, read the LOMAC stuff and fix your apps to live within the LOMAC rules. This will do more for security than any amount of patching.