Disabling the RFID in the New U.S. Passports

slashchuck writes "Along with the usual Jargonwatch and Wired/Tired articles, the January issue of Wired offers a drastic method for taking care of that RFID chip in your passport. They say it's legal ... if a bit blunt. From the article: 'The best approach? Hammer time. Hitting the chip with a blunt, hard object should disable it. A nonworking RFID doesn't invalidate the passport, so you can still use it.' "

Comments

No Hurry

[JusticeISaid]

Great idea! Anything else I can do to slow down my passage through Immigration and Customs after a long flight? I'm always looking for ideas.

Re:No Hurry

[Anonymous Coward]

here's one: broadcast your personal data, allowing others to clone your passport and using it to enter the U.S. while you are off on holiday. Customs will surely take notice that you are trying to enter the country a second time.

Re:No Hurry

[Qzukk]

Yeah, because stopping you, scanning your passport, then letting you on through was SO much faster than stopping you, sliding your passport through a stripe reader, and letting you through.

Re:No Hurry

[swillden]

here's one: broadcast your personal data, allowing others to clone your passport and using it to enter the U.S. while you are off on holiday. Customs will surely take notice that you are trying to enter the country a second time.

What technology would you suggest to use to do this broadcasting? The contactless smart card chip in the passport won't do the job very effectively because:

• it requires execution of a cryptographic authentication protocol using an AES key derived from data printed inside the passport cover (called the MRZ)before it will divulge anything; and
• the shielding in the passport cover hold the chip incommunicado unless the passport is open

Perhaps you could photocopy the information page and post flyers? Or just walk around holding your passport open so that any would-be passport cloner can see the MRZ data? If you *really* want to use the passport's contactless chip to distribute the data, I guess you could print your name, birthdate and passport number on a sign, hang it around your neck, and then stick your passport to it so it's held open. Given the name, birthdate and passport number, an attacker will be able to guess the MRZ fairly quickly. If you want to make them work for it a little, you could leave out the birthdate and passport number and let them guess those values. Be sure to give them your name, though, otherwise it'll take too long, because the chip just doesn't report the failed authentication attempts fast enough. There's also the small issue of the communication range of the contactless chip, but perhaps there's an area of the airport that is nicely EM-shielded so that the attacker's lab-grade transciever and signal processing equipment can talk to your passport at a reasonable range. Or perhaps you could just let the attacker give you a booster device that you could hold near your passport.

All in all, it seems like a rather ineffective way to broadcast your data. I'd go with the flyers.

Removing toungue from cheek, it's a pretty ineffective way for an attacker to try to get your data, too. There are many other approaches that are much, much easier.

Re:No Hurry

[swillden]

Yeah, because stopping you, scanning your passport, then letting you on through was SO much faster than stopping you, sliding your passport through a stripe reader, and letting you through.

Umm, you missed the point. The intent of the smart card chips isn't to speed up processing,it's to increase security without slowing processing down too much. However, once the smart chips are in place, the normal processing flow for a chip-bearing passport will involve reading the chip data. What happens when the chip fails to respond? Well, that will be an exceptional circumstance that will take the bearer of that passport out of the normal, expedited flow and into another process that scrutinizes the passport and its bearer more closely.

Once the system is well-established, such that the vast majority of passports have working chips, having a broken chip will slow you down.

Oh, and current and future US passports don't use a magstripe reader. The thing they swipe your passport through a scanner that reads the printed data. I think it's an optical scanner, though it might be magnetic if the information is printed with magnetic ink (much like the numbers on the bottoms of checks used to be -- though I think those aren't magnetic any more either).

Re:No Hurry

[Jah-Wren Ryel]

the shielding in the passport cover hold the chip incommunicado unless the passport is open

That's true if your definition of "open" is anything not held tightly closed.

It has already been demonstrated that the faraday cage effect of the shielding is negated if the passport is only open a centimeter or so, as could easily happen with a passport carried in a handbag, or pretty much anywhere there is not much pressure to hold it closed.

So, while you may not be able to crack the data from the RFID, you can certainly talk to it under conditions that are reasonably common in the field.

it requires execution of a cryptographic authentication protocol using an AES key derived from data printed inside the passport cover (called the MRZ)before it will divulge anything; and

Doesn't this strike anyone as ironic? The RFID is of no value for official use without first having to read something printed on the inside. So much for any improvement in convenience or ease of use over the previous implementation. Seems like an RFID manufacturer (patent holder?) hired a really good lobbyist.

Re:No Hurry

[realisticradical]

Perhaps I'm simply naive here but if the RFID tag requires information printed inside the passport be entered into a computer then why have RFID at all? There's no need to use a contactless method unless someone is picturing a scenario where customs will be something that you just walk through with your passport in your pocket or just have it tapped on a reader.

Re:No Hurry

[Fordiman]

Which leads me to question:
Why didn't the government look into a challenge-reponse solution to these passports? Doing an SHA-1 in hardware doesn't take up THAT much juice, does it?

Re:No Hurry

[rlp]

It has already been demonstrated that the faraday cage effect of the shielding is negated if the passport is only open a centimeter or so, as could easily happen with a passport carried in a handbag, or pretty much anywhere there is not much pressure to hold it closed.

Or you could put a rubber band around the passport to keep it closed.

Re:No Hurry

[Dare nMc]

Doesn't this strike anyone as ironic? The RFID is of no value for official use without first having to read something printed on the inside.

took me some time to grasp the advantage. I think the obvious advantage of the rfid chip is for the entering country to keep a complete record for post/off site processing. It does no good to the US customs for US citizens to give back the info. We already have that in our databases, + more for anyone "interesting" just from their SSN.
Essentially the RFID passport is a Tit for Tat jester. To tell the EU, etc we'll force our citizens to give you their data in a nice tight bundle, so that you will return the favor with your citizens data on Entry to the US.
obviously easier for a untrained agent to beam all passport data to a offsite FBI agent, then you can have one central surveillance office.

Re:No Hurry

[Jah-Wren Ryel]

Or you could put a rubber band around the passport to keep it closed.

Yeah. Somehow, I don't expect to see THAT in the instructions from the State Department anytime soon. That's the kind of thing that gets noticed, it would end up in Leno's monologue, maybe even a skit or two on SNL.

The whole point of putting shielding in was that the average joe traveler would not need to worry about band-aid security because the people whose damn job it was to get it right did so.

Re:No Hurry

[iron-kurton]

Here's an idea: not giving up your civil liberties for the sake of convenience and national security (to be distinguished from ACTUAL security). What's really funny about your statement is that 5 years ago, people like you were in front of news cameras at the airline check-in saying "we don't mind waiting in line if it makes us more secure." Now, 5 years later, even after we have all established that airport security is a joke, instead of coming up with a more efficient screening method, we spent our resources developing YET another new technology full of holes.

My point is, your anger at the poster and the method of destroying the chips is a bit misdirected -- if you really want to spend less time at security checkpoints and Immigration and Customs, you should lobby for improving the methods currently in place. Besides, like someone who replied to your post already said, there really is no speed improvement in putting your passport through a barcode reader or waving it in front of an RFID reader. However, there is a relative security difference, and given the choice, I would take the former.

Re:No Hurry

[rlp]

... because the people whose damn job it was to get it right did so.

We ARE talking about the US government, aren't we?

Re:No Hurry

[drinkypoo]

Checks are still printed with a magnetic ink. You can buy special toner carts for printing checks with different numbers at the bottom, although most people just buy preprinted checks instead.

Re:No Hurry

[pdhenry]

I think it's an optical scanner, though it might be magnetic if the information is printed with magnetic ink

The Machine readable stuff in the passport is OCR, not MICR. MICR uses a different font than what you find in the passport (see your check example). Also, from what little information I can find, "real" MICR is used for numbers but not letters.

Re:No Hurry

[voidptr]

But if the encryption key is printed in some machine read format, why not just print the data that way in the first place and skip the RFID step?

New York's DMV uses 2d barcodes on everything. The driver's license, auto registration, and insurance cards all have one with the relevant data on them, and all the cops carry readers. Just put one of those on the inside back cover with the data you would have kept in the RFID chip.

Re:No Hurry

[BigCheese]

But if the encryption key is printed in some machine read format, why not just print the data that way in the first place and skip the RFID step?

So some government contractor can make giant piles of money. Why else?

Re:No Hurry

[Anonymous Coward]

Hide 5 kilos of hash up your ass.

Re:No Hurry

[jacksonj04]

Under your ID page (With your photo, name etc) is all the information in a machine readable format, full of >>>>>>>. If all the RFID chip does is broadcast the same info, and the machine must read the code first, what's the point? US Customs already has my fingerprints and face map on record and linked to my passport number, so it can't be used for biometrics. I see no use in RFID in passports at the present time.

However, there may come a time when you simply stand on a spot, look a scanner in the 'eye' and it does face mapping and retina scans. In this case, I can see the logic in making you 'flash' your passport at the reader so it can grab the info (Or at least a unique key to do a DB lookup if we've got to that stage).

I'm all for automating border processing, and well designed machines cock up a lot less frequently than humans. My only worry is it seems to be US and UK politicians driving this digital ID revolution, instead of people with actual experience in security and data handling. Hell, I could design a better system than the current UK ID card scheme and I've not even got as far as university.

Re:No Hurry

[Tim C]

Or just put it in your pocket; seems to do a good job of keeping my wallet closed.

Re:No Hurry

[swillden]

Perhaps I'm simply naive here but if the RFID tag requires information printed inside the passport be entered into a computer then why have RFID at all?

It's an anti-forgery mechanism. A forger doesn't want to duplicate a passport, a forger wants to create a passport with the bogus holder's photo, plus some either real or real-looking but innocuous identification data. The thing the RFID's copy of the data has that the printed page doesn't have is digital signatures. A forger may be able to print a perfect-looking passport, and embed a chip loaded with all of the corresponding data, but he won't have access to the private keys necessary to apply the proper digital signature to the data. This makes the new passports essentially impossible to forge, assuming RSA remains unbroken and assuming the private key is well-protected.

There's no need to use a contactless method unless someone is picturing a scenario where customs will be something that you just walk through with your passport in your pocket or just have it tapped on a reader.

Not true. The engineers who created the passport chip specification for ICAO wanted to use off-the-shelf technology, rather than inventing and debugging something entirely new. Given how much trouble the various vendors have had making the off-the-shelf technology interoperate correctly, this was a wise choice. But off-the-shelf contact smart card technology has some fundamental limitations for this application.

First, where on a passport do you put the chip and how do you insert it? Obviously, you can't use off-the-shelf smart card readers, because the passport is the wrong shape and size. Further, passports aren't rigid enough to guarantee that the contacts will correctly land on the regions of the smart card contact plate. Using a contact chip would have required adding some card-shaped rigid plastic "page" to the passport, which would have complicated manufacturing, made the passports more fragile and probably also increased the time required for Immigration officials to insert the card.

Second, and more importantly, contact smart cards are too slow. Due to a quirk of history, contact smart cards are limited to a maximum data rate of 115kbps. Because of the inefficiency built into the ISO 7816 T=0 and T=1 protocols, that means you get about 8KiBps (note: kbps = 10^3 bits per second, KiBps = 2^10 bytes per second) throughput, *max*. And, in practice, you only get that speed by carefully matching and testing cards and readers. In the smart card world, we expect real-world transfer rates of 1-2KiBps. The ICAO data set sizes are in the range of 30-40KiB. Contactless cards, however, are either 400kbps or 800kbps. Even at the slower speed, that produces a transfer rate of over 30KiBps. You can see that a contact card's best case is around four seconds to move the data set, and a more realistic common case is 10-15 seconds. A contactless card's worst case is about 1.3s, and the best case is about 300ms.

Add to that the fact that contactless is more forgiving of passport placement accuracy than contact, and you have a really significant difference in per-person processing time. Five seconds per traveler, per agent adds up to another full-time position or two at each major airport.

All of this could have been addressed by designing a new contact interface and protocol, of course. The custom contact plate could have been much larger so the individual contact areas were much bigger, solving most of the issues. But they wanted off-the-shelf, both in the interest of development time and in the interest of cost. By using standard parts, the passport issuers and immigration agencies benefit from economies of scale that they wouldn't get with custom components.

Finally, there was really no reason *not* to go contactless. Privacy wasn't traditionally part of the security issues that passport agencies were concerned about and, in any case, the MRZ-based encryption seemed to addr

Re:No Hurry

[swillden]

It has already been demonstrated that the faraday cage effect of the shielding is negated if the passport is only open a centimeter or so, as could easily happen with a passport carried in a handbag, or pretty much anywhere there is not much pressure to hold it closed.

Yes, I'd recommend placing a rubber band around your passport. The US State Dept. has issued the same recommendation.

Doesn't this strike anyone as ironic? The RFID is of no value for official use without first having to read something printed on the inside. So much for any improvement in convenience or ease of use over the previous implementation.

That's because improved convenience and ease of use weren't goals. The primary goal was improved resistance to forgery of the sort that's actually useful to criminals. Such forgery requires replacement of the photo and perhaps other data, so that the forged passport appears to belong to the holder. The chip carries exactly the same data as the information printed on the page with one important addition -- all of the data on the chip is digitally signed. Without access to a valid signing key (or the ability to break RSA), the forger can only duplicate, not alter the data on a valid passport, and can't make an invalid passport appear authentic.

What strikes me as sad is how often people like you automatically assume that the designers of sophisticated systems were stupid, rather than considering that perhaps you just don't understand the problems they were trying to solve.

Re:No Hurry

[swillden]

The driver's license, auto registration, and insurance cards all have one with the relevant data on them, and all the cops carry readers. Just put one of those on the inside back cover with the data you would have kept in the RFID chip.

Do you know how big that barcode would have to be to hold 40KiB of data?

Re:No Hurry

[swillden]

But if the encryption key is printed in some machine read format, why not just print the data that way in the first place and skip the RFID step?

So some government contractor can make giant piles of money. Why else?

I gave a better answer to this question here.

Re:No Hurry

[Project2501a]

> What technology would you suggest to use to do this broadcasting?

Who said that there should be any broadcasting at all in the first place?

Re:No Hurry

[Jah-Wren Ryel]

The US State Dept. has issued the same recommendation.

I call bullshit. Let's see some backup for that claim.

Besides, what are you supposed to do when the rubberband breaks?

What strikes me as sad is how often people like you automatically assume that the designers of sophisticated systems were stupid, rather than considering that perhaps you just don't understand the problems they were trying to solve.

Yadda, yadda, yadda. What strikes ME as sad is how often people like YOU automatically assume that critics of these systems are stupid, rather than considering that perhaps you just don't understand the full scope of the issues involved.

Passports do not exist in a vacuum. Just because the designers had a narrowly defined goal, doesn't excuse them from worrying about unintended consequences of their solution. Particularly if those unintended consequences compromise the root goal, increased safety, that prompted the redesign in the first place.

You want to advocate for a heads-down engineering approach? Go ahead, but don't get all sanctimonious about it when people point out that reality can easily bite you in the ass.

Re:No Hurry

[Gros_Nours]

Besides, what are you supposed to do when the rubberband breaks? Mmmm.... Get another one???

Re:No Hurry

[Jah-Wren Ryel]

Mmmm.... Get another one???

