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What are you, stupid? Do stores "specifically state" that you have the right to wear clothes you buy? Do stores "specifically state" that you have the right to eat the food you buy? Do stores "specifically state" that you have the right to read the books you buy?

No, but there isn't a law that prevents you from wearing clothes without their designer's permission, or from eating food without the consent of its manufacturer. Or reading a book without a contract with its author.

However, most computer programs are designed to require installation. This involves making a copy of the program. Making a copy of a computer program is illegal, unless it comes under one of the standard exemptions from copyright. Loading and executing a program in memory is (in the US) one such exemption. Installing it on your hard disk, however, isn't.

Besides, I dare you to cite one single instance (that wasn't subsequently overturned) of a court enforcing an EULA that wasn't printed on the outside of the box or otherwise presented to the buyer before sale. Because I believe you're a fucking liar.

"For every game at issue in this litigation except for Diablo, the outside packaging of the game
states that use of the game is subject to a EULA, and that use of Blizzard's Battle.net service is subject
to the Battle.net TOU. The terms of the EULAs and TOU themselves do not appear on the outside
[...]
Blizzard asserts that the
EULAs and TOU are enforceable contracts. Defendants assert that the EULAs and TOU are not
contracts because under Missouri law there was no agreement between the parties.9 Defendants argue
that the only agreement between the parties is the offer to sell the software and the defendants'
acceptance by purchase of the software. Also, defendants contend that the terms of the EULAs and
TOU were not presented at the time of purchase. The defendants assert that if a contract exists, it is
unenforceable because it is unconscionable.
[...]
The Court finds that the license agreements are enforceable contracts under both California
and Missouri law. California courts have enforced end user license agreements, which are valid under
California law. See Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F.Supp.2d 1086, 1089-93 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (end user license agreement valid under California law); Hotmail Corp. v. Van$Money Pie,
Inc., No. C-98-20064, 1998 WL 388389, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (applying California law, plaintiff
likely to prevail on breach of contract claim regarding clickwrap agreement).
[...]
Defendants state that the EULAs
and TOU are additional terms which they rejected. Defendants contend that is unfair for them to pay
$49.99 for the games and then be unable to install them or access Battle.net without assenting to the
EULA and TOU.
The Court finds the EULAs and TOU are enforceable under the UCC.
[...]
A sale
consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer. Mo. Rev. Stat. 400.2-106(1) (2000).
When defendants purchased the games, they bought a license to use the software, but did not buy the
software. Defendants' argument parallels the "first sale doctrine," although defendants do not use this
term.
Under the first sale doctrine, "a sale of a lawfully made copy terminates a copyright holder's
authority to interfere with subsequent sales or distribution of that particular copy."
packaging.
[...]
Defendants do not produce sufficient evidence demonstrating that
title and ownership of the games passed to them. Therefore, the Court finds that the first sale doctrine
is inapplicable here."

(Davidson & Associates Inc. et al v Internet Gateway et al; US District Court, Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division; No. 4:02-CV-498 CAS - confirmed in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals)

Correct there man.

First off, let's define militia, and we'll use current US law regarding the militia - TITLE 10 - Subtitle A - PART I - CHAPTER 13 - 311 states that there are two classes of the Militia, the organized militia (National Guard), and the unorganized militia (all men between 17 and 45, and the women in the National Guard - current Supreme Court binding precedent would also include all women between 17 and 45 - equality of the sexes). Most Slashdot readers are probably legally part of the militia whether they knew it or not.

Right now the courts are split far and wide. The Miller decision was ambiguous at best (full text of decision), there has been a lot of wrangling about what they meant, with most coming out on the "no personal right to bear arms" side of the argument. The decision was centered around whether or not a a sawed off shotgun was a legitimate militia style weapon. The court decided that sawed off shotguns had no legitimate use in a militia - they did not know that sawed-off shotguns had a history of being used in the trench warfare of World War One. This is important because if you read the decision, basically what is said is that people have an individual right to bear arms, but only those arms which have a legitimate military purpose. Some on the "personal right to bear arms" side interpret this as meaning that you have no right to own that hunting rifle that grandpop left you in his will, but you do have the right to, say a fully automatic M4 with grenade launcher attachment. HOWEVER, since the law that it was dealing with, which it didn't strike down - NFA1934 - essentially bans all weapons used in the modern military (Automatic weapons, Destructive Devices {weapons larger than 50 caliber}, and short barreled shotguns and rifles) we were left with the idea that most people who are part of the militia have no right to personally own military weapons.

