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Biometrics: Prepare to be Scanned

npistentis writes "From an article in the Economist: It has been a long time coming. But after years of false starts, security systems based on biometrics--human characteristics such as faces, hand shapes and fingerprints--are finally taking off. Proponents have long argued that because biometrics cannot be forgotten, like a password, or lost or stolen, like a key or an identity card, they are an ideal way to control access to computer networks, airport service-areas and bank vaults. But biometrics have not yet spread beyond such niche markets, for two main reasons. The first is the unease they can inspire among users. Many people would prefer not to have to submit their eyes for scanning in order to withdraw money from a cash dispenser. The second reason is cost: biometric systems are expensive compared with other security measures, such as passwords and personal identification numbers. So while biometrics may provide extra security, the costs currently outweigh the benefits in most cases."

284 comments

  1. Fingers by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 4, Funny

    I think they may be able to steal my finger with a big knife!

    1. Re:Fingers by altek · · Score: 3, Interesting

      There are safeguards to prevent this, such as methods to determine body heat and pulse being necessary for a positive ID.

      --
      THE MAGIC WORDS ARE SQUEAMISH OSSIFRAGE
    2. Re:Fingers by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I'd still be out of a finger.

    3. Re:Fingers by digitalsushi · · Score: 1

      I'd rather lose five fingers than one eye! I think. Well, if they were like my left pinky, ring, middle, and right pinky and ring. Otherwise I dunno. Still. Ewwwwww

      --
      slashdot: where everyone yells sarcastic metaphors to themselves to understand the issue
    4. Re:Fingers by iabervon · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Actually, people can steal your finger with a piece of tape and a bit of rubber. So far as I know, nobody's made a biometric system that actually manages to determine that what it's examining is actually flesh and blood, rather than a thin layer of some other material with somebody else's fingerprints on it (or something even less sophisticated).

    5. Re:Fingers by scottganyo · · Score: 2, Funny

      Sure, but not without your knowledge!

    6. Re:Fingers by Rumagent · · Score: 1

      I don't think your eye is very secure either... It could easily be scooped out with a spoon:(

    7. Re:Fingers by iantri · · Score: 2, Interesting

      As far as I know most of the systems actually measure the temperature of the 'thumb', so that would make it a bit more difficult to fake (I'm not saying it would be hard, though).

    8. Re:Fingers by digitalsushi · · Score: 1

      i'm an old man? actually, what you said really makes very little sense. i say ewwwww all the time in real life, too. neeener neeeener

      --
      slashdot: where everyone yells sarcastic metaphors to themselves to understand the issue
    9. Re:Fingers by Yorrike · · Score: 5, Interesting
      What about making a replica finger or eye that looks and feels like the real thing? Rest assured, if there's money to be made from creating such material, any technological shortcomings will be dealt with by the criminal world.

      And what about classical hacking using the binary data your biometric details will eventually become once scanned?

      Biometrics may sound futuristic and secure, but unlike a password or card, you can't replace your fingerprints or retina with a few keystokes, or have the bank send you a new one.

      --

      Looks can be deceiving. Or CAN they?

    10. Re:Fingers by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Interesting
      There are safeguards to prevent this, such as methods to determine body heat and pulse being necessary for a positive ID.

      OK, but does your average criminal know that?

    11. Re:Fingers by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      What we need is some way to prevent people from aremoving your fingers unless they know the right code.

    12. Re:Fingers by altek · · Score: 1

      Good point. You'd think they would try to make this common knowledge to avoid a rash of finger severings (a new crime?), but then again who knows...

      --
      THE MAGIC WORDS ARE SQUEAMISH OSSIFRAGE
    13. Re:Fingers by _Sprocket_ · · Score: 4, Informative

      It seems that these sorts of sensors can be fooled using a geletin finger.

    14. Re:Fingers by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      As far as I know most of the systems actually measure the temperature of the 'thumb', so that would make it a bit more difficult to fake

      This could probably be defeated by placing the new fingerprint over your own finger - assuming it was thin enough, your body heat and pulse would still be detected.

    15. Re:Fingers by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Interesting

      Are there safeguards to prevent germs? Do you really want to stick your finger where thousands of other fingers have been before? Do you know that some people pick their ass? And thats not the worst of it.

    16. Re:Fingers by Monkelectric · · Score: 2, Funny

      Reminds me of an episode of STTNG where a "time travel historian" has come to visit the enterprise (and steal technology). He tries to kidnap Commander Data by trapping him in his time machine, and Data says to him, "I assume your palm print will open the door whether or not you are conscious."

      --

      Religion is a gateway psychosis. -- Dave Foley

    17. Re:Fingers by abe+ferlman · · Score: 1

      Ever seen demolition man?

      Every time you think about this as a good idea, just repeat the phrase "My eye impaled on a pencil" over and over again until you reconsider.

      --
      microsoftword.mp3 - it doesn't care that they're not words...
    18. Re:Fingers by tytyty · · Score: 1

      Penile scan?

      --
      REAL penguins build their own kernels and binaries!
    19. Re:Fingers by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Funny

      That's easy! just require that all knives be fitted with a security feature that only allows the user to cut off their own fingers. At the same time, you could program the knive to only allow preparation of government sanctioned wholesome food.

    20. Re:Fingers by Ulven · · Score: 1

      So tell me, how do you open doors?

    21. Re:Fingers by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Informative

      And will these methods work, and be reliable in, for instance, outdoor ATMs? Kind hard to detect bodyheat accurately is the sensor pad is in direct sunlight, or half-covered in ice.

      And, you HAVE heard of the guy who used Jello to defeat fingerprint scanners, right?

      http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1105-916135.html

    22. Re:Fingers by smchris · · Score: 1

      Many people would prefer not to have to submit their eyes for scanning in order to withdraw money from a cash dispenser.

      Well, exactly. I don't want some _robber_ submitting my eye for scanning.

    23. Re:Fingers by speed-sf · · Score: 2, Interesting

      You raise an interesting point, the solution is actually simple, you use a series of biometrics and create a composite biometric. Something perhaps like a fingerprint and a retinal scan. Besides the obvious logistical problems with the composite I mentioned this is how you could make situations like demolition man more difficult to acheive.

      There will always be ways to circumvent any security system. Text based security is OK, but it is being abused and raped by naive users and crackers. Biometrics is just the next level in digital personal security it is certainly not the end all solution.

      --
      All your database are belong to us
    24. Re:Fingers by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      most of the systems actually measure the temperature of the 'thumb'

      Great, I run out real quick inthe middel of winter (forgetting my gloves). THe ATM refuses my thumbprint because my thumb is cold.

    25. Re:Fingers by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      LOL, yeah, cause the guy who had his eye stolen would have had a whole lot more to say if they'd taken his finger too!

    26. Re:Fingers by Type-R · · Score: 1

      So much for using these in Canada for 8 months out of the year

    27. Re:Fingers by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Use the biometric data to unlock a local private key (e.g. on a smart card) and use the key for further authentication.

      In that way you would not even need a database storing the biometrics, which is a bad idea anyway. Database records can be stolen (by the millions if you are unlucky).

    28. Re:Fingers by halowolf · · Score: 1
      Those however require a pre-requisite of an intelligent perhaps sober/un-drugged thief, mugger, etc to know that the system cannot be bypassed so easily...

      I wouldnt want to bet my fingers on that happening... :)

    29. Re:Fingers by iabervon · · Score: 1

      Thanks; I think that was the reference I was remembering (although I also remember there being someone else who did a study on fooling a broad range of biometric sensors).

    30. Re:Fingers by _Sprocket_ · · Score: 1


      (although I also remember there being someone else who did a study on fooling a broad range of biometric sensors).


      ExtremeTech did an interesting bit on some of the available consumer biometric devices circa '02. Its also interesting to note that apparently Siemens did their own testing based on this article.
    31. Re:Fingers by letxa2000 · · Score: 1
      Biometrics is silly. In the end it converts your retinal scan or fingerprint to a digital number or code which is really the "password." Biometrics makes sense in a secure environment (within a CIA building, FBI building, etc.) but if the environment isn't secure potential hackers are just going to hack the encoded password rather than trying to fake the source biometric. I.e., why try to "fake" the retinal scan or fingerprints when you can just tap into the data transmitted from the biometric scanner before it reaches the authenticating system?

      Plus... while you can't "lose" your biometric ID, if someone compromises the "encoded password" (i.e. the data sent from the scanner to the computer) then you are compromised for life.

    32. Re:Fingers by gcaseye6677 · · Score: 1

      As you pointed out, fingerprint and other scans are hardly the 'bulletproof' security that some people seem to think they are. However, they are also not quite the invasion of privacy that they seem like. Fingerprint scanners, as this article explains, do not store the whole fingerprint, but only several minutae points, which are used to recognize a print within a pretty good margin of error. You could not reconstruct someone's fingerprint using the data stored in a scanning system.

    33. Re:Fingers by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Well, it's not that complicated. Some people (not even scinetists, but some securita testers) have tricked a fingerprint recognition system with fake fingerprints - they would make a fingerprint, scan it, print it and create a printed circuit board, with no elements but a fingerprint lines made of copper :) Price: a couple of $.

      Then they made this fake fingerprint of silicon - the PCB was the model. The thin silicon fingerprint was attached to someone's finger - and it passed. The fingerprint was "verified", heartbeats and body heat indicated that this was not a fake rubber finger...

      Less than 10USD.

