Run Your Firewall Halted for Extra Security
n8willis writes: "There's a great article over at the SysAdmin magazine site that presents a unique approach to improving network security: run your firewall in a halted state. This means runlevel 0; no processes running and no disks mounted, but with packet filtering still on. The author heard a rumor of this capability in the 2.0 series kernels, and he's managed to get it working in 2.2 as well."
Fear the Retards, 2002, Unf Unf
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Eminem's mom says hi (from under my desk).
VI
The other way to keep your computer secure is to run it in access mode standby mode.
frosty pist
Haha
Yours truly,
Rob Malda
A: This is one question that I am happy to answer because there is no bad news. You can masturbate as much as you want. Your body will tell you if you are too tired by lack of libido or inability to ejaculate.
Now for the second part of your question. Oral sex -- especially if it is vigorous -- can irritate the head of your penis. In addition to skin irritation, you can develop small blood clots in the head of your penis (like a hickey) from the suction. Don't worry, it's not dangerous. If it is still sore, warm compresses and aspirin or Advil will help it go away faster. If you have a skin irritation, try a very mild hydrocortisone cream available without prescription in your pharmacy. If the problem persists, go to a doctor for an evaluation to be sure you don't have an STD.
The owls are not what they seem
Though I usually just use the power switch. Can't beat a powered-off firewall for security.
See floppyfw. Does not even *need* a HD to boot. Floppies can be write-protected. Even an old 486 will do that trick.
Amazing what queer pranks people invent in place of a rather obvious solution...
Use The Source, Luke!
First post, will robinson.
This might be fine for a firewall whose rules never change, but if you want to actually do something to it, you can't have it halted, and rebooting will just cause downtime.
Why don't you just run with drives mounted read-only, or have everything copied to a ramdisk? Surely you can verify a rule to allow remote access from only certain locations if this is your problem, or even require serial console access.
Don't think of it as a flame---it's more like an argument that does 3d6 fire damage
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a
I used to run my ipfwadm firewall kind of like this. I replaced INIT with an ipfwadm replacement I wrote that read ipf style rules from a config file and applied them to the kernel chains, then suspended. This was all on a ramdisk. It worked pretty well, although the ramdisk had to be replaced to change rules, which was kind of inconvenient.
In the stone age of firewalling, a firewall was a fairly complicated device that was less-than-trivial to factor into your network. It needed an IP address on it's outside, and another on the inside. This immediately created subnetting problems, forcing wasted IP allocation and overall disquietude amongst the cognoscenti. It also meant that your firewall was very visible to the world, and its function was rather obvious and easy to deduce. There had to be a better way. And now there is...
Dream with me for a moment: A black box, shimmering in the soft LED-green glow of the network cabinet. You take the network cable from your router, which previously went into a switch, and stick it in one of the snappy plugs in the back of the box. There's one more plug on the black box, so you grab another cable and hook the box up to the switch. You step back, and suddenly: everything looks the same. You go to all your computers. As far as you can tell from inside and outside the network, the box doesn't exist. It does nothing. A few minutes later, you have a monitor and keyboard hooked up to the back of the box. You quickly and easily begin to tweak a file that gives you fine grained control over access to your network. You shut off all access to your mailserver from the outside world except on port 25.
Acts@core.mailboks.com Acrux@core.mailboks.com Adam@core.mailboks.com Adar@core.mailboks.com Ada@core.mailboks.com
Cann't you also hash you ack with the syn as the key so that you don't have to keep the handshake local and can maintain a stateless connection? Less chance of being overwhelmed in a DDOS?
Interesting article, but I'm wondering what the benefits are of running IPCHAINS (or whatever) at init 0 as opposed to running a stripped down linux distro from read-only media or a RAM disk?
http://www.openbsd.org
Carousel is a lie!
Bit of a shame if you want to log any attacks
on the firewall though.
With no disks mounted where can you log it to?
#exclude <ms/windows.h>
We were offering a linux-firewall, VPN solution to a hospital and turns out one of the machines we sent out had a bad token ring card, that mixed with an obscure bug in the Token ring driver, (Which has since been fixed) it would cause linux to die quite often. To the point where the computer would accept no keyboard input, would cease logging, and for all intents and purposes was a dead box. Yet the machine continued to route traffic and continued to function as a VPN.
Any listening ports were ignored, but the routing still took place. I never thought of it as a way to make the router more secure, but I guess in that way it makes since. It would really suck to have to completely shutdown everything to have to malke routing changes though, so I'm not sure this is the best solution for high availability router use.
Do you Gentoo!?
The most interesting thing I see with this is why?
It can't be managed. It can't be monitored. It can't be logged.
This may be fine as a novelty, but running a network secured with such a hack is silly.
Let's talk about shutting down all userspace processes on a box except syslog and snort and I say you've got an interesting box.
OTW - it seems just like a game.
--Adrian
Where is the log going without filesystems mounted or daemons running? Do you trust a firewall that much that you don't want to see if maybe some "interesting" patterns in traffic occur?
This is a very interesting idea.
It only works with firewalling that's inside the kernel - packet filtering and NAT. But what if kernel modules were added to handle some of the features now run in user space?
Indeed, what if kernel modules were added to handle non-firewalling tasks instead? Could a kernel module provide a useful network service? You start the machine up, it loads the kernel and "halts" but still provides the service. Something goes wrong? Just power cycle; there's no disk access, no way for an attack or malfunction to make a persistant alteration in the machine.
Tom Swiss | the infamous tms | my blog
You cannot wash away blood with blood
This troll brought to you by retard world domination in 2002, Unf Unf.
Ha ha, I chopped up my computer with an axe, now lets see you break into it, Haw Haw!
Fear the Retards.
Don't Drop the Soap.
Enjoy the Ride.
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e
This means runlevel 0; no processes running and no disks mounted, but with packet filtering still on.
When I first read this I thought it said "no processor running". Sure that'll make for great network security but it will be totally useless.
...run it unplugged! Now who will succeed to break into that?
Say no to software patents.
Ok, I'm Joe Schmoe - "runlevel 0; no processes running and no disks mounted" sounds like a pretty dormant machine to me.
What about logging for the firewall? Any way to write logs to a separate machine over a serial connection (or something) while halted?
Just log to a remote machine using syslog. Most people do this anyhow. That way if the firewall is compromised the logs are less likely to be altered and cover that compromise.
I'm a little bit ignorant around the linux firewall setup, but don't you want your firewall to do some logging? Without logging how would you figure out where a DoS attack was coming from? Someone port scanning you? Wouldn't you want to know if someone tried to access a service you blocked with your firewall? This method seems to be nice armor for your firewall, but you have no idea who just whacked you upside your head.
Brought to you by Team SPAM! where we believe: "Information in the noise!"
Halted Firewalls
/etc/rc.d/rc0.d/ directory and run all scripts that start with a K. This script would run the K90 network and K92 ipchains scripts, which would kill the network and ipchains.
w al ls/1999/Mar/0116.html
Mike Murray
As systems administrators, it's often funny how new and interesting information ends up in our hands. Sometimes, it's through an intentional course of study; other times, it seems to arrive by accident. That's exactly how the concept of using a halted Linux computer as a firewall occurred to me. I was at work, perusing an internal corporate mailing list and saw a message about something that was once present in Linux. The message referred to a method for shutting down a Linux box while ipchains is still running, and having the box continue to perform firewall tasks. My first response was to stifle a laugh -- a firewall that works while in a halted state? I contacted the author (with a bit too much sarcasm in my letter), and was sent a link to an old discussion thread on the Firewalls list about a rumored feature in the 2.0.x kernels. This feature allowed you to run shutdown -h (halt) on the machine, and the firewall would remain active but with no drives mounted and no processes running. That is, the firewall would be in run level 0, but still be filtering packets. However, the list mentioned that this no longer worked in the 2.2.x series kernels.