The circuit courts have split this down further - The Ninth and Tenth have both found that the Second Amendment does not protect an individuals right to bear arms - the Fifth has found that there is a right to bear arms (see this Wiki article for more).

Where does this leave us? Well, the District of Columbia Circuit will now be deciding its stance on whether the Second applies to individuals or the collective. Eventually, the SCOTUS will have to make a decision, because there will be so many different circuits with differing opinions on the matter. I'm frankly surprised that they haven't taken it up already, since they already have the conflict between the different circuits, but so it goes.

http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/ts_search.pl ?title=10&sec=311

(a) The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied males at least 17 years of age and, except as provided in section 313 of title 32, under 45 years of age who are, or who have made a declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States and of female citizens of the United States who are members of the National Guard.
(b) The classes of the militia are -
(1) the organized militia, which consists of the National Guard and the Naval Militia; and
(2) the unorganized militia, which consists of the members of the militia who are not members of the National Guard or the Naval Militia.

Hmm, you might actually be correct about that, although I will point out that doing so outside of the US is illegal regardless of intent. I think this is probably a more the more appropriate law for your example. So (standard disclaimer applies, ie. IANAL) as long as you make no attempt to actual pass these off as geniune (regardless of whether you receive any compensation) it appears to be legal. In the gentleman's case, I would probably argue that indeed he was passing them off as geniune, although probably without full regard to the consequences. A nice watermark on them still would have been a good idea.

Regardless, you are correct about the counterfeiting being legal.

Hmm, you might actually be correct about that, although I will point out that doing so outside of the US is illegal regardless of intent. I think this is probably a more the more appropriate law for your example. So (standard disclaimer applies, ie. IANAL) as long as you make no attempt to actual pass these off as geniune (regardless of whether you receive any compensation) it appears to be legal. In the gentleman's case, I would probably argue that indeed he was passing them off as geniune, although probably without full regard to the consequences. A nice watermark on them still would have been a good idea.

Regardless, you are correct about the counterfeiting being legal.

Whoever, with intent to defraud, falsely makes, forges, counterfeits, or alters any obligation or other security of the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.

Very well. I suggest you reference Fischer v. United States, pp 402-414, in which the court wrote:

(a) Whether or not the Fifth Amendment would have barred a subpoena directing the taxpayers to produce the documents while they were in their hands, the taxpayers' privilege under that Amendment is not violated by enforcing the summonses because enforcement against a taxpayer's lawyer would not "compel" the taxpayer to do anything, and certainly would not [425 U.S. 391, 392] compel him to be a "witness" against himself, and the fact that the attorneys are agents of the taxpayers does not change this result. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 . Pp. 396-398.

As held in United States v. Hubbell,

Moreover, the court has long held that only the defendant in a criminal trial has any fifth amendment protection whatsoever, so the court could force production of the keys from the other side of the communication channel even if for some reason the fifth amendment prevented them from retrieving them from the defendant.

The essential and controlling fact is that the stockholder has received nothing out of the company's assets for his separate use and benefit; on the contrary, every dollar of his original investment, together with whatever accretions and accumulations have resulted from employment of his money and that of the other stockholders in the business of the company, still remains the property of the company, and subject to business risks which may result in wiping out the entire investment. Having regard to the very truth of the matter, to substance and not to form, he has received nothing that answers the definition of income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment.

That is, unless Congress comes along and mucks with the law. Of course, they'll have a hard time reconciling new law with the current IRS realization requirements. They could declare that you can realize a paper profit, but it would be really tricky to do so without royally screwing stock market investors on capital gains taxes. And if that happens, good luck getting reelected.

