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Failed Avionics a Possible Cause of BA038 Crash

Muhammar writes "As you may have heard by now, both engines of the Boeing 777 aircraft flight BA038 suddenly cut off without warning at very low altitude and low speed during autopilot-assisted landing at Heathrow. A prompt reaction of the pilots prevented the stall and saved all lives aboard. The crash landing short of the runway tore off the landing gear on impact, and the fuselage plowed a long, deep gouge in the grass. With the investigation ongoing, the available information points to an electronic control problem as the most likely cause of the sudden engine power loss."

369 comments

  1. Software? by Marcion · · Score: 2, Interesting

    If it is a software problem, then expect more public scrutiny of software based machinery. Especially after the US Senate vs UK debacle over the source code for the new joint-combat fighter.

    1. Re:Software? by Marcion · · Score: 1

      (wikipedia reference) - those buying expensive technology projects increasingly want the source code too.

    2. Re:Software? by Marcion · · Score: 1

      TFA: The 777 model, which entered commercial service in 1995, relies heavily on computers, so one area for examination is whether the software functioned properly.

    3. Re:Software? by Technician · · Score: 4, Funny

      If it is a software problem, then expect more public scrutiny of software based machinery.

      That is not likely. More likely is they had a glitch from a strong RF field someplace. Knowing the timing, it is likely to be either a radar or other high power beam or a very near lower powered source such as a cell phone inside the farady cage. Very likely the radio source is from something like this; **RING** **RING** "Hi hon, we are landing now.. Oh no, somethings wrong.."

      --
      The truth shall set you free!
    4. Re:Software? by SteveAyre · · Score: 1

      Unlikely. The have several computer systems all doing the same thing, designed, written and built completely separately to each other. The plane then does whatever the majority of them say. In the unlikely event one happens to have a bug and gives the wrong command, the other systems disagree and outvote the buggy system.

      For the plane to actually fail because of a software bug, the majority of the systems would need to have exactly the same bug at exactly the same time. Given their source code is checked very carefully and they share no source code between the systems, the chances of that are pretty slim.

    5. Re:Software? by TheLink · · Score: 2, Funny

      Well I hope they didn't outsource the coding to 5 different software companies in India who then in turn outsource it to the same subcontractor :).

      --
    6. Re:Software? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Oh look, it's Mr. I'm-So-Clever-Because-Of-My-Sig, trying to make a funny -- and failing.

    7. Re:Software? by 0racle · · Score: 1

      I've heard of this before somewhere.

      --
      "I use a Mac because I'm just better than you are."
    8. Re:Software? by AlecC · · Score: 3, Interesting

      Actually, they have given up creating multiple implementations of the code. There were only ever two implementations, scattered across several computers. However, when developing the systems for this very aircraft type, Boeing decided that they now have tools which can verify precisely that the software matches the specification, and where they actually need to put the effort in is in checking that the specification makes sense. Rather than wasting effort in having two teams implement implement the specification, and verify that using automated tools, you use the extra effort to look closely at the specification.

      --
      Consciousness is an illusion caused by an excess of self consciousness.
    9. Re:Software? by Z00L00K · · Score: 1
      It sure seems to be some kind of glitch - either software or hardware.

      If the hardware weren't redundant then somebody has to be responsible for that and at least get a good kick in the ass. Probably at the economic department...

      A software glitch may be triggered by borderline limits exceeded and started a default mode in which the engines were shut down or at least put to idle mode. Since this was at an unfortunate position this was triggering an accident. At a higher altitude there would have been ample time for the pilots to go manual and recover or initiate better reserve procedures.

      --
      If builders built buildings the way programmers wrote programs, then the first woodpecker would destroy civilization.
    10. Re:Software? by ObsessiveMathsFreak · · Score: 3, Interesting

      That is not likely.
      Yes it is likely. We are expected to believe that a single consumer grade device caused the simultaneous failure of both engines? Or from high powered sources which the planes must be built and certified to withstand. Give me a break. A Computer/Hardware glitch is a far more plausible cause.

      That said, my paranoia meter says this could have been caused by some nut near the airfield with a HERF Gun.
      --
      May the Maths Be with you!
    11. Re:Software? by Troed · · Score: 3, Interesting

      or a very near lower powered source such as a cell phone inside the farady cage

      While already moderated funny, I'll just clarify that this is a myth. A more likely explanation for the cellphone ban on planes is due to the networks not being able to handle several hundred clients moving at 800km/h in view of tenths maybe hundreds of base stations.

    12. Re:Software? by bheading · · Score: 1

      No, because other devices are banned as well, not just cellphones. Anyway, why would the airlines concern themselves with the inability of cellphone base stations to handle this supposed problem ?

      It does seem unlikely that a cellphone would knock out the avionics computer, especially considering that the computer has to deal with all kinds of more exotic radiation sources when it's higher up in the atmosphere. I'd be surprised if avionics equipment were not surrounded by a faraday cage to start with.

    13. Re:Software? by Troed · · Score: 1

      Other devices are banned as well (including those with no RF transmitters whatsoever) since the distinction would be to confusing to explain. Please think about it for a minute.

      You're correct that there are other far worse sources of radiation at 30000 feet besides cellphones though.

    14. Re:Software? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Informative

      If a cell phone can do this much damage, why the hell am I allowed to bring one (several even) on a plane?! These days, a swiss army knife will maybe get you as far as row 6 before people dogpile you, and they are confiscated. But a plane has easily 50 cell phones on it at any given time. If the only thing between me and engine failure are passengers dutifully following crew member instructions, then we are all screwed. So I am going to respectfully suggest that you are mistaken, because the alternative seems ludicrous.

    15. Re:Software? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Funny

      Very likely the radio source is from something like this; **RING** **RING** "Hi hon, we are landing now.. Oh no, somethings wrong.."

      obTWW:
      "We're flying in a Lockheed Eagle Series L-1011. Came off the line twenty months ago. Carries a Sim-5 transponder tracking system, and you're telling me I can still flummox this thing with something I bought at Radio Shack?"
    16. Re:Software? by badasscat · · Score: 4, Informative

      Yes it is likely. We are expected to believe that a single consumer grade device caused the simultaneous failure of both engines?

      You're right that it's more likely than RF interference. But neither is likely at all.

      A software glitch of this type (if that's what it was) has never happened in aviation history. Certainly not in the 10 year history of the 777, with more than 500 of them flying around the world, but not to any other type either.

      Also, the engines didn't "fail". The engines were running both before and after the stall (and yes, the aircraft did stall, despite what the article summary says). "Failure" and "failure to respond" are two different things.

      In some ways that's even more scary, because it rules out simple explanations like fuel exhaustion. It's one thing for engines to fail, quite another for them to simply ignore control inputs.

    17. Re:Software? by PingXao · · Score: 2, Insightful

      That sounds really dumb. Tools that can verify that software matches the specifications 100% in every case under every condition? For anything but the most rudimentary code I seriously doubt that. There was a relatively recent incident where a 777 gave warnings that it was going too fast and too slow, both at the same time. Attributed IIRC to a failed sensor and software not programmed to handle the error correctly. That blows the 100% software verification test suite right out of the water. If they really adopted that methodology they probably did it for economic reasons rather than safety.

      "This is your automated pilot speaking. Sit back and enjoy your flight with us this afternoon on the first completely automatic airliner. Nothing can go wrong... go wrong... go wrong... go wrong."

    18. Re:Software? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Software? Are they sure it wasn't some fool onboard who was messing with some electronic gadget when he shouldn't have?

    19. Re:Software? by terrymr · · Score: 1

      No, because other devices are banned as well, not just cellphones. Anyway, why would the airlines concern themselves with the inability of cellphone base stations to handle this supposed problem ?

      Because the FCC prohibits their use while in flight. (The FAA does too, but is looking into changing the rules).

      Generally all radio receivers/transmitters are prohibitied - the theory behind banning receivers is the small amount of radiation from the local oscillator. Most of the concerns are probably overblown - pilots have made reports of electronics interfering with aircraft systems, however aircraft manufacturers disagree.

    20. Re:Software? by Gordonjcp · · Score: 1

      ...very near lower powered source such as a cell phone inside the farady cage

      If the tiny amounts of power emitted by a mobile phone can crash the aircraft's avionics, why can't the very very powerful transmitters used for comms, TCAS, ACARS and so on? Why don't the igniters (which are sort of like a car spark plug, but the size of a beer bottle) crash the avionics when they're turned on?

    21. Re:Software? by eggnoglatte · · Score: 1

      As somebody else has pointed out, that design was abandoned for the 777.

      An additional point, though: even if you had independently develped 3 systems and used them in a voting scheme. You would run into problems as soon as 2 of them have ANY kind of error (they don't need to be THE SAME errors). In that case, you'd end up with 3 different results, and since an aviation system doens't have the luxury to throw its hands up in the air and ask for service, you now have a situation where you have to pick one of the three distinct results. The probability for picking a faulty one is 2/3 at that point.

    22. Re:Software? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You're assuming that the sensor failure was covered in the spec. If it was and didn't make the test plan, then you've got a point. But "bad sensor input" is on the list of relatively easy things to test, so that scenario seems unlikely to me. More like, IMHO, is that the spec didn't say anything about failed sensors, and therefore the software didn't do any checking and the test plan didn't include bad sensor input. Having two independent implementations of the same incomplete spec is just an expensive way to get the same failure.

      You're also assuming that avionics software is A) complex and B) doesn't have 100% prescriptive specifications, and neither of those is true. Avionics software isn't trivial, but a lot of it is very basic control algorithms with a well-defined set of inputs and outputs with known safe ranges for both of those. And avionics software generally isn't vulnerable to the pressures of feature creep and the like, which hamper good specs in other software. Moreover, as with any control system, there are prescriptive specifications of every single function; the specs are expected to describe the desired reaction to every possible combination of inputs, and coding managers would be expected to either reject or revise specs that failed to meet that standard. Having complete specs coverage means a complete testing plan *is* possible, and there's no reason to think they wouldn't create or execute one.

      I'm not saying they aren't saving money by moving to a single implementation, but there's no reason they couldn't also be preserving or even improving safety.

    23. Re:Software? by AlecC · · Score: 4, Informative

      No - it shows that the specification did not define what should happen with out of range conditions. The use formal specification languages to define what they want the software to do, but it is precisely these sorts of unforeseen circumstances which show that the spec was wrong, and the code only did what was specified.

      --
      Consciousness is an illusion caused by an excess of self consciousness.
    24. Re:Software? by willfe · · Score: 1

      Hehehehe. Looks like it worked perfectly to me, Anonymous Coward :)

      --
      Read my stuff.
    25. Re:Software? by TooMuchToDo · · Score: 3, Informative

      In some ways that's even more scary, because it rules out simple explanations like fuel exhaustion. It's one thing for engines to fail, quite another for them to simply ignore control inputs.

      Indeed. If I'm piloting a turbine engine aircraft, I much prefer for the engines to just fail then for them to ignore my commands. Fly-by-wire is pretty cool until the engines ignore your commands and you have no way to shut the fuel off to them.

    26. Re:Software? by (H)elix1 · · Score: 1
      Actually... there was something like that near by. Still very much a long shot, for a cause, but a cell phone jammer did get close.

      6. Accidental jamming of onboard systems by police because the Prime Minister was nearby

      A far-fetched theory which suggests that the police may have blocked mobile phones in the area as the Prime Minister's motorcade drove past. This in turn would, it is claimed, have created a systems failure on a plane overhead. This is unlikely to the point of impossibility.

      "I am sure other people would have noticed and more than one plane would have come down," said Mr Ling.


      If they fret about cell phones on the plane, who knows if a more powerful jammer may cause an issue with avionics. I'd not bet on this, however.
    27. Re:Software? by MichaelSmith · · Score: 1

      the aircraft did stall, despite what the article summary says

      Can you clarify that? A stall on landing would make sense. Most aircraft come close to stall on landing. I suspect that a stall at 600 feet in a B777 would put you into the streets with or without engines.

    28. Re:Software? by MichaelSmith · · Score: 1

      Tools that can verify that software matches the specifications 100% in every case under every condition? For anything but the most rudimentary code I seriously doubt that

      It helps that the flight control system is an isolated system. They could embed it in a simulated environment with simulated engines, control surfaces, physics, etc. The problem is that the simulators won't have been well validated and they are affectively writing the software. Bugs found during testing will likely result in changes to the flight control system.

      Perhaps this is a design fault resulting from a badly built test environment.

    29. Re:Software? by tftp · · Score: 3, Informative
      I guess a very powerful, always-on jammer could have reached an aircraft at 600 ft. However, airplanes are designed to be illuminated with radar beams, obviously. The metal frame of the airplane shields the inside space (and the inside space is also shielded from the outside.) So the possibility of an external signal getting to an internal equipment (other than via the proper path through an antenna) is fairly low, IMO.

      Another data point to consider is that the failure was not transient. Normally if you introduce some noise into the channel then you lose some symbols here and there, or the clock even. But the higher level protocols take care of that. Pull the network cable, for example - your SSH session will stay alive for half a minute, until TCP timers run out. I am sure that in an airplane loss of a message will be first noticed and logged, then reported as a potential trouble, and if it continues then some other emergency action will be taken. But if the error ceases to be then the message gets through and you can continue using the controlled device.

      Since the malfunction occurred quite far from the airport, and it did not fix itself after the aircraft moved away from a possible jammer location, then in my uneducated opinion the relevant controls just "wedged" somewhere, asking for a hard reset. It will take some Boeing engineers with the diagrams to find out where two independent engine control paths merge or at least get close to each other. And they still have the physical electronics of the airplane, most of it probably undamaged. On top of that they have every single bit from every single flight data recorder, and those are of improved type that record more parameters than usual.

      In addition, if the two engines are identical (as they should be) and have the same firmware loaded into their controllers, then the same command sent to both engines could easily take them out at the same time. It could be a fairly complicated sequence, for example, but as long as both engines are operated by another computer (autopilot / autothrottle) then you can be fairly sure that the two engines would be as much in sync with each other as possible, and the "ping of death", so to say, would affect both.

    30. Re:Software? by joshsnow · · Score: 1

      Ha ha! I thought the same thing. I'm not the only West Wing nut on here then!

    31. Re:Software? by sgt_doom · · Score: 1

      While it could simply be a problem of technical origin - something I appreciate having been in the field of aviation programming for a short time during the '80s - I would still very much like to peruse the passenger list.....just in case....

    32. Re:Software? by The+-e**(i*pi) · · Score: 1

      just be glad it didn't happen at o'hare, people live in front of the runway

    33. Re:Software? by MttJocy · · Score: 1

      Well of course it could have the option at this point to decide that it is in error and issue a status alert to the pilots to take manual control of the aircraft, the pilots form a backup system throughout automatic flight anyway in the case of error so there is no reason to believe that such a system could not issue a report of a fatal error to the pilots and allow them to take control of the aircraft either for the remainder of the flight if need be or until the system could reinitialize the systems in the voting scheme and clear up the fault (if clearing it up was possible by doing this) else it would have to be a manual landing at the nearest suitable airport for the aircraft like is practice for any other serious unresolvable fault with the aircraft systems, this even occurs often where a backup system is present (on the grounds an aircraft with one system failed and using backup now has a single point of failure issue and is vulnerable).

    34. Re:Software? by eggnoglatte · · Score: 1

      Not in a fly-by-wire system, where the pilot's instruments aren't directly connected to the mechanical components, but only issue commands to the control computers. If you send these computers the same requests and they come up with different courses of action, you are in trouble, no way around it.

    35. Re:Software? by sapphire+wyvern · · Score: 1

      Has the tool's compliance to the tool's specification been certified 100% as well?

      Otherwise you've just shifted the possibility of bugs out one layer: maybe there's a class of specification non-compliance that the compliance-checking tool can't find!

    36. Re:Software? by IronChef · · Score: 1

      Very likely the radio source is from something like this; **RING** **RING** "Hi hon, we are landing now.. Oh no, somethings wrong.."

      Sir, please remove your shoes and place them in a tub... yes, put it on the x-ray conveyor belt. Step through the detector now--sir, do you have anything in your pockets? OK, put your keys and phone right there. Step through... Good.

      Don't forget to pick up your phone, sir. And please, don't use it on the plane because any consumer electronics device has the potential to freak out the delicate avionics and crash the god damned airplane and kill everyone on board and all the retarded orphans in the orphanage at the end of the runway and hundreds of gallons of blazing fuel will flood the nearby farmer's market and roast the old folks and you'll all be joined for eternity in a mangled, smoking mass of metal and flesh.

      So, because you can kill hundreds of people with your phone, we ask you very seriously not to use your phone on the plane, and please, respect the honor system on this matter.

      Here are your shoes. Please step to your left for secondary screening.

    37. Re:Software? by TClevenger · · Score: 3, Interesting
      A software glitch of this type (if that's what it was) has never happened in aviation history. Certainly not in the 10 year history of the 777, with more than 500 of them flying around the world, but not to any other type either.

      It's certainly not without precedent. No case of air/fuel mixture explosion was found in 747's until TWA 800 in 1996, and 1,396 of those were built since the 747 started flying commercially in 1970.

    38. Re:Software? by Doctor+Memory · · Score: 1

      ISTR that back in the 70s the RCAF developed a processor using formal methods that had guaranteed responses to all inputs. Does anybody know what kind of processor Boeing uses for their FCS? Or is it a multi-processor system that is implemented with various architectures?

      --
      Just junk food for thought...
    39. Re:Software? by Technician · · Score: 1

      Why don't the igniters (which are sort of like a car spark plug, but the size of a beer bottle) crash the avionics when they're turned on?

      Put your cell phone inside a metal coffee can and type a reply. Now take the phone out of the metal can and put it inside the computer case next to the memory. Don't bother replying. You will be busy rebooting.

      Antennas outside the metal can are not the same as antennas inside the can with the electronics.

      --
      The truth shall set you free!
    40. Re:Software? by einhverfr · · Score: 3, Informative

      I think a single software glitch is unlikely to be the cause of the failure. However, best guess at the moment is that the engine issues were software initiated.

      You can only mathematically prove that software is bug free given some basic assumptions about hardware performance. If those assumptions fail, then your bug-free software is now buggy because the hardware is buggy and it can't sort out valid from invalid information.

      TFA mentions another avionics glitch where a failed accelerometer caused a near accident on a 777 in Australia. The software inappropriately responded to the failure because the failure condition wasn't foreseen.

      Most likely the root cause is hardware-related, not software-related. For example, maybe water-based corrosion on some contacts somewhere where the seal was damaged, or a short circuit on some sensor somewhere else. The issue is that this may have triggered failure conditions that were not previously foreseen in the software design.

      The 777 has an impressive safety record. However incidents where, say, water gets into circuitry and causes problems, or some previously unforeseen failure situation arises, there will be problems.

      As for the "first of its kind" remark-- this is not the first software initiated problem in the 777 if indeed that is the case. It *is* however, the first 777 crash ever. Which ought to make one a little less inclined to question previously unforeseen problems.

      --

      LedgerSMB: Open source Accounting/ERP
    41. Re:Software? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      To be fair, it did NOT stall... they got stick shaker. So it was close, but that's it. Even if they had done nothing, there would have been an automatic AP disconnect and stick push prior to aerodynamic stall. That would've been a far worse outcome... the point is, they did not stall.

    42. Re:Software? by JimBobJoe · · Score: 1

      A software glitch of this type (if that's what it was) has never happened in aviation history.

      Though it's not conclusively known, a software glitch is one of the suspects in the mid-air thrust reverser deployment that brought down Lauda Air 004.

    43. Re:Software? by Gordonjcp · · Score: 1

      Hm, there's a thing, a mobile phone has *absolutely no effect at all* on a computer. Who would have thought it?

      Ever noticed how the engines and radios are inside the same big metal can as the avionics? If the avionics need to be screened from RFI from the engines and transmitters, as you suggest, then why can't they be screened from the passenger cabin? Here's a hint - it's because *mobile phones do not affect aircraft control systems in any way*.

    44. Re:Software? by AGMW · · Score: 1
      I suspect that a stall at 600 feet in a B777 would put you into the streets with or without engines.

      They simply had to make the airfield! Have you seen the parking restrictions around Heathrow?

      --
      Eclectic beats from Leeds, UK
      handmadehands.co.uk
    45. Re:Software? by adpsimpson · · Score: 3, Informative

      A software glitch of this type (if that's what it was) has never happened in aviation history. Certainly not in the 10 year history of the 777, with more than 500 of them flying around the world, but not to any other type either.

      IAAAE (I Am An Aeronautical Engineer) and to take serious issue with that statement.

      According to the Times today, there have been at least 2 reported computer 'glitches' on 777s in the last 3 years. One lowered the airspeed from 270 to 158 knots along with putting the a/c in a 3000'/min climb causing it to stall. The other caused an uncommanded lurch to the right.

      There have been numerous other computer (software AND hardware) glitches and failures in many aircraft, some leading to accidents (remember the A320 landing in the woods?) but most detected and corrected by the pilots. A brief search of the AAIB database should show that.

      and yes, the aircraft did stall, despite what the article summary says

      Of course it stalled. It hit the ground short of the runway - the pilots were doing everything possible to get over the fence. After flaring the aircraft, it is usually lowered to the ground. By holding off till stall (at a few metres above the ground), they probably got an extra 20 or 30m of flight. This was probably enough to get the aircraft onto the tarmac where it stopped, easing the evacuation and recovery. It did not, however, stall during flight when the error began.

      --
      Is crushing a suspect's child's testicles illegal?
      John Yoo: "No, [if] the President thinks he needs to do that."
    46. Re:Software? by Alioth · · Score: 3, Informative

      I doubt the aircraft stalled: a large aircraft like a Boeing 777 will _not_ recover from a stall in 600 ft, and everyone would have been dead. If it stalled at all, it would have been just before touchdown while the crew were trying to arrest whatever sink rate they could before impact.

      As for fuel exhaustion - that was ruled out very quickly - plenty of fuel leaked from at least one breached fuel tank. It's the first thing the investigators would have done - look in the tanks and see if there was fuel. That doesn't rule out fuel STARVATION though - you can have plenty of fuel on board, but something stopping it from reaching the engines.

    47. Re:Software? by CrossChris · · Score: 1

      Don't be silly. If avionics were in any way sensitive to mobile phone signals, it would prevent the use of radar, radio communications and "Airphones". Working in the industry, I can assure you that the highest standards of Electromagnetic Compatibility are maintained. I can also tell you that the fault was a software crash. We've been warning about this problem with Boeing software for three years, but nobody's listening.

      "Abort, Retry, Fail" now has a new meaning!

