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Lawyers Would Rather Fly Than Download PGP

An anonymous reader writes "The NYTimes is running a front-page story about lawyers for suspects in terrorism-related cases fearing government monitoring of privileged conversations. But instead of talking about the technological solutions, the lawyers fly halfway across the world to meet with their clients. In fact, nowhere in the article is encryption even mentioned. Is it possible that lawyers don't even know about PGP?" The New Yorker has a detailed piece centering on the Oregon terrorism case discussed by the Times.

426 comments

  1. Security not just about encryption. by Whiney+Mac+Fanboy · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Is it possible that lawyers don't even know about PGP?"

    Is it possible that the submitter doesn't even know about keyloggers, passive listening devices (for phones), compromised encryption binaries, vulnerabilities in protocols, etc?

    If the goddamn NSA can't snoop on an encrypted conversation between a lawyer & client, then frankly, they're not doing their job

    --
    There are shills on slashdot. Apparently, I'm one of them.
    1. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Brian+Gordon · · Score: 4, Insightful

      If the NSA can listen in, then PGP isn't doing their job.

    2. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Whiney+Mac+Fanboy · · Score: 5, Insightful

      If the NSA can listen in, then PGP isn't doing their job.

      It's got to be decrypted at one end of the other - there's not much PGP can do about a compromised terminal, keyloggers, passive listening devices (reconstructing passwords from the sound of keyboard tapping), etc.

      Basically, a well-resourced, determined attacked doesn't have to crack PGP itself.

      --
      There are shills on slashdot. Apparently, I'm one of them.
    3. Re:Security not just about encryption. by BungaDunga · · Score: 2, Insightful

      PGP's job is to stop anyone snooping in between sender and receiver. If either computer has been rooted, then you could be running as much encryption as you like and they'll still be able to read your keystrokes. PGP stands for "pretty good privacy": is that good enough for a lawyer?

    4. Re:Security not just about encryption. by nomadic · · Score: 1

      Is it possible that the submitter doesn't even know about keyloggers, passive listening devices (for phones), compromised encryption binaries, vulnerabilities in protocols, etc?

      Don't forget the FBI just seizing their computers and just looking at everything in their inbox and sent folder.

    5. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Ethanol-fueled · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Another question: Why does the summary title read, "Lawyers would rather fly than download PGP" while the summary asks,
      "Is it possible that lawyers don't even know about PGP?"

    6. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Sloppy · · Score: 4, Insightful

      there's not much PGP can do about a compromised terminal, keyloggers, passive listening devices (reconstructing passwords from the sound of keyboard tapping), etc.
      If there's a microphone in the room, then meeting in person probably isn't much better.
      --
      As copyright owner of this comment, I authorize everyone to defeat any technological measure which limits access to it.
    7. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Otter · · Score: 2, Interesting
      Basically, a well-resourced, determined attacked doesn't have to crack PGP itself.

      Anyway, who says the NSA can't crack PGP? Some crypto-fanboy showing off how much smarterer he is than lawyers who make no claim of security expertise and have a professional obligation to err on the side of caution?

    8. Re:Security not just about encryption. by mabhatter654 · · Score: 1

      I'd think the fear is what I mentioned before. The TSA being used by other agencies to gather intelligence rather than just protect the plane. We hear "turn it on" to prove it works, now it's let them root around for "objectionable" material... and they've been taking whole laptops they have "under suspicion" to document the entire drive. I'd guess Lawyers finally caught up that trend and don't like it one bit. Your travel plans are submitted and checked against a database 24 hours before flight so they know when you're flying... Imagine the DA tipping off TSA that they want to inspect a lawyer's data by "searching" his laptop and they take it in the back room and allow a prosecutor to dig for whatever they want... totally legal, and highly unethical.

    9. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      PGP doesn't provide for secure keyboards, displays, RAM and uncorrupted security staff. PGP can't prevent a good old-fashioned beating to make you give up the pass phrase for captured traffic. WTF is PGP supposed to do about the fact that you can reconstruct key presses from an audio recording of someone typing?

      When the stakes are high (lives, vast sums of money) you don't rely exclusively on encryption geekery. For some people failure means someone will get hellfired.

    10. Re:Security not just about encryption. by AHuxley · · Score: 1

      You do not need into "PGP".
      If its running on MS, you are in with a click.
      This is not the Enigma or Crypto AG days where the spooks need to think about a unique 'box'.
      No need to get into PGP, when the OS is wide open.
      Face to face you are in the lawyers world.
      They can read a face like the NSA/CIA/FBI/DHS can read MS.

      --
      Domestic spying is now "Benign Information Gathering"
    11. Re:Security not just about encryption. by darkmeridian · · Score: 5, Insightful

      This is the credited answer. At first, I was leaning towards being cynical and thought that the lawyers just wanted to pad the bill. But we're talking about the United States of America deciding to spy on "terrorists" and their attorneys. I mean, "The Justice Department does not deny that the government has monitored phone calls and e-mail exchanges between lawyers and their clients as part of its terrorism investigations in the United States and overseas. *** In a terrorism-financing investigation centered on the offices of an Islamic charity here, the government mistakenly provided defense lawyers in August 2004 with what the lawyers say was a logbook of intercepted phone calls between the charity's lawyers in Washington, D.C., and clients in Saudi Arabia."

      If the government is tapping your phone lines, what makes you think they aren't intercepting your e-mail? I'm sure PGP would avoid problems like the U.S. government installing a keylogger on your system, or just sending a national security letter demanding access to your e-mails on pain of imprisonment as an accomplice to terror. Oh wait, it doesn't.

      I'd rather take the airplane flight be more sure that I'm not getting bugged.

      --
      A NYC lawyer blogs. http://www.chuangblog.com/
    12. Re:Security not just about encryption. by dekemoose · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Unless that meeting occurs outside of this country, which is why the lawyer in question is racking up the frequent flyer miles.

    13. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Chris+Mattern · · Score: 1

      Because there are no US agents anywhere outside the boundaries of the US.

    14. Re:Security not just about encryption. by maxume · · Score: 1

      Yeah, because some lawyer is going to know how to find the bug that they installed in his laptop.

      --
      Nerd rage is the funniest rage.
    15. Re:Security not just about encryption. by maxume · · Score: 1

      While the theater surrounding laptops is irritating, you are confusing the TSA with customs.

      --
      Nerd rage is the funniest rage.
    16. Re:Security not just about encryption. by A+nonymous+Coward · · Score: 1

      Kdawson hasn't done much to earn his editor keep here, but he has done much to cement his reputation for knee jerkery.

    17. Re:Security not just about encryption. by natenovs · · Score: 1

      just try to get into my windows box...

    18. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      More likely, it's easier for the customer to secure their premises, instead of securing two premises.

    19. Re:Security not just about encryption. by SanityInAnarchy · · Score: 0, Redundant

      installing a keylogger on your system Seems like this one would be pretty obvious, especially given that you can now buy a computer capable of (at least) PGP for less than the cost of a plane ticket. Unless you're arguing that every single Linux distro, or every single computer sold, has a keylogger by the US government, it isn't going to happen.

      or just sending a national security letter demanding access to your e-mails Whoops, my hard drive crashed. And gosh darnit, I forgot to make backups. You know, I'd really love to cooperate; here's my PGP key... Now, what was the passphrase again?

      I'd rather take the airplane flight be more sure that I'm not getting bugged. Because it's not possible to bug the physical room. Oh wait, it is.
      --
      Don't thank God, thank a doctor!
    20. Re:Security not just about encryption. by OrangeTide · · Score: 1

      For all I know the NSA can decode the text on your screen by listening to the whine of your CRT from down the street.

      --
      “Common sense is not so common.” — Voltaire
    21. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Another question: Why does the summary title read, "Lawyers would rather fly than download PGP" while the summary asks,

      "Is it possible that lawyers don't even know about PGP?" You must be new here.
    22. Re:Security not just about encryption. by s0litaire · · Score: 1

      Well if the UK' TV licence detection van's can do it why not the NSA? Seen a Detection van pull a reasonable image off of the interference put out by a CRT in a van 30 feet away!! NSA gotta have more sensitive equipment! Then again, Knowing the UK TV Licence team, they could probably get more info out of the American embassy using their van, than any spy around.... ;)

      --
      Laters Sol "Have you found the secrets of the universe? Asked Zebade "I'm sure I left them here somewhere"
    23. Re:Security not just about encryption. by dynamo · · Score: 2, Funny

      Ok. What's your IP address?

    24. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Architect_sasyr · · Score: 1

      Would a recording outside of the US be viable in a US court? I don't know Australian law on the matter either. Of course, using said recording to direct ones investigations ("I just had a hunch boss") is still, of course, viable.

      --
      Me failed English...
      FreeBSD over Linux. If my comments seem odd, this may explain...
    25. Re:Security not just about encryption. by MyLongNickName · · Score: 2, Funny

      207.46.232.182

      --
      See my journal for slashdot ID's by year. Mine created in 2005. http://slashdot.org/journal/289875/slashdot-ids-by-year
    26. Re:Security not just about encryption. by antispam_ben · · Score: 1

      Still running 3.1?

      --
      Tag lost or not installed.
    27. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Actually,+I+do+RTFA · · Score: 4, Funny

      You can try mine if you like: 192.168.1.1

      --
      Your ad here. Ask me how!
    28. Re:Security not just about encryption. by NotQuiteReal · · Score: 1
      Heh, even the submitter didn't bother to include a link for PGP.

      Which, in turn, has links...

      --
      This issue is a bit more complicated than you think.
    29. Re:Security not just about encryption. by cjb658 · · Score: 1

      Bah, there's no place like 127.0.0.1

    30. Re:Security not just about encryption. by natenovs · · Score: 1

      yeh, plugged into the cable modem ip: 64.58.66.214

    31. Re:Security not just about encryption. by AdmiralWeirdbeard · · Score: 1

      well, kinda I suppose its not really listening, per se.

      --
      Come read my stupid blagablog. Rants and Giggles
    32. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Ok. What's your IP address? 127.0.0.1
    33. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Fishead · · Score: 5, Funny

      Ha ha, sucker, I am in!

      Now I'll just change your router settings so you can't access the inter...

    34. Re:Security not just about encryption. by cheater512 · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Does it have to be viable evidence in a court of law?

      Remember that we are talking about private discussions between lawyers and clients.
      Thats supposed to be highly confidential to start with.

    35. Re:Security not just about encryption. by antikaos · · Score: 1

      Wow, that's really similar to my IP, you must live right next door to me.

      --
      I don't believe you, I'm here for a seat on the secret spaceship.
    36. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Martin+Blank · · Score: 3, Informative

      That's not far from the truth. Each monitor has a unique signal that can be tuned in using TEMPEST gear, to which s0litaire indirectly referred in another reply to you. PGP has (had?) a viewer that was intended to defeat TEMPEST viewing. I don't know the details of it, but I recall it was a gray-on-gray scheme, and it had something to do with the relatively low resolution and color depth available on TEMPEST viewers.

      However, the FBI (and by loan or extension, the NSA) has some very good black bag people, and they are much more likely to add in a hardware keylogger or currently-undetectable rootkit nowadays. That's how the FBI got crucial evidence against Nicodemo Scarfo, Jr., son of former mob boss Little Nicky Scarfo, adding a hardware keylogger to grab his PGP password to allow them to decrypt his messages in concert with his private key, also copied at the time.

      --
      You can never go home again... but I guess you can shop there.
    37. Re:Security not just about encryption. by MaskedSlacker · · Score: 2, Informative

      Actually you don't even have to call it a hunch. You can use all sorts of things in the course of an investigation that you cannot use in court. For example intelligence gathered by one of the agencies from a foreign agent that reveals the identity of an internal mole. Generally that would be inadmissable as evidence, but its perfectly legit to use it as justification to investigate the individual to get evidence you can use in court.

    38. Re:Security not just about encryption. by hardburn · · Score: 2, Interesting

      NSA isn't a god-like organization. They have limits like anyone else.

      It seems that in the vast majority of cases the NSA handles involving encryption, they don't bother to try breaking the crypto itself. Rather, they find some backdoor (keylogger, mishandled key management, etc.). It may seem like cheating to use human error to break the crypto, but in the real world, humans make errors all the time, so you can rely on it in your investigations.

      Therefore, it's likely the NSA can't break PGP, simply because it's a waste of effort to try.

      --
      Not a typewriter
    39. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      help my mouse is moving itself

    40. Re:Security not just about encryption. by cjb658 · · Score: 1

      PGP stands for "pretty good privacy": is that good enough for a lawyer?

      No, but maybe Firefox is.

    41. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Funny

      Moron, I just logged into your machine and deleted your entire hard dr...

    42. Re:Security not just about encryption. by gustolove · · Score: 1

      huh? hack my router? i'm thinking you were looking for 127.0.0.1

    43. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Ihmhi · · Score: 1

      passive listening devices (reconstructing passwords from the sound of keyboard tapping), etc.

      How the hell can they do that?

      RECORDING: *tik* *tak* *tik* *tik* *tak*

      JIM: "The password's gotta be penis, Bob! We got the bastard!"

    44. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Morty · · Score: 1

      Public key encryption can be broken by anyone with sufficient time and computing power. PGP, SSL, SMIME, et. al. are all inherently breakable. The theory is that the secrets protected by public key encryption have a relatively limited monetary value, so it's not worthwhile for an attacker to spend massive resources to try to get access to secrets that are probably worth less than the cost of breaking them.

      Guess what? To the US government, uncovering possible information related to terrorism has a massive monetary value. That means that the NSA and other related government agencies have ample incentive to bring correspondingly massive computing resources to bear.

      So while sidechannels such as keyloggers and tempest-style attacks are probably cheaper, I bet that the US government could crack a PGP key if it had a good reason to do so.

    45. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      If the NSA can listen in, then PGP isn't doing their job. PGP file contains the key also, so dont trust it
    46. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      PGP can be secure, but PGP security presumes you have good random numbers. How good are yours? What's the period of your generator? How big and how random is your seed? Knowing how to use PGP is not the same as understanding PGP, which is something I fear most armchair crypto kiddies would rather gloss over.

      Have you heard a lot of consternation from the NSA about our poor crypto regulations lately? I haven't either.

    47. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      a fact known here for 10 years...

    48. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I hear you. When you do matrix multiplications to project a higher dimension into lower ones, you lose data, plain and simple. This crap is the soundwave equivalent to recreating a WHOLE body mold from the shadow we're casting on the floor nearby.

      And to those that think it's still possible to hear out, how many combinations of letters does and symbols does a password normally have? you might be sure that the third letter somewhere is an 'a' from the sound of my pinky (somehow) but how the hell are you sure the rest of the word MUST be perfect? Doesn't it defeat the purpose of dictionary attack if you can't be positive of the words you're cmparing the actual pw to?

    49. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Angst+Badger · · Score: 3, Insightful

      If it were my ass on the line, I'd assume that the NSA can crack PGP. I remember many years ago when PGP first appeared and how much effort the NSA put into trying to get Congress to stuff the genie back into the bottle. Then, all of a sudden, they stopped resisting. Either the NSA decided they couldn't win -- which is frankly out of character for them -- or they found a way to crack it. Given the resources available to them, I wouldn't want to rely on any cryptographic system that doesn't bother them.

      --
      Proud member of the Weirdo-American community.
    50. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      NSA _can_ crack PGP, otherwise they'd be up in a tizzy about it being available to the general public. Anyone remember when IE6 with SSL wasn't allowed to be exported, and then poof, one day it was OK? C'mon guys, NSA breaks codes, that's what they do, and they've got a massive budget to do it with.

    51. Re:Security not just about encryption. by furbearntrout · · Score: 0, Offtopic
      1. 1. Slashdot is owned by SourceForge, Inc.
      2. 2. SourceForge relies on ad revenue for operations.
      3. 3. Inflammatory headlines means more hits, clicks, actions.
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      My first on topic Underpants Gnome post. :")
      --
      Crap. What did the new CSS do with the "Post anonymously" option??
    52. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Funny

      You can try mine if you like: 192.168.1.1

      Wait, that is my ip address... oh my god you're calling from inside the house.
    53. Re:Security not just about encryption. by speederaser · · Score: 1

      Just in case anyone is wondering...

      $ whois 207.46.232.182
      [Querying whois.arin.net]
      [whois.arin.net]

      OrgName: Microsoft Corp
      OrgID: MSFT
      Address: One Microsoft Way
      City: Redmond
      StateProv: WA
      PostalCode: 98052
      Country: US

      NetRange: 207.46.0.0 - 207.46.255.255
      CIDR: 207.46.0.0/16
      NetName: MICROSOFT-GLOBAL-NET
      NetHandle: NET-207-46-0-0-1
      Parent: NET-207-0-0-0-0
      NetType: Direct Assignment
      NameServer: NS1.MSFT.NET
      NameServer: NS5.MSFT.NET
      NameServer: NS2.MSFT.NET
      NameServer: NS3.MSFT.NET
      NameServer: NS4.MSFT.NET
      Comment:
      RegDate: 1997-03-31
      Updated: 2004-12-09

      RTechHandle: ZM39-ARIN
      RTechName: Microsoft
      RTechPhone: +1-425-882-8080
      RTechEmail: noc@microsoft.com

      OrgAbuseHandle: ABUSE231-ARIN
      OrgAbuseName: Abuse
      OrgAbusePhone: +1-425-882-8080
      OrgAbuseEmail: abuse@microsoft.com

      OrgAbuseHandle: HOTMA-ARIN
      OrgAbuseName: Hotmail Abuse
      OrgAbusePhone: +1-425-882-8080
      OrgAbuseEmail: abuse@hotmail.com

      OrgAbuseHandle: MSNAB-ARIN
      OrgAbuseName: MSN ABUSE
      OrgAbusePhone: +1-425-882-8080
      OrgAbuseEmail: abuse@msn.com

      OrgNOCHandle: ZM23-ARIN
      OrgNOCName: Microsoft Corporation
      OrgNOCPhone: +1-425-882-8080
      OrgNOCEmail: noc@microsoft.com

      OrgTechHandle: MSFTP-ARIN
      OrgTechName: MSFT-POC
      OrgTechPhone: +1-425-882-8080
      OrgTechEmail: iprrms@microsoft.com

    54. Re:Security not just about encryption. by profplump · · Score: 3, Interesting

      Looking at your shadow I can still tell your body type, if given some scale I can make reasonable guesses about your height and weight. I can tell what orientation you're in, if you've got long or short hair, possibly your gender. You're right, I can't draw a picture of your face, but given a list of all 6 billion faces I could narrow down the choices quite a bit before I started rounding up people for a lineup.

      If someone has a 12-character password alpha-numeric password the keyspace is about 104^12. If you can determine when the shift key is pressed and which of the 4 rows of keys each character is in, you can make that 13^12, which is 36 bits less keyspace -- almost a 50% reduction over the original 80 bits.

    55. Re:Security not just about encryption. by RiotingPacifist · · Score: 1

      Wait so basically if they have physical access to your set-up your screwed.Now the only question is would you rather use a free piece of software to protect communication between the 2 points or spend loads on flights.

      Oh right these guys are lawyers, and the client gets charged for the flights, so what do they care!

      --
      IranAir Flight 655 never forget!
    56. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Otter · · Score: 1
      NSA isn't a god-like organization. They have limits like anyone else.

      Sure, but the question isn't whether it's likely that they can break PGP, or whether, even if they could, they'd expend those resources on some loser jihadis in Oregon. The question is whether the bizarre "lawyers dont no how to use teh computarz!!" spin of this story is justified.

      It may seem like cheating to use human error to break the crypto, but in the real world, humans make errors all the time, so you can rely on it in your investigations.

