AMI Guy Talks About TCPA, Palladium, and Other BIOS Issues
Preface:
I thought it might be handy for the audience to know who's handling their questions ...
My name is Brian Richardson. I work for American Megatrends, Inc . (AMI). AMI is a privately held company located in Norcross, GA (just north of Atlanta). We employ approximately 400 people worldwide (about 200 in the United States).
I am a "BIOS Sales Engineer", responsible for handling technical issues related to selling and marketing the AMIBIOS8 , our latest BIOS code revision. This includes writing whitepapers, demonstrating products, answering technical sales questions, speaking at industry conferences and handling requests from the press that may require more than a passing knowledge of technology (like this one).
I started at AMI in 1996. I've been in this job for two years. Before that I wrote BIOS code for our notebook team and helped design our Software Quality Automated Testing (SQuAT) system. I also maintain several company intranets and our Bugzilla server, used for tracking bugs during BIOS development.
In spare time, I serve on the board of directors of Tech Corps Georgia. I also managed the Hardware section of linux.com (old articles are archived at linux.omnipotent.net).
This interview covers BIOS in general, but the questions have a heavy slant towards TCPA & Palladium. I'm sure I won't address everybody's TCPA related questions here. AMI has a "TCPA and AMIBIOS8" whitepaper at our website which discusses AMI's implementation. There are also links to other information on TCPA.
To answer some of the more unusual questions that didn't make it into the Top 10:
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You use XOR to clear a register instead of a simple MOV instruction because of the instruction size (XOR uses a two byte opcode, MOV uses three bytes). The savings in space really adds up after a while.
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We haven't finished 1394 boot yet, but we do have USB & USB 2.0 boot support
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I don't know, I've never met Satan ... but I have been to WinHEC
Now on to the questions ...
1) On the Exclusionary Uses of TCPA
by the-banker
Is it (will it be) possible to use TCPA to effectively lock-out certain operating evironments from various services (software, media, etc) solely because the operating environment is not backed by a company, and has no mechanism for paying certification fees and licenses? Specifically, could TCPA be used against free OS's like Free/Open/netBSD and Linux to prevent those users from accessing the same content users of commercial OS's can?
Let me start out by reminding the audience I am not a security expert. I have been reading specs like a madman the past week, expecting such a question from the /. audience. I'm also not a professional TCPAadvocate ... my understanding of TCPA is in relation to what AMIBIOS must do to enable the TPM(a hardware component required by the spec). I'm going to refer toTCPA specifications & FAQ a lot, so verifying my answers will be an exercise left to the reader.
Your question brings up a lot of common issues people seem have with TCPA:
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What does TCPA do?
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What does AMIBIOS have to do with TCPA?
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What is the licensing structure?
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Can open-source software make use of TCPA?
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Does this have anything to do with Digital Rights Management (DRM)?
Let's see if Brian can hash his way through these items in some sort of order ...
a) What does TCPA do? TCPA is an industry specification that defines mechanisms for "trusted" client/server interaction ("trust" and "security" are two different things).
TCPA works in a very similar fashion as other key-based security mechanisms (SSH, PGP, SSL). Transmissions are secured by hashing against a key. Keys tend to be very long (128 bits or more), so it is difficult for "bad people" to guess your key. In many mechanisms, the key also serves to identify the user (proof that they are who they say they are). This key is often contained in a file or some sort of removable media, like a smart card.
TCPA adds a few elements to this security scheme:
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More keys and longer keys (some keys are 160 bits, most are 2048 bits)
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A crypto-processor to speed key computations
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Secure key storage on the system mainboard
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Establish platform "trust". The two excerpts below are taken from the TCPA FAQ:
12. What do you mean by trust?
The ability to feel confident that the software environment in a platform is operating as expected. This is done by reliably measuring and reliably reporting (using aliasing) information about the platform.
Another such benefit is improved control of access to data. Previously such access has depended upon authorization or authentication. Now such access can also be linked to the state of the software in the platform. This enables the denial of access to data if rogue software, such as a virus, is introduced into a platform, because such introduction necessarily changes the software state of the platform.
The crypto-processor and key storage are provided by the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). A TCPA enabled system will have a TPM on the motherboard. This TPM can be disabled, as per TCPA specification, if the user wants to opt-out.
One concern is that TCPA is equivalent to a unique identifier on your computer, which causes a large number of privacy concerns. There's a large section of the FAQ (Item #13) that covers this topic:
The solutions support privacy principles in a number of ways:
1. The owner controls personalization.
2. The owner and user control the trust relationship.
3. Provides private object storage and digital signature capability.
4. Private personalization information is never exposed.
5. User keys are encrypted prior to transmission.
6. Supports multiple certificate authorities giving the user choice.
It is also important to know what the solutions are not:
1. They are not global identifiers.
2. They are not personalized before user interaction.
3. They are not fixed functions - it can be disabled permanently.
4. They are not controlled by others (only the owner controls).
b) What does AMIBIOS have to do with TCPA? The TPM requires initialization during BIOS POST. This allows what they refer to as "metrics" to be stored that help establish that the BIOS & OS can be trusted (i.e. haven't been h4x0r3d). Our "TCPA & AMIBIOS8" whitepaper has more information.
c) What is the licensing structure? There isn't one. From the TCPA FAQ:
10. What are the licensing and/or royalty arrangements for the technologies outlined by the TCPA specification?
The TCPA spec is currently set up as a "just-publish" IP model.
d) Can open-source software make use of TCPA? Yes. From the TPM FAQ:
18. Does the TCPA support open source systems?
Yes. The ability to use the TPM functionality is available to all developers of software. An open source project could determine to use TPM functionally today. The concepts of measurement, protected storage and attestation of measurements are fundamental concepts that hold true for any type of OS or application. The platforms that support TCPA today are not limited to only one OS and if open source developers provided applications that used the TPM functionality they would find support.
Remember ... SSH, GPG and SSL aren't any less secure because they're open-source. The whole point of key-based security is that you can't see the data without the key, even if you know the decryption mechanism.
e) TCPA & DRM? This question wasn't directly asked, but it's on everybody's mind ...
TCPA has been connected to proposed legislation that would require "content protection" on most digital media devices (including PCs).
While somebody could write a DRM application using the TPM, they could also write one without it. Non-DRM applications can be developed under TCPA. The example I thought of is an improved VPN for companies that are super-paranoid about their data (think about it ... 2048 bit keys, no hash load on the system CPU, ability to tie accessibility to a unique platform).
Adding TCPA & a TPM to a system doesn't automatically add DRM to a platform. Some application has to tie the TPM to the "media" being "protected". Merely adding TCPA to AMIBIOS doesn't constitute DRM:
Captain: What happen?
Mechanic: Somebody set up us the DRM.
Cats: How are you gentlemen !! All your BIOS are belong to us.
2) Advantage
by TedCheshireAcad
What is the advantage to me, a Linux using consumer, to buying your product over those of your competitors?
First, the short answer: a proven and stable product based on nearly two decades in the PC industry, with support for the latest technology.
Now, the long answer: Let me give a little background on how BIOS gets onto your average motherboard. I know that's not what you asked, but it will explain product design and benefits to the end user.
AMI markets AMIBIOS directly to the motherboard manufacturer, who we see as the actual "BIOS customer". So many of our features are oriented to motherboard manufacturers or BIOS developer. The end result of using our codebase is to produce a stable BIOS for the motherboard manufacturer's customer (that's you, the end user).
You can break these down three major areas:
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Code structure (ease of development, tools, source management, etc.)
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Technology support (OS, chipsets, processors, peripherals, etc.)
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Support after the sale
a) The "BIOS core" is a different code component from silicon support code. The same applies to our technology support modules (ACPI,USB, TCPA, ASF, SMBIOS, APM, etc.). This allows board developers to pick just the code they need for their system. An embedded Linux board for an industrial controller has different BIOS requirements than the typical "white box" motherboard (OS compatibility, supported hardware, power management, etc.).
AMI also developed a custom GUI to make BIOS development easier (Visual eBIOS, or VeB). Believe it or not, most BIOS development happens at the DOS prompt in x86 assembly code. We found it harder to get new engineers comfortable with DOS-based development (DOS is 22 years old, so is the average college graduate). VeB also incorporates source control, so engineers manage the code from the same place they edit the code.
b) Technology support is pretty broad. We have to work on new chipsets, technologies and devices while keeping backwards compatibility for older hardware we'd rather forget about. This involves a lot of work with hardware vendors (Intel, AMD, ServerWorks, nVIDIA, etc.), software companies (Microsoft, RedHat, etc.) and technical specification groups (there's one for most every acronym out there). As you might imagine, there's a lot of testing to make sure all these things play well together.
Technology support also applies to features that don't have cool three letter acronyms. One example of this is "Fast POST" (POST is Power On Self Test, BIOS execution from power-on to OS bootloader). There was customer demand to boot the PC faster. This pressure came from Microsoft for a better overall user experience (yes, the obvious joke is "boot speed doesn't matter when you don't have to reboot so often" ... but I'm taking the high road). So now Fast POST is standard in AMIBIOS8.
c) "Service after the sale" sounds like something you hear in a men's clothing store, but it applies to BIOS as well. Customers expect bugs to be fixed, new features to be added, and a voice on the phone when they can't quite figure out which bit goes where. Some customers develop using our source code (as a licensee), while others use our engineers to create their BIOS (as contractors).
That might have been more of a sales pitch than you were expecting (sorry). There's more product information at the AMIBIOS website.
3) Performance hit
by oliverthered
I assume that data pathways will be signable or encrypted in some way. What performance hit will the [operating system] take when using trusted system? e.g. How much extra data is added to form a signature, what methods are used for signing. and how will this benefit the end-user?
A: I assume this is in reference to TCPA, so I'll use what I know of that spec to answer the question.
Everybody who's used SSH or SCP has experienced computation overhead from data encryption. That's the main reason TCPA has the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). Along with storing keys, it had a dedicated crypto-processor to handle random number generation, hashing and digital signatures. Due to the size of a security key, these hash computations add overhead (overhead == delay).
In TCPA, the hash/generation stuff is offloaded to the TPM. Since this dedicated processor does the work, the main system processor doesn't have to. The TPM is also a function specific processor, meaning it's optimized for security tasks (translation: faster than your general purpose x86 CPU). This is a good thing, since most of the TPM keys are 2048 bits.
If you look at Transmeta's recent security press release, you see the same functionality. Although this story was reported as Transmeta releasing DRM, they are actually providing an integrated crypto-processor in the TM5800. This function-specific processor is accessible through an extension to the x86 instruction set (similar to MMX or 3DNow!). The difference between this & the TPM is how you access the functions.
Sidenote: does any open-source developer want to check if these extensions could be used to improve SSH, SCP or GPG performance?
The signing methods and potential benefits are outlined in the TCPA specification and FAQ.
4) Why are BIOSes closed source?
by mcelrath
Having recently had a lot of trouble with my laptop's BIOS, on an issue that I could most certainly fix if I had access to the code... I started wondering what benefit AMI and other vendors have by keeping BIOS code secret? I can think of none whatsoever.
An open-source TCPA BIOS might go a long way to alleviating the fears of the open source community, since we could see exactly what it is you're forcing on us. And hey, no doubt you'd get a few bug-fixing patches in return for your efforts.
So, is an open-source BIOS a possibility? (TCPA or otherwise)
Just to get this out of the way:
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AMI isn't forcing anybody to take any product offering, TCPA or otherwise.
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TCPA doesn't block open-source (see #18 in the TPM FAQ @ trustedpc.org).
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The TPM Memory Present (MP) driver BIOS uses during POST isn't open-source (it's provided by the TPM manufacturer).
This was the focus of a linux.com article several years back. There's plenty of advantages to open-source, but there are two main reasons for closed source BIOS: Legal Restrictions & Economics.
The creation of an open-source BIOS isn't limited by the BIOS itself, but by the information required to create the BIOS. Let me take a second and explain how the BIOS works at a programming level. This may seem like a tangent, but it helps explain issues faced by open-source BIOS developers (just think of it as Good Eats for BIOS).
There's three major components of any BIOS:
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Core Routines
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Silicon Support Routines
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Board Specific Routines
The core can be equated to the kernel of an operating system, except that it comprises a larger percentage of the codebase (both in functionality and actual code size). This is everything that's generic from one BIOS to the next.
Silicon Support applies to the chips on the board initialized by the BIOS (processor, northbridge, southbridge, I/O, flash). BIOS core routines will call silicon routines when hardware configuration is required. These routines are created according to an API, so swapping any of these code modules doesn't affect the structure of the core.
Board Specific Routines represent the motherboard manufacturer's configuration. If you look at motherboards from two manufacturers that use the exact same silicon components, you might expect the BIOS from one board to work on the other ... but you'd be wrong. The small hardware changes that differentiate Board Vendor A from Board Vendor B have a large impact on the BIOS. PCI Interrupt routing, chipset General Purpose I/O pins and other parts of vendor's "secret sauce" go into this BIOS layer.
"Fine," you say, "but what does this have to do with open-source BIOS?"
I'm sure you've noticed that there's a BIOS ready for a chipset the day it is announced. AMI and other BIOS companies don't just come along the day of the silicon release and slap a BIOS together. We work hand-in-hand with the chipset vendor for months before the release. They send us an alpha board, we boot it ... they send us a beta board, we add more features ... they send us final silicon, we validate it.
Now remember that this hardware isn't public when AMI gets it. AMI has to sign a has to sign a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) to get a development board or advance specifications, which means we can't tell anybody what we know about the product. Vendor-supplied reference code (memory detection, bridge configuration, etc.) is also covered under NDA. AMI also signs NDAs to cover the motherboard manufacturer's confidential information.
So the BIOS that ends up on those motherboards is constructed using information we can't release to any party not covered by NDA. You might be able to understand how this doesn't fit into to the open-source model.
So an open-source BIOS developer has a big dilemma ... they need access to information, but legally can't include it in open-source code. Many chipset vendors provide information after their chipset is released, but not many board vendors hand out schematics. Reverse engineering might reveal this information, but some items controlled by the BIOS can damage the system if not set properly (data corruption, overheating, smoke, flame, etc.) ... so random bit flipping may not be the answer. And nobody wants to get into the legal issues of using disassembled code in place of reverse engineering.
I think the closing statement from the linux.com LinuxBIOS article still applies ... "The real question isn't if an open source BIOS will ever work on a handful of platforms, but if it will ever become viable for mass market across many platforms."
There's another issue that comes into keeping AMIBIOS source code closed (or for that matter anycommercial source code). This has to do with economics.
This is where I change hats from "AMI company representative" to "average techno-Joe". The next few paragraphs are my feelings, not necessarily those of my employer or anybody else on the planet.
I personally like the idea of open-source, and I use a lot of open-source programs at home and work (Mozilla, OpenOffice, RedHat, Mandrake, ClarkConnect, PostNuke, perl, php, Bugzilla). But I also buy and use regular closed-source programs (my DV editing and VCD/DVD authoring tools). The choice isn't whether or not the source is accessible, but if the tool fits my needs.
In either case, those programs are the product of somebody's time (in most cases, a large group of bodies). They're a conglomeration of people's ideas, a manifestation of their talents, and monetary investment (open-source isn't free to develop, somebody bought that computer hardware). Those people, and whatever company funded their efforts, have the choice to distribute their product anyway they choose.