The essential and controlling fact is that the stockholder has received nothing out of the company's assets for his separate use and benefit; on the contrary, every dollar of his original investment, together with whatever accretions and accumulations have resulted from employment of his money and that of the other stockholders in the business of the company, still remains the property of the company, and subject to business risks which may result in wiping out the entire investment. Having regard to the very truth of the matter, to substance and not to form, he has received nothing that answers the definition of income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment.

That is, unless Congress comes along and mucks with the law. Of course, they'll have a hard time reconciling new law with the current IRS realization requirements. They could declare that you can realize a paper profit, but it would be really tricky to do so without royally screwing stock market investors on capital gains taxes. And if that happens, good luck getting reelected.

People need to get their heads out of their asses and realize that this kind of thing is ridiculous and retarded.

Standard disclaimer: I'm not a lawyer, less a Supreme Court expert, but I am a former patent examiner.

The the definitive previous case by the SCOTUS on the interpretation of obviousness is GRAHAM v. JOHN DEERE CO. in which the Court basically concluded that the 1952 enactment of section 103 of the patent statute was basically a codification of a line of judicial opinions going back into the 19th century (with the exception of a 1941 Supreme Court opinion that appeared to introduce a "flash of genius" test that the new law seemed to overrule in the last sentence of section 103). The "test" that this article mentions is the "suggestion" and "motivation" showings that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) and its predecessor, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) developed since the Graham decision was handed down in 1969.

The CCPA only controlled appeals from the PTO, which, of course, affected what claims would be allowed. When the issued patents were challenged by accused infringers, the appeals were decided by the regular Federal Circuit courts, which didn't follow the CCPA. In 1982, responding to complaints from patentees that the law was not uniformly applied the CAFC was formed by merging the CCPA with another court and was given exclusive appellate jurisdiction for all patent appeals, and they took their view of obviousness with them.

Now, usually the SCOTUS is pursuaded to review areas of law where there is a diversion of opinions on the law among the various federal circuits; here, there is, by the exclusive CAFC jurisdiction only one, yet the case was selected for review. I haven't seen a transcript of the hearing; it is still possible that the CAFC's "suggestion/motivation" test will survive and this case will be decided narrowly on the facts of the case, but it looks like, even if they do survive it will be in a less severe form than has been.

However, even if they strike down the CAFC's standard I don't think there will be a big impact on the quality of patents being issued, other factors being equal, since the main problem is the often that the prior art made of record is inadequate. Nevertheless, it would be easier to make sustainable rejections, since more prior art references will be available.

This story is a dupe but I'll comment further. I'll also make my standard disclaimer when discussing patents: I am not a patent attorney, but I am a former patent examiner.

The point you make is known in the patent biz as "hindsight", and is commonly argued by patent applicants against rejections based on obviousness ( 35 USC 103). This, of course, is the crux of this issue;given a patent claim and a set of pieces of "prior art", no one of which describes the invention in the claim (which would render the claim unpatentable for lack of novelty (i. e., "anticipation") under 35 USC 102) how does one apply the law to render a conclusion. Of course, there's one additional factor, beyond mere descriptive disclosure of the "process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter" (35 USC 101) claimed, and that is the mythical "person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains". In infringement cases, where there's real money involved ( the patentee/licensee and/or the accused infringer markets), expert witnesses can give testimony for either side in addition to the prior art entered as evidence.

In the PTO during application prosecution, on the other hand, there is no access to expert opinions for the examiner. On average an examiner has on the order of 15-20 hours to work on a typical application (varies by examiner's level and the art he/she is assigned). This includes all handling of the application from initially reading it, searching for prior art, formulating actions, reading and responding to amendments and arguments presented by applicant, reading applicant's appeal brief and writing an examiner's answer in those cases where applicant appeals the examiner's rejection to the PTO's appeal board, etc. In this environment, the level of ordinary skill in the art must derive from the prior art references, themselves, and any conclusion of obviousness must derive from what the prior art references show.