      OK, but that just makes my point better than I did!!

    57. Re:Security not just about encryption. by jd · · Score: 1

      TEMPEST-style detection works great on CRTs, not so hot on flat-panel LCD monitors, and not hot at all if anyone has added a metallic coating to windows and wall paints. But then, any lawyer booking a Faraday cage to talk with a terror suspect can expect the spooks to wheel in every listening device on the planet and then some.

      --
      It's a small world and it smells funny; I'd buy another if it wasn't for the money; Take back what I paid (SoM)
    58. Re:Security not just about encryption. by LiENUS · · Score: 1

      Does it have to be viable evidence in a court of law?
      IANAL but it doesn't matter if they listen in on PGP. No need to encrypt. Client-Attorney communications are not allowed to be used in court. Neither are the results of searches based on such eavesdropping. Fruit of the poisonous tree and whatnot.
    59. Re:Security not just about encryption. by BrainInAJar · · Score: 1

      Think of it from an information warfare perspective.

      You're the NSA. You can crack RSA. Do you want to reveal that you know how to crack RSA to arrest a gangster/druglord/whatever ? Or would you rather crack it, and then look for some other excuse of why you know this info?

      Especially in light of the fact that if your superiors were on an invading spree and were looking to target some states that may or may not be using RSA because they think it's uncrackable

    60. Re:Security not just about encryption. by RiotingPacifist · · Score: 1

      Wait so does that mean that the NSA encouraging people to use WPA over WEP, means theyve cracked it too!!!?. Lets calm down a second, take the tinfoil hats off and realise that 1 + 1 still equals 2 for the NSA, they cant break maths.

      Why the change of attitude? Im gunna go with:
      1) Due to OSS it was impossible to block
      2) 'They' started relying on the tools too (TOR, PGP, etc), and if only NSA/FBI/CIA agents are using PGP well its fairly easy to catch them
      3) It allows them to get more powers because they cant just read peoples emails anymore.
      4) A new set of directors realised they be better of working with security experts so they no what's happening, than working against them and locking themselves out.

      --
      IranAir Flight 655 never forget!
    61. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Z34107 · · Score: 2, Funny

      Try hacking my IPv6 only machine at ::1

      --
      DATABASE WOW WOW
    62. Re:Security not just about encryption. by OrangeTide · · Score: 1

      They do that in the US too way back to detect if you're stealing cable service. The tuners on a TV (and radio) create a new carrier frequency to heterodyne the signal into an intermediate frequency. Like your normal consumer AM radio takes the 540kHz-1600kHz (i think) and turns it into a 450kHz (i think) intermediate frequency. If you modify your AM radio to allow you to tune to 450kHz, or just build a very simple amplifier for that frequency you can pick up the signal an AM radio is listening to from a few feet away. depending on how shielded the radio is, like if it's grounded, and the sensitivity of your amplifier and the gain on your antenna.

      All cheap & good tuners are setup to work at a single intermediate frequency to run it through a series of amplifiers tuned to work efficiently at a narrow frequency. When you add two AC wave-forms of different frequency you get the Sum, the Difference and the two original frequencies. heterodyne is where you amplify the difference and discard the other three.

      at least that's the best I can remember from a high school electronics course from 12 years ago.

      --
      “Common sense is not so common.” — Voltaire
    63. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Without comminicating first how do you know which flight is safe? Seems like a chicken and egg problem, but I hear that one has been solved already.

    64. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      If there's a microphone in the client's room, and the lawyer is there, she can say "This looks suspicious -- don't say anything".

      Defense lawyers exist precisely to cover your ass. If the client could think of everything the lawyer could think of, said client wouldn't require the services of said lawyer to begin with.

      If I was being held in a prison on the other side of the planet, I sure as hell would want my lawyer in the room. I wouldn't trust the prison guards for a second if they said "here's a terminal from which you can use PGP safely, winkwink, now we'll leave the room, winkwink".

    65. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      127.129.81.231 own away!

    66. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      127.0.0.1

    67. Re:Security not just about encryption. by TheLink · · Score: 1

      Just listen to your keyboard as you type. Not all the keys on your keyboard sound the same. It's trivial to tell if someone is using the backspace, spacebar and enter. Even the shift keys sound different.

      If the person logs in to their computer using a known (or guessable) keyboard, username and operating system (so you know the sequence of events), you will have a high chance of guessing the keys used.

      As for using PGP instead of flying. How in the world would you exchange PGP keys securely assuming a very "hostile" scenario?

      If you already are going to fly there to securely exchange keys you might as well talk to the person.

      --
    68. Re:Security not just about encryption. by PopeRatzo · · Score: 4, Insightful

      the question isn't whether it's likely that they can break PGP,
      How long before the possession of a PGP key is grounds for landing on a DHS no-fly list?
      --
      You are welcome on my lawn.
    69. Re:Security not just about encryption. by PopeRatzo · · Score: 1

      Wait so does that mean that the NSA encouraging people to use WPA over WEP, means theyve cracked it too!!!?
      Yes.

      Next question.
      --
      You are welcome on my lawn.
    70. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Torvaun · · Score: 1

      Presuming you're in the US, prisons on the other side of the planet aren't necessarily all that great about allowing you that lawyer anyway.

      --
      I see your informative link, and raise you a pithy comment.
    71. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      IANAL but it doesn't matter if they listen in on PGP. No need to encrypt. Client-Attorney communications are not allowed to be used in court. Neither are the results of searches based on such eavesdropping. Fruit of the poisonous tree and whatnot. I'm sure the lawyers are completely unaware of that. They probably just like to fly.
    72. Re:Security not just about encryption. by ceoyoyo · · Score: 2, Insightful

      In terrorism cases I don't believe you need to worry about things like "viable in court."

    73. Re:Security not just about encryption. by ceoyoyo · · Score: 1

      Strange. It's my luggage combination.

    74. Re:Security not just about encryption. by STrinity · · Score: 1

      What's the first rule of PGP? Your communications are only as secure as the private keys of yourself and the person you're talking to. If the government controls one of the machines used in the conversation, there's nothing PGP can do.

      --
      Les Miserables Volume 1 now up with my reading of
    75. Re:Security not just about encryption. by STrinity · · Score: 1

      Either the NSA decided they couldn't win -- which is frankly out of character for them -- or they found a way to crack it.
      Or the NSA's mission includes making sure that companies like Lockheed and Boeing have secure communications that can't be cracked by foreign governments.
      --
      Les Miserables Volume 1 now up with my reading of
    76. Re:Security not just about encryption. by timmarhy · · Score: 1

      they probably realised they don't need to crack pgp, they now have the power to spy directly on your PC which is a much softer target.

      --
      If you mod me down, I will become more powerful than you can imagine....
    77. Re:Security not just about encryption. by cgenman · · Score: 1

      Does anyone know if they've adapted CRT-style Tempest viewing to LCDs? Or if such a thing is even feasible?

    78. Re:Security not just about encryption. by The+Master+Control+P · · Score: 1

      I'm curious what the upper limit on the image resolution they can reconstruct by intercepting the RF emission from a CRT. Is it more difficult to recover the 160Mhz signal from my workstation monitor than it is to recover the 18-ish Mhz signal from an sdtv? And in any case, what's the quality look like? OK or utter shit? And what about the highest-end CRTs, that reach something like a 350Mhz pixel clock?

    79. Re:Security not just about encryption. by ceoyoyo · · Score: 1

      No encryption technique except one time pads is absolutely secure. And one time pads are only secure if you're VERY careful. So careful that most people/organizations screw up somewhere. So "the maths" side with PGP being breakable. Breakable by the NSA? Who knows. Considering most people's PGP password is probably "golf" or their birthday, and there are all sorts of excuses to seize computers, the encryption itself doesn't even have to be broken.

      WPA is almost certainly generally breakable by an organization with the NSA's resources. In many cases it's not even particularly hard to break by an individual (http://www.berghel.net/col-edit/digital_village/aug-05/dv_8-05.php).

    80. Re:Security not just about encryption. by 1u3hr · · Score: 1
      The question is whether the bizarre "lawyers dont no how to use teh computarz!!" spin of this story is justified.

      It's a question I wish the reporter had asked. I'm sure that PGP is secure. All the attacks -- keyloggers, etc, are a risk. But does that mean the lawyer never makes notes on any digital device? If he does, then sending such communications encrypted with PGP does not increase his risk of interception. A device with full disk encryption, that only connects to a network to send or receive email, could be dedicated to this fuction for the cost of a generic PC. But then he wouldn't get his frequent flier miles.

      And sorry, but I feel not the slightest sympathy for a lawyer who is paid to fly around the world business class and stay in 5-star hotels.

    81. Re:Security not just about encryption. by darkjedi521 · · Score: 1

      127.0.0.1 Have at me.

    82. Re:Security not just about encryption. by 1u3hr · · Score: 1
      e. Then, all of a sudden, they stopped resisting. Either the NSA decided they couldn't win -- which is frankly out of character for them

      When the code can be printed on a T-shirt, and freely downloaded from any number of foreign sites, it is perfectly reasonable to concede that you can't stop the "bad guys" from using it, so you are just wasting effort and hurting "good guys" by trying to.

    83. Re:Security not just about encryption. by thejaded1 · · Score: 1

      How the hell can they do that?

      In high school I had a friend that was an avid guitar player. I suppose he was very not tone deaf.

      He was able to figure out a particular password (forgot what it was for) on the family computer, just by listening to his father typing it in. Took a bit of trial and error, having to listen to each key, but he got it.

      So yeah, it's certainly plausible, and imagine what is possible with a multitude more resources at your disposal.

      --
      :wq
    84. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Note that Al Quieda also doesn't use PGP. They use extremely low bandwidth codes (a few dozen keywords) that are sent on websites, by personal courier or through randomly chosen cell phones. A lot harder to crack than PGP. I don't mean to be rude, but all the users of PGP I know are paranoid hackers with nothing to hide anyways.

    85. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Insightful

      It's more than that. A keyspace reduction of two bits out of a hundred isn't 2%, it's 75%. A keyspace reduction from 2^80 to 2^44 isn't "almost 50%" it's well over 99%.

    86. Re:Security not just about encryption. by perlchild · · Score: 1

      Actually, the onus of proof, as I understand it, in the US is higher, not lower, if the recording was made in the US. There are statutes that prevent some US organisations from listening to american's private conversations. If foreigners are involved, those restrictions no longer apply.

    87. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Roger+W+Moore · · Score: 1

      If the goddamn NSA can't snoop on an encrypted conversation between a lawyer & client, then frankly, they're not doing their job
      Really? I thought that in the US client-lawyer communication was protected by law. Forget the technical aspects of whether they can: if US lawyers are this convinced that the US government has zero respect for its own laws you guys are in a lot of trouble.
    88. Re:Security not just about encryption. by falconwolf · · Score: 1

      That's how the FBI got crucial evidence against Nicodemo Scarfo, Jr., son of former mob boss Little Nicky Scarfo, adding a hardware keylogger to grab his PGP password to allow them to decrypt his messages in concert with his private key, also copied at the time.

      Though I'm not sure it's this case, I think the FBI had to let him go because they didn't have a warrant or some such thing.

      Falcon
    89. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It seems you are having some difficulty with timescales, because while what you say is true, it is not of very much use. For example, suppose that the NSA can build some sort of hardware cracking devices that can test a trillion (~2^40) AES keys a second. If your key is 256-bits, this will take them 2^220 seconds. Of course, they can build many of such devices, so imagine they were to build a lot of them. A thousand trillion ought to do it, which would knock out another 2^43 out of the keyspace, leaving 2^173 possible keys. On average they'll have to try only half of these before guessing the right one, so let's say 2^172 seconds on average. That's 2^147 years. Good luck with that.

      Of course, if they know of some algorithmic weakness then that's a whole different ballgame, but there is no evidence of that.

    90. Re:Security not just about encryption. by init100 · · Score: 1

      NSA gotta have more sensitive equipment!

      Higher sensitivity is not always good, as it also brings more noise.

    91. Re:Security not just about encryption. by 1u3hr · · Score: 1
      f you already are going to fly there to securely exchange keys you might as well talk to the person.

      You only have to meet once to do that. TFA says: "for the last two years. Every few weeks, he boards a plane in Portland and flies to the Middle East". So he's gone about 100 times. 99 of these are redundant.

    92. Re:Security not just about encryption. by fyngyrz · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Would a recording outside of the US be viable in a US court?

      Do US courts seriously consider these issues any longer? The majority of the constitution is at best nod and wink territory these days. They tap whoever they want; they jail whoever they want; and as for admissible in court, who says it'll even get to court? Who says you'll even get a phone call? This isn't your father's USA.

      --
      I've fallen off your lawn, and I can't get up.
    93. Re:Security not just about encryption. by pipingguy · · Score: 3, Funny

      I'd rather take the airplane flight be more sure that I'm not getting bugged.

      And then the bastards will install a 3 year-old to kick your seat from behind, an incessant talker who loves chatting about lolcats next to you and a screaming infant in the seat in front just to bug you. You can't possibly win and they'll all be wearing a wire.

    94. Re:Security not just about encryption. by turing_m · · Score: 1

      "If it were my ass on the line, I'd assume that the NSA can crack PGP."

      That would be my guess too. They are about the last organization that would trumpet their ability to crack it. They have nothing to gain by doing so. In fact, judging by past wars governments do everything in their power to indicate that they can't decrypt communication, e.g. sending "scouts" to "see" enemy movement they knew was there all along.

      Ideally, any security organization wants everyone else to be using encryption it knows how to decrypt, while reserving the best possible encryption for its own use.

      Arguing about impossibility of cracking it is irrelevant - NSA can afford better mathematicians, better computer engineers to design the hardware, and can also afford to silence anyone who divulges secrets, making an example of a few from time to time. More so than any other organization I am aware of.

      --
      If I have seen further it is by stealing the Intellectual Property of giants.
    95. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      PGP = Pretty Good Privacy. Not prefect and certainly not NSA proof. The NSA has been in the game for years and has the largest and best server farm in the world and the bestest and brightest crypto-geeks on the planet. They have a printing press that prints money and access to the most secret tech. Or they have invented that tech.

      This I assume, pure speculation. I known no details and I do not *want* to know any details. I want to live.

      But I assume they can crack almost anything they want.

    96. Re:Security not just about encryption. by 1u3hr · · Score: 1
      Public key encryption can be broken by anyone with sufficient time and computing power. PGP, SSL, SMIME, et. al. are all inherently breakable.

      Really? Citation?

      Last I heard it would take till the heat death of the universe to do break PGP. But maybe you have a magical method. Maybe pigs can fly.

      http://www.philzimmermann.com/EN/faq/
      Q: I heard that the US Government would never allow PGP to be published unless there was a back door. Is there one? Come on, you can tell me, I won't tell anyone, really, I promise.
      A: Look, if you really feel the need to believe in conspiracy theories, here's an even better one: The government actually started these nasty rumors of back doors in PGP, because in fact they don't know how to break it. What better way to scare people away from using it? And you played right into their hands by falling for their clever rumors. Personally, I don't buy that theory either, because unlike some people, I'm not a conspiracy nut.

      http://axion.physics.ubc.ca/pgp-attack.html
      The Feasibility of Breaking PGP

      KeySize MIPS-years required to factor
      512 30,000
      768 200,000,000
      1024 300,000,000,000
      2048 300,000,000,000,000,000,000

      http://senderek.de/security/secret-key.protection.html
      How secure is PGP ?
      ... Theoretical attacks on PGP will be unsuccessful, as I will prove subsequently, because the use of RSA-keys of sufficient length makes it practically impossible to gain the user's secret key. The security of cryptographic methods is not merely based on religous faith but can be justified by the history of failed attempts to break them. As theoretical security is based on the results of recent research in the field of computer science it has to be constantly reviewed in the light of new knowledge....
    97. Re:Security not just about encryption. by RiotingPacifist · · Score: 2, Interesting
      No the maths sides with it being impossible to factorise by anything much better than brute force.
      Is PGP breakable by brute force on current hardware? even with NSAs resources this is unlikely.
      Has PGP been broken in the crytpographic sense, well given that mathmaticians cant get the maths sorted, unless you belive the NSA has a secret lab of mathmaticians that are years ahead of the rest of them, Hell no.
      Can 2GB (or whatever the upper limit is for a key) encryption be broken, again unless the NSA dedicate a cluster of supercomputers to every email (as PGP isnt broken) its unlikely.

      In some senses PGP is actually safer than one time pads, you use the same pad to encrypt and decrypt the message meaning there are two pads that could be captured, hell pgp keys can be used as improved one time pad. The only place where one time pads beat PGP is if your message is bigger than your encryption strength, but thats only because a one time pad is effectively one huge encryption.

      considering most people's PGP password is probably "golf" or their birthday, and there are all sorts of excuses to seize computers, the encryption itself doesn't even have to be broken. Theres a big difference between people being stupid and PGP being broken, as long as Im careful with my key (keep it on me at all times, and only use it on safe systems), in the absence of
      a) a bunch of supper mathematicians
      b) a huge amount of computing power (not feasible)(per email)*
      c) an even bigger amount of computing power (probably not even possible)(per PGP key)*
      encrypted emails sent to me can only be read by me.

      *in the case that the NSA are going to dedicate either of these to me, then I really have to wonder what Im doing to deserver all this attention.
      --
      IranAir Flight 655 never forget!
    98. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Yes; slashdot had a story a while back (I'm too lazy to find it). IIRC it's more the signal from the cable than from the monitor itself --- you're not entirely safe even if the monitor is off, as long as its cable is plugged in. (This is all from memory, though, and you should of course verify all of this yourself rather than trust an anonymous /. comment)

    99. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Arancaytar · · Score: 1

      PGP has no influence over what is attached to your keyboard or your monitor.

      So unless you use a real-time disk encryption and an invisible editor where you can tap in your message in morse code using the Space bar (hey Neal!) it's not really that secure.

    100. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Iamthecheese · · Score: 1

      You're reading it wrong. They put pressure on Congress to disguise the fact that they can read PGP from the start. You're naive if you don't realize that the government has a 15 year lead in every branch material and computer science. For example, our nukes have been tipped with carbon nanotubes for ten years.

      --
      If video games influenced behavior the Pac Man generation would be eating pills and running away from their problems.
    101. Re:Security not just about encryption. by el+americano · · Score: 2, Interesting

      I can think of a couple of reasons to meet face to face, but the vulnerability of PGP is not one of them. There are scientific reviews of the implementation, so it's disingenuous to characterize it as a fanboy technology. Besides, if you really doubted it, you could make a single trip to your client and set up a supply of unbreakable one-time pads.

      I think it's funny how willing some people are to speculate that US Intelligence agencies have superhuman powers. Haven't their obvious limitations dispelled the idea that nothing gets by them?

      --
      Those are my principles. If you don't like them I have others. -Groucho Marx
    102. Re:Security not just about encryption. by ettlz · · Score: 1

      I'm lead to believe that if you're using it properly, shy of someone making a working quantum computer, PGP is as good as unbreakable.

    103. Re:Security not just about encryption. by xstonedogx · · Score: 1

      help my mouse is moving itself
    104. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Ihlosi · · Score: 1
      NSA _can_ crack PGP, otherwise they'd be up in a tizzy about it being available to the general public.



      Then they can crack one-time pads, too ? Those are also readily available to the general public. Just not as convenient as PGP.

    105. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I read somewhere that the NSA was buying up companies like Hushmail and other security related companies. If this is true and they're buying certificate authorities, encryption probably won't if its being issued by a company that already has the key.