I knew that I couldn't leave it alone, however. I set out to make a 2.2.x box perform a similar function, and I hoped that I would be able to do it without having to patch the kernel in any way. It turns out that I can.
Perfect Security?
I realized the security implications of such a possibility. Assuming that the firewall could be cleanly shut down, having removed all process space and file systems, there would be no way for any attacker to gain access to the system. This is because there is a complete lack of process space, and there are no drives mounted. Thus, an attacker could not run code on the system outside of code that he or she could directly introduce into kernel space. This would require writing shell code to produce the desired results, which would not be a trivial task.
Note that this doesn't make the firewall invulnerable to denial of service-type attacks. In fact, with respect to denial of service and resource-exhaustion attacks, this machine is no more secure than any ordinary Linux-based firewall. However, it can also be said that it is not significantly more vulnerable to that type of attacks.
Because this method does ensure that no user will ever gain controlling access to the firewall itself, there is definitely a huge security benefit. It's a step in the direction of the old adage that the only perfectly secure machine is one turned off and locked in a room.
Implementation
My test machine was an x86-based Red Hat 6.2 machine with two Ethernet cards. No special system or kernel modifications were made. To begin, I searched the run control scripts, thinking they would be the most likely place to find a hint of what was to come. Specifically, I focused upon the scripts for rc0 (the script that runs when halting the machine). It turns out that this was all I had to do. I started removing scripts, working entirely by trial-and-error.
After a relatively short period of time, I concluded that for Red Hat Linux 6.2, removing the following scripts will allow this behavior to occur:
/etc/rc.d/rc0.d/S00killall
/etc/rc.d/rc0.d/K90network
/etc/rc.d/rc0.d/K92ipchains
Removing these three scripts keeps the network up, and keeps ipchains running. Note that removal of the killall script is necessary because its task is to recurse through the
Explanation
The design of Linux is as a monolithic kernel. When the machine is halted, the kernel still resides in memory, even when the machine runs through the shutdown process. The usual method to prevent this from being evident is to kill all possible access to the kernel during the shutdown process, which is accomplished by killing all running processes, shutting down all of the machine's network interfaces, and unmounting the filesystems. This prevents the kernel from performing any intentional tasks while the machine is "halted". However, the kernel is still running as a scheduler and memory manager at that point.
Because the kernel is still running, any kernel-based tasks that we can run in normal use can be run while halted. Of course, most tasks require some form of input and output, either through the shell (user input), the file system, or the network (as in this case). Thus, we must force the machine to allow that interface to continue to exist even while the machine is halted. This is the effect of removing the K90network script. It no longer forces the Ethernet cards to be stopped.
Additionally, any kernel-based services that are required (e.g., ipchains) must be kept running. The default behavior of the system is to flush all ipchains rules when the machine is halted. If that happens, the firewall won't be working at this point, so the machine must be forced to leave the ipchains ruleset in place by removing the script that would flush all the rules.
Limitations
Given that only utilities that run in kernel space will be left intact upon halt, the major limitation for this task is that any type of IP addressing that requires a user-space daemon (e.g., PPP, DHCP) to run will be unable to function in this case. This places a limit upon the usefulness of using this on most dynamic connections. Similarly, any sort of user-space proxy server (e.g., Socks5) will be killed on halt. Thus, only packet filtering and NAT are possible with this setup.
The other consideration is that with drives unmounted, all swap space is removed from the machine. This shouldn't be difficult in a machine that is handling even large amounts of traffic, given sufficient amounts of memory. However, in an older machine with fewer resources, it is possible to experience performance issues with extremely large amounts of traffic.
Conclusions
This discovery seems interesting as an exercise, at the very least. It gives us a model for improved security in machines that are dedicated to a specific task. I am curious to see whether this type of experiment is possible in other free Unixes (especially OpenBSD, given kernel space IPSec and pppoe). And, while there is limited application for home use, it seems that this type of firewall could be used in small to mid-size business applications to provide extremely secure packet-filtering ability. Or, perhaps this could be used to create a very secure and very high-bandwidth firewall/router for larger business tasks.
References
Firewalls Discussion thread (archived on SecurityPortal):
http://www.securityportal.com/list-archive/fire
Mike Murray is an expatriot Canadian who works as a Scientific Technologist for nCircle Network Security, where he has performed various tasks in the areas of systems administration, network security, and development. He is a graduate of the University of Toronto with a degree in Philosophy. He can be reached at: mmurray@ncircle.com.
Would it be possible to log that kind of stuff to another host on the network? Not sure if that's really possible or not...
Retard Network Security in effect!
-And the retards shall inherit the earth
RWD, 2002
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This isn't much of a firewall when there is no logging or alerting. With this approach you basically have a solid state packet filter and if that's what you want, a Linksys box would still be a better solution.
There are a lot of things that can be done but, one has to ask: Other than doing it for the sake of doing it, what's the point?
IPF can run in stealth mode. In this mode a packets TTL isn't decreased when the packet traverses the firewall. It is invisible to the netork at large.
All those of you saying that you wouldn't be able to log in this way.. why not log via syslog to a remote PC? Don't most people do this anyhow?
With logs on a seperate machine, you're much less likely to have the logs altered if the firewall is compromised too.
while reading SysAdmin magazine, i touch myself.
I just read the dead tree version of this about a week ago while sipping some coffee. It's an interesting idea to say the least, but I don't think the practice of turning the machine off and still expecting it to work will be widely accepted by any large production environment.
/.'d so I can't check my facts, but I thought it mentioned it was possible with a 2.4 kernel as well.
Essentially, I don't see why any process that runs entirely in kernel space couldn't be handled the same way. It has sparked my interest enough to build a test machine to try out this kind of thing. The site is already
Also, that was the most interesting article of the issue. It slightly miffs me that I can read it online for free, but their magazine just cost me ~5$.
I'm against picketing, but I don't know how to show it.
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In the wake of the dot-com washout, a lot people nearly wrote off cyberspace as a retailing wasteland. But last week, Amazon reported that it had finally turned a profit, something most of us thought we'd never see, and preliminary figures show a sharp upturn in online sales despite the mild recession. Some other interesting post-Christmas tidbits are popping up, too: for the first time, more women than men are buying things online, a landmark barometer of a bright digital retailing future. Beyond that, in case you haven't noticed, online retailers are getting a lot smarter. The arrogant, customer-abusive tech world could learn a lot from these people, who offer steep discounts, stand behind their products, and actually offer real and free customer support.
The final Christmas shopping figures for 2001 are not in, but some industry analysts believe the new savvy and sensitivity of online retailers might have rescued the U.S. Christmas shopping season in the wake of September 11, when a lot of people either stayed home or tightened their belts. "I can't be quoted on this until the figures are finished," a friend and research analyst e-mailed me, "but I believe online shopping really saved retailing last year. The sites and service are getting so much better, and consumer confidence in them -- especially among women -- is skyrocketing. Online retailing is not only on the rise, it's really getting to be fun and easier. More importantly, they grasp customer service, something almost no software or hardware company yet does."