If a company wants to go open-source, then they can't make money selling source or seat licenses. RedHat doesn't make money selling code, they make money selling a code package and support for that package. My company doesn't operate that way ... in the realm of BIOS, money is made licensing source and selling per-board licenses. That's the way every BIOS vendor makes money.
That doesn't mean there's no open-source within AMI (perl/php/PostNuke/apache intranets, Bugzilla bug tracking, ucLinux on our MegaRAC G2 management card). But the choice to go open-source is done product by product, company by company.
In an industry driven by innovation, many companies feel they loose competitive advantage by opening their source ... if everybody has access to their ideas, then why buy their product over another? That mentality may not fit well with open-source, but these inexpensive computers we currently enjoy are the product of market forces. If there was no profit in computing, would Intel and AMD even exist?
Thus ends my personal views ... back to the actual interview ...
5) Technical Explanation of BIOS Settings
by doppleganger871
I have been doing research on BIOS settings for many years, and I have found good articles on what the settings do, and how to tweak them for the best performance/stability mix. But, I would like to know if the BIOS manufacturer itself would be able to provide an in-depth manual of all the BIOS settings, and what exactly they do. All the manuals that come with motherboards are very short on explanations, and I would like to see someone within the company actually explain to us hardware enthusiasts the down 'n dirty, nitty gritty, dirt under the rug, needle in a haystack type of information that we could use to make our computers run the absolute best they can. Because, as we all know, optimizing software and firmware is a lot cheaper than upgrading parts.
A: I wish I had a great answer for this. Despite my verbose nature, there's not enough room in this interview to discuss every setting that is or will be in the BIOS. Some of the basic settings are covered in BIOS setup manuals, and a few websites do a good job of explain the ugly details. The problem is that those "cryptic" options change for every chipset on the market.
We're always looking at product improvements, and that includes documentation. Our setup manual is a generic template, designed for the motherboard customer as a starting point for their manuals. The "chipset specific setup information" is part of a new documentation effort within AMI (we talked about in meetings this week).
Outside of that, optimizing settings for a specific combination of board, memory and processor is still trial and error (tweak, reboot, benchmark, swear ... tweak, reboot, benchmark, swear ...). I don't know if better documentation will change that.
6) "Trusted" computer
by michael
A few related questions:
a) Isn't the goal of "trusted computing" to allow entities other than the owner of the computer to control what the owner does with his/her hardware? For example, "trusted computing" applied to music implies that the music publisher gains control over what the computer owner can do with the music data files. Isn't this the exact opposite of "trust" as that word is normally used - a trusted computer is one that can't be trusted by the computer's owner to perform the tasks asked of it, because other entities have veto power over the computer's actions?
b) Companies like AMI have repeatedly claimed that they aren't part of Palladium. However, isn't it true that without AMI's trusted BIOS (and all the other components necessary to build a "trusted computer"), Palladium wouldn't work? Why does AMI think they shouldn't be held responsible for enabling Palladium and similar schemes?
c) In what way does AMI benefit, financially or otherwise, from introducing a BIOS designed to make the computer it is installed in less useful to the purchaser of the computer? Please avoid saying that this is "optional"; AMI wouldn't create this BIOS if it wasn't intended to be used.
A: Let's take these in order ...
a) The Goal Of Trusted Computing: Despite the fact my company is a TCPA member company, the concept of trusted computing wasn't created by AMI (we're not even a founding member).
As far as the goals of the specification, I'm not the designated defender of TCPA. I'll let theTCPA speak to their own goals. You seem to automatically equate "trust" to DRM, but that's not what I get from reading the specifications and related materials (see part (e) of my answer to the first question).
b) Palladium & AMIBIOS: You are correct in understanding that Palladium will require some amount of BIOS support. The reason we keep saying "we're not a part of Palladium" is because Palladium doesn't exist in the marketplace ... it's a Microsoft initiative being developed under guarded care in a small circle of developers. It's not a public specification like TCPA, so our role in this scheme is unknown. My understanding is that we'll get a specification from Microsoft whenever they're ready to involve the BIOS developers, but I don't know under what terms it will be made public (my Magic 8 Ball says "Ask Again Later").
c) Financial Benefit: Yes, there is a financial benefit to supporting a technology that our customers ask for ... they continue to be our customers. Not every customer has asked for TCPA yet, but enough large customers have asked to make it financially reasonable. Keep in mind that this is just one more feature we offer, which the customer may or may not want to take.
So when a customer (or customers) comes to AMI and says "Our next motherboard will support TCPA, and we need a BIOS module", AMI has two choices:
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Say yes, develop the code, make the customer happy
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Say no
If we select option #2 (for whatever reason), our customer has one of two responses:
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"No problem, we licensed your code ... we'll add the support ourselves."
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"Too bad, you have a competitor who offers this support ... it was nice doing business with you."
Option B is an obvious downer, because customers give us money. Money can be exchanged for goods and services, like food ... and I find food to be an important part of a nutritious breakfast.
Option A presents another series of problems. Yes, we kept the customer, but now we have a forked version of our code floating around. If only one customer wants this feature, then it's not a big deal. If twenty customers want this feature, then there's twenty code forks. They're still our customers, so they expect support ... and this is a support nightmare.
Our decision to develop a TCPA option was driven by sufficient demand for the technology. We're not the only company in the marketplace offering TCPA. Phoenix, our largest competitor, has been working on TCPA for quite sometime. IBM is already shipping notebooks with TPM hardware (which run Linux, according to LinuxCare Labs). If AMI customers don't ship TCPA, they we spent time developing a feature nobody wanted (it wouldn't be the first time, but that's happens in cutting edge development), but we have customer goodwill because we're responsive to their needs. It's the same in our eyes as developing support for a chipset ... if nobody likes the chipset, then they don't buy the code to support it.
What we have done by choosing TCPA over any number of proprietary security solutions is present an option that isn't closed to third parties. If we enable TCPA on a board and you want to make use of it, read the spec and develop accordingly.
7) Hardware vendors
by cybermace5
Since a BIOS is only part of a motherboard: what steps will hardware vendors have to take, in order to incorporate your BIOS? Will they have to adhere to certain hardware design rules or controls in order to maintain the TCPA? Is there going to be a licensing procedure for hardware manufacturers?
A: Hardware vendors don't have to do much for AMIBIOS to support TCPA. The TCPA code module gets included as an add-on. The hardware manufacturer has to obtain a TPM to place on the motherboard, but that's available from a third party vendor.
The TCPA specification doesn't mandate licensing (see point #10 in the TCPA FAQ). It's not an AMI specification, so it's not our job to check for compliance. Third-party labs will most likely perform platform certification based on TCPA specifications.
8) Windows override
by Forkenhoppen
I have a question; on previous occassions on VIA hardware I've owned, I've noticed that occasionally, Windows will enable a feature even though I have turned it off in the BIOS.
My question is this; if I have TCPA disabled in my BIOS, will Windows drivers abide by this? Or will they still be able to use aspects of the BIOS originally put in place for use by TCPA even though I have it shut off?
What plans are in place to keep a Windows driver from hijacking TCPA-related information for it's own purposes?
A: A lot of that depends on how the motherboard vendor implements the TPM disable option mandated by the TCPA specification.
The TCPA specification has many options for disabling the TPM. It can be a BIOS setup question, jumper or software driven. The first two would be really hard to override in software (unless there's a robotic hand attached to the USB port). The third option could present a software override, but you would have to reboot to have the TPM enabled at power-on to set proper "root of trust" (you can't just turn it on midstream, since a TCPA system is supposed to hash the BIOS & bootloader).
9) TCPA & Palladium
by ignipotentis
Perhaps you can clarify the differences between the two (TCPA & Palladium). After reading up on both of them, i still find that they seem to be pretty much the same, just marketed differently.
A: From the information that's been made public concerning Palladium, I can try to elaborate on this. As I understand it, the major differences are listed below:
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Curtain Memory
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Control of Specification
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Intellectual Property (IP) Rights
The last two points are pretty self explanatory. Palladium it not a public specification, there may be licensing issues. TCPA is a public document created and reviewed by a number of different companies, with no licensing demands.
The first point is technical in nature. Here's how the Microsoft's Palladium FAQ describes "curtain memory":
The ability to wall off and hide pages of main memory so that each "Palladium" application can be assured that it is not modified or observed by any other application or even the operating system
This type of mechanism doesn't exist in TCPA, and would probably require some sort of support at the chipset level (which means it couldn't be implemented using current northbridge hardware). The total system impact isn't known, and it's any body's guess what this does to application development.
10) What do you think about Linux BIOS?
by lanner
At first, I was going to ask you about how you have cooperated, if at all, with the Linux BIOS project. After all, you often have historically cooperated with Microsoft and Novell. What are you doing to help Linux?
But then it occurred to me, if Linux BIOS was successful, it would put AMI out of the BIOS software development business. Linux BIOS is a competitor of AMI.
What is your personal perspective about Linux BIOS, and what does AMI think about it?
A: There's a lot of overlap with question #4 here. But there are two points I'd like to touch on:
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Cooperation with Microsoft, Novell & Linux
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Perspective on LinuxBIOS
a) Saying that we "cooperate" with Microsoft and Novell is misleading. AMI creates AMIBIOS for maximum hardware and software compatibility. For years, Microsoft and Novell were the primary OS vendors used by our customers. Microsoft also drives many PC specifications, and the majority of our customers use Microsoft operating systems. Development and testing are focused based on customer demand.
In the past few years, that situation has changed. Novell isn't a major consideration for our customers, but we still test compatibility. Linux is demanded by more customers, and our testing efforts have been increased to match that demand. We test RedHat, SuSe, Mandrake, Xandros, Lindows and FreeBSD by default (along with various beta distros).
Microsoft is still key to our testing and development (we test everything back to Win98). Customers still need that "Designed for Windows" sticker. But Linux is a major focus in our testing and development ... not just because we develop for compatibility, but because our customers ask for it by name.
b) In some areas, people see LinuxBIOS as competition to the other BIOS vendors.
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As far as the source licensing (open vs. closed), see my answer to question #4.
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In features, LinuxBIOS does some things that our BIOS doesn't (mostly in the areas of cluster management) ... AMI has advantages over LinuxBIOS as well (boot from USB/USB2, JPEG graphics as boot logo, broader chipset support, ACPI/APM power management, etc.).
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LinuxBIOS was developed for a specific application, but has broadened ... AMIBIOS aims to offer broad support in many market segments.
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AMIBIOS has been tested against a larger number of system configurations, works with a larger variety of hardware, and has a longer product history.
I'm not sure how others at AMI feel about LinuxBIOS, but all I have to say is "go for it". There's some neat stuff coming out of that project, and it's interesting to see what they've accomplished. Competition in the market is what makes technology improve ... one notch better than the last thing, one step ahead of the next guy.
Thus ends the interview. Thanks to Slashdot for the opportunity, and thanks to the readers for wading through the text.
Good to see michael modded himself into the question bin (see question #6)...
Wow I would have never guessed! So I guess all that Anti-MS/Pro-Linux stuff isn't PR.
I think Microsoft is scared. they are running from the Linux/Open Source Communinity while trying to figure out how to live by the "if you cant beat em, join em" Business Plan. 20$ says Bill gates will see how bad the TCPA is, and scrap it, like he did with Microsoft Bob. Or at least I can hope... (Is this going to be the first on topic post??)
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I don't think posting the entire article here is gonna stop people from posting beforing reading, nice try though.
X(7): A program for managing terminal windows. See also screen(1).
I loved the XOR answer. I learned that trick when I was writing 8085 assembly as a coop in the very early 80's. I'm surprised it is regarded as unusual, by now I would have thought every good programmer would have discovered or seen this trick.
Thanks for the memories. Somewhere around here I have an IBM PC technical reference with the assmebly listing for the BIOS.
Philip
2) Advantage
by TedCheshireAcad
What is the advantage to me, a Linux using consumer, to buying your product over those of your competitors?
His awnser was basically non existant, i belive the poster of this question was asking, what advantage does TCPA present for me, a linux user, in which case the awnser is a big fat nothing, and waht benifit for windows users? once again, nothing
Microsoft IIS is to webserving as KFC is to healthy eating
Captain: What happen?
Mechanic: Somebody set up us the DRM.
Cats: How are you gentlemen !! All your BIOS are belong to us.
Best info I have seen on the /. in a while
Over? Did you say "over"? Nothing is over until we decide it is! Was it over when the Germans bombed Pearl Harbor? Hell
Maybe one day we'll be able to ask Bill Gates a question or two trough the Slashdot.
Now that, was a good interview.
Why not fork?
He mods his own crackpot conspiracy theory question into the top 10, then gets schooled by someone much smarter than him.
Also, Roblimo said:
we have low tolerance for PR whitewashes around here
What the fuck is that? So all of the editor's smart-assed snide comments added to user-submitted stories (and the accepted stories themselves, which are often titled misleadingly and contain an obvious bias) are just my imagination?
Slashdot commits as much whitewashing and FUD spreading as any other organization. Lunix and open source are ALWAYS good, Microsoft is ALWAYS bad.
Goddamn hypocrites. Especially you, Michael "I HATE CENSORSHIP UNLESS I NEED TO BITCHSLAP A DISSENTING OPINION".
Watch. I had a comment posted the other day that was +5 Funny (despite getting modded by editors as "overrated" and "Troll"). How much you want to bet michael will magically make that post -1 real soon?
The users modded that up, dipshit. You don't have the right to override it ("bitchslapping") just because you don't like me.
Learn to live with your dissenters, Slashdot editors. We're actually trying to help, but you're too fucking hypocritical and insecure to see it.
Seriously, this article was the first time it ever occurred to me that MOV might be a more obvious way to clear a register.
Now I'm afraid that there are legions of people out there zeroing registers with MOV and I'm left out.
Whence? Hence. Whither? Thither.
Once again, NO!!!
Give us an alternative or not, the choice is yours.
I will not buy TCPA enablied products, I don't care if I can turn it off or not
I will seek to return any TCPA product not labelled and I will discourage anybody from buying TCPA enabled products
I don't care if I'm running a 486 to do so
Anything within reason to discourage it's use
The failure is on your behalf; for not checking with your customers first and the undertaken should be written off at your expense.
I don't trust large corporations other than cash and sometimes a credit card, and that mistrust is not misplaced.
I have access to all of Stephen King's ideas, since he publishes them in an easy-to-read and often easy-to-carry format, and yet when it comes to book writing he has a considerable advantage over me.
Ryan T. Sammartino
"Ancora imparo"
3. I don't know, I've never met Satan ... but I have been to WinHEC
Man that's like having diner at the Whitehouse and not meeting the president.
Shop smart, Shop S-Mart.
So, since you left your first job you can now really say that you don't do SQuAT?
I don't mean porno dirty, but more like greasy used car salesman dirty.
It just seemed to me he was spending most of his time jusifying his existence, his 'geekishness'. We asked for answers and what we got was feelgood hyperbole. This bodes ill for the computing community.
This is great. It would be even better if there was a tighter relationship between motherboard, chipset and BIOS manufacturers on the one hand, and the Linux kernel community on the other hand.
For one thing, if instead of "beta distros" AMI would invest time working with the latest even and odd-revision kernels, both the kernels and the BIOSes would benefit.