    34. Re:Fingers by escallywag · · Score: 1
      Every time you think about this as a good idea, just repeat the phrase "My eye impaled on a pencil" over and over again until you reconsider

      Actually this wouldn't work in real life because when an eye is severed from the nerve or when death occurs it "breaks" within seconds, rendering it useless for biometric ID.

      Off course it could take a while before Joe and Jane Crackhead realize that their collection of "eyes on a stick" are quite useless :)

    35. Re:Fingers by optelwb · · Score: 1

      This is not true, there is a method, that allows not only to recognize, if the finger is real, but also if it is living.

      See please here: http://www.optel.pl/article/english/livetest.htm

      Today it is obvoius, that biometrics can have a very good and interesting future, but it is necessary, that a device will be proposed, that not only can regognize living finger, but also is able be very robust and convenient.

      I am sure, that the device, hat I have proposed can offer this both advantages.

    36. Re:Fingers by Catnapster · · Score: 1

      In the Japanese yakuza, members who make a mistake are traditionally punished by having one of their fingers removed, starting with the pinky. I imagine that there are several yakuza bosses in Japan who have even more control over their subordinates (and their bank accounts).

      --
      The world can be wrong today for once.
  2. right to be uneasy by mrfibbi · · Score: 3, Interesting

    i'm all in favor of it, but it still does bring my mind back to minority report. Some people have a right to be uneasy.

    1. Re:right to be uneasy by Glonoinha · · Score: 2, Interesting

      Bah! Sounds real expensive and hideously complex. Didn't some European country do this like 60+ years ago with tatoos? As I recall all they had to do was show their tatoo and they got to ride on trains, go to theme parks, entry to showers and maybe a bar-b-que ... all without carrying cash or showing any form of ID. I don't remember how that all turned out but I am sure that Biometrics is surely the way to a brighter, safer tomorrow here in America.

      -Some people have a right to be uneasy.

      Jeez - just follow the rules of Herr Ashcroft and everything will be just fine. All aboard!

      (Yes I am being facetious, and no mrfibbi this wasn't directed at you. Just a good place to get my two pfenning's worth in.)

      --
      Glonoinha the MebiByte Slayer
    2. Re:right to be uneasy by Zebbers · · Score: 1

      ummm
      minority report was about psychics

      gattaca maybe...

    3. Re:right to be uneasy by thynk · · Score: 1

      minority report was about psychics

      Gattaca used a LOT more biometrics, but remember in Minority report, he did have his eyes replaced to be someone else because of all the retna scanners.

      --

      Good judgment comes from experience, and a lot of that comes from bad judgment.
  3. At least... by Scrameustache · · Score: 4, Funny


    Here you'll be treated with dignity. Now strip naked and get on the probulator!

    --

    You can't take the sky from me...

  4. The main problem in my eyes... by matticus · · Score: 5, Insightful

    The main problem in my eyes is the fact that a biometric system turns a fingerprint or retina scan into a string of ones and zeros. If the software is cracked to reveal this string, then the person who belongs to the fingerprint is *permanently* compromised. You can't change fingerprints like you can passwords.

    1. Re:The main problem in my eyes... by Kirill+Lokshin · · Score: 4, Insightful

      The digital form of the biometric is not really meant to be secret. After all, I can get your fingerprint just by setting up my own print scanner at a store.

      The point of the scanner is to tie the binary string to a particular physical object, such as your finger or eye. For instance, suppose that you are visiting store X. If you scan in your finger and the fingerprint matches the one on file, the store is reasonably certain that you are the person who you claim to be.

      Of course, this is vulnerable both to compromises of the scanning hardware, and, more importantly, of the central server that would store the biometric data. If, however, we assume a certain level of trust in someone and have them sign all the fingerprints, and also assume that the scanning device correctly produces a print matching that of the person putting their finger on it, then we can prevent most cases of things like identity theft.

    2. Re:The main problem in my eyes... by Clever+Pun · · Score: 3, Interesting

      The movie "Gattaca" comes to mind - people may well start SELLING their biometrics to others - sure, losing your hand is a bitch, but wouldn't you do it for ten million dollars? I honestly don't know if I could say 'no' to that, if I needed the money badly enough.

    3. Re:The main problem in my eyes... by Siergen · · Score: 1
      "If, however, we assume a certain level of trust in someone and have them sign all the fingerprints, and also assume that the scanning device correctly produces a print matching that of the person putting their finger on it, then we can prevent most cases of things like identity theft."

      But in the "Internet Age", where a store or bank is receiving electronic transactions from all over the globe, how can the store or bank have a "certain level of trust" that the data it is receiving is from a biometric scanner and not just a stolen recording of someone else's data?

      If my SmartCard is compromised, I can get it revoked and have a new one issued. If my biometric data is compromised, the best I can hope for is to have all stores, banks, etc. permanently refuse to accept my biometrics from any remote sites.

    4. Re:The main problem in my eyes... by kjd · · Score: 2

      This is why all important biometric security should be combined with a memorized passphrase which can be changed. Even better, bio + phrase + pseudo-random data (e.g. SecurID).

    5. Re:The main problem in my eyes... by glesga_kiss · · Score: 3, Insightful
      But in the "Internet Age", where a store or bank is receiving electronic transactions from all over the globe, how can the store or bank have a "certain level of trust" that the data it is receiving is from a biometric scanner and not just a stolen recording of someone else's data?

      And just take a look at the ATM thread a couple of articles below this to see how ATMs have been comprimised. Cracking counter-point devices will be childs play in comparison.

    6. Re:The main problem in my eyes... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Your logic doesn't hold up.
      ok, so I steal your ones and zeros of your eyes, from your ATM transaction. I STILL need to hack the NEXT ATM system that will gather and check your eyes, so that I can drain your account.
      If I have to hack the NEXT ATM, why would I even need your data. I'll just hack it to the point where it asks "If Scanned_eyes = Stored_eyes", and change that to "If 1=1".
      I don't need your eyeprint to do that!

    7. Re:The main problem in my eyes... by Unregistered · · Score: 1

      actually, i think your problem is not in your eyes, but the scanner. Sorry to nitpick. ;)

    8. Re:The main problem in my eyes... by Lord+Ender · · Score: 2, Insightful

      That's why fingerprints aren't used untrusted scanners. You wouldn't scan a fingerprint on your home PC and use it as your slashdot password, because slashdot can't verify that the scanner sending it the data is real. They would be used for physical security, like to get into your hotel room. Even if a crook knows the digital version of your print, the only way he can input that for authentication is by sticking your finger on to the scanner.

      --
      A slashdotter who didn't build his own computer is like a Jedi who didn't build his own lightsaber.
    9. Re:The main problem in my eyes... by TobiasSodergren · · Score: 5, Funny

      "Do you want to look younger, loose weight or change password? Call your local cosmetic surgeon now!"

    10. Re:The main problem in my eyes... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      If I have to hack the NEXT ATM, why would I even need your data. I'll just hack it to the point where it asks "If Scanned_eyes = Stored_eyes", and change that to "If 1=1".
      I don't need your eyeprint to do that!


      Look idiot, think a little. The ATM doesn't keep your authentication data, the back-end ATM network does. When you use an ATM, the ATM collects your data and sends it to the ATM network for authentication - is this info correct?

      The ATM network then tells the ATM yes or no. The ATM network has no way of knowing if the ATM is getting the data from a fingerprint scanner or is playing back some stolen information.

      Breaking into the ATM network would be a big problem, but you don't need to, because the ATM network trusts the ATMs when it shouldn't. Any idiot can get your own ATM and modify it.

    11. Re:The main problem in my eyes... by matticus · · Score: 1

      wonderful response.
      brilliant.

    12. Re:The main problem in my eyes... by a1cypher · · Score: 1

      It seems to me to be basically another form of cryptography. For instance, alot of places use encrypted passwords, meaning that when a new password is issued, it will encrypt it and store it in the database. If the database is ever hacked, the encrypted passwords are still useless because they are encrypted and theres no simple way of recovering the actual password from the encrypted form.

      Simmilarily, when someones eye is scanned into a string of ones and zeros, that string is still useless unless the thief has a way to convert this string back into an eyeball, which is not inconceivable... I could imagine someone making a glass marble that would trick the scanner into thinking its a real eye.

    13. Re:The main problem in my eyes... by grotgrot · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Other than very closed systems with very good guarantees, there is only one good use for biometrics and that is identification (NOT authentication). Think that instead of typing in your username, you scan something. Stealing that information is about as useful as stealing your username. You still need a seperate authentication step. The social security number nonsense is a good example of confusing identity with authentication. There are several companies out there who think that anyone who can recite the last 4 digits of my SSN must be me.

      Would you be happy carrying no id cards, credit cards, library cards, employee cards etc but instead everywhere type in a pin or similar secret?

    14. Re:The main problem in my eyes... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Obviously biometrics will not be used for remote authentication.

    15. Re:The main problem in my eyes... by Gumshoe · · Score: 1
      I honestly don't know if I could say 'no' to that, if I needed the money badly enough.


      Well it should be illegal to do so and for the same reasons why it's illegal to buy and sell organs -- it allows the wealthy to prey upon the poverty striken.
    16. Re:The main problem in my eyes... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Didn't the *ix OS's use a system like that? Keep all the passowrds in the 'passwd' file, which everyone has access to. After all, they're encrypted....

    17. Re:The main problem in my eyes... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      If the software is cracked to reveal this string...