If that's so, and it definitely matches my personal shopping experiences, it's huge news for the Net. Consumers, chronically abused by the software and hardware industries, were initially anxious about buying things online. They worried about hackers, crackers and security; they faced poor customer service and complex downloading and other problems. But those problems -- unlike similar headaches in the larger computer industry -- are being addressed.
Retailers competing online this holiday season were a lot shrewder, says a story on About.com about the online retailing industry.
About.com cited a survey of 63 retailers who found a successful holiday season marked by a surprisingly effective combination of widespread promotions and discounting. Most consumers hate spam, but it doesn't bother them so much if it's about things they want, and if they're getting something for the attention. Both multichannel and Web-based retailers seemed to have learned a lot from past marketing missteps. The Shop.org/Boston Consulting Group (BCG) found that more advanced retailers, after carefully studying the economics of each online and offline promotion, are finding ways to offer the minimum discounts necessary for increasing sales volume and ways to deliver targeted promotions to the more than 100 million consumers estimated to have used the Net over the holiday season.
Besides that, sites have radically improved their graphics and visual representations of products. As fears about theft and security have subsided, companies have radically upgraded their customer service. This is in striking contrast to tech industries which sell products that are confusing and difficult to use, and either makes themselves unavailable to confused or outraged customers or charge them extortionate fees for "priority service," which is really just the service they would be entitled to for free in any other business.
If you want to see smart web businesses, I'd cite two in particular -- L.L. Bean and Pet Food Direct. L.L. Bean's site architecture is brilliant -- well organized, easy to navigate. It shows clear pictures of all of its products and allows easy customer access to account information, while still providing security. More interestingly, the site offers customers several ways to get instant help -- phone, instant messaging, nearly instant e-mail response. If you're encountering problems, you can simply e-mail or call and a human will respond promptly. This support is crucial to building consumer confidence. A shopper is much more likely to risk buying something online if they know they can get help with any problems. Tech shoppers are among the most distrustful on the planet after years of confusing products and poor service.
Pet Food Direct also offers a different kind of targeted retailing, e-mailing customers weekly about specials, sales and promotions on the products they have already demonstrated they want and use regularly. This isn't quite like spamming, since it's stuff the buyer needs. And the sharp discounts have a way of offsetting any irritation. The site isn't trying to be funny or cute. Rather than promoting a silly sock puppet, it offers heavily discounted pet food and reminds pet owners when they are apt to need it. It also offers sophisticated graphic renderings of products and instant customer service both online and by telephone. The purchase takes seconds. The discounts are heavy enough to attract shoppers attention, but apparently not so heavy to erode profits. One reason is that the site, like L.L. Bean, gives the consumer a variety of shipping choices, from regular mail to next day air. And the customer pays for shipping, choosing exactly how much of a discount he or she wants. In both cases, the sites don't spam -- they target people who have bought and need their products.
Dozens of other sites have similarly polished their presentation, honed their sense of marketing and discounting and, most importantly, invested in tech support and customer service. Shoppers feel secure not only through repeated use, but through the sense that somebody will speak to them if problems arise.This is something that, alas, computer and software companies still haven't learned.Globalization Posted by JonKatz on Tuesday October 30, @11:00AM
from the the-cause-of-the-taliban-or-the-cure? dept.(First of two parts). Globalism is one of those notions much kicked around and little understood, shrouded in hysteria and knee-jerk cant. People with a host of grievances against technology, multinational corporations and capitalist democracies have made globalism a dirty word, at the same time that many social scientists and economists argue that the equitable spread of technology and a free-market economy is the planet's best hope. Either way, September 11 makes it clear that globalization - pitting fundamentalism against cosmopolitan tolerance - is one of the most important issues in our lifetimes. In fact, as British political scientist Anthony Giddens writes in his eerily prescient book Runaway World: How Globalism is Reshaping Our Lives, the conflict now underway between the United States and some extremist fundamentalists was inevitable. Cosmopolitans welcome technology and cultural diversity, while fundamentalists find it disturbing and dangerous. In a globalizing world -- one of its cornerstones being the Net -- technology, information, culture, money, business and imagery are routinely transmitted across the world. Boundaries mean different things now, including the inescapable fact that they are highly porous. This enrages political, social and religious fundamentalists, as we are hurriedly learning. They turn to religion, ethnic identity and nationalism to build "purer" traditions -- and a few turn to violence. So despite the fact that there's no consensus on exactly what globalism is (my dictionary defines it as the process by which social institutions become adopted on a worldwide scale), the questions torment us: is globalism a force to ease poverty and inequality, by bringing higher standards of living and new technologies to poor and distant regions? Or merely an unprecedented vehicle for promoting the greed, conformity, environmental destruction and profit-at-all-cost ethos of multinational corporations? Perhaps it's both. Giddens' predictions are coming true before our eyes. The conflict is here, and we seem to be unwilling and unknowing combatants. We, along with our leaders, are astonished at just how much we seem to be hated out there. We see our popular and technological culture despised in much of the world. Fundamentalist extremists have declared a holy war against it, one that may continue for years with bloody and uncertain consequences. It's not an oversimplification to say that technology is the prime battleground. Technologies from movie cameras to TV sets to the Net are the means by which culture and wealth travel from one part of the world to the other. Fundamentalists have declared war on technology as much as on anything. And from anthrax to passenger jets as missiles, they've shown a sophisticated grasp of how technology can be used to devastating effect against its creators, who revel in making it but not thinking much about it. In this conflict what Giddens calls "the cosmopolitan approach" is the choice of the people who are reading this column and working in the tech universe. We value free speech, religious freedom, scientific exploration, open communications, cultural choice and diversity. Such tolerance is closely conected to democracy. Yet democracy and fundamentalism are both spreading world-wide, two seemingly irreconcilable ideologies colliding head-on. As Giddens points out, globalism creates a paradox: democratic cultures are its most enthusiastic proponents, yet globalism doesn't seem to promote democracy so much as corporate profits and practices. In fact, you could argue that globalism seems to expose the limits of democratic structures: Can governments preserve the environment, keep work secure and equitable, ensure fair wages, control capitalism, distribute new technologies equitably, respect diverse cultural values, contain greed and restrict the imagery that Americans love but that frightens and offends large segments of the world population? In Part Two: Have multinationals hijacked globalism? (Yes.) Posted by JonKatz on Tuesday January 22, @11:00AM
from the does-tech-connect-or-disconnect? dept.
Do media/entertainment technologies connect or disconnect people? That Americans have become increasingly disconnected from one another and the social capital that binds people since the rise of TV and the Net is an idea much debated since Robert Putnam published Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community two years ago (the book is now out in paperback). The Net -- ironically the world' s most connective medium -- could be radically advancing that trend. Putnam cites numerous surveys that show that interaction with family, friends, and neighbors, and participation in social activities -- from joining civic groups and bowling leagues to voting -- has declined as Americans find more reasons to stay at home. Online, fragmentation abounds. People turn increasingly inward. The big open spaces of the Net have either been corporatized, flamed to death or shut down, and communications steadily turned to exclusive p2p "me media," the fragmented, often self-censored, personalized and specialized weblogs, IM programs and mailing lists that dominate much of online communications.