In fact, I would not be surprised if this was already happening. I am just responding to what Brian said, and to the consistently higher level of problems I see reported on the kernel mailing list having to do with newer motherboards.
-David.
Wow! Thanks, Brian, for taking the time and effort to go well beyond most interviews here. I now feel I have a much better picture of the whole BIOS and TCPA scenario. And you make a lot of reasonable points.
This was great,
Lnuss
That was a great interview and some very good info in there. One thing I was particularly interested in was the mention that the onboard chip is responsible for generating random numbers. Is this the answer to the dream of every computer having a hardware RNG that generates true randomness? I for one would be thrilled to see a general purpose crypto processor in every computer.
I don't have a listing of any of my (or anyone else's) BIOS sitting around anywhere, but I learned the xor trick back when I was learning graphics programming via x86 assembly. It got mentioned a few times if you read the right docs. (It was stuff geared towards demo writers, but I never got that good, nor that aware of the demo scene ... such a dork I was. ^^; ) I also want to say the professor of my machine architectures class in uni mentioned it. Don't remember. But yes, it seems pretty widely known among people who "wanted to program games" between, oh, the mid eighties and nineties.
he keeps on insisting and he repeats several times through the "interview" customers want it. I don't know which customers he means. The OEM? The indivigual lusers who go into CompUSA and buy an HP with XP preinstalled? I built my own system a year ago by buying the indivigual components and putting them together. I certanly don't care to have a TCPA enabled BIOS. I am a customer too.
Overall, an OK interview. Yeah,sure Linux will work on any BIOS if its ceertified forit. That means a kernel that got re-compiled or changed won't work. That means if I d/l the brand new SuSE iso ver 8.5.3 and try to install it it won't work either.
This all means one thing:
Welcome to the end of computing as we know it.
We might have to start buyng China made boards in coupl a years.
I asked Theo de Raadt of the OpenBSD project about this. In the interview answers, Mr Richardson of AMI asks "does any open-source developer want to check if these extensions could be used to improve SSH, SCP or GPG performance?" Given OpenBSD's integrated crypto and more specifically crypto hardware support, I put the question to Theo. Within about a minute he responded. It was short, sweet and to the point. Will Mr. Richardson help follow through on this and get the OpenBSD project leading the way on using AMI's latest security developments at the OS level? From: Theo de Raadt Date: Fri Jan 17, 2003 12:12:47 PM America/New_York To: Anonymous Coward Subject: Re: /. interview regarding new security hardware on x86
If we had hardware docs.
I dont want to say I feel better about TCPA now but I know better now where to focus the fear. It seems that what needs to happen is the open source community needs to quickly jump on TCPA and make it worthwhile for doing REALLY cool things, long before someone else turns it into something that makes me unplug.
The ultimate network admin tool needs HELP!
Brian,
As evident by the development of current Internet technologies such as TCP and IP by the Department of Defense-backed Advanced Research Projects Association (ARPA), we can only achieve a standard if one company or organization is behind both the medium and the protocol.
Do you feel that the Intel-backed TCPA and the Microsoft-owned Palladium technologies both have better chances of succeeding since they're one-man operations? If not, what alternatives do you suggest?
Reply or e-mail; don't vaguely moderate. Ex-O'Reilly/MIT employee, now a full-time Google employee.
hmm... Well he didn't answer the question, more avioded it.
Any extra header data will have to travel around the system bus reducing bandwith.
Any processing overhead will introduce latency, not a nice thing to have kicking around.
So it may not affect the CPU in terms of processing overhead but there's an overall systems performance hit.
thank God the internet isn't a human right.
A follow-up question: Is it possible to use the TPM for things other than security and TCPA-related calculations? If you boot in non-TCPA mode, is it possible to use the processor instead of just letting it sit there on the board doing nothing? I'm not a hardware guy, just a curious quasi-geek.
I really wonder if question #6 (posted by the editor michael) got modded up under normal moderations, not unlimited moderation points of the editors (or, if it got a last second mod-down if it was 'pushed back up' by the editor).
But, OTOH, its nice to see an editor get a "RTFM" response:
What we have done by choosing TCPA over any number of proprietary security solutions is present an option that isn't closed to third parties. If we enable TCPA on a board and you want to make use of it, read the spec and develop accordingly.
Good quote, too many chars. Seriously, the slashdot 120 char limit sucks!
I think it is a bit silly to say, "Someone would have to write software to tie our bios initiatives to DRM," as if such a probability is extremely remote.
I think the correct answer might have been:
"If we weren't including and supporting these bios initiatives, there'd be nothing in our bios anyone could tie to a DRM software inititiative."
The problem here is that even though it can be disabled by the end user, and can't be software-enabled through the OS on the fly, the mere inclusion of it as a standard feature in a bios will encourage the DRM software author to say: "If you don't enable your bios control, you won't get any standard functionality out of our software." The mere fact that it is in the bios will be enough to spur software development in that direction.
The bright side to this is that it's all still years into the future--there are hundreds of millions of machines in use world wide which don't have any such bios capabilities and which aren't going to be discarded any time soon. And of course current machines being sold right now do not have it.
The question is will there be a market for this sort of thing? If implementers could guarantee me that using it means I can safely shut out Microsoft or any other company from doing *anything* (via the Internet) in my system without my express advance permission [and I don't mean EULA licensing--I mean per-occurrence notification as it happens]--well, even I might be interested at that point.
But the DRM initiative by private companies and the "privacy issue" for me seem entirely at cross purposes, and frankly I'm getting a little tired of hearing that these initiatives are promising that they can allow companies to inspect my system and control my software in the name of DRM, but at the same time will use the same technology to guarantee my privacy. I can't see how the two mix.
If booted in non-TCPA mode, is it possible to use the TPM for other calculations? He mentioned the possibility of using it for SSH and other things. What about decoding audio/video formats?
Yet, I do not feel very confident, after reading how he tries to avoid question concerning the newspeak on what "trust" is supposed to mean. OK, so any technology can be used for good and bad, that is clear.
It is my firm belief that technologists have a great responsibility for the things that they make, because no one is better suited to understand the consequences of the tech that they develop than the techie himself.
So, just referring to TCPA and what they say, what their goals are, and so on, it doesn't cut it. Brian has a moral duty to try to understand what motives drive the stuff that he is doing, and if he thinks that these motives are bad, he has a moral duty to speak up about it.
I really haven't seen anything non-fuzzy from TCPA about what their real motives are, but one thing I know: If the real goal is to take away the control of the technology each individual uses away from the individiual, it will be the most drastic step towards an authoritarian society.
Few are better suited than Brian to examine these issues, and with that comes a huge responsibility to make sure that the technology he is developing does not move society in that direction.
After reading this interview, I do not feel confident that Brian takes this responsibility seriously enough.
Employee of Inrupt, Project Release Manager and Community Manager for Solid
Even if people complain about the content of his answers, at least he didn't "Shatner" the questions. Granted, they were two totally different types of interviews, but he answered the questions, expanded on them, gave opinion and fact, and even a little humor thrown in. Even though I am not much more comfortable with the whole idea, I liked the interview.
My beliefs do not require that you agree with them.
I'm excited to see the end product. Cryptographic processors on all motherboards sounds to me like a great idea. I wonder how hard it will/would be to change the keys though... I hope they aren't hard-wired. Palladium is just another reason to not run windows, but TCPA could theoretically be disabled, and you can run Linux.
The only way this will improve DRM is by allowing stronger encryption of data. 2048 bit encryption will be tough to break, and with these chips in DVD players, strong encryption will be possible even for small devices. The media companies will always have the problem of "It has to get in my brain somehow, and if it does, I could store what I see with good enough technology." Because your brain doesn't have DRM, they can never really lock out illegal copying. It has to be in a human understandable format at some point in order for it to have value. The more they fight the inevitable, the sooner an illegal trust/monopoly will be out of business. Art will continue. It probably won't pay the ludicrous amounts that it does now, but it will survive as it always has.
Karma Clown
"The answer to this is yes, if you can't pay the fees, you don't get the certificate, so you're not trusted."
He clearly states that the user has a choice of Certificate Authorities. That means users should be able to self sign certificates just like with OpenSSL, and Redhat or FSF could issue their own certificates if they wanted to use TCPA features. Your RIAA-approved media player won't run if you booted with a self-signed TCPA certificate, but that just means you can't play RIAA-approved content you downloaded from a future Pressplay-type online service. That's not any different from today where there's virtually no RIAA content legally downloadable on the Internet.
Is PC BIOS security relevant to any modern OS ? Linux does not use the BIOS routines. And I don't see how a protected piece of data (video, audio, software) can't be reproduced by open source code.
Anything that is software can be hacked: just do a hardware debugging step-by-step execution and disable the relevant security calls. It is even easier today with all the virtual PC environments available. Of course, it would be a legal problem, but it is no different than today's piracy.
I believe that in the future, PC manufacturers will deny pre-installing any free O/S in a PC due to legal problems, and thus preventing the spreading of free operating systems.
While the TCPA stuff maybe be an "Open Standard", the crypto keys hidden in a chip on the motherboard are NOT open. That's what takes your control away.
SSL might be an open standard, but I can still encrypt something so YOU can't see it.
Isn't it possible that Computer Manufacturers could use this so these machines would only boot Windows? Maybe AMI is saying "You can disable it", but what will a Dell machine do? Will they sell a "Developer" version of thier machines that allow you to turn it off, but cost twice as much as the standard machines? This gives them the power to do such a thing....
Imagine, RedHat could even pay to get their kernels signed so they boot on such a machine, but the regular user wouldn't be able to recompile a custom kernel and use it!
If the keys on the motherboard get out though, then it's all over... anyone could use them to sign code.
I can imagine as soon as these show up, hardware and software hackers will work to extract the keys.... Maybe that's the only thing we can hope for to save us from losing control of our own computers....
With regards to all the financially related questions on Palladium/TCPA, I believe we asked the wrong person.... not that we could help it, though.
In reference to Answer 6c, the people we need to be pressuring is the motherboard manufacturers (Asus, Shuttle, etc) and the final vendors (Dell, Compaq, etc). Writing in TCPA support to their product is a purely business move on AMI's part. They have no room for ethics here. It's sink or swim.
If we, however, convince the mobo and vendor people to not use this "technology," AMI will never be pressured into making a TCPA-compliant product.
So, I ask the Slashdot editors: Can we get a rep for Abit, Gigabyte, Gateway, or somewhere to do an interview? I think our Palladium-fluent readers will have much more success in crafting questions for these people.
Not to say this was a waste, though. It's good to see a fresh perspective: the man caught in the middle.
IWARS.
People, in general, disappoint me. Politicians even more so.
The thrust of half those questions was: "TCPA seems to provide benefit only to those who wish to tell me what I can and cannot do with my computer. Is this true? If not, what's in it for me? If it is true, how can you sleep at night?"
I think Michael's questions were most on-point, and what I most wondered myself (there, I said something nice about him
If I sound harsh it's because I'm pissed. The goal of TCPA is transparent, and Brian The AMI Guy is either trying to pull the wool over our eyes or incompetent. Given that he used to hack this stuff for a living, and now has "Sales" in his title, I'd suggest the former.
Big Media nad Big Software are chortling in glee as they see their plans for "Trusted Computing" coming to fruition. The MPAA wants to turn your computer into a TV, and AMI is only to happy to help.
This isn't as much "normalization" as it is "don't take so many drugs when you're designing tables."
I like how this interview starts out with what looks like a good understanding of the technology, its place, and AMI's place in it, but once we get to the key question (relating DRM, "trust," and pre-emptive behavior prevention in software), the interviewee completely opts out and suggests we all take a look at the extensive TCPA documentation. Yeah, we could do that, or we could interview a BIOS person. Oh wait..
I also LOVED where he said AMI doesnt' bear responsibility for palladium because it "doesnt exist yet." What a lame cop-out. "Yeah uh, Im gonna make this handcuff ring, but the other side isnt done yet, so you can just kind of wear it like a bracelet. I dunno what it will do!"
I also noticed this guy is from "sales," so naturally he's going to try and sell this to us. "It's not as bad as you think - you guys with your crazy linux stuff will love it! 0wnz0red!" Remember, people dont give away freedoms all at once - they do it piece by piece, being convinced by stuff like this.
I also enjoyed how he referenced Zero Wing. That shows he's really one of us. What a cool guy!
So, roblimo says this guy reads Slahsdot, maybe he will answer follow-up questions here...
Please clarify, in 50 words or less, wether or not the trust model that TCPA implements will ever allow software to consider the owner and operator of a TCPA-enabled computer "not trusted."
Beer wants to be free
I don't know, I've never met Satan
You say you haven't met me yet? That's kind of funny. Well, regardless, I distinctly remember you.
Have a nice day.
you would have to reboot to have the TPM enabled at power-on to set proper "root of trust" (you can't just turn it on midstream, since a TCPA system is supposed to hash the BIOS & bootloader).
If this is true, then how do we get our free bootloader (lilo?) to work? Will (insert free bootloader here) have to switch to binary only releases, and pass every one through a certificate authority?
I have a gut-wrenching feeling that either we aren't hearing the whole story, or this guy is oblivious to the larger strategies at work here...
Really, everyone is being too hard on this guy. Altough he is involved with Linux he is just a salesman trying to make best out of a bad situation. I mean, AMI pays his salary. What is he supposed to say: Yeah, the primary use for our BIOS will be to secure a steady revenue stream for a couple of Hollywood/Redmond a$$es and take the fair use rights from the user. He is clinging hard to the fact that it may have other uses as well (VPN, whatever..) and that it may be disabled. In any case, e hasn't changed my mind a bit. That crap isn't going to make it into my house.
No, it's not. On paper, it appears to be a feature. Get a BIOS pre-palladium. List features and count. For exmaple, lets say 110 "features". Now add palladium to that same chip. We now count 111 features. Again, on paper it looks good. But in the real world, where we live and where the chip will run, it's bullshit.
That 1 "feature" will reduce a very important part of my computing usage. "Freedom" and "choice" and "control" el. at. It's a net-negative. You added 1 "feature" on paper but reduced my "LIBERTY" as the user.
If Ford were to advertise "New Options! All cars CAN have a STEARING WHEEL and an ENGINE if you like!" they would be shut down. But in the digital world, AMI et. al. calls this type of selling a "feature". No thank you.
He basically said that their project
a) Is well engineered
b) Supports lots of configurations
c) Is Well maintained
Re-read the answer. Also, read the answer to #10 for more reasons.
The one question I wanted to see an answer to was whether I could designate myself as a signing authority and get the motherboard to only run code I had signed, or whether there was a fixed list of signing authorities.
Perhaps I missed it, but I didn't see an answer to that. The answer seems to be no, which means the comsumer is being taken for a ride.
I can't be absolutely certain what you're claiming he didn't answer because you used commas instead of periods in your last sentence, and none of the other necessary punctuation marks. Sometimes you need to use actual grammer rules to get your point across. He did explain what the benefit of the technology is.
It can be used to uniquely identify a particular computer with a low amount of computation. It's a glorified MAC address system, but with an encryption system based upon this as well.
I don't even see how this is even bad by itself. Is MAC bad? In addition, the only way it's going to be permanently encrypting data is if you put software on it that does that.