      You clearly don't understand how the systems work. Each time you place your finger on the sensor a unique data stream is generated and encrypted, matching itself *anonymously* to a central database of users. Cracking the software to reveal the string will not work, and is like using answers to last years exam to copy for this years exam. Won't help you at all.

      Nice try.

    18. Re:The main problem in my eyes... by penguin7of9 · · Score: 2, Insightful

      After all, I can get your fingerprint just by setting up my own print scanner at a store.

      Yes, and with a little gelatin, you can then produce something that can be used to fool other fingerprint scanners.

      If you scan in your finger and the fingerprint matches the one on file, the store is reasonably certain that you are the person who you claim to be.

      That just means that someone pressed some object with roughly the right pattern against the scanner.

      Human beings weren't designed to be difficult to forge and they make poor keys as a result. Furthermore, current biometric systems don't even perform a lot of verification on the physical tokens they are presented with.

    19. Re:The main problem in my eyes... by jackb_guppy · · Score: 1

      Thats a joke! Into my hotel room?

      Less see a thosand doors each with it own scnner. Then the secured wiring, can not use 802.11 here. Now all that wiring goes though a closet or two per floor. And of course those closets are locked.

      Hell, they can not get those rotating key locks to work all time. Besides the maid always has the key.

      That will be a big waste of cash.

    20. Re:The main problem in my eyes... by 1029 · · Score: 1

      How would allowing the sale of biometric information or organs allow the wealthy to prey upon the poverty striken?

      The current organ donor rules are ridiculous. Sure it sucks that a rich guy could buy his way to a new liver even after he drank his last one useless, but it is MY liver/spleen/kidney/arm/hand/whatever... if I damned well want to sell it to the rich guy, totally of my own choosing, why shouldn't I be able to? What business is it of anyones who I sell my organs to? And how does being poor make you automatically given to doing whatever a rich guy wants?

      Quite frankly if a poor person thinks that their next meal, better shelter, etc. is worth more than their kideny, why not let them sell? Everyone has to make choices that will permanently affect lives, not just the poor.

      --
      - I love animals. I try to eat at least one a day.
    21. Re:The main problem in my eyes... by Gumshoe · · Score: 1
      How would allowing the sale of biometric information or organs allow the wealthy to prey upon the poverty striken?


      By permitting donations in exchange for wealth you're putting the less wealthy in a position where it's difficult for them to refuse. Moreover, reliance on a poverty class for the supply of organs is yet another reason for the maintenance of the poverty class for the benefit of the bourgeois.

      but it is MY liver/spleen/kidney/arm/hand/whatever... if I damned well want to sell it to the rich guy, totally of my own choosing, why shouldn't I be able to?

      Quite frankly if a poor person thinks that their next meal, better shelter, etc. is worth more than their kideny, why not let them sell?


      Would you advocate slavery if people could choose to become slaves? Extending your logic to the extreme then it would seem that selling yourself into slavery is perfectly okay. After all, each individual is sovereign over himself so you could argue that he is perfectly entitled to sell his freedom?
    22. Re:The main problem in my eyes... by cableshaft · · Score: 1

      Would you be happy carrying no id cards, credit cards, library cards, employee cards etc but instead everywhere type in a pin or similar secret? Yes, I think I would. Beats getting mugged and have to go through the fun of getting new IDs/charge-stopping my CC's and Debit Card.

      --
      Creator of the popular web game Proximity
    23. Re:The main problem in my eyes... by genner · · Score: 1

      You don't need a fake eye. Once you have the "ones and zeros" all you need is a device to feed that info into the system you want to hack, bypassing the scanner.

    24. Re:The main problem in my eyes... by 1029 · · Score: 1

      You CAN currently sell yourself into slavery. Sure you might not be called a slave, but you sign a contract to get a job that has certain requirements. You can sign over and agree to do just about anything short of kill a person (or sell your own organs). And I have no problem with that whatsoever. If you want to sign a contract that says you are x's slave for y amount of time, so be it. I wouldn't do such a thing, but short of coercion or threats of force, I have no problem with anybody else doing just that.

      Also, anybody can refuse anything at any time. A poor person would only accept the money because it seemed worth more to them than whatever body part is being bought. Again, where is the problem with this? How is more difficult for a poor person to refuse? You mean to tell me that rich people offering to buy from poor people is inherantly unfair? So rich should only buy from rich, and I guess poor can only buy from poor? By what logic?

      And if the rich are keeping the poor on the lower rung just to harvest organs than lets do something about THAT problem. But the problem wouldn't be with being able to sell your organs. The problem would be with rich people using some sort of force or threat to keep the poor poor and keep the organs coming for cheap.

      I seriously just don't understand folks that want to regulate and ban everything simply because it can be abused. Punish the abuser! PUNISH THE ABUSER!

      --
      - I love animals. I try to eat at least one a day.
  5. Is it worth the cost? by Isopropyl · · Score: 5, Insightful
    The trouble is, it is not clear that these identity-verification systems are worth the cost and trouble of introducing them. All 19 of the September 11th hijackers entered the United States using valid visas, on their own passports, for example. Verifying their identities using biometric visas would have made no difference.

    I find it hard to justify the cost of using biometrics, at least in this airport example. The airlines in are in decline, the government has just bailed them out with a couple billion, and revenues are still falling. Does the TSA really need to scan my finger before I step onto a plane? Like the quote says, biometrics wouldn't have made a difference on 9/11.

    1. Re:Is it worth the cost? by bug-eyed+monster · · Score: 2, Interesting

      I believe that part of the article was commenting on using biometrics at border-crossings not airports (yes, it still would not stop most terrorists). So the airlines don't get financially affected, the US government does. At airports, biometrics are used to control access to secure areas, fair enough. At border-crossings, biometrics are used to verify the ID of people with special visas like INSPASS. I suppose even for internal flights the INS will check foreigners' visas (to find visa overstays), but that's still up to the government, not the airlines.

      The future plan is to incorporate biometrics into all US-issued visas and passports. That's where the problem lies:

      The cost of the new system will not just be financial. All visas will now have to be issued face to face, so that scanning can take place.

      I'd guess the increased cost will be added to the price of US visas. For me, the scary part is this:

      And the new rules specify that by October 26th 2004, all countries whose nationals can enter America without a visa--including western European countries, Japan and Australia--must begin issuing passports that contain biometric data too.

      Basically, the US is making other countries add biometrics to their passports. If you live outside US, you might want to contact your government rep and urge them to cut the reciprocal agreement with US for not needing visas. If US wants everybody who visits them to carry biometric data, let them make their own copy.

  6. Biometrics scanners available for consumers? by pilot1 · · Score: 1

    I would LOVE to have one for my Linux computer, that would be the perfect way to control access to it.
    Does anyone know if there are any that are compatible with Linux and are available for consumers?

    1. Re:Biometrics scanners available for consumers? by itsari · · Score: 1

      It's just a matter of righting the appropriate software for the Biometric Mouse, or run the windows software through WINE. Also a search for Linux Biometric yeilds some juicy results.

  7. False claim by G3ckoG33k · · Score: 5, Insightful

    The two main reasons being unease and cost?! That is wrong. The simple truth is poor performance. So far, no system has been able to match faces better than 60-80% in real life tests. That is still far too poor to be really useful for police work and other, similar purpose.

    1. Re:False claim by cgranade · · Score: 1

      While this may be, the justifications of unease and cost are nothing to sneeze at. Especially in the presense of the poor performance that you noted, we need to look carefully at the cost-benefit analysis. As another post indicated, such a system provides little benefit to security, as "terrorists" often have valid visas, and perform acts under their own identities, especially if the "terrorist" in question is planning a suicide attack. Thus, the system would only verify what we already know- data that wouldn't help in acertainting the level of the threat posed by the potential attacker.
      In light of this, we see that the cost-benefit analysis for the cirumstance of 9-11 is a theoretical zero. In the case of ATM access, what does it do if there are fake ATMs that can just record fake data and resend it at a later time? That doesn't help at all there, either. Therefore, I am drawn to that in the case of these two examples, we get no benefit from the cost. Furthermore, I see no compelling reason to assume that the circumstances would be different in any other case.

      --

      #define DRM chmod 000

    2. Re:False claim by kid-noodle · · Score: 1

      To be entirely fair, a sensible biometrics security system would utilise a collection of different characteristics - you don't just check face, you check say, face, retina, and right thumb.

      Not that I'm saying they will be sensible...

      --
      fortune -o
    3. Re:False claim by Coventry · · Score: 4, Interesting

      Facial recognition is only 1 of the technologies involved in biometrics... To claim that the whole industry has failed to grow because one Type of biometric does not function well is untrue.

      Besides that, your numbers are wrong... facial recognition systems can actually have failure rates higher than that under less than ideal ircumstances, and when put into use as identification, not verification systems.

      First, definitions, for those who didn't read the article:

      Identification: determin from a scan who someone is, searching over a list of possibilities.

      Authentication: determin with reasonable confidence that the user is who they claim they are.

      Authentication is much much easier to get right, since you can always ask for a rescan if you are unsure. Authentication systems are designed so that the device (hardware and software) return a confidence level - sometimes a percentage. It is up to the application developer to determin just how high a confidence level you want. If you set it too low, people with similar faces might be abel to authenticate for each other - borthers for example. If set to high, then slight (natural) variations in a person's face can cause rejections. Generaly, you must strike a balance between false positives and rejections. Such a compromise is acceptable, if you have other security measures in place (see note at end of post).