In his book, Putnam argues that our access to the "social capital" that is the payoff for community and civic work is shrinking. Though the reasons are complex, technology and mass media are primary factors, Putnam says. We spend more time at home watching TV (and, increasingly, working and amusing ourselves online) and less with other people. Our detachment from communal efforts -- and opportunities to meet other people -- grows. In l960, 62.8 percent of voting-age Americans went to the polls to choose between John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon; in l996, after decades of slippage, just 48.9 percent chose Bill Clinton over Bob Dole. The inverse correlation between the rise of screen-driven entertainment technologies and civic disconnection is persuasive. So is the epidemic hostility online.
Although Putnam's book focuses on TV more than the Net (since TV is older and its use has been more widely studied), it's impossible not to think about the new ways networked computing may contribute to this disconnection. The Net is the world's greatest communications medium, but the notion of cyberspace as providing a social connection -- remember the virtual community? -- has turned out to be a fantasy. In many ways, the intensely connective Net is helping people become more disconnected all the time. It's the new TV.
This is of no small consequence, Putnam argues. Social bounds are the most powerful predictor of life satisfaction. Communities with low social capital have poor schools, more teen pregnancies and child or youth suicide, and higher prental mortality. Social capital is also the most reliable indicator of crime rates and other measurable quality-of-life issues. Such disconnection has happened before in American life, Putnam writes, especially during periods of great migration and immigration, but it was reversed by periods of stability and the rise of organizations like the Red Cross, the Boy Scouts, and thriving religious organizations.
Of all the many dimensions along which forms of social capital vary, writes Putnam, perhaps the most important is the distinction between "bridging" (or inclusive) and "bonding" (or exclusive). Some forms of social capital are, by choice or necessity, he writes, inward looking and tend to reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups -- fraternal organizations, church-based women's reading groups, snooty country clubs. Other networks are outward looking and encompass people across diverse and different social networks -- youth service groups, civil rights organizations, ecumenical religious associations.
The Net, it was originally believed, would be a "bridging" technology, one that would connect the planet. But the most interesting evolution in software in recent years has been code that permits people to narrow, not expand, their universes. Blocking and filtering software has become epidemic to product against flamers, crackers and spammers. The explosion in weblogs, specialized mailing lists, instant messaging and other so-called p2p media means that people online increasingly talk only to one another, not to people who are different or unfamiliar. The rise of this narcissistic communications is understandable, but it hardly is inclusive. People all over the Web routinely block and filter points of view they don't like or don't want to hear (or buy), so nobody online really ever has to encounter all that discordant diversity that digital technology makes possible. More disconnection.
Thanks in part to the Net, Americans have never had so many reasons to stay home, so many entertaining or useful options when they do. I remember an e-mail I got from a grandmother last year lamenting all the TV ads showing AOL grandmas getting pictures of their grandchildren. "That's nonsense," she says. "My kids don't visit me nearly as much because they feel they can just e-mail me. I love digital pictures, but I rarely get to see my grandchildren in person." Her lament -- the illusion of connection, while facing the reality of tech-spawned separation -- was intriguing.
The rise of the Net would seem to have exacerbated this tendency. Americans had already been spending an enormous amount of time watching television. Putnam found that 80 percent of all Americans watch some TV every evening, while only about 60 percent talk with their families nightly, let alone neighbors, strangers or others. Watching TV has become one of the few universal experiences of contemporary American life.
Increasingly, the Net is one too. It promises consumer use as great as television's, if not greater, since work connects with home. This seems especially ironic, since the Net was supposed to be one of the most powerful devices ever for connecting with humans. Mostly, it connects us with bits and links. In a sense, it is a connective medium. We can stay in touch with friends, colleagues and family members all over the planet. But Americans use the Net to get free data from music to weather, send messages, play games, shop and talk about sex. So the Net could exacerbate the techno-trend that television began. We're e-mailing and browsing alone as well as bowling. The Net could have an ever more striking impact, since it enables users to do things TV doesn't -- like play games and shop for nearly everything. Those, among others, were activities that people once had to go outside to do, where they might glimpse or even speak with a neighbor -- or go bowling.
America was founded partly on the notion of common civic spaces -- taverns, greens. A lot of cyber-idealists thought the Net was becoming our new common space. That hasn't happened. Nasty teenagers, spammers and greedy corporatists have made common turf on the Net either too expensive, hostile or annoying for most people to spend much time on.
Putnam's idea about social capital might be even more timely relevant than he understood.
Give it to me, Yah baby, feed me Karma
This whore brought to you by Karma for retards
RWD 2002
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Don't fear the retard, dude!
"Why did they cancel my favorite Sci-Fi show? I downloaded ALL the episodes!"
The kernel is still executing, as is IPChains (obviously)..If IPChains has any exploits, what is to stop a hacker from being able to modify the firewall configuration in memory, thus punching holes in the firewall?
This method causes the firewall to act as a bridge instead of a router. The advantage is that the firewall is not IP-addressable. To hack it, you'd have to go down to the MAC layer, which is generally only possible if you're on the same network segment.
I read the SysAdmin article a month ago and thought the same thing. The OpenBSD Invisible Firewall is a much better solution -- you can't hack it from the outside, but you can still make any changes necessary without causing downtime.
Software sucks. Open Source sucks less.
I don't think this is totally useless.. Everyone is saying that you would have to reboot to change the routing info. I say that can be fixed... Add in the khttpd, add some extra features to it to process form on particular pages, to interact with the routing tables. Voila, you have modifiable routes. The only problem I can see is that doesn't khttpd require a filesystem (ram or otherwise?)..
Overall I see that this could have several uses, not just for routing. You would just have to write a kernel module that could do the task that you want. Could be interesting for embedded systems.
Slashdot is like Playboy: I read it for the articles
We use a simple clay brick as our firewall. Makes our internal network virtually unpenetrable.
This is kind of ridiculous because it requres you to take the whole firewall down to make rule changes. Why not just blackhole all packets with the firewall's interface addresses as destination, and leave a local serial console with password authentication and idled running?
Alternately, this is kind-of a solution for embedded firewalls or something.. maybe for tiny flash-card bootable network probes (remember firewalls are routers and can be made to do nasty things too) that you boot and then eject the flash media...
--- Nothing clever here: move along now...
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Just bought a pack of Gillette Blue II Plus "Ultra Grip" blades and some sensitive skin shaving gel.
The owls are not what they seem
I don't know how bulletproof they are, but they're a snap to set up.
Couldn't one simply also remove K88syslog from /etc/rc.d/rc0.d/ and log all messages to a remote syslog server?
This is a really neat idea, although I imagine still not practical. To make any configuration changes, it'd be a pain.
-davidu
# Hack the planet, it's important.
If the filesystem is down, then does this mean that logging is halted?
Or could you re-direct the logs?
At home, I run two servers - one inside the firewall with NFS services and so on, and the firewall itself, which is a self-sufficient machine except during boot, where it netboots from the NFS server. After that point, its two NICs are only used for routing packets. All administration takes place through the serial port, which init respawns /bin/sh onto. The system runs off of a ramdisk loaded during the netboot. I've found this to be a nice solution, and it rules out any possibility of breach since the machine is only accessible through a serial port hardwired to the server - ethernet interfaces are configured to only route packets.
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h
You seem to be ignoring the security you get wiuth Connectiva
[http://securityfocus.com/vulns/stats.shtml]
0xC3
when there are better solutions out there?
ceci n'est pas une signature
There's no syslog running anymore.
Dumbass.
You can't have syslog running in runlevel 0.
There have been some great comments to this article (which I haven't read) but I got to wondering: if you're going to run in a sort of comatose state where your only ability to change the system is to reboot it, why bother booting in the first place?