If that's what you want - data that is restricted to one machine - then just make an encryption scheme that combines serial numbers of all of the components in a machine to make a hash and use that. Is TCPA a technology that enables unique identification? Yeah, but so is a friggin' turing machine.
I won't accept a system that keeps my data from being portable. I won't use any XP product because when they're no longer supported, you won't be able to register them, and then even having the software won't mean you can use it. I won't use any DRM software that limits my rights to my files or is not portable among operating systems.
But if I can get a coprocessor that does encryption for free when I buy my board, and I don't have to be quite so paranoid in figuring out who is who because they have one too, I'm all for it. Maybe this'll help knock out the screwed up digital certificate market.
Mod me down and I will become more powerful than you can possibly imagine!
The opposite is also true, if they wrote it with TPM then it can still be hacked. If the object files for the DRM program are distributed on any non-trusted medium, for example the internet or CD-ROM, then they can be read on a non-TPM system, and attacked. It expect it won't be easy, I'd start with a TPM protected decyrption program, but non-easy and impossible are two different situations.
Damn....at least that explains it, tho. Although I could contend that being married to Bill is, in effect, Microsoft Ice-land. I mean, he is a friggin' robot.
The Trusted Computing Alliance is still annoyingly cloak-and-dagger, but this does clarify things a bit. (It's a shame more of the questions asked didn't take into account that TCPA obviously != Palladium, though TCPA -> Palladium.)
;)]
My thoughts here-
-Crypto offloading is great, if done properly. Question is, will it be self-perpetuating, or will the initial implementation be light-years ahead of general-purpose processing, but various issues bog down R&D and spec-updating until 'brute force' CPUs once again mop the floor with the specialized units?
-As we probably knew in the back of our heads, TCPA is just a 'technology,' like SSH, or more accurately, SNMP/WoL/other remote-management solutions. What would make things evil would be:
-TCPA-only hardware/systems models, roughly equivalent to Winmodems or anything else built under the assumption of proprietary licensing (of OSes, keys, etc). The real risk here doesn't sound like "Linux/BSD won't boot;" it sounds more like "Linux/BSD won't be able to boot 'Trusted' so you can't put that SAMBA server on your Windows network."
-In fact, let me repeat that. "Linux/BSD won't boot trusted, so you can't put that SAMBA server on your Windows network." This is why MS gives a hoot, and while TCPA itself might not be an idea with [good|evil] alignment, beware of influence to the spec. Network filesystems are a good idea; CIFS is an example of a good idea manipulated for lock-in.
-As to Palladium... first off, it's sounding more and more like another lovely exploitable mechanism. If, somehow, Gator or friends can inject code into the Palladium box, they get free reign and undetectability. Heck, imagine if worms could take advantage... [I'm not feeling up to speed on the spec today, so I may be ignoring how code gets into the Palladium box in the first place. Still, it's long been proven there's more than one way to skin a horse- Microsoft signatures aren't necessarily from Microsoft and all that.
-...secondly, it sounds like the full Palladium vision (in the sense of MS revoking the 'license' to your Word documents and so forth) is going to be an *application* of TCPA and other protocols, in the same way BackOrifice is an application of TCP/IP networking.
-Finally, as far as I can tell, most jumpers in this day and age simply set registers read by the BIOS at boot, so unless these are physically cutting power/pathways to various chips, I can't see why the TCPA processor can't be enabled later. After all, there've long been hacks like SoftFSB and similar. Whether that'd have actual utility is anyone's guess... The potential to curtain some memory in Palladium-ready chips based on an exploit's request sounds more disturbing.
" Merely adding TCPA to AMIBIOS doesn't constitute DRM:"
then later he says that TCPA can be turned off three defferent ways: In the bios, jumper, or software.
Which way do you think Mother board manufacturers will want? I'm guessing the cheap route, Software.
So you can turn Off tcpa , then the OS could turn it back on 'for' you.
But that doesn't matter, because a company with a history of abuses in the market place, and a convicted monopoly, won't have an issue with popping up a message telling the user to enable tcpa, or there OS won't run. Probably After its been installed for a month for 'convience' sake.
The Kruger Dunning explains most post on
I believe this is a play, to set precedent for the digital tv turn over.
Services can be concidered any show you watch.
Very accurate information about every person that uses this new technology.
Instead of broad stroke appeals to certain demographics, precision strikes. Similar to a certain trusted news organization selling it's time and reporters to praise the virtues of hormone therapy, which ended up cutting short the lives of 10 million women in North America. With little to no mention of a retraction.
There are no laws to protect a countries citizens from such abuses.
c) What is the licensing structure? There isn't one. From the TCPA FAQ:
d) Can open-source software make use of TCPA? Yes. From the TPM FAQ:
I think that's the best description of the situation I've seen yet. This guy has the right idea on how to handle TCPA from a consumer standpoint.
Brian Richardson (AMI)
I'm going to address something Brian said from the perspective of a motherboard designer, because that is what my recent job was.
Brian says "So when a customer (or customers) comes to AMI and says "Our next motherboard will support TCPA, and we need a BIOS module", AMI has two choices:"
This really is the key. AMI doesn't sell their BIOS to "Linux Users", nor do they sell it to any other end users. AMI's customers are the companies that either design or specify designs for motherboards (think Dell, IBM, HP, Intel, Tyan, etc.) AMI simply can't say "no" to these customers, as they will simply go somewhere else. Or, as he pointed out, since the motherboard designer usually has a license for the code, they can just have their own programmers put in the offending feature.
The next question you have to ask yourself is why are the motherboard designers pushing for this feature? Extending Brian's argument, it is because their customers are system integrators and the system integrators are demanding it. In the case of Dell or HP, the system integrator is just another group in the same company, in the case of Tyan it is another company altogether, but the case is the same either way.
So why are the system integrators demanding it? The simple answer is, Microsoft doesn't give you any choice. No PC maker can be competitive without that little "Designed for Windows 2004" sticker on the front of their box. Our contracts with Microsoft give us a big discount on Windows licenses if we meet their demands, and one of those demands is that the hardware platform we ship meet all the requirements of a MS/Intel driven design guide.
Ever notice that all computers now ship with a network port? Ever notice that no computers ship today with ISA slots? Ever wonder why? Because those are the demands that MS makes, and the costs of failing to meet their demands are so high that the PC makers really have no choice.
Don't get upset with AMI for enabling Palladium. They really have no choice. If you want to find out who you should be upset with, just follow the money and see where it leads.
The whole purpose behind TCPA/Palladium is to sell product. How do you think Microsoft will keep the Xbox a game console? They need to make it as proprietary as possible. Besides "Trusted Computing" is a Microsoft buzz word. Microsoft has buckets of money to protect the Xboxes future!
The motherboard manufacturers could have the economy model for home users that would only work with win9x or XP. The server, workstation or Linux versions would be priced much higher.. Now this would also work for Dell, say you have Dell servers and workstations and you have a server board failure, you would need to have an extra Server and Workstation since the motherboards have different BIOSes. The end result is companies have fewer choices while the VARs make more money. DUDE! Your Seagate IDE Server hard drive FAILED? We can send you one today, the replcemnet is $499! So you try to put a workstation drive in and it won't boot! You know capitalism, after all we are Greedy-American-Capitalistic-Pig-Dogs!
The next thing it will do it will allow poorly conceived business to stay afloat, like Net Appliance when all the hackers bought IOpeners and caused their business model to fail.
Your Average Joe
I've often wondered how I'd go about developing my own BIOS if I should want to do so. I have years of programming experience and decent electronic engineering experience but I'm not really sure how I'd start on writing a BIOS. Are their books devoted to such a thing? Motherboard Design and BIOS Hacking for Dummies? I wouldn't mind tearing up some old mobos to get some practice in.
At what price learning? At what cost wisdom? The price is a man's peace of mind, and the cost is his life.
AMI has advantages over LinuxBIOS as well (...) JPEG graphics as boot logo...
That's it. I'm not interested in LinuxBIOS anymore until they support JPEG graphics.
Prescriptive grammar:linguistics
From the TCPA specification, I am definitely a BIOS engineer, here's why:
a) Main
b) Advanced
c) Security
d) Power
e) Boot
f) Exit
For those reasons, it's clear that engineering BIOS is all about making lists.
http://github.com/gbook/nidb
Can anyone tell me what happens to materials I have purchased on PC #1 when I upgrade to PC #2. IS it just me, or does it seem that there should be legislation guaranteeing this ability. If there isn't this is going to be the biggest rip-off for consumers in history. When you purchase DRM content, not only will you not be able to play it on more than one electronic device, but you will lose the ability to use it at all when you upgrade computer or switch mobos or if your mobo goes bad.
Or is there some mechanism to avoid this?
I guess "windows-only" will truly mean windows only with tcpa (and webmasters will never do this, as we all know).
...)
TCPA provides one thing, and one thing only (unless you pay thousands of dollars) : forced incompatibility, a windows program will NOT work on wine, or any other system, after this is done.
Websites will check you configuration and refuse to send anything to other configs (we've seen it happen before). Browsers will identify themselves, and we will no longer be able to lie about our browser at all. MSN, Hotmail, Yahoo, etc will be off-limits to anyone using anything other than windows. (Remember the sort of stuff this gets used for, websites where you cannot take screenshots, DRM, mails that destroy themselves,
It is quite obvious that this is the whole purpose of tcpa in the first place, to "protect intellectual property". I would think long and hard before endorsing it to anyone as you will NOT be doing them a favor.
unless your not allowed to read cd-rom without TCPA enabled.
The Kruger Dunning explains most post on
I was a little disappointed by the answers that just reiterated the TCPA FAQ, but then again if I didn't know much about it, that's probably what I'd do, too. For example:
Unless the operating system is designed to refuse to run uness TCPA is enabled.
I wish I'd thought to ask this earlier. I'd love to know why PCs still use the old, crufty, ugly, BIOS at all. Why does the Intel architecture industry not use an implementation of the powerful, flexible, architecture-independent OpenBoot (IEEE 1275) standard?
SPARC, PowerPC, and Alpha machines use it. Why is the x86 world stuck in 1980? (This, the clever reader will observe, is a rhetorical question.)
Posted with Mozilla
So you're a Role Playing Game gamer, huh? Do you often use the Automated Teller Machine machine and work for the redundancy office of redundancy? :-)
He asked me why to buy AMI over a competitor ... that's what I answered. That's what I do for a living, so I had an answer.
If he wanted to ask about something else, he should have asked a different question.
Brian Richardson - AMI
When I hear the phrase "XOR trick," I think of its usefulness for exchanging registers.
If you don't have an XCHG op like the Motorola 68k to exchange two registers, you can use the following trick:
XOR AX, BX
XOR BX, AX
XOR AX, BX
Now, that's a real trick!
It seems that there is no limit on how much some people can brown nose for a few karma points...get a life you troll!
The old swap trick a ^= b ^= a ^= b may have worked well on older architectures without a swap instruction, but modern processors can swap R1, R2 in one cycle as opposed to the three cycles a ^= b ^= a ^= b takes. In fact, GCC will optimize a ^= b ^= a ^= b to swap R1, R2 on such architectures.
Will I retire or break 10K?
While this interview has some semi-interesting info about BIOS business and architecture, it answeres NONE of the questions that it promised to answer.
The promise was to explain why TCPA is not effectively going to stop open source. The answer amounts to little beyond "read the specs". We all understand that TPM maybe be turned off in some cases. We all understand that a linux distro can theoretically be certified and run as a trusted OS. This doesn't mean, however, that wide spread of TPM wouldn't be the end of open source. If future cohort of Windows machines know to ignore any files produced on something that is not certified to be Windows, turning off TPM isn't going to be much of a solution. If you can't compile and certify your own software, how will certified HP Linux be practically different Windows?
I am extremely disappointed with this interview. If Brian is not qualified to talk about the implications of TCPA, as he himself admits, he shouldn't have volunteered to talk about it.
I am not sure if it was the Pentium III or P4, but I think RIGHT NOW there is a RNG in Hardware, which uses thermal noise for the number generation.
*** Suerte a todos y Feliz dia!
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/tcpa-faq.html
On RISC architectures, each instruction typically takes one cycle and fits in one 16- or 32-bit word. Thus, there's no speed or size difference between mov r4, #0 and xor r4, r4, r4.
The people who don't "get" xor ax, ax at first glance are primarily those whose first assembly language experience was on an architecture such as 6502 that can't do operations between registers and registers, only registers and memory.
Will I retire or break 10K?
.
- First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then ???, then profit.
He specifically pointed out that it isn't a global identification.
I think the only thing it can identify is what BIOS-and-bootloader combination you're running.
The REAL question is, "so I have an ASUS P5B, and I use LILO. How does that affect the operating system?" (You can use LILO without using Linux or BSD...you might be running OS/2, DOS and x86 OS/X)
What's this Submit thingy do?
Understood - this isn't personal, just a few points which I though were unclear or misstated.
I would assume that the 128 and 160-bit keys are keys for some symmetric cipher, and the 2048 bit keys are RSA keys. It is wrong to suggest that key length correlates to strength without taking the algorithm into account, and even then practicality limits the usefulness of longer and longer keys. 128 bits is probably safe enough, and though I'd be happy to use a 160 or 256 bit key in a symmetric cipher, longer than that gets silly: at 128 bits you're already never going to see the key brute forced.
The benefits of 2048 bit RSA keys come not from strength through length, but from the fact that they belong to a different class of algorithm, which allows you to do very different things with them.
I have yet to be convinced that this is true of data in the general sense and malware. All real world software contains bugs, some of which can be exploited to subvert the system. No amount of hardware trickery can stop this being true, the best you can hope for is to contain the spread of corruption by compartmentalizing the system. If you only have one compartment, or only one compartment you really care about, which I suspect will be the case for the majority of systems, then containing malicious code to that compartment provides little benefit. Even if you care about other compartments, the premise of containment assumes no bugs in the boundaries between neighbouring compartments.
In all likelihood you can make things prohibitively difficult for individuals to do something against the policy of the creator of the platform/application, even with their own property, but you can't make the guarantee that the platform is immune from malware.
This is not necessarily useful. Anyone may well be able to implement TCPA features, just as anyone can implement an SSH client. Without access to the necessary keys, you can still be prevented from accessing particular data or functionality, just as your own SSH client won't allow you to login to any extra servers. With open access to the keys, you've lost any security guarantees that rested on them. This makes the exercise somewhat pointless in many cases.
DRM without hardware support can never be secure. At some point the data being protected has to be decrypted, and since the DRM implementation doesn't have the secure platform guarantee the TPM provides, it can't be sure there isn't something out there waiting to extract the data. It's even relatively easy to directly subvert the software, but subverting secure hardware is very much more difficult. This is significant because the R in DRM is not directly tied to law - it can be used to enforce policy that extends beyond the data owner's rights, by restricting rights that the end user does have.
This can of course be done without TCPA. You could easily push the crypto into the NIC. nCipher make a variety of crypto hardware accelerators for networking, storage and other uses, which don't impact the architecture of the whole of the rest of the system.
This is my World Wide Web of Whatever
So can you turn TCPA *off* and *on* like a switch, like a jumper, or bios setting? And can you run Windows, Linux, etc. the same way you always did once TCPA bios's becomes the norm? This may sound painfully obvious, but my head's spinning.