The determination, thus, rests with determining whether the things shown in one reference would be applicable to be used in another. In th past, patent examiners were often given great weight in making such judgments, although they had to be supported by some kind of reasoning. However, over the last few years under the judicial oversight of the PTO's appeal court, the previous Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), now the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) the ability of examiners to make such determinations has been limited, with the Court demanding that more and more of the rationale be expressly stated in the prior art themselves. If you assumed that, in each case, that the absolute best prior art has been developed this would tend to decrease the number of rejections that could be sustained, since even expert testimony would be questioned for not supporting their conclusions, or being biased, that is, the expert is using hindsight to reconstruct the invention and this is the main reason the case is before the SCOTUS. In the PTO there is the additional burden of increased searching to find "better" prior art; references that would be perfectly fine in supporting rejections made under the environment of years ago will no longer provide such support; the haystack gets larger (more and more prior art heaps on as time progresses) and the available suitable needles get fewer and fewer.

The legal requirements derived and applied by the CAFC have not previously been tested by the SCOTUS; the leading case, which the CAFC has used as part of its legal reasoning, is GRAHAM v. JOHN DEERE CO. which, while setting out a ser

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

The books were written in the 30s and 40s. I thought they would be in the public domain by now?

I suppose what you're overlooking (with respect to the ICC) is that this clause was used to apply federal law to *private* companies and not states. Laws were written that required private companies to serve minorities, etc., and for most of these, the consitution (10th amendment) is quite clear that it is the state's position to make such laws. Again, I want to stress that I fully support the intent of these laws, but I don't understand how one can argue with a straight face that they're actually constitutional.

The 14th amendment required that "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States", but it did not require the completion of this sentiment - i.e., that states actively PASS laws which prevent others from abridging "the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States".

"Whites Only" signs were, for the most part, at places of business. Constitutionally, it is the state's responsibilities to pass laws telling those businesses to ship up. You want a more creative solution - how about what the federal government did to get all states to raise the drinking age to 21? That one at least seems constitutional to me.

(I don't disagree at all about Dred Scott being a bad decision, but the Dred Scott case stated that Dred Scott was still a slave even when his "master" traveled with him through free states. I've just reviewed the Dred Scott case - very quickly, mind you - and don't find reference to a 2/5 (or 3/5) person. Of course, IANAL.)

First, ignore the fact that it was an attempted solicitation of a minor. That's irrelevant to the issue.

It would seem to make intuitive sense that intensionally, IM is an electronic communication which is within the intentions of the legislators (sorry to slip into the language of formal logic here -- as we see below it hardly has a place in the law).

The problem is that the courts have not followed that same approach in other "obvious" cases. For example the fourth amendment to the US constitution seems clear in that people and their homes, cars, possessions and the like shouldn't be messed without a probable cause and warrant. But the courts have consistently chipped away at this (scanning your house via IR, looking into cars, seizure without a warrant, etc) by interpreting what the constitution says literally. If you accept that, you cannot accept this otherwise sensible judgement.

could someone go and renew their license yet refuse to have their picture taken citing the 5th amendment.

Forget the 5th amendment, I think this ought to be considered a direct violation of the 4th amendment: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated...

Searching a database of pictures which were collected under the premise of a different use seems like an unreasonable search of my papers or if 'papers' is considered narrowly as actual paper, my effects.

In so saying, we do not suggest that Albion and JMI waived their rights to be compensated by the Miracle in accordance with their oral understanding. What they waived was any right to sue for breach of copyright on account of the playing of the song while the license was in effect.

"You may see this as hairsplitting, but it's this kind of hairsplitting that determines what kinds of crimes you can be tried for..."

Now hold on a second. I've never argued that copyright infringement is theft under legal definitions since that would be stupid in light of http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?n avby=search&court=US&case=/us/473/207.html. The confusion here yours, perhaps because you've entered this late. It is undeniable that copyright infringment is a crime entirely separate from theft of goods (in the US).

"He is not attempting to legally define copyright infringment as theft. He is saying that unlawful copying amounts to unlawful *taking of property* and that "garden-variety theft" also involves taking of property. He is not saying that the two crimes are equivalent crimes, merely that they both involve the taking of property. In theft, *by definition*, the victim is deprived of the property that is taken. He may be trying to derive a moral equivalence, but there is no legal equivalence, and nor is he trying to create one."

And of that we completely agree. There is no doubt that illegal distribution is not "legal theft". However, "theft" is an english word as well as a legal term. While infringement isn't theft in the legal sense, it certainly is as far as the dictionary is concerned. Breyer clearly associates the two but makes no legal link between them. The dictionary would say that theft is "the unlawful taking of property". That's not in doubt.