So, are you in the habit of traveling internationally with a bag of spare rubberbands? You sure they will let you on the airplane with those? A terrorist could use one to take the pilot's eyes out and crash the airplane.

Re:No Hurry

[yoyhed]

Do you just break every rubber band you use every time you use it? You'd only need a couple rubber bands, not a whole bag, and that's still assuming you're so incompetent you can't pull one off and put it back on a few times over the course of your trip without breaking it.

Re:No Hurry

[Jah-Wren Ryel]

Do you just break every rubber band you use every time you use it? You'd only need a couple rubber bands, not a whole bag, and that's still assuming you're so incompetent you can't pull one off and put it back on a few times over the course of your trip without breaking it.

Step back for a second. Are you seriously arguing in support of a half-assed solution to a problem that shouldn't exist in the first place? That every single American traveling abroad should keep a rubber-band around their passport and a handful of spares because their own government can't get basic security right?

Re:No Hurry

[swillden]

I call bullshit. Let's see some backup for that claim.

I stand corrected. It looks like I was confusing it with the state department's recommendation that you put a rubber band around your wallet. I'm sure that a sleeve or rubber band recommendation will be forthcoming, though, especially if there is ever an actual case of contactless passport skimming.

Besides, what are you supposed to do when the rubberband breaks?

Get a second mortgage so you can invest in another one. Or put the passport in a flat pocket.

What strikes ME as sad is how often people like YOU automatically assume that critics of these systems are stupid, rather than considering that perhaps you just don't understand the full scope of the issues involved.

I fully understand the issues involved. It's what I do for a living (not passports, per se, but similar stuff, and using the same sorts of technologies as the passports are applying). And the so-called "critics" on slashdot clearly *don't* understand the issues, as evidenced by comments like:

Doesn't this strike anyone as ironic? The RFID is of no value for official use without first having to read something printed on the inside. So much for any improvement in convenience or ease of use over the previous implementation.

That comment clearly indicates complete ignorance of the anti-forgery goals, the issues involved in passport reliance, the complexities of key management and the security analysis that drove the decision to use the MRZ as the basis for the key.

I wasn't involved in designing or implementing this new international passport standard, but I've done a lot of similar work, and faced with the same set of requirements I'd have made exactly the same decisions as the designers did, with one exception -- I'd have added more entropy to the MRZ. Well, and I'd probably have argued for a mechanical switch to disconnect the antenna, rather than the shielded cover, but odds are that wouldn't have been cost-effective and the shielded cover would have been the final solution.

The security design of the US passports is very good. They're effectively unforgeable, pose very little risk to privacy without the shielded cover and none when shielded and closed. They make use of off-the-shelf technology to keep the cost down, the use of contactless technology makes use at immigration checkpoints faster and easier, and the decision to use data printed on the inside to access the chip is a beautifully elegant solution to the problem of key management.

Just because the designers had a narrowly defined goal, doesn't excuse them from worrying about unintended consequences of their solution.

What unintended consequences? Given a small modification in how you carry your passport -- and you always had to be careful about how and where you carried it -- there are no consequences, except the intended one that passports are now effectively unforgeable.

Re:No Hurry

[msoftsucks]

So..
put a damn rubber band around it.

Jeesh..

Re:No Hurry

[CohibaVancouver]

Do you know how big that barcode would have to be to hold 40KiB of data?

About the size of a large postage stamp. A PDF417 bar code can 'store' over 2500 characters, so a couple / few of them could do the trick:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PDF417

Re:No Hurry

[CohibaVancouver]

there really is no speed improvement in putting your passport through a barcode reader

True, but this doesn't address the other issue: Making the US Passport harder to forge. It's my understanding that's the primary reason for going RF/ID, not speed.

Re:No Hurry

[swillden]

About the size of a large postage stamp. A PDF417 bar code can 'store' over 2500 characters, so a couple / few of them could do the trick

A single PDF417 barcode is larger than a large postage stamp by itself. You'd need 20 of them to store the ICAO test data set, and it's expected that future data sets will be larger. Further, according to this, trying to encode lots of data is problematic.

Re:No Hurry

[sarahemm]

About 40 square inches, from a quick look at current 2D bar code symbologies. Not quite realistic for a passport, plus to make it decently durable you don't want to squish it all together like you'd have to to fit 1KiB/sq. in.

Re:No Hurry

[swillden]

Thanks. I was starting down the path of looking that up, but didn't get there.

Re:No Hurry

[Jah-Wren Ryel]

What unintended consequences? Given a small modification in how you carry your passport -- and you always had to be careful about how and where you carried it -- there are no consequences, except the intended one that passports are now effectively unforgeable.

As I said to another poster, do you actually realize what you are advocating? That every single American on foreign travel carry around a handful of rubberbands because the system designers couldn't do it right in the first place. If it were a free market, that product would be a loser real quick.

That comment clearly indicates complete ignorance of the anti-forgery goals, the issues involved in passport reliance, the complexities of key management and the security analysis that drove the decision to use the MRZ as the basis for the key.

No, that comment clearly indicates what the people who are required to use the new system will think. The two issues are in no way mutually exclusive. I've been critiquing bad government crypto policies since before the Clipper chip initiative, and implementing secure authentication systems for many of those years too -- my "I do it for a living" internet dick is big enough here.

The security design of the US passports is very good.

Spoken like someone who has never had to worry about more than a nice, clean controlled environment with a handful of pre-defined threats. Classic heads-down engineer mentality.

Re:No Hurry

[swillden]

As I said to another poster, do you actually realize what you are advocating? That every single American on foreign travel carry around a handful of rubberbands because the system designers couldn't do it right in the first place.

Okay, if they didn't do it "right", how should it have been done?

You claim you understand crypto technology and policy... put up or shut up.

Re:No Hurry

[Jah-Wren Ryel]

Your answer says nothing about why RFID was chosen over another technology like 2D barcodes - you know, the OP's question about "why not just print the data in the first place."

Current state of the art gets about 64K plus error correction on a piece of paper the size of one passport page. That's plenty for passport use.

Furthermore, this focus on forgery is completely short-sighted. All it will do is change the business of forging passports from one of making them up on the spot to one of collecting copies of thousands of valid ones so that the forger can more easily provide a dupe that closely matches their client. Since a passport is suppossed to last for 10 years, there will always be a lot of leeway in interpreting the "biometrics" that are stored there.

It would not surprise me in the least to see a black-market in databases of passport dupes spring up - any place that "holds" yours passport, like a hotel, will be an easy point of vulnerability - desk clerks don't make much money, especially in 3rd world countries. 50 cents per valid dupe would be extremely cost effective and more than enough incentive.

The real goal is supposed to be increased security, but all this system does is re-arrange the pieces on the chess board - and line the pockets of a bunch of government contractors.

Re:No Hurry

[Jah-Wren Ryel]

Okay, if they didn't do it "right", how should it have been done?

As I wrote here, I question the basic assumption that making an 'unforgeable' document is of any net benefit. Just because some people WANT something doesn't mean that their desires are feasible.

Re:No Hurry

[swillden]

Your answer says nothing about why RFID was chosen over another technology like 2D barcodes - you know, the OP's question about "why not just print the data in the first place."

Well, first a nitpick: it's not RFID, it's contactless smart card. The two terms really do have very distinct meanings in the industry.

Current state of the art gets about 64K plus error correction on a piece of paper the size of one passport page. That's plenty for passport use.

It's possible that 2D barcodes could have been adequate, barely. I'm skeptical, though, particularly since the data stored on the passports is not very compressible (most of it is a fairly high-quality copy of the photo, and much of the rest is the digital signature data). Can you provide a link to the sort of 2D barcode you think would work? According to this PDF417 has a maximum recommended density of 686 bytes per squire inch, which means your 64KiB page would have to be 95 in^2, which is slightly larger than a letter-sized page. Not good for a passport. I just measured my passport, and using two facing pages gives a printable area of just under 31 in^2. So 64 KiB would require a data density of about 2120 bytes per square inch -- over three times what PDF417 does. Perhaps other encodings are better, but three times better? The contactless smart card chips on the market have capacities of nearly 100KiB.

Further, what kind of reliability track record do large, high-capacity 2D barcodes have? Can they really take a decade of hard use? Smart card chips definitely can take the abuse. Are there off-the-shelf readers available that can read such large barcodes, or would this require new technology to be developed. What's the cost of such optical barcode readers? Contactless smart card readers are already produced in volume and cost as little as $30 each?

Another serious limitation of barcodes is that they're read-only. Smart cards can be configured to allow writing, and to do it securely. It is expected that additional authentication data will eventually be added to the passports. One of the goals is to eventually augment visual identification by an agent with automated biometric matching as well.

Furthermore, this focus on forgery is completely short-sighted. All it will do is change the business of forging passports from one of making them up on the spot to one of collecting copies of thousands of valid ones so that the forger can more easily provide a dupe that closely matches their client. Since a passport is supposed to last for 10 years, there will always be a lot of leeway in interpreting the "biometrics" that are stored there.

Such databases will simply push the issuers and relyers to move towards adding automated biometric matching. If, to give a rather extreme example, the immigration checkpoint were to automatically score the match of both irises, a couple of fingerprints, and your face and hand geometry, in addition to having a trained agent watching you, it would be very, very difficult to find a sufficiently close match even in the largest database. In reality, two factors -- say, face and one finger, are adequate.

To pre-emptively quash another likely objection, yes I'm well aware that biometric matching has problems with false negatives, and those issues are easily addressed in a situation like this which is attended by a trained agent. I'm not generally a fan of biometric authentication, but there are situations in which it works well, and this is one of them.

all this system does is re-arrange the pieces on the chess board

What this system does is provide a mechanism for deploying effectively unforgeable authentication credentials. You point out that the credentials currently being deployed by the system may be inadequate to identify the passport holder with sufficient accuracy. That lack of accuracy may permit indivi

Re:No Hurry

[yoyhed]

Nah, I pretty much agree with you there.. I just thought you were pushing the rubber-band-breaking point a bit much.

Re:No Hurry

[rtechie]

That's because improved convenience and ease of use weren't goals. The primary goal was improved resistance to forgery of the sort that's actually useful to criminals. Such forgery requires replacement of the photo and perhaps other data, so that the forged passport appears to belong to the holder. The chip carries exactly the same data as the information printed on the page with one important addition -- all of the data on the chip is digitally signed. Without access to a valid signing key (or the ability to break RSA), the forger can only duplicate, not alter the data on a valid passport, and can't make an invalid passport appear authentic.

Please explain to me why this could not have been implemented through a smart chip or a mag-stripe, both of which allow the use of AES, signed keys, etc. but they don't have the security risk of the data being wirelessly sniffed. Both technologies are also significantly cheaper. RFID passports are a very bad idea. The European experience shows that the data can be EASILY sniffed and until that data is contradicted in the field, we must assume that American passports using a similar system will also be sniffed. And even if it's NOT, there is no LEGITIMATE reason whatsoever RFID should be used rather than mag-stripes or smart chips, or similar technologies. The ONLY quasi-legitimate reason to use RFID in identification is for allow officials to COVERTLY identify people. For example, you walk through a concealed archway in an airport or arena and individuals are silently identified and possibly intercepted. If you don't believe this line of thinking is draconian, there is something wrong with you.

You're also incredibly naive in assuming that this system will be bulletproof against cryptographic attack, which would be unprecedented in world history. Systems should be deployed with the assumption that they will be broken with an eye towards limiting the damage whn that happens. That's why things like currency and passports have multiple security features. The "all eggs in one basket" approach of the RFID chip makes it EASIER to dupe passports since (in practice) if you get the data off the chip all you will need is a passport cover to make a fake passport.

Though I don't necessarily attribute mailce to the implementation of RFID in passports, the real reason is pure greed. Most of this "homeland security" nonsense is a joke, a big collection of useless and expensive pork-barrel technologies that don't do a damn thing to intercept and protect against foreign terrorists. They're only useful for busting petty criminals.

Re:No Hurry

[Jah-Wren Ryel]

It's possible that 2D barcodes could have been adequate, barely. I'm skeptical, though, particularly since the data stored on the passports is not very compressible (most of it is a fairly high-quality copy of the photo, and much of the rest is the digital signature data). Can you provide a link to the sort of 2D barcode you think would work?

Sorry, I don't have one. A company came and demoed it for one my clients a year or two ago. The primary difference over the standardized codes is that they make use of color - looked kinda of like those tests for color-blindness. They claimed the potential for significantly higher data densities over time, easily more than 1MB/in^2. One downside was the cost of printing equipment, but that wouldn't be a significant issue in this case. The upside was that it was pure software and even sloppy shots from 1 megapixel cameras were capable of capturing enough information to handle data densities in 10KB/in^2 range. Very easy to put into whatever embedded hardware you wanted.

Another serious limitation of barcodes is that they're read-only. Smart cards can be configured to allow writing, and to do it securely. It is expected that additional authentication data will eventually be added to the passports. One of the goals is to eventually augment visual identification by an agent with automated biometric matching as well.

If you really need to write, just print a regular B&W barcode on a page of the passport, same as an entry/exit stamp and it since it isn't erasable you have a much stronger audit trail. Unlike chips, it requires no upgrade to the passport to support. When you have a 10 year minimum life-cycle to deal with, that means a long time before any changes to the hardware will make a difference, long enough for them to become obsolete before they are even fully deployed.

Such databases will simply push the issuers and relyers to move towards adding automated biometric matching.

Again, see my point about 10 year life-cycles - partial deployment means no net security benefit until it isn't partial anymore, and an "arms race" is not affordable - field upgrades are not cheap - consider the hundreds, if not thousands, of entry points to the USA, that's a LOT of hardware to replace each time the bad guys come up with a new way to short-circuit the current system. Moving to biometrics is not "free" either - there is a reason the US forces everyone but its own citizens to provide fingerprints on entry - citizens can vote, foreigners can't.

Adding additional authentication tools requires deploying new hardware to the passport control checkpoints, but it does not require restructuring the system as a whole.

That applies to any system they implement - any system that a hundred thousand people are able to do in a timely fashion every day will be interchangeable from a "deploy new hardware" perspective. Still doesn't really make it much cheaper.

What it does do, though, is to effectively eliminate post-issuance forgery, allowing security resources to be focused on addressing the up-front problems.

Well, I'll grant you that is true for the narrowest definition of forgery. I just don't see a cost benefit to the system as a whole, plus now they've upped the ante for the what the regular people have to worry about too. From the regular joe's perspective it is definitely a net loss.

Re:No Hurry

[swillden]

Please explain to me why this could not have been implemented through a smart chip or a mag-stripe, both of which allow the use of AES, signed keys, etc. but they don't have the security risk of the data being wirelessly sniffed.

First, off-the-shelf magstripe technology has neither the data density nor the durability required for this application.

As for why a smart chip couldn't be used -- the passports *do* use a smart chip. It's a contactless chip rather than a contact chip. For a lengthy explanation of why contact chips wouldn't work, see this comment.

You're also incredibly naive in assuming that this system will be bulletproof against cryptographic attack, which would be unprecedented in world history. Systems should be deployed with the assumption that they will be broken with an eye towards limiting the damage whn that happens. That's why things like currency and passports have multiple security features. The "all eggs in one basket" approach of the RFID chip makes it EASIER to dupe passports since (in practice) if you get the data off the chip all you will need is a passport cover to make a fake passport.