      Identification is much, much harder. First of all, it is very cpu intensive - one can model identification as a low-confidence-level authentication against every listed person in the database. If you have 40,000 people in the database, this can take awhile. Hashing doesn't help much, and is illadvised, since we are looking for a close match, not an exact. Biometric data isn't the kind where you can take the first 5 bytes and dump into hash buckets either - but I digress. So, how do you speed it up? You reduce the dataset by reducing the detail in the data you store for each person.

      Then you run into the problems with how these systems have been rolled out - using low resolution security cameras is not a good way to get an accurate scan of a person's face - especially when the people being scanned a re small enough (in relation to the scene) to be only 10s of pixels wide.

      So, now we know the technical difficulties - but why the bum rap, and why would a police force choose to roll something like this out anyway? This is several fold, but the main thing it comes down to is misconceptions about what these systems are doing, and badly written systems. Due to the limitations mentioned above, these systems can only provide possible matches, like 'Person X is a 20% match against Osama Bin Laden'. the system isn't claiming that the person IS Osama, only that the face appears somewhat similar. As such, the system is supposed to be used as a guide - if it picks someone out, that person deserves more attention - that attention could be a remote-controled security cam singling them oout for a better scan, or for officers in the area to walk over for a better look. Unfortunatly, just because that is how the system is supposed to work does not mean it is used that way - all too often these are rolled out as a way to 'increase security while retaining a minimal police/secuity force'. You get officers who think of a potential match as a authentication, and they send officers running down at high speed only to find it's not Osama... The next potential match they are more hesitent about, and so on, until they mistrust the system completely. Is the system doing anything wrong? No, its that the users don't understand what it is doing. Better training would help, but so would the people making the purchasing descisions understanding the technology, and staffing accordingly.

      In the sort of rollouts described above, facial recognition has a success rate of less than 30%, much lowe r than what you describe. With rates that low, people complain, and stories get published. Used properly, the data these sy

      --
      man is machine
    4. Re:False claim by Trbmxfz · · Score: 1

      So far, no system has been able to match faces better than 60-80% in real life tests.

      That's interesting. I seem to remember that biometrics were used to control access to certain sites of the Atlanta Olympics back in 1996.

      They scanned hands (since they didn't want people walking around the city with stolen eyes in a plastic bag or at the top of an ice-pick... but I digress), at the time.

      I wonder if this was a major failure? Or did they somehow get a "sufficient" success rate?

    5. Re:False claim by Coventry · · Score: 1

      Ok, first, your post seemed directed at me, but was a reply to the parent.

      Secondly, how can you claim no ROI for such a rollout? If the return on investment is enhanced security, and if such a system were to provide you with better results than just having extra officers standing around with sheets containing photos of known bad guys, then the ROI is positive.

      However, the bad guys must be identified Before they came into an airprort or some other area with such a system - otherwise the system isuseless, as would be name-lists and security guards and wanted posters.

      Pre-9/11, most of the hijackers were not on the rader of law enforcement. That sort of failure can ruin investments in all sorts of security technologies - not just biometric ones.

      --
      man is machine
    6. Re:False claim by gnu-generation-one · · Score: 3, Insightful

      "Facial recognition is only 1 of the technologies involved in biometrics... To claim that the whole industry has failed to grow because one Type of biometric does not function well is untrue."

      Even if a system were your fabled 5-nines accuracy (1 wrong answer per 100,000 questions) it would still be unsuitable for the applications it's being suggested for. It's almost too easy to remind you that the very best biometrics is about 60% accurate.

      It's not just about biometrics, although their dismal rate of failure, combined with the unattainable promises of their salesmen should be suspicious enough. It's about the statistics of large numbers. If you have a million people per day going through an airport, and a biometric machine with 99.999% accuracy, you've falsely accused 100 people of being terrorists. Every day.

      And, to quote Schneier, it decreases security. Biometrics can be fooled. Easily. Trivially. If you depend on biometrics, then the terrorists will waltz past your scanners undetected, even as the innocent people queue to be strip-searched. Biometrics fail in a predictable way, and anybody who realises that can game the system. Vendors and terrorists alike.

      Of course, it's a rosy future for people who sell such failed systems. Look at "lie detectors" for example. Still in use long after it was proven that you could toss a coin for better accuracy. Does it increase security? No. Does it make people think we're doing something? Yes. Sold!

    7. Re:False claim by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Also note that optical id systems discriminate against the blind, who cannot use them.

    8. Re:False claim by Coventry · · Score: 1

      Uhm, I am confused, did you read my post and it's description about how multiple layers of security are really needed? - Even Schneier agrees with this principle - it is the use of a biometric instead of a password, which I explicitly mention is not smart, that he is against, and that he thinks adds a false sense of security.

      You seem to assume in this post that a biomtric be used on its own, and then discuss failure rates that are low (for authentication), but about right normally for identification (except for facial recognition systems, where it is lower).

      You then go and claim that 100 people would be 'accused' of being terrorists, when my text clearly discusses how that is the Wrong way to use such a system - that each claim of such a system needs to be looked at closer, but the system is not to be trusted to be accurate - hence using another camera to zoom in on possible match's face, and get a better reading. The vast majority of a system's failure rate is due to the quality of samples taken.

      It is the improper use of such systems, as I described, that leads to being being falsely accused - and from that, we get horrible impressions of the systems themselves, not the (untrained, illinformed) people who run such systems. It is very easy to a security cheif who is getting in trouble because his team is falsely accuwsing people to point to his new facial scannign system and go 'it sucks!' and quit using it, rather than to look into why 'it' isn't working properly and find out that his people don't know how to utilize such a system.

      --
      man is machine
    9. Re:False claim by geighaus · · Score: 1

      The simple truth is poor performance. So far, no system has been able to match faces better than 60-80% in real life tests. That is still far too poor to be really useful for police work and other, similar purpose. Uhm, this might be true for facial or fingerprint scans, but the fault rate for retina scanning systems is equal to zero. So the article authour is right, ethical issues and high costs are two main reasons why such systems are not widely adopted.

    10. Re:False claim by KD5YPT · · Score: 1

      You're missing the point of Coventry's reply. He's saying biometric merely helps pick up "POSSIBLE" suspects, he never say anything about using biometric to accuse people. It merely reduce police's workload by narrowing down the number of people they need to scrutinize.

      --
      In US, you can easily buy enough major firearms to wipe out your neighbourhood but a few little fireworks are banned.
    11. Re:False claim by gnu-generation-one · · Score: 1

      "You're missing the point of Coventry's reply. He's saying biometric merely helps pick up "POSSIBLE" suspects, he never say anything about using biometric to accuse people."

      Okay, taking that point on its own, a biometrics system which (for whatever reason) is imperfect, will identify people you want to catch as "NOT POSSIBLE" suspects. And the percentage of such false-negatives can be modified in your favour.

  8. this cannot be rushed by saiha · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Whether you consider this a good thing or not, if and when it is implemented we need to remember that just like anyother form of security, the weak link will still be the human factor.

    Even if you have the best biometric system, but it is not monitored for tampering (and its database) regularly, who is to say a malicious person didn't add or change a users information. And because biometrics are supposed to be so good, who will the people in charge believe, someone saying they are john smith the computer tech, or the computer that reported them being as being some criminal?

    1. Re:this cannot be rushed by pyrbe · · Score: 1

      And the sad thing with most consumer-grade biometric systems (at least those using fingerprints) is that they are easily fooled. In some test gelatin-made fake fingerprints fooled every biometric smartcard reader tested. And it seems that those "gummy fingers" are very easy to make. So malicious attacker doesn't even have to tamper with the system.. Just steal someone's fingerprint and make fake one with gelatin. Here's nice pdf about testing biometric readers with "gummy fingers" and making those fingers (Tsutomu Matsumoto - Yokohama national university) A case study of user identification. The site (www.turvallisuus.org) is in Finnish and with frames - that's why the hotlinking.

    2. Re:this cannot be rushed by Coventry · · Score: 1

      I think you forget that in any case of security, another weak leak is relying upon any single means of identification/authentication.

      The example you gve of the database being compromised is a very horrific one - but the same sort of problem exists for passwords.

      I should probably mention that, jsut as passwords are usualy stored as one-way-hashes of the actual plaintext, so biometrics are stored as one-way processings of data taken from a scan, so in either case, the original data (the plantext/scan) isn't being stolen, its representation is being replaced.

      Your scenario would be deadly for any authentication scheme, even one that used multiple types of authentication (as all truely secure systems do). Normally, this would be two or more of the following types of items:
      - something kept (a security card, id card)
      - something known (a password)
      - soemthign intrinsic (a biometric, a dna scan)

      But all three fail if the root system is compromised that contains the information they are being compared against...

      So, your scenario is a problem, but not just for biometrics.

      --
      man is machine
    3. Re:this cannot be rushed by saiha · · Score: 1

      What I was saying was just supposed to be a very simple example, and I see exactly where you are coming from. However my main point was that people seem to believe that biometrics are the end all security scheme and like you said, if they only rely on that then it is a horrible false sense of security.

    4. Re:this cannot be rushed by Coventry · · Score: 1

      The media (because they don't understand security), and certain biometric firm executives and salespeople promoto this view - it is a quite horrid view as well. Every engineer and developer I met in thefield (and I met quite a few) thinks it is disgusting - but the media always wants to interview the executive or marketing guy in the suit - not the people who know how the things work and should be used.

      --
      man is machine
  9. Disabled people? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Interesting

    So what happens when someone who has lost one or both eyes tries to withdraw money from their bank account? Or when a burn victim passes through a face recognition checkpoint?