One minate I get the feeling that TCPA is on/off switchable (not on the fly of course), then the next minate by what the AMI guy said in his interview, it's really not.
Yes? No? Maybe? Just a simple answer is all i'm really looking for. If it was already said, I apologize, but I missed it.
A Penny for my thoughts? Here's my two cents. I got ripped off!
This has been bugging me for a hell of a long time (not just you, but your sig sent me on a rant...)
YES, I'm a Christian... and a RPG gamer
Who gives a flying fuck if your a Christian? This is a tech/nerd forum. I don't give a damn if you're Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Shintoist, Pagan, Animist, Agnostic, Atheist, or [INSERT YOUR FAVORITE BELIEF SYSTEM HERE]. This is a technical discussion, and all I give a damn about is how technically competent you are.
Dear Brian
I was the author of question number 10, "What do you think about Linux BIOS?". Thank you very much for your answers.
You appropriately split up this question into two parts, which was great. Novell is not much of a player anymore, but Microsoft is, and of course you have to support them. But I am happy to hear that you test for BSD and Linux comparability too. My preferences are Debian GNU/Linux, and FreeBSD.
When I think of the possibilities of LinuxBIOS, I think of my Sun SparcSTATION 10 which I have here at home. It was built in 1993, and has an EEPROM BIOS, called the PROM in the Sun world. It uses Forth and has a lot of cool features. Basically, it is a small OS built into the BIOS which allows you to modify settings, boot from CDROM, tape, and other devices, you can configure the network interfaces without booting into the OS, have pretty logos and such, shunt the CLI to a serial port (ding ding ding!), and much much more, all from a little CLI. This computer is ten years old!
Of course, Sun is like Apple -- they don't have all of the crazy hardware that we deal with on the PC platform. This is why the PC had to wait so long to get all of this support.
When I spoke about LinuxBIOS, I did not necessarily mean to imply the GPL licensing. If there was a FreeBSD-BIOS, I would be just as happy. This would allow you to keep the source to yourself. The true utility in my mind is the CLI interface, versus a simple GUI. I am after the utility. BIOS has gotten better over the years, but there are still some things that I desire. This is especially true of serial port control IO, remote power and reset control, diagnostics, and a few other little things. Being able to do a 'cat
Of course, if this LinuxBIOS or FreeBSD-BIOS ever came into being real, would they have to support booting from Microsoft's operating systems? Absolutely they would. Doing otherwise would be as bad as,... Microsoft.
I appreciate your positive competition attitude!
Take care
I'm pretty sure that the online pr0n industry is working on this.
Kind thoughts do not change the world
...it means that TCPA is not DRM "per se", but simply as a tool that enables trusted computing. The problem lies with the fact that this tool can easily be used to implement a DRM scheme. If all the media, programs necessary to play the media (it has already happened with many audio CDs), and etc. all have DRM restrictions which in turn require TPCA to work, then having the option to disable it in the BIOS is not really an option, since all the stuff I'm going to run is mostly likely need it anyway.
:|
Not only DRM-ed media, but DRM-ed applications, utilities, and all sort of stuff will probably rely on the TCPA itself for implementation. This leaves us with two scenarios:
- Use only open-source/non-signed software. This is the very good scenario, given that if a good number of commercial companies follow, then we can keep on working with our computers just the way we did before TCPA or DRM came around. Unfortunately, with all the anti-piracy craziness of late, this doesn't seem to be in any chance of happening, because the first thing software vendors will do when enough people have TCPA-enabled PCs will be digitally signing them and bang, you're dead.
- Use only proprietary, TCPA-signed, DRM-ed media and software. We all know that scenario. All your base are belong to us, Embrance and Extend, You Will Be Assimilated.
So if this gets along, there's nothing that can be done except providing good open-source alternatives to all the current mainstream applications. Unfortunately, that's not enough to cover the "DRM-media" problem, but hopefully if the ghoulish media companies get themselves locked out because nobody wants or needs TCPA, they'll end up playing "our game" and drop this thing in the trash bin where it belongs.
Sorry for the long rant
Oh, I think Brian's answers were very truthful...have no complaints about his forthrightness.
But you have to admit the logic in all of this gets a little tangled...if it's as unrelated as you say, then why would any software maker think of writing a DRM application that uses TCPA? Apparently Brian thinks it would be possible to integrate if not suborn TCPA into a DRM software application. The idea, as well as its feasibility, has occurred to him and apparently he's concluded that the two are not so dissimilar as to rule out someone writing such a DRM software application. If he thought that I think he would have said so.
I think you missed my point--if TCPA isn't in a bios, and Palladium chips aren't on motherboards--then obviously nobody's going to write software that integrates either one or requires either one, as is currently the case today.
As far as TCPA goes I'm interested in what is meant by an "authenticated" boot. IMO, this could conceivably have several meanings and not strictly refer to the unspoiled state of the kernel.
It's surprising to me, but as detail oriented as you have to be to get things done in this industry, I've friends and acquaintances who really have trouble seeing connections and subtleties that to me, anyway, seem quite obvious. This is like a Pandora's box of sorts because what you start with, regardless of how inoffensive it may seem, and what you end up are likely to be very different things.
(Microsoft has, however, continued DRM support in WMP9, I note, and the fact that WinXP Product Activation is not popular has not dissuaded Microsoft's continued use of it--which they have now spread to a program as innocuous as Plus!. But that's really not the point here....)
You make a very good point, which perhaps you ought to consider a bit more--like you say, DRM is currently possible on existing hardware--just as is SSL (which I think seems to work pretty darn well.) Something like SSL does *not require* DRM or Palladium to function properly.
So whence cometh the need for Palladium, TCPA, and DRM...? (DRM is the obvious one, of course.) IMHO, the others will be used as system foundations for more "advanced" (more invasive) DRM software technology.
I used to laugh at the notions people had when they said that Microsoft wanted to take over the world. In fact, I still find it pretty darn funny. However, with Microsoft pushing technologies like these I do think Microsoft wants to take over my desktop--and yours--and everyone else's. I don't find that to be outlandish at all. Microsoft is pushing to be the traffic cop on my machine and seeking to install software and firmware initiatives so that Microsoft, not me, decides what and when I can run something on my computer. The problem with the whole Digital Rights initiative is that my Constitutional right to the ownership of private property (which I consider my computers to be as well as the software that resides on them) is usurped in favor of the *imagined rights* of corporations to invade my privacy to "help me" remain honest.
So why does an end user "need" TCPA or DRM or Palladium?
Who controls its future? We (consumers) are not in it just for a couple of months.
I can understand AMI's reasons for keep the source to their BIOS closed while it is being developed, and prior to the release of the motherboard in question. But is there any reason why they can't release the source to older BIOS code that applies to equipment that is already outdated and no longer manufactured? Is there a competitive advantage to holding on to outdated technology?
Just wondering...
12. What do you mean by trust?
The ability to feel confident that the software environment in a platform is operating as expected.
Operating as expected by who ?, the owner of the bios ?.
Idiot. People already watch Hollywood(tm) movies on their computers.
The crack you're smoking must be real good. The only reason Palladium is coming is because the IP cartels haven't figured out that it's useless for the purposes they've designed.
Moron.
MSN, Hotmail, Yahoo, etc will be off-limits to anyone using anything other than windows.
Since MS can't get Hotmail to RUN from Windows, I don't see them requiring it.
For a good laugh, look at the "OS" and "Netblock Owner" columns in the table.
Its been my experience that REAL engineers don't exist. Rather they are born. People who go to college, and THEN start to engineer stuff, become engineers. People who freelance engineer stuff, are NOT considered engineers. Engineers are meerly egotistical, degree driven people with little-to-no world experience with the products that they "engineer". Products made from companies with REAL WORLD engineers, are always higher quality and don't fail. Don't get me wrong, every corporation has its share of DECENT degree empowered engineers. Majority rules, however, giving the idiots all of the power. I've worked in a few engineering departments at a LOT of large corporations over the years. What I have said is true at all of them. I doubt its isolated to my opinion. ---_WHEW_--- Glad I got that out there.. I just saw the word engineer in that article and got a little steamed up. :) Forgive me.
"I know this... this is a unix system" -- Jurrasic Park
This was the question asked by the original man:
"Is it (will it be) possible to use TCPA to effectively lock-out certain operating evironments from various services (software, media, etc) solely because the operating environment is not backed by a company, and has no mechanism for paying certification fees and licenses"
This was my answer:
"The answer to this is yes, if you can't pay the fees, you don't get the certificate, so you're not trusted."
This was your answer to my comment:
"...That means users should be able to self sign certificates just like with OpenSSL, and Redhat or FSF could issue their own certificates if they wanted to use TCPA features....but that just means you can't play RIAA-approved content you downloaded from a future Pressplay-type online service"
So you're confirming my comment? That he's lock out from TCPA content, his exact question. The PR man dodged the question. If you self sign, you have a machine that won't interoperate with any other machine that uses TCPA services.
...every question that goes at "what does that mean for us end-users" he basicly goes blank and talks about how their consumers are mobo companies, or refer to specs. I see no reason why the outrage which caused this interview should subside, because it smells foul. Why give a public interview as response to public outrage if you're not going to give any information that is interesting to the public?
Here's my summary: "Yes we know what this will do to you but we don't want to talk about it. We'd even like to pretend we have nothing to do with it." Seriously, everybody that has looked at the specs will realize that it's designed for DRM. So why deny it? They'll blame the mobo makers, and the mobo makers will blame Microsoft, Microsoft will blame it on business (RIAA/MPAA) demand and so on. Whether AMI likes it or not, they're actively pushing DRM to the markedplace. If they want to play stupid, well... I can't say I'm fooled.
Kjella
Live today, because you never know what tomorrow brings
"The opposite is also true, if they wrote it with TPM then it can still be hacked."
I agree, it will still be hacked, but the idea behind this 'trusted' solution is that the machine on the end is verifiable and 'trusted' as being unhackable.
So a hacked DRM system on a non-trusted machine has no purpose because the machine (and hence the object files) couldn't be verified as unhacked and so would be denied the content anyway.
Do you see my point?
It sounds like the open source community needs to get a handle on this technology and make the most of it.
Brian brings up a good point about OpenSSL, GPG, etc... wouldn't it make sense to have those programs detect the existance of the TPM hardware and use it to offload certain functions from the processor?
Also, wouldn't it make sense build "trusted computing" features into Linux... such as being able to setup a file system so you cannot read it if the machine was booted from floppy, or removed from the machine. Sounds like that would be a good way to protect data on a stolen laptop, or on a server that some unauthorized person got their hands on.
My point is that if the open source community continues to shun this technology just because Microsoft/MPAA/RIAA are going to use it to implement DRM, we'll miss out on the good uses of this technology.
--
"What do you want me to do? Whack a guy? Off a guy? Whack off a guy? Cause I'm married."
Brian,
Contrary to the subject, I do not intend to question your credentials, but there is no mention of your participation on the Board of Directors in Tech Corps Georgia. It looks like the web page might be in need of a little update.
Just figure I'd point this out and send you a little wave from a fellow Georgian (Canton).
-SS "Teach the ignorant, care for the dumb, and punish the stupid."
[flame]
Ever heard of Public Key Crypto? If they decide to ignore their prior promises of allowing the end user to load keys it is over. You won't need to crack the keys out of the module, the BIOS will happily SHOW them because they are the Public keys. The software vendors (i.e. M$) will have the Private keys. Think XBox.
[/flame]
Democrat delenda est
I don't think many apps are using this yet. Intel has a FAQ on this technology here, and they even have a Windows driver to support this.
Nothing is so smiple that it can't get screwed up.
"Is it (will it be) possible to use TCPA to effectively lock-out certain operating evironments from various services (software, media, etc) solely because the operating environment is not backed by a company, and has no mechanism for paying certification fees and licenses"
The answer to this is yes, if you can't pay the fees, you don't get the certificate, so you're not trusted.
That has nothing to do with him or AMI or TCPA. Obviously MS could use TCPA with Palladium in such a way that it would lock out anyone not running Windows. Guess what, Red Hat could do the same thing. What part of "TCPA is an open spec" did you not understand?
TPM is just a tool, like a hammer. If I kill someone with a hammer, does the blame go to the hammer? No, the blame goes to me, the one who decided to use the hammer that way.
"While somebody could write a DRM application using the TPM, they could also write one without it. "
If they wrote it without TPM then it would be hacked, so TPM is pretty much a pre-requisite.
So what he said is true, but yet not true.
If they wrote it with TPM it could still be hacked. TPM is just a peice of hardware that is optomized for crypto, it doesn't do anything that can't already be done (albeit a lot slower) in software.
"18. Does the TCPA support open source systems?
Yes. The ability to use the TPM functionality is available to all developers of software"
Sure, if you remove anything the thought police object to.
There are people who can help you with these paranoid delusions you seem to be suffering. I suggest you look into it.
Under capitalism man exploits man. Under communism it's the other way around.
3. They are not fixed functions - it can be disabled permanently.
As also mentioned, how this is controlled (BIOS screen only, jumper, software) is mostly up to the motherboard manufacturer. But really... if it can be turned off, why worry?
You know windows is going the DRM road... you'll probably have to turn it on for Win2005 or whatever, but for the linux users simply having the switch-off feature is key.
If specific options can be switched, even better. I'm particularly interested in the ideas of using it to speed up PGP/MD5/etc processes, or spawning new-and-improved ones.
"Our decision to develop a TCPA option was driven by sufficient demand for the technology." ... hopefully manufacturers will recognize that there's also demand for motherboards without the technology.
My comment:
...TPM is just a tool, like a hammer. If I kill someone with a hammer, does the blame go to the hammer? No, the blame goes to me, the one who decided to use the hammer that way."
"The answer to this is yes, if you can't pay the fees, you don't get the certificate, so you're not trusted."
Your reply:
"Obviously MS could use TCPA with Palladium in such a way that it would lock out anyone
A trusted machine is one that conforms to a certification process. You don't define the certification, the remote service requires it of you. So using your metaphor, the hammer that kills someone is not in your control, you just swing it as per instructions.
I wrote:
"If they wrote it without TPM then it would be hacked, so TPM is pretty much a pre-requisite.
So what he said is true, but yet not true."
Your replied:
"If they wrote it with TPM it could still be hacked. TPM is just a peice of hardware that is optomized for crypto, it doesn't do anything that can't already be done (albeit a lot slower) in software."
I can change software, those tiny silicon transitors are a damn site harder. But yes I agree they could do the useful stuff in software - there is no need for this stuff.
I wrote:
"Sure, if you remove anything the thought police object to."
You wrote:
"There are people who can help you with these paranoid delusions you seem to be suffering."
Please read the bills before Congress, particular the "DRM in all devices" bill. To be paranoid I have to *suspect* something that is not true, not *read* something that is true.
Quoth the poster:
Thanks for the answer.
Quoth the (AC) replier:
Too bad it was probrably bullshit.
I was one of those moderators. Not everything is a conspiracy.
Video meliora proboque deteriora sequor - Ovidius
I think Brian said more than he intended perhaps. Notice how he went out of his way to hammer home the fact that WE aren't the customer/user from his/AMI's POV. Now re-read all of the bits about where the 'user' could disable this junk and think about it. Dell being able to disable isn't the same thing as thee and me being able to control this monster.