The chip is an additional security measure, in addition to all of the other security measures implemented in the passport (microprinting, laser perforation, holograms, etc., etc., etc.).

As for my naivete, you do realize that breaking RSA would be a significant mathematical breakthrough, right? A break of SHA-256 is more likely, and the right kind of SHA-256 break would be just as damaging to the forgery resistance as a break of RSA, but that kind of SHA-256 break is also pretty small. Further, unless the break happened to destroy all public key and/or secure hash algorithms, the same system of smart chips could be moved to a new algorithm set, with practically no changes to the deployed infrastructure required. Passports would likely (but not certainly) have to be reissued.

Though I don't necessarily attribute mailce to the implementation of RFID in passports, the real reason is pure greed. Most of this "homeland security" nonsense is a joke, a big collection of useless and expensive pork-barrel technologies that don't do a damn thing to intercept and protect against foreign terrorists.

You do realize that the contactless smart chips in passports is not a US initiative, right? ICAO is an international organization and the initial impetus for the chips came from Europe.

I certainly agree that it doesn't do anything to protect against terrorism. Terrorism is a strawman threat.

Re:No Hurry

[swillden]

The primary difference over the standardized codes is that they make use of color - looked kinda of like those tests for color-blindness. They claimed the potential for significantly higher data densities over time, easily more than 1MB/in^2.

Interesting. I can certainly see how adding color would increase the data density. The densities you're talking about seem extremely high, though. It would obviously be easy to, say quadruple, the densities over standard 2D barcodes, and even higher densities wouldn't be too hard.

If you really need to write, just print a regular B&W barcode on a page of the passport, same as an entry/exit stamp and it since it isn't erasable you have a much stronger audit trail. Unlike chips, it requires no upgrade to the passport to support.

No upgrade would be required with the chips, either, and you still have the data density issue for the barcodes. As for the audit trail, that's also easy to implement in the chip. I don't see a significant advantage either way there.

I also note that you didn't address my questions about durability and, even more important, about a track record of proven durability. This would apply particularly to new, colored barcode solutions.

Again, see my point about 10 year life-cycles - partial deployment means no net security benefit until it isn't partial anymore, and an "arms race" is not affordable - field upgrades are not cheap - consider the hundreds, if not thousands, of entry points to the USA, that's a LOT of hardware to replace each time the bad guys come up with a new way to short-circuit the current system.

Ah, the "an incomplete solution is a useless solution" argument :)

You don't need to equip all entry points to make the system effective. Randomly assign incoming passengers to different queues, some of which have the new authentication technology and some of which don't. With respect the problem of some passports that have the additional authentication data and others which don't, there are a variety of ways to handle the situation depending on whether field enrollment is used, or whether the new credentials are only issued with new passports. Assuming that they're only issued with new passports, you just have to accept for a while that your passports aren't as secure as you'd like them to be (and they never are). After the volume of less-credentialed passports dwindles you can start implementing more thorough reviews of holders of older passports.

Further, keep in mind that passport security technologies, like any sort of identification document technologies, are *always* partial solutions. It's very rare that a single passport design stays in use long enough for all of a nation's passports to be upgraded to it, so this is an issue they know very well how to manage.

Finally, as for the "arms race" issue -- security is *always* an arms race. In this particular case, once you get to two or three reasonably-good biometrics, the bad guys have some very serious problems to solve. They have to be able to fool multiple authentication checks while being actively observed by a trained agent who knows what techniques can be used to fool the scanners. As I said, I'm not normally a fan of biometric security, but having a trained observer present at all times makes biometrics a couple of orders of magnitude harder to defeat.

That applies to any system they implement - any system that a hundred thousand people are able to do in a timely fashion every day will be interchangeable from a "deploy new hardware" perspective. Still doesn't really make it much cheaper.

Not true. The difference is that with the chips, no modification to the passport or the passport scanning process will be required. With a printed 2D barcode you'd need to add an additional page to support the new data, or somehow print it on an existing part of the booklet. With the chips it's simply a ma

Re:No Hurry

[C0R1D4N]

It's an anti-forgery mechanism. A forger doesn't want to duplicate a passport, a forger wants to create a passport with the bogus holder's photo, plus some either real or real-looking but innocuous identification data. The thing the RFID's copy of the data has that the printed page doesn't have is digital signatures. A forger may be able to print a perfect-looking passport, and embed a chip loaded with all of the corresponding data, but he won't have access to the private keys necessary to apply the proper digital signature to the data. This makes the new passports essentially impossible to forge, assuming RSA remains unbroken and assuming the private key is well-protected.

And provided the forger doesn't make the chip then smash it with a hammer thereby making it useless but authentic looking and apparently still viable for use.

Re:No Hurry

[swillden]

And provided the forger doesn't make the chip then smash it with a hammer thereby making it useless but authentic looking and apparently still viable for use.

Chip-enabled passports with a broken chip will take the bearer out of the normal "expedited" processing flow and subject the passport and bearer to more scrutiny. So the forger had better get the paper part of the forgery perfect, and passports have many features to make that very difficult.

For normal users, the chips are tough enough that failures will be very rare except in the case of intentional sabotage.

Re:No Hurry

[rtechie]

First, off-the-shelf magstripe technology has neither the data density nor the durability required for this application.

I sharply disagree on the durability aspect, it's good enough for credit cards and other photo ID. And the data density is only a problem if you want the stripe to contain ALL of the data on the passport, including the photo, which I maintain is a terrible idea.

Your main pint of the other post was that privacy was not a design consideration of the contactless system even though this represents the primary object to such a system. So you're essentially validating that concern.

The chip is an additional security measure, in addition to all of the other security measures implemented in the passport (microprinting, laser perforation, holograms, etc., etc., etc.).

IN PRACTICE, it will be the sole security measure because no security staffer will ever actually look at the passport in detail. They will simply thumb open the back cover and scan the chip. If you have a fake chip all you will need, IN PRACTICE, is a passport cover. But it doesn't change the fact that it really is an all-eggs-in-one-basket approach.

Now you might argue that it's easier to fake the rest of the passport, but you would be wrong. Tampering with the photo, text, special paper etc. represents a relitively complicated procedure that must be done for each passport, requiring some sophistication. But with this system all that really hard work of cracking the system only needs to be done ONCE, then the chips could be easily cloned, etc. with off-the-shelf tools in a very short amount of time. This is EXACTLY what we say with the EU system.

As for my naivete, you do realize that breaking RSA would be a significant mathematical breakthrough, right?

Cryptographic attacks are usually based on implementation rather than direct attacks on the algorithim, like the attacks on the EU epassport system. The EU system uses AES but you can clone a passport in 5 minutes. I'm sure the Europeans thought their implementation was perfect too.

Passports would likely (but not certainly) have to be reissued.

Invalidating and reissuing millions of passports is completely impractical. I'm just going to ignore this.

You do realize that the contactless smart chips in passports is not a US initiative, right? ICAO is an international organization and the initial impetus for the chips came from Europe.

Yes, but that doesn't mean it isn't pork-barrel nonsense. Look at Joint Strike.

Re:No Hurry

[swillden]

First, off-the-shelf magstripe technology has neither the data density nor the durability required for this application.

I sharply disagree on the durability aspect, it's good enough for credit cards and other photo ID.

All of which have much shorter useful lives than 10 years. I've seen many smart chip/magstripe combo cards which have had to be replaced early because the magstripe wore out. For that matter, I've had credit cards that I had to have replaced because the magstripe became unreadable.

And the data density is only a problem if you want the stripe to contain ALL of the data on the passport, including the photo, which I maintain is a terrible idea.

How then would you propose to digitally sign the photo? That is the whole *point* of using the digital storage medium, to bind the authentication data (the photo) to the identity data (the rest of it) and prove that the whole pile was issued by a legitimate agency.

Your main pint of the other post was that privacy was not a design consideration of the contactless system even though this represents the primary object to such a system.

No, you misread my point. What I said was that it wasn't the primary goal of the system, i.e. the designers of the system weren't focused on improving the privacy aspect of passports. It was a secondary goal, to avoid unnecessarily introducing privacy risks. IMO, the solution, as implemented, almost does that. Were additional entropy added to the MRZ, I'd say it achieves the goal fully.

The chip is an additional security measure, in addition to all of the other security measures implemented in the passport (microprinting, laser perforation, holograms, etc., etc., etc.).

IN PRACTICE, it will be the sole security measure because no security staffer will ever actually look at the passport in detail. They will simply thumb open the back cover and scan the chip. If you have a fake chip all you will need, IN PRACTICE, is a passport cover.

If the chip scans correctly, the passport will be given the same kind of cursory visual analysis that it gets now. The agent doesn't use a magnifying glass or microscope to analyze the microprinting, doesn't use a black light to review hidden details, doesn't verify the laser engraving or perforation, etc. But he or she does look at it to make sure it looks right -- hologram over the image, that sort of thing.

A chip that fails to scan correctly, though, will cause the agent to shuffle the passport holder off to another queue for further review, where this more detailed analysis will be done. Thanks to the fact that 99.9% of chips will scan correctly, it will be feasible to apply greater scrutiny to the potentially compromised passports.

Now you might argue that it's easier to fake the rest of the passport, but you would be wrong.

No, I would be absolutely right. Tampering with the rest of the passport is difficult, yes, but childs play compared to forging a digital signature.

Tampering with the photo, text, special paper etc. represents a relitively complicated procedure that must be done for each passport, requiring some sophistication.

Yes, and the new system makes it even harder, because since forging the chip data is essentially impossible, the only way to get a fake passport past immigration is to break the chip, which will mean that the rest of that stuff has to be done so well that the passport is indistinguishable even under very close scrutiny

But with this system all that really hard work of cracking the system only needs to be done ONCE, then the chips could be easily cloned, etc. with off-the-shelf tools in a very short amount of time. This is EXACTLY what we say with the EU system.

Besides the other flaws in your argument, you're making two very large and unsupportable assumption here.

First, that

Re:No Hurry

[RockDoctor]

Do you know how big that barcode would have to be to hold 40KiB of data?

40KiB ?
40 KiB is 40 x 1024 x 8 = 327680 bits.
Allow about 10% for error-correcting redundancy. 350000 bits.
Put it onto a two dimensional array of monochrome dots - around 350 high by a thousand dots wide.
Make the dots fit into your grid at 4 to the millimeter - 87.5mm high by 250mm wide.
That's a fairly large barcode, but not particularly incredible. Comparable in size with a European passport (I don't know what size US passports are). A scanner for it would be around the size of those hand-held scanners that were popular a decade ago and were bloody useless.

Microwave...

[maedls.at]

should do the job!!! has anyone tried this before?

Re:Microwave...

[bilbravo]

The article (in the magazine, not sure about the online version) states that microwaving it could cause burn marks, which would invalidate the passport.

Re:Microwave...

[RockModeNick]

Besides, smashing something that bothers you with a heavy hammer is theraputic.

ObSneakers

[Rob T Firefly]

(Bishop is at a door with an electronic lock.)
Bishop: Anybody remember how to defeat an electronic keypad?
Mother: This might help. An old buddy of mine who was in Desert Storm sent it to me. 'Course, he was on the other side.
Bishop: Come on. There's got to be a way around these things.
(He listens intently to instructions via his earpiece.)
All right, all right... This might work... Yeah. Yeah... Right. Okay. I'll give it a shot.
(He kicks the door in.)

Re:ObSneakers

[Dachannien]

And here I thought you were going for, "My RFID is my passport. Verify me."

Tinfoil Passport Cover?

[ToteAdler]

Is it possible to make a passport cover that will block the signal when it's in the cover but USC&I can still use thier RFID thing when you take it out?

Re:Tinfoil Passport Cover?

[Rob T Firefly]

Yes.

Re:Tinfoil Passport Cover?

[melstav]

Sure.

And as long as you keep your passport in the RF shield, nobody can read it.
But the instant you pull it out, anyone can try accessing it.

What's worse: You *know* that Customs Officials won't have Faraday Cages around their reader stations. All someone'll have to do is set up a high-gain antenna somewhere in the area, and they can parasite the data as it's being read by the legitimate scanner.

Re:Tinfoil Passport Cover?

[MightyYar]

I think that I'll wait until I actually read about this kind of extreme measure actually occurring before I start bashing my passport with a hammer. I'll take my chances at being the first victim.

Anyway, I think the odds of me losing my entire passport are quite a bit higher than having it electronically cloned... especially considering that they will apparently accept a passport even if the RFID tag isn't working - why would a counterfeiter bother cloning it?

Re:Tinfoil Passport Cover?

[MightyYar]

I'm pretty sure that a common thief or pickpocket is not sophisticated enough to have a piece of equipment capable of detecting large amounts of currency, if that's even possible.

Re:Tinfoil Passport Cover?

[jcr]

All someone'll have to do is set up a high-gain antenna somewhere in the area,

No chance of that arousing suspicion, since people routinely carry high-gain antennas around airports, right?

-jcr

Re:Tinfoil Passport Cover?

[melstav]

why would a counterfeiter bother cloning it? The hype is that these RFID passports are supposed to be un-clonable.

And they're not.

If the customs official scans a passport and the RFID tag responds as expected, it saves the customs official from actually having to *look* at your passport. If the tag responds as expected, the passport, as a whole, is assumed to be genuine, and only given a cursory look.

THAT is why it is worth a counterfeiter's while to clone the RFID tag.

Re:Tinfoil Passport Cover?

[melstav]

A high-gain antenna doesn't have to look like a high-gain antenna, as illustrated by this set of instructions for building a high-gain 802.11b WIFI antenna out of a Pringles can

I'm not saying that this is necessarily the best kind of antenna for the job, but it's something that you could get through an x-ray partially disassembled, and nobody would question it.

PLUS You don't have to go waving the antenna around in the open for it to be useful. Radio frequencies will pass through the soft cloth sides of most carry-on luggage with absolutely zero loss in signal strength.

Re:Tinfoil Passport Cover?

[MightyYar]

But the instant that a cloned passport shows up (or a critical mass of cloned passports show up), customs will change their procedures...

Besides, they still need my physical passport to copy the cryto key printed on it, no?

Re:Tinfoil Passport Cover?

[h4rm0ny]

Well that's fine for the companies that provided this solution. Because now there is lucrative money in fixing the security problem. If they got it right the first time then the big money would dry up. Government contracts are about redistributing your tax money to private business. Basically.

Re:Tinfoil Passport Cover?

[triffid_98]

Really? I'm pretty sure common thieves and pickpockets have had this technology for quite some time. See that 80 year old man in Baggage Claim with the hot 20 year old arm jewelry? I detect large amounts of currency.

I'm pretty sure that a common thief or pickpocket is not sophisticated enough to have a piece of equipment capable of detecting large amounts of currency, if that's even possible.

Re:Tinfoil Passport Cover?

[melstav]

Not if they're set up to read the data when you're at the passport-scanning station.

Here's how it would work:

1) The customs official asks you for your passport.
2) You pull it out of your tinfoil sleeve and hand it over.
3) Customs official opens the front cover and scans the front page so his computer has all of the information for the security key. (It's not used for encryption. It's just a plaintext password.)
4) Customs official's station broadcasts the security key.
5) The RFID tag in your passport broadcasts your passport data.