    48. Re:Software? by broken_chaos · · Score: 1

      Yes - if it was really such a huge problem, it wouldn't just be "please turn off your cellphones". It would be "please turn off your cellphone, show it to us, and put it in a bag that's not with you, or give it to us for the duration of the flight".

      I've even once, by accident, left my cellphone on - I thought it was off, but I found out when I went to turn it back on after the flight, I'd forgotten to turn it off. Guess what? Nothing happened. Perfectly safe, normal flight.

    49. Re:Software? by gonzoxl5 · · Score: 1

      much of my professional life has been spent helping to recover users/systems from faults which 'should never happen'

      strangely, it only seems to be the SW developers who never expect this behaviour, the support guys and end users both seem to expect them on a regular basis.

    50. Re:Software? by kelnos · · Score: 1

      It does seem unlikely that a cellphone would knock out the avionics computer, especially considering that the computer has to deal with all kinds of more exotic radiation sources when it's higher up in the atmosphere. I also tend to think that if the FCC/FAA/etc. truly believed that a cell phone (or other radio transmitting device) inside a plane posed a significant risk to aircraft electronics, they'd confiscate everyone's cell phones before they got on the plane, take out the batteries, and hold them for you until the plane landed at its destination.
      --
      Xfce: Lighter than some, heavier than others. Just right.
    51. Re:Software? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      O'Hare??? Apparently you haven't heard of or seen Midway!

    52. Re:Software? by einhverfr · · Score: 1

      Eyewitness reports suggest that the plain did indeed stall when it reached the place where it finally hit the ground. Total drop appears to have been less than 10 feet.

      Which is probably as good as could be hoped for under the circumstances.

      --

      LedgerSMB: Open source Accounting/ERP
    53. Re:Software? by ckaminski · · Score: 1

      Cellphones are banned because they want you using the $5/min skyfones.

      It's only the ubiquitousness of cellphones now that they're thinking of changing their tunes. But you'll only get an AT&T flight, or a Verizon flight, or a Sprint flight. Not all three. :-/

      I hate the free market, sometimes.

    54. Re:Software? by Hognoxious · · Score: 1

      I don't know if you're joking, but somoene agrees with you. Automated (and pretty poor)translation here, sorry I don't have time to do a better job.

      --
      Confucius say, "Find worm in apple - bad. Find half a worm - worse."
    55. Re:Software? by PRC+Banker · · Score: 1

      I'd suppose much of the reason for restrictions on the use of electronic equipment on planes is because the airlines don't want dense hard plastic objects flying through the air when the user doesn't have a good grip and the plane is banking 30 degrees. 2kg laptops in turbulence would be even worse. Business/First class is less passenger-dense so more is allowed. The ban on radio devices is simply a convenient legacy restriction. As another commenter said, if there really was a problem with radio waves, what would stop a bunch of maniacs hijacking a plane by threatening to turn on their cell and wifi enabled devices.

      --
      Oh.
  2. terrists? by gEvil+(beta) · · Score: 1, Funny

    I'm sure the CIA will make "unofficial" statements shortly saying that they have credible evidence that it was Iranian terrists behind the whole thing.

    --
    This guy's the limit!
    1. Re:terrists? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Funny

      Terr*or*ists! Or is it the same as with alumin*i*um?

    2. Re:terrists? by Timesprout · · Score: 1

      Its surprising boeing have not been at this already. After the Long Island crash they were quite keen on the terrorist missile theory because it helped "explain" the fact that their fuel tanks could explode when a light was switched on.

      --
      Do not try to read the dupe, thats impossible. Instead, only try to realize the truth
      What truth?
      There is no dupe
    3. Re:terrists? by Hrdina · · Score: 4, Funny

      Actually, it's more like "nucular", "gubmint", and "librul".

    4. Re:terrists? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Interesting

      Its surprising boeing have not been at this already. After the Long Island crash they were quite keen on the terrorist missile theory because it helped "explain" the fact that their fuel tanks could explode when a light was switched on.
      In this case, however, in the absence of any explosions it's surely far simpler for them to fall back on their old favorite "pilot error" explanation. Like, maybe the pilot carelessly forgot that he hadn't landed yet and switched the engines off too soon? Sounds far more plausible than the possibility that a Boeing might have been faulty.
    5. Re:terrists? by R2.0 · · Score: 4, Interesting

      A little bit of perspective here.

      First, there were MANY credible witnesses that swore they saw a missile shoot into the sky before the explosion. Of course, it turned out to be the different trajectories of the airplane pieces, but that was only figured out after a detailed analysis of radar records.

      Second, prior to Flight 800 the terrorist explanation WAS more likely - I don't think a modern airliner had EVER exploded by itself before that, but there had been a few that did it with outside help.

      Finally, the intelligence and police agencies were careful NOT to peg it on terrorists as the only theory. It was the news media that ran with the "Arabs and Stingers and Bombs Oh My" stories incessantly. Yeah, the government floated the idea - because it was a definite possibility. What are they going to say? "We have some eyewitness acounts of what looks like a missile launch, but we have definitely ruled out terrorist involvement."

      As an aside, where are the Flight 800 "Truthers"? Why isn't anyone blathering about the conspiracy to hide the REAL reason Flight 800 blew up?

      --
      "As God is my witness, I thought turkeys could fly." A. Carlson
    6. Re:terrists? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Funny

      Actually, it's more like "nucular", "gubmint", and "librul". I wish all you right-wing nut jobs would quit picking on Jimmy Carter like that.
    7. Re:terrists? by badasscat · · Score: 4, Informative

      First, there were MANY credible witnesses that swore they saw a missile shoot into the sky before the explosion.

      a) no, they were not credible, and

      b) they by and large didn't claim they saw "a missile".

      What they claimed is that they saw a "streak of light" or some variation thereof. Only a few people claimed they saw "a missile", and those people by and large are the people that made it onto the news. So it probably seemed like there were more of them than there were. The news outlets chose the most radical, attention whoring witnesses to put on the air.

      But if you read the NTSB report, they break down the witness statements. Out of something like 2,000 witnesses, only a relatively small percentage (I'm remembering it being something like 25%) saw a "streak of light". Of that percentage, about half saw the light going up, half saw it going down. Some saw it going to the left, some going to the right. In other words, none of them had any idea what they were looking at.

      This is pretty normal for witnesses to an airliner crash. Nobody's expecting to see what they're seeing, so their mind initially doesn't record things correctly. What the NTSB has to do is filter out the crud and see if there's anything that everybody agrees on. If there is, then they investigate that. In this case, a large enough percentage of people indicated they saw a flash of light, and that ended up supporting the mid-air explosion theory.

      But the NTSB never gave any real credence to it being a missile. Neither did the FBI, for that matter. There was just never any evidence. The FBI had pretty much ruled out terrorism within 2 days of the accident.

    8. Re:terrists? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I'm sure the CIA will make "unofficial" statements shortly saying that they have credible evidence that it was Iranian terrists behind the whole thing.

      Maybe funny now. But not entirely impossible. Say I could generate a EMF pulse inside the aircraft on decent. An electronic bomb sort of. At this point nothing should be assumed or ruled out.

    9. Re:terrists? by nelsonen · · Score: 1

      A Philippine Air Lines 737 had it's center fuel tank explode ON THE GROUND while being pushed back in 1990 (years before TWA 800). The tank did not have much fuel in it, and there was bad wiring.

      A Thai 727 also had a tank explosion sometime after TWA 800, that resulted in an AD.

      Modern airliners have exploded on their own.

    10. Re:terrists? by tftp · · Score: 2, Informative

      It is indeed far more convenient to blame the pilots, regardless of the real cause. However in this case Boeing and BA and Rolls Royce have no such an easy way out. The airplane was on autopilot when the error occurred. Pilots involved themselves only when they had to, after the failure was apparent. In addition, they have megabytes of data intact on all flight data recorders, and they won't be allowed to change even a single bit of that, since these companies are not the investigators.

    11. Re:terrists? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
      a) no, they were not credible, and


      b) they by and large didn't claim they saw "a missile".

      So, you're saying it was a missile?

    12. Re:terrists? by Alioth · · Score: 1

      There have been several incidents of modern airliners catching fire all by themselves. Fortunately, with the exception of TWA800 they have all been on the ground. But the conditions have been the same: stochiometric mixture of fuel vapour and air in a fuel tank, set off by an electrical fault.

    13. Re:terrists? by CrossChris · · Score: 1

      It would be really scary to be a Tourist in Texas right now!

    14. Re:terrists? by peccary · · Score: 1

      But the NTSB never gave any real credence to it being a missile. Neither did the FBI, for that matter. There was just never any evidence. The FBI had pretty much ruled out terrorism within 2 days of the accident. Of course, that didn't stop them from rolling out new ID requirements to prevent terrorists from buying and selling frequent flier tickets. Yes kids, before TWA 800 blew up all by itself, you didn't have to show photo id to board a domestic flight.
  3. Errrrr.. by Deekin_Scalesinger · · Score: 5, Insightful

    A bit of FUD here I think - unless I read TFA wrong, the entire thing is under investigation and no one is saying anything for at least a month. The autopilot apparently sensed the need for more thrust and warned the pilots of this. It might be premature to say that a software problem is the likely cause of failure...

    --
    "As the intrepid kobold companion continues his journey, he begins to wonder... if priests raises dead, why anybody die?
    1. Re:Errrrr.. by Thilo2 · · Score: 2, Interesting

      You can be sure that the autopilot did not need to warn the pilot. Even a relatively unexperienced pilot will notice when
      a) The airplane drops below the glide path
      b) The airplane flies at too high of an angle of attack
      during landing.

    2. Re:Errrrr.. by einhverfr · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Not so sure.

      I read a number of articles on it and:

      1) Avionics resulted in a near miss relating to a 777 a few months ago operated by Malaysian Airlines. The problem was a combination of a software bug and a dead sensor (i.e. the software didn't properly handle sensor errors and a sensor went dead).
      2) Despite this problem, the 777 still has an impressive safety record. Only one crash in the history of operating that aircraft and that didn't result in fatalities?

      In a plain like the 777 basically, you have three possibilities: human error, electronics failure, or mechanical failures. I think this case seems unlikely to be the result of other human or mechanical failures, so we are left with electronics issues and the primary suspect.

      I am guessing that the real lesson here is that nothing is infallible, but that the 777 is pretty-darn good.

      My suspicion is that we will eventually find that the 777 needs regular maintenance to portions of it which have not received as much attention in the past. It could be a similar issue to the MA failure-- a dead sensor sending information the software was not prepared to handle, it could be an electrical short circuit (for example, caused by water corrosian or even condensation) as we saw recently with the ISS. The point is that only now, thirteen years after the planes entered operation, we are running into these problems. I don't think that software alone could have caused the problem. More likely it is a combination ofhardware failure triggering bugs in software.

      --

      LedgerSMB: Open source Accounting/ERP
    3. Re:Errrrr.. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      "The avionics system incorporates an extremely high level of redundancy and fault tolerance. The aircraft has a triple redundant digital autopilot and flight director designed by Rockwell Collins. The BAE Systems triple digital primary flight computers provide flight control limits and flight envelope protection commands. Each of the three primary flight computers contains three different and separately programmed 32-bit microprocessors, a Motorola, Intel and AMD, to manage the fly-by-wire functions."

    4. Re:Errrrr.. by PingXao · · Score: 0, Offtopic

      What else do you expect from a
      Rupert "Fox News" Murdoch rag? Actual news with real reporting? Just wait, it will get worse as his stink infiltrates all corners of the Wall Street Journal.

    5. Re:Errrrr.. by Richard_at_work · · Score: 4, Informative
      The current official initial report says the following -
      1. The autothrottle system commanded an increase in thrust from the engines which did not respond
      2. The autothrottle demanded further increases in thrust again with no results
      3. The PIC commanded an increase in thrust via movement of the throttles, with no result
      4. The aircraft slowed and subsequently lost height
      http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/latest_news/accident__heathrow_17_january_2008___initial_report.cfm

      For both engines to have not responded to either the autothrottle or manual throttle movements, we are looking at a software issue in either the FADEC or the EMC.
    6. Re:Errrrr.. by SL+Baur · · Score: 4, Insightful

      I am guessing that the real lesson here is that nothing is infallible, but that the 777 is pretty-darn good. That's what I read out of it too. The track record remains and speaks for itself - those are damn good planes.

      They experienced a catastrophic failure losing both engines at low altitude where the plane has all the flight worthiness of a brick and nobody died.
    7. Re:Errrrr.. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      One thing is interesting is the thread on software bugs and being able to 'proove' that a system is bug-free. This is about as useless as 'security' proofs.

      All your doing by stating these things is shifting the burdon to the specification which can not be systematically proven to be optimal.

      A failure of imagination (not anticipating hardware failure modes) still results in death and destruction. Quorum agreement and other fancy techniques won't save you.

      Assuming a hardware failure occured this does not mean software is automatically off the hook.

    8. Re:Errrrr.. by aztektum · · Score: 1

      George Carlin: Here's one they just made up: "near miss". When two planes almost collide, they call it a near miss. It's a near hit. A collision is a near miss.

      --
      :: aztek ::
      No sig for you!!
    9. Re:Errrrr.. by arkhan_jg · · Score: 1

      According to the preliminary report of the investigators of the black boxes (reported on the BBC), the autothrottle asked for more thrust when it was coming in slightly too steep, and didn't get it from the engines. The pilots then manually increased the throttle levers, and didn't get any more thrust then either. By the sounds of it, they had to manually dive the aircraft to keep up sufficient speed to stop it stalling altogether, then pull up the nose just before impact.

      Both pilots have been heavily praised for getting the plane more or less safely on the ground by gliding in with insufficient power on final approach - if they hadn't, there's a good chance it would have stalled and crashed badly, quite possibly into the 6 lanes of traffic and houses near the end of the runway they narrowly managed to fly over.

      A failure in the autopilot and autothrottle in a plane taking off from Perth might have caused a crash in a 777 if the pilots hadn't disconnected them both and got the plane under control - that was due to a faulty sensor and software bug combined. The chances of *both* engines on a 777 suffering a major mechanical problem at the same time is considered virtually impossible; it's possible to successfully take off in a 777 even if one engine fails, so both must have failed to cause such a major loss of thrust. The most likely cause of both to lose power (excluding fuel exhaustion) is a control problem, and again it's more likely a software bug that affects both engine control systems (or major pilot error which doesn't appear to be a factor here).

      The engines weren't hit by birds, as the blades visually weren't damaged. They didn't run out of fuel (as has been speculated), as there was fuel all over the runway after the crash, though a feed problem affecting both engines is a possibility, but again that's most likely a software controlled pump issue to affect both at once.

      --
      Remember kids, it's all fun and games until someone commits wholesale galactic genocide.
    10. Re:Errrrr.. by samkass · · Score: 1

      I've only read the news reports, but the most salient facts I've seen are:
      1. Both engines cut out simultaneously, and
      2. There was no fire despite major wing and undercarriage damage.

      IMHO, the overwhelmingly likely cause is fuel exhaustion due to either excessive fuel burn during the flight or insufficient fuel aboard on takeoff. It's a very common cause of aircraft loss, although not as much in commercial aviation. Either one of the above would make me a little suspicious of fuel exhaustion, but both together raise big red flags in my mind.

      But loss of fuel is the only thing I can think of for two turbines to fail simultaneously. Each is essentially its own generator and a self-contained mechanical unit. The only thing they share is a control system (which you suspect) and a fuel supply (which I suspect).

      --
      E pluribus unum
    11. Re:Errrrr.. by TooMuchToDo · · Score: 1

      The flight control system should have notified the crew of fuel exhaustion (if that's the case). Otherwise, the fuel level sensor may have been bad, and the flight control software didn't recognize the failure condition properly.

    12. Re:Errrrr.. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      IMHO, the overwhelmingly likely cause is fuel exhaustion...loss of fuel is the only thing I can think of for two turbines to fail simultaneously.
      Errrmmmm...the interim accident report said that "a significant amount of fuel leaked from the aircraft", suggesting the plane was not short of fuel. Do you have knowledge that AAIB investigators on the scene don't?

      Just to point out, the plane landed on grass and as such, I guess there would have been a much smaller chance of a spark to ignite the fuel.

      The engines may have both been starved of fuel at the same moment, but I suspect they would be fed from separate tanks and so I would expect one to fail before the other if fuel exhaustion was a factor - unless, with the fuel shifting that would be done on a 7 hour flight, there happened to be exactly half the fuel in each engine tank...but I suspect that the chance of me being hit by lightening is better than that (and, incidently, that's also a better chance than the chance of me, or anyone, winning the national lotto - there's a sobering thought: how many people want to be hit by lightening compared to the number who want to win the lotto, even though the former is a higher probability!).
    13. Re:Errrrr.. by samkass · · Score: 1

      no, as I mentioned I didn't read the report. But the only other case I'm familiar with where a jet lost both engines at once was when a fuel leak occurred, the pilot misdiagnosed the problem and opened the crossover feed between the tanks, dumping all the fuel out the leak and starving both engines. I'm not saying that's exactly what happened here, but something related to the fuel supply still seems likely to me.

      --
      E pluribus unum
    14. Re:Errrrr.. by jaxtherat · · Score: 1

      Mod parent up please. Most dangerous times during flight are during landing and takeoff, as the ground is far closer and you have less time to react.

      The track record of the 777 is right up there amongst the best. Probably why it is such a freaking expensive aircraft.

      --
      http://www.zombieapocalypse.tv/
    15. Re:Errrrr.. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It's possible to have bug free software, it's just not easy or cheap.

    16. Re:Errrrr.. by nmg196 · · Score: 1

      > The autopilot apparently sensed the need for more thrust and warned the pilots of this.

      The autopilot does not "warn" the pilots. The autopilot flies the plane itself.

      The autopilot itself demanded more power from the engines (by physically pushing the throttle levers forwards) and neither engine responded. The autopilot is not responsible for warning pilots about things that are wrong. The pilots would probably have got a stall warning or low airspeed warning first, but fundamentally, they would have already known something was up as they would be falling below the glide slope on the ILS and they also have a pretty good view out of the front window.

      Since both engines are completely independent from each other, it's a fair hypothesis to say that's likely to be the engine control software which was at fault. The chances of both engines failing simultaneously are close to zero unless the aircraft has recently collided with something (eg the terrain). I think the hypothesis is therefore fair. The articles are clearly suggesting a hypothesis and and NOT claiming that the the REASON has already been found. Hence phrases like "likely to be" and "prime suspect" in the TFA.

      How is that +5 Insightful when you don't even seem to know what an autopilot does?

    17. Re:Errrrr.. by tx_derf · · Score: 1

      A bit of FUD here I think - unless I read TFA wrong, the entire thing is under investigation and no one is saying anything for at least a month. The autopilot apparently sensed the need for more thrust and warned the pilots of this. It might be premature to say that a software problem is the likely cause of failure...

      Another possible explanation for this failure is that the plane ran out of fuel. An experienced pilot I know who has flown that China-Heathrow route explained how planes flying out various airports in China are held to lower altitude (20-24K feet) for longer periods of time. This causes them to burn more fuel, sometimes leaving insufficient reserves to make it all the way to Heathrow without stopping to top the tanks off.

      While I have no direct evidence to support this theory, it is plausible that the plane simply ran out of fuel a few miles short of the runway.

    18. Re:Errrrr.. by boot1973 · · Score: 1
      Agreed. According to the AAIB initial report the Autopilot needed more thrust. The auto throttle requested it but the engines failed to respond. A further request was made by the A/T and the by the pilot manually pushing the throttle levers. The engines still failed to respond. Any suggestions as to the cause at this moment are pure speculation.
      That's not to say that some theories are more credible than others. There was apparently plenty of fuel on board (a large amount was spread on the runway afterwards) so it didn't run our of fuel. That's not to say the engines weren't starved of fuel for some other reason, or that the fuel wasn't contaminated.

      Computer error could be responsible as could EMF interference I guess but until further details come out from the AAIB, facts will be replaced by guesswork.

    19. Re:Errrrr.. by einhverfr · · Score: 1

      However that is only possible within certain parameters of hardware function.

      Things get interesting when unforeseen electrical faults start occuring in the electrical and electronics systems which feed and power these processing systems. I maintain that you *cannot* guarantee bug-free operation of software on failing hardware, even if the failure is a sensor external to the system because you cannot predict and prepare for every possible failure condition (including miscalibration) of such a component with perfect confidence.

      --

      LedgerSMB: Open source Accounting/ERP
    20. Re:Errrrr.. by einhverfr · · Score: 1

      fuel supply issues could have been a factor but are currently being categorized as unlikely. (What *is* a likely cause of the first crash landing of a specific model of aircraft in over a dozen years of operation?)

      Now, current information suggests that the engines basically ended up stuck in idle mode. THis does not suggest fuel starvation.

      Fuel supply issues could include however fuel contamination. However: jet fuel and water are immiscable. It seems to me that this would have been quickly identified as a problem because any surviving fuel tanks would have water or sludge sitting in the bottom. I think that were this the case, we would have known already.

      engine line control electronics is not likely because the engines are controlled on independant systems.

      pilot error could be a factor but seems unlikely to me since the error first occurred when the plain was on autopilot.

      There is a redundant computer system which does provide commands to the engine line control electrinics. If an unforeseen error condition occurred relating to system input, that could have caused failures in all redundant nodes (this would not be the first time on a 777, but it would be the first time it caused a crash).

      Finally, I would take issue with the idea that this scenario is not something that pilots train for. I have known a number of pilots who have said that they train for engine failure-based crash landings on other forms of aircraft (usually light aircraft) and while this is not the exact same scenario, the same principles apply (keep control of the aircraft as long as possible, and slow down as much as possible). The one point I would make however, is that this is a far more touchy situation and a 777 is going to be harder to control into such a soft crash-landing in that sort of scenario than, say, a Cesna due to the much higher stallspeed of the former. Hence the pilots while using procedures taken from general pilot training applied these procedures flawlessly and deserve recognition for superb handling of the crisis.

      --

      LedgerSMB: Open source Accounting/ERP
    21. Re:Errrrr.. by samkass · · Score: 1

      Finally, I would take issue with the idea that this scenario is not something that pilots train for. I have known a number of pilots who have said that they train for engine failure-based crash landings on other forms of aircraft (usually light aircraft) and while this is not the exact same scenario, the same principles apply (keep control of the aircraft as long as possible, and slow down as much as possible).