    106. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Antique+Geekmeister · · Score: 1

      It's a good question. I'd put the sensors in the ceilings near the common rooms, where wi-fi or network access is available to the prisoners. Then I'd buy one of these (http://www.sandstorm.net/products/netintercept/) to intercept and reconstruct all traffic, and pay attention to the non-encrypted traffic for email and web traffic. And I'd hack into the people's machines and steal their PGP keys, if I were willing to take the risks of discovery (which are pretty small, given that security attacks occur all the time against most publicly exposed systems).

    107. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Antique+Geekmeister · · Score: 1

      Yes, we're in a lot of trouble. Please go read the un-classified parts of the Patriot Act, and be very, very frightened.

    108. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      ..and if you're reading this then you're not doing your job.

    109. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Jah-Wren+Ryel · · Score: 1

      Actually you don't even have to call it a hunch. You can use all sorts of things in the course of an investigation that you cannot use in court. However, there are also all sorts of things that you can not use.

      For example, see the recent wiretapping scandal. One of the judges on the FISA court resigned in protest because he felt that the results of the illegal wiretaps were being used to justify follow-on FISA warrants -- in effect 'white-washing' the original illegally obtained information.
      --
      When information is power, privacy is freedom.
    110. Re:Security not just about encryption. by L4t3r4lu5 · · Score: 1

      Well hello there, Mr Bush!

      --
      Finally had enough. Come see us over at https://soylentnews.org/
    111. Re:Security not just about encryption. by L4t3r4lu5 · · Score: 1

      It's one of the fundamental rules of computer security; Physical access = Total access.

      --
      Finally had enough. Come see us over at https://soylentnews.org/
    112. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Then don't use a room: go on a long, unannounced walk in the park.

    113. Re:Security not just about encryption. by bickerdyke · · Score: 1

      Why would you need to exchange keys with a PUBLIC Key encryption system?

      --
      bickerdyke
    114. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Lincolnshire+Poacher · · Score: 1

      > unless you belive the NSA has a secret lab of mathmaticians that
      > are years ahead of the rest of them, Hell no.

      Hell, yes. You might like to familiarise yourself with the story
      of the DES S-boxes. NSA cryptologists were 20 years ahead of the
      field. It wasn't until the mid-1990s that differential cryptanalysis
      became known to public researchers and, no surprise, the mysterious
      changes that the NSA had recommended to the s-box design did indeed
      harden the cypher against this vector.

    115. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Assuming your comms are all subverted how'd you know it's his keys and not the CIA/NSA/FBI's you're getting?

    116. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      No carrier dude, no carrier.

    117. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      If someone has a 12-character password alpha-numeric password the keyspace is about 104^12. If you can determine when the shift key is pressed and which of the 4 rows of keys each character is in, you can make that 13^12, which is 36 bits less keyspace -- almost a 50% reduction over the original 80 bits. No it isn't. A 1 bit reduction in the keyspace would be a 50% reduction.

      A 36 bit reduction is a 1-1/(2^32) == 99.999999976716935634613037109375% reduction in the keyspace.
    118. Re:Security not just about encryption. by gadget+junkie · · Score: 1

      Anyway, who says the NSA can't crack PGP? Some crypto-fanboy showing off how much smarterer he is than lawyers who make no claim of security expertise and have a professional obligation to err on the side of caution?
      ...Of course, the NSA would vigorously deny being able to do that anyway.

      Apart from that, PGP-encrypted content is like an apple....leave it in the open too long and it rots away. no self-respectin' geek would use anything else than One time pads
      --
      "If a boss demands loyalty, give him integrity. But if he demands integrity, give him loyalty." (John Boyd, 1927-1997)
    119. Re:Security not just about encryption. by mcvos · · Score: 0

      Would a recording outside of the US be viable in a US court? We're talking terrorism here. Who cares about US courts?

    120. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Cal+Paterson · · Score: 1

      Does it have to be viable evidence in a court of law?
      Does that matter anymore? Lawyers and clients are probably worried about the US waterboarding; because there seems to be no requirement for a court case before you're waterboarded.
    121. Re:Security not just about encryption. by mcvos · · Score: 1

      This is exactly why smart people have invented the cryptophone. Well, it won't help against passive listening devices near the speaker, but it's very easy to take it with you to a place you think is safe.

      (By the way, one of the guys behind the cryptophone is Dutch hacker Rop gonggrijp, founder of a Dutch hacker magazine in the '80s, founder of the first Dutch ISP, organiser of international hacker cons, and currently activist against voting machines. Sounds like the kind of guy Slashdotters will like.)

    122. Re:Security not just about encryption. by hey! · · Score: 1

      True, but you don't have the scenario where the torturer is standing next to the prisoner with a cattle prod in his hand as the prisoner gets his email. The prisoner doesn't know whether it's actually his lawyer on the other end, and not an agent who has stolen the lawyer's key.

      Prisoners in terror cases probably don't even have the right to send and receive unmonitored email. Prisoners don't have the right to make unmonitored calls.

      Finally, you can't see that your client is haggard from sleep deprivation and rail thin from being starved and bruised from being beaten. The prisoner doesn't get the same reassurance that he hasn't disappeared into an anonymous void from exchanging emails.

      I'm not saying that cryptography doesn't have some application in these situations -- although perhaps more for the coordination of the defense than for communicating with prisoners. I'm saying there is no substitute for being there.

      --
      Post may contain irony: discontinue use if experiencing mood swings, nausea or elevated blood pressure.
    123. Re:Security not just about encryption. by mrogers · · Score: 1

      This isn't your father's USA.

      On the contrary.

    124. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Ahruman · · Score: 1
    125. Re:Security not just about encryption. by knewter · · Score: 1

      I was under the impression that TEMPEST was the name for the regulations that vital computer systems had to fall under so that *they* were not prey to Van Eck phreaking. Have I gotten the nomenclature wrong, or have you?

      Answer? You: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TEMPEST

      --
      -knewter
    126. Re:Security not just about encryption. by PalmKiller · · Score: 1

      Not to mention, if they did want to crack a PGP key, they would be able to use some of the fastest available, all they gotta say is they need it to crack a terrorist email.

    127. Re:Security not just about encryption. by PalmKiller · · Score: 1

      And yes, I know it will take a really long time to crack with the hardware that we know about...but if they don't do it exactly right, or if the government somehow knows something that might be in the text, and/or if they didn't use the right algorithm, it might just be possible.

    128. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The "50% reduction" is referring to using 50% of the number of bits, not the keyspace smartypants.

    129. Re:Security not just about encryption. by elrous0 · · Score: 1
      Most non-geeks would probably be about 1000x more likely to know the acronym "ESP" over "PGP." We take terms like "PGP" for granted here on /. But most of the world probably has only heard the term "encryption" in passing at best, and has absolutely no clue about specific software to do it.

      Lawyers are just laymen as far as we geeks are concerned (they probably think the same of us when we talk about legal issues).

      --
      SJW: Someone who has run out of real oppression, and has to fake it.
    130. Re:Security not just about encryption. by mrogers · · Score: 1

      How the hell can they do that?

      Two methods: the sounds of keystrokes and the intervals between keystrokes.

    131. Re:Security not just about encryption. by nahdude812 · · Score: 1

      With a PGP encrypted message, you have communications whose capture is almost guaranteed, and whose access may be compromised at a much later date if the client uses a compromised terminal to read one of these messages months later.

      With a physical meeting, you can sweep for bugs. You can know that unless the communications are captured in real time, they cannot be intercepted later. You can bring eavesdropping defeating devices (eg, a recording of a crowded room played loudly while you and your client converse quietly). You can require that some form of conspiracy must be made to eavesdrop on each occasion (installing listening devices requires physical access and knowledge of the meeting room in advance).

      With a physical meeting, there really are fewer points of attack than with electronic communications.

    132. Re:Security not just about encryption. by houghi · · Score: 1
      --
      Don't fight for your country, if your country does not fight for you.
    133. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Fmuctohekerr · · Score: 1
      I think you mean IBM. Differential cryptanalysis was discovered by IBM in 1974. IBM also invented DES. NSA approved, reduced the key size, and asked IBM to keep differential cryptanalysis a secret.

      It's funny that you point to a case where the NSA failed to keep some encryption technology developed by a public company a secret... as proof that they have a crack team of super mathmaticians hidden away somewhere.

      Not that I disagree with you. You just need a better example.

      A couple of things the NSA has going for it are lots of money, and power. So I figure they have whatever those things bring you. I can make a long list of things, from steam engines, the first computer, airplanes, fission, DNA, the first personal computer, not to mention... calculus... geometry... I could go on here... that caught the "government" by surprise. Throughout history, the governments of the world have proven themselves to be thugs... not enlightened scientists. IMHO.

      Not that the NSA couldn't brute-force your email, of course.

    134. Re:Security not just about encryption. by TheVelvetFlamebait · · Score: 0

      Basically, a well-resourced, determined attacker doesn't have to crack PGP itself.
      ... which the government certainly is not.
      --
      You know, there is a difference between trolling and pointing out the flaws in your reasoning. Just saying.
    135. Re:Security not just about encryption. by eth1 · · Score: 1

      Actually, if I was the FBI/NSA, I would be using your guaranteed absence as an opportunity to have free run of your house for a few days in order to thoroughly pwn it with other bugs.

    136. Re:Security not just about encryption. by canajin56 · · Score: 1

      Whoops, my hard drive crashed. And gosh darnit, I forgot to make backups. You know, I'd really love to cooperate; here's my PGP key... Now, what was the passphrase again?
      Good luck not going to jail for contempt of court and obstruction of justice. I'm sure some waterboarding will help you remember your passphrase. And remember, waterboarding is not torture since you only think you are about to die, but really are pretty likely to not choke and drown. Oh and it's also not considered cruel and unusual punishment either, because technically it's interrogation, not punishment!
      --
      ASCII stupid question, get a stupid ANSI
    137. Re:Security not just about encryption. by BVis · · Score: 1

      Seems like this one would be pretty obvious, especially given that you can now buy a computer capable of (at least) PGP for less than the cost of a plane ticket. Unless you're arguing that every single Linux distro, or every single computer sold, has a keylogger by the US government, it isn't going to happen.
      It might not have a keylogger on it out of the box, but 1) lawyers don't use (or know about) Linux, they use Windows, and 2) bearing 1) in mind, getting a keylogger onto a system is not beyond (technically or morally) the current government. (As an aside, I think I'd rather have my legs broken than try to explain Linux to a lawyer.)

      Whoops, my hard drive crashed. And gosh darnit, I forgot to make backups. You know, I'd really love to cooperate; here's my PGP key... Now, what was the passphrase again?
      That's called 'obstruction of justice' and 'destroying evidence'. "I forgot my passphrase" is much easier to prosecute; you're being compelled to disclose information pursuant (ostensibly) to a court order or other legal instrument. "I forgot" doesn't save you. You might prevent their access to the information on the drive, but you have to decide whether or not you're willing to be locked in a cell indefinitely for contempt of court to protect said contents. IANAL, are those separate charges or does the first cover both?

      --
      Never underestimate the power of stupid people in large groups.
    138. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Tell that to them when they get put into a van in the middle of the night and wake up in Gitmo.

      There's plenty that our government does outside the law.

    139. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You can have my IP!

      127.0.0.1

    140. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      > Is it possible that lawyers don't even know about PGP?"

      It is also possible the submitter doesn't even know the business value of face time with clients.

    141. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Kadin2048 · · Score: 1

      > If there's a microphone in the room, then meeting in person probably isn't much better.

      I think people are ignoring the real issue here. By meeting in person, the lawyer gets to charge a living shitload of money to fly over there, and bill all his travel expenses, etc.

      That's nice work if you can get it.

      It doesn't matter whether GPG would suffice; I doubt the lawyer would suggest that to his client, if the client is ponying up for First Class tickets and isn't looking at the expense receipts too closely ... why would he? If the client wants to be paranoid and can afford it, it's their money to burn. If that's how they're most comfortable, that's their business.

      Although there aren't the privacy implications, I've dealt with similar issues working as a consultant. There are lots of times when it would be entirely possible to conduct a presentation over video or audio teleconference. But if the client's willing to pay just to see my smiling face in person, I'm not going to argue. Just as long as I don't have to fly coach.

      --
      "Ladies and gentlemen, my killbot features Lotus Notes and a machine gun. It is the finest available."
    142. Re:Security not just about encryption. by LWATCDR · · Score: 1

      Tempest safe gear can be made pretty easily. A Faraday cage is a good start. Throw in some equal strength white noise and maybe a totally fake data signal and your all set.

      --
      See my blog http://ilovecookes.blogspot.com/ for light hearted technical information.
    143. Re:Security not just about encryption. by plague3106 · · Score: 1

      Which is why any evidence gathered from such a recording would be immediately thrown out. It really doesn't matter that they can do it, because in the end the court should not allow it. So.. what use is the recording then? Don't forget the "fruit from he poisoned tree" wouldn't (shouldn't) be allowed either.

    144. Re:Security not just about encryption. by MBraynard · · Score: 1

      It's worth pointing out that the government monitors these conversations for real reasons. Maybe you've heard of Lynne Stewart.

    145. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Martin+Blank · · Score: 1

      My use of TEMPEST in this case was incorrect, but the point still stands. It can be intercepted, and PGP makes use of a method to attempt to counter that.

      --
      You can never go home again... but I guess you can shop there.
    146. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Martin+Blank · · Score: 1

      He was found guilty in 2002 and sentenced to three years in prison, though I'm not entirely sure it was the same case, as the story broke in 2000. The FBI did have a warrant for the password interception, and it allowed them to enter as many times as necessary to install, monitor, and remove the surveillance mechanisms.

      --
      You can never go home again... but I guess you can shop there.
    147. Re:Security not just about encryption. by rtb61 · · Score: 1
      The lawyer in question is doing far more than just racking up frequent flyer miles, they a racking up huge numbers of extra billable hours, not only at the meeting but also in travel time, to and from the meeting.

      Why the hell would lawyers seek the far cheaper method, which means the client pays a whole lot less and the lawyers earns a whole lot less.

      Now if you could demonstrate how PGP will allow lawyers to rack up hundreds of extra billable hours they will of course all jump onto the bandwagon.

      --
      Chaos - everything, everywhere, everywhen
    148. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The "50% reduction" is referring to using 50% of the number of bits, not the keyspace smartypants.


      You're both right. The 50% reduction of the number of bits in the key-length is correct, but the "scarier" implication that there is a corresponding reduction in key-space that needs to be searched of over 99% is the staggering and important part to grasp.

      The key-length only really matters in terms of how secure the message is, which is in large part how difficult it is to search the key-space.
    149. Re:Security not just about encryption. by ceoyoyo · · Score: 1

      First off, the NSA isn't dedicating a supercomputer to you. They're dedicating a supercomputer to someone who is ALREADY an accused terrorist. Do you think they might get special treatment?

      There is no mathematical proof that factoring numbers has to be as hard as our brute force methods. It might be. It might not. We don't know. Has the NSA got a fast factoring algorithm? Probably not, but you never know.

      Yes, people being stupid is VERY relevant to the topic under discussion. The point is that even if the encryption is totally secure, which is far from certain, there are lots of other reasons why you wouldn't want to trust PGP.

      You'll also note that the NSA does have a bunch of super mathematicians AND a huge amount of supercomputing power. Also remember that even if whatever base encryption method you use with PGP is secure, it depends on little details like finding random numbers, choosing keys randomly, etc. Those are all little details that have been the downfall of a LOT of encryption implementations.

      Finally, even if PGP, the theory, the implementation AND the usage are all airtight, right now, if you're a terrorist sending encrypted e-mails to your lawyer you're going to want those messages to stay safely encrypted for the rest of your life. If someone builds a working quantum computer tomorrow, or fifty years from now, who do you think is going to be the first to deploy it on a large scale? The NSA maybe? Oh, and they just happen to have a convenient copy of your confession in the archives, naming all your co-conspirators.

    150. Re:Security not just about encryption. by mpeskett · · Score: 1

      Am I the only one who felt like reminding him that 127.0.0.1 is the loopback address?

      192.168.1.1 would probably be your router...

    151. Re:Security not just about encryption. by skintigh2 · · Score: 1

      I vaguely recall someone once made the analogue that using PGP for email was like having a letter delivered by armored car by armed guards and then left on your doorstep.

      You have to decrypt it to read it, so it exists unencrypted in RAM at the very least and can be read by other programs, possibly even long after you close the email. In addition, a camera in the room looking over your shoulder could read it, or someone using a "tempest" system could read the EM radiation from you monitor at great distance and read it that way.

      So, PGP is great to avoid the drift-net type of surveillance Bush authorized, but it wont stop a really determined government. But then again, for all the lawyer knows his face-to-face meetings are bugged, too.

      So, you both win, now kiss and play nice.

    152. Re:Security not just about encryption. by jonbryce · · Score: 1

      PGP may stop them from knowing what you are saying, but as far as I'm aware, it doesn't stop them knowing who you are saying it to.

      In some cases, knowing who you are talking to could be enough, and more important than what you are actually saying.

    153. Re:Security not just about encryption. by jonbryce · · Score: 1

      It lets them know where to look to find other evidence. Then they just tell the court they found the evidence and here it is. They don't have to say what prompted them to look there.

    154. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonamused+Cow-herd · · Score: 1

      I remember many years ago when PGP first appeared and how much effort the NSA put into trying to get Congress to stuff the genie back into the bottle. Then, all of a sudden, they stopped resisting. This was also pushed strongly by the FBI, particularly under Louis Freeh. I've often (very often, actually) come to the exact conclusion you have. Isn't it "funny" that the hoopla didn't begin again after 9/11? One would think that it would have re-ignited the crusade against strong encryption. Oddly, it didn't.

      The NSA is the largest mathematical research and code-breaking entity in the world, and somehow we're arrogant enough to think that our little homebrew scheme is nigh-on uncrackable. They've got the infrastructure, the manpower, and the intellectual concentration -- I would be scared if they hadn't cracked it by now.
      --
      -----[0_o]-----
      We are not amused.
    155. Re:Security not just about encryption. by jonbryce · · Score: 1

      To prevent a possible man-in-the-middle attack.

    156. Re:Security not just about encryption. by rootpassbird · · Score: 1

      Remember that we are talking about private discussions between lawyers and clients.
      Thats supposed to be highly confidential to start with. Well IANAL, but I see this client-attorney privilege going down in history as the worst thing in this century.
      Wait, I know its immense value for someone who is being framed and the lawyer can get him out of it. But seriously, think of it the other way round, the present legal system guarantees that 50% of all people working as laywers on cases are putting the client-attorney privilege higher than the constitution, social law, freedom of ordinary citizens, and what not.
      How does it always end up that the biggest of the crooks often get away due to the client attorney privilege?
      I mean, when someone as esteemed and powerful as a lawyer in one of the higher courts of law is trying his best to defend a horrible criminal, one can only wonder how much damage is being done...
      This and the fallacy that we call politicans "democratically elected **representatives** of people".
      These two are going to be the things kids in future civilizations will look up to parents and ask - "They used to do that, mommy?"
      "and nobody said anything against them?"
      That's gonna be as easy to answer as Copernicus was persecuted for going against the church.

      Can't think of bigger flaws in system design.
      --
      Hackers have long memories. It works both ways.
    157. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
      How long before the possession of a PGP key is grounds for landing on a DHS no-fly list?

      When I first read the submission title, I thought that was what it meant; that lawyers would rather avoid using PGP than get put on a no-fly list.

      Seemed reasonable too.

    158. Re:Security not just about encryption. by plague3106 · · Score: 1

      Courts ask how they got the information all the time. Even if the court doesn't, the accused's defense will certainly want to know where the information came from, and the evidence would be thrown out then.