If I have a sensitive enough high gain antenna pointed at that customs station, I now have both your security key AND all of the information in your passport.

The broadcasts in steps 4 and 5 are OMNI-DIRECTIONAL. They're relatively low-power, because according to the design, the passport's supposed to be only a few cm away from the reader.. But that's why you need a high-gain antenna.

Re:Tinfoil Passport Cover?

[eclectro]

I can imagine a scenario where the high gain antenna is housed in a suitcase also. Nobody would know.

Re:Tinfoil Passport Cover?

[eclectro]

They are lookinf for hair gels. Not antennas.

Re:Tinfoil Passport Cover?

[MightyYar]

I still contend that, until this highly elaborate scheme is actually demonstrated to be more than theory, I have nothing to worry about. There are many greater dangers in my day-to-day life. Have you ever been in a customs area? They come over to you and scold you for turning on a cell phone... I can't imagine being able to get an antenna and amp going covertly. I think it would be much, much easier to rob a tourist's hotel room or pick pockets. The penalty should you get caught would also be much lower.

If I were in charge of implementing this scheme, on the other hand, I'd be worried about my job if it is as bad as you say.

Re:Tinfoil Passport Cover?

[flosofl]

4) Customs official's station broadcasts the security key.

I was with you until number 4. All I can say is, HUH? Why would it broadcast the security key. The RFID chip has no use for the key since it cannot use it. Where does this RFID chip store, oh I don't know, the RAM and CPU required to decrypt data.

The key phrase here is *reader*. The passport system reads the data off the RFID and then applies the key in the computer system. The only way the key is "transmitted" in the clear is via photons to the OCR.

Here's a revised list that I think will more accurately reflect reality:

1) The customs official asks you for your passport.
2) You pull it out of your tinfoil sleeve and hand it over.
3) Customs official opens the front cover and scans the front page so his computer has all of the information for the security key. (It's not used for encryption. It's just a plaintext password.) (kind of missing your point here)
4) The RFID tag in your passport broadcasts your passport data.
5) The customs officical's system decrypts the data received using the non-transmitted key.

For a thief to clone a passport, he will need to know the plain text in addition to nabbing the RFID data. Both are fairly trivial, esp. if there's a team working it. A pickpocket to lift/read/copy and replace. And another to "listen" for the OTA data. Of course you're only going to get targeted victims, not the wholesale copying people are claiming.

This is simply security theater. The problem is not cloned or forged passports. The problem is people getting valid passports for false IDs. This tries to solve a problem that doesn't exist.

Re:Tinfoil Passport Cover?

[owlstead]

Who are the idiots that mod this piece of crap up? The data on the front page (the MRZ, or machine readable zone) is used to create master keys for BAC (Basic Access Control). Although these keys are not that well protected because the entropy is low, they are NEVER transmitted in plain.

CAN'T YOU IDIOTS JUST READ THE SPECIFICATIONS? THEY ARE AVAILABLE ONLINE:

http://www.icao.int/mrtd/download/documents/TR-PKI %20mrtds%20ICC%20read-only%20access%20v1_1.pdf

Re:Tinfoil Passport Cover?

[jcr]

Yeah, I know I can make an antennna out of a pringles can. Now, don't you think someone might find it suspicious if I hang around the passport control area of the airport, and point it at the desks?

Another poster pointed out that there are far easier ways to phish someone's ID info.

-jcr

Great idea!

[tulmad]

That's great until they make it a requirement to have working RFID to go through customs.

Re:Great idea!

[ScrewMaster]

Well, it remains to be seen just how reliable (or otherwise) these things are ... my feeling is that there's going to be a substantial failure rate. It's one thing to require RFID to speed the process of verifying an identity or to make it nominally more accurate. However, if you invalidate a passport because of a malfunctioning chip you're going to have BIG problems. People sit on things, they flex them, they drop things on them, they otherwise break them. It's what people do, whether they mean to or not.

Let's face it, you're gonna see a certain percentage of RFID passports that just don't work, for whatever reason. What do you do? Lock those people up? No, you just treat the passport like a traditional non-RFID-equipped passport. Well, if you're a properly-trained security person maybe you actually look at the traveler and make sure the picture matches. Maybe you do your job, because if the RFID isn't working you can't just doze through the interview and let the machine do the work. You should be on your toes anyway, because the one time you aren't is when the technology will let you down. And they (yes, they) know that.

And you can bet your boots that any (ahem!) undesirables will have properly-functioning RFIDs anyway. As always, it's us ordinary folk that will get busted for not dotting our I's and crossing our T's (not that most of us have any way to test the goddamn things anyway, except by trying to travel somewhere and seeing what happens.)

Personally, I think the Feds ought to focus more on people skills (i.e., well-trained, well-paid security forces with an effective organization to back them) and less on failure-prone, unproven technology.

Re:Great idea!

[peragrin]

Well the smartest move I made was to get my passport 18 odd months ago. that gives me 8 years to find a solution to this headache.

Re:Great idea!

[thebigbluecheez]

The only problem I see with making it a requirement to have working RFID is that my non-RFID-equipped passport is valid until 18 June 2016.

So unless they are going to recall all non-chipped passports, they'll have to wait quite a while to make it a requirement.

Also:

Alteration or mutilation of passport: This passport must not be altered or mutilated in any way. Alteration may make it INVALID, and, if willful, may subject you to prosecution. (Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1543)

Re:Great idea!

[JFitzsimmons]

The goal of adding RFID to a passport was to add another layer of security to the passport. This may sound a little strange at first, but there is some logic to it. The RFID chip contains the same information as the printed passport, including a digitized version of the picture, AND a cryptographic hash. The desired outcome is that it is difficult to forge BOTH parts of the passport simultaneously. Ideally, the person would only be able to pass if both portions of their passport matched and the hash was valid. Although it may be a result, being able to just wave people on through after scanning the RFID portion of the passport was not a goal.

Practically, since passports are still valid without RFID, this measure is almost useless, and opens up tons of privacy problems as already stated. I don't think that ranged communication should have been a major feature of a passport, which makes me wonder why the government chose RFID over any other tagging technology, such as smartcards. Smartcards could perform the same or perhaps even better task as the RFID tags currently are, except they would be more secure simply by the virtue that they require physical contact with the reader.

Re:Great idea!

[advocate_one]

Personally, I think the Feds ought to focus more on people skills (i.e., well-trained, well-paid security forces with an effective organization to back them) and less on failure-prone, unproven technology.

hahahahahahahahahahahahahahaha... sorry... just had to laugh... you owe me a new keyboard...

Re:Great idea!

[ScrewMaster]

... which makes me wonder why the government chose RFID over any other tagging technology ...

Well, much has been made over the potential for these passports to be read by bad guys for some distance. It occurs to me that our government (and others) might like to have that same ability. It sure would be convenient for the cops if they could just stop anyone that they can't "ping". It would be a variation on usual "papers, please!" but no less invasive from a privacy perspective. Readers could be installed at any place where people have to pass (bus terminal, subway station, bank, restaurant, you-name-it.)

If law enforcement is looking for an individual they suspect is in a particular area, they could just dot the region with portable scanners. Heck, England will probably incorporate the technology into some future generation of their cameras. They already have speakers, why not an RFID reader? This would certainly make catching terrorists even more straightforward, it being common knowledge that terrorists can never obtain legitimate documentation while in a foreign country.

I understand that the current generation of RFID passport is being supplied with shielded covers to avoid remote polling, but that was only after enough people complained about it. It wasn't a concern until then, and the State Department was perfectly happy to dump them on us anyway, regardless of the risks.

Besides, this is just a pilot program, using the cover of anti-terrorism to get a bunch of people to walk around with RFID tags. If the technology works as well as they hope and expect, you can bet your bottom dollar that our up-and-coming RealID cards will incorporate RFID tags as well. It's just too tempting, and since that's something that everyone will be required to carry with them at all times (or, if not required, then strongly encouraged) we'll be even easier to track.

Re:Great idea!

[ScrewMaster]

What do you find so amusing about "failure-prone, unproven technology"?

Oh, you mean the Feds providing well-trained, well-paid security forces. Yes, well, other nations have done very well along those lines ... but I agree, there's not much chance of ours being able to pull it off. Not anymore.

Re:Great idea!

[pilgrim23]

Someone once said that all better ID control ever does is raise the costs for fake papers.. When I was young I worked a cattle ranch. Back then we had a handy gizmo for tagging the ears of cattle; White tags for cows, blue for steers, yellow for hefers. It made culling for slaughter so much easier. Nice to see this tech put to the next logical step.

Re:Great idea!

[n00854180t]

There's a great amount of logic to it. If you're a technology layman, and/or some sort of managerial or politically minded person that doesn't know any better. It's absolutely absurd for anyone that has the faintest clue about the realities of technological security to claim that RFID would add any sort of security, rather than doing exactly the opposite. The claim that RFID somehow makes passports more secure assumes that no one would ever bother attacking them, and that they're somehow "unbreakable" (which, non-laypeople should know is basically never true). Adding RFID to passports to add security is like replacing your kevlar vest with cheesecloth and expecting the latter to somehow block shrapnel more effectively.

Re:Great idea!

[Anonymous Coward]

And this, illustrates something I have been mentioning for quite some time now. Why forge something that is so freakin' hard to forge, when you can have the real thing with so much less effort? The government is going through so much trouble to "secure" airports and passports, that they have managed to (and many citizens have managed to play along with) convince themselves that securing this is the final answer to security.

In reality, it just opens up a whole new area to be exploited. If route A is easier than route B, people will choose route A for whatever it is they want to do. A quick idea, which I'm sure the "terrorists" have already considered: Kill a person, steal his identity, get new ID. Easy. The passport is real, your photo will be real. Immigration will be happy.

Hell, you don't even need to kill anyone to steal their identity! Just go find someone that lives in Idaho. Chances are this person will never leave the U.S., and thus neither the person in question, nor immigration, will ever notice something is fishy.

Another idea. Get a genuine, non-U.S. passport that's in someone elses name, and travel with it. Just find another contry that is lax with issuing passports and get one there. Not such a big deal if you're part of an international terrorist ring, right?

Essentially what the gov't is doing is similar to what I saw at a datacenter once. The front entrance was like a freakin' fort. But to get in, all you needed to do was slip in through the back when the cleaning lady was walking in. Really, Stupid. As we all know, the weakest link in the chain will break it.

Which reminds me of a recent trip from Tokyo to Frankfurt that I took. I was in business class, which had REAL cutlery with the meals. But the butter knives were plastic. BUTTER KNIFE!! I swear to god, if I had a real butter knife and a real fork, and I had to use one or the other to threaten someone or defend myself, I would choose the fork!!! Stupid, stupid, stupid. Oh, and the inflight material all says that ALL radio wave emitting devices are banned from use. Then the Connexion by Boeing ad shows how to use your WiFi card to get internet access. Oh, the list of complaints I have over stupid policy...

What the Heck...

[Noryungi]

Microwave the sucker and be done with it, I say.

Oh wait, that leaves a big smoking hole in the passport... Errr, never mind, carry on...

US Passports

[PerlDudeXL]

I wouldn't try this with a european passport when I travel the next time to the US - as I don't want to risk it being sent back on the next plane.

Re:US Passports

[rvw]

I wouldn't try this with a european passport when I travel the next time to the US - as I don't want to risk it being sent back on the next plane.

"It" being sent back is not such a big problem. You being sent back along with it is maybe more unpleasant.

Re:US Passports

[56ker]

Immigration usually confiscate the passport, then keep the person in custody (either at the airport or local prison) until the next plane back. At least that's the way I've seen it done before - even to the innocent. It kind of makes it difficult for a person to return to a country but there are plenty of passports issued under a false name for trips that aren't going to appear on the official "entry/exit" database (or are just asylum seekers - genuine or otherwise).

Re:US Passports

[ultranova]

I wouldn't try this with a european passport when I travel the next time to the US - as I don't want to risk it being sent back on the next plane.

"It" being sent back is not such a big problem. You being sent back along with it is maybe more unpleasant.

Actually, I'd be more worried of being improsoned without trial or access to a lawyer for being a suspicious person, and never again seeing home.

DMCA

[Anonymous Coward]

They'll just say you are violating the DMCA somehow if you bust the RFID in there.

Re:DMCA

[jesboat]

Might be less "Funny" than "insightful"...

(Though I'm too lazy to go sifting through Copyright Law and figure out whether or not it actually does apply.)

Re:DMCA

[Kagura]

Shut up, it's funny. No need for your agenda here. :(

They do NOT say it's legal

[torstenvl]

FTFA: "But be careful - tampering with a passport is punishable by 25 years in prison."

Also, only TFA works. The other links are bogus.

Re:They do NOT say it's legal

[ceejayoz]

Sure, but how are they going to prove you hit it with a hammer instead of, say, had it at the bottom of your backpack and put heavy books on it?

Re:They do NOT say it's legal

[ScrewMaster]

That's not the question. I don't think our Federal Government is as much concerned about "proving" things as it should be, not anymore. The real question is: what is the penalty for being accused of tampering with your passport.

I would think that "tampering" would be more along the lines of "falsification". Destroying the RFID is really more defacement than tampering. At worst that would make the tag useless, at best make it more secure, and only means the passport works the way passports have always worked, requiring visual identification. It doesn't give the holder a different ID or allow him to do anything he otherwise could not.

Re:They do NOT say it's legal

[Anonymous Coward]

I would think that...

Never, ever, use that phrase when discussing the law, or legal issues. The law != common sense. Common sense != the law.

Re:They do NOT say it's legal

[manifoldronin]

I don't intend to disagree with your assessment on where "our federal government" is heading to, but your interpretation on "tamper" sounds a little "over-relaxing". According to WordNet, "tamper" means "play around with or alter or falsify, usually secretively or dishonestly". Smashing the RFID sure falls into "alter".

Re:They do NOT say it's legal

[ScrewMaster]

Oh, I know, and it's absolutely something that the Feds aren't going to want you to do so it doesn't really matter what the definition is ... you can bet it's illegal to smash the chip. And if it isn't, it's just an oversight that will get corrected, particularly if chip-smashing becomes popular enough.

Re:They do NOT say it's legal

[ScrewMaster]

Never, ever, use that phrase when discussing the law, or legal issues.

Why not? This is Slashdot, not a courtroom or a law office. There is no ultimate arbiter of rightness or wrongness here (other than the mods, and we all know how half-baked they can be.) And believe me, I have enough lawyers in my family to know how precise a legal definition is and should be, and how irrational the law can appear to the layman (and often actually is, period.) But I was expressing a casual opinion, based upon no factual input whatsoever, and I prefaced it with "I would think" to distinguish it from anything resembling knowledgeable commentary. So my remark, right, wrong or irrelevant, was correctly stated in this context.

Re:They do NOT say it's legal

[ross.w]

Whether it's legal or not, it's a sure way to ensure you get cavity searched every time you go through customs.

Re:They do NOT say it's legal

[Monkey Angst]

Why not? This is Slashdot, not a courtroom or a law office. There is no ultimate arbiter of rightness or wrongness here

True, but everyone should bear in mind this disclaimer: Taking legal advice you find on Slashdot can land you in prison. Don't drop the soap.