And why is it that anytime TCM/Palladium come up I have this recurring vision of this being a retelling of Belling the Cat with us in the role of the Cat and the MPAA/RIAA (And of course Disney [grin]) being in the role of the Mice? Except in this dope smoking surreal version one of the mice is an MBA with a minor in Marketing who stands up and says, "No! No! You guys are doing this the hard way. Forget drawing lots to see who will go on the suicide mission to put the bell on the Cat. I will handle it. Whereupon the smart mouse takes the bell and goes and SELLS it to the Cat."
Democrat delenda est
It should be mentioned that, even leaving the effect on IP aside, the three instructions
MOV AX,#0
XOR AX,AX
SUB AX,AX
are not equivalent. MOV leaves the AF bit alone, SUB sets it to a defined value (0, I think in this case), and XOR leaves it undefined. Or don't assembly hackers notice condition bits these days?
> boot Windows?
> do such a thing....
Yes. But you also have the power not to purchase such a machine. And while it is true that you may be compelled to buy these machines in order to access certain DRM-protected content, you also have a choice not to purchase that content (just as today you can choose not to buy copy protected CDs).
Clearly, everyone is concerned about what happens if all content becomes DRM-protected and unavailable to people that are using open/free systems. I wish people would realize that the best way to kill Palladium is to beat Microsoft to it. I wish there was some efforts under way to implement an Open Source DRM system under Linux, perhaps based on the Ogg Vorbis format. If we had a "trusted" Linux platform, signed by the FSF, for example, I'm sure content creators would take advantage of it to sell music or media under Linux. If this catches on before Palladium does, Microsoft would have a hard time pushing their own closed standard and Linux would have gained the upper-hand in a very big way
Sadly, OpenBoot is no longer an IEEE standard. IEEE 1275 lapsed when no one took the initiative to update it on the required basis. I think you can still buy the manuals; IBM, Apple and Sun still use it; and the other adjectives (flexible, etc.) still apply. But not IEEE standard.
Have you ever actually *used* an Alpha? One of the best parts of the x86 is the BIOS itself. The x86 bios initializes cards, sets IRQs, and supports tons or boot hardware.
Alphas do NOT use Openboot. Installing linux generally requires SRM, which has very little hardware support. On most Alphas, you cannot boot from an onboard IDE hard device. I own a PC164LX and run RedHat on it. One reason for the lack of device support in linux is because the drivers expect certain things to be done automatically by the bios (for instance, initialization.)
If you want to learn more about the bios, or lack thereof, on an alpha, you can try this link
What exactly do CD keys and registration requirements indicate if not a complete distrust of the end user's good intentions?
Actually, CD keys are *reasonable* and non-invasive steps a software company could and should take with its software. As the software companies are quite aware that a single valid CD key could indeed athenticate scads of bootleg copies, they are in fact trusting the end user to a very great extent, CD key or no.
Take the recent story on Quicken's Turbo Tax program, where Quicken removed your option to print returns on a computer other than the one the software was originally activated on. Do you think maybe Quicken did this because they don't trust you?
No, I think Quicken did this out of a fevered, greed-drenched imagination which caused them to hallucinate losing billions of $ to software piracy. Greed, not trust, is the issue here.
Why would Microsoft do this if they trusted their customers? Hint: they wouldn't.
Ironically, however, Microsoft has no trouble trusting corporations who buy as few as 5 licenses, since they do not have to jump through the product activation hoops at all. I'm sure you knew that. Microsoft simply did this to penalize the small user (who has little clout individually with the company because he doesn't buy thousands of licenses at a time) who has 2-3 machines at home and was installing a single legitimately purchased copy to both machines--and Microsoft wanted to double its money. Greed again (not necessarily intelligence for the long haul.)
Bottom line: software companies do not trust you.
True, no doubt. However it is more an issue of greed than I think it is one of trust. After all, Microsoft got very, very rich before the first copy of Product Activated WinXP was sold (all their "piracy estimates" notwithstanding.)
Don't like this? Buy/support/use software that does not constrain you. That's your option. Boycotting AMI or TCPA-enabled motherboards does not solve the problem; those manufacturers are responding to a demand from software developers and content owners.
What a load...;) There is no reason any bios company has to stop selling its non-TCPA builds. They can sell both, and the idea that they would have "no demand" for non-TCPA formats is ludicrous. After all, who is the ultimate customer of the bios company--hint: it's not the software developers, it's not the content owners--it's the *end users who buy the motherboards.* Was it the "content owners" which influenced bios companies to start making bios versions with all kinds of adjustable parameters, parameters that for years were excluded from the user CMOS interface (ram timings, voltage regulation, etc?) *chuckle* Hardly (snicker)
Companies large and small who forget who their actual cutomer base is will regret it, I predict, because their customers will go elsewhere. There's an old capitalist adage that businesses today would be well-advised to heed: the customer is always right. It would appear that some companies today are so confused they don't even know who their customers actually are--they think the middlemen they sell to are their customers. However, it's the needs and demands of the end user that shape the order of the middlemen companies. If the last guy in the chain loses his business (in this case the motherboard makers) then everybody upriver loses theirs, too. I shouldn't even have to say any of this it's so obvious.
Brian, you might not see this since Im posting it late and I didn't get to print out and read your answers till a little later in the day. This is one of the best interviews I've read on SD. Thanks so much for the thoughtfull responses and consideration you put into your words. It's a treat for readers to get a feel for a topic from an "insider" of any company. Again, thanks a ton for all the information. I know I found it incredibly enlightening and definitely helped me sort out my facts and opinions on TCPA and Palladium. Great job!!
Have a Happy.
...would ask this question.
First of all, the modern x86 bioses are self-configuring and can be safely ignored if the end user wishes to do so. However, a bios offers *hardware configuration options* that I personally find invaluable and could not imagine doing without. Suppose that I want to adjust the motherboard voltage regulation and raise or lower the voltage the motherboard provides to the cpu, the ram, the AGP bus, I/O--etc? (Whether or not a person thinks this is "necessary" is utterly irrelevant *chuckle* so please don't go off on that silly tangent.) The fact is that these are the kinds of hardware configuration options, among many, many more, which a modern bios provides.
If you don't have a bios you are autoconfigured and the bios is still there--it's just hidden from you completely and you have no control over it whatever. This is progress? I think not.
Ten years ago on an Amiga 3000 I was booting a bios image to ram from hard drive and using the MMU of the 68030 to point the system to it--whoopee-doo--big deal *chuckle* It was maybe marginally quicker to change out the file as opposed to flashing a bios--but the priciple is exactly the same--and the bios is a lot less cumbersome than something like I used with the Amiga (temporarily as I went back to the standard bios after failing to discern a benefit--ram and HD space was very limited in those days--plus I wanted to use the 68030 MMU for other things.) I see no advantage to something like that at all (though I dearly loved my Amigas!)
PCs use a bios still because of the enormous hardware choices available in the x86 marketplace that do not exist for small, closed hardware companies like Apple, for instance. Sometimes it's very nice to go into the the bios and configure a piece of hardware you've installed as opposed to packing up the system and dropping it off at the dealer's and telling him to fix it--just because the system locks the end user out of some of the internals. OpenBoot wouldn't work well at all in the x86 desktop market (I don't think) because you have so very many more hardware choices than these other cpu markets support.
I don't know. I don't care. Everything is fine. You are not the customer. We just do what we are told and so far this is what we have been told to do.
/. reader and COMPLETELY miss the point of of almost every question is that trolling slashdot is in his job description. From the responses so far, he is very good at his job.
It is an art form to use so many words and say so little. The only way this guy could be a
I will now selectively quote from one of his responses which I believe may be a tighter summary than even my caustic words.
I can't do anything about the paranoia, but I hear there is a pill for that.
I suggest that AMI pop a few of these because paranoia is the only explanation for dropping marketing dollars on a crowd that by his own answers have no influence on their decision making process.
Of course you might need some explicit prefix to say that an instruction shouldn't be touched, say because it's a part of self-modifying code. But for the most part, it's just a laziness on the part of tool developers. Although there was some satisfaction in knowing the tricks and writting better code than other people.
Now the big question is: was MASM written in assembler and did they bootstrap the development process using DEBUG?
Anyone familiar with these as usable features on any current x86 systems? What OSes (yes, including Windows) will support installation and boot off of USB devices?
USB2 might just be fast enough where boot from a USB2 HDD might be a very useful feature. I didn't think that PCs would ever be able to boot off of a non-IDE/SCSI disk (network boots and CD/floppy helper boots notwithstanding).
This is a really educational article. Thank-you, Brian, for taking the time to write it. I'm still very frightened by Palladium, but at least I don't feel threatened by TCPA :)
Slightly OT: I also thought it was really cool to see that AMI has an installation of Bugzilla. Brian, do you mind if we list you (AMI) as a company using Bugzilla?
Life has many choices. Eternity has two. What's yours?
The quote is from Animal House. IIRC it was the John Belushi character after their frat house was closed by order of the Dean for various violations.
"From my cold, dead hands you damn, dirty apes!" - CH
I disagree that vast hardware variety is the reason we need x86-style BIOS in x86 machines. The BIOS does *not* let you configure hardware you plug into your machine beyond what standard OpenFirmware (ieee1275) supports. (What special options suddenly appear in *your* x86 BIOS when you plug in XYZ-super-controller-2000? None appear in mine...)
OpenFirmware supports setting up software boot options, configuring boot devices, setting memory & bus options, etc, etc - if the implementer of your platform's firmware wrote in support. IEEE1275 (or what was formerly ieee1275, I suppose) is merely a framework for that. Some people give lots of options in their implementation with pretty menus - others autoconfigure everything. Part of that framework is that add-on cards are supposed to be *self-configuring* - They contain a ROM of code that is called by the system's OpenFirmware at boot time that provides all sorts of useful information to the system firmware. Thus new devices show up in the system's device tree, and if the device's firmware (again, provided by the card vendor on the card's ROM - this is why many standard PC-style PCI cards won't work in an IBM rs6k without additional code support from IBM or without a new version of the PCI card with an openfirmware rom on it) may support configuration routines that the user can invoke.
In short, openfirmware has less 3rd-party hardware support because it's cheaper (in development costs and manufacturing) to not put an openfirmware rom on every card.
So, why are we stuck with x86-style BIOSes? Most all OSes rely on the bios for initialization. Some still use it after startup "handoff" (*cough* win98 *cough*.) Ditching it ditches support for every PC operating system (initialization only, for the most part - practically every modern x86 BIOS goes *poof* once the OS has started).
This doesn't even begin to address the superset functionality BIOSes give now for things like ACPI - things which OSes sometimes rely on the BIOS to control but probably shouldn't. TCPA is another superset functionality - whether or not you think being able to call the BIOS from OS is a sane architecture at all is another discussion entirely.
(The point someone made about the SRM on alpha is illustrative - an equivalent hack would be required for OS initialization if the PC changed its BIOS.)
No system is secure if you have physical access.
Most people have mastered locking their doors, locking their servers is a totally different matter. None of the solutions provided deal with physical access, only logical...
errr....umm...*whooosh* *whoosh* Is this thing on ?
That's actually a cryptography co-processor on those boards. I could use that ! Giga throughput VPNs, keeping whole partitions encrypted, offloading SSL processing... Bring it on as long as we can write software to exploit that stuff !
Now the real question: will developpers actually be able to peruse this piece of hardware as they fancy, or will there be restrictions ? If the dreaded DRM features can be disabled and the extra silicon put to good use with a couple of nice hacks, then I'm all for it.
Think positive ! Turning useless junk into something fun and/or valuable is what hacking is about, not endlessly complaining about the latest MPAA/Microsoft conspiracy.
Id like to see something like security enhanced linux be further developed with this as a platform, it can then be used for what its meant to be used for.
"and I decided to do what I could to try and separate fact from fiction .... I can't do anything about the paranoia, but I hear there is a pill for that).
... from introducing a BIOS designed to make the computer it is installed in less useful to the purchaser of the computer?
Thats nice, but his points were valid, you dodge the questions and continue to do so. Let me pull out the important phrases you dodged:
a) Isn't the goal of "trusted computing" to allow entities other than the owner of the computer to control what the owner does with his/her hardware?
Brian mumbles something about his reading of the TCPA spec and DRM, neither of which were the point of the question. The answer is obvious: "Yes, of course that's the goal. Shut up and eat your BIOS."
b) However, isn't it true that without AMI's trusted BIOS, Palladium wouldn't work?
The reason we keep saying "we're not a part of Palladium" is because Palladium doesn't exist in the marketplace...
This is splitting hairs at best, and another artful dodge. If Palladium were in the marketplace, would AMI be part of it? Of course they would. And right now they're laying the groundwork.
c) In what way does AMI benefit
Here Brian reinforces that you and I are consumers, not customers - mobo manufacturers are customers, and they get the features they want. This is the way the market works, and I've got no special beef with it, but it's a bit of a wake-up call for those who still believe companies like AMI give a rat's ass about the average geek buying a motherboard.
I asked this question when the request for questions first went out and I was left at _0_ even though other people reasonded with interesting comments after me.
:) ) and get's +5? Where the fuck were you when you were modding every DRM-obsessed fool up to "+10000, Horse Isn't Dead Yet" ?
This guy asks this question too late (good question, btw
Just realized that xor will modify a bunch of flags like ZF and mov will not. Even add ax, 1 can not be always replaced with inc ax because the later one doesn't modify the carry flag. So I guess assembler would have to look if you have another instruction that overwrites a flag before anything that tests them or a jmp. So eventually, you still need to use the optimized form yourself, because *ASM can not determine all the cases when it's safe. Just curious, what algorithm did the later versions of MASM use?
I would enjoy a "safe-spot" in my PC for things to run clean and safe and where computers can identify me when I want them to (Citibank, EA game servers, etc). But what will happen with this control VERY quickly will be bad enough to negate any and all good aspects.
>Believe it or not, such abusive "features" are unpopular and cause companies that employ them to lose market share.
True... EXCEPT for Microsoft. That's the threat. That's the worry. That is what will - despite my passion for free computing, free information, etc - turn every computer into an X-Box type device in 5-10 years. Don't envy X-Box users. When ALL computing is done on a closed PC, where opening the box will get us arrested, we'll remember the days back on Slashdot when all this was nothing more than wild paranoia.
I remember only a few years ago people joking around about being arrested for swapping songs. "Never gonna happen." was the general response.
... would make such a fool out of himself.
.
There's no reason that voltages, temp monitoring, and the rest couldn't conform to the Openboot standard. I think Apple makes machines for people who can't cope with serious hardware, but they have an Open Firmware boot console that allows you to query EVERY detail of the system hardwre config without even having an OS installed (without even having a HD installed, really).
Since you need a clue, here it is: Openboot (aka Open Firmware) is a standard by which mainboard, peripheral, and OS developers can all speak the same language to bootstrap the system. One of the central pieces of this system is FCode, a Forth-like system that has, like Java, a sort of virtual machine and a standardized bytecode. Each component in the system that needs to speak to the mainboard to boot is programmed with FCode that the VM on the mainboard executes first off.
Video cards on x86 have actual x86 code in their BIOSes so that the POST can happen (and the VGA BIOS, but that's separate). Openboot makes this possible on a cross-platform basis, hence FCode.