My idea was to use the Linix BIOS or something similar, and run your packet filtering from there. Then you can forget the hard drive and floppy (though you'd probably want that floppy to be able to flash your BIOS with updates and the like.)
Does this make sense to anyone? Or is there something I'm overlooking like maybe that while running as a BIOS, Linux wouldn't be able to talk to the network interfaces, say?
I guess if you're going to go to that kind of trouble, you might as well have an embedded system, or run from flash RAM, as others have mentioned. Still, it's always fun to get hardware and software to do things beyond what they were designed to do.
This is roughly equivalent to a briding firewall with no assigned IP address. No one can ever connect remotely.
A bridging firewall as the advantage of still being administrable from the local console.
{{.sig}}
Hmmm.
I wonder if you could keep enough of the filesystem up to run, say, firewalling and TUX. (TUX *is* a kernel-resident www server, correct?)
If so, that's a neat possibility. Serve web pages off a machine runlevel 0 machine.
I use LEAF/LRP based routers a lot, I'm going to fiddle with one of them and see if I can't get them to run halted.
Ed R.Zahurak
You know, oblivion keeps looking better every day.
another cmdertaco-less article
security through obscurity = modding down anti-linux posts so maybe noone will see them
...so what do I do? :-)
In fact one time my gateway machine crashed and I didn't notice it until I tried to check my imap box there, it didn't had a squid proxy at this time, so I continued sufring with no problem. The total time since it crashed was about half day.
It was a linux 2.3.x linux box, but I didn't try to reproduce it again.
Paradise Lost peaked with the Icon album, although some would say their last good one was Gothic.
Discuss.
"Why did they cancel my favorite Sci-Fi show? I downloaded ALL the episodes!"
I had my server running the firewall. Needed to format a floppy. dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/hda.....Oops. Say, honey, you better check your email one last time and then I'll reinstall the server.
Hate trolls? Troll 'em back...at home!
it's not working
is the system i have at home. i look at each incoming packet on paper and then pass it on the the lan if it looks legit. the only way to punch a hole in the firewall is with a shotgun at my belly..
I'm missing something here, is the linux kernel now pageable? If not, how is lack of swap an issue?
-michael
Bah, I've got an old Pentium with some faulty memory that crashes on a regular basis.
It's been reliably packet-forwarding for me for over a month with a kernel-oops on screen.
As other people have pointed out there will be no
syslog running in runlevel 0.
I guess you could always run the video out into
a VCR... or use a serial console and a line printer.
#exclude <ms/windows.h>
Imagine a Beowolf Cluster of THESE!!!
Maybe this is a stupid question, but on all of my boxes, after I run shutdown -h and all of the killall scripts are run, it runs S01halt, which then calls either halt or reboot. This either stops the processor (soft power down) or else reboots the thing. The author didn't mention how he avoided this problem in his efforts - if you want the box to run in run level 0, you have to also disable the script that runs at that run level that shuts down the machine. Otherwise your machine really will be halted and there won't be any firewalling going on. Or more precisely, everything will be firewalled :) Did he not mention this problem, or did I just miss it somehow?
Assuming that this works, I don't see a whole lot of advantage to this over just using a firewall that's booted from a read-only floppy firewall distribution. Except that if you could come back from run level 0 (not sure if you can or not) then you could remount the disks, make a change to your firewalling rules, and then return to the halted mode. That might be a minor advantage over floppyfw systems.
Your right to not believe: Americans United for Separation of Church and
I bought Host and Believe in Nothing just out of curiosity. I had never heard the new PL sound. Host wasn't that good (Behind the Gray was perhaps the best track), but I really like the latest CD. They've toned down the "Depeche Mode" sound and the lovely riffs are back.
The owls are not what they seem
If your data needs that much security, you shouldn't have it connected to the internet in the first place.
I DO miss the old Academy Studios sound though. Did you know Academy, as it was, isn't around anymore? It was a lovely studio - with the staircase lined with old vinyl. My own band recorded there a few years back! :)
The studio has been moved to either Mags' or Keith Appleton's house now, and has taken the big step onto digital, which ain't too bad. (Our new album's been done digitally, at another studio, and our battered ears can't tell any difference from a purely analogue setup.)
Metal!
"Why did they cancel my favorite Sci-Fi show? I downloaded ALL the episodes!"
...at the ability of some to (re)discover very mundane things. Even not halted, just booting up the kernel into bash instead of init provides an excellent level of security. It's been standard (at least for some people I know and me) practice for years! We even developed a linux firewall (in beta right now) doing just that.
In my opinion, Scientology is a cult you should avoid.
This is shit, the kernel itself is not swapable, never ever is going to be any part of a monolithic kernel in swap, at least without it being a little less monolithic.
And by the way you don't need huge amounts of ram to route traffic, with 16Mb you have almost enougth to route a satellite link (high speed pipe, very high latency), and I'm pretty sure you can route with only 4 megs (and a 386sx12), been there, done that.
The rest it's ok, and true, but I managed to know it by watching a crashed kernel route & NAT a network (it was a 2.3.x dev. version).
1. Does the kernel swap out stuff like routing tables or partial packets when it's packet forwarding? I don't think so, so having no swap space should be a non-issue.
1A. If it does use swap space, can't swap space continue to be mounted when the machine is in this state? Swap space is an extension of memory, and if the machine goes down, it doesn't really matter what's in there anyway.
2. An older machine will have performance issues with large amounts of traffic. This doesn't have anything to do with swap, though: it's based on CPU speed, and maybe a little bit on memory bandwidth. Then again, if your connection to the outside world is fast enough to saturate an "older" computer, you must have one hell of a connection. (I think a 486, doing nothing but packet filtering/forwarding, should be able to keep up on a T1, no sweat. Probably even on 10Mbs ethernet.)
... can achieve almost the same thing.
man securelevel
man chflags
gd
This sure brought up an intresting idea
what if one was to combine both methods
(transparent bridging) and halted state
firewall in one device.
Hmmmm.........
AP
SunScreen has been doing this for quite some time.
Read about it here
http://windows.scares.us
So the obvious question: how long before someone attempts this with the 2.4 kernel and IPTables?
I had my firewall's IDE controller go up in smoke, but the Linux kept chuggin' along. I couldn't log in or do anthing to the box, and the display was full of errors, but it still was routing for the rest of the network. now that was security.
---
I post links to stuff here
Then how would I telnet to my firewall from school?
*dodges flying shoes*
;)
Klowner
As the article points out, the kernel continues to run when halted, so the first part of the solution is to signal the kernel to transition out of run-level 0 in a safe way. There used to be ISA cards for debugging that had a push-button at the end of a cable; when pushed, an interrupt was triggered to invoke the debugger. I can't see any reason why the Linux kernel couldn't be patched to watch for that interrupt while halted and restart the boot process, say from the point where a boot disk is mounted. The second step would be to modify the init.d scripts affecting the IP stack to abort if the NICs are already configured.
The end result would be a firewall with a button that, when pressed, would cause the system to "wake up" and allow configuration changes to be made. When you're all done, just do another "init 0". To guard against forgetful netadmins, you may want a watchdog process that also does an "init 0" fifteen minutes after the system comes up.
I can't see any show stoppers to this idea. What do you think?
Nothing for 6-digit uids?
Why not lock out all new processes and only allow login at a specific time? Say for 2 minutes at 12 past the hour you can connect to the machine to make your changes, new processes won't be killed, at all other times all new processes (that are not essential) are terminated at the kernel level. That's better than a solid state firewall and loose anytime access firewall.