Re:They do NOT say it's legal

[mabinogi]

If you seriously think that anyone here is going to take a sentence prefaced with "I would think that..", posted by some guy on slashdot as real legal advice, then you've got bigger problems.

There is no disclaimer required.

hammer time

[beanerspace]

Heh, the solution gives a whole new meaning to the phrase 'hammer time.'

Makes me wonder if this 'brute force' approach will be applied to other government introduced RFID technologies?

"duh, how do I know it didn't work ...?"

Ooops

[dj961]

I dropped a hammer on my passport.

Re:Ooops

[alexfromspace]

Why was I just thinking of that? No, hammer is too obvious. It would have to be something less obvious, like a 30lb exercise weight or a heavy plate. Oh yeah, and the coffee table was also broken in the process.

Re:Ooops

[TheGratefulNet]

I dropped a hammer on my passport.

yeah, and that's about as smart as a bag full of passports.

It's like wearing a big name tag...

[paladinwannabe2]

That broadcasts your information. This makes it so much easier to stalk people you've just met! Of course, if I was a criminal I'd just use this to make a list of people going on a nice long overseas flight... plenty of time to stop by their house and help myself to a few things.

Re:It's like wearing a big name tag...

[teslar]

yeah, except that RFID chips don't broadcast anything anyway and US RFID passports, unlike their British counterparts have a layer of tinfoil in their covers, so unless it's actually open, you can't read the chip.

So, to answer the OPs questions.

How far will you go to protect or disable the RFID chip in your passport?

Wrap it in tinfoil

Do you think such a step is necessary?

For US passports: nope, it's already been done for you, courtesy of your government. Other non-foil-wrapped passports: Meh. But yeah, better safe than sorry, I guess. Actually destroying the chip is just plain stupid though, unless you're a fan of full cavity searches.

Re:It's like wearing a big name tag...

[MightyYar]

You don't have to worry about this unless you walk around with your passport open. When the passport is closed, metal fibers in the cover act as a shield that makes reading the RFID chip impossible.

At least, that is my recollection.

Re:It's like wearing a big name tag...

[swillden]

Of course, if I was a criminal I'd just use this to make a list of people going on a nice long overseas flight... plenty of time to stop by their house and help myself to a few things.

Yeah? How would you get the MRZ data that's printed inside the passport? You know you need that to authenticate to the chip before it will give you any data, right? Also, you're going to have to convince the people to open their passports, otherwise the RF shielding in the passport cover will prevent you from talking to the chip. Maybe you can scan them when they show their passports at the checkin counter. Of course, you still need that pesky MRZ data -- maybe a camera with a long lens? Hey, when you take a picture of the passport to get the MRZ data, you'll also get a photo of all of the data that's on the chip, so you can just skip the whole messing with antennas and crypto bit!

Re:It's like wearing a big name tag...

[gad_zuki!]

First off, its encrypted. The key is written on the inside of the passport. Unless theyres some flaw with key generation then that AES will be difficult to crack.

Secondly, when the passport is closed the chip is enclosed in a layer of tin-foil making it pretty much impossible to read.

Its not perfect but its not the security nightmare some people make it out to be. Personally, I'd much prefer they use something that requires a physical contact.

Re:It's like wearing a big name tag...

[Dare nMc]

before it will give you any data, right?

well not to get any data, the hype anyway is that it will give you a challenge code, that is unique enough to track a passport reliably. Passports without a RF shield could be of use in 2 ways (assuming a dirt cheap reader comes about.)
    1, a reader in driveways, they carried their passports out of the house, they must be planning to leaving the country.
    2, insider: I learn the challenge string of all potential victims, I can now track when your passports cross any of my readers.

seams a bit far-fetched currently, but if cellphone GPS RFID readers become smaller than a dime, and only $20 or so. And Passports become a necessity at all times... then stash them all over the place, and have data transmitted to my web-log. Knowing device # 5554890 spends most nights at coordinate X,Y,Z With time you can correlate that with a actual person fairly easily.

Re:It's like wearing a big name tag...

[swillden]

You could have a buddy working at a hotel desk who asks to see your passport (they do that in some countries in Europe, if you're a foreigner, right?) and takes a quick pick of the MRZ with a webcam.

At which point you can ignore the MRZ, because the webcam will have captured all of the information on the printed page -- which is exactly the same as the information on the chip.

Re:It's like wearing a big name tag...

[swillden]

well not to get any data, the hype anyway is that it will give you a challenge code, that is unique enough to track a passport reliably

Ummm... no/maybe... It's complicated.

The passport gives you two things: The Answer To Reset (ATR) string, which doesn't contain any unique information -- all of the chips of the same type from the same manufacturer give the same ATR, unless the chip issuer has set them to something else. Second, the upon receipt of the command to authenticate, the chip issues a challenge code, which is randomly generated (and most chips include a hardware-based TRNG, so it really is random).

So, no, the chip doesn't give you a challenge code that enables you to identify the passport, unless you're unlucky enough to have one with a very unique ATR.

However, even though the chips are manufactured in large lots, there are always tiny differences, and researchers have shown that by precisely measuring timing and power variations in the chip's transmissions, they can "fingerprint" a chip. Whether or not this can be done very reliably outside a lab is an open question.

but if cellphone GPS RFID readers become smaller than a dime, and only $20 or so.

I'm pretty certain that the cellphone RFID readers being deployed (which are small, and cheaper than $20) can't communicate with ISO 14443 contactless smart cards. Instead, they use the frequencies and protocols of RFIDs (there are a couple of different ones, and I don't recall their numbers -- I've only worked with RFID a little bit).

Even assuming they could, though, both of your scenarios run into range problems -- especially if you want to have a reader with an antenna "smaller than a dime". To get more than a couple centimeters of range you need larger a larger, directional antenna, and it's very difficult. The ability to read contactless smart card chips as they pass through a doorway would be a huge boon to the contactless smart card industry, but no one has been able to do it reliably outside of a carefully controlled lab environment. Dumb RFID's that don't have the hefty power requirements of a smart card chip can do it, but smart card, with their full-blown microprocessors, crypto engines, etc., simply require too much power to run at longer ranges.

Of course, to prevent these issues, the sensible thing to do is to prevent the chip from being used at all when it's not supposed to be. I would have preferred a mechanical switch that had to be moved to connect the chip's antenna, but the shielded passport cover is a reasonable approach.

Freedom vs. Safety

[TrisexualPuppy]

Great idea! Anything else I can do to slow down my passage through Immigration and Customs after a long flight? I'm always looking for ideas.

Hey, actually, it is a great idea. If you're the kind of person who likes to protect his rights and privacy, this is an excellent way to go. Not only do you get to destroy the RFID, but you can still use the passports that are being released from here on out and are the only way to get in or out of the country. This means that we have an option to keep passports as they used to be, a little less like cattle ear tags.

For me, cue the Tchaikovsky 1812 Overture final movement. Cannons sounding in the background, I'll be smashing my RFID with a 12-pound copper mallet the next time that I have to renew.

Re:Freedom vs. Safety

[Threni]

Talking of freedom etc, check out this:

http://cryptome.org/bdvp-stasi.htm

Time for some people to leave town and get a new identity!

Re:Freedom vs. Safety

[Yocto Yotta]

Copper? You must be one of thems there fancy boys.

Re:microwave it

[nomadic]

US money doesn't have RFID tags. Yet.

Tags: dontaskquestions

[75th Trombone]

How far will you go to protect or disable the RFID chip in your passport? Do you think such a step is necessary? Does anyone have an argument in favor of the technology's implementation here?

Or how about in opposition of it? What do you think are the legal ramifications of such a move? Who is likely to be hurt by this scenario? Who am I? What am I doing posting on Slashdot? When is my question-mark key going to break under stress?

Taking bets...

[Junior J. Junior III]

How long until they make hammer possession a felony?

Re:Taking bets...

[Perseid]

Who cares? Does anyone still have any of his CDs anyway?

Re:Taking bets...

[multiOSfreak]

How long until they make hammer possession a felony?

Probably not long. And then only the criminals will have hammers. That's why we should all join the National Hammer Association.

They can have my hammer when they pry it from my cold, dead hands.

Re:Taking bets...

[dkleinsc]

Doesn't solve the problem, unless they're going to outlaw rocks as well.

Re:Taking bets...

[TheGratefulNet]

yeah, but when all you have is a hammer, everything looks like NIN.

or so I've heard..

Re:Taking bets...

[marcosdumay]

Don't give them ideas...

Several observations

[Rosco P. Coltrane]

Smashing the chip is obviously just a political statement (one that I agree with mind you). If the guy only wanted to prevent the chip broadcasting data everywhere, it's easy enough to make a tinfoil-lined wallet for the passport, or carry it in an old cigarette case.

The other thing: if a US passport with a defective rfid chip is legal and valid, it won't stay that way for long.

I like microwaves myself

[a voice in the crowd]

10 seconds in the microwave oven fixed the RFID chip in my Airmiles card just fine, and no burnt aroma.

Re:I like microwaves myself

[msanford]

Not being a US citizen I've not seen the new passports up close, but I would assume that there is an RFID tag near some paper (i.e., the rest of the passport). What would do you if you microwaved your passport only to see it burst into flames in the oven?

Re:microwave it

[nomadic]

Sure they explode, because they have foil inlays in them, and we all know what happens when you microwave foil. But they don't have RFIDs.

No thanks.

[webdog314]

And who is more likely to get that random cavity search, the touring Swiss couple who don't give a damn about their privacy risk, or the scruffy looking nerd who's passport just happens to have a non-functional RFID chip?

State Department FAQ

[brewer13210]

From the US State Department FAQ on electronic passports

What will happen if my Electronic passport fails at a port-of-entry?

The chip in the passport is just one of the many security features of the new passport. If the chip fails, the passport remains a valid travel document until its expiration date. The bearer will continue to processed by the port-of-entry officer as if he/she had a passport without a chip.

Re:State Department FAQ

[pr0digy25]

The bearer will continue to processed by the port-of-entry officer as if he/she had a passport without a chip.

"Processing" can include a secondary customs/immigration examination. As long as you play by the rules, the only thing you have to give up is your time.

Re:microwave it

[supabeast!]

I do it with bigger ammount of cash, too, since new US banknotes can be detected from distance.
If I'm about to carry few hundreds of $ in my pocket, I don't want to advertise it. Anyone with the money, time, and ability to set up an electronic system to identify potential targets for a mugging probably has better things to do than mug people. Like just robbing you at an ATM.

Re:Lots of F.U.D. spread around

[eglamkowski]

Why do you have to be canadian to safely say the US government is stupid? I'm an US citizen and I'll say: my government is stupid. And insane. It hasn't given a damn about the constitution in what, 150 years at least? It's been all downhill since :-p

But not to worry, we're rapidly approaching the point where Our Robed Masters (i.e. the courts) will run the whole show anyways, so pretty soon it just won't matter who sits in Congress or the Oval Office. For some things they already do have the power, they just haven't been able to seize all the power for everything. Yet. But they're working on it!

Anybody got an RFID detector?

[mmurphy000]

Does anyone make a handheld RFID detector? Not something to read the tags, but just to note their presence, kinda like the rudimentary keychain WiFi detectors? I'd love to have something that I can use at home to find these little buggers as they start invading everything, so I can choose which to keep, which to somehow enclose (e.g., passport), and which to hammer into oblivion.

For my purposes, a simple meter showing strength of reflected RFID signal would probably suffice, so one can slowly pan over an area to watch for needle jumps. An audible signal (think Geiger counter or metal detector) could work too, though a headset jack would be nice in that case.

Re:Anybody got an RFID detector?

[Lord Grey]

I don't know of a handheld RFID detector, but I've often thought about what I could do about the increasing use of RFID tags and the potential for misuse (particularly with respect to anyone tracking my actions, purchases, etc.). It seems that it will only be more and more difficult to try to defeat RFID tracking. Given that, I've thought that perhaps sowing disinformation is the better way to go. What about a handheld RFID transmitter, instead? One that simply continuously spews random information at maximum power, overwhelming any embedded RFID chip?

Re:Anybody got an RFID detector?

[cdrguru]

Contrary to popular media, RFID is not something that enables tracking by satellites, black helicoptors or mysterious vans you see roaming your neighborhood streets.

It is a passive device that requires a RF signal strong enough to induce an electric current in an antenna so the chip can transmit a response.

No, you aren't going to be able to detect this without transmitting the proper frequency signal at a high enough power to trigger the chip to respond. It isn't going to respond unless "prompted" by a reader either. This prompting isn't any sort of encryption because RFID is not secure. But the only way to read TI RFID tags is with a TI reader. Oh, you want to read Motorola tags ... well, then you need a Motorola reader. Yes, it is likely this sort of thing with manufacturer incompatabilities.

Yes, there is a standard... or more correctly there are many standards. You just need to figure out what standard(s) you would like to be able to interact with and get the proper reader device. I'm sure a generic one is possible but very likely rather pricey.

Re:Anybody got an RFID detector?

[jaymzru]

Yes.

Re:Anybody got an RFID detector?

[Lurker187]

Well, if you're scanning objects in your home, you might as well use a stationary device connected to a computer, since there's little point in putting RFID tags in furniture or other normally non-mobile objects. Also, I would think a mobile power source and even basic processing would drive up the price.

I haven't tried them yet, but if you are interested in PC-based RFID readers, some friends recommended these:

http://www.hobbyengineering.com/H2177.html

http://www.phidgets.com/index.php

Re:Anybody got an RFID detector?

[realisticradical]

I don't think the major concern here is the government tracking people from outer space with RFID tags. If the government really wants to track me they have plenty of ways of doing that already. It seems more likely that identity and other thieves would be able to use RFID to steal with very little risk.

The RFID tag in a passport could be used to steal a social security number assuming that it's one of the things being broadcast. Or, as pointed out above, just to know who is going away for a while and where they live and then rob their houses.

There is an RFID tag in my ATM card and it's probably coming soon to my credit cards so someone with a powerful enough reader can steal my credit card information without me ever noticing.

New cars have RFID keys instead of regular keys. The chips are powerful enough that the cars unlock when the key is a few feet away. It wouldn't be too hard to steal cars by say waiting in a movie theater parking lot. A thief would be guaranteed two hours before the owner noticed the theft.

Even if the required reader is large a thief could simply walk around with a backpack. Sure a powerful RFID tag reader would be expensive but once the profit motive is big enough it will easily catch on as a way to steal without much risk.

Re:Anybody got an RFID detector?

[owlstead]

In the Dutch/German C'T magazine there have been schematics on how to build a detector to find ISO 14443 tags (which is what these passports are). Also, you can find another way to protect yourself against these sort of attacks here:

http://209.85.135.104/search?q=cache:HuNI-ek20WkJ: www.cs.vu.nl/~melanie/rfid_guardian/papers/acisp.0 5.pdf+rfid+vu&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=2&lr=lang_nl|lang_e n|lang_de

They also link to the RFID detector in the C'T magazine (first reference).

Re:Anybody got an RFID detector?

[Fulcrum of Evil]

Contrary to popular media, RFID is not something that enables tracking by satellites, black helicoptors or mysterious vans you see roaming your neighborhood streets.

How about a nailbomb?