So tell us, krell, is copyright infringment theft?

*Looks at krell* Mind if I take this one? Thanks.

I'll tell you: No, copyright infringment is not theft. Please see Dowling vs. United States (1985). Here's the good part...

"The language of 2314 does not "plainly and unmistakably" cover such conduct. The phonorecords in question were not "stolen, converted or taken by fraud" for purposes of 2314. The section's language clearly contemplates a physical identity between the items unlawfully obtained and those eventually transported, and hence some prior physical taking of the subject goods. Since the statutorily defined property rights of a copyright holder have a character distinct from the possessory interest of the owner of simple "goods, wares, [or] merchandise," interference with copyright does not easily equate with theft, conversion, or fraud. The infringer of a copyright does not assume physical control over the copyright nor wholly deprive its owner of its use. Infringement implicates a more complex set of property interests than does run-of-the-mill theft, conversion, or fraud. Pp. 214-218."

Google for Graham v. James , 144 F.3d 229, 236 (2d Cir. 1998). This finding is used in just about every case of copyright violation. For example RT COMPUTER GRAPHICS, INC., vs United States Postal Service. They claimed the post office was violating copyright because they used some of their computer graphics in a stamp. The post office's reply is that they secured a license to use the graphics through a third party. RT Computer Graphics claimed that the use in stamps was not authorized. The post office claimed that matters of contract are null because they don't have a contract with RT Computer Graphics and, as such, RT Computer Graphics can only sue them for copyright infringement, but because the post office has a license, they can't. Post office wins. That's my understanding anyway. Ahh, here's the finding. I'll probably read all this now and find out I'm wrong :)

Dowling (473 U.S. 207), was a narrow ruling about the National Stolen Property Act. The court found that under the terms of the statute the defendant's interstate shipment of bootleg records was not covered under the terms of the Act, because it was a criminal statue, which must be construed strictly.

This does not mean that the court would not construe copyright violation to be "theft" under a different statute. I'll agree with your premise that in this case the court differentiated between IP rights and rights in tangible property. Despite the language of Justice Ginsburg's concurrence, "And deliberate unlawful copying is no less an unlawful taking of property than garden-variety theft," the term doesn't seem to have been used in a majority opinion by the USSC in defining copyright infringement. So perhaps for copyright, at least, there is a clear line between infringement and theft.

That still leaves us with theft of trade secrets, trademark, and patents.

The Economic Espionage Act of 1996 explicitly refers to the theft of trade secrets.

It may be that trade secrets are the only area of IP law where the term "theft" is explicitly used, and it may be that patents and trademark both conflate infringement with theft. I don't have time to go sifting through cases, but it does seem clear to me that at least with regard to trade secrets, the law explicitly states that theft of IP is possible.

I appreciate your bringing Dowling to my attention. I was obviously overly broad in my portrayal of infringement as "theft." I'm pleasantly surprised.

Whether this is a copyright or a contract case turns on
whether the compatibility provisions help define the scope of
the license. Generally, a "copyright owner who grants a non-
exclusive license to use his copyrighted material waives his
right to sue the licensee for copyright infringement " and can
sue only for breach of contract. Graham v. James , 144 F.3d
229, 236 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Peer Int'l Corp. v. Pansa
Records, Inc., 909 F.2d 1332, 1338-39 (9th Cir. 1990)). If,
however, a license is limited in scope and the licensee acts
outside the scope, the licensor can bring an action for copy-
right infringement. See S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d
1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 1989); Nimmer on Copyright , S 1015[A]
(1999).

First of all, the US government can't deny you a passport (even if they want you on a no-fly list!) -- see Kent v. Dulles. Secondly, US Citizens have the right to enter and leave the US (I can't find the USSC citation -- sorry). This proposal is thus manifestly unconstitutional -- unless they try claiming that "you have the right to leave the US, but not by the means of transportation of your choice". This has worked for the government in the cases about the right to travel anonymously and the airport identification requirements.

The definition of dictator is a : a person granted absolute emergency power; b : one holding complete autocratic control; c : one ruling absolutely and often oppressively.