    159. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Antique+Geekmeister · · Score: 1

      State courts do. Federal courts that can manage to get the case in front of them, do, but they're having real problems getting past the Department of Justice and 'national security' to hear the worst of these cases. And yes, it is your father's USA. If your parents are old enough, they lived through McCarthy-ism and the illegal harassment of Vietnam protesters and civil rights activists, and if they're really old or you have grandparent, they can tell you about what happened to the Japanese-Americans of World-War II. Every generation encounters this kind of abuse: some generations do better than others at stopping it.

    160. Re:Security not just about encryption. by 2short · · Score: 1

      "unless you belive the NSA has a secret lab of mathmaticians that are years ahead of the rest of them"

      Well, they do send recruiting letters to every Math grad from every fairly good college. I didn't respond to the one they sent me, so I can't tell you if they're putting them all to work flipping burgers in the cafeteria, but that's not my guess.

    161. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Pardon me if I'm wrong, but i thought that shortly after PGP encryption became popular for encrypting e-mails, the NSA etc began putting pressure on PGP to make the encryption decryptable by a 'master key' known only to government security agencies, and that all of a sudden when this version was ready, all previous versions of PGP instantly disappeared off the internet.

      Also from using open source software there are laws in the US preventing users from using the maximum security technology, and instead US users have to use weak master key able encryption in the US. I seem to recall this because the highest level of encryption for unix passwords the development is all being done outside the US because of the US cryptography laws.

    162. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Garridan · · Score: 1

      Uh. What's your proposed fix? That only innocent parties get lawyers? That'll work.

    163. Re:Security not just about encryption. by scott_karana · · Score: 1

      It's a moot point, if you live anywhere with key escrow laws.
      I'm looking at you, Britain.

    164. Re:Security not just about encryption. by scott_karana · · Score: 1

      Nobody knew that nukes were so close to being deployed until, you know, they were deployed.
      For all we know the NSA has worked out something faster than General number field sieve for integer factorization, or has quantum computers developed enough to the point that they can find cribs, or use related-key attacks, on otherwise infeasible problems. Incidentally, this addresses your point on computing power, which is overstated already because the NSA will KNOW who to tap, most of the time.

      Hell, and it's not like OpenSSL and various other crypto implementations haven't been completely vulnerable to side-channel and timing attacks, either. Auditable GPL code in the hands of a malicious, well-funded organization of mathematicians is a scary thought.

    165. Re:Security not just about encryption. by SanityInAnarchy · · Score: 1

      Remember, we're talking about lawyers here. You'd really have to make them completely disappear; otherwise, they're going to know all the reasons waterboarding is torture, and why they deserve a fair hearing.

      Also: People do, in fact, forget passphrases, and I wasn't suggesting that sarcasm actually be used.

      --
      Don't thank God, thank a doctor!
    166. Re:Security not just about encryption. by SanityInAnarchy · · Score: 1

      (As an aside, I think I'd rather have my legs broken than try to explain Linux to a lawyer.) You know, lawyers did draft the GPL. Some of them do, in fact, get it.

      "I forgot" doesn't save you. I don't really see why not, unless they can conclusively demonstrate that you'd used that passphrase frequently.

      But IANAL either.

      Hard drive crashing, though, you're right -- better to let them just beat their head against AES256 for awhile.
      --
      Don't thank God, thank a doctor!
    167. Re:Security not just about encryption. by BVis · · Score: 1

      You know, lawyers did draft the GPL. Some of them do, in fact, get it.
      You're right, there are exceptions. I guess I should have said 'average lawyer'. Ostensibly, however, I wouldn't have to explain Linux to someone who already knew about it, so anyone I'd have to explain it to would cause pain.

      I don't really see why not, unless they can conclusively demonstrate that you'd used that passphrase frequently.
      If they can prove you were logged into a system at the time an encrypted file/volume was accessed, IMHO they've got a strong case for proving you knew the passphrase. All they have to do is prove you knew it once, and then convince a (most likely computer illiterate) judge that you should still know it.
      --
      Never underestimate the power of stupid people in large groups.
    168. Re:Security not just about encryption. by VE3MTM · · Score: 1

      Indeed it is possible. Here's a paper describing the technique:

      http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/pet2004-fpd.pdf

      --
      09 F9 11 02 9D 74 E3 5B D8 41 56 C5 63 56 88 C0 Whoops, silly middle mouse button...
    169. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Jarik_Tentsu · · Score: 1

      If you're reading slashdot, then *you're* not doing your job.

    170. Re:Security not just about encryption. by Mjec · · Score: 1

      If the goddamn NSA can't snoop on an encrypted conversation between a lawyer & client, then frankly, they're not doing their job

      The NSA shouldn't be spying on US citizens in the US. And if they are, that can't be used in court. If you've already got a lawyer, you're protected by attorney-client.

      --
      "But everyone should know everything." -markab
  2. What so bad about meeting your lawyer? by pvt_medic · · Score: 1

    Of course, while PGP may solve some of these problems what is so bad about having some face to face time with your lawyer.

    --
    30% Troll, 50% Underrated, 10% Interesting
    Score:5, Troll
    1. Re:What so bad about meeting your lawyer? by JesseL · · Score: 1

      Nothing, If you've got more money than you know what to do with.

      The lawyers travel time and business class airfare are going on your bill.

      --
      "Prefiero morir de pie que vivir siempre arrodillado!"
    2. Re:What so bad about meeting your lawyer? by scaryjohn · · Score: 1

      Of course, while PGP may solve some of these problems what is so bad about having some face to face time with your lawyer.

      Nothing. Some encrypted e-mail correspondence might be cheaper, though. Which may explain why lawyers hesitate to go that route.

      Kidding. I suspect the reasons for not supporting e-mail encryption have less to do with bill padding and more to do with:

      1. Decision makers at law firms typically constitute the second-oldest generation on the scene and they tend to be the least tech-savvy working day-to-day.
      2. The most tech-savvy attorneys in a firm may not know about encryption.
      3. Stereotypes aside, firms don't want to train their staff in a new way to do things.
      4. Firms don't want to alienate their clients by demanding the clients use public key encryption.
      5. The web of communication from client to receptionist to secretary to paralegal to associate to partner could be irretrievably broken by any one of them having an outdated public or private key.

      But do those reasons justify never using public key encryption, or not making it an option for clients?

      --
      One might ask the same about birds. What ARE birds? We just don't know.
    3. Re:What so bad about meeting your lawyer? by CastrTroy · · Score: 1

      I don't know why the law firm couldn't just have a website set up, where clients could "email" their lawyer by submitting the message over SSL. It wouldn't be email per se, but you probably wouldn't want to use your regular email for information that requires such a high level of security.

      --

      Anthropic principle: We see the universe the way it is because if it were different we would not be here to see it.
    4. Re:What so bad about meeting your lawyer? by jsiren · · Score: 1

      Because the client's browser could be compromized.

      --
      Usage: km/h for speed (kilometers per hour); kph for very slow impulses (kilopond hours).
  3. Stupid summary ever by QuantumG · · Score: 1

    nuff said.

    --
    How we know is more important than what we know.
    1. Re:Stupid summary ever by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Actually, "stupid summary ever" isn't even plain English, you might actually want to say a little more for it to make sense.

      Not that I would expect intelligence from a fucking Slashdot subscriber.

    2. Re:Stupid summary ever by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
      Well, he did expand it by saying "nuff said." That made the meaning pretty clear to me.

      Asshole.

    3. Re:Stupid summary ever by stormguard2099 · · Score: 1

      stupid summary ever
      nuff said indeed
      --
      http://greenobyl.com/ please.... think of the children!!
  4. So where is the downside? by overshoot · · Score: 5, Insightful

    It's all billable hours, remember.

    --
    Lacking <sarcasm> tags, /. substitutes moderation as "Troll."
    1. Re:So where is the downside? by Pendersempai · · Score: 2, Insightful

      The downside is in the jet lag, waste of time, and inconvenience to both attorney and client. A criminal defense lawyer prominent enough to represent a wealthy Saudi defendant accused of terrorism likely doesn't have any trouble billing as many hours as he is willing to work. I assure you that this guy would much rather be working on an interesting legal problem than snoozing on an airport seat. I think your cynicism is going too far.

    2. Re:So where is the downside? by grassy_knoll · · Score: 1

      Exactly what I came here to say.

      When you think about it, if you bill by the hour any time efficacy ends up costing you money ( in terms of lost billable hours ).

      Now, if you can make up that lost revenue in terms of increased business ( possibly through undercutting the competition on price, although that can't last forever ) then it's worth the effort. If not, then you're cutting your own throat.

      Think I'll go throw up now... seems I'm channeling a PHB or something.

    3. Re:So where is the downside? by MaskedSlacker · · Score: 1

      But what about the shaggable office assistant?

    4. Re:So where is the downside? by story645 · · Score: 1

      It's a minimum of about 20hrs each way (http://www.sidestep.com/s/flightprogress.jsp?searchid=B$r8ynkpesBha6s0Q8hy), almost no nonstop flights, and in my experience flights out to the middle east seem to have a decent amount of families with little kids-and I don't think even first class is sound proof. Dunno, doesn't seem pleasant, even if it's billable.

      --
      open source modern art: laser taggi
    5. Re:So where is the downside? by PopeRatzo · · Score: 1

      You think most "terror" suspects are wealthy Saudis who have endless resources? First of all, most wealthy Saudis are friends of the Bush family, so they're never going to see the inside of an interrogation room.

      And do you really think lawyers who represent "terror" suspects are in it for the big bucks?

      --
      You are welcome on my lawn.
    6. Re:So where is the downside? by LearnToSpell · · Score: 1

      Isn't that the whole point of having an office in the first place?

    7. Re:So where is the downside? by MaskedSlacker · · Score: 1

      You misunderstand. I meant that yes the lawyer would prefer interesting work to jet setting. But what about the shaggable office assistant's preference? Surely paid vacations with sex are preferable to shuffling papers around the office. Or maybe I feel that way because I'm not a shaggable office assistant. And I don't have one.

    8. Re:So where is the downside? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It's all billable hours, remember.


      Wrong. The face2face meeting is billable and the cost of the flight will be charged. Apart from that there are no more billable units involved in this than staying home (ie. you bill for the amount of work you do on the case).

      Oh and I've never come across billable hours in the industry. We bill in 6 minute units, so you should write "it's all billable tenths of an hour."

    9. Re:So where is the downside? by LearnToSpell · · Score: 1

      Oh, right. Well, having a job sucks, I guess. :-) And if there are lawyers involved, somebody's getting screwed...

    10. Re:So where is the downside? by The_Crowder · · Score: 1

      I would agree with your point if you didn't use the example of "A criminal defense lawyer prominent enough to represent a wealthy Saudi defendant." Do you honestly believe that this prominent lawyer is flying coach class? This lawyer is flying on a private jet and spends absolutely no time on an airport seat. Most likely, the Saudi defendant owns the plane and sent it over for him or her to use.

  5. Really? by Conception · · Score: 1

    You have that much faith in PGP over the government's nearly unrestricted resources in surveillance? really?

  6. S/MIME, anyone? by danaris · · Score: 4, Interesting

    What is it with the Slashdot crowd and PGP? What's wrong with S/MIME?

    I can say with some authority, having been evaluating and testing it for my company for some months now, that it is natively supported by current versions of the 3 major email clients (Outlook, Thunderbird, and Apple Mail), and that their implementations are, by and large, compatible.

    So...are there any particular issues with S/MIME that make PGP a significantly more desirable solution?

    Dan Aris

    --
    Fun. Free. Online. RPG. BattleMaster.
    1. Re:S/MIME, anyone? by ScrewMaster · · Score: 4, Funny

      So...are there any particular issues with S/MIME that make PGP a significantly more desirable solution?

      Everybody hates a mime.

      --
      The higher the technology, the sharper that two-edged sword.
    2. Re:S/MIME, anyone? by Tacvek · · Score: 4, Interesting

      What is it with the Slashdot crowd and PGP? What's wrong with S/MIME?

      I can say with some authority, having been evaluating and testing it for my company for some months now, that it is natively supported by current versions of the 3 major email clients (Outlook, Thunderbird, and Apple Mail), and that their implementations are, by and large, compatible.

      So...are there any particular issues with S/MIME that make PGP a significantly more desirable solution?

      Dan Aris

      I think many Slashdot poster prefer OpenPGP encryption to S/MIME because OpenPGP is not email specific, and having 2 different keys (an S/MIME email key, and a PGP key) is not ideal. Further I suspect the PGP Web of Trust model is preferred by many of us to the CA model. Of course, there are ways around both things, but it may be slightly easier to use PGP for email than to deal with those issues. However, for your uses (depending on what they are), S/MIME may indeed be the best solution.
      --
      Stylish sheet to fix many problems in Slashdot's D3: https://gist.github.com/801524
    3. Re:S/MIME, anyone? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Clowns! Shit! RUUUUUUN!

    4. Re:S/MIME, anyone? by mechsoph · · Score: 1

      S/MIME requires going through a CA to get your key signed. PGP's web-of-trust makes more sense for individuals.

    5. Re:S/MIME, anyone? by Sentry21 · · Score: 1

      And they're terrible things to waste.

    6. Re:S/MIME, anyone? by peacefinder · · Score: 1

      I love S/MIME, and it's great for practical commercial security. It's good enough for the exchange of HIPAA-protected data, IMHO, and I'm kinda paranoid about that.

      But if I were up against an intelligence agency, I would not trust S/MIME. (Nor PGP, for that matter.)

      --
      With reasonable men I will reason; with humane men I will plead; but to tyrants I will give no quarter. -- William Lloyd
    7. Re:S/MIME, anyone? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Informative

      Who controls the certificate authority that issues the certificates? You have to place trust in a third party to certify the people you are communicating with. With PGP and the web of trust, you are responsible for verifying signatures. This means you can be as stringent (require ID, although who says you can trust it) or as relaxed (sure, the fingerprint matches what's on this website or the keyserver) as you would like to be.

    8. Re:S/MIME, anyone? by Hatta · · Score: 2, Funny

      You're right. S/MIME is a terrible thing to waste.

      --
      Give me Classic Slashdot or give me death!
    9. Re:S/MIME, anyone? by danaris · · Score: 2, Interesting

      Who controls the certificate authority that issues the certificates?

      In our case, me :-)

      We're just using Microsoft's PKI (yeah, I'd rather use something OSS, but requirement #1 is that it work well with Outlook, and I wasn't able, with my limited experience, to get anything else set up to do so...), so the certificate authority is one of our servers. Naturally, it means that anyone who wants to be able to use & trust our user certificates is going to have to install our CA certificate, but that's the price of getting it all for free...

      Dan Aris

      --
      Fun. Free. Online. RPG. BattleMaster.
    10. Re:S/MIME, anyone? by Chandon+Seldon · · Score: 4, Interesting

      OpenPGP software allows you to easily self-generate valid keys. Doing the same with S/MIME (self-signing certificates) is really obnoxious. Further, OpenPGP clients tend to support a web-of-trust introduction model which is strictly better for actual security than the centralized commercial PKI model that S/MIME software tries to force on users.

      For sending secure messages within a medium to large sized organization there is some argument for S/MIME using a local CA, but even then simply emulating the same effect with a organization PGP key signer and key server is probably cleaner.

      --
      -- The act of censorship is always worse than whatever is being censored. Always.
    11. Re:S/MIME, anyone? by ccharles · · Score: 1

      Since when is Apple Mail among the top three mail clients? Lotus Notes, as awful as it is, is probably the second most widely used corporate email client behind Outlook. Apple Mail may (or may not) be more popular among home users, but it's probably business users who are most concerned with encryption.

    12. Re:S/MIME, anyone? by dpilot · · Score: 2, Insightful

      S/MIME has a single point of failure - the CA. They can be presented with a warrant, or worse still, a National Security Letter, and your privacy is all gone.

      The Web of Trust of PGP doesn't give anyone else your private key. It only gives attestation to your identity. Even if one of your contacts was wretched villainous scum he can't compromise your key, the worst he can do is issue transitive trust (ab)using your trust of him.

      --
      The living have better things to do than to continue hating the dead.
    13. Re:S/MIME, anyone? by danaris · · Score: 1

      S/MIME has a single point of failure - the CA. They can be presented with a warrant, or worse still, a National Security Letter, and your privacy is all gone.

      The CA maintains a copy of your private key? Are you 100% certain of this?

      My understanding of the way it worked was that the CA *generated* the private key, and, more importantly, signed the certificate and keypair for you, but that only you (and anyone you're dumb enough, or trusting enough, to give it to) actually has a copy of the private key...

      Not that that's really a practical issue in my case, because, as I mentioned in another reply, the CA is us, so if we get served with a subpoena or what have you, we can fight it to whatever degree we deem appropriate.

      Dan Aris

      --
      Fun. Free. Online. RPG. BattleMaster.
    14. Re:S/MIME, anyone? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Web-of-trust is retarded nerd shit that nobody actually uses.

      PGP is better for individuals and adhoc applications because you can generate your own keys without dealing with certificates.

    15. Re:S/MIME, anyone? by bockelboy · · Score: 3, Informative

      That is correct. I work in an organization which deals exclusively in certificates (everyone also encrypts with S/MIME). The CA does not keep the private key.

      If the NSA compromises your CA, the best they can do is create another certificate which pretends to be yours. If the destination already had your certificate, then the public key they have won't match your private key.

      The grandparent needs to review PKI.

    16. Re:S/MIME, anyone? by Michael+Wardle · · Score: 1

      As far as I can tell, there's no easy way to get somebody's public S/MIME key. With PGP, all you need to know is their email address and your mail client looks it up for you.

    17. Re:S/MIME, anyone? by SillyNickName · · Score: 1

      The CA does not keep the private key.
      And how do you ensure that? Without some way to ensure that, it seems to me that you are practicing "faith based" security.
    18. Re:S/MIME, anyone? by beat.bolli · · Score: 1

      So...are there any particular issues with S/MIME that make PGP a significantly more desirable solution?

      For one, you don't need an PKI (with the associated hassles). But, of course, if you're working in an enterprisey environment, this'll be the only way to go...
      --
      Karma: none (due to not believing in reincarnation)
    19. Re:S/MIME, anyone? by pipingguy · · Score: 1

      Everybody hates a mime.

      That's a meme.

    20. Re:S/MIME, anyone? by dkf · · Score: 1

      Everybody hates a mime. I thought that was specific to the Patrician. Seems not.
      --
      "Little does he know, but there is no 'I' in 'Idiot'!"
    21. Re:S/MIME, anyone? by ModMeFlamebait · · Score: 1

      The CA does not keep the private key.
      And how do you ensure that? Without some way to ensure that, it seems to me that you are practicing "faith based" security. Because they never see it? They don't generate it, as somebody upthread said. You hand them a CSR (certificate signature request, essentially the public key) and they send you a certificate (public key + signature). Never ever do they get to see your private key.
      --
      Pavlov. Does this name ring a bell?
    22. Re:S/MIME, anyone? by ModMeFlamebait · · Score: 1

      The CA maintains a copy of your private key? Are you 100% certain of this?

      My understanding of the way it worked was that the CA *generated* the private key, and, more importantly, signed the certificate and keypair for you, but that only you (and anyone you're dumb enough, or trusting enough, to give it to) actually has a copy of the private key...