      I never said any such thing. I'm a pilot myself, and agree that pilots train for this from very early-on. However, you definitely do NOT "slow down as much as possible"-- you set the plane to Vy, which is defined as the speed at which the aircraft achieves "max glide", or the best glide ratio. If you're landing in air without significant up or downdrafts, that also translates to the maximum distance over the ground per foot of lost altitude. (With downdrafts, maximum travel over ground may be significantly higher than Vy if you can get out of the downdraft quickly.)

      However, once you've cleared obstacles and it becomes apparent you will not make the runway, then you slow down to the minimum airspeed possible to reduce the energy of impact (which is relative to the square of speed, making this important).

      Also, a quick review of accident reports will show that fuel starvation is still a plurality of the identified causes for small aircraft crashes, despite the training. It's instantly something to focus on when you have multiple simultaneous engine failure along with lack of fire... if the investigation is ruling that unlikely, so be it. My original comment about that being a likely cause based on the news reports still held.

      By the way, I agree that the pilots maneuvered the plane expertly during this crash landing. I think the jury is still out whether they did something wrong before the situation became critical, though-- we just don't know. It's pretty rare for a crash to be due to a single failure of anything, mechanical or human.

      --
      E pluribus unum
  4. BA are extremely happy about the crash by Malevolent+Tester · · Score: 5, Funny

    They actually have a decent excuse for lost luggage for once.

    --
    If you haven't made a developer cry, you've wasted a day.
  5. No, not the Avionics... by bradgoodman · · Score: 5, Insightful
    No - I don't think so. The autothrusters responded properly, but they literally just move the throttle levers, to which the engines didn't respond.

    The pilots then manually increased throttle - to no avail.

    For both engines to malfunction like this at the same time greatly seems to point to a fuel delivery problem.

    This does not necessarily mean "running out of gas" - as a plane like this has multiple tanks, valves and pumps, all of which can be configured multiple different ways - which change during the flight.

    A simplistic example: they could have been running both engines off one tank - which went dry - though another was full - or both engines were being fed from a common fuel pump which failed, etc. These things *shouldn't* happen - but the investigation will tell...

    1. Re:No, not the Avionics... by FooAtWFU · · Score: 1

      For both engines to malfunction like this at the same time greatly seems to point to a fuel delivery problem.

      This does not necessarily mean "running out of gas" - as a plane like this has multiple tanks, valves and pumps, all of which can be configured multiple different ways - which change during the flight.

      Perhaps the electronics malfunctioned and stopped pumping the gas?
      --
      The World Wide Web is dying. Soon, we shall have only the Internet.
    2. Re:No, not the Avionics... by s20451 · · Score: 4, Informative

      In two other instances in large jets of engine failure by fuel starvation (Air Transat 236 and Air Canada 143), the failure of the engines was not simultaneous: one engine kept working for a few minutes longer than the other.

      The fact that the engines responded the same way, at the same time, strongly suggests a single point of failure in an electronic flight control system.

      --
      Toronto-area transit rider? Rate your ride.
    3. Re:No, not the Avionics... by 427_ci_505 · · Score: 1

      They're just damn lucky this happened on final approach and not out in the middle of the ocean. Even losing power where they did is risky...you risk hitting the ground too hard when you do hit it.

      The copilot did a great job. It could have been a fuel pump failure...no reason for both to cut off like this normally.

    4. Re:No, not the Avionics... by rsmoody · · Score: 1, Insightful

      The 777 is fly by wire. The commands are sent from the throttle levers in the cockpit, to the computer, the computer sends the commands to the engines. This is not the first example I am aware of were software caused an incident. About 2 years ago a Challenger Jet was about to rotate on takeoff at our local airport, and the computer refused to allow the aircraft to rotate. The pilots immediately aborted, but they still ran off the runway by about 20 feet. No injuries, no fire, just damage to the aircraft. This was not the first case of this model having this issue. Again, it was fly by wire that was at the heart of the issue. I think we will find that there was a coding error that caused the engines not to respond to controls with this one.

      --
      45 5F E1 04 22 CA 29 C4 93 3F 95 05 2B 79 2A B2
    5. Re:No, not the Avionics... by chuckymonkey · · Score: 3, Insightful

      These things *shouldn't* happen - but the investigation will tell...


      Exactly why speculation as to the cause gets us nowhere. Pointing fingers and throwing blame about serves nothing, just like the guy above saying something about Iranians. We really should have something similar to a Godwin for Terrorist/Bush/Iranian bullshit that people post.

      --
      "Some books contain the machinery required to create and sustain universes."-Tycho
    6. Re:No, not the Avionics... by DaveAtFraud · · Score: 4, Insightful

      No - I don't think so. The autothrusters responded properly, but they literally just move the throttle levers, to which the engines didn't respond.

      Just because the indicators in the cockpit show that the autothrusters were to provide more power doesn't mean the signal gets to the engines. There is a lot of wiring and other systems between the cockpit and the engine. On a "fly-by-wire" plane like the 777, even moving the throttle levers just sends a signal to a system that eventually gets to the engines. Bottom line is there are lots of lower level avionics systems that could have failed and the pilots would only see that the autothruster was supposed to provide more power and didn't.

      The question is, which on the various boxes along the way had a BSOD?

      Cheers,
      Dave

      --
      They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither safety nor liberty.
      Ben
    7. Re:No, not the Avionics... by hughk · · Score: 4, Informative

      I think we will find that there was a coding error that caused the engines not to respond to controls with this one.
      Flight systems (hydraulics, power and controls) are triplicated to give the appropriate security for fly-by-wire. Airbus Industrie on the 320 used two different processor architectures and three separate teams working on flight software to ensure that the same problem would not occur on two out of three computers. Does anyone know if Boeing used the same practice for their flight systems?
      --
      See my journal, I write things there
    8. Re:No, not the Avionics... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      A simplistic example: they could have been running both engines off one tank - which went dry - though another was full - or both engines were being fed from a common fuel pump which failed, etc. These things *shouldn't* happen - but the investigation will tell...

      If they were doing that then the entire flight crew needs to be fired and blackballed from ever flying an airplane again.

      You constantly balance your fuel between the wings, and there is no way of only using one of the tanks in the wings. on approach, the most dangerous part of the entire plane flight, you make sure everything is OK, it's part of the checklist.

    9. Re:No, not the Avionics... by timthorn · · Score: 5, Insightful

      No, this happened at the worst possible point. Over the middle of the ocean the aircraft will have been at perhaps 38000 feet and in a flight configuration, giving time to attempt various restart procedures, declare an emergency and glide to an airfield - a transatlantic flight is rarely out of gliding distance to a landing strip, and a flight from China likewise.

    10. Re:No, not the Avionics... by mpe · · Score: 1

      A simplistic example: they could have been running both engines off one tank - which went dry - though another was full - or both engines were being fed from a common fuel pump which failed, etc. These things *shouldn't* happen - but the investigation will tell...

      The design of a typical jet's fuel system means that you just cannot have engines running from the same tank. Each engine has it's own tank (in the case of a twin such as the 777 this is the entire wing tank). Fuel can be fed from other tanks into the wing tanks but this typically happens early on in the flight.

    11. Re:No, not the Avionics... by in+a+shadow · · Score: 1

      Never ever a commercial jet runs "on one tank", much less running on one and that single one going dry. If you are unfamiliar to fuel distribution don't use your imagination to compensate. Flight panning: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flight_planning [Wiki] Tank Fuel distribution (You'll get the idea) [freepatentsonline??]

    12. Re:No, not the Avionics... by roman_mir · · Score: 1

      From the article:

      On February 7, 2005, a Virgin Atlantic Airbus 340, flying from Hong Kong to Heathrow, was passing through Dutch airspace when, without warning, one of its four engines - the outer engine on the port wing - went dead.

      The crew quickly established from the Airbus's sophisticated displays that the amount of fuel contained in the inner tank, from which the engine was feeding, registered as "0". What they did not realise was that the automatic transfer system between the tanks had failed.

      The outer engine on the right wing also began to lose power and the warning display showed that its tank contained zero fuel. The captain immediately realised there was a "fuel management problem" and opened the valves between the tanks to begin a manual transfer. It worked, but the crew still declared a Mayday and diverted to Amsterdam.

      Some experts are sceptical that such a problem affected BA038. One former pilot on the 777 pointed out that during landing, fuel is going directly from tank to engine - there may be no transferring from one tank to another - and it is unlikely that both engines would suffer such a problem at the same time.

    13. Re:No, not the Avionics... by AlecC · · Score: 1

      The didn't fail exactly at the same time: one was spinning and one not when it hit the ground.

      --
      Consciousness is an illusion caused by an excess of self consciousness.
    14. Re:No, not the Avionics... by Hognoxious · · Score: 3, Insightful

      a transatlantic flight is rarely out of gliding distance to a landing strip
      Assuming it's flying at 40 thousand feet and can do 30 feet forward for every foot of drop (probably a high estimate; top sailplanes get more but they're designed for it) that means it can never be more than about a million feet from a fairly long and smooth runway. Sounds a lot but that's barely 200 miles.
      --
      Confucius say, "Find worm in apple - bad. Find half a worm - worse."
    15. Re:No, not the Avionics... by mpe · · Score: 1

      Pointing fingers and throwing blame about serves nothing, just like the guy above saying something about Iranians. We really should have something similar to a Godwin for Terrorist/Bush/Iranian bullshit that people post.

      The term you are looking for is "conspiracy theory"...

    16. Re:No, not the Avionics... by Mike1024 · · Score: 4, Informative

      Airbus Industrie on the 320 used two different processor architectures and three separate teams working on flight software to ensure that the same problem would not occur on two out of three computers. Does anyone know if Boeing used the same practice for their flight systems?


      They probably do. This is the time to whip out An experimental evaluation of the assumption of independence in multiversion programming by Knight and Leveson. It's a 47-page paper, but here's the summary:

      N-version programming has been proposed as a method of incorporating fault tolerance into software. Multiple versions of a program (i.e. ''N'') are prepared and executed in parallel. Their outputs are collected and examined by a voter, and, if theyare not identical, it is assumed that the majority is correct. This method depends for its reliability improvement on the assumption that programs that have been developed independently will fail independently. In this paper an experiment is described in which the fundamental axiom is tested. A total of twenty seven versions of a program were prepared independently from the same specification at two universities and then subjected to one million tests. The results of the tests revealed that the programs were individually extremely reliable but that the number of tests in which more than one program failed was substantially more than expected. The results of these tests are presented along with an analysis of some of the faults that were found in the programs. Background information on the programmers used is also summarized. The conclusion from this experiment is that N-version programming must be used with care and that analysis of its reliability must include the effect of dependent errors.


      Of course, one would think there would be two types of redundancy: The software would be N-version programmed and there would be separate systems for each engine. The chances of two independent N-version-programmed programs failing at the same instant seems particularly low.

      It's easy to jump to the it-must-be-the-computers conclusion because PCs are unreliable in everyday use compared to washing machines, cars or compact disk players. But until the accident investigators' report comes out there really isn't much evidence to base speculations upon; the problem could have been anything.

      Just my $0.02
      --
      "Goodness me, how unlike the FBI to abuse the trust of the American public." -- The Onion
    17. Re:No, not the Avionics... by icebrain · · Score: 1

      Just because it was spinning doesn't mean it was running. Next time you see a parked airliner, watch how the wind blowing through the engine causes the blades to spin.

      --
      The meek may inherit the earth, but the strong shall take the stars.
    18. Re:No, not the Avionics... by rthille · · Score: 1


      Oh fine, kill our fun. But you know, without speculation the comment area on a slashdot story will pretty much be empty... :-)

      --
      Awesome furniture, accessories and cabinetry in Santa Rosa, CA: http://humanity-home.com/
    19. Re:No, not the Avionics... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      > a transatlantic flight is rarely out of gliding distance to a landing strip,

      Being 'out of gliding distance' may be just once per trip, but that 'once' lasts for some hours.

      The longest glide by an airliner was around 130 km from 35,000 feet. The glide angle was about 1:10. That particular flight was extremely lucky. The fuel load was miscalculated and when the engine quit with no fuel left there was an airfield at the limit of its ability to glide and the runway was approximately in-line with the glide path.

      The atlantic is wider than 260 km.

    20. Re:No, not the Avionics... by Deadstick · · Score: 1

      The fuel presumably came from a Chinese refinery...

      rj

    21. Re:No, not the Avionics... by terrymr · · Score: 1

      For a two engine plane I believe the rules put you at most 180 minutes from an airport. Thats a long glide even from 40,000 feet. Thats a worst case scenario of course.

    22. Re:No, not the Avionics... by excelblue · · Score: 1

      Yes, but that's not much of a problem at all. Flight routes are often designed so that the nearest landing strips are within 200mi of the path at all times. Next time you go on a transatlantic or transpacific route, take a look at the flight path. Sure, it's a great circle, but it's not necessarily the most efficient great circle - land is basically right next to you for most of the time.

    23. Re:No, not the Avionics... by glitch23 · · Score: 0

      Over the middle of the ocean the aircraft will have been at perhaps 38000 feet and in a flight configuration, giving time to attempt various restart procedures, declare an emergency and glide to an airfield - a transatlantic flight is rarely out of gliding distance to a landing strip, and a flight from China likewise.

      Really? From the 2nd linked article:

      At high altitudes, planes that lose power can glide for distances of up to 100 miles, according to Boeing, helped by starting at cruising speeds of more than 600mph. At less than 1,000ft and at much slower speeds, they can drop like a stone.

      100 miles isn't much over an ocean that is 3000 miles across. This might help in the south Pacific that has a lot of little islands or if you are close to the African coast (Azores, a decade or so ago I read about a flight that had to make an emergency landing there by gliding to one of the islands) coming from the west side of the Atlantic but in the middle of the ocean 100 miles isn't going to do shit.

      Also, from China to the UK a flight will be going over land but from China to the US it will head over water however I think a large portion of that flight will be over land because the flight path is actually up towards the southern edge of Alaska because it is shorter than going due east. Unless you are going south from the northern hemisphere or north from the southern hemisphere a flight will probably head toward the appropriate pole to cut down on flight time and thus largely avoid open water which is a good thing. In that case, 100 miles may be useful to reach a landing strip on land.

      --
      this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom. -- Lincoln, Gettysburg Address
    24. Re:No, not the Avionics... by rhinoX · · Score: 1

      I don't know if you've ever noticed, but due to the great-arc flight paths trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific flights tend to take, they spend very little time over open water and are in fact over land for most of the flight. The days of Lindbergh's straight-line trans-Atlantic flights are long gone.

      --
      The copper bosses killed you, Joe. 'I never died', said he.
    25. Re:No, not the Avionics... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Explain?

      - The Gimli Glider (a 767) managed a glide ratio of 12:1. 38000 feet times 12 is 75 nautical miles.

      - Flight 236 (an A330) also ran out of fuel (due to a leak); from 30,000 feet, and glided "almost a hundred miles".

      - In the Jakarta Incident, a 747 lost all engines at 37,000 feet; a 747 has a 15:1 glide ratio, so they had 141 nautical miles.

      The Atlantic is maybe 3000 miles wide. Where are all these landing strips you speak of?

    26. Re:No, not the Avionics... by Tom · · Score: 1

      It's easy to jump to the it-must-be-the-computers conclusion because PCs are unreliable in everyday use compared to washing machines, cars or compact disk players. Because people put up with behaviour in computers that would make them return every other product.

      But that aside, computers and computer software can be very reliable. The consumer market isn't a good indication of everything. Boing doesn't exactly run windos on their airplanes, you know?
      --
      Assorted stuff I do sometimes: Lemuria.org
    27. Re:No, not the Avionics... by superdana · · Score: 1

      30 feet forward for every foot of drop

      That's an incredibly generous estimate. I'd be surprised if the actual figure is more than six or seven to one.

    28. Re:No, not the Avionics... by rv8 · · Score: 1

      The fact that the engines responded the same way, at the same time, strongly suggests a single point of failure in an electronic flight control system.

      It is not nearly so simple. The design standards for transport category aircraft require that the engines and engine installations be designed so that single failures do not cause all engines to stop. For example, each engine would have its own separate Full Authority Digital Engine Control (somewhat like electronic fuel injection on your car), with each FADEC connected to separate sensors. A failure in one FADEC or one sensor would not affect both engines. See FAR 25.901(c)

      For each powerplant and auxiliary power unit installation, it must be established that no single failure or malfunction or probable combination of failures will jeopardize the safe operation of the airplane except that the failure of structural elements need not be considered if the probability of such failure is extremely remote.
      --
      Kevin Horton
    29. Re:No, not the Avionics... by CompMD · · Score: 1

      "A simplistic example: they could have been running both engines off one tank - which went dry - though another was full - or both engines were being fed from a common fuel pump which failed, etc."

      Possible both engines were running off one tank. You can't run one tank empty and have the other full, you would have lateral CG problems leading to uncontrollability. You also cannot run both engines from a single pump; flight critical systems (engines) are triple redundant. Thus there cannot be a single point of failure.

    30. Re:No, not the Avionics... by hedley · · Score: 1

      Or continued to pump but with a 30000ft mixture ratio vs a sealevel one.

    31. Re:No, not the Avionics... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I always wondered where people got the idea that just because you conformed to a standard and had a well documented process your software must be bug free. You think MS and Apple dont have software design practices?

    32. Re:No, not the Avionics... by Tom · · Score: 1

      For MS, I would answer that in the affirmative. But that's just my prejudice speaking.

      No, having standards doesn't grant you bug-free software.

      But some standards and design principles are proven to result in much better and almost bug-free code. There are some developer teams on this planet who count their bugs in something like "bugs per year" and the number is very low. Compare that to thousands upon thousands of bugs in every major consumer software (I dimly remember the number of 14,000 for win NT, but I'm not sure where from).

      That's not perfect, but it's several orders of magnitude better.

      Google for the NASA software team, or "Zero Defect Software Design" - two of several approaches that result in software quality that's roughly where it should be.

      --
      Assorted stuff I do sometimes: Lemuria.org
    33. Re:No, not the Avionics... by Oldav · · Score: 0

      30:1 glide ratio from a jetliner-No way, the glide ratio would be lucky to be 11:1.( ee the Gimli glider, a 737 that ran out of fuel) The best sailplanes (ASH 25/Nimbus 4/ASG30)acheive between 60-70:1 Glide ratios

    34. Re:No, not the Avionics... by seifried · · Score: 1

      Newfoundland, Greenland, Iceland, Faero Islands, Northern Britain (a.k.a Scotland), etc. Every time I fly to Germany from Canada I get to see Greenland (very pretty glacial fjords).

    35. Re:No, not the Avionics... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      An order of magnitude (or even two orders of magnitude) less than 14,000 is still a pretty big number. At its core all these standards basically say is have a well written specification and have test case(s) for every requirement in that standard. While this may be a worthwhile endeavor it doesnt necessarily mean that there will be zero bugs when you are done. And frankly, this isnt that much different from what MS and Apple do.

      As an example, you cite NASA, but havent they had catastrophic bugs before?

    36. Re:No, not the Avionics... by Man+On+Pink+Corner · · Score: 1

      For a two engine plane I believe the rules put you at most 180 minutes from an airport. Thats a long glide even from 40,000 feet. Thats a worst case scenario of course.

      Is that really true? I'm pretty sure that some flights from the US to Australia use the 777. No way you could stay within 180 minutes of a suitable landing strip on that route, unless you went by way of Siberia.

    37. Re:No, not the Avionics... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Lindbergh actually was one of the first to use a great circle route. www.charleslindbergh.com/history/maps.asp

    38. Re:No, not the Avionics... by PhotoGuy · · Score: 1

      Link to the most recent Canadian one. The pilot reporting a autopilot problem sure does sound like borked avionics...

      --
      Love many, trust a few, do harm to none.
    39. Re:No, not the Avionics... by Duhavid · · Score: 1

      And the put little nano-technology dodads in the fuel to clog up the
      fuel filter when commanded. This was the test. And this is why
      the US Air Force has been dabbling in biofuels.

      Wow, that was fun! I can see how these theories get started.

      --
      emt 377 emt 4
    40. Re:No, not the Avionics... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Informative

      No they didn't. The majority of the 777 code is written in Ada, and instead of separate implementations of the same spec, Boeing used the same code for all the redundant hardware systems. A little googling will give you the details.

    41. Re:No, not the Avionics... by Ciggy · · Score: 1

      Hmmm...in 1979 on a flight back from Toronto to Heathrow, we had to make an emergency landing at Bangor, Maine - we were 45 mins over the Atlantic when we turned back due to a hydraulic leak. I'm not sure of the distance, but I suspect that the DC-10 couldn't have glided that distance - perhaps glide distances have gone up and there are more strips between Bangor, Maine and Bangor, Wales now?

      --

      A rose by any other name would smell as sweet;
      A chrysanthemum by any other name would be easier to spell
    42. Re:No, not the Avionics... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Nah, we just use Windows CE and VBscript. Microsoft's right next door, and they give us a great bulk discount.

    43. Re:No, not the Avionics... by Tacvek · · Score: 1

      The fact that the engines responded the same way, at the same time, strongly suggests a single point of failure in an electronic flight control system.

      It is not nearly so simple. The design standards for transport category aircraft require that the engines and engine installations be designed so that single failures do not cause all engines to stop. For example, each engine would have its own separate Full Authority Digital Engine Control (somewhat like electronic fuel injection on your car), with each FADEC connected to separate sensors. A failure in one FADEC or one sensor would not affect both engines.

      But both FADECs would consist of identical hardware and be running identical software correct? So despite the safety precautions, it is still theoretically possible that some command sent to them triggered the exact same bug in both, assuming an actual software or specification problem. (In systems like these a specification can be buggy) That would be one of my suspicions.
      --
      Stylish sheet to fix many problems in Slashdot's D3: https://gist.github.com/801524
    44. Re:No, not the Avionics... by Jeremi · · Score: 1
      The chances of two independent N-version-programmed programs failing at the same instant seems particularly low.


      True, although if they were both programmed from the spec, and the bug was present in the spec, and they both correctly conformed to the spec.... boom.

      --


      I don't care if it's 90,000 hectares. That lake was not my doing.
    45. Re:No, not the Avionics... by rv8 · · Score: 1

      But both FADECs would consist of identical hardware and be running identical software correct? So despite the safety precautions, it is still theoretically possible that some command sent to them triggered the exact same bug in both, assuming an actual software or specification problem. (In systems like these a specification can be buggy) That would be one of my suspicions.

      I'm not familiar with the B777 or the Trent engines, but on other aircraft the FADEC typically only receive quite simple commands. Those commands are pretty much universally independent between the two FADECs (i.e. if one command was screwy, it should only affect one FADEC. But even then, commands coming into the FADEC would normally be checked for validity. Thrust commands typically come from LVDT attached to the thrust levers in the cockpit. Other things like engine anti-ice commands typically are simply discrete inputs from cockpit switches, or commands via a data bus.