While you could argue whether Bush, technically, meets the definition, there is plenty of evidence that he is trying to evade Congressional oversight, elimination of habeas corpus for detainees and immunity for torture, the use of signing statements to effectively nullify legislation, NSA spying on U.S. citizens and so forth that are clearly moves in that direction.

Further, he is definitely claiming power and using it based on a framework of emergency that goes by the label of the "war on terror". He, and especially people under him like Cheney, believe that that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, has the authority to disregard virtually all previously known legal boundaries. That's pretty close to an understanding that believes itself to have absolute emergency power, i.e., a dictatorship - given certain conditions (which in this case are vague).

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation

For constitutional purposes, the joint resolution passed with but a single dissenting vote by Congress on Sept. 14, 2001, was the equivalent of a formal declaration of war. The Supreme Court held in 1800 (Bas v. Tingy), and again in 1801 (Talbot v. Seamen), that Congress could formally authorize war by joint resolution without passing a formal declaration of war; and in the post-U.N. Charter era no state has issued a formal declaration of war. Such declarations, in fact, have become as much an anachronism as the power of Congress to issue letters of marque and reprisal (outlawed by treaty in 1856). Formal declarations were historically only required when a state was initiating an aggressive war, which today is unlawful. Robert F. Turner,co-founder of the Center for National Security Law at the University of Virginia School of Law

I am somewhat familiar with it, but perhaps your copy is missing a few pages. Article I Section 8 of my copy of the United States Constitution contains what is commonly refered to as the commerce clause, and give Congress the power, "To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes". Now, there's some debate about the boundaries of the scope of the commerce clause, but I think you'd have to be pretty far out there to claim that commercial air travel isn't covered. If you are serious about this, you might want to check out Gibbons v. Ogden .

I swear to god I'm going to take a claw hammer to the next person who repeats that myth.

For the thousandth fucking time, that bill only applies to non-citizens!

Or anyone who is determined to be an enemy combatant. And the rules for being declared an enemy combatant is that the president says you are. So yes, it DOES apply to every single person, since anyone at any time can be declared an enemy combatant for any reason.

Enjoy a bit of reading:
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/am endment04/03.html#5
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/ amendment04/04.html#2
By definition, whether you like it or not, a ruling by the Supreme Court is constitutional.

Well different people have different ideas of what it means for the press to be free. For me...

However, if it's in the EULA, even if cleverly buried in all the legalese you find there, it's legal to the best of my understanding.

In Wisconsin, as elsewhere, a contract includes only the terms on which the parties have agreed. One cannot agree to hidden terms, the judge concluded. So far, so good-- but one of the terms to which Zeidenberg agreed by purchasing the software is that the transaction was subject to a license.

Notice on the outside, terms on the inside, and a right to return the software for a refund if the terms are unacceptable (a right that the license expressly extends), may be a means of doing business valuable to buyers and sellers alike.

Sure some artists love it, because they often get paid when the music is used, or at least get credit for the riff/sample. The courts have ruled multiple times that unlicensed sampling is a violate of copyright (for example: Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Demsion Films, 2004). Plus, I don't think most artists have access to all the master tracks when sampling "illegally" ... which is partly why contests/experiments like those of Peter Gabriel and Nine Inch Nails were so interesting.

Claiming that all "Real" musicians love having the music sampled is a bit overstated ... particularly since the practice seems most common in Rap and Hip Hop.

Did the whole "everybody is an Enemy Combatant if we say so" thing start already and no one told me? What exactly is this "isolation" where you can't contact your laywer?

Until and unless he's formally charged (indicted), the right to an attorney doesn't actually attach, except as has been judicially constructed/interpreted. For light reading on the topic: http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/am endment06/11.html#1 If he hasn't been arraigned yet (and it sounds like he hasn't), he doesn't technically have a right to counsel yet. (The 'custodial interrogation' right to counsel, Miranda et seq., says that an interogatee, upon clear demand for the assistance of counsel, either be provided with assistance of counsel or that interrogation stop until and unless the party under custodial arrest voluntarily reinitiates contact with his interrogators. It doesn't mean the attorney automatically gets access to the guy.)