Causing Chaos Everywhere,
Nik J.
The strange world of a loner, in a populous city, drowning in society
That's a tremendous waste of a computer. If that's all you're doing, you might as well use a network appliance for a firewall.
-------------------------
Stupid people suck.
Okay, so do anyone know of a cheap place to get rackmount 1U's, like, with just a pentium, network card and cdrom?
:)
Take this idea, a cheap rackmount, a readonly boot medium, and you have a very very secure device.
Possibly the ultimate in security?
GPL'd web-based tradewars themed space game
no need for it. the fw is acting as a *client* for syslog. syslog would be running on the log server.
The main drawback of course would be that changing iptables rules would be a painful process of rebooting and maybe 30 seconds of downtime (in an optimally configured setup).
There has to be a simple way to hack the kernel to "revive" from runlevel 0 with certain key presses locally?
If so, this would make another powerful method of running production Linux firewalls. IMPOSSIBLE to root remotely, and you can change iptables rules without downtime locally.
Wow, good comments.
If you wanted to do this, why not go with the bridged firewall solution instead? Any advantage this has over that?
maybe they should try to cluster their firewall. lol.
Hi all...
:)
As the author of the article being discussed, I wanted to point out one of my own errors. I discussed the lack of swap-space as a limitation to the setup; however, the linux kernel isn't pageable, so swap space would have no effect on the performance of the firewalling code.
I've had a few people point that out, so I wanted to post that correction publically.
Feel free to email me at mmurray@ncircle.com if you have questions or commments...
Mike
Frankly, with all of the discussion centered around administering a machine that's at runlevel 0 or fully stealthed with no IPs, etc., I'm surprised that no one (so far) has mentioned hardware-based remote access products such as Compaq's Remote Insight boards (many other server vendors have similar products).
For ~$500 you get a board that replaces your keyboard, mouse, and video controllers, has its own built-in ethernet adapter (that is invisible to the rest of the computer - it's dedicated to remote access) and an SSL-secured web server. You can completely control the machine via a java applet. You can even cold-boot it if it's in a hung state (and, of course, view any errors on the screen while the machine's in a hung state). Other features include a virtual floppy drive that allows you to copy data to and from the machine (you can even boot off of the virtual floppy). There's plenty of additional coolness; the only downside is that Compaq cards only work in Compaq Proliant servers, HP cards only work in HP servers, etc...
Help save the critically endangered Blue Iguana
It's quite useful to log both on and off the box (even better if you set it up so the off-box logging is reasonably invisible on the firewall), and compare the logs between the two for differences.
Cool! I just halted my BlackIce service. If I hadn't read this article, I would never have known that doing that would make me more secure.
:) You rock. I don't have to worry about my hard drive shares being exposed now...
Thanks Slashdot
Funny.
You forgot to call him a dumbass.
A stealth firewall does not have an IP address -- it's a MAC-layer bridge rather than a router, and like the "halted" Linux box your firewall cannot be compromised from the outside world.
RFM
And in addition, as others have said, you can afford not to log it, and if---just when you think you can "afford a very static set of firewall rules"---you reboot, you can afford network downtime. This sucks.
OK, now this is a kind of straw man and slippery slope. Just because you "offer a shell", doesn't mean anyone can get it. Running a getty off the serial port isn't going to be susceptible to remote attacks. Only stuff you put on the network is a problem. And if they've got physical access, all bets are off anyway. Just because you're running processes doesn't make you vulnerable.
It isn't necessarily the case it'll be "child's play," but it will be possible. If you're not experienced, you shouldn't let this novelty solution lull you into thinking you're secure. Ask or hire someone with experience to help.
"And if you're screwed, you're screwed." Duh.
Don't think of it as a flame---it's more like an argument that does 3d6 fire damage
Aren't we forgetting the most important security feature of a firewall...? There's no logging! This is fly by the seat of your pants security if you ask me. You gonna hang a lucky rabbit's foot over the thing?
Isn't that kind of like Windows firewall?
I mean, they're always freezing to a halted state too
Tim Dorr
Owner/Manger
A Small Orange
The kernel runs with four different levels of security. Any super-user process can raise the security level, but no process can lower it. The security levels are:
- -1 Permanently insecure mode - always run the system in level 0 mode.
This is the default initial value.
- 0 Insecure mode - immutable and append-only flags may be turned off.
All devices may be read or written subject to their permissions.
- 1 Secure mode - the system immutable and system append-only flags may
not be turned off; disks for mounted filesystems,
/dev/mem, and /dev/kmem may not be opened for writing; kernel modules (see
kld(4)) may not be loaded or unloaded.
- 2 Highly secure mode - same as secure mode, plus disks may not be
opened for writing (except by mount(2)) whether mounted or not.
This level precludes tampering with filesystems by unmounting them,
but also inhibits running newfs(8) while the system is multi-user.
In addition, kernel time changes are restricted to less than or
equal to one second. Attempts to change the time by more than this
will log the message ``Time adjustment clamped to +1 second''.
- 3 Network secure mode - same as highly secure mode, plus IP packet
filter rules (see ipfw(8) and ipfirewall(4)) cannot be changed and
dummynet(4) configuration cannot be adjusted.
-FzzCan't Break it.
Can't Break in.
Instead of logging to the parallel port of the printer, you could send it to the serial port connected to a second machine through a null modem cable. The second machine could log all the input received from ttySx. The logging machine wouldn't even need to be connected to the network in any way, so it would be secure as well.
An untouched TTL is not the core factor which provides stealth; it's the non-creation of ICMP time exceededs, which tend to originate from the router's IP address and thereby expose the hop. If these are silenced, few other clues to the router's identity remain. (well, let's ignore esoteric ICMPs).
WARNING: TTL was meant to be decremented to thwart a particularly nasty problem: infinite routing loops. If you ever notice a ever-wrapping packet count on the loopback interface, or a solid activity light between two of these dementedly configured routers, you might have just fscked yourself.
What am I thinking? It's halted, you wouldn't be able to remotely log in to administer it. D'oh.
See what happens when you post right after getting out of bed?
This would work for an invisible firewall however, which is what I was thinking about when I wrote the above post.
Do you even know anything about perl? -- AC Replying to Tom Christiansen post.
somebody mod down this dumbass to -1.
We'll know for sure if the next iteration of Windoze continues to run internet connection sharing after BSOD....
go hit compusa and pick up a linksys, will ya?
I have a weirdo-paranoid firewall/NAT-box running an ultra-stripped-down OpenBSD. I have put weirdo-paranoid security on it. The only open port is ssh, and you have to be inside my home network to reach it.
It would be a lot easier to crack the very few daemons (apache, etc) running on my Linux box on the other side (that the firewall routes) than to crack the firewall itself. I could imagine someone exploiting apache, getting ssh access to the Linux box somehow, and thus ending up behind the firewall.
At that point, the security of the firewall can be as good as it wants to (which IMHO it is), but the network it's supposed to protect has compromised due to the ports it DOES forward. Why would said cracker even bother to try to exploit the firewall (with one port open, mind you) at that point? To open up ports, perhaps, but he can just use existing forwarded services to do his dirty work.
Bottom line? Every sysadmin already knows this, but firewalls do not make your box magically secure. A secure firewall only goes so far.