      I'll bet you a case of beer that the AAIB report will state that something other than a FADEC software bug caused this accident.

      My bet is on some other common cause, such as a fuel issue (water in fuel, or out of spec fuel freezing or gelling in the fuel system and restricting the fuel flow, etc).

      --
      Kevin Horton
    46. Re:No, not the Avionics... by CRC'99 · · Score: 1

      It's also interesting to note that in the case of a fuel pump failure, there is usually enough suction to drag fuel into the engines. We're talking engines that suck 500lb/minute of fuel here - not something like a car...

      When fuel pumps fail, you'll probably get a slight decrease in available power, but I would suspect very little decrease in N1/N2. Fuel pump failures are usually not causes of engines stopping.

      --
      Sendmail is like emacs: A nice operating system, but missing an editor and a MTA.
    47. Re:No, not the Avionics... by terrymr · · Score: 1

      On further research it seems the FAA has increased these limits : http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/info/all_infos/media/2007/info07004.pdf

      Other countries may still be working on their own revisions to these rules though.

    48. Re:No, not the Avionics... by letxa2000 · · Score: 1

      So despite the safety precautions, it is still theoretically possible that some command sent to them triggered the exact same bug in both, assuming an actual software or specification problem.

      My guess is that the probability of both engines getting the same command is small. Sure, it's possible. But in a complicated system like the 777, I'd be surprised if the system isn't constantly optimizing the thrusts/fuel of both engines independently. Just because the plane wanted more thrust from both engines doesn't mean it wanted the same amount of additional thrust from both. The exact amount of thrust requested of each engine could differ based on a plethora of variables. In short, I don't think it's so simple as to assume "Both engines shut down because they received the same command." Sure, it's possible... but I'd say that at any given time it's far more probable that each engine is receiving different commands. If one assumes that each engine is generally receiving different commands, the simultaneous failure of both looks less like a software problem.

      It's all very suspicious and it seems very easy to blame software. And maybe that was the problem. But I, too, am reserving my judgment and am not ready to give the hardware--or even the pilots--a pass yet.

    49. Re:No, not the Avionics... by terrymr · · Score: 1

      This document has information regarding limits on 240 minutes and above : http://www.alpa.org/alpa/DesktopModules/ViewDocument.aspx?DocumentID=4431

    50. Re:No, not the Avionics... by AGMW · · Score: 1
      On a "fly-by-wire" plane like the 777, even moving the throttle levers just sends a signal to a system that eventually gets to the engines. Bottom line is there are lots of lower level avionics systems that could have failed and the pilots would only see that the autothruster was supposed to provide more power and didn't.

      Indeed. My guess is that the autopilot is a completely seperate system designed to fly the plane in isolation from the 'flight' computers, and to do this using much the same interface to the 'flight' computers as the meat-Pilots use - ie the cockpit controls (hence why the levers move to request more power).

      An interesting question might be "why did the 'plane need more thrust?". I guess as a 'plane comes in to land it raises it's nose, thereby changing the "angle of attack" and thusly it needs more thrust to stay airborne, but wouldn't the change of the angle of attack also increase lift from the wings (presumably already in the landing configuration, flaps, etc)?

      Maybe the need for more thrust is normal (IANAP!), but might that indicate something happening earlier?

      --
      Eclectic beats from Leeds, UK
      handmadehands.co.uk
    51. Re:No, not the Avionics... by Alioth · · Score: 1

      Fuel exhaustion was immediately ruled out - significant fuel leaked out at the crash site. Fuel exhaustion was one of the first things that was publically ruled out by the investigators - it's easy to rule out - look for leaked fuel, and check for fuel in tanks that haven't been breached.

      This doesn't rule out fuel starvation - where for some reason, while there is plenty of fuel on board, it's not being delivered to the engines.

      Also, redunant systems have a nasty habit of occasionally not being quite as redundant as the designer hoped. A recent example is the Boeing 747-400 (i.e. a late model 747, with all electronic instrumentation) which lost complete generator power, despite having 4 generators and independent power buses and an APU. The power was routed underneath the first class toilet - which blocked and overflowed. But it seems the 747 designers had thought of that eventuality, and had designed it with a tray under the toilets to ensure an overflow wouldn't go on something it shouldn't.

      The tray was cracked. The water leaked right onto the equipment below, and the crew were left with nothing but battery power. Fortunately, they were not far from landing so battery power was sufficient, otherwise they may have had to go back to old fashioned celestial navigation.

    52. Re:No, not the Avionics... by mpe · · Score: 1

      In two other instances in large jets of engine failure by fuel starvation (Air Transat 236 and Air Canada 143), the failure of the engines was not simultaneous: one engine kept working for a few minutes longer than the other.

      In the case of the Air Transat flight the cross feed valve was open, which is as near as you can get to "both engines on the same tank".

    53. Re:No, not the Avionics... by Tom · · Score: 1

      At its core all these standards basically say is have a well written specification and have test case(s) for every requirement in that standard. Your assumption is wrong. There is more to it. Do yourself the favour and do Google a bit. Try "They write the right stuff" for the NASA team, that's a good summary.

      And yes, NASA has had catastrophic bugs. Their handling of it (mentioned in the article above) is worlds apart from the way MS or Sun or Apple or any Linux team does it.

      Again, google and read before you continue with speculations.
      --
      Assorted stuff I do sometimes: Lemuria.org
    54. Re:No, not the Avionics... by Hognoxious · · Score: 1

      I don't know if you've ever noticed, but due to the great-arc flight paths trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific flights tend to take, they spend very little time over open water and are in fact over land for most of the flight.
      I did. Did you notice how much of that land consists of runways suitable for large passenger planes?
      --
      Confucius say, "Find worm in apple - bad. Find half a worm - worse."
    55. Re:No, not the Avionics... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      30:1 glide ratio from a jetliner-No way
      Boy, I say boy, is some part of "probably a high estimate" giving you specific problems there?
    56. Re:No, not the Avionics... by PPH · · Score: 1

      a transatlantic flight is rarely out of gliding distance to a landing strip, and a flight from China likewise.

      Not so much gliding distance as single engine (with some other reduced capabilities) range. Its outlined in the FAA/JAA ETOPS rules.


      The (major) problem with this BA incident is that many of these sorts of operational rules are based on the extreme improbability of a single failure affecting more than one redundant system (autopilot channel, engine, etc.). If this accident demonstrates that there is such a single point failure, Boeing may be forced to revisit their systems design for proper separation. Worse yet, if its a software bug which leaves no trace, operations may be severely restricted for quite some time.

      --
      Have gnu, will travel.
    57. Re:No, not the Avionics... by kelnos · · Score: 1

      Stating "I'm probably wrong" after giving an incorrect numerical estimate in no way should be construed as a reason to avoid correcting that person.

      --
      Xfce: Lighter than some, heavier than others. Just right.
    58. Re:No, not the Avionics... by DaveAtFraud · · Score: 1

      I took flying lessons back in the late '80s but the way you land a little Cessna like I was flying is quite a bit different than landing a jet. All I really have to go on is the awareness of what's going on when I'm riding in back in a jet. The goal with a prop plane is to to set up your approach so that when you turn on to final (lined up with the runway), you cut the engine back to idle and effectively glide to the runway. The advantage of this is you are no longer dependent on the engine opperating correctly which is a real safety factor for prop planes. The glide path can vary due to a number of factors including wind and weight of the plane. If you see you are going to undershoot, you apply power but the goal is to not to need to.

      For jets, the idea seems to be to fly the plane to the runway with power adjustments required along the way to maintain the correct angle of descent. I'm guessing that most jets glide like a rock so the idea is to keep the airspeed at something reasonable (150kts?) until just before actually landing. I'm guessing the 777 in question was going to undershoot (as it did) so the autolander asked for more thrust and didn't get any.

      Again, I've only ridden in back in a jet so I'm just going on what I sense (changes to engine speed, feeling of thrust applied, etc.).

      Cheers,
      Dave

      --
      They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither safety nor liberty.
      Ben
    59. Re:No, not the Avionics... by einhverfr · · Score: 1

      According to the reports I have read, the engines were stuck in "flight idle" which meant spinning but not really delivering any real thrust.

      --

      LedgerSMB: Open source Accounting/ERP
    60. Re:No, not the Avionics... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I am familiar with these standards. I spent years working in the safety critical avionics industry. Its the reason I am posting as anon. Believe me when I say that my opinions are based on that experience. Just out of curiosity what is your experience? I am guessing ivory tower. (that sounded more flamey than I really meant for it to, but I am genuinely curious) :)

      Look, you cant compare NASA software to windows. They operate devices that are really not that complex from a software point of view. If you are going to compare them to anything compare them to something like DVD players or your wireless routers. Sure there are some crappy ones, but most of them work more or less perfectly.

      That article tries to give a lot of reasons why they think that NASAs processes make them invincible.

      1) They are white collar and dont have a punk kid grunge atmosphere like the MS of old or more recently google.

      This is nonsense, just because someone wears torn jeans instead of khakis doesnt mean they are any worse of an engineer. There are some extremely smart and hard working engineers who wear metallica t-shirts. (or whatever the new rebellious thing is these days) Stereotypes dont make better software.

      2) They have people whos job role is verifier and people whos role is to write code.

      So do most companies that develop software. They just call them test engineers or something similar outside of that industry.

      3) They have a database of why changes were made and they track every bug that ever was.

      Every software company worth a damn has cvs with check in logs and a bug tracker that tracks all useful information.

      4) They have such a small number of bugs! It must be perfect!

      They put out a product that only does a very small number of things. (example used there is a robot arm) With the vast majority of safety critical and nonsafety critical software products its used the exact same way every time and so it behaves prettymuch the exact same way with rare exception. Therefore if they quit looking for bugs at the point its released they wont find many later. Again, I think that the comparison to a DVD player is much more valid here than a comparison to MS Windows. I have personally found more bugs than I could ever count from reviewing code that had already been safety critical certified and shipped. And I didnt find them from following the holy "process", I found them from opening up the source and being smart enough to understand what was going on better than the last guy who looked at it.

      5) They have a well written design before they start. (this is the main thing that followers of the allmighty process like to point to)

      I actually do give them a little credit for this. This does have some value. But understand that mainstream software companies also write high level specifications. The safety critical industry may take it a little further with lower level requirements, but that addition hardly makes the software invincable in and of itself. And for things like windows kernel internals they also do more or less the same thing.

      At the end of the day a good process may be valuable, but it isnt the be and end all. Smart engineers are just as important, probably moreso. And even then people make mistakes, its just the way things are.

      Did I miss any points?

      As a final note, for all the smugness surrounding NASA (and other safety critical companies) and their allmighty process, they have allowed critical bugs to make it into production and cause errors in the field many times. Shuttle launches have been delayed due to software errors discovered on the launch pad, satellites worth more money than either of will ever see in our lives have been lost, etc.

    61. Re:No, not the Avionics... by hughk · · Score: 1
      First, thanks for digging out that reference.

      Of course, one would think there would be two types of redundancy: The software would be N-version programmed and there would be separate systems for each engine.
      Normally, it would be all three systems delivering data to voting logic that would allow the data through to both engines. Each processor has identical input but one of the two that correlate is permitted to deliver control instructions.

      The chances of two independent N-version-programmed programs failing at the same instant seems particularly low.
      That is if they have been well tested. I think any teacher of programming can talk about students independently developing software with the same mistakes (off-by-ones).

      It's easy to jump to the it-must-be-the-computers conclusion because PCs are unreliable in everyday use compared to washing machines, cars or compact disk players.
      Apart from the plague of duff capacitors or occasional loose connections after relocation, PC hardware tends to be extremely reliable. The software isn't. If it was, we would have laboriously tested code costing a fortune and everyone would have configuration management so that only tested configurations are deployed. Interestingly enough, in the examples you gave all have processors these days. Those on the car can be said to be safety critical (particularly if your car has stability control or whatever). In all cases, what the processor does is rigidly defined and on the car, the lesser defined tasks such as entertainment or navigation are offloaded to a separate system.
      --
      See my journal, I write things there
    62. Re:No, not the Avionics... by Tom · · Score: 1

      Just out of curiosity what is your experience? I am guessing ivory tower. Not as solid as yours, but I did some work with High-Availability systems many years ago, and I ran the core systems of a billion dollar company a little later. I don't do zero-defect or NASA-style software development, but I try to adapt a bit of it for my projects.

      compare them to something like DVD players or your wireless routers. Sure there are some crappy ones, but most of them work more or less perfectly. True. I'll also give you what I believe to be the real reason: You can't patch them. If they are defective, you have to make a recall, and that's horribly expensive.

      In the pure software world, you just issue a patch. Proof for my theory? Right here: Games. For PC games, it has become very common that even if you buy a new game on the day it's released, there's already a patch, or will be within the first week. Most games go through several patches in their first few months. A dozen or so is not uncommon. Now same industry, different environment: Console games don't suffer from that problem. What's the difference? The only difference I can make out that affects this is what I just said: You can't patch them.

      2) They have people whos job role is verifier and people whos role is to write code.

      So do most companies that develop software. They just call them test engineers or something similar outside of that industry. True, but the difference is that they cut corners. I've seen quite a few companies that do have a QA part in their software development. In most cases, the QA's real job is to cause as little trouble as possible while ensuring some minimum standard to prevent that utter crap goes out the door.

      3) They have a database of why changes were made and they track every bug that ever was.

      Every software company worth a damn has cvs with check in logs and a bug tracker that tracks all useful information. I read that part of the article differently. They don't just log bugs, they actually look at them, try to understand them, and make sure that knowledge reaches everyone in the team. Also, they try to analyze why that bug was made and fix the source of the bug in addition to the bug itself.
      Most developers I know will mark the bug as "fixed" in the bugtracker, upload the fix to CVS/Subversion/whatever and be done with it.

      They put out a product that only does a very small number of things Bah. Some of those companies do the exact same statistics as everyone else, stuff like average bugs per LOC. They still look a lot better. Sorry, you can't put it down that easily.

      Did I miss any points? Yeah, some of the more important ones. The crucial one, as I see it, is that these people actually do have a process on how to code, not just when to code or what to code. I have never seen that in the IT industry anywhere else. Everything is pretty much "here's our code, here's the APIs, here's the specifications, you know your stuff, get going". The most you ever get is a style guide.

      And yes, nobody really writes bug-free software. But ask MS if they'd give a life-long "we'll fix every bug you find, quickly and for free" guarantee on any of their products.
      --
      Assorted stuff I do sometimes: Lemuria.org
    63. Re:No, not the Avionics... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      True. I'll also give you what I believe to be the real reason: You can't patch them. If they are defective, you have to make a recall, and that's horribly expensive.

      In the pure software world, you just issue a patch. Proof for my theory? Right here: Games. For PC games, it has become very common that even if you buy a new game on the day it's released, there's already a patch, or will be within the first week. Most games go through several patches in their first few months. A dozen or so is not uncommon. Now same industry, different environment: Console games don't suffer from that problem. What's the difference? The only difference I can make out that affects this is what I just said: You can't patch them.

      Actually I think this supports my basic thesis here. :) With console games you know exactly what the hardware as well as the other software on your system is going to look like. Even for bugs that arent caused by the different enviroments, they usually occur the same way on the testers system that they would on the end users system. This is the same situation I was trying to describe with my dvd player example and the nasa shuttle arm. In this case a lot of video games are probably more complex than the software on that shuttle arm, and yet there are ones that you can play forever without ever finding a bug. I seriously doubt that Nintendo follows a process as rigorously as the avionics industry or cares as much about stamping out bugs since the only person who might die there is Mario.

      I read that part of the article differently. They don't just log bugs, they actually look at them, try to understand them, and make sure that knowledge reaches everyone in the team. Also, they try to analyze why that bug was made and fix the source of the bug in addition to the bug itself.
      Most developers I know will mark the bug as "fixed" in the bugtracker, upload the fix to CVS/Subversion/whatever and be done with it.

      With all due respect you know some crappy developers. :) Why do you think commercial software companies take forever to fix bugs? Its because they do exactly what you just described. It would be easy to hack together a quick fix in a few hours and send it out the door. Everyone makes fun of MS for taking a long time to get bug fixes out, but its because they are following a lengthy and fairly rigorous process. I dont want to turn this into an argument about how good the quality of MS's patching process may or may not be, I am just pointing out that they do have a process in place that goes well beyond "hey looks like something went wrong there, Bob you go fix it and let me know when youve got it checked in to CVS".

      Yeah, some of the more important ones. The crucial one, as I see it, is that these people actually do have a process on how to code, not just when to code or what to code. I have never seen that in the IT industry anywhere else. Everything is pretty much "here's our code, here's the APIs, here's the specifications, you know your stuff, get going". The most you ever get is a style guide.

      I thought my entire post was about that process. (I certainly made lots of comments mocking the allmighty process) :)

      I thought I had hit on all the main points of the process in my last response. Which part of the process is it you think is important that I did not address? I understand that there are a few things that I didnt mention, but I think I hit all the main ones. The biggest one that everyone likes to point to from what I have seen is developing high level and then low level requirements for software and then writing code and test cases from those. And as I mentioned before, I do give them credit for that, but I do not believe that it reduces your total bug count by several orders of magnitude.

      Also, I am not sure what you are familiar with but companies like MS do have a process in place. While it isnt what you will see in the Avionics in

  6. Airplane Operating Systems by Alien54 · · Score: 4, Funny

    "It might be premature to say that a software problem is the likely cause of failure..."

    Unless it was running on an OS like Windows for Aircraft, "now with fewer crashes".

    Yes, I know it's all custom designed. But thinking about the infamous Windows for Warships I couldn't resist

    --
    "It is a greater offense to steal men's labor, than their clothes"
    1. Re:Airplane Operating Systems by jorghis · · Score: 4, Informative

      These OSes typically are not custom designed. (although a few in older aircraft are) There are a few commercial rtoses that are commonly used, they are specially marketed to the avionics industry as conforming the DO-178B standard. The most common would probably be Integrity-178B sold by Green Hills Software and VxWorks 653 Platform sold by Wind River.

    2. Re:Airplane Operating Systems by heffrey · · Score: 0

      Would Linux be better at this?

    3. Re:Airplane Operating Systems by Alien54 · · Score: 3, Funny

      unfortunately I can't mod up your reply to my comment.

      But the idea of Windows for Airplanes is something that would strike fear into many a person's heart. Would you trust your aircraft to Windows for Airplanes?

      Or your helicopter to Windows for Helicopters?

      --
      "It is a greater offense to steal men's labor, than their clothes"
    4. Re:Airplane Operating Systems by Alien54 · · Score: 4, Funny

      2nd thought:

      The Knowledge Base reports on Flight Simulator are scary enough as it is.....

      the rest of the scenario writes itself

      --
      "It is a greater offense to steal men's labor, than their clothes"
    5. Re:Airplane Operating Systems by drsmithy · · Score: 1

      But thinking about the infamous Windows for Warships I couldn't resist

      You mean when a bady written application crashed ?

    6. Re:Airplane Operating Systems by Gordonjcp · · Score: 1

      You mean when a bady written application crashed ?
      ... and brought down the underlying OS, which then left attached equipment in an unusable state.

      There should be no possible way for a failure of application-level code to bring the OS down. Any system where this can happen is mindblowingly broken, and shouldn't be let loose on production systems.

    7. Re:Airplane Operating Systems by drsmithy · · Score: 1

      ... and brought down the underlying OS, which then left attached equipment in an unusable state.

      Evidence ?

      There should be no possible way for a failure of application-level code to bring the OS down. Any system where this can happen is mindblowingly broken, and shouldn't be let loose on production systems.

      And there is no reliable information suggesting this is what happened.

    8. Re:Airplane Operating Systems by supermank17 · · Score: 1

      Ugh, I hope the avionics VxWorks platform is different from the standard 6.x VxWorks... that OS is a train wreck. I've seen the source, and its frightening. Even some of the basic stuff like file I/O is buggy...

    9. Re:Airplane Operating Systems by jorghis · · Score: 4, Informative

      It is substantially different. (and integrity is different from integrity-178b also)

      The 653 in the name is a reference ARINC-653, which is an industry standard that specifies the api that the OS exposes to the user. (Integrity also supports this same api)

      I havent used VxWorks 653, but I am very familiar with both Integrity and Intregrity-178b, and there is no question that the latter is a LOT more reliable.

      There may be a little bit of code reused in these platforms, but really the name is the same for marketing reasons. (kind of like how windows CE is completely different from the windows you run on your desktop)

    10. Re:Airplane Operating Systems by DMoylan · · Score: 2, Funny

      > But thinking about the infamous Windows for Warships I couldn't resist

      that explains the recent recruitment advert. i saw it first on theregister before christmas and thought it was a joke till i saw it on tv.

      http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDHPCr5m4ko

      don't you feel safer knowing that they are using windows on expensive weapon platforms? you couldn't pay me to get on a sub with windows involved.

    11. Re:Airplane Operating Systems by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      FYI, most, if not all aircraft avionics are based on ARINC-653 time-and-space partitioned hard real-time operating systems, and typically implemented with hardcore languages like Ada. When lives are on the line, you ask for nothing less.

    12. Re:Airplane Operating Systems by MiniMike · · Score: 2, Funny

      Maybe somebody uploaded a pirated copy of 'Windows for Gliders'...

    13. Re:Airplane Operating Systems by jorghis · · Score: 1

      Good luck implementing an OS with Ada. :) Some of the apps built on top of the OS may be in ada, but the operating systems itself will be implemented in C.

    14. Re:Airplane Operating Systems by Alien54 · · Score: 1

      You have obviously never had to reboot an aircraft carrier during flight ops at night

      --
      "It is a greater offense to steal men's labor, than their clothes"
    15. Re:Airplane Operating Systems by BSDetector · · Score: 0

      Well - it did't take that long for the infantile and toally irrelevant Microsoft postings to appear!

    16. Re:Airplane Operating Systems by AGMW · · Score: 1
      Maybe somebody uploaded a pirated copy of 'Windows for Gliders'...

      Then they, sir, are the heroes, as without said gliding the 777 might well have ended up getting a parking ticket on the perimiter road, then being towed away and we'd have never found out what happened! Do you know how much it would cost to get a 777 out of the pound?

      --
      Eclectic beats from Leeds, UK
      handmadehands.co.uk
    17. Re:Airplane Operating Systems by Weedlekin · · Score: 2, Informative

      "Good luck implementing an OS with Ada."

      http://www.adahome.com/articles/1998-07/nw_ghs.html

      "Written in Ada, RT Secure is a real-time, pre-emptive multitasking microkernel optimized for mission-critical applications that require true hard real-time response."