The term you're looking for is adverse possession,

2) The question of if such searchs are "unreasonable" is a question of law.
Ok, show me case law against this interpretation, I showed case law for it. OTHER than the one in this article by a lower court.
3) The constitution gives the judical branch (not executive) the power to interperate law (thus warrents are required from a judge who decides of the searches are reasonable)
Right, and as the case law shows, there is ample evidence that the President can wiretap international calls for foriegn intellegence.

I'm not sure I understand what you mean here. Maybe I didn't put it the best way. What I'm tring to say is that its the responsibility of the judical branch to give permission or not to these "searches" in the form of warrents. The police cannot just decide on thier own if its reasonable or not, they must make the arguement to a judge (or other office of the judical branch) and have it approved or denied. On point, this is what the FISA court was designed to do. The goverment certainly has more leaway in these cases and a lower burden of proof, but the law still says in the end a judge still has oversight and ability to approve/deny requests. Unless I've missed some huge sections of law, I don't know of any case where the US government can legally just wiretap US citizens without warrents (even if the call goes over seas) Of course the president or any law enforcement office can wiretap anyone. The question is are they bypassing the judical oversight?

Also, its not so simple as just saying he is wiretaping for foriegn intelligence if it also includes a US based side of the call.
Here in my opinion is one of the better examples of the Supreme Court defining limits on wiretaps. Its (amoung other things) about the person on the end of the other line (not the person the warrent was applied for) does matter and must be considered and should be included in the warrent application if you can reasonably know who it will be.

I don't know what my full opinion on this topic is because at this point it a lot of rumors about what is happening without much fact. However, at least from what you hear it seems they have completely bypassed the judical oversight which is worrisome.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Does anyone have any estimates of how much Unisys collected in blackmail^Wlicensing fees on GIF? And any analyst estimates on the costs of producing, defending and prosecuting that "submarine patent"?

Is the flagship submarine patent really worth the money Unisys sank into it? Worth the money the US government spent protecting it? Worth it to "the progress of science and useful arts"?

And the best part is they're really hard (if not impossible) to challenge!

Hooray for executive abuses!

You sir, are an idiot. Pointing a laser at someones eye is a crime.

http://janus.state.me.us/LEGIS/STATUTES/17-A/title 17-Asec1002-A.html
http://law.onecle.com/illinois/720ilcs5/2-10.2.htm l

Pointing it at an aircraft is a bigger crime:

http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/laser/usbanach1 0405cmp.html

Thus, pointing it at a satalite is an attack.

One interesting facet of the federal constitution that many don't reflect upon is the amendment process: STATES have the final word on the shape of the federal constitution. Not Congress.

Is that so? Check out this site about how the Congress has ignored petitions under Article V of the Constitution to call a convention. SCOTUS will decide in the next few months whether or not they will hear the case. My guess is that they're going to punt it on technical reasons to avoid addressing the real issue.

I realize this is off-topic, but depending upon where the employer is located, it may be legal to fire someone based on their sexual orientation. In some states/localitites, sexual orientation is a protected trait. In other states/localities, it is not protected. So, in some situations, your employer can fire you based on the fact that you may be gay, straight, or somewhere in-between.

Here is an article on it. You have to scroll down a few pages in the PDF file.

1st. Every law that makes an action , done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2nd. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3rd. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender.

Every ex post facto law must necessarily be retrospective; but every retrospective law is not an ex post facto law.

Do they order the police and national guard to round up all gang members and get them off of our streets? ... And what happens when an individual police force tries to get tough on gangs? Civil lawsuits! The police "violated" these murderers', rapists', drug-dealers', and illegals' "rights."

...

I live in fear of my own government.

People like you, who think that the government can take away rights from people just because they're from a different country or have a different skin tone than you, are the reason that the current Congress thinks it can get away with legislature like the bill we are talking about now. You cannot have it both ways. You either support the Bill of Rights and the rule of law, or you can support dragnet round-up of gangs, and mass incarceration and deportation. We cannot bypass due process. That sort of flagrant disregard for the law is what led to a Canadian citizen getting deported by the CIA to be tortured in Syria. Besides, some MS-13 members use deportation as a free trip home, and others use it as a recruitment technique. By the way, El Salvador is in Central America, not South America.