      No, nobody gets to see your private key. When you're e.g. buying an SSL certificate, you generate a key pair plus a CSR, which contains the public key and other data, like your name (cert subject). Then you send only the .csr file to the CA. They have no business knowing your private key and it's only your problem if the signed CSR (i.e. a certificate file) doesn't match your key.
      --
      Pavlov. Does this name ring a bell?
    23. Re:S/MIME, anyone? by jrumney · · Score: 1

      Nope. The way it works is that you generate a private/public keypair, then you send the public key to the CA as a CSR (certificate signing request). The CA never needs to see your private key, and signing it would be pointless, as noone other than yourself needs to be convinced of its authenticity.

    24. Re:S/MIME, anyone? by jrumney · · Score: 1

      That assumes that you only trust PGP keys that you yourself have verified. In that case you can achieve the same level of trust by running your own CA. The difference comes when you need to trust a wider range of keys. In the PGP model, you have to trust your contacts to be as vigilant about checking the identities of others as you yourself are. In the S/MIME model, you trust one third party to have consistent checking policies, and generally the more you pay the more thoroughly they will check.

      Which model you prefer generally comes down to how paranoid you are about government spying and other issues arising out of centralised control. For terrorists and those that communicate with them, there is probably good grounds for preferring PGP, out of fear that a CA might issue fake keys to government agencies to allow them to trick you into sending them info. For others, the scenario of fake keys is far more likely to be a problem with PGP where you are trusting random people to verify others' identities. There was a case some years ago where Mickey Mouse was found to be only two or three degrees of separation away from Linus Torvolds in the PGP web of trust, demonstrating the flaws that appear when you try to scale PGP beyond those you immediately trust.

    25. Re:S/MIME, anyone? by dpilot · · Score: 1

      Thank you for the information. Most of us, myself included, don't really understand how PKI works.

      Part of the problem is that it SHOULD be widespread, even pervasive. But it's sufficiently expensive that it's limited to businesses. Most people would look at the expense and wonder why the heck they should spend that much money, when their email "works" as it is. Others know why, but it's still a lot of money, and go with PGP. Then some of us try PGP, and don't have enough friends that care or understand, and our keys wither with only a few signatures.

      --
      The living have better things to do than to continue hating the dead.
    26. Re:S/MIME, anyone? by betterunixthanunix · · Score: 1
      For me, it is the fact that some CAs have lax policies about which keys they will sign. For example:

      http://weblog.infoworld.com/udell/2004/03/23.html

      Granted, this vulnerability can be mitigated by other email clients...but Outlook is pretty popular, especially among non-technical users.

      --
      Palm trees and 8
    27. Re:S/MIME, anyone? by anwyn · · Score: 1

      If you ask for both encrypted and signed, PGP signs first then encrypts. This is the correct order, they can't see the signature unless they can decrypt. S/MIME does it in the wrong order so that everyone can see the signature. This is perfect for government agencies that want to do traffic analysis. It is so obviously wrong that the only explanation is that government agencies applied pressure to get it done that way.

    28. Re:S/MIME, anyone? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      S/MIME has a single point of failure - the CA. They can be presented with a warrant, or worse still, a National Security Letter, and your privacy is all gone. WRONG! The CA doesn't have your private key. It may have your public certificate but that's about it.

      Who the hell modded this up?

      S/MIME is a world recognized standard. PGP is a hack Zimmermann did in his basement because there wasn't anything else.
    29. Re:S/MIME, anyone? by An+ominous+Cow+art · · Score: 1

      It's always 'mememe' with you, isn't it?

    30. Re:S/MIME, anyone? by reiisi · · Score: 1

      Unfortunately, all too often, the applicant sends both keys. A good CA will send them back, since the private key has already been compromised.

      Some CAs are willing to generate the key pair for the customer, apparently not caring that the private key thus generated is already compromised.

      --
      Computer memory is just fancy paper, CPUs just fancy pens with fancy erasers; the 'net is just a fancy backyard fence.
    31. Re:S/MIME, anyone? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Why it is wrong? I think it's quite good for businness use for mail server to see that it routas a authentic, signed message, rather than a false message.

  7. Must be thinking that by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    You never know what other people are capable of...

  8. Government by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    You do realize that PGP is only Pretty Good Privacy. I daresay the NSA would consider a terrorist case something worth spending a little computing power on in case the defendant spills something they could use. So Pretty Good isn't going to stop them...

    1. Re:Government by snl2587 · · Score: 1

      Good luck with that. "Pretty Good" is more tongue-in-cheek than fact...I don't think you could crack it by brute force during your lifetime.

      That being said, PGP is only safe if both people are capable of avoiding surveillance techniques. Otherwise, no amount of encryption will help. The smart lawyers probably already know/have been told this.

  9. Other considerations by Derling+Whirvish · · Score: 4, Funny

    But instead of talking about the technological solutions, the lawyers fly half way across the world to meet with their clients. There are other considerations involved. Similar to how TV News anchors somehow manage to find stories to report on in the Caribbean that require their personal presence during the worst months of North American winters.
    1. Re:Other considerations by motorbikematt · · Score: 1

      Actually this is closer to the truth. Why not get a possible vacation, fine dining, and a possible trip to the strip club, all on your clients' dime? Wasn't Larry Spitzer a lawyer?

    2. Re:Other considerations by Alpha830RulZ · · Score: 1

      A strip club? In Saudi Arabia? Is that where you get to see some hot ankle? RTFA.

      --
      I was taught to respect my elders. The trouble is, it's getting harder and harder to find some.
    3. Re:Other considerations by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I did read the article, smartass. I was making a comment about lawyers and business travel in general.

  10. Err... by The+Ancients · · Score: 1

    Has the submitter not heard about billable hours?

  11. Perceived Security vs Actual Security by Bazar · · Score: 1

    Something I've learnt a bit from business.

    Perceived security is a lot easier to sell and profit from then actual security.

    Unless their clients are nerds themselves, they are not going to understand, let alone trust what PGP does.

    Every client understands how much harder it is to listen in on a face to face talk. They appreciate that, and that kind of appreciation is also billable.

    --
    To avoid criticism; Say nothing, Do nothing, Be nothing.
    1. Re:Perceived Security vs Actual Security by BiggerIsBetter · · Score: 1

      Every client understands how much harder it is to listen in on a face to face talk. I think every client has a better understanding of the concept of listening in on a face to face talk, not that it's any harder. Old fashioned bugs work just fine, and if the parties are visible, there is potential for lip reading (possibly via recording), parabolic mics, laser reception of air vibrations on window surfaces, etc. IMHO, it's really *not* harder to listen in the old fashioned way.
      --
      Forget thrust, drag, lift and weight. Airplanes fly because of money.
    2. Re:Perceived Security vs Actual Security by RiotingPacifist · · Score: 1

      In fact id go further and say compromising a secure system (e.g a an EEE you keep on you at all times) is a lot harder than listening the old fashioned way.

      --
      IranAir Flight 655 never forget!
  12. LOL by EdIII · · Score: 1

    Is it possible that lawyers don't even know about PGP?"


    No, they probably do. They just ALSO know the amount of billable hours it takes to "fly half way across the world" to meet their clients.
  13. Erm... by mobby_6kl · · Score: 1

    They're just aware of all the CIA backdoors.

    \me adjusts tinfoil hat

  14. Slow to adopt by dreamchaser · · Score: 1

    I know quite a few attorneys, and for some reason cuturally many of them are very slow to embrace technology. Most of them still prefer faxes over emails, and I can see encryption taking a long, long time to get any kind of adoption in the legal community.

    That doesn't mean all lawyers by any stretch, but many really do seem to be a bit hidebound with regards to adopting technology.

    1. Re:Slow to adopt by LeadLine · · Score: 1

      This does not pertain only to lawyers. Over half the country is like that. It does get irritating, does it not?

    2. Re:Slow to adopt by dreamchaser · · Score: 1

      I at least finally got my own attorney to trade documents via email. Important stuff we do in person, but simple, not very sensitive stuff he will send back and forth for revision/approval.

    3. Re:Slow to adopt by Bieeanda · · Score: 1

      Faxes make their own paper trails.

  15. NEVER trust a computer by kentsin · · Score: 1

    basically, a computer is build with speed in mind, no trust is being considered when design the whole thing.

    Never trust the computer.

  16. Encryption not the answer here... by Compuser · · Score: 2, Insightful

    I would not trust encryption in this case. You are dealing with an agency or agencies capable of gaining physical access to your computer so the only security worth a lick is guarding yourself against planted mics and the like and keeping it all in your brain. Sounds like the lawyers are doing their job properly.

  17. PGP won't help them... by fatjesus · · Score: 1

    ... once the RSA gets a quantum computer. http://slashdot.org/articles/01/12/20/006228.shtml WHo knows? They may already have one.

    1. Re:PGP won't help them... by Constantine+XVI · · Score: 1

      I'm pretty sure Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman would like one, but what do we care what they do with it?

      --
      "I think an etch-a-sketch with an ethernet port would beat IE7 in web standards compliance."
  18. Face to face means something by Fluffeh · · Score: 1

    You can get a person to say a lot of thing face to face that they will never say over an impersonal email - no matter how encrypted.

    --
    Moved to http://soylentnews.org/. You are invited to join us too!
  19. Are you dumb? by Reality+Master+201 · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Since the government's willing to bug communications, what's going another step and snagging the prisoner's password with a keylogger? Or snagging decrypted text from memory, or any one of a slew of things you could do with a lot of money, time, and complete access to one end of the connection.

    Hell, they could just torture the password out of the prisoner - turns out that the Land of the Free and the Home of the Brave does that kind of thing now.

    1. Re:Are you dumb? by alfredo · · Score: 1

      The NSA can crack just about anything you can throw at them. If I was a lawyer I not trust any electronic transmission with any client in US custody. Where you meet will be bugged. Big brother doesn't believe in fair trials. To them it is a privilege, not a right.

      --
      photosMy Photostream
    2. Re:Are you dumb? by LeadLine · · Score: 1

      The point of leaving the country is so that the client doesn't have to enter the US, where he would be put in jail. He's currently free, from what I've read.

    3. Re:Are you dumb? by MyDixieWrecked · · Score: 1

      Hell, they could just torture the password out of the prisoner

      this is what deniable encryption is all about.

      --



      ...spike
      Ewwwwww, coconut...
    4. Re:Are you dumb? by SolidAltar · · Score: 1

      Hell, they could just torture the password out of the prisoner this is what deniable encryption is all about. Deniable encryption isn't worth anything when your captors have no morality or reason to stop torturing you.
    5. Re:Are you dumb? by MyDixieWrecked · · Score: 1

      Well, all the more reason to use deniable encryption. At least you have something to give them rather than just denying having anything.

      --give them a password to some portions of data, but not others, etc. If they're going to keep torturing you anyway, it doesn't matter.

      --



      ...spike
      Ewwwwww, coconut...
    6. Re:Are you dumb? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      At a certain point it doesn't matter if you already gave them the deniable key. If they keep torturing you you will eventualy give them the real key in the vain hope they will stop.

  20. Where I work by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Informative

    Not specific to the article but anyway...

    I work at a law firm that is considered in the top 25 as far as firms go. We are also ranked in the top 10 in terms of providing technology to the lawyers.

    We have probably 3 out of 1000 lawyers that have used PGP for business purposes. For those 3, it was because the client requested it. PGP is a PITA in a law firm environment. Lawyers get paid to practice law, not to use technology. Communications between lawyers and the client is not between Joe Client and Jim lawyer, it is between Joe Clients group of 20 people and Jim lawyers group of 20-500 people including third party processors, litigation support teams with their applications, paralegals, etc....

    Even with the current offerings of commercial PGP applications and integration into Outlook, it does not work easy with that many people.

    What many large firms and large clients do is use TLS integrated into the outgoing/incoming email. The path out and in is secured. It is seamless to the lawyer and client.

    1. Re:Where I work by Blahbooboo3 · · Score: 1

      But what about the other servers the emails pass through on the way to the destination? I don't think TLS will apply to those servers so the email isn't secured?

    2. Re:Where I work by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Specific configurations on the TLS server for each client that we communicate with TLS. Sounds hard but since it has somewhat become a "standard" with law firms, the finer details have been worked out.

  21. PGP&Co not useful this time by niteshifter · · Score: 1

    Encryption is not the answer for them - good old fashioned lips-to-ear is (the interview room is bugged).

    Consider: The laptop / PDA / cellphone is subject to search going and coming. Also consider they can be compelled to divulge password / keyfiles or face the ire of the Court and that assumes conventional doctrines apply (and that's dubious). This is not a typical legal setting, this is the Bush Administration's ball game - they own the field, the bat, the ball, the glove ...

    1. Re:PGP&Co not useful this time by PopeRatzo · · Score: 1

      this is the Bush Administration's ball game - they own the field, the bat, the ball, the glove .
      And after seeing the 60 Minutes interview with Supreme Court Justice Scalia last night, you could say they also "own the umpires".
      --
      You are welcome on my lawn.
  22. Communication more than just writing by mrbluze · · Score: 5, Insightful

    If you take into consideration that communication (as we are told) is 70% non-verbal, then any half decent lawyer will make sure he/she is able to see the client face to face. It is impossible to take a good history from a person if you can't see them, let alone hear their voice.

    Given this fact, it is not a surprise that lawyers want to meet their clients. Yes and there are limitations to PGP that won't ensure privacy especially when you are opening lines of communication in an already hostile environment. There are things you just can't know unless you are physically there.

    --
    Do it yourself, because no one else will do it yourself. [beta blockade 10-17 Feb]
    1. Re:Communication more than just writing by Pendersempai · · Score: 3, Informative
      That's an interesting theory, but shot down in the first two paragraphs of the article:

      PORTLAND, Ore. Thomas Nelson, an Oregon lawyer, has lived in a state of perpetual jet lag for the last two years. Every few weeks, he boards a plane in Portland and flies to the Middle East to meet with a high-profile Saudi client who cannot enter the United States because he faces charges here of financing terrorism.

      Mr. Nelson says he does not dare to phone this client or send him e-mail messages because of what many prominent criminal defense lawyers say is a well-founded fear that all of their contacts are being monitored by the United States government.

    2. Re:Communication more than just writing by ozbird · · Score: 1

      I'm sure being able to charge for your travel time and expenses had nothing to do with their preference to fly. No siree...

    3. Re:Communication more than just writing by mrbluze · · Score: 2, Funny

      What? You expect me to read the full article? This is Slashdot, remember!

      --
      Do it yourself, because no one else will do it yourself. [beta blockade 10-17 Feb]
    4. Re:Communication more than just writing by MaskedSlacker · · Score: 1

      In Slashdot, we kick the enemy messengers into a pit of spam email rather than earth and water.

    5. Re:Communication more than just writing by nomadic · · Score: 1

      I'm sure being able to charge for your travel time and expenses had nothing to do with their preference to fly. No siree...

      Trust me, for the vast majority of lawyers, especially ones successful enough to land high profile clients, the jet lag isn't worth it. And any halfway successful firm has more business they can handle at any given time, they don't need to rack up hours by flying to Saudi Arabia, they can just work on domestic stuff.

    6. Re:Communication more than just writing by tepples · · Score: 1

      If you take into consideration that communication (as we are told) is 70% non-verbal, then any half decent lawyer will make sure he/she is able to see the client face to face. It is impossible to take a good history from a person if you can't see them, let alone hear their voice. Is there a limitation of common webcams that makes it impossible to use PGP to encrypt the audio and video sent over the wire?
    7. Re:Communication more than just writing by mrogers · · Score: 1

      Is there a limitation of common webcams that makes it impossible to use PGP to encrypt the audio and video sent over the wire?

      It's not impossible, but it's complicated enough that a prudent lawyer shouldn't risk it. For a lawyer to experiment with encryption during a terrorism investigation is as rash as for a geek to experiment with novel legal defences during a murder trial.

  23. Mod this story troll by bperkins · · Score: 1

    It's an interesting story but a very silly title.

    The type of security that you need to ensure a very interested US government from monitoring you is not affordable in this case.

    PGP would make the government's job a great deal more difficult, but the physical security needed to prevent the feds from inserting some sort of eavesdropping device on either end of the communications channel is not affordable to your average terror suspect.

    1. Re:Mod this story troll by OldFish · · Score: 1

      I think a small palmtop that has thoroughly documented HW could be turned into a moderately secure device that used a general purpose PC as a gateway to the standard channels. Plaintext only ever visible on the dedicated device.

  24. Extra: Lawyers don't want to go to jail... by Actually,+I+do+RTFA · · Score: 2, Insightful

    How would that play out?
    An e-mail:
          Attn Client,
    Please download PGP in violation of US export control laws.
                Your accomplice,
                      your lawyer

    Or maybe tell them in person, and then use PGP to communicate, indicating that you knew and ex post facto helped them pay off their violataion US export laws.

    Fact of the matter is, is is illegal to get encryption software to some parties as individuals, and some countries in mass. And I'm sure the clients referenced in the article are on the verboten list.

    --
    Your ad here. Ask me how!
  25. Time one planes is billable hours ... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    In fact, nowhere in the article is encryption even mentioned. Is it possible that lawyers don't even know about PGP?

    Is it possible that lawyers look at the time on these planes as billable hours?

    1. Re:Time one planes is billable hours ... by kiosky · · Score: 1

      of course...

    2. Re:Time one planes is billable hours ... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The question is not about encryption. It is about the ability of the government subpoena everything and anything including encryption keys. A face - face meeting in a foreign land will not have written notes and rely on a oral testemony.

    3. Re:Time one planes is billable hours ... by RiotingPacifist · · Score: 1

      Client-Lawyer confidentiality means that the government cant subpoena anything.

      --
      IranAir Flight 655 never forget!
    4. Re:Time one planes is billable hours ... by Antique+Geekmeister · · Score: 1

      This is utter nonsense. Such privilege is not absolute, and never has been: the circumstances under which it can be violated differ from state to state, but there are numerous cases of such privilege being overwhelmed by other needs.

  26. It's not that lawyers are stupid. . . by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    It's not that attorneys are too stupid to figure out how to download and install pgp; it's that they can charge billable hours, travel time, travel expenses (marking up the travel costs, of course!), per diem, and so forth.

  27. Very Tricky Business Indeed by OldFish · · Score: 1

    I've been writing SW for almost 30 years. I would never trust a general purpose computer as a means of secure communications. It could be used as a gateway for a specialized device. And as for face to face, I wouldn't even trust that without the Cone of Silence.

  28. You forget the real reason - lawyers are greedy by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Lawyers are experts at spending other people's money and living the good life on everyone else's money.

    Why would it surprise anyone that a lwyer would rather fly? It's not like they're paying for it in the end anyway.

  29. Summary is flamebait. by MMC+Monster · · Score: 2, Insightful

    Encrypting correspondence only works if the end points are secure. If your fears of the government spying on you are based in fact, your computer is effectively compromised already.

    Between hardware keyloggers, low-level virtualization, and good old fashion espionage, it would be difficult to impossible to keep data hidden from the feds if they had the timeframe needed to run a case through the courts.

    --
    Help! I'm a slashdot refugee.
    1. Re:Summary is flamebait. by v1 · · Score: 1

      keep data hidden from the feds if they had the timeframe needed to run a case through the courts.

      and what part of that are we seeing less and less of in today's Amerika?

      --
      I work for the Department of Redundancy Department.
    2. Re:Summary is flamebait. by RiotingPacifist · · Score: 1

      Face to face correspondence only works if the meeting points are secure. If your fears of the government spying on you are based in fact, your room is effectively compromised already. At the end of the day the lawyers are flying out because that's what lawyers do, a face to face meeting is a lot more effective than email correspondence, and these lawyers will charge the client anyway, so they couldn't care less about the cost. If the government are spying on you, which is easier, compromising your computer or following you, given that they have your flight numbers.
      --
      IranAir Flight 655 never forget!
    3. Re:Summary is flamebait. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Which computer? Oh the government/military owned computer in the Gitmo prison?