      --
      I'm not going to change your sheets again, Mr. Hastings.
    18. Re:Airplane Operating Systems by jacquesm · · Score: 1

      no. It's too big to certify and it doesn't have hard real time.

    19. Re:Airplane Operating Systems by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Funny

      "Increase engine output? Cancel or Allow" ... oops!.. Too late.

    20. Re:Airplane Operating Systems by heffrey · · Score: 0

      That's kind of my point. Typical of Slashdot for folk to have a pop at Windows when talking about avionics! Perhaps Slashdot should be renamed as "We hate M$".

    21. Re:Airplane Operating Systems by BVis · · Score: 1

      That's not really fair. With so much material to work with, people can't help but be inspired.

      --
      Never underestimate the power of stupid people in large groups.
    22. Re:Airplane Operating Systems by tx_derf · · Score: 1

      These OSes typically are not custom designed. (although a few in older aircraft are) There are a few commercial rtoses that are commonly used, they are specially marketed to the avionics industry as conforming the DO-178B standard. The most common would probably be Integrity-178B sold by Green Hills Software and VxWorks 653 Platform sold by Wind River.

      When the avionics for the 777 were first developed, operating systems like Integrity-178B and VxWorks 653 just didn't exist. I worked for one of the subcontractors that supplied avionics for the 777 (and other planes) back in the 90's. Before specs like ARINC 653 came about (653-1 was only approved in 2003 mind you), there was no commercial RTOS that we could certify to DO-178B standards. We had in-house developed environments that were ported from platform to platform. Now, we took an active role in getting the 653 standard ratified and worked with the RTOS developers to bring their environments on board. But at the time the avionics for the 777 were developed, none of that existed.

      So while pretty much all current development projects all use 653 compliant RTOS', it wasn't so long ago that the engineers were developing their operating systems by hand.

    23. Re:Airplane Operating Systems by tx_derf · · Score: 1

      FYI, most, if not all aircraft avionics are based on ARINC-653 time-and-space partitioned hard real-time operating systems, and typically implemented with hardcore languages like Ada. When lives are on the line, you ask for nothing less.

      Once the FAA dropped the mandate for Ada in avionics systems, many new projects at the company I used to work for were developed in C and C++. Quite frankly, it was difficult to find people who wanted to develop software in Ada. And after working in it myself for several years, I was very happy to make the switch myself. Don't get me wrong, Ada is a fine language but there are a few universal truths about safety critical development that are quite simply inescapable.

      1. A good process with well thought out coding standards allows good programmers to write quality code in any language.
      2. Poor programmers can write bad code in any language.

      I've seen some pretty bad programmers write simply dreadful Ada code. Which is really unfortunate. But it underscores the issue that no matter how great the language may be on paper, it's the programmers who ultimately determine the quality of the software written. And when it comes to recruiting developers, it's a lot easier (and cheaper) to find people willing to work on C/C++ than it is to find Ada developers.

  7. Damnit! by DoofusOfDeath · · Score: 3, Funny

    Now we're all going to be forced to re-learn Ada!

    1. Re:Damnit! by flyingfsck · · Score: 1

      Hmm, there may be a strong case for that. Who-ever thought C++ is suitable for flying aircraft needs to have his head examined.

      --
      Excuse me, but please get off my Pennisetum Clandestinum, eh!
    2. Re:Damnit! by IkeTo · · Score: 2, Informative

      Don't think it is just funny... it might be truth. BA is a customer of SPARKAda (as listed in http://www.praxis-his.com/sparkada/customers.asp). I expect the software run by the aircraft is proved to be correct to its specification using that, which is a variant of Ada.

    3. Re:Damnit! by Skreems · · Score: 1

      Even worse, they use Java.

      --
      Slashdot needs a "-1, Wrong" moderation option.
      The Urban Hippie
    4. Re:Damnit! by Sponge+Bath · · Score: 3, Funny

      I read it was actually MIX machine code converted directly to Java byte code by a drunken leprechaun.
      Wikipedia is an awesome source.

    5. Re:Damnit! by 6Yankee · · Score: 1

      He did say re-learn - maybe he was the one who f*cked this up?

      With a name like DoofusOfDeath, you never know.

    6. Re:Damnit! by Bonobo_Unknown · · Score: 1

      with text_io; use text_io; !!

      That's all I remember hehe...

      --
      We don't believe in radical loony monotheistic religions from the middle east -- we're Christians.
    7. Re:Damnit! by IkeTo · · Score: 1

      I mean "Boeing" is a customer of SPARKAda as listed, not "BA". Sorry for confusion.

  8. Possible autothrottle problem by bananaendian · · Score: 5, Interesting

    With the investigation ongoing, the available information points to an electronic control problem as the most likely cause of the sudden engine power loss."

    What I've read is that the pilots observed a relatively gradual loss of power symmetrically on both engines. This tells me that I can rule out engine problems with FADEC and fuel. It all points to the auto-throttle. Autopilot tells where it wants the plane to go and autothrottle calculates how much throttle is needed. It then commands both engines FADECs via the bus system which is doubly redundant. What I'm thinking is that auto-throttle is supposed to be backed up, bypassed by a manual direct control to the engine FADECs from the cockpit throttle control?

    Any B777 avionics mechanics around - I only know military jets...

    --
    www.tribalnetworks.org - helping tribal people around the world to own their own means of high-tech communications
    1. Re:Possible autothrottle problem by BosstonesOwn · · Score: 1

      That damn signed integer strikes again ! http://games.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=08/01/19/1321241

      --
      This package Does Not Contain a Winner
    2. Re:Possible autothrottle problem by markov_chain · · Score: 1

      There are so many things that could have gone wrong. The Bowden cable might have been loose. The fuel filter might have caught some dirt if the fuel tank was low. The idle air control might have failed due to a number of reasons, such as the failure of the air flow sensor-- note that the engines were basically idle on approach. I don't think it was the ECU, since they probably have a bunch of redundant ones.

      --
      Tsunami -- You can't bring a good wave down!
    3. Re:Possible autothrottle problem by gaforces · · Score: 0

      Is a FADEC like a CODEC? Those pesky things are a menace! Are you sure they used a certfied HDMI cord?

    4. Re:Possible autothrottle problem by BlueStrat · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Not a commercial aircraft airframe and powerplant mechanic, but I was a senior avionics technician for many years dealing with corporate and private jets.

      What I've read is that the pilots observed a relatively gradual loss of power symmetrically on both engines.

      Interesting. Do you have a link to the source for that? Not that I doubt you, just curious to parse it myself.

      This tells me that I can rule out engine problems with FADEC and fuel.

      FADEC, possibly, but fuel? It's quite possible there was either water or crud in the fuel, especially since the aircraft almost certainly took on fuel in China, and China seems to have had problems of late with products being adulterated in some form. The crud could cause blockages in the filters from the tank(s). The water would cause an increasingly-diluted fuel mixture to enter the engines as the level dropped which might also cause the gradual loss of power.

      The two most-likely culprits I would examine first are the discrete devices at either end of the control path that send the data and receive it at the other end, and the cables and connectors used to transmit the data.

      The next point I'd check would be the power supply that powers the electrical actuators that physically move the actual throttles in each engine. This supply would be separate from the power used for the electronics, as it would be a relatively high-current source. This might also be caused by cabling/connector problems.

      Aircraft tend to have many problems with cabling due to high vibration and multiple pinch-points and stress and vibration/abrasion at support points, as well as contact problems at connectors.

      Another very major problem is human error. In many cases the turn-to-lock type connectors are in very tight spaces, sometimes so much so that it may only be visible by a small mirror and flashlight held by the tech while he may be laying on his back or nearly standing on his head. I had a whole set of strange-looking pliers of different lengths and weird angles with curved padded jaws for just this purpose in my tool box, along with small hand-held extend-able flexible-tubing-mounted inspection mirrors and flashlights with the head on flexible tubing as well.

      It can be very hard to tell, given the above circumstances, if the locking sleeve on these aircraft instrumentation connectors had been twisted far enough to complete the lock. It doesn't take much imagination to see what could happen given time, vibration, and G-forces.

      Of course, these are just my rough guesses, and I don't have enough information to really make any informed statements.

      Cheers!

      Strat

      --
      Progressivism (aka US 'Liberalism'): Ideas so good they need a police/surveillance-state to enforce.
    5. Re:Possible autothrottle problem by Hognoxious · · Score: 1

      The Bowden cable ... The fuel filter ... the fuel tank ... idle air control
      You're using a lot of singular nouns, considering it was a twin-engined plane.
      --
      Confucius say, "Find worm in apple - bad. Find half a worm - worse."
    6. Re:Possible autothrottle problem by couchslug · · Score: 1

      "I had a whole set of strange-looking pliers of different lengths and weird angles with curved padded jaws for just this purpose in my tool box, along with small hand-held extend-able flexible-tubing-mounted inspection mirrors and flashlights with the head on flexible tubing as well."

      You certainly worked Avionics. I won't tell anyone about the Vise-Grips and Channellocks in the other drawer...

      (Note to readers: invent connector pliers that have both padded jaws and actual traction and the world will beat a path to your door.)

      --
      "This post is an artistic work of fiction and falsehood. Only a fool would take anything posted here as fact."
    7. Re:Possible autothrottle problem by florescent_beige · · Score: 2, Informative

      FADEC = Full Authority Digital Engine Control. On the Rolls Royce Trent 800 engine its called an Electronic Engine Control System (EECS).

      The article describes the EPR (Engine Pressure Ratio, a measure of the power output) as slowly decreasing in both engines at the same time. If thats true it doesn't sound like fuel starvation. One: the EPR would simply drop to zero, not tail off, and two: the engines are unlikely to both stop at the same time.

      There was a 767 that ran out of fuel over the Atlantic some time ago, their salvation was that one engine ran for several minutes after the first one quit. In that case they were feeding off different tanks. I'm not a systems guy but I believe that's the normal way of doing things, because what's the point of having independent engine systems if the fuel source itself for the two engines isn't independent.

      The 777 was the first twin to get ETOPS (Extended Twin Operations (or as some call it Engines Turn Or Passengers Swim)) to allow it to operate in situations where it might have to fly for two hours on one engine to get to the nearest airport. To get that certification the engine systems have been scrutinized by the FAA who are, shall we say, detail-oriented people.

      Something as obvious as taking the fuel for both engines from the same tank is unlikely to be procedure on that plane.

      Having said all that, maybe on landing the fuel system is configured differently than for cruise.

      I just don't think it feels like a software thing. They tend to be catastrophic and weird and scary. I like the fuel contamination theory. It was coming from China right? Who knows what gets into fuel in China.

      --
      Equine Mammals Are Considerably Smaller
    8. Re:Possible autothrottle problem by dsgrntlxmply · · Score: 1
      My reading of the article tends to point away from the autothrottle itself, unless its connection to the engine controls is independent of the thrust levers, and under some condition carries greater authority.

      The engine display has Commanded and Actual EPR indicators. Flight crew noticed a disparity between these, and attempted to correct by increasing the thrust lever settings manually. The engines continued to fail to develop the needed power.

      This points toward fuel quality, fuel supply, something in common to both engines and their engine controls, or the connection(s) (and the connection might have some un-obvious aspects) between autothrottles, thrust levers, and the engine controls.

      All of this assumes, of course, that the pilots' statements and the reporting match the facts.

      One question is whether the engines could have developed the needed additional power in time - how late was the thrust deficit noticed, compared the normal expected lag in engine response? The report gives the impression that the pilots believed they commanded something that was feasible, and it did not happen.

      Note also that the report claims that L and R autothrottles are independent systems, and that both engines failed. That means either that the autothrottles are not at fault, or that something in common between L and R systems (which obviously can include the design and implementation) failed, or that something downstream of the autothrottles failed identically on both sides.

    9. Re:Possible autothrottle problem by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Jet fuel is lighter than water. And the tanks feed from the bottom, So if there was water in the fuel, it would have come out first, as they were starting the engines while still on the ramp in China.

    10. Re:Possible autothrottle problem by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The Autothrottle commands the FADEC? It's the throttle quadrant that would command the FADEC, with the Autothrottle commanding the Throttle Quadrant. The report said that the pilots tried to command thrust and it didn't not respond. That says to me we're talking about the problem somewhere between Thorttle Quadrant->FADEC->Engine.

    11. Re:Possible autothrottle problem by icebrain · · Score: 1

      The 777 was the first twin to get ETOPS Actually, the 767 was the first aircraft with ETOPS certification (TWA was approved in 1985 for its 767 fleet)... the 777 was the first one to have 180-minute ETOPS on the day it entered service. And yes, ETOPS regs are very strict... the same mechanic can't work on both engines, for example, and there's a whole list of extra equipment required.
      --
      The meek may inherit the earth, but the strong shall take the stars.
    12. Re:Possible autothrottle problem by BlueStrat · · Score: 1

      Jet fuel is lighter than water. And the tanks feed from the bottom, So if there was water in the fuel, it would have come out first, as they were starting the engines while still on the ramp in China.

      Actually, no, they don't feed from the bottom. They feed from a flexible feed-tube inside the tank, so that gravity or G-forces do not affect fuel flow.

      It's possible that the pilots had switched over to a different set of tanks that had been filled elsewhere before they landed in China, and only topped off the tanks they had been using up to that point in the flight, and switched to the full tanks that had been topped off in China prior to landing.

      Cheers!

      Strat

      --
      Progressivism (aka US 'Liberalism'): Ideas so good they need a police/surveillance-state to enforce.
    13. Re:Possible autothrottle problem by jbengt · · Score: 1

      The Bowden cable might have been loose.

      Do they really still use Bowden cables for actuation on a totally electronically controlled aircraft?
      Just asking.

    14. Re:Possible autothrottle problem by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I just don't think it feels like a software thing. They tend to be catastrophic and weird and scary. I like the fuel contamination theory. It was coming from China right? Who knows what gets into fuel in China.

      I hear you're a racist now, Father. Should we all be getting with the racism thing?

    15. Re:Possible autothrottle problem by groovelator · · Score: 1

      It's quite possible there was either water or crud in the fuel, especially since the aircraft almost certainly took on fuel in China, and China seems to have had problems of late with products being adulterated in some form...

      Which would be most ironic since the PM was heading out to China (from Heathrow) for trade talks at that very hour...

    16. Re:Possible autothrottle problem by tftp · · Score: 1
      One question is whether the engines could have developed the needed additional power in time - how late was the thrust deficit noticed, compared the normal expected lag in engine response? The report gives the impression that the pilots believed they commanded something that was feasible, and it did not happen.

      The pilots had about one minute between the detection of the failure and hitting the grass. The [working] engines are certainly able to go all the way from idle to takeoff power within that time (actually, in far less, as any air traveler knows.)

      That means either that the autothrottles are not at fault

      There is a post somewhere above this one where the poster tells that on 777 autothrottle works through the pilot's controls, physically moving the levers. This way the pilot can overrule the automatic controls by just forcing the levers to the desired position (and then presumably the autothrottle detects that and disengages.) So if this is true then the autothrottle is not at fault here.

    17. Re:Possible autothrottle problem by OldManAndTheC++ · · Score: 1

      It can be very hard to tell, given the above circumstances, if the locking sleeve on these aircraft instrumentation connectors had been twisted far enough to complete the lock.

      That does it. From now on, I'm taking the train.

      --
      Soylent Green is peoplicious!
    18. Re:Possible autothrottle problem by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It's not exactly racism. Chinese people are perfectly willing to acknowledge that quality control in China is severely lacking. Whether they do anything about it is a different matter.

    19. Re:Possible autothrottle problem by NewtonFan · · Score: 1

      Not very likely (but possible). I read that the engines also didn't respond to manually moving the throttles. But it could be that they did respond, but the SFO thought they didn't respond, because the engines were spooling up, which may appear to take centuries in such a situation.

    20. Re:Possible autothrottle problem by sjames · · Score: 1

      Autothrottle problems don't fit the pilot's observation. He saw the autothrottle call for more power, not get it and then he manually increased throttle. The manual increase got no response from the engines either, so they landed short.

      Further, the pilots report that the engine status display did show the correct commanded output and that the engines were not producing it.

  9. Prevented the stall? by steogede · · Score: 0

    >> A prompt reaction of the pilots prevented the stall and saved all lives aboard. If the stall was prevented and therefore never happened and never existed, what stall was there to be prevented?

    1. Re:Prevented the stall? by 427_ci_505 · · Score: 1

      The stall that, had it happened, would have ended up in a crash.

    2. Re:Prevented the stall? by Goaway · · Score: 1

      The stall that would have occurred had the plane continued on its current flight path as if it still had enough engine power to make it.

    3. Re:Prevented the stall? by Hognoxious · · Score: 1

      And if you'd had the dictionary that you didn't have, it wouldn't have prevented you looking up what 'prevented' means, but it might have prevented you making an ass of yourself.

      --
      Confucius say, "Find worm in apple - bad. Find half a worm - worse."
  10. Are the pilots heros? by XMLsucks · · Score: 2, Interesting

    I've read several summaries, such as this one, which state that the pilots did something to save the lives of the passengers. But I've never read a news article that provides the information that supports this claim. I'd like to read about what the pilots did to save the situation. Can anyone point out a news article that is actually coherent, and tells more than how many 777s are in service around the world?

    1. Re:Are the pilots heros? by bradgoodman · · Score: 5, Insightful

      The word "hero" is thrown around a lot these days...

      I believe what they meant, was that the pilots realized that things were going wrong, and the "normal" reaction would be to add thrust. When they realized that they couldn't add thrust, that this would result in loosing airspeed, entering a stall, and crashing

      So they realized that an alternative was to lower their angle-of-attack, preventing the stall, and maintaining a bit of airspeed. This would have the unfortunate side affect of landing well-short of the runway (and perhaps airport) and destroying the aircraft - but given the information available - was a bad - but the best alternative

      So they implicitly decided the best course of action was to glide the airplane and ditch it in a field - not a decision that would have exactly won them any praise had they read the situation wrong - but it saved everyone

    2. Re:Are the pilots heros? by the_Bionic_lemming · · Score: 1

      the second article states

      There are about 670 Boeing 777s in service around the world.

      --
      _ _ _ Go for the eyes Boo! GO FOR THE EYES!
    3. Re:Are the pilots heros? by supercrisp · · Score: 1

      From what I gather, the pilot(s) saved the situation by rapidly pointing the nose down to avoid a stall and then yanking it up to avoid a nosedive into the ground. At least this is what all the articles say, including TFA #1 here.

    4. Re:Are the pilots heros? by u38cg · · Score: 4, Insightful

      To my mind, if you manage to get 300 tonnes of falling metal out of the sky and on the deck with nothing worse than a broken leg, you've done something right.

      --
      [FUCK BETA]
    5. Re:Are the pilots heros? by flyingfsck · · Score: 1

      Hmm, if I was the pilot, I would have pulled the wheels UP, to reduce drag, though it probably makes buggerall difference on a craft that big.

      --
      Excuse me, but please get off my Pennisetum Clandestinum, eh!
    6. Re:Are the pilots heros? by IkeTo · · Score: 1

      It seems you didn't RTFM. Here's some help...

      The failure of the engines had cut the main power. The 777 does not have cables connecting wing flaps and rudder to the pilots' controls. It is all done by sending electronic signals. However, the plane has several back-up batteries that enable the instruments to work until the emergency power units kick in.

      "If they had done nothing, the autopilot would have tried to fly the glide path," said a former pilot. The plane would probably then have stalled and crashed. "So they have to lower the nose to maintain speed, then lift it just before hitting the ground."

      ...

      But he and Burkill, said one former pilot, did "a brilliant job". If the angle is right, a plane gets the benefit of "ground effect" - the wings in effect trap a cushion of air underneath them that softens the landing.

    7. Re:Are the pilots heros? by XMLsucks · · Score: 1

      I guess not ... that is what I was looking for.

    8. Re:Are the pilots heros? by Deadstick · · Score: 4, Insightful
      "Good airmanship" would be more apropos. They recognized the problem, in time to take over from the autopilot, and had the skill to pull off a deadstick landing with a survivable impact.

      In principle, the airplane could have been landed on the runway without damage, if the right variables had come together -- but low and slow, in a big heavy airplane, with full flaps and no power, you're pretty well boxed in. I don't think they could have done better.

      rj

    9. Re:Are the pilots heros? by caseih · · Score: 1

      The wikipedia entry on the crash is pretty lucid and has all the latest actual facts as they are known. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Airways_Flight_BA38

      As for the number of 777s in service, that's between 600-700, according to reports on Sky news. Another report said that Boeing reports they have around 300 pending orders for 777s over the next few years. A remarkably safe and capable plane. And this accident investigation will likely only make them safer.

    10. Re:Are the pilots heros? by Enleth · · Score: 1

      Yes, one of the articles states quite clearly that the co-pilot remained calm in a situation he wasn't even trained to expect (stalling just above the ground) and, by well-judged control of the angle of attack, managed to keep the lift enough for the plane to glide down in a controlled fashion instead of just dropping down like a stone. That, in turn, allowed the plane to crash into the ground while still gliding, not straight on, so it kind of remained in one piece. Had the co-pilot not do anything, the plane would just smash into the ground, probably killing everyone on board and making a nice, burnt-out crater.

      --
      This is Slashdot. Common sense is futile. You will be modded down.
    11. Re:Are the pilots heros? by celle · · Score: 1

      That's where the hero part comes in, they didn't worry about their jobs or careers, just their lives and those of the passengers. Okay sounds self-serving to me too.

    12. Re:Are the pilots heros? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      For a crash landing having the gear down is beneficial in absorbing much of the impact and raising the gear creates a period of increased drag as the gear doors open that would likely offset any benefit gained.

    13. Re:Are the pilots heros? by skewer · · Score: 1

      Actually, the co-pilot was a Coward. John Coward.

    14. Re:Are the pilots heros? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The word "hero" is thrown around a lot these days... Yeah, I think you'll find one of the pilots was a Coward though.
    15. Re:Are the pilots heros? by rts008 · · Score: 1

      Hear! Hear!
      Most Old Pilots will tell you that any landing you walk away from is a Good Landing. Helicopter pilots seem to be even more adamant about this for some reason....

      --
      Down With Slashdot BETA!!! I've been around the corner and seen the oliphant; you can only abuse me from your perspecti
    16. Re:Are the pilots heros? by mysticgoat · · Score: 1

      To go a little beyond parent post's very good description, what I read into TFA is that the copilot appropriately dropped the nose to maintain air speed and then also managed a flare maneuver much lower than usual that put the plane in ground effect when altitude was around the wingspan of the plane (or even lower). He then managed to ride the ground effect for some distance.