FCode is to the modern x86 BIOS what Linux (or any 32bit OS) is to DOS 3.3
Yeah, the real hackers are all laughing at you now.
That was the biggest whitewash I have read in recent memory. He even made it sound like he was actually addressing concerns. He/AMI are not. Don't buy into this tripe. Just because an interview has to have a disclaimer saying 'this isn't whitewash' taints it. AMI is obviously worried that noone will purchase boards with TCPA/Palladium/DRM and I think a small startup WILL make a bios (likely flashable to any tainted board). We will buy that. Plain and simple. If we don't want something, don't buy it. Capitalism is great for this. Someone else will come along to figure out how to take our money and we get what we want. Consumer's are a powerful force and this is why you see an AMI engineer dispatched to quell growing dissent.
"During times of universal deceit, telling the truth becomes a revolutionary act." - George Orwell, 1984
That seems to imply to me at least that there's a TCPA<->Palladium link in the background that seems rather sinister. Particularly the reference to MSFT being a "founding member" (although that could be to clearify MSFT's role in TCPA, although that tends to make me (and I'm sure many others) envision TCPA being driven at least to a modest, if not large extent, by the World's most Wealthy and Powerful Monopolist, who has been proven again and again to abuse this position to further its own interests and crush actual and potential competition) and in particular the "directed to Microsoft at this time" bit seems to signal to me that the TCPA is just the hardware component of Palladium, and that TCPA will accomodate Palladium and MSFT (who is doing everything it can to kill Linux and Free Software) when the time is right. Maybe even now, but only the members (or even a subset of them!) know. After all, an API is only as open as is actually revealed.
I would be much more reassured if you were actually an active part of the AMI TCPA contingent, and then also privvy to all of the internal docs. You could then possibly reassure us that we won't be excluded from the fun now or later on down the road.
An additional thorn in my side is this "membership" business. It seems that you have to sign some agreements in order to get more access to TCPA docs, which leads me to wonder that the "open" specification isn't really quite so open, and that we're being left outside in the cold for anything that will potentially hurt us, so that we will go along with it. Once again, an API is only as open as is actually revealed
What reassurances can you offer?
--
Given enough personal experience, all stereotypes are shallow.
This type of mechanism doesn't exist in TCPA, and would probably require some sort of support at the chipset level (which means it couldn't be implemented using current northbridge hardware). The total system impact isn't known, and it's any body's guess what this does to application development.
This is what it does:
INVALID PAGE FAULT AT UNKNOWN ADDRESS
You need to restart your computer. Hold down the Power button for several seconds or press the Restart button.
I can imagine a world where I can buy first run books to read electronically for 50 cents. This would be worth it to me. I am as happy reading a book on my computer as I am reading it in paper - perhaps happier as I can search. It would be worth it to the author. They are compensated for their extraordinary effort in writing the book.
I can see the possibility that 'trusted' computing platforms do give me something that I don't currently have. They give me access to content that simply will not be made available if there is no 'trusted' computing platform.
And, at the same time, nobody's arm is twisted. If you don't want the content, then you don't need to have an implementation of something like Paladium.
What if we could move to a world where *everything* is online. All content is available. Some of it is free, as in free beer and etc. Some of it is not free, and it is within the rights of the author to decide which category he wants to place his content.
Actually, in my opinion, this *is* going to happen, whether I want it or not, or whether anyone else wants it or not.
I see a lot of posts on /. that advocate that all information should be free. Some idiot even said "why should someone own the intellectual property rights to something just because they created it."
This is just like someone saying, "Why should you be able to mold your children's values in the direction that you choose, just because you *created* them."
My point is that if I create some intellectual property, I get to decide what to do with it, not you or anybody else on the web, and Paladium helps. And at the same time, it will make it far easier for me to release my content to a much vaster audience. And I believe that there will be much more content available to me post-Paladium.
That still doesn't make it right. If you're speaking for AMI, it reflects poorly on them for sending you here to give dishonest answers; if you're speaking for yourself, it reflects poorly on you.
But from how he fails to describe it, it sounds as if this is a "Let's make crypto faster and more integral by having a dedicated, onboard hardware encryption module to replace all the thousands of possibly-not-as-good software versions."
That sounds like a decent idea to me, as long as it doesn't uniquely identify me and doesn't allow an application to circumvent my control.
I want my Cowboyneal
That cleared it up pretty much. My basic gut feeling about this was right after all. Customers have a choice (TCPA on/off) but it won't matter because if this thing catches on (which obviously shit's starting to roll down hill now) you evenually be forced to keep it *on* in order to do anything on your PC. Lovely. How about older hardware? If my gut feeling is true, the TCPA enabled apps will probably detect prior-to-TCPA mobo's as *off*.
:)
The bible reference is quite fitting, I had a hunch it was REV 13:17. In any case, thanks for the clarification, now i know who's side i'm on.
A Penny for my thoughts? Here's my two cents. I got ripped off!
Oh, so that ROM code included on all PCI cards that plugs right into the x86 BIOS framwork and gives you extra configuration menus and boot possibilities on everything from NICs to RAID controllers doesn't count?
OpenFirmware doesn't solve your problem, there's no chanse in hell PCI card vendors will include the necessary code compiled for each and every CPU arch on earth.
ACPI is exactly what you want, it specifies a virtual machine and the pheripal ROM contains code compiled for this machine. Think Java in a BIOS. Unfortunatley ACPI today leaves a lot to be wished for but I bet that by version 3.0..."The only way you let technology take control of you is if you let it."
Um, that's pretty profound there Brian. Similar to saying the only way I type this message is if I type it.
And when did we start talking about technology controlling us? The fact that you made that jump is revealing in itself. This is about who controls our technology. And how our control is in the process of being undermined and eroded by new "trust" initiatives, whether it is welcome or not.
Look I appreciate the time you spent answering the interview, it's obvious you put a lot of work and thought behind it, nobody is saying otherwise. But you DID evade some sticky questions, and you're doing it now. And don't shovel us that line about how you're not a security expert. These questions are ethical and philosophical in shape. They're about copyright regimes stripping us of technological freedom and empowerment. As a fellow member of the human species (salespeople excepted joke omitted), do you have a raw, honest opinion on that? Or do you just take your paycheck and not think about where this is going? (I say IS going, not COULD go. The parties behind this have goals. Profit by means of as much control as possible.)
"Mind, as manifested by the capacity to make choices, is to some extent present in every electron." -Freeman Dyson
But it did include random number generation which is used in many areas of computing not just security (games, simulators, whatever).
OpenFirmware doesn't solve your problem, there's no chanse in hell PCI card vendors will include the necessary code compiled for each and every CPU arch on earth.
They don't have to. OpenFirmware is written in FCode, which is like Forth, which was heavily influential in the development of Java. One of the things Forth provides is write once, run anywhere (for real this time). Openboot devices have interfaces in Fcode and the bios can talk to them. It is stable and mature and has been used in production machines for over a decade. ACPI is reinventing the wheel poorly. 'Java in a BIOS' already exists. Please do your research first.
Even if this is not a direct sales pitch, I am glad to hear a company rep talking straight instead of quoting sales liturature.
Even if the AMI doesn't open source their product, it is almost as good to have straight answers about the industry and why they won't do it. Open answers are the next best thing to open-source.
How could you do that?
Okay, I'll admit that you could have some sort of future disc hardware that might refuse to run without TCPA, but that wouldn't be a cd-rom or a dvd, in any case.
A new disk format could be created that demands TCPA support in the backend and only sends if it trusts your system, but unless the entire format of the disc were unknown, it would still be possible to create a disc reader that doesn't require TCPA that outputs the encrypted version.
the point being, it's not that simple. (and probably not worth doing, unless the encryption sucks, at which point there isn't that much point in using it in the first place)
I loved to use it in my 8086 assembly and watch how it gives people reading my code a pause ;)
I'm scared. I don't want a Microsoft Computer. If I paid for it, it's mine and I can run any fucking software I want. Linux, Viruses (virii? whatever), porndialers, worms, Fucking Free Software that I don't have to pay Microsoft for.
I don't want Microsoft telling me what I can and cannot do with something I own. I used to chat on their IRC servers and saw how they treated users. It was a daily thing to dump everyone off just to see what would happen. I could see this: "BSOD: Microsoft has halted your computer's operation to see what would happen, please reboot to continue..."
If that is what is coming, I hope some group gets together and continues to make real computer parts. Of course it will probably be illegal by then.
Someone please post a real scenario of what things might be like with this stuff enabled...
A trusted machine is one that conforms to a certification process. You don't define the certification, the remote service requires it of you. So using your metaphor, the hammer that kills someone is not in your control, you just swing it as per instructions.
The point of my metaphor is that TPM is just a tool, like a hammer. It has beneficial uses and harmful uses, and which use it is put to is not up to the tool. In the event the TPM is used to lock out certain OSs it makes no sense to blame TPM or even TCPA, the blame rests squarly on the issuer of the certificate. Most likely that would be MS, but it could just as easily be RH as I attempted to point out.
I can change software, those tiny silicon transitors are a damn site harder. But yes I agree they could do the useful stuff in software - there is no need for this stuff.
You're right, there isn't strictly a need for this. However, it would be really useful to me if I could put really strong crypto (say 2048 bit) on an ssh connection to a server I'm responsible for without bringing that server, or my home computer, to it's knees processing the encryption algorythms. It would also be really nice if there were a way to limit what machines my server would accept connections from specific remote machines. Since I can't do that currently, I err on the side of caution and leave no possibility for remote administartion.
Please read the bills before Congress, particular the "DRM in all devices" bill. To be paranoid I have to *suspect* something that is not true, not *read* something that is true.
There are no bills before Congress. Congress is not currently in session, and any bills which were undecided upon at the close of the last session are now gone, and will have to be reintroduced to the next session, which is unlikely considering the backlash against the Hollings bill, the fact that Hollings is no longer in the same position of power he was in which would have enabled him to push the bill through comittee, and the fact that the RIAA has stated that it no longer seeks such legislation.Based on that evidence I think it's quite reasonable to say that the threat no longer exists, therefore you are paranoid.
That said, though, the statement that was in response to had nothing to do with DRM.
Under capitalism man exploits man. Under communism it's the other way around.
good point wraithlyn
enoof sayd
(yes, the obvious joke is "boot speed doesn't matter when you don't have to reboot so often" ... but I'm taking the high road)
OOOOOOH....Damn I forgot, you gotta reboot windows every other day right?
Hmmm let see, last time I rebooted my PC was....Oct. 28th 2002, because I had to take it to a LAN party. Before that it had been up a month before I upgraded the video drivers. And I routinely do everything from browsing, to photoshop, to Maya Unlimited, to 3DSMAX, to Dreamweaver and more. Take the high road indeed.
"The saddest words of mice and men, are not those which were, but should have been."
I might've missed it, but I didn't notice anyone thanking you for submitting yourself to the scrutiny of the /. community.
I happen to live in your neck of the woods and lunch is on me whenever and wherever you prefer. Just msg me from my profile if you're interested.
That being said, and acknowledging your statement that you're not a TCPA advocate, please forward this statement to your leadership: I did not ask for TCPA. I know that I'm not one of your big customers, but that fact is irrelevant to me. From a purely risk-assessment point-of-view, I'm much more comfortable accepting the possibility of a million crazed virus authors versus the alternative: allowing a conglomeration of companies to control the future of computing innovation. I can fight the authors of computer viruses on the technological common ground that is the PC today. I cannot afford to fight teams of lawyers from large companies tomorrow. Maybe once we get the DMCA (and its worldwide equivalents) repealed, TCPA can be re-addressed. Until then, given today's frenzy of litigation...it's just too risky a prospect for me to consider.
Again, thanks for taking the time to explain your company's involvement with TCPA and for answering our questions. More companies need people like you to address the "masses".
--K.
Sig: Bad people happen. Try to avoid being one of them.
on by the onboard TPM
what happens when the power goes out in the middle of a hash?
actually I thought his replies were excellent. You on the other hand, are a god damned imbecile.
I personally like the idea of open-source, and I use a lot of open-source programs at home and work... But I also buy and use regular closed-source programs... The choice isn't whether or not the source is accessible, but if the tool fits my needs. [emphasis added]
;-) Seriously, great piece. A lot was over my head, but what I understood was very good. Thanks!
Who is this freak of nature and how the hell did he wind up on slashdot?
Dear Slashdot: next time you want to mess with the site, add a rich-text editor for comments.
AMI customers are motherboard manufactures.
MB manufacture clients are system developers.
System developers are companies like Dell and HP.
Dell and HP have to choose MSFT to achieve repsectable sales numbers, hence they ignore the consumer and listen to the MSFT monopoly. I do not blame AMI for wanting to stay in business.
One problem with performance -
Bios will likely run at the motherboard clock speed, which is usually a lot closer to 133MHz than 2.0 GHz. Even custom hardware will have a tough time making up this difference. Hence, won't a dedicated Bios processor still be slower than a processor based solution.
---- Smokin' another sig.
Sometimes you're just humble.
I might bith and moan about slashdot every now and then, but stories like this makes me realise why I end up reading slashdot pretty much every day. Cudos to all of you keeping slashdot up, and that includes the people in the forum as well.
yeah I'm drunk and it's over 6 o'clock here in the UK. but I just wanted to give some credit back to the people here. cheers...
if (!signature) { throw std::runtime_error("No sig!"); }
If cheap Quantum Computing was created by the end of TCPA-installation of machines..
;-)
Would quantum computers be against the DMCA? After all, they just brute force the key (just all at once, heh
xor ax, ax
depends on the value of ax... this may seem silly since it's going to be zero, but with a superscalar architectures it can mean a stalled pipe waiting for ax to be set before you clear it. For speed optimized code which one to use depends on the surrounding instuctions. For a BIOS stored in potentially slow memory and then only 64KB or 128KB of it xor always makes sense, but gcc -O3 should probably use mov.. The difference between xor and sub is like one flag in this case (both are two bytes.) I'd go with the xor because it's a simpler instruction and probably consumes some part of a nanoWatt less energy. But may in fact not be the case, and it hasn't ever been high enough on my list of todo's to measure.
Forget about TCPA for a second. I bought a decent voice-recorder for CAD 150 a few days ago. It can capture output from my PC speakers reasonably well. Let the RIAA go broke paying for MS's Palladium, v can still get our music if aren't too finicky. I know 3D effects r cool but let us await voice-recorders which can better capture sound. I think the demand for voice-recorders is high enough for someone to bring out recorders with capabilities comparable to studio-equipment.
Hey, does anyone know if AMI still has that stupid 'windows lookalike' bios setup?
I've avoided any motherboard using AMI Bioses ever since the day I bought a 486 that had a "WinBios".
self sign certificates
Self sign certificates are useless for interoperating with other systems. Either you turn over full control to the primary certificate authority or you get completely locked out. Microsoft *is* going to be the 800-pound gorilla certificate authority.
Try this on for size - websites are COPYRIGHTED CONTENT. Copyrighted text. Copyrighted images. Copyrighted audio. Copyrighted video. Now imagine Internet Explorer supports protected web content. And imagine various websites protect thier content. Anyone running Microsoft signed software can access the entire internet. Anyone NOT running Microsoft signed software can only access part of the internet. And Microsoft can come up with a variety of ways to pressure everyone to move inside the protected zone. It would take several years, but it certainly is conceivable.