    1. Re:Disabled people? by starfurynz · · Score: 1

      I smell a lawsuit. After living in America for 4yrs, I'm oretty sure that would be the outcome. Seriously, biometrics as with all security, needs to be part of a layer. Layers works, one layer after it's comprimised is wide open for attack. Bye Bye money.

      --
      We tend to become like the worst in those we oppose. --Bene Gesserit Coda--
    2. Re:Disabled people? by iantri · · Score: 1
      For the blind person, the system should allow different types of authentication. So, for regular users it would use the biometrics; if a person had their account flagged so that the system knew they were blind it could ask them for a conventional password instead.

      The burn victim would have to have his face rescanned, but after that I don't really see what difference it makes whether the face is disfigured from burns or not.

    3. Re:Disabled people? by TinheadNed · · Score: 1

      The same thing that happened to the guy who was undergoing radiotherapy when he walked through some Geiger checkpoint in New York, ie. nothing nice until they realised the poor bastard had cancer rather than actually being a terrorist.

    4. Re:Disabled people? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      if a person had their account flagged so that the system knew they were blind it could ask them for a conventional password instead.

      So, now the criminals don't have to crack the biometric database, they just have to fill out form 102-7J; Application for Conventional Password Due to Blindness in your name?

      The burn victim would have to have his face rescanned,/i>

      How do you know the man with the burned face standing in front of you is really the person the account belongs to? Lots of crooks would burn their faces to have a chance at 'becoming' Bill Gates...

    5. Re:Disabled people? by poot_rootbeer · · Score: 1


      What happens if someone has an identical twin sibling? How do you prevent them from misauthenticating as each other?

    6. Re:Disabled people? by nametaken · · Score: 1

      I supposed they'd default to CARD+PIN instead of CARD+PIN+RETINA for missing eyes, and recatalog face for burn victims.

    7. Re:Disabled people? by Carnildo · · Score: 1

      Identical twins don't have identical fingerprints.

      --
      "They redundantly repeated themselves over and over again incessantly without end ad infinitum" -- ibid.
    8. Re:Disabled people? by jcp797 · · Score: 1

      Their fingerprints aren't identical.

      Their DNA is the same, but its phenotypic expression is influenced by various other environmental factors including body size (which depends on embryonic blood supply and hGH levels).

  10. The third reason... by pwagland · · Score: 3, Insightful
    Actually there is a third reason that many of us are uneasy about biometrics. You can't change, unlike, for example, passwords or some "secure token" type of device.

    That means, once your identity is compromised, it stays compromised... and there is little to nothing that you can do about it.

    That is why I don't like biometrics...

    1. Re:The third reason... by EinarH · · Score: 2, Insightful

      In other words; when the fake ATM front steal the file with your fingerprint, face shape and retina scan you are fucked.

      --

      Melius mori in libertate quam vivere in servitute.

    2. Re:The third reason... by penguinoid · · Score: 1

      I suddenly see a future for plastic surgery...

      --
      Don't waste your vote! Vote for whoever you want, unless you live in a swing state it won't matter anyways
  11. minority report by potpie · · Score: 1

    This makes me think of a movie. In the movie Minority Report, biometrics are used to identify criminals (as well as future criminals) walking down the street in public. That's kind of scary to think about, but realistically, the government would never spend the insane amount of money to install cameras all over the public area of America, especially not high-tech eye-scanning ones.

    Now imagine walking into a store, like in the movie, and the computer hologram instantly recognizes you and greets you and talks to you about your last purchases. Wouldn't that be extremely annoying? Anonymity is actually quite nice when dealing with strangers, especially the kind who don't trust you enough not to scan your eyes. Don't we all hate that spam that calls us by name?

    As long as this technology doesn't go beyond use in criminal records and other instances where fingerprints are used now (driver's licenses for example), it should be acceptable.

    --
    Esoteric reference.
    1. Re:minority report by rknop · · Score: 5, Insightful

      but realistically, the government would never spend the insane amount of money to install cameras all over the public area of America, especially not high-tech eye-scanning ones.

      Agreed. But don't estimate the money-spending abilities of corporate marketing departments as they attempt to identify and target consumers. (Which, by and large, was what was scanning whatshisname in Minority Report.)

      If you're not happy being paranoid about marketing departments, consider that once the cameras are there, it's real easy for whatever random government organization to use PATRIOT IX to get that data without a warrant, but with a gag order that prevents your being told they got the data.

      -Rob

    2. Re:minority report by RedRocketRanger · · Score: 1

      I don't know about America, but there are already a lot of CCTV cameras all over the place to stop and record criminal activity. You wouldn't need special cameras, just software on the other end to process what information the cameras receive.

      This has already been done in several American cities and airports to pick up known criminals based on a facial recognition software program. As far as I am aware there was a zero percent success rate fairly universally. I believe that in one airport it failed to pick up staff members in a trial run.

      I don't necessarily think the technology is bad, but it's too immature at the moment to be effective.

    3. Re:minority report by gl4ss · · Score: 1

      cost is a moot issue for thing like that(if you're to be controlled, cost is not an issue as you're the one for paying for it).. you can have essentially the same(ultra control) system with shitloads of policemen(and indeed, such systems have existed/exist). total control society isn't a technology risk, it's a social/human one.

      --
      world was created 5 seconds before this post as it is.
    4. Re:minority report by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Now imagine walking into a store, like in the movie, and the computer hologram instantly recognizes you and greets you and talks to you about your last purchases.

      I think that by today's standards this is pretty impossible. It's one thing to use biometric data to ensure of one's identity, but it's a lot different to match this data against 6 billion people (and counting). It would require an insane amount of computational power. So no "Minority Report" for you in the near future.

    5. Re:minority report by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It only has to match against that store's customers, not "6 billion people". And they'd propably have a spending limit and a time limit so you aren't greeted if you bought a pack of gum 5 years ago, but you would be greeted if you purchased $100 last week.

  12. Chopping of your Nose despite your Face by |>>? · · Score: 5, Funny

    With passwords, all they had to do is torture me, but with biometrics they just cut off my hand...

    --
    |>>? ..EBCDIC for Onno..
    1. Re:Chopping of your Nose despite your Face by altek · · Score: 1

      No, it's not actually that easy. You know what happens when you assume... ;)

      There are other methods to prevent this such as monitoring body heat and pulse. Makes it a lot more difficult and obvious if someone has your severed hand hooked up to a heater and some kind of pump device to simulate pulse at an ATM or airport terminal...

      --
      THE MAGIC WORDS ARE SQUEAMISH OSSIFRAGE
    2. Re:Chopping of your Nose despite your Face by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Informative

      It is "to spite your face" not "despite your face". "despite your face" in that context doesn't even make sense.

      Retard.

    3. Re:Chopping of your Nose despite your Face by |>>? · · Score: 1

      Cool, given that the first language I learnt was Dutch, I'll just let that one through to the keeper...

      --
      |>>? ..EBCDIC for Onno..
    4. Re:Chopping of your Nose despite your Face by Atrahasis · · Score: 2, Interesting

      Great, now what if I'm a manual labourer suffering from vibratin white finger, or just one of the many people afflicted with poor circulation in the fingers? No/weak pulse and room-temperature fingers.

    5. Re:Chopping of your Nose despite your Face by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      See, look at that. You were just mistaken for a native English speaker!

    6. Re:Chopping of your Nose despite your Face by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      There are other methods to prevent this such as monitoring body heat and pulse. Makes it a lot more difficult and obvious if someone has your severed hand hooked up to a heater and some kind of pump device to simulate pulse at an ATM

      What about outdoor ATMs? They are subjected to the heat of the sun, and the cold of winter. Would they REALLY be able to accurately measure the heat of a hand? I don't think so. And I think that banks would fall over backwards to eliminate the heat sensors once a few customers complain about not being able to get $20 because their hands were too cold one winter morn.

    7. Re:Chopping of your Nose despite your Face by anto · · Score: 1

      That- OK your just not allowed to fly anymore. Its not any more stupid than half the reasons other people are having problems in our brave new world.

    8. Re:Chopping of your Nose despite your Face by Feztaa · · Score: 1

      Well, what if you were an amputee and didn't have any fingers at all? They'd have to find some other biometric for you to use.

  13. the most important aspect by 23 · · Score: 2, Insightful
    they point out is IMO that politicians have so much faith in the flakey technology, that they totally disregard the warnings from security experts.

    This of course, next to waisting huge amounts of money, can create a false sense of security or even lower security as in the example they cite: on an airport, if every 10000th passenger is screened for second testing, the odds are high that guards will not be very optimistic about the system and make mistakes, diss the system, etc.

    in the mean time, terrorists travel by sea, land, etc. Even most of 9/11 went by their real names....

  14. Biometrics are bad because.... by rknop · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Becuase you can change your password a whole lot easier than you can change your DNA.

    The flip side of not being able to lose or forget your biometrics is that you can't change it when it gets stolen. And, yes, people will find ways to spoof biometric authentication schemes into believing that they have your data. Whether it's fake fingerprints, or (more likely) some sort of data hack that sendst the computer the right bitstream for a given person's biometric data, once yours is gone, you're just hosed forever.

    If your password or PIN gets stolen, you can make a new password, or get a new ATM card and a new PIN, and cancel the old ones. Once your biometric info is stolen or spoofed, you have the choice of cancelling it and not being able to authenticate anywhere, or just accpeting that your identity is stolen and will stay stolen.