A strange but maybe working idea would be memory that you could writeprotect. I dunno if this has been done yet but it would make servers damn hard to hack if you could specify what memory can be written and not by hardware settings. Like a separate chip thats not interfaced to the processor but sits between memory and cpu and has an own interface for settings. A chip that just blatantly says no when anything other than read are passed thru to that memory adress. It should be very hard to brake the apps that was protected. Strange idea, strange and probably silly....
HTTP/1.1 400
Thanks for the laugh..
It plays hell with your uptime. We all know that's more important to /. users than security, right?
Bonus points to anybody who does this and then submits an nmap fingerprint of it...
Better yet, get a NULL parallel cable and connect it to another PC. Set up the other PC to log anything coming over the cable. Your firewall can then "print" the logs to the other system, without ever mounting a file system!
- Rob Cottrell
Just testing my user id #56 really. :)
The dangers of knowledge trigger emotional distress in human beings.
I've read nearly all of the posts on logging. Most people recommended using the firewall as a syslog client (to a printer, serial port, ethernet port, etc.).
I am unclear, however, exactly how this can be accomplished. Would we need to prevent another process from shutting down (like we did with ipchains and the network)? Also, how can one do remote logging to a serial port or printer when /dev isn't mounted?
I appreciate anyone who can explain the process and/or answer my questions. Thanks.
Check out Chad's News
I guess we didn't need those $60k Marconi and Nokia units after all!
If you're interested in this, also see FreeBSD's kern.securelevel facility. From the init(8) manpage:
/dev/mem, and
/dev/kmem may not be opened for writing; kernel modules (see
The kernel runs with four different levels of security. Any super-user
process can raise the security level, but no process can lower it. The
security levels are:
-1 Permanently insecure mode - always run the system in level 0 mode.
This is the default initial value.
0 Insecure mode - immutable and append-only flags may be turned off.
All devices may be read or written subject to their permissions.
1 Secure mode - the system immutable and system append-only flags may
not be turned off; disks for mounted filesystems,
kld(4)) may not be loaded or unloaded.
2 Highly secure mode - same as secure mode, plus disks may not be
opened for writing (except by mount(2)) whether mounted or not.
This level precludes tampering with filesystems by unmounting them,
but also inhibits running newfs(8) while the system is multi-user.
In addition, kernel time changes are restricted to less than or
equal to one second. Attempts to change the time by more than this
will log the message ``Time adjustment clamped to +1 second''.
3 Network secure mode - same as highly secure mode, plus IP packet
filter rules (see ipfw(8) and ipfirewall(4)) cannot be changed and
dummynet(4) configuration cannot be adjusted.
If the security level is initially nonzero, then init leaves it
unchanged. Otherwise, init raises the level to 1 before going multi-user
for the first time. Since the level can not be reduced, it will be at
least 1 for subsequent operation, even on return to single-user. If a
level higher than 1 is desired while running multi-user, it can be set
before going multi-user, e.g., by the startup script rc(8), using
sysctl(8) to set the ``kern.securelevel'' variable to the required secu
rity level.
You know, this brings up some interesting points. I'm not quite sure anymore whether or not this'd work. I was thinking a serial line, but is /dev mounted at runlevel 0? I might just have to set this up and try it out. If I get a chance to do so soon, I'll reply here and let you all know.
MOD THIS UP!
If you bring the system down to runlevel 0, is init still running or is it terminated??
/bin/init again, thereby causing a 'reboot' of the system without actually reloading the kernel (and therefore no downtime)
:)
Perhaps it is possible to hack the 'magic sysrq key' code to either tell init to go back to another runlevel or to tell the kernel to start loading
Change the config, and then bring it down to runlevel 0 again.
That would be almost as safe as the original idea, because the sysrq function can only be accessed from the system's console, which is ofcourse located in some secured serverroom
Figure I should toss in some info here: note that I posted a correction below. Given that the kernel isn't pageable, swap space won't ever be an issue.
:)
As far as CPU performance goes, I tested this on a 486DX/66, and I could run full 10Mb ethernet links saturated without any packet loss with a minimal ruleset (but running NAT [masquerading]).
Thought that might be useful info...
No, it's still needed. By itself, the kernel can only log to its ring buffer in memory. To send kernel messages to a remote syslog server, you need klogd to grab them and send them to syslogd, which sends them to the remote server.
It's probably possible to add this functionality to the kernel, but it's not there now.
$ find
How does this work? It would seem like packet filtering would require a process or two.. how can you having it working at a runlevel which has no processes running?
Security (especially security by obscurity) must remain useful and not get too much in the way of doing one's job. Using that criteria, running the firewall on a halted OS is pretty stupid. One cannot use the firewall for an IPSEC endpoint (key negotiation happens in user space). One cannot log events (also in user space). One cannot remotely administer the firewall (all in user space). These things are all bad in much the same way that obscure naming conventions are bad---they get in the way of operating and trouble-shooting the network.
While we're on the subject, another tremendously bad idea is using an interior light timer to control a physical connection between two servers (e.g. a bastion host uploading data to an internal server). The only thing this does is limit the window of opportunity to a pre-set (and predictable) time, while increasing the chance of interrupting whatever the connection is there for. Physical security hacks like this should be the last thing one does (after locking down a box, setting up encryption, etc.), not the first.
I'm proud of my Northern Tibetian Heritage
If you think that freesco has logging that could be more robust, try running syslog on a halted system ;)
LedgerSMB: Open source Accounting/ERP
Management is one reason I like SPARC so much. IE, connect a serial line to even a decade+ old Sun Pizzabox and manage via OpenPrompt. Even if the operating system is hosed you can still reach the OK prompt and reboot, or perform other tasks. Further, you can use the OK prompt to do network boots out of the box.
The Compaq cards do have an upside, however, in that the way you describe them it seems that you can foobar the 'parent' machine and still use the card. It does use power from the parent machine, so both SPARC's OpenPrompt and this card will be null if the host machine loses power.
I really wish x86 engineers would develop something similar to a server-class BIOS implementation. Don't get me wrong, modern x86 CPUs are great, but the BIOS has got to grow up.
Why not just avoid starting all services, and verify with "netstat" that there's no processes listening.
If there's not a single process listening on sockets (shown by netstat), then only the kernel is around doing it's masquerading, routing, etc., just as per runlevel 0.
While it's a cute trick, why limit *all* your potential functionality (flipping on ftp for 15 minutes, to let a buddy upload a file).
-me
Love many, trust a few, do harm to none.
Than you for this wondeful troll. These are the things that make my life worth living.
i was using that pigeon WAN for a while. but after a bunch of hawks migrated to my area it dropped too many packets. at one point i totally lost all connection. so had to give up that pegion WAN. besides it left a lot of fragmented packets near my network and was a bitch to clean up.
Or... you could just use one of these:
- D-Link DFE-570tx 4-port 32bit PCI fast Ethernet adapter
Not cheap in any case -- but it'll sure open up some PCI slots!Phobos P430 (same thing)
Adaptec 6944a Discontinued model, cheaper -- still 4-port, still 10/100
Or, if you're lucky enough to be playing with 64 bit PCI @ 66 MHz... there's the newer Adaptec stuff.
Adaptec 64044 4-port 64bit/66MHz PCI fast Ethernet adapter
Now, to answer the Rick's "Feasible? Stupid?" question...
- Feasible? Certainly. These cards are basically 4 Ethernet chipsets put on one card. The Phobos one uses an Intel DS21143 setup, and can be addressed with generic Linux drivers (tulip.o) as 4 separate devices.