It isn't going to respond unless "prompted" by a reader either. This prompting isn't any sort of encryption because RFID is not secure.

Pheww, that's a relief.

Re:Anybody got an RFID detector?

[pclminion]

Does anyone make a handheld RFID detector? Not something to read the tags, but just to note their presence, kinda like the rudimentary keychain WiFi detectors?

I don't think it would work. The detector would pick up ANY metal object in the vicinity which happened to have an inductive resonance at the RFID frequency. Hell, I bet a big dangly pair of lady's earrings might even register. The only way to tell if what you are detecting is an RFID chip is to try to read the data off of it.

Anyone who disables the tag, is a terrorist.

[krygny]

"Does anyone have an argument in favor of the technology's implementation here?"

Soundly thrash, arrest, incarcerate, try, convict and execute anyone with a malfunctioning passport tag. Problem solved.

Re:Anyone who disables the tag, is a terrorist.

[o2sd]

Soundly thrash, arrest, incarcerate, try, convict and execute anyone with a malfunctioning passport tag.

But why stop at those with malfunctioning passport tags? Surely anyone who applies for a passport to leave the land of the free/greatest country in the world/worlds greatest democracy is a subversive anyway. They are just going overseas to meet socialists in old Europe or terrorists just about everywhere else, so why not nip it in the bud? Just incarcerate and execute anyone with a valid passport.

Call me obvious, but...

[gillbates]

Why bother hitting it with a hammer or microwaving it when simply wrapping it in aluminum foil will do?

Just keep your passport in an aluminum pouch

[rmpotter]

At least others have done something similar:

http://www.rpi-polymath.com/ducttape/RFIDWallet.ph p

Bad Idea

[Vulturejoe]

Don't do this. The government considers US passports to be its property not yours, and mutilating your passport can get you in trouble, especially if you did it on purpose. Plus, there will be a lot of paperwork to fill out if you ever want another passport.

Re:Bad Idea

[BCW2]

How are they going to prove it was done intentionaly? I have a serious workshop, something could have fallen on it like my favorite short handled 3LB hammer!

Re:Bad Idea

[alexfromspace]

That's a good point. If the passport is not my property than I can not mess with it. Neither would I want to fill out a lot of paperwork to get another one. I guess it's time to look for a perfectly-shaped tin-box, or just bind the passport with a rubber band so it does not open by itself.

Re:Bad Idea

[OceanBarb]

I'd be more worried about having to pay for a rush job on a new passport. Expensive, aren't they?

Re:Bad Idea

[Vulturejoe]

Yeah, they're an extra $60 plus overnight shipping, and if you messed up on any forms then you have to pay it all over again.

So what's the point of this "Security device"?

[Zadaz]

If my passport is perfectly valid without it then why does it exist? It's certainly not preventing counterfeiting if they can just skip that step.

Re:So what's the point of this "Security device"?

[whatnever]

US Passports have a 10 year expiration date. 10 years from now, they'll probably require the RFID in all passports. Any non-RFID passports will probably be considered invalid after that date. So, this is just an interm period where passports with and without are considered valid. Just your normal upgrade period. :-)

Re:So what's the point of this "Security device"?

[Teancum]

Keep in mind that the reason why this "technology" is being added into the passports is mainly because the people running the passport control stations at places like international airports are lazy, through and through. That and they don't want to "hold up" those "important passengers" who have an uncanny tendancy of voting in the next election to get rid of anything that might be annoying. Or more important spend money on candidates to make a difference.

As if the Dept. of Homeland Security hasn't screwed up passenger travel enough anyway under the guise of increased security.

Instead of having to run a passport through an optical scanner like in a grocery store, you simply have to run it by an RFID scanner that brings in the same information. Oh, that and they can throw in additional "bits" to be something like a "flag" that is read only by border agents. Unfortunately, this is a classical case of somebody not thinking through this decision 100% completely and not realizing there are other consequences to this action.

New Logo, and now worries for most people.

[slashkitty]

Here is the new logo mentioned: http://travel.state.gov/images/e_ppt_logo.jpg

I was just issued my new passport, and while it feels different than the old one, it doesn't have the new logo. As long as I don't lose my passport, I should be good and electronic free until 2016. Hopefully by then, they would have worked through any of those nasty security problems.

Since passports have such a long expiration date, most people won't have to worry about this for many years.

Re:microwave it

[Anonymous Coward]

this is correct--there are NO rfid tags in US bills. They cannot be detected from a difference.

Geez, people get so paranoid.

And speaking of paranoia, why bash the RFID chip in the passport? It contains very little personal information, and any info that is in it could be stolen even easier by an old-fashioned pickpocket. There is no *reason* that a data thief would want to steal the chip info, and no *damage* they could do to you if they did. Hammer away, if you wish--and let your paranoia buy you prison time or a longer wait at customs.

Somebody doesn't grok RFID...

[pointbeing]

I do this stuff (among other things) for a living.

There are two types of RFID tags - active (carries its own power supply) and passive (powered by the magnetic field generated by an RFID reader). The best active tags can be read a couple hundred feet away - that's what you use to go speeding through toll booths and such.

Passive tags (like the one in the passport) can only be read a few inches away and someone with even a basic knowledge of physics knows that the power requirement to maintain an adequate magnetic field increases exponentially with distance.

Also, when using the FUD Technologies Nuclear Long Distance Handheld Omnidirectional RFID Reader® one has to remember that tags operating on the same frequency will tend to interfere with each other, reducing the chance of getting a good read.

My suggestion is to take the tinfoil off one's head, wrap their passport in it and go about their business ;-)

Re:Somebody doesn't grok RFID...

[swillden]

Passive tags (like the one in the passport) can only be read a few inches away and someone with even a basic knowledge of physics knows that the power requirement to maintain an adequate magnetic field increases exponentially with distance.

Good post. I just want to add that because the readers EM field powers the chip and the chip's transmitter that the effective power requirement increases with the *cube* of distance, rather than following the normal inverse-square law. That's not to say it's impossible to read chips from larger distances, but it's very tricky, and works best in an EM-shielded lab environment.

Re:Somebody doesn't grok RFID...

[Jah-Wren Ryel]

I do this stuff (among other things) for a living. ...
Passive tags (like the one in the passport) can only be read a few inches away and someone with even a basic knowledge of physics knows that the power requirement to maintain an adequate magnetic field increases exponentially with distance.

While you may "do" it for a living, it sounds like you don't hack it for a living. It takes a whole different mindset to look for vulnerabilities to exploit.

Even the State Department admits the RFIDs used in the passports can be read from at least 10 feet away. NIST says they've been able to do 30 feet and are working on clever ways to get beyond even that. These numbers are for ISO 14443 RFIDs which seem to be the type used in US passports.

one has to remember that tags operating on the same frequency will tend to interfere with each other, reducing the chance of getting a good read.

There are plenty of situations in which just knowing that the RFID and associated passport are present are trouble enough. The classic example being the bomb with an "american detector" - left out in a public area it only needs to get enough of a signal fingerprint to differentiate american passports from others in order to make that passport's owner very unhappy. Put one of those into the doorframe of a mcdonalds somewhere and you don't even need to worry about long-range fancy-smancy stuff.

Re:Somebody doesn't grok RFID...

[canavan]

passive (powered by the magnetic field generated by an RFID reader).

Passive RFID tags are not powered by magnetic, but by electromagnetic fields, more precisely essentially the same radio frequency they use to send back their data - they use the same antenna for sending and receiving.

someone with even a basic knowledge of physics knows that the power requirement to maintain an adequate magnetic field increases exponentially with distance.

Since we determined that radio is used to power the tags, everyone with a basic understanding of physics should know that the field strength diminishes with something like x^-3 and not y^-x, which would make it a cube law matter, and not exponential. Additionally, the same directional antenna that can be used to read the tag's signal can be used to direct the radiated RF energy to the tag.

one has to remember that tags operating on the same frequency will tend to interfere with each other, reducing the chance of getting a good read.

Sorry, but that's wrong again. RFID tags only send an answer when they are specifically addressed. The inventory control tags allow for a binay search to find all tags, e.g. you start by asking if any tag have addresses <2^31. If any answer, you check < 2^30 and between 2^31 and 2^30, etc. until you know the individual addresses of all tags in your range. Only after you have the right adress you will start actually reading their data, anything before that is just to detect their presence. Whether or not passport tags even give away their presence if one doesn't provide the (printed) secret key in the request, I do not know.

Re:Somebody doesn't grok RFID...

[Anonymous Coward]

For an isotropic (directionless) transmitter/receiver pair, the power requirement is distance^4. That is not exponential.

By using a directional transmitter and receiver, the power requirement is distance^4/transGain/recGain. Both the power/sensitivity requirements and interference from non-targetted RFID's decrease. A gain of 6 changes a 2" range into 1'. Antenna gain of 60 increases that to 10' range... all with standard equipment. However, this assumes that the passport is broadside to the attacker; as others note, it will generally be partially closed and facing away; both effects increase the power requirements.

Kids, beware of people using pringles-can antenna near the airport. and don't wave your passport around all the time.

Re:Somebody doesn't grok RFID...

[Catbeller]

No. Passive RFID tags can be read at a much greater distance than "a few feet". Boosting a faint signal into readability is 90 year-old science.

The RFID industry claims that the passive tags only work at a distance of a few feet, but such claims have already been refuted. What a motivated technologist can do isn't limited by the opinion of the manufacturer, who you must remember has a vested interest in pretending hacks won't work.

Besides, I'm more worried about the low-frequency semi-active tags. What would stop anyone from replacing passive high-frequency tags with the low-frequency tags that only broadcast when commanded to do so? To boil the frog, you kick the temperature of the water up a few degrees at a time.

http://www.dynamicbarcode.com/rfid/rfid_faq.htm

What's the difference between passive and active tags?

Active RFID tags have a battery, which is used to run the microchip's circuitry and to broadcast a signal to a reader (the way a cell phone transmits signals to a base station). Passive tags have no battery. Instead, they draw power from the reader, which sends out electromagnetic waves that induce a current in the tag's antenna. Semi-passive tags use a battery to run the chip's circuitry, but communicate by drawing power from the reader. Active and semi-passive tags are useful for tracking high-value goods that need to be scanned over long ranges, such as railway cars on a track, but they cost a dollar or more, making them too expensive to put on low-cost items. Companies are focusing on passive UHF tags, which cost under a 50 cents today in volumes of 1 million tags or more. Their read range isn't as far -- typcially less than 20 feet vs. 100 feet or more for active tags -- but they are far less expensive than active tags and can be disposed of with the product packaging.

http://www.rfidjournal.com/faq/18

What is the read range for a typical RFID tag?
There really is no such thing as a "typical" RFID tag, and the read range of passive tags depends on many factors: the frequency of operation, the power of the reader [EMPHASIS MINE], interference from other RF devices and so on. In general, low-frequency tags are read from a foot (0.33 meter) or less. High-frequency tags are read from about three feet (1 meter) and UHF tags are read from 10 to 20 feet. Where longer ranges are needed, such as for tracking railway cars, active tags use batteries to boost read ranges to 300 feet (100 meters) or more.

http://72.14.203.104/search?q=cache:Xw0bOrVpWVQJ:p risms.cs.umass.edu/~kevinfu/papers/RFID-CC-manuscr ipt.pdf+rfid+passive+range+boost+hack&hl=en&gl=us& ct=clnk&cd=3

2.2 Read ranges
Industry claims around the security of RFID devices often hinge on their short read ranges.
Some cautionary notes are in order, however. As discussed in [32], RFID tags do not have
a single, definitive read range. While the nominal read range of an RFID tag may be quite
short, on the order of several centimeters, for example, a non-standard reader or large
antenna can provide a significant boost in range at which an attacker can skim an RFID
tag. Hancke [22] has recently demonstrated skimming ranges of over 20cm for RFID systems
in which most readers operate at a distance of only several centimeters, while Kfir and
Wool have hypothesized a possible skimming range of up to 50cm for ISO 14443-B [35].
Furthermore, while skimming requires that a reader power the targeted tag, an attacker
performing passive eavesdropping on a session between a legitimate reader and RFID tag
can

Re:Somebody doesn't grok RFID...

[Catbeller]

Gah. This is a complicated subject, and I may have switched terms in my post. Forgive the gaffe. Not a radio maven.

Point is, a short-range radio signal CAN BE picked up at greater distances than "normal" with a powerful receiver and a good antenna. Unless the signal is cancelled out by interference, it always exists, and can be amplified. The industry is not going to promote this fact, but it exists nonetheless.

Re:Somebody doesn't grok RFID...

[pointbeing]

While you may "do" it for a living, it sounds like you don't hack it for a living. It takes a whole different mindset to look for vulnerabilities to exploit.

This is true. Given a directional antenna and enough power you can read most anything. Truth be told I hadn't considered the 'American detector'. Interesting thought.

Re:Somebody doesn't grok RFID...

[pointbeing]

For an isotropic (directionless) transmitter/receiver pair, the power requirement is distance^4. That is not exponential.

As a matter of fact it is - the most basic definition being "of or involving exponents" ;-)

You're correct - boosting receive gain will increase range but you've still gotta induce enough current in the chip's antenna to get it to transmit in the first place.

Re:Somebody doesn't grok RFID...

[pointbeing]

All respect, but the part you're missing with the whole passive RFID thing is that yes, the signal can be picked up given enough antenna gain but you've got to induce enough current in the RFID tag's antenna to power the chip before it will transmit anything. Passive RFID signals don't always exist, they only exist when the RFID tag is energized by an RFID reader.

Re:Somebody doesn't grok RFID...

[frogstar_robot]

Perhaps I'm being naive here but it seems to me that a "long distance passive RFID reader" could be cobbled together utilizing a fancy-schmancy high tech piece of gear known as a "directional antenna".

Re:Somebody doesn't grok RFID...

[pointbeing]

The fly in the ointment is the electromagnetic field required to power the chip. To double the distance between RFID reader and chip requires about eight times the power. So - just for grins let's say we've got a best-case read of half a meter at the FCC limit of one watt RFID receiver power. It'd take 8 watts of power to activate the chip from one meter away, 64 watts to power it two meters away and 512 transmitter watts to activate the chip from four meters away. You're gonna need a big antenna or lotsa juice - or both ;-)

Re:Somebody doesn't grok RFID...

[pclminion]

Passive tags (like the one in the passport) can only be read a few inches away and someone with even a basic knowledge of physics knows that the power requirement to maintain an adequate magnetic field increases exponentially with distance.

When are people going to figure out the difference between a POWER LAW and an exponential? The field drops off according to some multipole expansion which is POLYNOMIAL. Exponential dropoff in physics is known as EVANESCENCE. It does not occur in a free field.

Passive tags (like the one in the passport) can only be read a few inches away and someone with even a basic knowledge of physics knows that the power requirement to maintain an adequate magnetic field increases exponentially with distance.

Anybody with a more complete knowledge of physics understands that the field strength is only part of the equation. The rate of change of magnetic flux is also relevant. For RFID this does not apply so much, since the field must oscillate at the resonant frequency or very near to it.

one has to remember that tags operating on the same frequency will tend to interfere with each other, reducing the chance of getting a good read.

All tags operate on essentially the same frequency. The frequency is determined by the geometry of the resonant loop. Trying to operate at any other frequency is going to quickly drain the available power. THIS is the real reason why RFID must be read at a close distance.