-
- - You can't take something off the Internet! That's like trying to take pee out of a swimming pool.
This interview was quite interesting and cleared up some points. So what it (TCPA) seems to be is
;) (for those who still don't know about the BOFH read it here [http://bofh.ntk.net])
an hardware ssl like, with the possibility given to the user to manage the certificates.
The usefullness of such a thing would be:
- restriction on users liberties (very efficient) with two applications that jumps to mind:
* DRM of course
* Use by system operators to prevent users from running the latest "play at work place" featuring the newest (and of course worst) trojan... I'm pretty sure all the BOFHs out there would love it
This could look like:
"
user: I can't log in my computer
bofh: (look at the excuse of the day) That's because you aren't registred by [insert some Redmond based software company]
[silence]
user: And is there something I can do to get myself registred? (note: woah this actually looks like some response of the emacs psychiatrist)
bofh (smiling gently): Sure! You have to go to Redmond for user identification.It's a bit like a medical check, but more thorough. Be sure to bring them a nice urine sample, they use it for DNA.
user: Do i need something special?
bofh (kindness radiating from his face): no, just hand the urine sample to the hostess and she will understand.
user: Ok I understand! Thank you so much!
bofh: No problem. Oh btw, I forgot to tell you that's this procedure is kinda secret, so don't mention me, just pretend you knew it was the right thing to do!
user: Ok, I'll remember it, rest assured!
"
- speeding encryption. This could be great: it could generalize secured transfers. However I'm not quite sure that WE need such a level of protection. Further more I can't see how this could possibly make governments happy! How would they be able to take a look at 2048 bits encrypted data?!
To conclude: the claim that the owner will be able to manage the keys is FALSE (or will be)!
This way, all adds up nicely, but not for us!
btw: note the distinction between "owner" and "user", which are WE?!
You cannot change the root certificate in your system. You most defineately cannot pick who you trust with tcpa. You cannot, for example "trust" yourself (which is the whole point of tcpa of course).
[ Is, I read the whole interview, with even some links. ]
One half thrust force these questions are: "What does TCPA seem provides the advantage only tells me to these hopes my canned food and is not possible to do with mine computer. Is this is real? If is not, is what in it is I? If it are real, how can you sleep in evening?"
I think Michael's question is most in the spot, and what I most do want to know I (there, I reach an agreement the matter about him :). The Brian complete sexual intercourse dodges each only their in the middle one.
Brian ambiguously said something about the TCPA stored routine education computer and DRM his study, two all is not this question spot. This answer is obvious: "Is, certainly is this goal. The closure and eats your biology live element."
This fission hair is best, slyly dodges with other. If is in this market, is partial it? Certainly their meeting. And they now eliminate the foundation.
Here Brian strengthens, you and I are the consumer, is not the customer - mobo manufacturer is the customer, and they obtain the characteristic they want. This is this market operation way, and I do not have the special beef with it, but it were one to these awaken the call still believe the company likely awarded the mouse the donkey buys the motherboard about general geek.
If I sound to be harsh it are because I urinate. The TCPA goal is transparent, and the person or is trying to pull the wool in ours eye or incompetent Brian. The supposition he pass randomly chop this kind of material are the life, has "with the now sells" in his title, I suggest front.
Big medium nad big software chortling in glee when they look their plan is "computation" which trusts is been mature. MPAA wants to turn yours computer the television, and is only to the happy help.
...would answer this way.
You confuse the mechanism with the functionality. Yes, a BIOS lets you set myriad options. None of those options are specific to a BIOS.
True, Apple doesn't really pack their OF implementations with features, but it suits the way a Macintosh is used. If you get into it, you will see that OF is actually remarkably flexible and powerful. For a really good example, get into the firmware on a Sun machine. Look at the things you can do with the SCSI cards. Note the extensive diagnostics for the network controllers. If Sun wanted to (indeed, if Sun users wanted the ability to) you can bet controls for voltages and the like would be there as well.
PCs use a bios still because of the enormous hardware choices available in the x86 marketplace that do not exist for small, closed hardware companies like Apple, for instance.
Not true at all. PCs use a BIOS because it provides all the bacwards compatibility the DOS (and now Windows) market demands. In fact, Open Firmware provides mechanisms so that devices can extend the functionality. If you insert a new card, it provides new abilitis related to the card in the firmware. The closest a PC BIOS gets to that is multiple independent BIOSes, like you see when you have a bootable SCSI controller, NIC, or the like installed.
The BIOS is very much like the x86 architecture. It's still here because it's the product of very gradual change. It is layer upon layer of compatibility, with advanced functions tacked on one at a time. Open Firmware, on the other hand, is relatively new. The group that designed it created it to be open and expandable, while the groups that designed the BIOS wanted to run DOS as well as the IBM PCs they were cloning, nothing more.
± 29 dB
I was goign to yell at you, but I see it's already been done. Oh well, might as well re-iterate.
Oh, so that ROM code included on all PCI cards that plugs right into the x86 BIOS framwork and gives you extra configuration menus and boot possibilities on everything from NICs to RAID controllers doesn't count?
By "plugs right into" do you mean "runs separately?" If not, well that's what you should have said. Your main motherboard BIOS has a boot option that allows other devices to take control of the boot process, but it's far short of a plug-in arch.
OpenFirmware doesn't solve your problem, there's no chanse in hell PCI card vendors will include the necessary code compiled for each and every CPU arch on earth.
Oh, but it does. It uses an interpreted language for everything, so it's platform-agnostic. It's rather powerful and flexible, as well. I have seen (not used, mind you, I didn't have the machine to run it) a version of Pong written in Forth code that you could run on a few specific Mac models. It was a product of MacHack, probably six years ago or so. You got it into the Mac by connecting a serial cable to the Mac, then entering a spefic command into the firmware that told it to read an incoming program off the serial lines. (Oh, what those geeks think of.)
ACPI is exactly what you want, it specifies a virtual machine and the pheripal ROM contains code compiled for this machine. Think Java in a BIOS. Unfortunatley ACPI today leaves a lot to be wished for but I bet that by version 3.0...
Okay, something sucks now, but I'm sure that by the time they work on it more it'll suck less. That's not the way clean interfaces get made. Look a little more into Open Firmware, and understand that it does pretty much everything now that you think ACPI will do eventually.
± 29 dB
How are we supposed to determine that a technical specification (TCPA is nothing more than that after all, it's its uses which are potentially negatives) can lead to abuses (Microsoft's or vendor's ones) if we don't get a detailed explanation of how works.
We would need to know how this crypto-chip interacts with the BIOS first, then the booted OS, then all software running under that OS in order to know if it can be used to deprive us of our liberty.
From what I've read on slashdot about the TCPA until now (but I may have read too fast) this point was not talked about and the interview while informative on some points fails to fill that hole (the TCPA FAQ Brian pointed to is not informative, nor are the TCPA specs I read). It could be intentional or not but - as some have mentionned it - vague answers have been replied to questions that might have lead to such detailed explanation of the working of the TCPA chip/bios system. I hope however that Brian Richardson will be given the possibility to correct this omission (more at the bottom).
Anyway, even without knowing how the whole thing runs we can make a few simple technical assumptions and see what consequences they would have on the user's liberty. Getting a clear answer on TCPA's risks would just be a matter of asking which assumptions are right or wrong to guys such as Brian R.
Let's imagine the boot process of a TCPA BIOS with TCPA enabled :
The chip is basically used to secure the boot process, ie its goal is to verify that essential boot code was not compromised beetween consecutive reboots. For this purpose, it must be the first chip on the mother board to boot. Then the only thing it has to do is check the BIOS signature and verify that it matches the private key (which the chip keeps hidden in its own externally-unnaccessible backup memory).
If the BIOS signature does not match then the chip would inform the user via an audio or visual message.
Whether the user chooses to continue the boot process or investigate further the cause of his BIOS "corruption" is up to him and does not interest us anymore : he has been warned that his system was compromised.
If the BIOS signature matches, then the user knows he can trust the BIOS to correctly load the boot loader. From there the BIOS would now send a message to the crypto-chip saying "take a rest now, i'll call you when needed", it would load the boot-loader and check its signature using the crypto chip.
Once the boot loader sig has been verified and can thus be trusted, the BIOS launches it.
From that point I guess there's no more need to detail the booting chain as most of you will get the point : the trusted boot-loader loads the OS kernel, uses the chip to check its sig, and so on.
When the OS has finally loaded, the user is fully sure that its system was not compromised in any way, if the OS (be it Linux or Windows, this is not relevant) or the software running on it need to check some important data integrity, they will just have to load it and ask the chip to check it for them.
This all leads to what we can call without fear in the common-man (ie not security expert one) sense to a really trusted computer : a computer which can be trusted by its owner to have all its critical (or not) data integrity guaranteed.
No one outside can change any part of the system or user data without the user being informed of it.
At this point, this looks rather helpful : user gets data integrity for the cost of a probably quite cheap chip (sorry) and everyone's happy.
With this system, windows can of course encrypt sensitive data which nobody will be able to decrypt from another OS (on the same machine)... unless this OS is able to use the TCPA chip, which means that anyone using a TCPA enabled Linux (always fully open source which guarantees nothing's hidden to us) will be able to decrypt the windows kernel, windows software, disassemble them and remove eventual protection.
User : "So where's does the monster hide ?"
To find it we must be able to locate what technically makes this system really "secure" (from the user's point of view) and it's quite easy : windows/linux can be trusted because they rely on a lauching stage which is itself considered trusted, which itself relies on a previous trusted stage and so on... until... the BIOS itself which is the first stage of the booting process :
The system is secure if and only because the BIOS is.
Which means that the BIOS is the most crucial security element of the whole TCPA system (and I can't believe that Brian Richardson as an engineer is not aware of this) : whoever can become a friend of the BIOS will have full access to every single unencrypted byte stored on the machine whether Bill Gates wants it or not.
User : "Well, I'm confused. Are you saying there's no monster ?"
Let's continue :
Imagine a user with a TCPA aware windows, we're not talking Palladium (at least not yet) : this is just a windows version able to use the crypto chip to ensure the user can trust all its data.
Now imagine that this user wants to install a TCPA aware Linux on his machine. As we saw before, to do so he must be a friend of the BIOS if he wants to modify the boot loader.
User : "Ok, so how do I become a friend of the BIOS ?"
It's easy to imagine that to access the BIOS settings one will have to enter a password known only to the TCPA chip : when you press DEL at boot, the BIOS prompts for the password, sends it to the TCPA chip which replies "valid" or "invalid" (with a few seconds delay to ensure that brute force attempts will be worthless). If the password is valid the BIOS considers you a friend and user has full access again to every single byte of its machine and can install whatever OS he likes, be it TCPA enabled or not.
User : "Ok, but no monster still ???"
But... imagine that your machine came with Windows installed.
User : "Well, I still get to enter the password so I can still install TCPA/Linux no ?"
Well, perhaps, but imagine there is no password.
Imagine that the only thing you can do is format your whole harddrive and reinstall only manufacturer-signed OSes.
That the BIOS does not allow you to install another OS, using the SAME private key which was used to install windows.
Do you get it now ?
I actually think that Brian Richardson might not have been very honest when answering the question regarding accessibility of data from open source OSes (TCPA enabled or not).
Answering that TCPA could be disabled is not a valid answer, the BIOS might let you install a non TCPA OS providing it allows you access only to hard drive partitions unused by windows but this OS still won't be to read windows data : you won't be able to read data you downloaded from windows if windows encrypts it (and be sure it will !).
The only monster present here lies in the very BIOS AMI and Brian R. try to present as innocuous, if the BIOS does not allow the user to share the same private keys beetween different OSes then it is clear that the Palladium system is just a smoke screen deployed by Microsoft in order to let time for all users to switch to TCPA BIOSes. Once most users will use such BIOSes there will be no need for a palladium chip or any other kind of Microsoft/Intel hardware : a TCPA enabled version of windows able to tell the chip "here's the new key, never share it with anyone but me" is all Bill needs to ensnare everyone.
There's no need either for curtain memory or anything else as long as this windows version only allows signed executables to be run...
So Brian, what have you got to say at that point ?
Now that it is clear that what is what *you* (and others) at AMI and not Microsoft will choose to implement will determine whether Bill will be king or not, are you going to tell us a bit more about the interaction beetween the AMI TCPA BIOS and the TCPA chip or are you still going to be very vague on that point ?
And please don't point on the quite vague TCPA FAQ or whitepaper. Tell us simply this : will multiple OSes be allowed to share the same key and what will be the procedures to become a BIOS friend ?
I guess everyone here at /. is eager to have your point on those.
Well this post is quite long enough, but I'll take the time to add another thing about ethics and trade.
Despite what Brian said, what we do with technology is not just a matter of consumers/vendors relation, the economic world does not (should not at least) rule over the civical one, it's the contrary which is (should be) true.
Did you ever ask yourself why it's not allowed to kill someone for money ? That might be beneficial for the economy if it was, but humans don't want to live in such a society so they make laws to restrict what the economic agents are allowed to do.
And as citizens of so-called civilized countries it is our duty to refuse to build/make tools whose intent is to gain power over other citizens and to make other citizens aware of such issues.
To this respect Brian I think that you might be a good sales engineer, but you might also be a quite bad human being depending on what you choose to do or sell.
A PeeCee will be an appliance and a computer will run ...ix
There will be enough demand for both...
Interesting. So if I substitute your words into their words, it all sounds very scary and is now propaganda. You've convinced me.
Here, let me try that with your post. Here, let's read the following sentence you wrote:
But keep the following translation table in mind:
By keeping my translation table in mind, I can make you into a pervert! Hey, this is fun!
Forget the whales - save the babies.
"Option B is an obvious downer, because customers give us money. Money can be exchanged for goods and services, like food ... and I find food to be an important part of a nutritious breakfast."
Fucking Whore
MONEY money MONEY money MONEY money MONEY money
MONEY money MONEY money MONEY money MONEY money
MONEY money MONEY money MONEY money MONEY money
MONEY money MONEY money MONEY money MONEY money
MONEY money MONEY money MONEY money MONEY money
MONEY money MONEY money MONEY money MONEY money
MONEY money MONEY money MONEY money MONEY money v
The executable is signed with M$'s PRIVATE key. The signature is checked against the PUBLIC key in the chip. No connectivity needed either. Cracking the chip only gets you the PUBLIC key. Please don't confuse encryption with signing. If you are still fuzzy go read the PGP docs by Phil Zimmerman, he explains it a lot better than I am going to here.
Democrat delenda est
> The people who don't "get" xor ax, ax at first
:)
> glance are primarily those whose first assembly
> language experience was on an architecture such
> as 6502 that can't do operations between
> registers and registers, only registers and
> memory.
Then what do TAX, TYA, and brethern do?
Of course, "transfer" isn't much of an operation, but it is one.
Very insightful point, howerver. The first time I saw "xor ax,ax" was in 1987, after programming 6502/6510 for a few years. I took me almost ten minutes to figure out what the hell was going on.
Of course, that was also the first day I'd seen 80x86 assembly, and it was literally the first instruction in the program I was reading.
Do daemons dream of electric sleep()?
Of course, "transfer" isn't much of an operation, but it is one. :)
Oops... I misused "operations" to mean "ALU operations or shift operations".
Will I retire or break 10K?