    Biometrics are great if *combined* with a password. But by themselves, they're foolish for strong authentication. Just because your fingerprints are on your hand doesn't mean that there isn't a pattern there that could be stolen and stored somewhere by bad actors.

    -Rob

    1. Re:Biometrics are bad because.... by AnyoneEB · · Score: 1

      Biometrics are worthless without physical security on the scanning station and computer with the database (and any network links between). They are worthless over a network because they can be stolen just as easily as a password (which may not always be easy, but it happens). The use of biometrics would be for identification if someone is watching you place your finger on their scanner and they had some way of being sure their database is correct. As someone else said: if the person can hack in to change the database of passwords/biometrics, it really doesn't matter what you use for identification.

      --
      Centralization breaks the internet.
    2. Re:Biometrics are bad because.... by Coventry · · Score: 5, Informative

      I think you need to look into security principles. As you say, a lone password is easy to compromise, so is a lone biomtric. However, any truely secure system needs to use multiple forms of identification - preferably two or more of the following:
      - something intrinsic (a biometric, dna scan, etc)
      - somethign known (a password)
      - somethign kept (a security card)

      By having more than one step involved, the system is much more secure than any individual part. Somesteals your backcard - but do they have your pin? Or, someone sees your pin - but do they have your card or account number? PINs are actually very simple and easy to break (thoeretically), but are pains to break in reality because of the Other required piece of the puzzle, the bankcard, and how false authentications lead to the removal of the card (most ATMs shred your card after a few false PINs are entered).

      similarly: Just because someone steals your face, how will they get ahold of your new bankcard?

      After that fact comes the fact that most biometrics are hard to fake - fingerprint scanners these days can be made smart enough to check the temperature of the item placed on them - and some are even smart enough to look for normal temperature differences and gradients within the skin surface, and refuse authentication to 'fingers' that are too regularly or irregularly warm. Some very high end systems look for capilary blood flow... Most facial systems are smart enough to refuse a photo held up of your face, and carrying around a stiff 3d mask of someone's face is kind of obvious.

      Also, the fact that every type of scanning device on the market practially has a different data format for the biometric data (which is all one-way, you can get the data from a fingerprint, but not the other way around), and spoofing the data becomes more restrictive - a spoof of, say, visa's system wouldn't work against mastercard's (unless they were using the same equipment).

      Having said all that, I'd still like it to be pin+card+face/fingerprint rather than card+biomtric. Biometrics should be used to Enhance security, not replace known or kept-item security methods.

      --
      man is machine
    3. Re:Biometrics are bad because.... by JohnnyCannuk · · Score: 4, Insightful

      While I agree with everything you have said, I must take issue with your contention that most biometrics are hard to fake.

      Subscribe to Cryptogram from Bruce Schneier. Read some of the news, widely diseminated here on Slashdot and other tech sites. Systems like most finger print scanners and facial recognition systems are easy to fool.

      For instance, while there are fingerprint systems that act as you indicate, the vast majority do not. They are the cheap readers in my iPaq or on some smart-card readers or those you can buy at Radio Shack. And since the famous gelatin exploit has the hacker wearing the stolen fingerprint gelatin mold over their own finger , even advanced machines will see 'normal temperature differences and gradients' or 'capilary blood flow' since it is seeing a real fingers. These systems are also prohibitively expensive, which means they can only be used for securing VERY sensitive assets. No use spending $10K on a fingerprint scanner to secure my $1k bank account, when this can be demonstably defeated for about $100 in materials and a few hours of work.

      The same with facial recognition systems. In the new recently, one of the most widely used systems was fooled by a person holding up a picture or wearing a picture over a face like a mask nearly 100% of the time (I don't have the link handy, but I'm sure I read it on Cryptogram and here at \.). Again, while it may be possible to overcome these technical issues, the cost of such a system would restict it to acting as part of an authentication system for military bases and very large organizations with sensitive data, but no the general public. Most facial recognition systems CAN be fooled by holding up a picture.

      However, if you are correct in your original assumption, that even using these easily foolable systems as one step in the authentication process is a much better way than relying on them alone.

      And using them as part of an authentication system, not as an identification system, as some US airports have tried... There is a vast difference between comparing a person standing at the right distance from the camera or pressing the right digit into the read with re-tries allowed, that to pick a face out of a crowd of unknowns nad try to say "Unknown identified as Osama bin Looben, please arrest"...

      --
      Never by hatred has hatred been appeased, only by kindness - the Buddha
    4. Re:Biometrics are bad because.... by zCyl · · Score: 1

      - something intrinsic (a biometric, dna scan, etc)
      - somethign known (a password)
      - somethign kept (a security card)


      The problem is that to the sufficiently criminal, a biometric IS something kept. You can give a mugger your wallet or your keys, but would you so willingly part with the skin around your finger? It's possible to reattach skin to someone else's finger.

    5. Re:Biometrics are bad because.... by Coventry · · Score: 1

      Do you honestly think A bank would use such a system? In my post, I was speaking of reputable systems, not the crappy 200$ versions bought for price over features.

      As for subscribing, I already do - and having been a developer in the industry for years, I have been reading up on security, as well as holes in biometric systems, for quite some time. But just because device A from a year ago had issues, does not mean new devices will - since any manufacturer who wants to survive will avoid the mistakes of the past.

      As for your assertion on facial recognition problems - one system common in use != 'Most facial recognition systems CAN be fooled by holding up a picture'. Usualy, such problems are incurred via the source of the image, when using facial recognition systems that is. Visionics 'FaceIT' for example, becomes less and less secure with cheap cameras. The cost involved in improving such systems is actually very low - the difference between usign a webcam as the image source and using a 2+ megapixel camera. That is 100$ - that does not limit the usage in military bases by any means.
      Lighting and other proper setup features are usualy just as important for a useful system.

      As for authentication versus identification issues, especially in airports, see my post here:
      http://slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=88410&c id=7655 259

      --
      man is machine
    6. Re:Biometrics are bad because.... by gnu-generation-one · · Score: 2, Insightful

      "Biometrics are bad because you can change your password a whole lot easier than you can change your DNA."

      Biometrics are bad because people believe they're perfectly accurate. Just look at the people who support killing suspects if a biometric test "proves" them guilty. The public at large believe that such systems cannot fail.

      And it just brings us back to the ID card problem. The harder something is to fake, the more valuable a counterfeit one is. So banks "increase" their security by requiring my fingerprint to withdraw money. Whoop-de-doo, now anyone with my beerglass and a jellybean can withdraw money. Or get on my plane flight and ditch it into the whitehouse. And because biometrics are "infallible", nobody will believe those who complain that it failed.

      I count the places I leave resolvable fingerprints, regularly. It's about 30 places per day, and that doesn't include the secure areas at work, or the prints you could get by breaking into my house. 30 per day. And any one of those could give you access to any fingerprint-controlled system where I was a registered user.

      Fingerprints? Try face-recognition. One camera every 15 meters apparently, in London. Plus tourists, and not even counting people deliberately trying to photograph you. Do you really want to trust a system where someone can print out my portrait from my website and hold it up to your biometrics system to gain entry?

    7. Re:Biometrics are bad because.... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Insightful

      Obviously you are right in mosts aspects of the story, as anyone in the industry (like you and me it seems) would point out.

      That biometrics are hard to fake is something I do not agree on totally though. Most commercially available (for large scale projects) ID products seem to be easy to circumvent. I would not trust a facial recognition or photo based retina scan one bit for authentication. Let alone finger prints.

      However, most of these problems can be circumvented by easy means. For instance by someone guarding the device against abuse. Holding up a photo or even using a fake fingerprint would be much harder if someone was watching - a lot less work than scanning passports.

      I would currently not use biometrics for fully automated tasks. Not yet anyways.

  15. can't be stolen? by _fuzz_ · · Score: 1, Interesting

    Proponents have long argued that because biometrics cannot be forgotten, like a password, or lost or stolen...

    I heard a rumor that the CIA used to use finger print scanners as a security measure. The problem was that their agents were being killed and their hands cut off to gain access to secure areas/information. Whether or not the rumor is true, the problem is still real. Biometrics can be stolen, it's just a bit more gruesome.

    --
    47% of all statistics are made up on the spot.
  16. Real-world biometrics by tr0llx0r · · Score: 2, Informative
    Mytec Technology Inc. develops applications of biometric encryption and optical computing. Mytec's technology of Biometric Signature Encryption can be applied to transmission on the Internet and to Electronic Commerce applications, enabling persons to securely transmit communication and information to each other. The Biometric Signature Encryption (BioscryptTM) has no relationship to the fingerprint image but is a randomly created pattern of the original fingerprint. It secures both the sending and receiveing of data. With the introduction of the CybermouseTM (wich houses an optical computer) the transmitting and receiving of data becomes totally secure. The CybermouseTM will identify the BioscryptTM of the sender, encrypt the message and, in turn, the receiver, with their CybermouseTM, will decode the newly received message via their BioscryptTM. This same degree of transmission security can be incorporated in a wide range of local and global business transactions, including Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), telephone faxes, Internet purchasing, ATM machines, debit cards, smart cards plus numerous other applications. A BioscryptTM can help prevent abuse of government benefit payments and programs, falsification of passports which are two areas of great concern in our society. This protection can be achieved without loss of individual privacy. With this optical technology, privacy is assured in that the individual's fingerprint is converted into a BioscryptTM which can not be identified to a particular individual without a live matching finger. The Mytec database comparator performs high speed search and match functions which can quickly detect duplicate situations and quick authorization is ensured. Access Control Mytec's special purpose optical computer, operating at the speed of light, is designed to provide instantaneous verification of a person's fingerprint (BioscryptTM) with unsurpassed accuracy. Only those authorized and identified can gain access to the protected area. The system is designed to respond only to a live finger or fingers which ensures that the individual is present as the system will not recognize any reproduction of a fingerprint.So the use of an employee's fingerprint as their timecard requires that they be present in person to clock in or out. This is an easy and quick enrollment process, taking less than thirty seconds.