      The original submission was dumb.

  30. Mimes? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    > What's wrong with S/MIME?

    Where can you find enough mimes for that? The last mime I saw was in Final Fantasy.

    [...]

    Well, that and in my wild youth, I was a mime for a short amount of time. But only because I needed the school credit! I just hope that that one snapshot never surfaces.

    Speaking of which, if any of you guys have a picture where a mime accidentally ran in front of your camera, please burn it and don't forget to destroy the negatives! Ex-mimes everywhere will thank you!

  31. You can't expense a PGP file in email by jafiwam · · Score: 1

    A nice trip around the world on the customer's dime however, that is a sacrifice they will make to obtain justice!

    (all of the following above has been sarcasm)

  32. ethics violation by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    it's called losing your law license b/c paralegal/secretary screwed up + malpractice suit

  33. PGP isn't really safe in that context by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    If you have access to the lawyers computer you can theoretically easily obtain his public key + passphrase.

    The same goes for his client, how can you know that his public key + passphrase isn't already well known?

    when you work with secrets it's best to not have anything written or logged.

    meeting someone at a safer random location is probably gonna give you maximum confidentiallity.

  34. A face to face meeting is just as insecure. by MrSteveSD · · Score: 1

    Here in the UK, there was a big fuss recently over the police bugging an MP while he visited one of his constituents in prison. In these kind of cases you have to assume you are being bugged too. That's not to say that covert communication is impossible. If a lawyer took a pad and pencil with him, they could communicate buy writing on that and keeping it close to their chest.

  35. The reason isn't technology by jgarra23 · · Score: 1

    Lawyers are social people by trade & by lifestyle, the better representative will go meet his client f2f because that is what's most important, not privacy and pgp bullshit.

  36. It's the money, stupid by ortholattice · · Score: 1

    If the lawyers can bill for their flight time, it's an easy way to bill extra hours. Years ago I heard the story of a lawyer who billed 25 hours in one day, because his red-eye flight crossed time zones. (This was from a friend of a lawyer who heard the story from another lawyer, so I can't really vouch for its validity or whether the billing was accepted, but my friend delighted in telling it and thought it was hilarious.) So why would they bother with PGP and reduce their income?

    1. Re:It's the money, stupid by Whatsthiswhatsthis · · Score: 1

      (IANAL, but ask me again after I take the bar in July.) That's not an entirely implausible story. If you fly across time zones such that you're sitting on the same date for more than 24 hours, then you could theoretically bill for more than 24 hours in one day. More likely, however, was that the lawyer billed one client for his time in the air (travel time) and then billed another client for the time spent in the air working on the other client's matter. This may be unethical in some jurisdictions, and it would certainly be frowned upon.

    2. Re:It's the money, stupid by MaskedSlacker · · Score: 1

      If you legitimately billed 25 hours for time zone crossing you would lose the gain on the return trip (meaning that the extra hour is just a time accounting artifact, not a real gain in billable hours).

    3. Re:It's the money, stupid by MulluskO · · Score: 1

      Unless you had another stop to make before returning home such that you go around the earth.

      Dallas > London > Tokyo > Dallas (maybe)

      --

      Too busy staying alive... ~ R.A.
  37. What makes you think they are permitted to encrypt by plover · · Score: 4, Insightful
    Imprisoned suspects don't have the right to free communications, and especially not encrypted communications. The only privacy they're assured of (in the United States) is if it's a letter going to an attorney; but how is the warden to know for sure that huey.dewey@dewey-cheatham-and-howe.com is really the public key belonging to a licensed attorney, and not the aliased public key of Emmanuel Goldstein or Osama bin Laden?

    Even if they knew this for sure, the jailer is under no obligation to provide access to PGP or even a computer, and he would likely be an idiot if he did provide PGP to the inmates.

    --
    John
  38. They dont trust anything with a wire, smart by posys · · Score: 1

    They, like the mob, do not trust anything with wires or electronic in general... Pretty smart if you ask me... Except of course if you are not up to anything... http://roboeco.com/Lets-Get-on-With-it

    --
    The Future is already here, just unevenly distributed... THE ROBOTIC WAGELESS ECONOMY NOW! http://RoboEco.com/slash
  39. Of course they thought about it. Not good enough. by peacefinder · · Score: 1

    "But instead of talking about the technological solutions, the lawyers fly half way across the world to meet with their clients. In fact, nowhere in the article is encryption even mentioned. Is it possible that lawyers don't even know about PGP?"

    When you're up against the FBI, CIA, and NSA - which he presumably is - even PGP is not good enough. S/MIME? Forget it*.

    PGP is a great way to protect messages in transit. But the problem here is not the security of the message in transit, it's the security of the message at every stage from composition to delivery, in both directions.

    For example: Is the lawyer confident that his own laptop is private? He shouldn't be. Barring the laptop remaining in his sight at every moment from the time he took the case until this moment, there's the possibility that a sneak-n-peek has compromised his private keys, or that someone has even installed a keylogger. And did you notice that even the Ninth Circuit has now allowed laptops to be searched by border guards without evidence of a crime?**

    Now consider that the lawyer's own laptop is probably the more secure end of the connection.

    No. PGP is not good enough. In a case like this, he's right to do everything live and in person.

    [*: The NSA is in a position to monitor S/MIME certificate exchanges with your key authority. Willing to bet your client's life or freedom that they can't they break the key delivery session?]
    [**: '"We are satisfied that reasonable suspicion is not needed for customs officials to search a laptop or other personal electronic storage devices at the border," Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain wrote (PDF) for the unanimous panel.' And this from the most liberal federal circuit.]

    --
    With reasonable men I will reason; with humane men I will plead; but to tyrants I will give no quarter. -- William Lloyd
  40. How my conversation went... by DnemoniX · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Several years ago now I set up a PGP server at work, mainly for my own use. However it was suggested that our attorney's might like to use it. Here is how the conversation went:

    "Hey I just finished setting up an encryption system for the e-mail system"

    "A what?"

    "Encryption, you know to keep your corrispondence confidential..."

    "A what what?"

    Then about 5 years later I rolled out an automated encryption system that uses lexicons to detect patterns and auto encrypt e-mails if they trip the filters. That conversation with the attorney's went like this.

    "You put in a what and why?"

    A lengthy explanation later filled with examples of when they should be using it. Finally the lawyer who had just spent a few days at a HIPPA conference sees the light. DING DING DING Clueless I swear.

    1. Re:How my conversation went... by Actually,+I+do+RTFA · · Score: 4, Interesting

      inally the lawyer who had just spent a few days at a HIPPA conference sees the light. DING DING DING Clueless I swear.

      Don't confuse your specialized knowledge with common knowledge. Your phrasing assumes that encryption, as a word, conjures up images as it would in a geek's mind (and more than five years earlier than now, when it was less well known.) Obviously they explained it better at the HIPPA conference.

      Really, I doubt had I not already know what encryption, or the ease of e-mails being read by third-parties, I would have gained nothing from your explaination.

      A possible alternative: It is easy for any third party to read your e-mails. Encryption uses a password (or automatic process) on both ends to make sure that only you and your recipients can read the e-mail. It also verifies that the person who claims to have sent the e-mail did, since falisifying the sender of an e-mail is also very easy.

      --
      Your ad here. Ask me how!
    2. Re:How my conversation went... by defile · · Score: 1

      How about... "Lets install a lock icon in your email so you when you see the lock it means no one else was able to read the message on it on its way in and it also means the name of the sender wasn't forged. Same deal goes for messages you send out."

    3. Re:How my conversation went... by lena_10326 · · Score: 1

      Don't confuse your specialized knowledge with common knowledge. Your phrasing assumes that encryption, as a word, conjures up images as it would in a geek's mind (and more than five years earlier than now, when it was less well known.)
      Adding to that comment.

      One of the attributes of a good IT professional is the ability to speak to non-IT professionals in a language they can understand. That requires learning to translate geakspeak to commonspeak on the fly. If one isn't able to master that, they generally don't progress in the organization because usually the people who make those promotion decisions are not technology people.
      --
      Camping on quad since 1996.
    4. Re:How my conversation went... by DnemoniX · · Score: 1

      Actually my post was considerably paraphrased. My explanations were quite detailed and put into laymans terms citing several examples. The problem was that it took actual user intervention and they did not see any value in that. The first time I implemented a solution was pre HIPPA, after that was enacted and violations actually came with rather stiff financial penalties did it finally get their attention. Mainly because those violations are impossible to fight in court and they know it. When I asked what would happen if we were cited for a violation the response from the attorney was that we bring along our check book. So really the problem was apathy until it cost them money.

  41. So would I by CSMatt · · Score: 1

    Given the choice between the ability to fly and being allowed to encrypt my e-mails, I would choose flight. If I really need to say something in private, I could just fly over to the person's house. The amount saved in gas bills is well worth it.

  42. Ob Simpson's Quote by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Worst. Summary. Ever.

  43. typical geek mindset by lawpoop · · Score: 3, Insightful

    This sounds like a typical geek solution: Jump latest and greatest technology.

    However, if I were a lawyer, I would stick with the time-tested method of ensuring privacy, rather than risk my client's confidentiality with some new-fangled technology that I don't understand. Do I have it installed right? What if it gets hacked?

    Heck, I'm a computer guy and I don't understand PGP. I do in the biggest sense; but not enough to pass my own judgment on how well it works. I have to rely on the opinions of people who are smarter than me. Suppose they discover a new kind of math tomorrow that renders PGP useless?

    --
    Computers are useless. They can only give you answers.
    -- Pablo Picasso
    1. Re:typical geek mindset by SanityInAnarchy · · Score: 1

      Jump latest and greatest technology. That would be S/MIME, if you just like new and shiny things.

      PGP is 17 years old. GnuPG is 9 years old. This is pretty mature stuff.

      Suppose they discover a new kind of math tomorrow that renders PGP useless? Then, chances are, we'll all know about it. More importantly, lots of people are trying, and in very public ways, and not getting very far -- short of a quantum computer, it's pretty unbreakable.
      --
      Don't thank God, thank a doctor!
    2. Re:typical geek mindset by lawpoop · · Score: 1

      PGP is 17 years old. GnuPG is 9 years old. This is pretty mature stuff. Why, PGP is almost old enough to vote! Quite mature. Meanwhile, meeting to discuss in private is thousands of years old.

      Suppose they discover a new kind of math tomorrow that renders PGP useless? Then, chances are, we'll all know about it. More importantly, lots of people are trying, and in very public ways, and not getting very far -- short of a quantum computer, it's pretty unbreakable. So, if it breaks tomorrow, and somebody has a copy of your PGP communiques over the past year, they can suddenly read all of them? Meanwhile, if Unfrozen Caveman Lawyer was meeting in person and writing his notes, his notes are still private, right?

      People understand physical security. They don't understand digital security.
      --
      Computers are useless. They can only give you answers.
      -- Pablo Picasso
    3. Re:typical geek mindset by jimthehorsegod · · Score: 0

      Suppose they discover a new kind of math tomorrow that renders PGP useless? More to the point, what if they discovered a new kind of maths, yesterday?
    4. Re:typical geek mindset by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Better still, what if they invent a new kind of math?

    5. Re:typical geek mindset by jimbob666 · · Score: 1

      People understand physical security. They don't understand digital security. Hit the nail right on the head there.
    6. Re:typical geek mindset by SanityInAnarchy · · Score: 1

      Meanwhile, if Unfrozen Caveman Lawyer was meeting in person and writing his notes, his notes are still private, right? Notes? Sounds easily compromised. Put those notes in a laptop, at least, with an encrypted hard drive.

      People understand physical security. They don't understand digital security. Quite right, and your "if it's broken tomorrow" comment serves to prove that.

      Let me clarify that: You may very well know what you're talking about. In absolute terms, you're right that an intercepted PGP communication should be considered compromised if PGP is ever broken.

      My point is that it hasn't, in 17 years, and the math behind it is older than that. They won't be going after the crypto.

      In the real world, unlike in the movies, people don't "crack the code" -- instead, they go after the weakest link.

      In this case, PGP or not, the weakest link is the physical room. And your caveman lawyer doesn't know it yet, but there exist computers -- running full webservers -- which can fit comfortably in an Ethernet socket. If they want that data badly enough to seriously tackle RSA, they have probably already bugged you so thoroughly they'll know every time you sneeze, and they've got daily and weekly histograms of your farts.

      I suppose my point there is that people don't really understand physical security, either. They just plain don't understand security, and this goes for me, too. In the case of lawyers, this likely has much more to do with the same things that keep them using faxes instead of email -- simple stubborn Luddism.
      --
      Don't thank God, thank a doctor!
  44. Encrypted != Unrecorded by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Insightful

    The advantage of saying something and not having it be recorded is that it can never be subpoenaed. And if it was never recorded, it can never be cracked, spied, or leaked.

    There are conversations I have in non-recorded form for just this reason.

    Encryption is only as good as cracking isn't, and also as good as the physical security of the consumers. Cracking has historically improved, and the ability to spy has also improved.

    Which isn't to say that the conversation in person is safe - but it is more safe than the recorded conversation of email - which has to be not encrypted at the producer and consumer ends, and which may be decrypted more than once at either end.

  45. Re: by clint999 · · Score: 0

    I would not trust encryption in this case. You are dealing with an agency or agencies capable of gaining physical access to your computer so the only security worth a lick is guarding yourself against planted mics and the like and keeping it all in your brain. Sounds like the lawyers are doing their job properly.

  46. Plus perks by EmbeddedJanitor · · Score: 1

    Plus minibar, out of town expenses and an excuse to take the shaggable assistant to an out-of-town location for a few days.

    --
    Engineering is the art of compromise.
  47. Still applies... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Most of the reasons people say PGP is not useful still apply if the data is on the same computer. If it is compromised... your already screwed.

    Then again PGP involves getting the client to install and use it. And the face to face with the layer on large matters is probably preferable for the client.

  48. It's all fair game by Sir+Holo · · Score: 2, Informative

    Any communication outside of the US is fair game to get intercepted by the NSA under the USA PATRIOT Act. Especially if one end of the conversation is an accused enemy of the state.

    These would probably be the first guys on the NSA's list of folks to snoop on.

    You can bet the lawyers handling these cases are, however, aware of the implications of a violation of attorney-client privilege, and would appeal if concrete records of such monitoring ever came out.

    1. Re:It's all fair game by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Any communication outside of the US is fair game to get intercepted by the NSA under the USA PATRIOT Act. Last time I checked, anything inside of the US is fair game too.
    2. Re:It's all fair game by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The lawyers for El Aramain, fighting a warrantless wiretapping case, appealed on just those grounds: they might be violating attorney-client privilege in discussing defense with their clients. The feds prosecuting "wouldn't confirm or deny" that they were listening in. So much for that.

  49. Clients Do Not Trust Computers by sampson7 · · Score: 4, Insightful

    You are thinking like nerds instead of lawyers. More importantly, you are neglecting the human element.

    The lack of internet security is not why attorneys visit their clients in person. It is because their client will tell them things face to face that they would never say over a telephone or video conference, no matter how secure. Assuming that the lawyer trusted the technology, do you think the client is going to? I've had corporate clients practically whisper things to me in perfectly secure conference rooms when it is clear that nobody is listening in. Why? It's human nature. Now take a terrorism suspect, who likely is not that well educated and has a legitimate fear of being spied on, and tell him to speak clearly into the microphone. Do you seriously think that is going to work?

    Moreover, lawyers -- the good ones anyway -- are half poker player. When we interview clients, we are looking for "tells" and evaluating everything the client says. Not only to determine if their client is telling the truth (sometimes it doesn't matter), but to determine if their client _looks like_ they are telling the truth. There is no way that you could ever evaluate whether to put a witness on the stand without seeing them in person. (Not that it matters in these cases where a jury trial is exceedingly unlikely, but still.) These human factors are every bit as important to properly representing your clients as knowing the law.

    1. Re:Clients Do Not Trust Computers by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      YANAL, so shut the fuck up.

    2. Re:Clients Do Not Trust Computers by sampson7 · · Score: 1

      My bar membership says differently -- but thank you for playing.

    3. Re:Clients Do Not Trust Computers by justinlee37 · · Score: 1

      Any high school kid who has done competitive mock trial could tell you all of this, so shut the fuck up, troll.

    4. Re:Clients Do Not Trust Computers by zerj · · Score: 1

      It probably doesn't help that PGP stands for "Pretty Good Protection" either. To the technically illiterate pretty good doesn't sound very impressive and leads to the client asking why don't you use something better.

  50. A more appropriate tech solution is needed by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    They should not only meet in person.
    They need to bring along their own portable Cone of Silence TM.

  51. Re:Of course they thought about it. Not good enoug by hyades1 · · Score: 1

    Very nicely put. I find it touching how much faith computer-oriented people tend to have in their machines and software. The plain fact of the matter is that most security breaches and failures of confidentiality occur as the result of good, old-fashioned sneakiness and duplicity, coupled with misplaced trust and human error.

    --
    I've calculated my velocity with such exquisite precision that I have no idea where I am.
  52. Re:Extra: Lawyers don't want to go to jail... by SanityInAnarchy · · Score: 1

    Which is why most crypto software is developed outside the US nowdays -- because there's nothing against importing crypto, only exporting it.

    --
    Don't thank God, thank a doctor!
  53. Don't carry priviledged documents by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    DHS will seize those because even if they're attorney-client privileged, they might be hiding something illegal! I wonder if it even helps if you have a diplomatic immunity.

  54. Re:What makes you think they are permitted to encr by xZgf6xHx2uhoAj9D · · Score: 1

    Do imprisoned suspects have the right to send encrypted letters (of the ink-and-paper variety) to an attorney? If so, encrypted emails should be fair game. After all, your objection doesn't seem to be with the encryption per se, but rather that the email is actually being routed to a lawyer. It wouldn't be difficult for the warden to ensure that the email is going where it's supposed to go, regardless of whether it's encrypted.

  55. Re:Of course they thought about it. Not good enoug by SanityInAnarchy · · Score: 1

    Barring the laptop remaining in his sight at every moment from the time he took the case until this moment, there's the possibility that a sneak-n-peek has compromised his private keys, or that someone has even installed a keylogger. That's actually pretty reasonable to guard against, and given that the laptop would presumably be locked, someone would need to be alone with it for an extended period of time.

    And did you notice that even the Ninth Circuit has now allowed laptops to be searched by border guards without evidence of a crime? A laptop can be had for less than that plane ticket, so you don't have to take that particular one overseas.

    Now consider that the lawyer's own laptop is probably the more secure end of the connection. If so, you have to assume that the other end of the connection is probably much more thoroughly bugged physically than either of their computers are electronically.
    --
    Don't thank God, thank a doctor!
  56. Re:Extra: Lawyers don't want to go to jail... by Actually,+I+do+RTFA · · Score: 1

    Which is why most crypto software is developed outside the US nowdays

    But PGP still is subject to those laws. Interestingly, I read somewhere where a textbook on cryptography was exported to a forbidden country. The CD with the binaries was confescated, but the book, with compliable source written out, was allowed.

    I agree with the spirit of the law, but it seems unenforcable.

    --
    Your ad here. Ask me how!
  57. Of course Lawyers know... by carnivorouscow · · Score: 1

    they know that travel time is billable, encryption isn't and that most people are comforted by proximity.