Re:Somebody doesn't grok RFID...

[Buelldozer]

It took me all of ten seconds to create a cover story to hide a good unidirectional antenna that you would be able to point at someones passport WHILE THEY ARE AT THE COUNTER.

Build your antenna and put it on your arm, put your arm in a temporary cast and aim it straight out with one of those support belts that has the stick.

Done.

Verrrry few people will question what they are seeing and you'll have a concealed high power unidirectional antenna to use right under everyones nose.

I'm sure that with another sixty seconds of effort I could come up with at least three more ways to accomplish this.

I'll post more later, I've gotta go answer the door...someone is knocking.

Re:Somebody doesn't grok RFID...

[marcosdumay]

"Passive tags (like the one in the passport) can only be read a few inches away and someone with even a basic knowledge of physics knows that the power requirement to maintain an adequate magnetic field increases exponentially with distance."

It is more near to x^3, huge difference. Also, you can get near constant field (a few meters apart) with the right design.

Re:Somebody doesn't grok RFID...

[pointbeing]

True, but we've pretty much given up on the idea that the chip can be sniffed without the bearer's knowledge. An antenna that would provide the required gain isn't gonna be real easily hidden.

Here's a really short article that shows what you're up against with a picture of an antenna that'll pick up passive RFID at 50 feet -

http://www.dvorak.org/blog/?p=2437

Re:microwave it

[profplump]

So apparently anything that can be heated by a microwave and detected with an EM field is now an RFID tag? Are my Hot Pockets(tm) safe?

The link you provided show no evidence whatever that there is any sort of remote tracking system -- just that you can unevenly heat cash in a microwave. Even if you assume there were some sort of RF identifier in currency there's no evidence that it's unique to the bill; a demonination-unique RF marking in currency could aid in automated handling, handling by the blind, etc., without any particular threat of privacy loss, as there is no way to track a particular bill.

If you want anyone to take you seriously you should find a better link. Or, you know, actually test bills for RF reactivity and to prove the presense of an RF device. Or even mechanically or chemically disassamble a bill and physically locate the supposed RF device. Until then I'm gonna file this one next to "Microwaved Water Kills Plants".

Ready-made RF Blocking Wallet

[curlynoodle]

Forget the unsightly duct tape or foil wallets and liners. Check out this stylish "faraday caged apparel".

http://www.difrwear.com/products.shtml

And here's another one:

http://www.kenakai.com/

CN

Re:Ready-made RF Blocking Wallet

[bubbl07]

That aluminum-covered wallet gives me an idea: why don't I just cover my passport in aluminum foil? It's safe, doesn't entail any permanent changes to the passport (such as breaking the chip), and it'll match perfectly with my tinfoil hat! Brilliant!

(BTW, that's not sarcasm)

Re:Lots of F.U.D. spread around

[MysticOne]

Not that I disagree with you about the stupidity of the US government, but, how have the courts been able to run the entire show? Not only can they not make laws, but they can't enforce them. All they can do is say whether or not the law is constitutional. On top of that, I don't think they can actually review the law until a lawsuit of some sort has been filed. There may be exceptions, but I think they're few. Could you elaborate on how the courts are going to undermine our entire system, and how this is any worse than the corruption we've already suffered from the executive and legislative branches?

Scrolling Name Badges

[bill_mcgonigle]

This makes it so much easier to stalk people you've just met!

A cookie for the first hacker who connects a portable RFID reader to one of those uber-geek scrolling LED name badges and writes out, "Hi, $FIRST_NAME $LAST_NAME, pleased to meet you!" whenever someone with a passport walks up to you.

Re:Scrolling Name Badges

[ScentCone]

A cookie for the first hacker who connects a portable RFID reader to one of those uber-geek scrolling LED name badges and writes out, "Hi, $FIRST_NAME $LAST_NAME, pleased to meet you!" whenever someone with a passport walks up to you.

Um, TEN cookies for the one that also has the x-ray vision thing set up to read the crypto key (which is printed in the document) which allows them to actually decrypt what's on the tag... or, something portable (that doesn't involve a giant back-pack) to brute force the decryption while you're standing there at the bar talking the person with the tag. Or, you can relay the scanned data to you fellow "24" cast members in the van outside, where Chloe will take care of it.

Re:Lots of F.U.D. spread around

[Planesdragon]

... hasn't given a damn about the constitution ... For some things [the Courts] already do have the power...

You, ah, ARE aware that the Constitution sets up three branches of government, and explicitly grants the Courts a rough third of aggregate power, right?

And since they're the only branch that has no say in amending the Constitution, letting them be the ones that determine what the words mean sounds reasonably fair. (Where's the "States may outlaw abortion" amendment, anyway?)

FWIW, it is disturbing that our current administration seems reluctant to abide by Checks and Balances. But that's why we live in a democracy; when the administration no longer suits us, we can remove them from power without killing anybody.

I think 5 seconds on High in a microwave....

[Fallen Kell]

... would be a better solution. I am pretty sure the electrical arch that will form on any/all electrically conductive material would be more then enough to fry the sensitive chips.

Very simple - it cannot stay in the wallet

[pilot-programmer]

I am not concerned with the possibility of having my data stolen when I am at immigration, because that is generally in a secure part of the terminal and I do not think the odds are very high of people setting up to steal data at that location.

But what about airport check-in? If you are traveling internationally, you will have to show that you have a passport at the check-in counter. That is not inside a secure area and anybody could carry a skimmer inside a backpack or briefcase and attempt to steal the data.

I know people who have made phone calls in airports using a calling card, who later discovered a lot of unauthorized calls to Mexico on their bill. Stealing data from passports would be even easier in an international terminal.

So are microwaves the ultimate RFID detectors?

[sottitron]

I think it would be more compelling to actually read something off a bill and then report back to the /. community.

HAmmer Time

[wolff000]

My passport doesn't have one but when it is time to get a new one I will definately smash the chip. I already intended to anyway. I know the possibility of someone getting my info off it is slim but it is there. I have dealt with identity theft twice and I sure as hell am not going to take a chance with my passport. Yes I am wearing my tin foil hgat right now.

THINK before you hammer

[dpbsmith]

Which is likely to cause you more trouble? Homeland Security being identify me wirelessly at a distance to they can yell at you "6079 Smith W. Yes, you! Bend lower, please!"

Or that Homeland Security can identify you as someone who has exhibited an unusual pattern of behavior by sabotaging my own passport, for reasons which they will not be interested in trying to understand?

Telling them that "An article in Wired says a nonworking RFID doesn't invalidate the passport, so I can still use it" is likely to be about as effective as John Gilmore saying that since nobody can show him a copy of any law that says he needs to show ID when flying, he should be able to fly without showing ID.

Re:THINK before you hammer

[bodrell]

Which is likely to cause you more trouble? Homeland Security being identify me wirelessly at a distance to they can yell at you "6079 Smith W. Yes, you! Bend lower, please!"

Just a comment--passports don't have addresses. They aren't like driver's licenses; you don't need to notify anyone and get a new passport when you move. This just reinforces your point.

Oh, and as someone who has been very interested in the John Gilmore case, I was pleased to read about someone who managed to fly without ID (though he had to submit to extra security checks), who actually got through security more quickly without his ID. From the article:

Harper told the identification checker he had no ID, and the attendant quickly wrote "No ID" with a red marker on his ticket and shunted him off to an extra screening line -- generously allowing him to bypass the longer queue of card-carrying passengers.

you're either lying or ignorant of the field

[Anonymous Coward]

Not only can the old-generation passive RFID tags be read more than "a few inches away" (to claim 1 meter="a few inches" you'd have to count the way the Congressional Budget Office does)*, but it's been more than a year since passive RFID tags which can be read anywhere from 4-8 meters away have been on the market.

Here's a nice little marketing presentation to get you started on the capabilities of passive RFID using Ultra-High Frequency ... http://www.idesco.fi/library/documents/PassiveRFID -Ifsecseminar2005.pdf/

*Yes, I know its only "1 meter" under near-ideal conditions but average street conditions still don't degrade the range to "a few inches".

Re:you're either lying or ignorant of the field

[pointbeing]

Actually I'm neither - and couldn't read your link. Pesky 404s anyway - but UHF RFID isn't what's being fielded here ;-)

In practice your 1 meter degrades to considerably less than half that distance under suboptimal conditions - at least in my experience. I get reliable reads out to about ten inches.

Re:you're either lying or ignorant of the field

[OriginalArlen]

I can think of a lot of ways to get a reader within ten inches of an RFIP passport (sports bag held on lap, get a one-day travelcard, sit on Piccadilly Line loop that runs out to Heathrow; go round and round for a few hours, getting up and moving your seat every second stop or so (perhaps get off one train and on the next one along). Not easy to target a specific individual but good enough to pull a few dozem good reads, I reckon.

Incidentally, the ten-inch range you mention -- presumably that using a standard reader/writer without any kind of high-power tranmitter or any other Handwavium-powered device to boost the range? I would guess that, inverse cube root law not withstanding, the range could be increased somewhat with applied effort.

Re:you're either lying or ignorant of the field

[pointbeing]

...Incidentally, the ten-inch range you mention -- presumably that using a standard reader/writer without any kind of high-power tranmitter or any other Handwavium-powered device to boost the range? I would guess that, inverse cube root law not withstanding, the range could be increased somewhat with applied effort.

I'm sure you could, given enough effort - and you're correct, I'm using off-the-shelf components.

Given enough effort I'm sure one can read these things from a much greater distance; but as the distance increases the portability of the reader decreases significantly ;-)

Re:you're either lying or ignorant of the field

[bodrell]

Actually I'm neither - and couldn't read your link. Pesky 404s anyway - but UHF RFID isn't what's being fielded here ;-)

Did you try removing the extra slash at the end of the broken link? I don't know you, I don't know your credentials in the field of RFID, but you definitely lose some credibility by claiming you couldn't read the link. I'm sure even the dumbest script kiddie could have figured that out. Maybe the RFIDs in passports don't use UHF, but the AC's point is still valid: RFIDs can be read from several meters away.

Re:you're either lying or ignorant of the field

[pointbeing]

Actually I didn't *see* the slash. I'd expect even the aforementioned script kiddie could post a valid link.

Okay, you win. UHF RFID can be read 4-8 meters away. That's still not what's in the passports.

Informationous!

[paladinwannabe2]

I didn't realize that the US passports were being wrapped in foil- that makes it much more difficult for random people to access your tag. As my post (hopefully) shows, there are reasons why you don't want random people having access to your full name, much less any additional data.

Re:Informationous!

[ScentCone]

As my post (hopefully) shows, there are reasons why you don't want random people having access to your full name, much less any additional data

Sure, I don't want them randomly knowing that. Which is why it's nice that the data on the chips is encrypted. Your average passer-by with an RFID reader - even if the document's existing RF shielding doesn't happen to be closed over the chip - isn't going to get anything, let alone your name. If they've got the major resources to crack the crypto, they've got a whole lot of other ways to play with people's identities, and would have better ways to be up to no good than wanding people in public hoping for some useful tidbit.

People who actually need their identies hidden because other people are targeting them (say, travleing intelligence officer types) are going to have much more souped-up ways of carrying and shielding such things, and are frequently going to be traveling under assumed identies anyway.

Re:microwave it

[Rob T Firefly]

Maybe the OP is just trying to justify an unusually strong love for warm cash. I could definitely see the appeal of leaving the house on a cold Winter morning, wallet full of crisp, warm bills... now that's a Hot Pocket!

Microwave

[OriginalArlen]

I live in the UK and recently received one of the new so-called "biometric" passports. (Presumably that means there's some sort of representation of my photo on the chip, as I certainly didn't provide any other biometric data.) The chip's very visible. I gave in 30s in the microwave, then cut through the antennae tracks with a sharp kitchen knife for good measure.

I haven't tried using it yet, so if they let me out I'll let you all know how I get on... :)

Re:Microwave

[cathector]

way to go ! anyone know what 'biometric' stuff might be in there 'sides photo ? any burn-marks from the microwave ?

Re:Microwave

[OriginalArlen]

No visible damage at all. I started with a 5 second zap, on the reasoning that when I've accidentally nuked a plate with a metallic glaze, it takes a couple of seconds before any discharges or sparks are visible. I then worked up in gradual steps. I was mildly surprised that paper and the plasticised cover didn't seem to heat up at all -- low water content I guess, I know almost nothing about RF absorbtion.

Same story over here...

[monktus]

I was hoping I'd have Irish citizenship before I'd have to renew my UK passport, however it looks like that's now a bad idea. Even the Lithuanian passport (which I think I can claim), has gone biometric.

Obligatory

[meridiangod]

In Soviet Russia, passport disables YOU!

Re:microwave it

[ScentCone]

I have $66,000 on me ... they COULD read the amount of currency in his pocket at a distance

He's going through customs. With over $60k in cash. I guarantee it was not in his pockets. Further, if you've ever been put into the "special" line crossing the border, you know that they'll probably ask you to empty your pockets, too. Especially when your baggage has tens of thousands of cash in it.

They didn't need to read it at a distance, they freakin' looked at it.

Violation of Privacy

[HermMunster]

I didn't give the government the right to voilate my privacy in such a fashion. I would say have at it.

Re:Violation of Privacy

[Helldesk Hound]

Actually you did - implicitly by virtue of your citizenship in the USA.

The republic known as the United States of America passed a law requiring such device to be used. You are as responsible for the laws in the USA as any other USAan citizen is.

And as a citizen of the USA you implicitly agree to be bound by the laws as approved by the majority of it's citizens.

You don't like it? Get the law changed, or emigrate to some other English-speaking country.

It's worth noting that the USA has recently passed several sets of laws (to do with monitoring & detaining people) that are very similar to those laws that were enacted in Germany in the years immediately prior to the Second World War.

Wake up USA. Wake up!

Re:Violation of Privacy

[Teancum]

No, you got that wrong. A "love it or leave it" is not always an option, and besides:

Where do you possibly move to, even if you don't have to rule out moving to non-English speaking countries (assuming you are smart enough to learn another language if you hated your current home)?

The only possible place that would allow you to maintain personal liberties is to move to Antartica, but then again there are "treaties" in place that prohibit people from even living there at all. Or perhaps Mars, but that makes even less sense and is completely not affordable. There is no other country you can run to from America that would really make much of a difference.... certainly not a mass migration from the USA to anywhere else in the world that might possibly wake up the rest of the citizens of the USA that there is something wrong.

Moving elsewhere is not a solution. Period. At least in terms of trying to maintain personal liberties. And the founders of the American Republic knew that oh so well when the U.S. Constitution was written. That their heirs (read those who currently are in control of the U.S. Federal Government) have trashed that document with unconstitional "laws" that never the less get enforced is more a sign that the founders were correct that government tends towards depotism in every situation where its hand isn't slapped down and told "NO".

Re:Violation of Privacy

[Helldesk Hound]

> No, you got that wrong. A "love it or leave
> it" is not always an option

I didn't say "love it or leave it" - I said take ownership of the decisions that are made in your name! If you don't like what is done in your name then exercise your current right to petition for change - or even exercise your current right to vote for those who will put in place what you want.