    Digital Biometrics Inc. provides live-scan systems from the Los angeles County Sheriff's Department. These systems are installed in Los Angeles County Courthouses to verify the identity of persons being released from custody. These systems are also installed in Los Angeles Sheriff's Department booking stations.

    Miros Inc. ,developers of the world's easiest ad most reliable personal identification systems, have announced that they will demonstrate the first biometric technology to secure Internet access employing face-recognition: TrueFace Web. This technology employs a live video image previously recorded.

    XL Vision Inc. a leading provider of fingerprint have announced the Human Authentication Application Program Interface (HA-API) for companies and electronic commerce applications.

    Eltron and 3M have announced their collaboration for secure identification-printing systems. Eltron International Inc. leading global designer and manufactor of thermal-label and plastic-card printers.

    PenOp Inc. is a privately-held international software company specializing in electronic signature capture and verification for on-line business transactions. While some vendors, including IBM Corp., have been quietly researching the viability of this type of software, PenOp Inc. is one company that has taken an agressive role in promoting it to the financial services market. The company's software allows signatures to be written onto a penabled computer screen or a digitizer (a computer pen and pad), then encrypted and tran

  17. Hooray for Biometrics! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Funny

    I would have posted this under my own ID but I can't remember my password. -- CapnCarrot

  18. Can't be changed, either. by Pyromage · · Score: 1, Redundant

    Sure, you can't forget your retinas, or lose your fingerprints. And good biometrics could, in theory, be extremely difficult or expensive to counterfeit.

    However, if anyone ever *does* compromise your biometrics, what then?

    You could have a society where access to so much is based on it (because it worked so well) and then all of a sudden, all the passwords are out in the open. Except that unlike a password list disclosure, you can't change your password!

    Sure, probably no one will ever compromise your retinas, but what do you do if it *does* happen? You can't argue that it's not possible, and just because it isn't practical doesn't mean it won't ever be. You always must be able to change your password. Always!

  19. Access to nukes by bIOHZRd · · Score: 1

    Is only a swipe of the card, weigh of my body, entering of my pin, and scanning of my hand.

    Whats funny though, is that my right hand down in the scanner works the same as my left hand upside down. guess it only scans proportions?

  20. You cannot change your biometrics. by aepervius · · Score: 3, Insightful

    As it was said time over and over here,
    The Problem is that if somebody menace at pinpoint you can give a password or a pin and they will go on statisfied. You loose money but after you can change the in or apssword and that's it.

    With biometric you CANNOT change those data. Meaning once you are compromised this is over. For ever.

    Furthermore criminal aren't exactly known to be Sissy which would repugn or be afraid of , let us say, chopping a handor an arm. Or getting an eye out of that socket. Even worst it was proved that for many system with caoutchouc , rubber or high res photo scan , you can foolsome of those system. And I bet that you could hack you way thru if you have physical access like any password system.

    The only way to go would be a DOUBLE system. password *and* biometric. Biometric cannot replace the password system with more security. On the contrary it has too many disadvantage.

    So what is my point ? Seeing biometric as more than an extension of the password system will bring a lot of problem as well as a false sense of security. And a false sense of security is far worst than anything weak security.

    --
    C. Sagan : A demon haunted world:
    http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0345409469/
    visit randi.org
    1. Re:You cannot change your biometrics. by iantri · · Score: 1
      Well, what about a system that allows multiple authentication options?

      If your forefinger is compromised, have it use your middle instead.

      If they take your whole hand off, have it switch to retina scanning.

      If they take your eyes, have it switch to face recognition.

      If they take your head, well, I don't think you'll need to be too concerned about how you will authenticate anymore ;).

    2. Re:You cannot change your biometrics. by Coventry · · Score: 2, Insightful

      your point about a false sense of security, and the need for multiple layers of security in an authentication scheme is correct, but so much of the rest of your post is incorrect, so I feel the need to interject.

      - a stolen biometric isn't useful except agaisnt the same sort of scanning system - as in, the same manufacturer. No standard data format exists.
      - the pin example is a bad one - the theif needs your card as well (as it is the other layer of security in the system). Anyone who gets the biometric data from the thief will have a hard time using it if they also need the new, shiny, replaced bankcard.
      - most biometric systems can tell the difference between dead and living tissue - although this might not stop an ignorant criminal in the first couple of years, it would become commong knowledge that the cut-out-the-eye trick doesn't work once some people ar behind bars.

      --
      man is machine
    3. Re:You cannot change your biometrics. by vadim_t · · Score: 1

      You have too much faith in this stuff.

      Your first objection isn't actually a problem. Any successful system is going to be deployed widely or the maker will go bankrupt, or at least stop selling it. This means that pretty much any system you will find is going to be deployed somewhere else, perhaps in thousands of places.

      Second, the closed formats aren't a huge problem. All you need to is to get the hardware, pay a smart guy to reverse-engineer the format, and get some data. I'm pretty sure that with some clever thinking biometric data can be converted between several systems.

      Second objection: Somebody mentioned that the card contains clear text account numbers. So if you know the PIN, and you have the account numbers you can make a card, identical to the original.

      The difference between dead and alive tissue sure is nice, but will never be perfect. Sensors exposed to the weather will have to be made less sensitive, to avoid annoying people with cold hands. Somebody will inevitably install the cheapest sensors available that don't check for that. And it's doubtful that you'll be put behind the bars for trying unsuccessfully. Biometric systems to and will fail a lot commonly, due to issues like people with cold hands, people with circulation problems, burns, dirt on the sensor... After the 128th failure in a day the guard will just not pay any attention at all to it.

      I have tested a fingerprint scanner myself. An expensive one too. Let me tell you what it was. It was a cheap grayscale sensor (ov511 if you're interested) that Linux detected as a common webcam. That's right, it's a cheap webcam in a specially built plastic body, and I could see my fingerprint with camstream. It didn't have any signs of doing any checks at all. The sensor got dirty very quickly, and breathing on it seemed to partially revive the image.

    4. Re:You cannot change your biometrics. by Coventry · · Score: 1

      Hrm, I'm not sure where to begin... perhaps a little background?

      My 'faith' in these systems isn't grounded upon assumption - its based upon experience. For several years I was a developer of biometric security applications. My company worked on a common api that abstracted what device you were writing for - this meant I got to know the engineers very well from several companies as I made contacts in the industry. Thus, I can safely assume that my knowledge of these subjects is beyond your own... no offense. That being said, let us continue.

      The first 'objection' I raised is important. In this industry, companies merge, new models come out and companies go out of business all the time. There are _many_ fingerprint scanners on the market, and all of them do things differently.

      Which brings me to your second point... Closed formats are a huge problem. Every device maker has their own format, and they are _not_ simple to break. Maybe some newer devices by startups who are staffed by newcomers would have the problem of an easily decoded format - but not the veterans. When you are making a product whose potential market includes the highest levels of the military, you design for close scrutiny. These engineers have been in the field for years, and they are experts. Take that information, and add the fact that each device may store completely different types of information - one fingerprint scanner can store simple minuta about variant lines in a fingerprint. Not all lines are stored, not even the majority fo liens are stored. Instead, where the lines end, and what angle the end of a line was pointing in, those things may be stored. Some manufacturers store even more information - the number of lines a cross sectional imaginary line through the finger may traverse, etc. Then, add in the fact that most formats don't hold the actual data, but instead hold a series of one-way hashes of the actual data... and you have the sort of 'decoding' problem akin to reversing engineering md5 hashes to plain text for 30-300 datapoints, let alone what the plaintext data meant. I've seen people go mad trying to decode these formats, some of them were coworkers. All of them were very clever.

      Ok, your third objection - about cards containing the cleartext account number. This is true, but each card also contains a card # - otherwise, everytime you would report a card stolen, you would get a new account number - instead you get a new card. Reporting the stolen card makes it null and void - any 'copied' cards would then contain the same card number, and be useless as well.

      Your fourth popint is valid - people do roll out cheap systems where they should not be used. However, any guard that ignored problems with an instaled security system and did not report them - and, per your example, just started ignoring them - would and should be fired. This is gross negelegence. Also, any security system is only as good as it's weakest link, and a biometric should _never_ be used by itself - just as (for real security) a password should never be used by itself.

      As for the system you tested, ov511s based systems are _not_ expensive. Old, greyscale camera only based systems are years out of date - and are reserved for the 'toy' market now - the sort of thing built into laptops and pdas (though many use contact based sensors instead of cameras, the same principles about cheapness apply). Some corporations still roll these levels of devices out to their desktops - usually out of ignorance. Expensive systems go for thousands of dollars, and can be worth every penny. Most systems under 500$ are not of high quality. If you were told this ws an expensive system, then they may have been quoting a price from years ago. As for how 'simple' the data presented was, remember that the vast majority of what you pay for in a biometric fingerprint scanner these days is the software-driver - the part that turns that image (and other information in more advanced scanners) into the data about a finerprint as described above.

      --
      man is machine
    5. Re:You cannot change your biometrics. by vadim_t · · Score: 1

      Well, that was interesting. Got to admit you have a point there with the different formats.