  58. Re:Of course they thought about it. Not good enoug by Pendersempai · · Score: 1

    And this from the most liberal federal circuit.] Eh. Probably true, but easily overstated. The Ninth Circuit has 28 judges from places as far-flung as Hawaii and Idaho. It takes only three judges to make up a panel, so you can end up with some extremely conservative permutations. Really, the most noteworthy aspect of Ninth Circuit jurisprudence is how politically unpredictable it is, since so much can turn on which three judges you draw. It makes for extremely fractured jurisprudence, as each panel tries to distinguish the facts of its case from those of the last panel so as not to be bound by it.
  59. if money is not an object by notoriousE · · Score: 1, Insightful

    If I had some very classified information that was super-important, $1000 or less for a round trip ticket to anywhere in the world would be money well spent.

    --


    And then there was E
  60. NSA and law-abiding Lawyers... by Hucko · · Score: 1

    Am I the only one wondering why the lawyers need to 'hide' their conversations from the NSA? I mean, what do they have to hide?

    --
    Semi-automatic amateur armchair Australian philosopher; conjecture ready at any moment...
    1. Re:NSA and law-abiding Lawyers... by Dr.+Donuts · · Score: 1

      If I was a lawyer, I would feel the need to 'hide' my conversations from anyone except those who I am conversing with.

    2. Re:NSA and law-abiding Lawyers... by SeaFox · · Score: 1

      No, but you are the only one who thinks the NSA should get to listen to whatever it wants.

    3. Re:NSA and law-abiding Lawyers... by MaskedSlacker · · Score: 1

      Hello Mr NSA troll. How is DC this time of year?

    4. Re:NSA and law-abiding Lawyers... by Hucko · · Score: 1

      Woah up. As an Australian, I have been listening to USA (as well as our own) legalese bring down laws that suggest if you don't have anything to hide, it doesn't matter who observes your actions. I'm all for privacy, and what is good for the goose is good for the gander; yes?

      --
      Semi-automatic amateur armchair Australian philosopher; conjecture ready at any moment...
    5. Re:NSA and law-abiding Lawyers... by falconwolf · · Score: 1

      Am I the only one wondering why the lawyers need to 'hide' their conversations from the NSA? I mean, what do they have to hide?

      Ever hear of Duty of confidentiality? Lawyers have the same duty as doctors and priests. Now let's turn that on it's head, "what does the FBI, NSA, and government in general have to hide? Other than how they misusing their power?"

      Falcon
  61. Since when... by Pasajero · · Score: 1

    do we expect lawyers to understand technology? It's like water and oil.

    OTOH, there might be a legal reason on using crypto tools with a suspected terrorist. You know, one might not want to teach underdeveloped countries how to use weapons or technology against western civilization...

  62. IANAL, but... by Whatsthiswhatsthis · · Score: 4, Insightful

    But I am about to graduate from law school in a few days, so hear me out. Lawyers are a risk averse bunch. If you tried to tell a lawyer to use PGP (and the lawyer actually knew what PGP was), in the back of his mind he's thinking, "How is this going to nail me? How is this going to lead to a malpractice lawsuit? How is this going to get screwed up and cost me my career, my reputation, or my client's ass?" The answer is that we just don't know. What lawyers can and do trust is face-to-face communication.

    Until PGP becomes widely adopted outside the legal context (and it hasn't), lawyers are not going to be the first to adopt it. The reasons proffered above--that the government can break PGP or tap into the end-users' computers--may be true, but I doubt they are the reasons lawyers don't use PGP.

    Also, while I would concur with most of the comments about lawyers padding billable hours, in these cases it's probably not about that. Suspected terrorists likely don't have the kind of cash that typical corporate clients do. Many of these lawyers are working for suspected terrorists (especially those in Gitmo) on a pro-bono basis. Ahkmed from a tent in Afghanistan probably couldn't afford a lawyer in his country, much less one from the United States.

    1. Re:IANAL, but... by MaskedSlacker · · Score: 2, Insightful

      The people accused of financing terrorism, like the aforementioned Saudi client DO have the kind of cash that typical corporate clients do.

    2. Re:IANAL, but... by Miseph · · Score: 2, Interesting

      Indeed, I am taking a course taught by a lawyer who is working with some people in Guantanamo Bay and I know that he flies down there frequently to see his clients (one of my papers has the smudges and small airplane grit to prove it, he did some grading on the flight). He's working pro bono because the people he is representing have no money at all, although I believe his actual expenses are being covered, at least in part, by various funds and groups (he's the ACLU representative for his county). Even if he could trust the Gitmo guards (who think it's funny to do things like turn around the legally mandated signs indicating which direction is east so that the prisoners will be tricked into breaking their religious tenets...) not to break into any encrypted files or otherwise illegally observe their communications, there just aren't any computers at all for the clients to use.

      Most terrorism suspects aren't Saudi billionaires living in comfortable modern homes in the Middle East, most of them are dirt poor and either holed up in some dark dirty corner of the globe or stuck in the world's largest and most paranoid prison complex. PGP just won't work for these people.

      --
      Try not to take me more seriously than I take myself.
    3. Re:IANAL, but... by Whatsthiswhatsthis · · Score: 1

      If I were an accused Saudi billionaire, I'd want my lawyer physically holding my hand.

  63. Erm by felipekk · · Score: 1

    IANAL but god dammit I would rather fly. Specially super-man style!

  64. Maybe they just want the frequent flyer miles? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    or they want to run up their travel expenses? /ducks

  65. billable time? by FriedSpam · · Score: 1

    I don't like lawyers, and the cynical part of me says that the flight may be 'billable time'.

  66. PGP in the legal field by atomic-penguin · · Score: 2, Insightful

    I would say there are 3 big reasons PGP is not used widespread in the legal community. I'm not trying to make a broad generalization about all lawyers, some are in fact quite computer literate. This is just a few observations I've made working with lawyers.

    1) Not all attorneys are technically inclined. Many do not even use technology outside of the scope of a cell phone or PDA. There are usually support staff available to law firms to do the typing and technological heavy-lifting. There are attorneys who have done things a certain way their entire career, and are reluctant to change their ways quickly. Unfortunately, software and training costs may be viewed as expenses rather than assets to the firm. After all, it is the legal staff bringing in the revenue, not the I.T. department.

    2) Not only do the attorneys and legal staff need to be aware of technologies such as PGP, but clients would also have to be aware of such technologies to take full advantage of them. Training both legal and support staff on such technologies is time consuming, and may not fit into a busy attorney's schedule. Even if the legal and support staff are up to speed, you still have the hurdle of training clients on such technologies. How do you go about training clients in your firm's privacy policies in respect to e-mail?

    3) Billable hours... Resources and time spent on a case can be billed to the client. That means a firm can bill more time on paper for traveling/flying than sending an e-mail.

    I think PGP will see more common adoption in the legal world, eventually. As far as I know, attorneys have to do continuing education credits to maintain their state bar status, so training is certainly encouraged. Privacy becomes a major issue when one of the parties, in a CC'ed e-mail, blindly hits reply-all to a sensitive e-mail. It is only a matter of time before more firms adopt more stringent communication policies.

    --
    /^([Ss]ame [Bb]at (time, |channel.)){2}$/
  67. Law and the free market: by AtlanticCarbon · · Score: 1

    There isn't much of a free market in the legal field. You have to be admitted to the bar to practice law and the bar is pretty hard to get into (I'm not just talking about the test but the process of going to school for seven years and jumping through a bunch of hoops.) The reason it's so hard is not to protect legal consumers, but to keep competition out. What does this have to do with technology? Just like any market that is insulated and closed, the legal market doesn't innovate. I would estimate that billions of dollars are wasted each year in the legal field because of a lack of moderization. Yes, there are times when face-to-face is necessary (like to meet your client), but each day thousands of lawyers spend time and money traveling to court, talking into tape recorders, and copying documents when they could be video-teleconferencing, typing, and using pdfs. This is probably true of a lot of industries but it is worse in the legal industry because it it protects itself from competition.

  68. They like to fly... by Palal · · Score: 1

    It's possible that they're mileage runners from flyertalk.com who like to earn miles. A mileage runs is flying only for the sake of earning miles and getting status with an airline

    --
    -Palal
  69. Encryption keys might not be privileged by harlows_monkeys · · Score: 1

    Option 1. You visit your client in person, carry out a conversation, and come back. The government asks what you talked about, and you refuse to talk, citing attorney client privilege. End of story.

    Option 2. You engage in PGP email exchange with client. Government tries to subpoena the encryption key from you, but does not ask for the emails themselves. You say no. You now get involved in a long court fight over whether or not attorney client privilege covers the keys.

    Option 1 seems the better way to go.

    1. Re:Encryption keys might not be privileged by TheLink · · Score: 1

      Option 3. You not knowing better use the same password for most stuff (including dialling up to the ISP). Government then gains access to your laptop (or steals it).

      Option 4. You not knowing better use the same key for both talking to clients and for doing "allegedly illegal" stuff. Government then subpoena's your passphrase+key for that "allegedly illegal" stuff.

      Option 5. You knowing better, use different PGP keys for different cases and scenarios. But of course you're then unlikely to be a lawyer, much less a lawyer who has rich Saudi clients accused of financing terrorism.

      Don't forget the client also has similar problems, why should the client jump through hoops (e.g. use PGP)?

      The client pays the bills, if clients require lawyers to use PGP, the lawyers then use PGP. This client requires the lawyer to fly halfway round the world, so the lawyer does that.

      --
  70. Re:Of course they thought about it. Not good enoug by peacefinder · · Score: 2, Interesting

    "That's actually pretty reasonable to guard against, and given that the laptop would presumably be locked, someone would need to be alone with it for an extended period of time."

    Oh, I dunno. Unless you're using an encrypting drive, worst case - for the attacker - is long enough alone with it to physically pull the hard drive, clone it, and button the case back up. A couple hours tops, for a well-rehearsed operation. (How good is the laptop's security while you're asleep?) A better case is to boot it in firewire target mode, snarf up the relevant files for analysis and/or execute a scripted keylogger install. Or if you're really paranoid, maybe you'd wonder if they can just pop in bootable media and install a custom keylogging bios (crafted just for your machine) in five minutes flat. Hard to say.

    Of course all these attacks have countermeasures - bios passwords, drive passwords, no firewire, truecrypt, keeping the laptop under your pillow at night - but to be really thorough would be pretty inconvenient, and still wouldn't protect against simple theft of the whole laptop for leisurely analysis of past secrets.

    "A laptop can be had for less than that plane ticket, so you don't have to take that particular one overseas."

    So you're leaving the one with the actual secrets on it back in the office, then? See above. :-)

    "If so, you have to assume that the other end of the connection is probably much more thoroughly bugged physically than either of their computers are electronically."

    True. But if you assume that level of surveillance on the other end, it wouldn't be safe for your client to use a computer there either, would it?

    As has been said often by people much smarter than I, "security is hard".

    --
    With reasonable men I will reason; with humane men I will plead; but to tyrants I will give no quarter. -- William Lloyd
  71. Flight times are billable hours by rossz · · Score: 1

    Need I say more?

    --
    -- Will program for bandwidth
  72. Make it easier then they might use it by Whuffo · · Score: 1
    Lawyers have enough on their plate keeping up on the changes in the law - it's not an easy job. They don't have the time to find, install, configure, jump through hoops, etc.

    If it was simple to install and use and guaranteed secure - then they just might consider using it.

  73. Nothing whatosever to do with security by nenya · · Score: 1

    The choice to fly to the Middle East rather than risk detection by federal authorities has absolutely nothing to do with whether or not the lawyer believes PGP--or any other encryption--is capable of thwarting government attempts to eavesdrop. Why? Because encryption doesn't do you any good if a court orders you to turn over the key, as it's likely to do if criminal charges are ever filed.

    The lawyers aren't nearly as concerned with having the content of their conversations intercepted as they are with having the fact of their conversations intercepted. In normal telecommunications, the police need no judicial authorization to record the fact of a telephone call, and they can use such a pattern to establish the likelihood of a conspiracy, which will enable them to get judicial authorization for a proper wiretap. Similarly, if authorities can establish the likelihood of a conspiracy using a pattern of emails, even encrypted ones, they can get a court order for the encryption key.

    This isn't a lawyer stunt to bill more hours or take vacations in Dubai. It's the entirely rational legal instinct to avoid a paper trail where it has the possibility of coming back to haunt you.

  74. Should be obvious... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Hmm, spend 5 minutes to download and install some software, or fly first-class while billing the client $900 per hour...

  75. If it's on windows, then nsa and others can listen by elucido · · Score: 1


    Windows has a broken random number generator. All encryption on windows therefore has a backdoor built in. I wouldn't recommend any electronic communications if I were the lawyer unless they were smart enough to use something other than windows.

  76. teh1337striker by teh1337striker · · Score: 1

    Hmm... Fly or Download. Fly or Download. Fly or Download. I think I'll take the ability to fly, thanks!

  77. Re:Extra: Lawyers don't want to go to jail... by RiotingPacifist · · Score: 2, Interesting

    Zimmermann challenged these regulations in a curious way. He published the entire source code of PGP in a hardback book, via MIT Press, which was distributed and sold widely. Anybody wishing to build their own copy of PGP could buy the $60 book, cut off the covers, separate the pages, and scan them using an OCR program, creating a set of source code text files. One could then build the application using the freely available GNU C Compiler. PGP would thus be available anywhere in the world. The claimed principle was simple: export of munitionsâ"guns, bombs, planes, and softwareâ"was (and remains) restricted; but the export of books is protected by the First Amendment. The question was never tested in court in respect to PGP, but had been established by the Supreme Court in the Bernstein case. More worryingly why do you agree with the spirit of the law? are foreigners not allowed privacy? DO you consider privacy as US ONLY, right?
    --
    IranAir Flight 655 never forget!
  78. Encryption Could Be Used As Evidence Against You by automandc · · Score: 1

    Using encryption is only going to convince the government that you do have something to hide, which will probably cause them to take a lot greater interest in everything you do, not just your relationship with the one or two clients they cared about to begin with. Given that the DOJ has decided it is fair game to prosecute lawyers for representing "terrorists", it isn't a happy time to be a criminal defense attorney in this area. And, if worse comes to worse and you find your client (or even yourself) charged with a crime, there is no current rule that would prohibit a court from allowing a jury to draw a negative inference from the fact that you took steps to conceal your communications from the government. In other words, the fact that you encrypted your email might be used as evidence that the email was incriminating unless you agree to produce it and prove otherwise. (You can't even claim it is privileged without at least disclosing it to the Court).

    --
    I'm a lawyer with excellent karma. Something's gotta be wrong.
  79. Luddites as lawyers by argStyopa · · Score: 1

    I have a tax lawyer that I've used for my business for 12 years who STILL doesn't 'trust' email for ANY communication. He doesn't have an email address at all - everything must be faxed or sent snail-mail.

    Seriously I've been on the verge of getting rid of him, just because he's so hard to communicate with (every call's a voicemail) but he does a great job knocking down my property taxes, so I put up with it.

    --
    -Styopa
    1. Re:Luddites as lawyers by freedom_india · · Score: 1

      My advice is don't ditch him.
      He has every right to be paranoid with reasons and you have a very good lawyer.
      USPS is still secure and cannot be intercepted by NSA.
      After all 15 years ago we didn't use email or chat or any such stuff.

      You should be happy your lawyer goes to great lengths to protect your privacy.

      --
      "Doing what i can, with what i have." ~ Burt Gummer
  80. Re:What makes you think they are permitted to encr by PopeRatzo · · Score: 1

    Do imprisoned suspects have the right to send encrypted letters (of the ink-and-paper variety) to an attorney?
    The US Government now simply denies "terrorist" suspects access to representation.

    If they can hold someone without a writ of habeas corpus, you think they're worrying about giving him/her access to a lawyer?
    --
    You are welcome on my lawn.
  81. MCI mail by griffinme · · Score: 1

    I used to support MCI mail. Yes, that one time alternative to regular email. Lawyers loved it since each email was charged. It drastically cut down on spam, hackers and other things that plague email today. By 2001 it was security through obscurity. Yes, that is a terrible security plan but it has worked well for Apple.

    --
    Is he strong? Listen bud, He's got radioactive blood.
  82. Encryption by AmonEzhno · · Score: 1

    If you ever worked in a law office, you will eventually realize EVERYTHING is encrypted to some point...Have you ever tried reading a settlement contract?

  83. Wait, what? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    The submitter must know nothing of attorneys, the way they work, or the protocols in place to protect the innocent and the guilty. My initial guess is the only experience they've had with the law has been interacting with the channel changer.

    How do these things get past the filters?

  84. 1st cluefull post by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Congratulations, you have the first cluefull post. Your'e right. The NSA is going to tap all of the terrorist calls going into the US. There are strong protections in place in the NSA to prevent the prosecuting attorneys from getting any of them going to the defense attorneys; the NSA doesn't want to blow the case. The NSA doesn't do stateside interceptions; it would be the FBI that would tap the attorney's computer. That is blatantly against the law and would not happen (again, they don't want to blow the trial).

    More importantly, though, lawyers don't believe in anything but face to face communications. And, keep in mind, there are a lot of billable hours from flying to the middle east and back every month. PGP is trying to apply a technical problem to a social problem. Paranoia can't be beat with technology.

  85. Yes, Because Terrorist Detainees are so Rich... by OakLEE · · Score: 1

    Yes, of course because a terrorist suspect in Gitmo, Ramstein, Guam or wherever the hell they are being held can afford to pay $500/hour for a top flight attorney. Get real.

    Most of the attorney's doing this work are either doing it pro bono or doing it for publicity/PR. They know that they are unlikely to ever get paid in full for the fair value of their services. Most of the expenses are coming right out of their own pocket.

    Getting back to the original topic. Much of communication is non-verbal. Visual cues like rapidly shifting eye movements or hurried language can be signs that a person lying, and those are not picked up over purely text exchanges. And believe it or not, plenty of criminal defendants lie to their attorneys either out of lack of trust or a desire to cover up/save face.

    Cutting through the bullshit and uncovering a truthful set of facts off which one can base a realistic defense is the essence of being a good defense attorney. If you let the defendant lie or misrepresent himself and his situation to you, you're failing to do that.

    --
    The sun beams down on a brand new day, No more welfare tax to pay, Unsightly slums gone up in flashing light...
  86. PGP isn't secure if your recipients don't use it by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    It's about education yes. But it's also about how easy it is to use encryption. PGP and certificates are just to much trouble. Identity based encryption has been proven to be easier. All you need is someone's email address to send them and encrypted message. Voltage Security is helping many different industries (including the legal industry!) protect partner and customer communication, files and databases. You can see for yourself at http://www.voltage.com

  87. Re:Encryption Could Be Used As Evidence Against Yo by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Safety in numbers. Ever heard of signal/noise ratio? If everyone does it, no plausible inference of guilt could be made in a particular case. So start doing it now.

  88. Hmm by someone1234 · · Score: 1

    Apparently they want to demonstrate that there is no terrorist danger!
    Otherwise they wouldn't be so brave to fly.

    --
    Patents Drive Free Software as Hurricanes Drive Construction Industry
  89. Ssssshhh! by Arancaytar · · Score: 1

    Dammit, don't tell them about encryption! Now they're going to subpoena our keys the next time they sue us for music piracy!

  90. IAAL by caitsith01 · · Score: 1

    IAAL and I am also quite familiar with encryption and PGP in particular. And you are quite right.

    Add to that the fact that electronic communication is virtually useless for legal work. If it's important, it's still on a physical piece of paper in a modern law firm. Email and phone calls are regarded as less significant forms of communication and are generally less useful as evidence, should that be required at a later date.

    I won't even start to talk about how moronic the suggestion of talking to a client accused of a serious criminal offence by email or other electronic methods is. There is no substitute for face to face contact.

    This article is obnoxious and is basically flamebait (or would be if there were more lawyers here).