Only after you have done that should you accept what the majority wishes to have, or leave for some other place that is more to your likeing.

Merely bleating on uselessly about things you don't like will not have an effect. You need to actively DO something or somebody else will get their own way.

Judicial review

[Allen Varney]

You, ah, ARE aware that the Constitution sets up three branches of government, and explicitly grants the Courts a rough third of aggregate power, right? And since they're the only branch that has no say in amending the Constitution, letting them be the ones that determine what the words mean sounds reasonably fair.

Your phrasing is ambiguous in that you make it sound like the Constitution explicitly grants the judiciary the power of judicial review -- the ability to determine a law's constitutionality. This is incorrect; judicial review is not enunciated in the Constitution. The Supreme Court claimed the power in 1803, in Marbury v. Madison.

Re:microwave it

[ScrewMaster]

since new US banknotes can be detected from distance.

All banknotes can be detected from a distance. A pair of eyes is all that is necessary in most cases. Unless nuking your wad will turn the bills invisible I don't see how it will help.

How Is This Legal?

[CyberLife]

Would somebody please explain to me how the willful destruction of U.S. Government property is legal? I don't like RFID chips either, but I have a hard time justifying this sort of action.

Re:How Is This Legal?

[rucs_hack]

1: You voted them in, and don't be telling me you didn't know what they were like....

2: Probably nothing bar re-issue a passport so the RFID's own identifier is different. Not only that, how on earth could you prove the theft? And what identifying info is on this card? Enough for an identity theft? Probably no more then you or millions of other people stick in your trashcan on a weekly basis.

3: Because they made it legal....

One word

[Zebra_X]

Microwave.

A few seconds in your microwave will be enough to roast that evil chip. Get to it!

Re:One word

[AugustZephyr]

FTA:

3) Forget about nuking it in the microwave - the chip could burst into flames, leaving telltale scorch marks. Besides, have you ever smelled burnt passport?

This approach would definately slow down your time in customs.

Re:li:ab:il:it:y :of: R:FI:D :ch:ip:s.

[jsiren]

Over here we use RFID bus passes. I don't know about the chip type (the equipment is made by Buscom), but in the 10 years I've been using the RFID passes, making an average of 1 to 2 daily trips, about five passes have died and had to be replaced (does that make a MTBF of 2 years?) The passes I've used have been rewritable; I don't know if this makes a difference.

I've had any one pass from 30 days up to several years; the failures have happened to both brand new and older passes. The common factor is that the bloody things always die at the most inconvenient time, like on a Friday afternoon just after the last possible moment to get to the ticket office, meaning I'll have to keep explaining the fate of the card to various drivers for the whole weekend... would I want to spend time catching my 5 connecting flights explaining why my RFID passport doesn't work?

whats the beef?

[sowhattf]

If you are travelling abroad, you show your passport (quite willingly) to just about every tom, dick, and harry in world anyway. Check into a hotel, show your passport (sometimes they even TAKE IT FOR DAYS OR UNTIL YOU LEAVE like in Italy and many other places - who knows who is looking at it all that time! In MANY countries, that is the LAW!). Take a train, show your passport. Go to the casino, you'll probably present it again. A night on the town to a club, show it again. Who the heck needs James Bond gizzmos? The info in your passport wasn't suppose to be a secret! It is shown and looked at constantly. Let me guess, your whole family gets assigned a fake name to call each other when you travel because you don't want anyone to know your Archie and your wife is Edith.... Meathead.

35-45 feet

[Ghostalker474]

Thats how far away your RFID equipped passport can be read.... almost 45 feet away from you. Someone can sit on the other end of a train station or airport terminal with a cup of coffee and a laptop, not drawing any suspicion and walk away after 10 minutes with a dozen new identities. While many of you try the hammer option or the microwave, I can offer something better. Goto a retail store, in the electronics dept and put your passport on the deactivator panel while its active. When triggered, the thing sends out a VERY powerful EMP that'll zap credit cards, cell phones, MP3 players, and certainly RFID tags (It's made to deactivate the RFID tags in expensive/small electronics). No scorch marks, no circular impressions, just a dead chip. One of the many things I've learned while working in retail =)

Re:35-45 feet

[iggymanz]

of course, some numbnuts is going to assume you are preparing to steal something

Re:35-45 feet

[Teancum]

This has abolutely nothing to do with "identity theft". Any numeric information (such as a SSN or other such number, including passport ID numbers) should never, never, never be used for identification purposes.

A SSN is nothing more than a name. No more or no less. It is the same as if your name is Joe "555-42-5553" Blow, or to perhaps "confirm" that a person with the name "Joe Blow" has a SSN with the number "555-42-5553". This does not in any way, shape, or form confirm that the person who has given you the name is the same as the one giving you the information.

Any bank, government agency, or other instutition who enters into a contract presuming that they have correctly "identified" the individual with just these two pieces of information is just being incredibly stupid, and IMHO any such contracts should be legally void. Unfortunately, the problem is that these insane institutions accept this piddling proof as sufficient to establish identity and courts accept that very strange notion.

The one and only legitimate way to identify somebody is through some biometrics test. This can be either a "signature", photo, fingerprint, retinal scan, or DNA sample, depending on how strongly you want the confirmation. To confirm identity in any other way is bulls**t.

Re:35-45 feet

[Teancum]

Too bad this is an anonymous posting. I hate replying to AC's.

In the sense that all software is really just a huge number, yeah, I guess you could think of it that way.

So, can you copyright a number? How about patent a number? There reaches a point that the question becomes absurd to think about.

The point of the biometric information is to prove conclusively that a person really is who they claim to be.

When trying to document identity you need at some point to have actually met the person to establish the identity. The problem with SSNs is that somebody showing off that numbers is being used to electronically establish identity when there is no justification to believe that the person claiming the SSN really is that person. And there are only two pieces of information used to correlate the information, just the legal name and SSN. That is clearly not sufficient, even if adding more obscure things like a mother's maiden name and birthdate.

It is for this reason that identity theft is even occuring, and why the whole premise is built on a house of cards.

Re:35-45 feet

[Teancum]

The whole point I was making was that any information you could possibly glean from an RFID tag on a passport can and ought to be public information, including SSN, the photo, passport number, and your full legal name.

That anybody could think of using that informaion as a means to commit identity theft is more an indication of a broken banking and government identification system that permits flimsy identity security needed for establishing and using identification information.

The reason for biometrics here is because you as an individual carry the "key" with you at all times, and it can be unique enough to distinguish yourselve from every other person on the Earth. Admitedly there are variations that do break down with most biometric systems, but those are rare and usually can't be duplicated by a determined criminal who wants to copy somebody's identity... at least the casual criminals that there are today who churn through hundreds of credit cards a day and thousands of SSN/name/birthdate records and randomly picking on people just to see who might "stick" on getting a false identity. Giving the current identity fraud that exists at the moment.

Those who are skilled to do a "James Bond" type of identity theft that duplicates DNA, retinal scans, and finger prints is hardly a major problem. If this were the only problem the Feds and others were facing in regards to identity theft, there would be about 2-3 agent/officers dealing with it in the USA as a total. The technology is available to get identity theft to this level and cheaply (to restrict identity theft to James Bond and his kin), but the various government agencies involved don't want to get to this level for various political reasons as the technical justifications are no longer valid.

Re:Lots of F.U.D. spread around

[daigu]

You, ah, ARE aware that the Constitution sets up three branches of government, and explicitly grants the Courts a rough third of aggregate power, right?

You are aware that the Supreme Court is the only court mentioned by the U.S. Constitution and that this court did not have any real power until Marbury vs. Madison in 1803? The notion of judicial review is not explicit in the U.S. Constitution and was developed over time as a tradition. It certainly wasn't there right out of the gate. Just thought that needed to be clarified.

Better Yet.....

[IHC Navistar]

Instead of a hammer, which would leave an obvious, and most likely ugly, mark on your passport, you could just use an N50 neodymium magnet. The integrity of the passport would remain unaffected. An RFID chip that has been hammered would most likely damage your passpord by fragmenting and cutting through the cover, if the blow from the hammer hadn't scuffed it up enough already.

N50 Neodymium magnets can be a little pricey (about UK3.00 / US6.00), but with a magnet that strong, you could probably keep yourself amused until the end of time!

Funny...

[master_p]

"'The best approach? Hammer time"

I have been dancing to mc Hammer's song for an hour now and nothing has happened.

Perhaps if I try James Brown???

Alternatively...

[adrianbaugh]

Anyone care to post a video of their passport in the microwave...?

Re:Alternatively...

[Teancum]

The problem of "microwaving" a passport like this is that the metal in the RFID tag itself may also overheat, causing a "burn" in the passport that could potentially catch the passport itself on fire.

Or at the very least a very visible "char" spot would be found where the RFID tag was embedded within the pages of the passport.

By hammering the passport (with a rubber mallet or using a board between the hammer and the passport) you can achieve the same effect but leave no (outwardly) visible marks on the passport to those countries who are using it for visa entry.

Getting back into the USA might be a problem, but only because your passport may still be marked as having an RFID tag that is disabled.

How to tell if your passport has RFID

[HungWeiLo]

A passport has an RFID implanted if it has this symbol.

I renewed mine about 1.5 months ago and didn't have it.

Re:How to tell if your passport has RFID

[slaida1]

Hammer it anyway, it's the only way to be sure.

For extra protection, use tinfoil around the hammer so that spooks can't detect it with their hammerscanner.

Disabling the RFID in the New Passports

[terrabuilder]

Sure, you will be able to disable your passports...temporarily. However, a time is coming when a passport will no longer be necessary, as well as a credit card or even a checking account. They will be placing RFID's in either your hand or on your head, and if you do not allow them to do it, you will not be able to work, get a job, open a bank account, be able to drive, rent an apartment, or buy food. Re: Revelation 13:11-17 If you want to dispute this, consider, a bank in Brussels has an accounting system that start with the number 666, which is run by the International Bankers, that own the Federal Reserve, and most other banks and currency throughout the world. In addition, the Constitution is being upsurped by Bush, as well as our so called "representatives" by perjuring their oath of office. Remember the "Golden Rule", whoever owns the gold makes the rules! All that gold that is in this country (United States) 90% of it does not belong to us. It was used to pay the debt as a result of the bankruptcy of the United States declared in 1930. We merely have custoidalship of that gold, because ever since the bankruptcy, the United States is acting as administrators of the bankruptcy to hide the true creditor(s), the Illiminati. That is why we pay high taxes, fines, money for permits, and licensing. We were sold out as to become slaves to the creditor(s) that applies to every generation since the bankruptcy. That is why you cannot (you can if you dare and know what you are doing and why you are doing it) bring up your "Rights" and/or the Constitution when appearing in court to dispute your tickets. I am well qualified to say all this because of my study of law, history and politics for the past 12 years, outside the classroom. I have just given you the nutshell and kindergarden version.

Extreme?

[blankoboy]

What's so extreme about hitting your passport with a hammer? It's not like you have to jump off of your roof taking a flying swing at it. You simply pick up a hammer and whack. Done. Not so extreme.

I'm all for automating border processing,

[falconwolf]

and well designed machines cock up a lot less frequently than humans. My only worry is it seems to be US and UK politicians driving this digital ID revolution,

Yea and look how it is in the UK, there's all those cameras that can track where you go. Forget that!!! I want to be able to go when and where I want without being tracked. Unfortunately the US is getting more like the nanny state the UK is getting to be.

"They who give up a little liberty for safety will neither get nor deserve either."

When the efficiency of government becomes more important than liberty is when fascism gets it's start.

Falcon

Re:I'm all for automating border processing,

[jacksonj04]

For the love of God - PUBLIC SPACE. Anybody can track you in a public space simply by following you. I'd be more worried about credit cards which can be used to track purchase history.

Re:I'm all for automating border processing,

[falconwolf]

For the love of God - PUBLIC SPACE. Anybody can track you in a public space simply by following you. I'd be more worried about credit cards which can be used to track purchase history.

True on both counts, what bothers me about tracking people in public spaces is government doing it, possibly to identify those it doesn't agree with. The political beliefs of those being tracked that are the opposite of the current admin for instance. I'm a photographer and do much shooting in public spaces, and even though I don't need to I frequently ask for permission from people I take photos of. The only tyme I need permission for this is when I use the photos for commercial purposes and the person is identifiable. At least that's the law in the US, other countries have different laws regarding photography in public. As for tracking by credit card purchases, I try to pay by cash most of the tyme just to make it harder to track me. Then what credit statements and offers I get in the mail, the statements I keep and file away while any offers I get I either use a marker to markout my name and other data then shred it or I burn it. Now I don't do this so much because of tracking but to make it harder for someone to steal my id.

Falcon

distroying the rfid in passports

[falconwolf]

Actually destroying the chip is just plain stupid though, unless you're a fan of full cavity searches.

If you love liberty it's the smartest thing to do, this being another step in a police state.

Anybody willing to give up a little liberty for temperary safety will neither get nor deserve either.

When government efficiency becomes more important than liberty, you have the beginning of Fascism.

Falcon

They say it's legal ... if a bit blunt

[dbIII]

They say it's legal ... if a bit blunt.

So is torture last time I looked - kids don't try this at home(land).

"Our tender mercy"

[bmasel]

Undersecretary of State Frank Moss, the guy who pushed through the chipped passport program, came to the 2005 Conference on Computers Freedom, and Privacy ( http://cfp.org/ ) to demonstrate the tech, and, to his credit, face the critics before the rollout.

After his presentation, we cornered him in the hallway photo Moss, EFF's John Gilmore, travel writer Ed Hasbrouck, and yours truly.

I asked Moss what would happen if one presented a hammered passport at an entry point. "We'll admit you, eventually. But expect to spend a few hours at our tender mercy."

d laid out a nightmare scenario in which terrorists placed chip readers capable of detecting the proximity of US passports as triggers on explosives under the seats of busses, bar seats, etc. Moss apparently grasped the problem, and delayed the introduction of RFID passports until they could be redesigned with shielding to prevent reading when folded closed.

Comment removed

[account_deleted]

Comment removed based on user account deletion

Re:They *will* be forged

[swillden]

Oh yes he will. They will inevitably leak. It's only a matter of time until someone bribes or blackmails a government employee or steals one of the machines used to sign the data and program up the chip.

Very, very, very unlikely. I have significant experience with how such signing keys are managed. A few years ago I built a key management system to protect the keys to protect billions in credit transactions. The project was considered important to national security, so I had design reviews with the NSA. I know what the NSA required of my designs, and I'm sure that the passport system will also benefit from their input. They're seriously good at this stuff.

The keys will almost certainly be generated in, stored in and used only by hardware security modules, themselves stored in the most secure areas of the already highly-secure passport production facilities. There will be no way to ever get the keys into the clear. The HSMs won't be in easily movable machines, and multiple senior officials will have to authenticate in order to clone the keys to another HSM, and under no circumstances will the HSMs be allowed to leave the facility. Further, once installed there will be no reason to ever move them at all, and plenty of physical security will be in place to assure that they're not moved.

The keys won't be stolen. That's easy to assure when you have such a small number of extremely important keys that don't have to ever be moved.

What almost certainly will happen is that corrupt passport issuance officials will create real passports, issued through the normal channels, with bogus names and identification data. That sort of risk is self-limiting, though.