Please think of the implications of your accusations.

Do they order the police and national guard to round up all gang members and get them off of our streets? ... And what happens when an individual police force tries to get tough on gangs? Civil lawsuits! The police "violated" these murderers', rapists', drug-dealers', and illegals' "rights."

...

I live in fear of my own government.

People like you, who think that the government can take away rights from people just because they're from a different country or have a different skin tone than you, are the reason that the current Congress thinks it can get away with legislature like the bill we are talking about now. You cannot have it both ways. You either support the Bill of Rights and the rule of law, or you can support dragnet round-up of gangs, and mass incarceration and deportation. We cannot bypass due process. That sort of flagrant disregard for the law is what led to a Canadian citizen getting deported by the CIA to be tortured in Syria. Besides, some MS-13 members use deportation as a free trip home, and others use it as a recruitment technique. By the way, El Salvador is in Central America, not South America.

Please think of the implications of your accusations.

Do they order the police and national guard to round up all gang members and get them off of our streets? ... And what happens when an individual police force tries to get tough on gangs? Civil lawsuits! The police "violated" these murderers', rapists', drug-dealers', and illegals' "rights."

...

I live in fear of my own government.

People like you, who think that the government can take away rights from people just because they're from a different country or have a different skin tone than you, are the reason that the current Congress thinks it can get away with legislature like the bill we are talking about now. You cannot have it both ways. You either support the Bill of Rights and the rule of law, or you can support dragnet round-up of gangs, and mass incarceration and deportation. We cannot bypass due process. That sort of flagrant disregard for the law is what led to a Canadian citizen getting deported by the CIA to be tortured in Syria. Besides, some MS-13 members use deportation as a free trip home, and others use it as a recruitment technique. By the way, El Salvador is in Central America, not South America.

Please think of the implications of your accusations.

2. The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, Roth, supra, at 489, (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. If a state obscenity law is thus limited, First Amendment values are adequately protected by ultimate independent appellate review of constitutional claims when necessary.

1. inclined to lustfulness; wanton; lewd: a lascivious, girl-chasing old man.
2. arousing sexual desire: lascivious photographs.
3. indicating sexual interest or expressive of lust or lewdness: a lascivious gesture.

Why not?

I thought that an individual could legally make copies of copyrighted material for the purpose of time-shifting and space-shifting.

So why is it not okay for people to do this? In MGM -vs- Napster the space-shifting argument was irrelevant since the Napster users were sharing their music with other people. But I don't know of anything to indicate that copying something to MP3 is illegal. Isn't that why the RIAA only goes after people who are distributing, not just downloading?

1) Only congress can declare war - and hence enable the wartime powers of the president (see that constitution thing).

) Even if I concede that we are at war, who is the enemy? How do we decide when it's over? A war on "terrorism" is not well defined - you can always say there may be someone plotting something that falls under that term.

We have not had a "terrorist" atrack on the US in 5 years. Where is this war you speak of? Iraq? That's "peace keeping", not war any more.

Yes, the modern world has problems that were not anticipated when the constitution was written. However, the behavior of the current administration IS the type of thing the constitution was designed to protect us from, and those protections are getting thrown out.

Article 2, Section 2, Clause 1. The President is given the role of Commander in Chief.

  The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

Discussion about the clause is here: http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/ar ticle02/07.html#3

It should be front page news. It's way more difficult to call people in high places to task than it is for the rest of us. The media, the public outcry is there to balance the incredible power to suppress that such people possess.

I'm pretty sure this is covered in Madison's commentaries on the language of the First Amendment, where he discusses the alternatives to a free press http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/am endment01/06.html; I refer to the quote "the disseminating, or making public, of bad sentiments, destructive to the ends of society, is the crime which society corrects" as being particularly interesting; I interpret it to mean poor ethics in high places should give you the boot, and the free press will help achieve it.

The alternative to a free press is often painful revolution. The fact that the American public has had it for so long is one reason for the country's incredible stability over two centuries. Count yourselves lucky you have it; the alternative is a torchlight parade, with pitchforks.