      Basically he managed to do a maneuver that is sometimes used by soar planes and hang gliders who find they are coming in unexpectedly short of their intended landing. But this kind of thing is not within the normal operations of a Boeing 777.

      I suspect that the copilot has done quite a bit of playing with a flight simulator and dead stick landings, beyond what is needed for certifications. I suspect that a lot of commercial pilots have been doing this in their off hours, ever since the Gimli Glider of 1983.

      These guys are heroes. With no time to prepare themselves, they handled an extremely dangerous situation with the kind of calm reactions that come from intensive self-preparation for emergencies. That they succeeded to such an extraordinary degree is icing on the cake.

    17. Re:Are the pilots heros? by arth1 · · Score: 3, Funny

      "Good airmanship" would be more apropos.

      Yes, but it doesn't make for as a striking newspaper headline as Coward the Hero!.
    18. Re:Are the pilots heros? by Blakey+Rat · · Score: 1

      Something went wrong on landing. The pilots took control away from the auto-pilot. All the passengers walked away. Maybe they're not "heroes" in the way that someone who runs into a burning building to rescue a kid is a "hero," but let's throw the guys a bone, eh?

    19. Re:Are the pilots heros? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      """Good airmanship" would be more apropos.""

      I agree; but it may not even be good airmanship so much as being "well trained" pilots. This is what they are trained for and why they get the "big" money ;-) They are definitely not heroes. This is a classic training situation and I imagine that there are very limited options when you are that close to a landing - heavy aircraft, full flaps, slow speed, no altitude and no time to try other options. They responded to what they were trained for and took the correct steps in that situation. I suspect that timing would play a substantial part in the the outcome too. Have the problem 15 seconds earlier or later and the outcome may have been quite different.

  11. Patience by Linker3000 · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Let's just wait for the official forensics rather than patched together rumours shall we?

    --
    AT&ROFLMAO
    1. Re:Patience by caffeinemessiah · · Score: 2, Funny

      Let's just wait for the official forensics rather than patched together rumours shall we?
      Um...what are you doing on /. then? Seriously though, this is the place to come for some relatively informed speculation (see for example comments by the jet maintenance guy earlier in the thread).
      --
      An old-timer with old-timey ideas.
    2. Re:Patience by JavaTHut · · Score: 2, Funny

      Let's just wait for the official forensics rather than patched together rumours shall we?
      You must be new here ...
    3. Re:Patience by iknownuttin · · Score: 2, Insightful
      Seriously though, this is the place to come for some relatively informed speculation...

      Seriously though, this is the place to come for some two-bit speculation...

      Had to fix that for you. Go back and read any /. article about NASA problems and just see the posts from folks who "know better" than the rocket scientists.

      I think I had too much coffee this morning. I'm feeling a bit cranky.

      --
      I prefer Flambe as apposed flamebait.
    4. Re:Patience by Linker3000 · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Oh, I am well aware of the /. crowd's ability to generate 'fact' - it's even more impressive than Leeloo's reconstruction.

      --
      AT&ROFLMAO
    5. Re:Patience by rooleg · · Score: 1

      Let's just wait for the official forensics rather than patched together rumours shall we?

      Um, you must be new here.

    6. Re:Patience by MacarooMac · · Score: 1

      Let's just wait for the official forensics rather than patched together rumours shall we?
      Yeah, and hopefully CSI: Heathrow will finally dig up my North Face backpack which they handily "misassigned" somewhere deep within the bowls of their sophisticated baggage management system, back in '94.
      I wouldn't have been that bothered only I lost a EEPROM datapack (all 64k of it) for my Psion Organiser, which had my coursework on it!
      --
      "He Who Dares Wins" ...or gets twenty-to-life for totaling their Bimmer on a poodle parade
    7. Re:Patience by Linker3000 · · Score: 1

      It's probably too late to submit the coursework now! Good job you had a backup eh!?

      --
      AT&ROFLMAO
    8. Re:Patience by evil_aar0n · · Score: 1

      Hi. You must be new around here.

      --
      Truth, Justice. Or the American Way.
    9. Re:Patience by ballpoint · · Score: 1

      You may believe official statements will tell the truth, but my experience is different.

      Once upon a time, while getting ready to deboard, my wife said "Hey, look there !". Out of a side window I saw another aircraft descending at a much steeper angle than usual. As we both watched, the aircraft landed brutally, the nose gear collapsed, and there it was sliding over the tarmac toward us, turning sideways while debris was flying left and right. The plane came to a stop turned 90 degrees, some 500 meters away. Scary movie stuff.

      I finally broke out of fascination and grabbed my camera just in time to capture the glide ramps being deployed and passengers sliding down.

      The official explanation was that a collapsed nose landing gear was the cause of the incident, blaming the manufacturer, not the pilot.

      Now, having seen hundreds of aircraft land, I know the difference between a normal landing in an expected configuration and a really bad landing in a weird one.

      With control, airport and the airline owned by the state, all personnel being public servants, the airport and the airline in dire straits financially and everyone involved closing ranks, I found it hard to believe the official statement.

      --
      Flourescent (adj): smelling like ground wheat.
    10. Re:Patience by Linker3000 · · Score: 1

      I take your point, but you have no proof apart from your gut feeling based on what you perceive as a 'normal' landing - and from what you wrote you're not even a pilot so who's to say the landing wasn't within acceptable parameters?

      Your belief has to remain speculative even though you are 100% certain you are correct and that the airport, pilots, flight data, independent crash analysis team and airplane manufacturers seem to all have agreed otherwise. I would also consider that any aircraft manufacturer would under most circumstances strongly dispute any false accusations that their equipment was at fault because this could lead to an extremely expensive maintenance and refit process.

      Not that I don't believe that what you say is impossible.

      --
      AT&ROFLMAO
    11. Re:Patience by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      With control, airport and the airline owned by the state, all personnel being public servants, the airport and the airline in dire straits financially and everyone involved closing ranks, I found it hard to believe the official statement. Air traffic control in the UK is run by NATS En Route plc, owned 49% by the government, and 51% is in shareholder/employee hands.

      Heathrow airport is run by BAA plc, owned by a private consortium led by Ferrovial, a Spanish construction company. While they are not a wonderfully-run organization, the emergency services at the airport performed admirably, and the operations of the airport itself are not a factor in the accident. They are certainly not in dire financial straits.

      British Airways plc is a publicly-listed company, and owned by shareholders. It is one of the most financially-successful and effectively-run airlines in the world.

      None of the employees of the above companies are public servants.

      While the Air Accident Investigatory Board is owned by the UK government, it has an excellent reputation for independence and quality investigation.

    12. Re:Patience by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Where's the fun in that!? This is Slashdot!

    13. Re:Patience by ballpoint · · Score: 1

      The incident I witnessed happened elsewhere, years ago and under different circumstances.
      Current conditions almost guarantee a vastly more independent analysis.

      --
      Flourescent (adj): smelling like ground wheat.
    14. Re:Patience by ballpoint · · Score: 1

      You're right in that, unless one is involved in the process, everything remains speculative to the (even knowledgeable) outsider.

      In the case I described no ADs were issued after the incident. So I guess it was more convenient to everyone involved that the manufacturer take the initial blame in the public statement, and to settle things differently behind the public scenes. After all it was a minor incident with no casualties or injuries.

      My point is that public statements may, for diverse reasons, tell a different story than what actually happened.

      --
      Flourescent (adj): smelling like ground wheat.
  12. even if it WAS a software problem... by cbraga · · Score: 1

    let's remember purely mechanical systems fail too, and more often than modern electronic controls

  13. Typical by pyrrhonist · · Score: 4, Funny

    Once such a procedure was set, the plane would continue under automatic control until it reached an altitude of 250ft. Then a female computer voice would say, "Decide."

    It's uncanny how they made the flight control system sound just like my wife.

    As Coward stared at the controls, the autothrottle demanded more thrust.

    That's a feature that is sadly lacking, though.

    --
    Show me on the doll where his noodly appendage touched you.
    1. Re:Typical by advocate_one · · Score: 1

      Once such a procedure was set, the plane would continue under automatic control until it reached an altitude of 250ft. Then a female computer voice would say, "Decide."

      It's uncanny how they made the flight control system sound just like my wife.
      he he... On Eurofighter, they planned to use the pilot's relatives to provide the audio warnings... the reasoning being that a known voice would cut right through... however, things were thrown out when they realised that that could lead to having the pilot's daughter saying "pull out daddy... pull out"...
      --
      Donald 'Duck' Dunn: We had a band powerful enough to turn goat piss into gasoline.
  14. uniforms by hey · · Score: 1

    Maybe programmers would get more respect if we wore snappy uniforms like pilots?

    1. Re:uniforms by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Probably. You guys won't even deign to wear work shirts (in a non-ironic, non-kitschy context). You dress like slobs. You are fooling nobody but yourselves when you say "that's their shortcoming" to those who "can't accept" your unprofessional wear.

    2. Re:uniforms by hax4bux · · Score: 1

      Then I will quit coding. You think pilots want to wear that stuff? Well, not all of us. Some night freight companies (you know who you are) insist on those fake epaulets too.

      True story. When I took my commercial checkride the examiner commented that not all of my logbook entries were in black ink. "So what?" "Well, the airlines like to see black ink."

      I have no idea if the airlines care or not, since I have never interviewed for an airline. My only point is the social filters for airline pilot are arbitrary and mighty.

    3. Re:uniforms by Starker_Kull · · Score: 1

      Then I will quit coding. You think pilots want to wear that stuff? Well, not all of us. Some night freight companies (you know who you are) insist on those fake epaulets too. True story. When I took my commercial checkride the examiner commented that not all of my logbook entries were in black ink. "So what?" "Well, the airlines like to see black ink." I have no idea if the airlines care or not, since I have never interviewed for an airline. My only point is the social filters for airline pilot are arbitrary and mighty.

      You may appreciate this, from someone with a major carrier. A long, long time ago, I went in for an interview with a regional airline. This was back in the mid 1990's, where they put you through pysch evals and various other annoying tests before they gave you the 'personality' interview just so you could start flying ATRs for $13k a year (after you paid for your own training, of course). I heard the same damn story about the logbook ink colors... 5 minutes before my interview. My logbook, of course, was filled in pretty much in every color under the sun, so there wasn't anything I could do about it - not to mention the various 'remarks' (hey, the column said remarks - I took it literally) regarding which FBO had the cutest counter girls. Anyway, I managed to quash the rising panic about my rainbow colored logbook, and aced the interview. We had second interviews at the end of the day, and they offered me a position - I was the only one to get one that day, out of thirteen interviewees. On the ride back to the hotel, with some rather glum fellow prospects who kinda knew they didn't get it, one knew why he had failed.... 'They said my logbook was horrible! It had entries in black AND blue! He said I'd never make it in an airline with that kinda sloppiness.'

      Moral of the story - the interviewers want to see if they would like to fly next to you in the cockpit. If they bust your balls about ink colors or suit fashions or FARs or other nonsense, they are either stress testing you or are looking for a reason to bounce you.

      The hat thing is my pet peeve. Hats stopped being cool around 1950. But they still want you to wear them, along with the fry-your-leg-in-the-sun black polyester. Rrrrrr.

  15. Summary Correction by ijakings · · Score: 0

    The summary is completely wrong.

    Current thinking is that the engines switched into reverse, not cut out. Hence the louder than normal engine noise passengers and spectators heard. This happens usually in the very last stages of landing to assist with slowing. 2 miles out and at 200mph this isnt supposed to happen.

    The pilots did not "Prevent a stall" the engines were either dead or in reverse, meaning the best the pilots could to was try to glide the plane in.

    The landing gear was not torn off on impact but about half way into the "touchdown".

    There, fixed that for ya.

    1. Re:Summary Correction by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Current thinking is that the engines switched into reverse, not cut out. Hence the louder than normal engine noise passengers and spectators heard. This happens usually in the very last stages of landing to assist with slowing. 2 miles out and at 200mph this isnt supposed to happen.

      Maybe that's your current thinking, but it doesn't necessarily reflect reality. Turbine engines don't "switch into reverse". They do have thrust reversers, but that's a mechanical device that redirects the exhaust flow. They're typically activated in the "last stages of landing" i.e. after the plane is fully on the ground.

      The pilots did not "Prevent a stall" the engines were either dead or in reverse, meaning the best the pilots could to was try to glide the plane in.

      Yes, they attempted to stretch the glide in without stalling the plane. "Preventing a stall" references an aerodynamic stall of the wing and other lifting surfaces; it has nothing to do with the engines.

      The landing gear was not torn off on impact but about half way into the "touchdown".

      Care to explain the difference between "impact" and "touchdown" in a landing such as this?

    2. Re:Summary Correction by mpe · · Score: 4, Informative

      Maybe that's your current thinking, but it doesn't necessarily reflect reality. Turbine engines don't "switch into reverse". They do have thrust reversers, but that's a mechanical device that redirects the exhaust flow. They're typically activated in the "last stages of landing" i.e. after the plane is fully on the ground.

      There are a set of interlocks involving both weight being present of the landing gear and the wheels rotating to prevent the reversers deploying.

    3. Re:Summary Correction by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The landing gear was not torn off on impact but about half way into the "touchdown".

      Touchdown! Thurman Thomas!

    4. Re:Summary Correction by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I'm a little rusty on my thrust reverser operational requirements, but I believe that they can only engage automatically during a Class III ILS landing, and the weather conditions at the time did not necessitate that. A thrust reverser engaging in flight can be sufficient to tear an engine from its pylon, which is why their use is subject to the pilot's discretion. And you must not have read the AAIB preliminary report: the words "thrust reverser" are never mentioned, however the autothrottle certainly is.

  16. Still pretty reliable..I guess by iminplaya · · Score: 1

    If something like this happens only once every 12 years, instead of engines and propellers coming off every couple of months like on the DC-4s and Connies, then I should accept the fact that these new fangled machines are pretty damn good. But note that the triple 7 has had some incidences with its electrical systems that didn't make the papers. I believe only the Concorde has a better record, and that without fly-by-wire, but at the very high cost of very vigilant maintenance requirements.

    --
    What?
    1. Re:Still pretty reliable..I guess by AlecC · · Score: 1

      Concorde did not actually have a very good record - counted by flying hours. The fleet was very small, end even those aircraft that did fly only did one round trip per day, which was not very lone because of the aircraft's speed. The one accident Concorde did have moved it from perfect to the worst per hour of any moder aircraft. And if you look at the frequency of "events" like damaged rudders,, they were fairly frequent. The 777 fleet probably has more than 100 times the flying yo9urs of the Concorde fleet already.

      --
      Consciousness is an illusion caused by an excess of self consciousness.
  17. But I should also note by iminplaya · · Score: 1

    the importance of having a human on board watching over the machinery. If this was a pilotless drone, it surely would have crashed, killing all on board.

    --
    What?
  18. Pointless story by Tim+Ward · · Score: 1

    There is little to no point in uninformed speculation.

    The facts that we know so far are those in the interim AAIB report.

    The AAIB will publish their full report in due course, at which point we can expect to know what happened.

    That's it, basically.

    1. Re:Pointless story by ColdWetDog · · Score: 1
      You sir, are no fun at all.

      I'll bet just everyone is just dying to have you at their parties....

      --
      Faster! Faster! Faster would be better!
  19. Are cables safer? by OpenSourced · · Score: 1

    It's still a bit early to jump to conclusions, but from now on I think I'll feel safer in planes that have not done away with the cables for transmission, and substituted them with an all-electronic control. If the software fails, I want the pilot to be able to _pull_ at the thing and have a nice physical path to the flaps, instead of an disconnected joystick.

    --
    Rome taught me patience and assiduous application to detail. Virtues which temper the boldness of great, general views.
    1. Re:Are cables safer? by Linker3000 · · Score: 2, Funny

      So how many airlines are still flying the De Havilland DH-50 anyway!?

      --
      AT&ROFLMAO
    2. Re:Are cables safer? by Technician · · Score: 1

      If the software fails, I want the pilot to be able to _pull_ at the thing and have a nice physical path to the flaps, instead of an disconnected joystick.

      Let's compare some old school with new stuff and see if that really makes sense. Let's start with safety and reliability. They are tightly related.

      Let's start with a short ramble, but I'm getting there.. In the old days (really old) the wagon brakes were a stick on a pin with a lever pushing a shoe into the wheel. Reliability was fair. In a panic the pin would fail, or the stick would break. Control was poor as each stick worked for only one wheel. Newer cars have moved to a hydraulic system where one pedal would apply brakes to all four wheels. The new system is more complex with more points of failure. A broken hydraulic hose failure or wheel or master cylinder caused the entire system to fail. To deal with the reliability issues, a back-up consisting of another lever or pedal with a linkage of wires (parking or emergency brake) bypassed part of the system and worked on only two wheels instead of 4. The hydraulic brakes went to a split or dual master cylinder to prevent a full system failure.

      Notice as the system becomes more complex, there are more points of failure. There is also more redundancy, which adds to the complexity. Improvements in materials has eliminated the broken wood brake lever and pin. Overall the brakes works much better and is vastly more reliable than the brake on the covered wagons.

      I have given up the mechanical control for electronic control for improved reliability and safety

      I now have a Prius. The transmission is entirely fly by wire as it is simply a planatary gear set coupled with a pair of motor generators. Changing the power to/from the motor generators is entirely how the variable transmission works. This has mechanically reduced complexity and increased reliability. Instead of a transmission with over 1,000 mechanical pars and a working fluid, all prone to failure, I now have a transmission with 7 mechanical moving parts, none of which is a friction or clutch part. As a bonus, the software control has fantastic traction control. Prius owners either love it or don't understand it and hate it. It is fantastic on snow. If a wheel slips, power is instantly cut. Those who are used to burning rubber to get unstuck will hate it. Those who ease power to regain traction and ease out will love it. (I am the latter and often use it to roll gently away from a stop sign at a slick intersection.)

      It would be possible to have a wire to bypass the fly by wire throttle, but engine power when the transmission is fly-by-wire is pointless.

      Let's compare the merits of both. My last car was a Ford Mustang with a stick shift. In the time I had it, I had one clutch cable failure and one engine failure from over speed when it popped out of gear once. I lost a rod. I have put twice the miles on the Prius. I have had no failures except the 12 volt battery needed changed when it wouldn't hold a charge for 2 days anymore. A cable to the throttle can be reliable. Sometimes they stick (often at wide open) when getting onto a freeway or passing. Clutch cables fail. In my driving history, I have had to limp back in two separate cars with a broken clutch cable. Driving on a broken clutch cable in heavy traffic is not really safe. Try it sometime in light traffic. A Prius won't let you destroy the engine from putting a brick on the pedal. In neutral, the engine does nothing. In park it simply goes to a faster idle.

      Mechanically the car I drive is much simpler, but electrically in software, it is much more complex. This does introduce a possible single point of failure while eliminating many mechanical and driver induced points of failure. Is it safer? Is it more reliable? Will it last longer? I believe yes! Are those who fear it because they don't understand it and don't trust it? Absolutely.

      --
      The truth shall set you free!
    3. Re:Are cables safer? by OpenSourced · · Score: 1

      You may well be right. My work as software developer may make me wary of software-controlled things when failure can cause injuries. Of course, now that I come to think of it, there are probably many places where that can happen (are X-Ray machines exposition times software controlled? I guess so.)

      I drive often a Prius, and aside from a certain sensation of having to make too many minute corrections to the wheel, which could be psychological, I have found no fault on it. I'm told that maintenance is lower. But my point is that software failures are _complete_ and _unexpected_. Usually (of course not always) a broken mechanical transmission will announce its failure in advance, and fail (again usually) in a more graceful way. If the steering software of the Prius has a hidden bug, the result will probably be a completely blocked car, in a sudden way.

      Of course it's possible that statistically, less accidents happen with the software-controlled, less-failure-parts system, but for me at least, the mechanical way makes me feel more in control of what's happening, feel that my caring of the machine and attention to what it's telling me (is the wheel feeling funny these last days?), will make a difference in the end results. I guess that sums my position better :o)

      --
      Rome taught me patience and assiduous application to detail. Virtues which temper the boldness of great, general views.
    4. Re:Are cables safer? by OpenSourced · · Score: 1

      Well, this article

      http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/business/boe202.shtml

      is a bit old, but not so much. Look where it says :

      " On conventional planes, the flight-control surfaces are moved by hydraulic devices controlled by cables that run through the airplane.

      Airbus also eliminated the wheel-and-control column, or yoke, that is used on all Boeing jets. Instead, Airbus pilots control the plane by moving a small, hand-held joystick off to the side. "

      --
      Rome taught me patience and assiduous application to detail. Virtues which temper the boldness of great, general views.
    5. Re:Are cables safer? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      What you mean is that you want the pilot, copilot, and any available flight attendants to all pull as hard as they can in hopes of moving the thing. You don't realize that today's modern airliners have control surfaces that are almost impossible to control with cables.

    6. Re:Are cables safer? by Technician · · Score: 1

      If the steering software of the Prius has a hidden bug, the result will probably be a completely blocked car, in a sudden way.

      This is highly unlikely simply because the steering is not fly by wire. The power steering is simply power assist just like in a conventional car. The assist is a linear electric motor instead of a hydraulic system. As such, it's torque limiting is better than a hydraulic system.

      As far as fly by wire throttle, it seems to be more reliable than it's cable counterpart.

      http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=stuck+throttle&btnG=Google+Search

      The mechanical failures are numerous. The Prius had a problem with the steering (nudging or shaking) in an early version, but since then, it has been solid.

      http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=prius+power+steering+failure&btnG=Search

      They have had failures and a recall, but no fatalities that I am aware of. This is minor compared to the number of failed power steering pumps, belts, and hoses in a year in the rest of the market.

      --
      The truth shall set you free!
    7. Re:Are cables safer? by cynvision · · Score: 1
      Heh. When the plane crashed in Sioux City, Iowa because all hydrolics got cut they sure had to been wishing for fly-by-wire-like system. The airplane tech had gone in sixty years from cables(which stretched and snapped) to triple redundant tubes of drippy hydrolic oil(that needs people to fix and check) and it still had an instance of catastrophic failure caused by breakage. A one-in-a-million day where something went wrong. And like the current crash, the pilots brought round the situation.

      Just like always, the newest tech is shown to not be "perfect" or "foolproof" guarantee of safety. Or, a replacement for people who know how to fly the plane.