Something worth considering though -- it'd make for less hardware, and it's something I find attractive for home use -- a combined worry-free firewall + home file server + seamless internet access... nice idea.Stupid? Possibly. Everything coming in from the internet has to pass through the bridge first, and thus pass its' rules. Nothing can directly address it. Pretty much perfectly invulnerable. The only real vulnerability would be a DoS, but that depends on the rules you've plugged into the firewall. In any case, it's impossible to directly compromise the firewall portion of the machine.
Having the machine providing other services does mean, however, that if something is somehow compromised that your firewall is compromised too -- it's a risk you have to weigh yourself.
Imagine you're running a webserver on the machine -- with a vulnerable CGI. Someone discovers this, and takes over what they think is "only" a webserver -- only to find they've taken over your company's firewall, too! Ouch.
"...America's great minds of today, teaching America's great minds of tomorrow. Poor bastards." -- A Beautiful Min
... the system isn't halted. Basicaly this person just shut down all user-space daemons. >yawn
The same effect could be had using an inittab that only runs the firewall setup script at boot time.
OpenBSD, FreeBSD, and even Linux can be run as bridges with full filtering, without having to issue the machine so much as an IP address!
IMHO, this is far preferable to running Linux in a halted state. Just as secure, and
You don't run anything on your firewall that would allow anyone access to it except via the console (for reboots, etc).
Isn't that the whole idea behind a firewall in the first place? A box that doesn't run anything besides what's necessary to allow access through it?
Excuse me, but DUH?
That does it! for $35 I can use my Dreamcast as a firewall. Just gotta get a cross compiler, some BSD stuff and I should be in halted mode on a CD-R in no time :P Oops! there goes my NAT. At least I won't get h4x3d cos they can't write to the GDROM
Can you say "fork bomb"? I can:
/bin/true ]
/dev/urandom > /dev/null &
coyote# while [
> do
> cat
> done
Just did this on my coyote box and it's still passing traffic and logging remotely. Here's an entry from my syslog server:
Feb 8 19:14:54 hades kernel: VM: killing process cat
Feb 8 19:15:47 hades kernel: Packet log: input DENY eth1 PROTO=17 10.34.64.1:67 255.255.255.255:68 L=328 S=0x00 I=15781 F=0x0000 T=255 (#22)
One you hit your memory limit, you aren't launching anything else.
:-)
-- I speak only for myself.
First, let me qualify my experience. I am familiar with OpenBSD -- what I use for my firewall -- not Linux. I have done many boxes with multiple identical cards, and never had them 'come up' in a different configuration than I had originally configured. Ever. I never gave it much thought, and I really have no idea exactly how it's prevented -- MAC address, perhaps? It'd make sense, at least to me...
I don't believe there'd be any danger of cards randomizing on every reboot -- there are far too many people out there using multiple interfaces to not allow that problem -- if there was one -- to be addressed.
Now, as far as this solution being aimed at home use... There are many people who wish to run services from their home network. Mail, file services, a proxy for their websurfing while at work... not all these services are 100% secure. Yes, I know I used business examples, but the same vulnerabilities could happen at home. Heck, when Code Red went around, look at all the home-based servers that were affected! The home/business line is very blurred.
"...America's great minds of today, teaching America's great minds of tomorrow. Poor bastards." -- A Beautiful Min
WTF does this have to do with running a minimalist firewall on a sub $500 box?
Our new Proliants run about $15k and that's buying 2000+ of them.
The interesting lesson, though, "kiddies," is that there are some interesting games to be played if you look at init with a view to rearchitecting how it works.
Typically, init is a program that starts some services, starts up some gettys , and then we can log in and do the traditional Unix stuff that we usually don't think much about.
In this case, the system essentially runs init-less.
Another approach would be to build a highly customized init that doesn't run the whole of user space, but rather just runs a few firewall-related programs.
- Mount a filesystem;
- Run an IP-chain loader;
- Perhaps run pppoe ;
- Unmount the filesystem, maybe.
And you have something smaller that doesn't work quite as hard getting things going, but leaves pppoe around to do a little bit of work.Other approaches could be taken to build quite different things:
Throw in that shell scripts in Bash are deprecated; it is considered preferable to have your programs written in Forth.
If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the precipitate.
Some people so far have mentioned that even having anything loaded in RAM creates a danger.
:) :) :) ) and just run almost everything directly out of that after booting. Though that would require some really nifty programming more then likely. :) It would DEFINTLY not be something that any random hacker would suspect, hehe.
Would it be possible to create a system that uses Static RAM (Smart cards, whatever) and have two sticks of it inserted?
One that you boot from and read the firewall rules and such out of, and another 8 meg or so stick that is used just for proccessing things.
Some types of flash cards now days have read write tabs on them, after your OS has loaded and all and you have got things how you want it, halt it, and then switch the tab on your main memory stick so that it is read only.
The 8 meg stick would have previously been assigned to be used for working with packets and such that the firewalls needs to do.
Even better of course would be if you could get a CPU with a nice sized Cache on it (hmmmm, K6-3s, hehe. External cache up to what, 8 megs?
Need help treating your acne? Come here!
If you want max security, you also need to look at your eeproms. In other words, the flash bios's that are present in your system. Those can be rewritten by an attacker and have malicious code executed. The hardware way to deal with it would be to replace the eeprom with a prom or eprom. But that's probably too much work for most people. The easy solution is to have a md5 (or maybe something better? I seem to recall an attacker being able to modify an image and still have the generated md5 look the same) of your bios image and whatever else you have in your system. On a read-only floppy (at the hardware level) coupled with that invisible firewall, logging, and maybe some other memory tricks, such as that read-only memory someone else proposed. That would make a really damned secure system.
So, you set up a computer as a firewall, and decide to make it as secure as possible. Well, for a simple 2 computer home network, this is just fine, but you've already blown far more money on the computer and 2 NICs than you would on a $100 4-port switch+router+firewall linksys. Also, you can no longer use that computer.
That and your computer sucks up far more electricity.
It's interesting, but I doubt it's worthwhile.
What packet size you tried? I bet it cannot handle
traffic if a lots of packets are minimum size
(up to 14800 packets per second).
I have gotten annoyed by amount of these this configuration is impossible to root remotely posts.
I mean how do you know? Linux kernel is a piece of software too and has contained a major amount of holes. You can never know whether it would be possible to break in to the host using some remote exploitable vulnerability in kernel, the chances are just small.
Even worse, if somebody manages to break in, you have no log information what so ever that would help you to notice what happened.
Remote Access is what hackers dream of, and in runlevel 0, they dream of it even more, come on, is manual administration all that much of a pain? Geez, Remote Access kinda takes the point out of securing a system, now doesn't it. If you really need remote admin that much, go buy a server off of eBay and connect a 20' serial cable to it and use a serial console.
Your approach to securing a Linux firewall is an interesting exercise because it highlights the issues of many software firewalls that depend upon the host OS for their own security. 3Com sells an embedded firewall NIC that provides a packet filter which is managed by a management interface that runs off box. Thus, there is not even a management process on the protected host for an attacker to take control of. Even the firewall administrator cannot spawn a process on the firewall NIC. The NIC sends its audit data over the network to the firewall administrator's machine (encrypted of course). This allows the administrator to manage the firewall without being onsite. The embedded firewall on a NIC provides a very secure yet inexpensive firewall for single host. It is cheaper and smaller than dedicating an entire box. It also addresses the remote management and auditing issues others have raised. This makes is very interesting for remote machines that must be protected by an administrator at the central office. It should give you everything your halted firewall does plus remote management.