    --
    Read Pynchon.
    1. Re:IAAL by Earered · · Score: 1

      Just to be sure, in the U.S. if you attend law courses/school, you're not automaticaly a lawyer afterward, there is some form of exam to become an attorney, right?

      (It's rather fuzzy what people means by lawyer, given the peticularities of each countries).

    2. Re:IAAL by SuiteSisterMary · · Score: 1

      Having various University Degrees in Law, up to and including J.D., a doctorate, does not confer to you the right to practice law, no. For that, you need to pass an exam from the state Bar, a professional association of other lawyers. This allows you to practice professional law in that state.

      --
      Vintage computer games and RPG books available. Email me if you're interested.
    3. Re:IAAL by Whatsthiswhatsthis · · Score: 1

      Correct. In the United States, all persons who hold themselves out as lawyers, "practice law", etc., must be licensed to do so, usually in the state in which they are practicing. There are, of course, exceptions and nuances, but this is the basic rule. Every state except Wisconsin (see this article for example) requires a person to pass the bar exam (or to waive in from another state where that person is licensed, with varying requirements). Thus, calling oneself a lawyer has considerably more meaning than calling oneself an economist, for example. Anyone can be an economist. I'm an economist. But not really.

  91. PITA by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Let me just tell you that taking your USB key with your key in and out your rectum every time you receive an e-mail, is plain PITA.

  92. So would I... by Rob+Kaper · · Score: 1

    But instead of talking about the technological solutions, the lawyers fly half way across the world to meet with their clients. In fact, nowhere in the article is encryption even mentioned. Is it possible that lawyers don't even know about PGP?"


    Most of them probably don't. Those who do probably have figured out they get paid anyway and prefer lunch in SF and spending the weekend in Miami.

    I'd rather chat with friends and peers in person than over PGP.
    1. Re:So would I... by mcvos · · Score: 1

      I'd rather chat with friends and peers in person than over PGP. But would you want to fly 8 hours every time you want to ask them something? My friends really like email for that sort of thing.
  93. All-inclusive trip by Noctris · · Score: 1

    " lawyers fly half way across the world to meet with their clients" Hmm.. now that's a hard one.. Fly half way around to world to exotic location all expenses paid Use PGP Fly half way around to world to exotic location all expenses paid Use PGP Fly half way around to world to exotic location all expenses paid Use PGP I have *NO* idea whatsoever which one to choose...

  94. Even PGP does not believe in encryption by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I just upgraded my PGP license yesterday. PGP's webstore is the only one I've come across so far where you can place an order using your credit card, and you do the whole process using unencrypted http connection...

  95. Technology and Lawyers by Metorical · · Score: 1

    A friend works at a top London law firm (think top 3). Her group was given a PDF document and needed to find all sentences refering to a certain person. Instead of using the in-built search function they printed out all 400 pages of the document and then went through it by hand with highlighter pens...

    They're bloody good at law though.

    1. Re:Technology and Lawyers by aXis100 · · Score: 1

      They're probably smarter than you think - they get paid by the hour to hold that highlighter pen after all.

    2. Re:Technology and Lawyers by SuiteSisterMary · · Score: 1

      Well, a search function isn't going to help you find all references to a person; it might let you find everywhere his name is, though.

      --
      Vintage computer games and RPG books available. Email me if you're interested.
    3. Re:Technology and Lawyers by Metorical · · Score: 1

      Yes it is. They always define precisely how things are referenced normally in the first pages.

    4. Re:Technology and Lawyers by Lord+Flipper · · Score: 1

      A friend works at a top London law firm (think top 3). Her group was given a PDF document and needed to find all sentences refering to a certain person. Instead of using the in-built search function they printed out all 400 pages of the document and then went through it by hand with highlighter pens... They're bloody good at law though.

      I'll bet they are, actually. I worked on a defense project, and later at a large firm (think #1) that specialized in legal discovery organizational work. You know, gathering all pertinent documents from two Fortune 500 companies involved in an M&A, or a big legal case... And the preferred method was a sort of triangulation using eyeballs and printed matter, rather than e-search and monitors.

      In the situation you mentioned, what if there were numerous individuals, who may or not be referred to in ANY sentence, by name, pronoun, or simply continuing data that no longer needed to refer, by name, to the 'topic' of the document's current discussion? How do you search for those adjacent sentences that have relevant data?

      Well, if I was using a search mechanism, I'd be reading paragraphs before AND after the ID'd instance. And that, my friend, is coming mighty close to just reading the bloody document. You say the firm used a 'team' or small group? Sounds just about exactly bang on the money, to me.

      I write web sites and fix them and decipher crappily-written (non-formatted) CSS, etc, and I love global find, and search & replace. All for it, believe me. But where statements that 'might' refer are also subject of the search, good old reading works really well.

  96. Good for him by AlXtreme · · Score: 1

    I have a tax lawyer that I've used for my business for 12 years who STILL doesn't 'trust' email for ANY communication.

    You should never trust email, so in that sense good for him. Then again, faxes and phonecalls can be tapped and are logged. So if someone is really serious about privacy, simply stay off the grid.

    My tax lawyer does have an email address, but he only uses it for arranging meetings. Rightfully so IMHO, as handling this kind of stuff face-to-face is much more fruitful (and they'll charge you the same anyway).
    --
    This sig is intentionally left blank
  97. Common sense tells me... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    lawyers can bill more hours by flying around the country then downloading PGP. So this comes down to: more billable hours or pgp... I think most will go with more billable hours, but I'm no lawyer so I can't say for certain.

  98. Is it possible.... by DaveDerrick · · Score: 1

    ... the submitter doesn't know about lawyers expenses ? Who do you think pays for the flight ?

  99. Billable hours? by kenh · · Score: 1

    I suspect the real culprit is that the Gov't pays their bills, and the hours they spend traveling to/from their clients are billable. I'm sure privacy plays a part, but first class air travel, as billable time (allowing them to double bill for the work they do on the plane) AND collect frequent flyer miles as well has to be tempting for these lawyers...

    --
    Ken
  100. Am I missing something here? by jimbob666 · · Score: 1
    Am I missing something here? I was led to understand that to break a 64-bit encryption key using a brute force method at 100,000 keys per second would take almost 12,000 years. I'm negating the fact that the key could be compromised by key-loggers etc - but that really isn't PGP's issue.

    Surely maths wins this overall at the moment? Unless Government agencies have super computers that make IBM's BlueGene/L look like a ZX Spectrum..

  101. TEMPEST by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Is it possible that lawyers don't even know about PGP?"

    Is it possible that the submitter doesn't even know about keyloggers, passive listening devices (for phones), compromised encryption binaries, vulnerabilities in protocols, etc?

    If the goddamn NSA can't snoop on an encrypted conversation between a lawyer & client, then frankly, they're not doing their job Don't forget TEMPEST.

  102. Two things... by Capt+James+McCarthy · · Score: 1


    1) Travel Time is chargeable
    2) In person discussions have the advantage of plausible deniability

    --
    There are no loopholes. It's either legal or it's not.
  103. I'd Rather Be on Expense Account by BECoole · · Score: 1

    Why would you want to sit in front of a computer all day when you could get out of the office, eat at nice restaurants and stay at nice motels on expense account?

  104. They probably don't. by GameboyRMH · · Score: 1

    I have some lawyers at my company...their computer knowledge is certainly nothing special. I'd be shocked if any of them had more than a passing topical knowledge of encryption in general. Not that I can blame them, my legal knowledge isn't that good either.

    --
    "When information is power, privacy is freedom" - Jah-Wren Ryel
  105. This is pointless by hesaigo999ca · · Score: 1

    This story is pointless, I am a lawyer, which whom I have a wealthy client of mine that is willing to pay me to travel to meet him in his defense, not only do I get to travel, BUT I GET PAID TO DO IT.
    I am going to make sure he thinks nothing but paranoid thoughts, feeding more and more until he cracks and gives me that plane ticket.

    The cool thing is even with keyloggers, and screen captures there is still stenanography.
    you get a comp that is brand new, install a software for steno, update the image, then encrypt it, then logon to the net send it by email, on his end he buys a brand spanking enw comp....unencrypts the image, then decrypts the steno...and wow, no pgp to tip off the NSA.

    But that would be the cheap way of doing it.

  106. there's a reason encrypted e-mail isn't used by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Face it lawyers know face to face conversations are more secure. There's no record of what was said other then what each person can remember. If it was sent in an encrypted e-mail, the key to decrypt the message could be supoenaed by the courts (IANAL but I can check things online)

  107. Re:What makes you think they are permitted to encr by dave420 · · Score: 1

    What makes you think the only people lawyers advise are imprisoned suspects?

  108. Re:Extra: Lawyers don't want to go to jail... by SuiteSisterMary · · Score: 1

    Yes, I remember that book. The page numbers had C-style comment markers around them, to facilitate scanning.

    --
    Vintage computer games and RPG books available. Email me if you're interested.
  109. maybe they know something we dont know by renegade600 · · Score: 1

    what if there is a backdoor to pgp for government use only? Can we really trust pgp to fully protect data from the hounds of riaa, nsa, homeland security, and the security agents from other nations or corporations.

    How do we know theres not one????

  110. tone down your flippant arrogance...you're wrong by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    How is it shot down, exactly? Just Because the journalist words things in a particular way to support his assertion? The lawyer might have a multitude of reasons for going in person, including both the need for 'face time' AND the fear that communications are monitored...the journalist might have just decided to emphasize the one...he may have asked the lawyer very specific questions about electronic communications and ignored other issues. You don't know. But even if 'face time' isn't an issue...PGP is still not an absolute guarantee of privacy, esp when you don't know how careful your client is with his computer security. The lawyer is maybe just providing services commiserate with his pay by going out of his way to ensure privacy in a world where (gasp) even PGP might be the government's bitch that yields whenever they get the itch to spy.

  111. Bootstrapping by Schraegstrichpunkt · · Score: 1

    "Lawyers would rather fly than download PGP"...

    And how would a non-techie lawyer ensure that his copy of PGP is actually authentic? Check its PGP signature? Use SSL? Review the source code and disassemble the compiler? What about getting good random numbers? As we've seen over the past year, you often can't rely on the operating system to generate them for you, especially not on Windows.

    Not transmitting sensitive information over an insecure network, while prohibitively expensive in many cases, is far more reliable than transmitting it "encrypted" and hoping the encryption actually holds.

  112. pgp is not the answer by houghi · · Score: 1

    In this instance pgp is a technical solution for a social problem.

    --
    Don't fight for your country, if your country does not fight for you.
  113. I call BULLSH*T!!!! by RogueWarrior65 · · Score: 1

    Give me an effing break. The lawyers use this as an excuse to get out of the office, go play golf, and stay at the Ritz Carlton all on their clients' dime. Who the hell are you kidding?

  114. wow.. can't believe nobody else pointed this out. by gru3hunt3r · · Score: 1

    I for one am glad the smart folks at Gitmo are not giving suspected terrorists access to the Internet, email, strong cryptography software such as PGP, and training how to use it.

  115. IANL by Dare+nMc · · Score: 1

    as long as Im careful with my key (keep it on me at all times, and only use it on safe systems), in the absence of

    In a case like this, that is probably not enough. IE lawyer client privacy only goes so far even constrained to US laws (this case wouldn't be constrained to US law), so they could be forced give up all info they have on the PGP encryption keys, etc, once the lawyers actions were considered illegal. Under US law these lawyers communications being kept private would be illegal (by my under-educated) understanding, the moment that any information they received could be used to stop a future attack.
    Which it sounds like (in this case) would be all evidence.
    Assuming the following:
    A) the lawyers have been notified they are under investigation as well.
    B) if A, then destroying evidence (such as a PGP key) would be illegal.
    C) the Government can crack PGP when given the Key.
    D) the government can intercept and log all the PGP traffic, until such time they receive the key.

    talking about the case would not create evidence, but transmitting it would cause it to be recorded and thus it sounds like no legal way to avoid exposing it.
    I am pretty technical minded, but I would have a hard time solving these issues for the lawyers, so they could transmit data that could only be viewed one time.
  116. Lawyers don't want a record of a meeting by MooseTick · · Score: 1

    IANAL but can the government require a lawyer communicating with a non-US citizen identified as a terrorist to turn over all communications if they believe there is a national threat?

    If they can't do it now, there is always the chance that legislation will be passed allowing such a practice.

    If so, that would discourage the use of PGP. Even if they can't crack PGP, the govt could require a lawyer to provied his key/password or sit in jail indefinately for comtempt.

    If communications between people are recorded, there is always the possibility the communication will be available to others. Face to face talk (barring listening devices) is the only way to ensure only the parties involved in the conversation will know the contents of that conversation. A lawyer could still be questioned about what they talked about, but then he could lie, omit facts, or take some other option if he didn't want to disclose the true nature of a meeting.

  117. Of course by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    > Do US courts seriously consider these issues any longer?

    Of course they do. However, this is YRO so you get mod points for talking out of your ass.

  118. Lawyers need PGP integration by Namlak · · Score: 1

    ...for Word Perfect 5.2

  119. PGP in this case is useless by wsanders · · Score: 1

    Why use encryption when you can fly 40 hours to Dubai and back, and use the hours to either bill the government or fulfill your pro-bono work requirement?

    --
    Give a man a fish and you have fed him for today. Teach a man to fish, and he'll say "WHERE'S MY FISH, YOU IDIOT?"
  120. Geez by bobbonomo · · Score: 1

    Geez, I hope they consider theirs "unbreakable" :)

  121. Could it be something else? by Have+Brain+Will+Rent · · Score: 1

    Is it possible lawyers bill by the hour and flying halfway around the world takes longer than installing PGP?

    --
    The tyrant will always find a pretext for his tyranny - Aesop
  122. Re:Extra: Lawyers don't want to go to jail... by Actually,+I+do+RTFA · · Score: 1

    More worryingly why do you agree with the spirit of the law? are foreigners not allowed privacy? DO you consider privacy as US ONLY, right?

    Because it is clear that encryption is useful in warfare (see Engima machines). I favor a decisive advantage. If it were possible to keep other countries governments from learning complex encryption techniques (for subtle improvements to them) I favor it.

    I want the NSA to be able to break any encryption. I just want it to be costly enough that it is only used for non-trivial cases.

    --
    Your ad here. Ask me how!
  123. bullshit, PGP of no help whatsoever in this by justdrew · · Score: 1

    and how are they supposed to generate a keypair for the convict and assure control over the keypair? what hardware is the convict supposed to run this on? get real.

    1. Re:bullshit, PGP of no help whatsoever in this by LinuxLuver · · Score: 1

      Excellent observation. Guys in jail don't get computers and they certainly don't get privacy like that. I worked in a prison for a year. The prisoner's legal papers were off-limits to us to read in full, but we could certainly flip through them looking for phone numbers or other things "of interest". It's actually possible to do that, too...scanning through for references to illegal drugs or threatened violence to others without actually comprehending the legal content. I didn't think it was possible until I found myself doing it. But that's a very thin layer of privacy....and a prisoner couldn't rely on it.

      --
      Only boring people are ever bored.
  124. Neither Do Lawyers by Geoff-with-a-G · · Score: 1

    Absolutely true.

    Also, as I understand it, the email is not considered properly privileged communication. If someone infiltrates the office and records the lawyer having a conversation with their client, that's still not evidence admissible in court. But if they subpoena the email server of a client being investigated, I believe those emails to the lawyer saying "Oh crap, I committed the following felonies, you think that's gonna be a problem?" are admissible in court.

    IANAL, any actual lawyers able to jump in and correct me here?

  125. Re:If it's on windows, then nsa and others can lis by Le+Marteau · · Score: 1
    --
    Mod down people who tell people how to mod in their sigs
  126. Ecoterrorists! by fugue · · Score: 1

    Doesn't all that flying around just increase the need to find them guilty so we can proceed to invade more "terrorist-ridden" (and coincidentally oil-rich) countries? That will put more pressure on the plaintiff to find terrorism everywhere, weakening the defendants' cases.

    And isn't raising demand for greenhouse-gas--emitting technologies doing a lot more to kill everyone than even a moderately effective terrorist could?

    --
    "The biggest problem with communication is the illusion that it has taken place."
  127. ludite lawyers by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    i live next door to a very intelligent and successful criminal defense lawyer. he doesn't have a computer. he doesn't even use email. he does use sms, but mostly to talk to his wife and kids. he just flew across the country to meet with a client.

    it's not that he has issues with pgp or doesn't trust it - he probably doesn't know it even exists. i'm sure if it came up in one of his cases he would go the distance to learn.

    i think we make a lot of assumptions about how much people's lives revolve around computers. amazingly, even with the number of personal computers out there, there's still a sizable percentage of people that simply don't need them.

    1. Re:ludite lawyers by manojar · · Score: 1

      maybe the lawyer knows pgp exists. maybe he knows how pgp is subject to us government export restrictions. maybe he knows his clients are "restricted users" according to these export restrictions. maybe he knows how the us government can snoop into any data they want to.

  128. Re:Of course they thought about it. Not good enoug by SanityInAnarchy · · Score: 1

    still wouldn't protect against simple theft of the whole laptop for leisurely analysis of past secrets. No, but encrypting the drive would do a pretty good job of that.

    So you're leaving the one with the actual secrets on it back in the office, then? See above. :-) Or locking it in a safety deposit box. Or throwing it away.

    But if you assume that level of surveillance on the other end, it wouldn't be safe for your client to use a computer there either, would it? I suspect that it is easier to secure a place to hook up a computer than it is to secure a physical meeting. Also, it absolutely is easier to arrange a meeting with some random public wifi network undetected than it is to arrange a meeting with a highly paid lawyer undetected.

    But yes, security is hard.
    --
    Don't thank God, thank a doctor!
  129. Re:Extra: Lawyers don't want to go to jail... by SanityInAnarchy · · Score: 1

    Because it is clear that encryption is useful in warfare (see Engima machines). I favor a decisive advantage. You should read Neal Stephenson's "The Diamond Age" -- I don't know if you will ever agree with me, but I don't think I've seen my own philosophy portrayed so vividly and beautifully before. At the very least, it's an entertaining and thought-provoking book.

    Science fiction, by the way, not propaganda, even if I'm using it as such.

    If it were possible to keep other countries governments from learning complex encryption techniques (for subtle improvements to them) I favor it. Governments will, full stop. They'll do it on their own if they have to.

    What's more important is for this to be available to individuals.

    I want the NSA to be able to break any encryption. I just want it to be costly enough that it is only used for non-trivial cases. Yeah, pretty sure we're never going to agree on this.

    I do NOT want the NSA, or anyone else, to be able to encrypt my own messages. Find a form of warfare which works even if indecipherable messages are a fact.

    Or better, don't fight wars.
    --
    Don't thank God, thank a doctor!
  130. Hang ethics or security... by bandmassa · · Score: 1

    Hmm, send and receive encrypted email, saving your client money, or jump on a plane and get some travel to interesting places at your client's expense? Which would you choose? (Remember, we're talking about lawyers here.)

    --
    "I hope you like Guinness, Sir. I find it a refreshing substitute for, er... food." Col. Jack O'Neil, SG-1
  131. Terrorists usually well educated, actually by typicallyterrific · · Score: 1
    "Now take a terrorism suspect, who likely is not that well educated and has a legitimate fear of being spied on, and tell him to speak clearly into the microphone."

    Three quarters were from middle-class or upper-class families, two thirds went to college and two thirds were professionals or semi-professionals, often engineers, physicians, architects or scientists. The average age for making an active commitment to violent jihad was 26, and three quarters of the terrorists were married, most of them with children.

    That's the word on the street, at least.

    Might not apply for mujahideen in Afghanistan.