      --
      "I got it all together but I forgot where I put it."
  20. Good case to examine by jhines · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Given that the plane is heavily instrumented, available, and didn't burn, this should be a simpler case to examine. Hopefully, a lot can be learned. At least more than if it crashed and burned in a jungle, or into the ocean.

  21. Your skepticism about such things is justified. by Futurepower(R) · · Score: 1

    I think your skepticism about such things is justified. After the recent crash in Brazil, it seemed to me that by far the biggest and strongest response was that officials tried to manipulate public thinking. (Click on "more" under "About This Video".)

    In that case, it was difficult to control perceptions because too many people knew that the runway had just been re-surfaced, and had been put back in service before the non-skid grooves had been cut.

    Too often, the "news" is not an honest attempt to understand and communicate the truth. I hope U.S. taxpayers will think about that as those with power in the U.S. government, who have investments in oil and weapons, try to involve the bankrupt U.S. government in a war with Iran. What are the facts? Maybe the average person has no way of knowing.

  22. I found the bug by bradgoodman · · Score: 3, Funny
    It was a regular-'ol "single equals" bug:

    if (engines = OFF) {
    PrepareForCrash();
    }
  23. There has already been one 777 software incident.. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Informative

    I follow several aviation forums regularly and this has obviously been the number one topic since it happened and thought I should share some interesting findings:

    A report of an earlier software problem with the 777.

    The interesting part:

    "a second accelerometer then failing and the latent software anomaly allowing
    the ADIRU to once more utilise the previously failed accelerometer
    information with its high output values in its computations, resulting in
    erroneous acceleration outputs into the flight control outputs but not the
    navigation (ground speed, velocity, position, etc.) outputs."

    Of the two current theories - i.e. a sotfware issue or contaminated fuel - I'm more inclined to believe a software issue since as a precaution during landing both engines use separate fuel tanks and pumps without crossfeeding and it would be quite a coincidence if two such independent systems failed at the same time. An analysis of the fuel filters will probably reveal a lot. If it indeed turns out to be the computer that failed, it will be somewhat ironic that the first* such accident involves a Boeing even though many have considered the higher degree of automation Airbus scary.

    *) Neither the official investigation nor the conspiracy theory blames the computer for the A320 crash in Mulhouse-Habsheim but those who aren't familiar with the conspiracy theory immediately assume that the theory blames the computer since it was the first civilian fly-by-wire.

  24. Not avionics, it was another problem... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Funny

    The problem was not computers. After extensive investigation, the authorities
    have released what actually caused the accident. The evidence is clearly visible
    in these pictures:

    http://www.heathrowpictures.com/pictures/images/picturegallery_baw_b772_gymmm20.jpg

    The cause for the engine problems is massive ingestion of dirt. The manuals clearly
    specify that the engines need to be run on air, not dirt. Even small quantities
    of dirt can cause loss of power.

    1. Re:Not avionics, it was another problem... by mikael · · Score: 1

      What is the object that appears to be in the dirt (blue, yellow/brown checkerboard pattern) - is it part of the engine, fireworks, a remote-control airplane, lawn-mower, scarecrow or tractor parts?

      --
      Vintage computer adverts: http://www.vintageadbrowser.com/computers-and-software-ads
  25. Pointless speculation by we who know nothing by caseih · · Score: 5, Insightful
    A comment on airliners.net's forums is very appropriate for us slashdotters I think:

    A BA 772 landed short of the runway. Initially, speculation was entirely wild, ranging from random double engine failure to fuel contamination to one engine being actually working. Some witnesses said the plane came in high and fast, others said low and slow, others mixed the two together; all agree it was nose-high. A few helpful posters who actually knew something contributed. Some posters asked why the tires were brown...after the plane had skidded through a wet, grassy area on collapsed landing gear. A few posters got into pedantic discussions on various features of the 772 or its operational history as compared to the 340. Others took great pains to demonstrate to the world their lack of basic knowledge of unpowered flight. Few seemed familiar with the notion that fan blades windmill even when no power is applied to the engine. Most all were engaged in a game of nerdy one-upmanship in which they vigorously tried to validate their lofty views of themselves based on their aeronautical knowledge. In sum, we know about as much now as we did when the plane went down: the plane turned onto final, engines did not respond to power inputs, plane landed short of runway, slides deployed, people all survived, plane almost certainly a W/O. Shockingly, neither BA nor Boeing has decided to keep the 15-year-old speculation artists abreast of the situation.
    1. Re:Pointless speculation by we who know nothing by hughk · · Score: 1, Troll

      First, that was a 777-300. Where did the 772 come from?

      Sorry, it isn't in people's nature to shut up and trust the experts. Particularly if you every fly in one of those things (I haven't flown in a 777 for six weeks now), but if I am expected to fly in one again, I would like to be able to second guess any issues with the plane and perhaps choose differently. What is even more relevant is that many of us work in IT and although I haven't touched avionics development for some 17 years now, I maintain an interest in reliable systems design.

      --
      See my journal, I write things there
    2. Re:Pointless speculation by we who know nothing by caseih · · Score: 1

      I believe it was a 772. Take this with a grain of salt, but wikipedia says it was a 777-236ER. Further wikipedia claims that "As of August 2006, a total of 60 Boeing 777-300 aircraft are in airline service with All Nippon Airways (7), Cathay Pacific (12), Emirates Airline (12), Japan Airlines (7), Korean Air (4), Singapore Airlines (12) and Thai Airways International (6)." British Air is not even listed there. The other news reports seem to back it up. Of course whether it was a 772 or 773 doesn't particularly matter; a flaw in one would be present on the other. You're welcome to react to this crash anyway you'd like, though.

    3. Re:Pointless speculation by we who know nothing by eipgam · · Score: 0, Flamebait

      Has nobody thought of checking BA's own website? http://www.britishairways.com/travel/flightops/public/en_gb?p_faqid=3115

    4. Re:Pointless speculation by we who know nothing by caseih · · Score: 4, Informative

      Obviously you didn't check the website either or you'd know that the site doesn't indicate whether the plane was a 772 or 773, only that it was a 777, of which there are several different types. Other places on the net, including the news sites, say it was a 777-236ER, which is definitely a 772.

      In case people are confused by people talking about a BA772 or a 773, these are standard designations. a Boeing 777-200 is referred to as a 772, the 777-300 is a 773, etc. Other common ones you'll find are things like 742 and 744 which designate 747-200s and 747-400s, respectively. Airbus planes also have similar designations.

    5. Re:Pointless speculation by we who know nothing by Richard_at_work · · Score: 2, Informative

      BA does not operate any 777-300 aircraft.

    6. Re:Pointless speculation by we who know nothing by PPH · · Score: 1

      Pointless speculation is the mission statement of Slashdot.

      --
      Have gnu, will travel.
    7. Re:Pointless speculation by we who know nothing by gpuk · · Score: 1

      Some useful information about the aircraft (not verified by me - taken from http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=309337):

      Initial Report AAIB Ref: EW/C2008/01/01 Accident

      Aircraft Type and Registration: Boeing 777-236, G-YMMM
      No & Type of Engines: 2 Rolls-Royce RB211 Trent 895-17 turbofan engines
      Year of Manufacture: 2001
      Date & Time: 17 January 2008 at 1243 hrs
      Location: Undershoot RWY 27L, London Heathrow Airport
      Type of Flight: Commercial Air Transport (passenger)
      Persons on Board: Crew - 16
      Passengers - 136
      Injuries: Crew - 4 (minor)
      Passengers - 1 (serious)
      Passengers - 8 (minor)
      Nature of Damage: Substantial
      Information Source: AAIB Field Investigation

    8. Re:Pointless speculation by we who know nothing by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      As the old saying has it...

      A landing where you can walk away is a good one.
      A landing where you can use the plane again is an excellent one!

    9. Re:Pointless speculation by we who know nothing by hughk · · Score: 1

      Sorry, you are correct, it was the 777-200ER model.

      --
      See my journal, I write things there
  26. Re:I had a suspicion by Linker3000 · · Score: 1

    Glad that's cleared up then.

    I'l let the boys at the AAIB know about the cause - that'll save a shit load of time and money - and I'll have a word with Boeing and see if they know about this 'redundancy' thing of whuch you speak.

    --
    AT&ROFLMAO
  27. Or, maybe they caused the situation too. by Shandalar · · Score: 1

    Careful about running around and calling them heroes. If it was pilot error that caused this (pilot error causes >80% of plane crashes) then you won't be so quick to happily burble that they saved everyone. The initial reports seem to mostly have come from statements by the pilots that they lost power but - again, statistics and not a judgment on this case - pilots lie, too, and say things like "I lost power" rather than admitting, "I pulled back the throttle way too much, way too early, and the engines cut out, so I lost power".

    I'd like to think they're heroes, sure; but the statistics warn otherwise.

    Anyway, this entire subject should not have been greenlit because it's useless speculation.

    1. Re:Or, maybe they caused the situation too. by makomk · · Score: 1

      The initial reports don't just come from them talking to the pilots - they've also pulled and looked at the data on the flight recorders. I assume that the reason everyone is still happy to refer to them as heroes is that the data confirms their story.

  28. Re:I had a suspicion by hughk · · Score: 1

    There is serious redundancy on all FBW aircraft. Also, since the DC10, manufacturers try to ensure that controls and power is routed separately so that damage in one area will not remove all controls.

    --
    See my journal, I write things there
  29. Not the autothrottle by DingerX · · Score: 1

    777 Autothrottle works by moving the throttle levers. What Autothrottle wants, it gets through a servo connected to the flight control in question. So, no, Autothrottle wasn't getting none neither.

    So somewhere between both throttle levers, and the independent systems they run through and the thrust coming out of the engine something failed. The common elements that I can think of: A. The shared space in the cockpit of the throttle levers, B. symmetrically designed systems, C. identical fuel condition D. the air the engines flew through, and of course, E. the flight crew moving the levers. As of now, E. has been ruled out (since the Autothrottle had the same problem), barring something really weird (like spilling a coffee cup of 1M H2SO4 on the flight controls). A-D are all equally improbable at the moment.

    1. Re:Not the autothrottle by IvyKing · · Score: 1

      barring something really weird (like spilling a coffee cup of 1M H2SO4 on the flight controls).


      Ever see "Fate is the Hunter"? The crash in that movie was triggered by coffee spilling on the flight controls. Whether that has anything to do with reality is another question (should be noted that Ernest K. Gann, the author of the book, was a veteran pilot).


      The accident does remind me a bit about the Eastern Airlines L-1011 loss of engine oil incident where some A&P guy forgot to put the O-rings back on the engine oil inspection magnets. The flight crew had to restart the center engine to get to the airport.


      Fuel problems may still be a possibility, the plane had been in descent attitude for a while, engines were probably at the lower range of power output (low fuel consumption) - fuel pick-up tubes wedged, water in the fuel (may have come from just melted ice), etc.

  30. Was that supposed to be funny? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Why don't you go fuck yourself?

    1. Re:Was that supposed to be funny? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I thought it was. Why don't you go fuck yourself?

  31. Re:I had a suspicion by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Insightful

    Posting anon for obvious reasons.

    I work in the avionics industry and this was exactly my thought as well. These systems are becoming much more complex than you would expect embedded software to be. Several address spaces and over a dozen threads is fairly normal with most newer systems.

    Typically the safety critical industry likes to tout itself as being better designed than other software because it conforms to various standards, particularly do178b. At their core, these standards basically say you need to have processes that everyone understands in place when you design your software and you need have documentation that shows you tested all the different elements of functionality. The testing may be fairly rigorous depending on who is doing it, but at the end of the day they arent doing much that microsoft/oracle/your favorite well known software vendor doesnt do. (although I am sure that many here beleive that ms doesnt test its software) :)

  32. One article FUD, the other reasonable by AlecC · · Score: 2, Informative

    The first linked article is more-or-less gossip, and gives no reason to blame the avionics. Not to say that it wasn't, but we want some evidence. The second is a much more reasoned article, and gives a number of possibilities, including avionics but also a number of others, all of which is possible. My favourite is fuel contamination - but we shall see.

    The simple "running out of fuel" hypothesis is very unlikely. All aircraft are supposed to carry reserves to divert to another airport (not far in this case) plus ninety minutes flying. While cheapo airlines might short-cut on this, I cannot imagine BA doing so. There is no indication that the aircraft had been "stacked" for any length of time, so it shoudl have landed with two hours worth of fuel on board. There have been cases of aircraft being misfueled, but on a regular run between two sophisticated endpoints, this seems unlikely.

    --
    Consciousness is an illusion caused by an excess of self consciousness.
    1. Re:One article FUD, the other reasonable by PingXao · · Score: 1

      You have that backwards. The Seattle article is short and throws out first theories, all of which are speculation at this point. That's actually the good article. The second is from a Rupert Murdoch rag in London that actually attempts to grade the theories - now that's rank gossip, handicapping the failure scenarios with NO hard evidence for any of them. That kind of article actually encourages people to pick their favorite theory and run with it at the office water cooler. Facts be damned, that's Roopert Murdoch's modus operandi in all his bidniz endeavors.

    2. Re:One article FUD, the other reasonable by arkhan_jg · · Score: 1

      Plus, there was fuel all over the runway after the crash. They had plenty fuel in the tanks (before landing, anyway!). Whether it could get to the engines, or was of decent quality is another question. Just bloody lucky it didn't catch fire. As you say, BA is not a budget operator, especially on its long-haul flights.

      --
      Remember kids, it's all fun and games until someone commits wholesale galactic genocide.
    3. Re:One article FUD, the other reasonable by Starker_Kull · · Score: 1

      The simple "running out of fuel" hypothesis is very unlikely. All aircraft are supposed to carry reserves to divert to another airport (not far in this case) plus ninety minutes flying. While cheapo airlines might short-cut on this, I cannot imagine BA doing so. There is no indication that the aircraft had been "stacked" for any length of time, so it shoudl have landed with two hours worth of fuel on board. There have been cases of aircraft being misfueled, but on a regular run between two sophisticated endpoints, this seems unlikely.

      Your numbers for the fuel reserves are not quite correct. For most domestic flights, the reserve above and beyond alternate requirements is 45 minutes, not 90. For flag ops (international), the numbers can be slimmer; they are usually based on a percentage - 10% above estimated burn - which is not that much.

      In addition, that is simply PLANNED fuel calculations. The winds you actually run into, the actual weight of the people & baggage & cargo on board (affecting burn rate, particularly on ultra-long range flights), all can significantly deviate from planned, and frequently in the same direction. It is not uncommon for airliners to land with 30 flying minutes in the tanks - that is not much at all. I HOPE that no fellow pilots would ever attempt something so stupid as to 'push' to make a destination rather than make a (rather expensive) stop for fuel - but when I saw not a trace of fire and the wing tanks torn open by the landing gear.... it does make one think seriously about the idea there was no fuel to ignite in there.

      I've heard a few reports that fuel was pouring out of the plane after impact - meaning they just got really, really lucky that it didn't ignite. Does anyone have a link to an article that reports such? It would be nice to hear.

    4. Re:One article FUD, the other reasonable by Alioth · · Score: 1

      Running out of fuel has already been ruled out - it was ruled out within minutes. It leaked quite a lot of fuel from a breached fuel tank, and the first thing the investigators would have done would be check for fuel in other tanks as well - it's a simple check to make. They publically announced that fuel exhaustion had been ruled out within hours of the crash.

  33. No, I'm New Here by New+Here · · Score: 0, Funny

    No, I'm New Here

  34. Concorde had Fly-by-wire by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Informative

    Otherwise, how else would it have been able to cope with the expansion of the airframe during flight? Ok, it was not FBW as we know it today but remember this was an aircfact designed in the early 1960's. It used LOTS of technology only ever used before in Military aircraft.

    1. Re:Concorde had Fly-by-wire by iminplaya · · Score: 1

      Otherwise, how else would it have been able to cope with the expansion of the airframe during flight?

      Cables and/or push-rods are connected to hydraulic servos which worked the flight controls themselves, just like every Boeing airliner(and Douglas DC-10 and Lockhedd L-1011) from the 747 up through the 767. The 727 used hydraulics for the elevator and rudder. Ailerons were mechanical. The only "fly-by-wire" aspect of them was the autopilot and instruments. And other aircraft, like the 707 and 737, had mechanical controls with hydraulic boost(rudder only on both for the yaw damper), and had a very fancy, but purely mechanical system of bell cranks to maintain proper cable tension to deal with it.

      --
      What?
  35. All I know is that Mr Coward by slashdotmsiriv · · Score: 1

    is a very brave man ...

  36. Surprised we haven't seen the TinFoil Hat Theory? by xmas2003 · · Score: 1
    As noted in the article, the British Prime Minister was in line to takeoff. So one wild idea would be an electronic jammer associated with his government detail inadvertently messed with the 777 avionics.

    Chance of that - pretty darn slim!

    Should be very interesting to see what the 30-day report says. They recovered all of the FDR/CVR, so with all that data, I'm sure they have already re-run what happened in the simulator and could address most of the speculation. However, may be a bit more challenging to determine *why* it happened - i.e. assuming that *both* engines didn't spool up, why?

    --
    Hulk SMASH Celiac Disease
  37. Made by Diebold? by Hognoxious · · Score: 3, Funny

    Their outputs are collected and examined by a voter
    That's OK then, we all know that computers couldn't possibly have any problems counting votes.
    --
    Confucius say, "Find worm in apple - bad. Find half a worm - worse."
    1. Re:Made by Diebold? by mcrbids · · Score: 1

      That's OK then, we all know that computers couldn't possibly have any problems counting votes.

      Ignoring the obvious sarcasm, I can say with confidence that computers generally have no problem whatsoever counting votes. What computers have a problem with is in preventing malicious people from convincing them to count irrelevant numbers.

      Computers have no moral compass.

      If it's your job to count votes, and somebody comes into the room and orders you to add 10,000 for A and subtract 10,000 for B, you'll become suspicious. Computers won't do this.

      In this case, it's highly unlikely that somebody was telling the computers to shut down the engines. Thus, the problems that Diebold (et al) have had with voting machines simply don't apply here.

      --
      I have no problem with your religion until you decide it's reason to deprive others of the truth.
  38. Re:learn by Dorceon · · Score: 1

    You've got a leg up on me if you learned it even once.

    --
    What sound do people on rollercoasters make? Hint: it's not Xbox 360.
  39. Call in the experts.... by heffrey · · Score: 0

    .....that's right, idle speculation from Slashdot readers, sure to be right on the money and more likely to reveal the true cause than the trained, expert investigators!

  40. That Is Brilliant! by hax4bux · · Score: 2, Interesting

    Please post this at every /. article on aviation.

    People, if you are so interested in aviation then get off the couch, take lessons and get some first hand experience. I know little airplanes are not completely the same as big airplanes, but you will be closer to some factual opinions.

    1. Re:That Is Brilliant! by caseih · · Score: 3, Informative

      That Is Brilliant
      Please post this at every /. article on aviation.

      In this case, then, the quote needs to be properly attributed and sourced, which I neglected to do. Apologies. The quote comes from this thread, post #6 by a user named IADCA.
    2. Re:That Is Brilliant! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      And thus copypasta is born.

  41. I think you meant... by MahariBalzitch · · Score: 1

    Windows Vista Ultimate Sparkly Edition for Aircraft (TM). "Now with fewer crashes and makes your aircraft even shinier!".

  42. Much more likely... by M0b1u5 · · Score: 1

    Much more likely is they ran out of fuel.

    --
    How many escape pods are there? "NONE,SIR!" You counted them? "TWICE, SIR!"
    1. Re:Much more likely... by Starker_Kull · · Score: 1

      Much more likely is they ran out of fuel.

      That was my very first thought when I saw the mains punched right through the wing tanks, yet not a single bit of fire or flame or carbon stains from such. That generally happens only when there is no fuel to ignite, such as the Avianca crash on Long Island many years ago. I still have not heard this definitively ruled out, but if the pilots were dumbasses and ran out of fuel, I think that would have come to the fore by now. It looks like something far more subtle... and probably common to many other flying 777s right now.

    2. Re:Much more likely... by Alioth · · Score: 1

      No, that was ruled out immediately. A significant quantity of jet fuel leaked from the aircraft after the crash. One of the first announcements from the AAIB was that the aircraft had not run out of fuel. It's the first thing the investigators would have checked: is there fuel leaking? (yes) is there fuel in the unbreached tanks? (yes)

    3. Re:Much more likely... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Having a full tank and a broken fuel line however, wouldn't be ruled out.

  43. CNN report by ArcticBirdman · · Score: 1

    I just watched a CNN report on this crash and it was brought up that the FAA issued a notification that water could get into the electronics giving the same results that happened in this crash. You would think that the electronic systems would be better insulated for just such a problem.

    1. Re:CNN report by cynvision · · Score: 1
      Heck, even the ISS can't get that no moisture around electronics thing right. IIRC, the Soviet computer failures the past summer was moisture-related. It had their firm and NASA going in circles.

      I believe the CNN video said 'ice' at some point rather than 'water.' From my time flying with my dad in small planes water in fuel was something you checked every time you started up. In enclosed spaces humidity does odd stuff when temperatures change. Just like on the ISS, cold metal would form up some frost somewhere without needing an opening to let water in. But I would have thought the big aircraft had more ways to deal with fuel water that didn't mean the pilots took a little vial to the tanks as they did their inspection.

      --
      "I got it all together but I forgot where I put it."
  44. Unix? by KC1P · · Score: 0, Flamebait

    I'm 63% sure the 777 was mentioned on UNIX-HATERS (I know, wrong crowd) back when it was in development. Something about the glass cockpit running on Unix and the FAA/etc. letting it pass certification with less testing than usual because of Unix's supposed proven track record. A good laugh was had by all (suddenly Amtrak's safety record looks appealing, etc.).

    Yeah you may sneer, but things are different now that Unix only has Windows to compete against. Plus it's had another decade or so of development since then. Most of you are probably too young to remember how Unix was during its inexplicable rise -- everyone's sessions lock up at once, then the operator comes running into the terminal room and shouts "everybody stop typing! the keyboard buffers are full again!" And we sit at our Teleray 1061s and wait many minutes for the poor thing to stagger to its feet. And that's just bad I/O, the crashes were something else. See how much you'd want to ride in a Unix-controlled plane when *that's* your daily life.

    Anyway I'm sure the true story won't be as simple as it being Unix's fault (if current 777s even run Unix), but I'll laugh my ass off if that's even 1% of it.

  45. Some facts about the 777 Electronic Engine Control by flywithjoe.com · · Score: 4, Informative

    Each engine has its own separate EEC. Each EEC has full authority over engine operation. In the normal mode, the EEC sets thrust by controlling EPR based on thrust lever position. EPR is commanded by positioning the thrust levers either automatically with the autothrottles, or manually by the flight crew.

    Engine flameout protection is provided for an auto-relight and rain/hail ingestion. The auto-relight function is activated whenever an engine is at or below idle with the FUEL CONTROL switch in RUN. When the EEC detects an engine flameout, the respective engine ignitors are activated.

    Fuel is supplied by fuel pumps located in the fuel tanks. The fuel flows through a spar fuel valve located in the main tank. It then passes through the first stage engine fuel pump where additional pressure is added. It flows through a fuel/oil heat exchanger where it is preheated. A fuel filter removes contaminants. If the filter becomes clogged, the filter will be bypassed, passing fuel directly to the engine. In that case, a Advisory EICAS message "ENG FUEL FILTER L/R" will be displayed.

    When main tank fuel pump pressure is low, each engine can draw fuel from its corresponding main tank through a suction feed line that bypasses the pumps.

  46. More likely Gizmodo is visiting London after CES by Barsteward · · Score: 1

    with their off-clickers

    --
    "The hands that help are better far than lips that pray." - Robert Ingersoll (1833-1899)
  47. Ah, no, they don't glide THAT well by VAG-Man · · Score: 5, Informative

    Trans-Atlantic flights are often 90 minutes of flying time from a suitable runway. Trans-Pacific flights can be 3 hours or more of flying time from a suitable runway. Needless to say, airlines cannot glide with no power for hours. Air Canada Flight 143 (see http://www.wadenelson.com/gimli.html) was estimated to have a glide ratio of 11:1 with both engines windmilling. So from 40,000 ft, the maximum glide distance would have been about 100km. Sink rate was estimated at 2000 ft/sec meaning with all engines out, you will be visiting some destination at sea level within about 20 minutes.

    1. Re:Ah, no, they don't glide THAT well by onion_joe · · Score: 2, Informative

      I don't mean to be a complete dork (aw hell, this is slashdot...), but I think you meant 2000ft/min. The previous number is significantly faster than terminal falling velocity of the airliner ;-)

      --
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    2. Re:Ah, no, they don't glide THAT well by IvyKing · · Score: 1
      Definitely not a complete dork - the GP's number of 2,000ft/sec is Mach 2 at altitude - which is, as you pointed out, faster than the terminal velocity of the airliner.


      There was a column in Flying magazine a nmber of years ago about how far an airliner could glide from cruising altitude and the figure was something like 120 nautical miles.

  48. fucking duh by DJCacophony · · Score: 1

    The immediate diagnosis of the crash at the time it happened was that all the electronics cut off, and people are just now learning it?

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    1. Re:fucking duh by McFadden · · Score: 1

      Most of the reports of what happened immediately after the plane came down were based on journalists questioning an unrelated airport worker who relayed a brief conversation he had with the captain. In other words although quite possibly true, in terms of reliability it was nothing more than hearsay. There's a world of difference between second-hand comments from someone not involved in the situation, and the initial statements from official investigators.

      Forgive me if your comment was meant to be some kind of humor that went over my head.

    2. Re:fucking duh by arthurpaliden · · Score: 1

      If we only listened to reports from people who actually investigated an incident, instead of reporters telling us what people thought they saw or heard third or fourth hand, then what would all the conspiricy buffs fill their time discussing.

    3. Re:fucking duh by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You underestimate the tinfoil hat crew.

                ~{:\

  49. Interesting Australian Passenger Recollection by Hynee · · Score: 2, Interesting
    Here's an interesting account from an Australian passenger, he says:

    ... just as we touched down, a piece of debris punctured the wall and slammed into my leg. ... My disbelief at the sound of rushing air through the hole was soon overtaken by a sickening crunch as the plane hit the ground hard and all too quickly we had stopped.

    Yep, the plane was actually punctured and he was hit, you can see the hole on the RHS of the aircraft behind the wing, just under windows.

    Anyway, his recollection indicates that the plane was punctured before it touched the ground. If that were the case, his "hole" would probably be the point of failure.

    I think it is more likely that the puncture happened after the plane hit the ground, caused by debris from the right landing gear ripping away. It would be like this--plane touches down on grass (he thinks they're still smooth in the air); wheels dig in rip off, and punctures hull in quick succession (he has been hit); the plane starts scraping along the hull and engines (he feels the plane "hit the ground hard").

    So it's probably just a slightly misleading passenger recollection, but something to think about while we're guessing about the control systems.

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  50. Why is this hard to diagnose? by shish · · Score: 1

    Do the multiple black boxes not have detailed logs of every action of every system?

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  51. Fuel/Air mixture ratio? by hedley · · Score: 1

    My $0.02 is that the air density computation came out wrong for whatever reason. Result: A very lean burn flaming out #2 and causing #1s request for more power to spin out to high RPM with not much to show for it. One passenger inside @the port side said it was takeoff loud how can it be takeoff loud with no power? If the 14:1 air:fuel ratio is wrong...

    Hedley

  52. No you didn't by gatkinso · · Score: 1


    -- The 777 software was written in Ada...

    if (engines = OFF) then
        PrepareForCrash();
    end if;

    --
    I am very small, utmostly microscopic.
  53. Glide path by MichaelSmith · · Score: 1

    Sailplanes fly their final approach with an excess of altitude and rely on drag brakes to guide them to the end of the runway. A drag brake which is stuck on could make them land short but these control surfaces are usually fail safe to off.

    Airliners rely on engine power modulation to keep them on the glide path. An engine failure will make them land short. So why not land like a sailplane? The descent will be slightly steeper and possibly less comfortable for the passengers but it guarantees that an engine failure in the last minute won't be as fatal.

    1. Re:Glide path by Starker_Kull · · Score: 2, Informative

      Sailplanes fly their final approach with an excess of altitude and rely on drag brakes to guide them to the end of the runway. A drag brake which is stuck on could make them land short but these control surfaces are usually fail safe to off. Airliners rely on engine power modulation to keep them on the glide path. An engine failure will make them land short. So why not land like a sailplane? The descent will be slightly steeper and possibly less comfortable for the passengers but it guarantees that an engine failure in the last minute won't be as fatal.

      A nice idea, but commercial airliners have several characteristics that would make that unworkable. First off, in the landing configuration (flaps 30 and gear down), the descent angle would probably be close to 6 or 7 degrees rather than the normal 3 - leading to a descent rate of 2000 fpm or more. In a sailplane (with a very low moment of inertia around the lateral axis), when you command pitch up, the lag between your pulling back on the stick and the airplane rotating to a different angle of attack and increasing lift is almost zero - i.e. near instantaneous response in vertical speed to pitch commands. In a commerical jet, the moment of inertia is much greater, so it takes a few seconds for the plane to rotate to a different angle of attack and thus generate more lift. If you didn't time your flare perfectly, you would smash into the ground quite smartly.

      Secondly, if you instead had the airliner attempt to land in a much 'cleaner' configuration with a better glide ratio, closer to 3 degrees, your landing speeds would probably be 50% faster, probably near 200 knots. The required landing distance is proportional to the square of the velocity, so you would need to double the size of existing runways. Not likely....

      Third, jet engines have relatively slow response characteristics, particularly from idle (much better than a decade or two ago, but they are still slow compared to piston powered engines); this caused several crashes back in the late 50's and early 60's - pilots would be doing idle thrust approaches, then circumstances called for a go around, and when they advanced the thrust levers, it took a good 10 seconds (or more... DC-9s particularly sucked in that area, from what I remember) for full thrust to be developed... and they didn't have 10 seconds to wait. So, it was decided that jets should approach in a 'thrusted-up' configuration; one where the engines were developing much more than idle thrust throughout the final approach - if go around was required, the time to full power was much smaller. But, to maintain such a 'thrusted-up' configuration, the approach slope had to be shallow (a good idea as I mentioned above), and the airplane had to have a very draggy configuration. The amount of extra lift at a given speed from flaps 15 to 30 is very small, but the additional drag is quite large... that's the reason airplanes take off with very small flap settings (typically 5 degrees), for maximum additional lift with little additional drag, but put out full flaps, with lots of drag, for landing, so the engines stay spooled up until about touchdown.

  54. Actually quite likely that PMs ECM did it by orbitalia · · Score: 1

    Lots of people are discounting the theory that the Prime Minister's (Who happened to be driving by at the time did it) I am not so sure it can be easily discounted - the range on these things are miles, and the power output is probably more than enough to kick out avionics on an plane passing by overhead at low altitude. I doubt we will ever see this made public if it is the case though, for fear of giving some people ideas. There should be exclusion zones around airports.

    A good job by the pilots to get the aircraft on the ground wings level.

    1. Re:Actually quite likely that PMs ECM did it by DanBrusca · · Score: 1

      The PM wasn't driving by at the time, he was waiting to take off from Heathrow onboard a hired British Airways 747.

  55. what a lame article summary by mr_death · · Score: 1

    Hate to burst your bubble, but a loss of engine power does not create a stall. Rather, an increase in Angle of Attack past the critical AoA (which is sometimes simplified to a stall airspeed) creates a stall.

    Additionally, much more investigation will happen in the following days and weeks, so locking on to one possible scenario is silly at this point. Offhand, I'd say the preliminary facts support a number of hypotheses, including:

    wind shear
    fuel starvation
    fuel contamination
    failure in the engine control
    bird strike/bird ingestion

    --
    It's Linux, damnit! Pay no attention to renaming attempts by self-aggrandizing blowhards.
  56. Water landing for sure..Re:No, not the Avionics... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Rarely out of gliding distance on transatlantic flights? I just flew on one from Frankfurt to Los Angeles)yesterday, watching the little screen with aircraft position, and I call BS. Flying at somewhere around 36000 ft (it varies during the flight as fuel burns off), we're talking roughly 11km high. L/D (hence glide ratio) is probably around 10:1, so your gliding range is 110km. There's a fair amount of the time that you're more than 110km from land, much less a decent landing spot (e.g. the Outer Hebrides are not what'd I'd call a place to make an "off-airport landing"... nope, it's going to be one of those "unexpected water landings" for sure if all the engines quit.

  57. Somebody trying out his TV-B-Gone.... by Joce640k · · Score: 1

    He just put new batteries in it and was trying it on the in-flight video.

    --
    No sig today...
  58. CAA Announces New Pilot Naming Convention by jeremyp · · Score: 1

    The CAA [British equivalent of the FAA for you Yanks] announced today that, following the BA038 air crash in which neither pilot was named "David", it will be mandatory that all flight crew on all 777 flights must have at least one "David" amongst them.

    "A major opportunity was lost" said a spokesman for the CAA. "We must ensure that this never happens again".

    Cut to the cockpit of a 777 on final approach.

    Pilot (called David): "The autopilot is in trouble, it has asked for increased thrust, but the engines haven't responded."

    Copilot (not called David, only one David is mandatory): "You'd better take over."

    Pilot: "Increasing thrust manually..." He moves the throttles forwards.

    Computer: "I'm afraid I can't do that Dave..."

    --
    All I want is a secure system where it's easy to do anything I want. Is that too much to ask ~~ Randall Munroe
  59. More complicated than that by einhverfr · · Score: 3, Informative

    It may not be just a software bug. It may be that the software cannot handle some unforeseen hardware state, as happened on the Malaysian Airlines incident a few months ago (that incident was a near-miss but did not result in a crash-- the problem was that the software was unable to handle properly bad data coming in from an accelerometer). Whether this counts as a "software bug" or a "hardware failure" I don't know....

    You can prove that the software is bug free for any set of foreseen inputs. The question becomes whether there are unforeseen inputs which can cause problems. Suppose for example, that a sensor fails in an unexpected way-- for example shorting a circuit instead of breaking it, or by sending incorrect data to the computer. In essence you not only have to handle valid inputs from sensors, and normal sensor failures, but you also have to handle sensors which fail in unexpected ways, and you also have to handle every possible electrical fault as well. And then you *still* have to make some assumptions about the underlying communictions between the remaining components.

    How, here is the real issue:

    Software exists only to process information on underlying hardware. When you have failures in that hardware which cause the information to be corrupted, you cannot count on any results on the software. Hence you software can only be proven bug-free within a reasonably limited set of circumstances. Or, in simpler terms, garbage in? garbage out.

    --

    LedgerSMB: Open source Accounting/ERP
  60. Re:There has already been one 777 software inciden by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    What if the main conspiracy theory was set up to dissuade people from the REAL conspiracy?

    Better tighten that tinfoil hat.

  61. Get it right please ! by DaveDerrick · · Score: 1

    The OP says the engines "suddenly cut off without warning", but the article he cites says "Both jet engines failed to respond to demands for more power". There is a big difference between failing to respond to an increase, and cutting off.

  62. Not the first time? by clickclickdrone · · Score: 1

    It didn't get repeated much but early on in the reporting (news.bbc.co.uk I think) a member of ground crew said a pilot had told him that had happened on another plane i.e. sudden power loss although in that case it was a rather better landing. Being just anecdotal, It does need to be treated with caution.

    --
    I want a list of atrocities done in your name - Recoil
  63. That's exactly what they want you to think by Hognoxious · · Score: 1

    Ignoring the obvious sarcasm, I can say with confidence that computers generally have no problem whatsoever counting votes.
    Maybe it was a cheap shot (not that sarcasm is at all obvious round here), but when such systems are described, I always wonder what happens if there's a fault in the vote counter? Ultimately, you must have one final decision maker, even if its task is somewhat simpler than the feeder systems that 'propose' the actions.

    In this case, it's highly unlikely that somebody was telling the computers to shut down the engines.
    I'm sure everyone agrees with you. Or at least everyone who isn't wearing a tinfoil hat.
    --
    Confucius say, "Find worm in apple - bad. Find half a worm - worse."
    1. Re:That's exactly what they want you to think by Mike1024 · · Score: 1

      I always wonder what happens if there's a fault in the vote counter? Ultimately, you must have one final decision maker, even if its task is somewhat simpler than the feeder systems that 'propose' the actions.


      You're right - that's the 'other' problem with N-version programming. There are several ideas on how to combat it:

      1. The vote counter should be substantially simpler than the N-version-programmed code. Autopilot software is complicated, finding the median of three outputs is not complicated. The voter can hence be made simple, be more thoroughly validated (code walkthroughs, formal methods validation, random input testing etc), and thus you can have confidence in the voter.

      2. Hardware voting. You have three wing angle control programs, each one controls a motor, and the three motors are all connected to the same axle, which is connected to the wing. If motor 1 wants to go up while motors 2 and 3 want to go down, two motors have more force than one, so the wing goes down.

      3. In some signal combination cases, such as safety cut-outs doing "enable machine if (A=safe)and(B=safe)and(C=safe)" you can combine the three systems' outputs with a series of relays (a relay is an electromagnet-operated switch). So for voltage to get to your dangerous machine it has to go through relay A, relay B, then relay C. If any of the three systems needs to trigger a cut-out they just open their relay and the machine stops. And if relay A has a fault, it's no problem: you still have relay B and relay C!
      --
      "Goodness me, how unlike the FBI to abuse the trust of the American public." -- The Onion
  64. NOT fuel exhaustion by Alioth · · Score: 1

    Just to get the message across to others, and correct the "prollyfuelexhaustion" tag, fuel exhaustion was immediately ruled out. A significant quantity of fuel leaked from the crashed plane.

    The AAIB initial report is here:
    http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/latest_news/accident__heathrow_17_january_2008___initial_report.cfm

  65. Fuel problems a possible cause by dtjohnson · · Score: 1

    It sounds like the flight controls, avionics, and autopilot systems all worked correctly, from reading the articles and the pilot comments. The engine controls themselves might have malfunctioned but the only supporting thing for that is that both engines simultaneously failed to respond. There are many other more likely causes for that, though, particularly some sort of fuel problem such as fuel contamination, no fuel, fuel pump problems, and the like. Even if the engine controls are found to be a fault, though, it's more likely that the problem is a mechanical problem rather than software or electronics. The indications are that the engines were still running but failed to increase thrust when commanded by both the autopilot and the manual throttle levers. Since this occurred at the end of a long flight and there was no subsequent fire after landing even though some of the fuel tanks were ruptured, lack of fuel in the tanks that the engines were feeding from seems a definite possibility.

  66. great circles? by einhverfr · · Score: 1

    Unless you are travelling exactly half-way around the world, there are only 2 great circles that connect the source and destination points.

    This means that there is the most efficient great circle arc(goind directly towards your destination) and the less efficient great circle arc (going the other direction around the world until you reach your destination....

    Perhaps you have a non-standard definition of 'great circle?'

    --

    LedgerSMB: Open source Accounting/ERP
  67. From various articles on the incident by einhverfr · · Score: 2, Interesting

    The right and left engines are controlled by different computers. The only single points of control are the pilot and a central engine control system. Thus in the absence of pilot error, the only single point of failure is that specific avionics system.

    Now the root fault may be due to some sensor or processing system failing and causing a cascade failure to other portions of the system. This sort of thing *has* happened in other 777's (an accelerometer failing in a way as to cause a cascade error into flight control software). In the end the most careful proof of software accurate operation must make certain assumptions about unerlying hardare states. Once hardware starts to go bad, all bets are off (for example, sensors could fail in such a way as to provide apparently valid but wildly inaccurate data to the software which would then return incorrect results (and hence take wrong actions).

    --

    LedgerSMB: Open source Accounting/ERP
  68. Are they sure.... by bogibear · · Score: 1

    ... That someone didn't ignore the instructions to turn off the iPod just before the crash?

  69. The worst possible point by peccary · · Score: 1

    would have been on takeoff, about 4 seconds after the wheels left the ground.

  70. To be fair by peccary · · Score: 1

    NASA exists in an entirely different competitive environment from MS or Sun or Apple or Linux. I agree that the hoi polloi tolerate entirely too much crap from consumer-grade software, but I don't agree that the performance of NASA's software teams should be used to throw stones at people who are operating in a different world.

  71. Conjecture is not news by c0d3h4x0r · · Score: 1

    Failed Avionics a Possible Cause of BA038 Crash

    I can come up with 10 other possible causes... see, I'm a newsman too!

    1. Large Wooden Badger a Possible Cause of BA038 Crash
    2. Drunken Pilot a Possible Cause of BA038 Crash
    3. Sharks With Freakin' Lasers a Possible Cause of BA038 Crash
    4. Snakes On Plane a Possible Cause of BA038 Crash
    5. Running Out of Fuel a Possible Cause of BA038 Crash
    6. Fat Ass in Row 23 Seat B a Possible Cause of BA038 Crash
    7. Vitamin D Deficiency a Possible Cause of BA038 Crash
    8. Giant Mutant Space Goat a Possible Cause of BA038 Crash
    9. Falling From High Altitude a Possible Cause of BA038 Crash
    10. CmdrTaco a Possible Cause of BA038 Crash

    (I feel a poll coming on...)

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  72. Sorry by einhverfr · · Score: 1

    The news stories say this is a scenario that pilots don't train for. I was not rebutting your point in this regard.

    My main point is that the may not train for this scenario relating to a 777, but they *do* train for it in other aircraft.

    "slow down as much as possible" was also a misstatement. I meant to say "hit the ground as slow as possible" which is usually just above normal landing speed. I suppose I clould have been more clear about this :-) IANAP but you are so I will defer to you on this area.

    --

    LedgerSMB: Open source Accounting/ERP
    1. Re:Sorry by samkass · · Score: 1

      Yeah, hitting the ground as slow as possible is always good... it's not a bad thing to shoot for on regular landings, too :).

      It's true that everyone with a pilot's certificate has done engine loss procedures ad nauseam. However, as far as I know (I only have my Private Pilot's ticket) it is not required to train on dual simultaneous engine loss on short final in a large jet aircraft. It simply "never" happens. So... you're both right. It's a situation way outside of the typical contingency and training envelope, but not a completely foreign concept... you keep it at best glide until you've made the airport and keep the plane under control, then slow down as much as you can and hope for the best.

      --
      E pluribus unum
  73. A more likely answer to BA038's loss of Thrust by daggerdirk · · Score: 1

    http://tinyurl.com/2nx3ym/ is far more credible than anything else to be seen on the subject

  74. Re:Glide path vs Quick-Go-Around by pg--az · · Score: 1

    >> full flaps, with lots of drag, for landing, so the engines stay spooled up until about touchdown. So to rephrase, what you point out and I never saw mentioned in any mainstream-media article, is what must be the huge number of disasters avoided by the ability of the pilot to quickly remove the "drag brake" of those 30-degree-flaps to avoid some other kind of problem. The trade-off is that in the statistically-rare engine-out-on-landing, this kind of thing happens. GREAT explanation, thanks !

  75. Re:Glide path vs Response-on-Engines-Out by pg--az · · Score: 1

    [[The amount of extra lift at a given speed from flaps 15 to 30 is very small, but the additional drag is quite large...]] A "delayed realization" - by Googling (( ba 38 coward flaps lift )) one can see that in response to both-engines-out the response was to INCREASE the flaps to provide more lift, and possibly to achieve more ground-effect. Your remark raises the possibility that counter-intuitively by backing off on the flaps one might reduce drag while not giving up very much lift... Of course this is a rare scenario and will be even more rare when they fix whatever allowed both sides to shut down simultaneously, but would a computer simulation which models the ground-effect and so forth possibly conclude that the correct response for such an scenario might actually be to BACK OFF on the flaps a little bit ?

  76. swithched Imputs / Outputs by bobinoz · · Score: 1

    From my reading of the reports both engines didn't fail simultaneously, but rather one failed 8 seconds after the first, and while there was fuel onboard that doesn't necessarily rule out fuel starvation from another cause such as contamination or a fuel blockage. While a software or hardware failure is unlikely to be the sole contributer to the cause, reversed inputs / outputs to the FADEC system could have led to the system inadvertenly causing the incident. Say for example the EEC on engine one indicates that it is experiencing fuel starvation from tank 1, and FADEC decides to switch engine one to tank 2, however because of reversed inputs / outputs it was infact engine 2 suffering the effects, now both engines are feeding from tank 2 where the fuel starvation is stemming from (be it cotaminated or blocked)! The time for the system to do the calculations and switch tanks is under 10 seconds, so in reality within 10 seconds the second engine would show similar characteristics. Not entirely different from the British midlands crash in the 1980's only it was the pilots who recieved the reversed information and reacted accordingly and shut down the engine appearing to be on fire, only they actually shut down their good engine. As for the pilots, it is without doubt that their quick reaction saved many lives, immediately upon the problem arising the captain(pilot not flying) raised the flaps, while this raised the ultimate stall speed, it enabled the aircraft to at least make the right side of the fence.