      I have nothing against biometrics when used well, actually. I'm just worried that in the public perception they're turning into a magical solution for all security problems, just like what happened with XML. Sure it's good and all that, but sticking it everywhere makes very little sense.

      Of course, there will be a few places that need paranoid security that'll do proper authentication with biometrics, security card and password. But I'm pretty sure that the way things go, for every place where they're used right there will be at least 20 where they're used wrong.

      About ov511, $500 happens to be pretty expensive, and that's part of the problem. The system I tried was somewhere about $300 I think, and neither the sensor nor the software looked very impressive. The price, and the problem of that many people don't really understand what biometrics are for is going to create lots of headaches in the future, I think.

  21. Error rates? by Realistic_Dragon · · Score: 2, Interesting

    Bioscrypt now claim an error rate of 0.1% on fingerprint IDs.

    I suppose it depends how large your access list needs to be. It would be pretty good for a server room inside a secure building with 2 staff members on the access list, but with 10,000 on site (such as some places have) a false positive would be almost assured unless they had to carry a token of some kind. (Physical or otherwise, eg pin or swipe card.)

    --
    Beep beep.
    1. Re:Error rates? by Simonetta · · Score: 1

      Bioscrypt now claim an error rate of 0.1% on fingerprint IDs.

      So if the nitwits in the government go ahead with this and use biometrics to 'identify' hundreds of millions of people, then one in a thousand people will never be able to prove who they are.

      They could end up spending life in prison because a stupid computer error (instead of a 'crime' like third conviction for possession of rolling papers or downloading an MP3 file.)

      The HUGE possiblity of misidentification due to computer error precludes any use of this technology except in very limited circumstances for civilized people.

      The question that we need to ask is not how we can perfect technological indentification, but why do we need such systems anyway? It's clear that this technology will lead to Orwellian fascism. So why are (as technologists) so obsessed with perfecting it? Anyone remember the lesson of Robert Oppenheimer and the development of atomic bombs? Once this stuff is in place it will never go away. And the technologists aren't going to ones controlling it.

      Don't focus on the technology; focus on underlining assumptions that the technology is supposed to address.

      Thank you,

  22. its already here by saiha · · Score: 1

    We already have a fairly reliable biometric system set up. Its called a security guard (or cop) looking at a stored picture of you and your weight/height and looking at you.

  23. Fingerprint Reader Recommendations? by shameless_sellout · · Score: 1

    I am looking for a fingerprint scanner that I can use to authenticate users for a custom windows app that currently authenticates employees with barcode ID badges.

    The fingerprint scanners we have seen can only be used for logging users into windows.

    Is there a fingerprint scanner that comes with drivers/software so it will work with a custom application? In other words, it should send the person's ID to the application or as keyboard input when the user scans their fingerprint.

  24. Biometric passphrases by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Insightful

    That article was more or less product placement. Biometric passwords, while looking very cool in sci-fi flicks, have the following misfeatures:

    1. The "password" can't be changed. If compromised, it's compromised for life.
    2. You only have two thumbs and two eyes, and then you have to re-use your "passwords". Do you want your employer to have access to your bank account? Would your current employer want your last employer to have your access code to their building?
    3. They are not secret. Especially so with thumbprints: every time you grab a glass or a doorknob you leave your "password" written all over it.

    I would say these are the real reasons no one else than gadgeteer type bosses would ever consider using biometric passphrases.

    1. Re:Biometric passphrases by Coventry · · Score: 1

      When is the last time your employeer knew your back account number, or more accuratly, knew the card number on yoru bacnk card?

      --
      man is machine
    2. Re:Biometric passphrases by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Interesting
      You are right.

      I work in the security business, and while biometric devices has been all the rage for years and many companies manufacture them, the truth of the matter is that no one really wants them.

      They have a very high error-rate, often requiring multiple scans if you want to be secure. They are also not very resilient to things like weather. Remember, many of these devices need to work outsice, in temperature ranges from -50 to +50 degrees. Things like fingerprint scanners simply don't work in these environments.

      Also, as has been mentioned in other posts, they are just too expensive when comapred to what you get. In fact, if you judge by the customers who actually buy security hardware, you probably need to see the price of biometric devices drop below the price of traditional magnetic or proximity readers before they become any popular.

      Yes, everybody talks about them but very few customers actually ask for them.

  25. great by jjeffries · · Score: 2, Offtopic

    instead of looking in your desk and finding out that your password is 'pencil', Rutger Hauer types are going to rip your eyes out. Yay for progress!

    1. Re:great by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      'Rip your eyes out?' That would be for the pleasure of it perhaps. The fingerprint (or iris scan) is readily available in their office database so there's no messy meat job here.

  26. Can't be stolen? Are they on crack? by raxxerax · · Score: 5, Insightful

    How long until someone sets up a phony ATM to capture retinal patterns? And unlike passwords, your retinal pattern is not something you can change as needed.

    Don't get me wrong, biometrics has its place but that place is part of a multi-factor security system. I predict that we will eventually see ATMs that require a card, password and biometrics. Three factors: something you have, something you know and something you are.

    Biometrics by itself is useless for security.

    1. Re:Can't be stolen? Are they on crack? by Cutriss · · Score: 1

      There is a way to counter this.

      Let's assume we're dealing with retinal scans. Do an intensive datapoint scan to establish the record. Field scanners are less-equipped, only capable of scanning a subset of this data (thus, they're cheaper). The subset would, of course, have to be sufficiently large to ensure uniqueness.

      Now, the field scanners randomize which subset they take each time a scan is performed. That way, if someone does "kidnap" your eyeballs, they've only got a solution to one particular scan, and not the complete set. They have no way of knowing beforehand if using their newly-acquired eyeballs will meet the criteria for the next scan or not.

      It'd be like having a strong 50-character password that you never forgot (just work with me), and the authentication mechanism only asks for characters 2, 8, 9, 16, 22, 24, 26, 34, 39, and 40. Next time, it asks for a different ten characters.

      An added layer of security would be for the person to provide a login credential first. In other words, the retinal scan shouldn't be *both* username and password. Let the user provide the username (or SSN or whatever), and the retinal scan will be the password.

      --
      "Mod, mod, mod...and another troll bites the dust."
    2. Re:Can't be stolen? Are they on crack? by 1029 · · Score: 1

      I think you are looking at this in the wrong way. Instead of scaning your retina as a password to get money from an ATM, you would be scanning in place of inserting your ATM card. In this case, you scan your retina, the ATM knows who you are and what account is yours, and then you enter your password/PIN to actually gain access to your account. And if this were the case it seems in some ways like a better system than the current card/PIN system. I can't misplace my eyes, nor can someone else easily copy them. It is possible of course, but it would certainly be harder than copying a card.

      --
      - I love animals. I try to eat at least one a day.
    3. Re:Can't be stolen? Are they on crack? by JimBobJoe · · Score: 2, Informative

      I predict that we will eventually see ATMs that require a card, password and biometrics.

      I don't, because ATM fraud is fairly low, and there is simply no justification for the investment in new ATM security infrastructure. (If anything, phony machines caching card numbers is far more a concern.)

      It is unlikely for a criminal to get both the card, the password, and a time to use the card before it gets cancelled. The current system works well.

      Having said that, the introductions of biometrics with ATMs has been biometrics alone. We all know that this is stupid from a security perspective, but the biometric companies are unable to sell banks on the security (since there is little need to chage the security situation) so they sell the equipment for customer convenience. Customers are willing to be scanned so that they don't have to carry their ATM card and know their password.

    4. Re:Can't be stolen? Are they on crack? by raxxerax · · Score: 1

      It is trivial to copy your eyes. To the computer your eyes are just a string of ones and zeroes. Once a thief has the stream that matches your eyes he can find a way to feed that to the computer and it will "think" it's interacting with you.

      Of course, biometrics is more useful when combined with additional security factors such as passwords. That is why I specifically mentioned that fact in the very message to which you replied.

    5. Re:Can't be stolen? Are they on crack? by 1029 · · Score: 1

      Wow, must have been on a mad reply streak or somesuch. You did indeed mention passwords in the parent to my reply, so I can only hope I was meaning to respond to somebody else. Cheers.

      --
      - I love animals. I try to eat at least one a day.
  27. Ob. h2g2 (Douglas Adam predition) by Realistic_Dragon · · Score: 4, Funny

    In 50 years time we will have to give all kinds of bio information for everything, so we will carry a handy machine readable card with every bit of data on it to make it more convenient...

    Thus defeating the entire purpose, and a stunning testament to human nature.

    --
    Beep beep.
  28. HSV by dollargonzo · · Score: 1

    the ultimate biometric would (i think) be handwriting. although many systems currently are not adequate to deploy, handwritten signature verification is a lot better (albeit also more noisy) than retina scans or fingerprints. unlike other biometric data, you can't steal a person's signature the way you can chop off a finger. remember gattaca?

    detecting forgeries is quite a difficult task, but most human experts don't have any temporal data to work with: they have to infer it all from the off-line data. the other big problem (that i have seen from my own research) is that in order to get a very low false acceptance rate you also have to be pessimistic about accepting real signatures (which tends to piss people off when they have to enter their signature an average of about 2 times before it is authenticated)

    --
    BSD is for people who love UNIX. Linux is for those who hate Microsoft.
    1. Re:HSV by NonSequor · · Score: 1

      I would be so utterly screwed by such a system. I am entirely incapable of making my signature look the same way twice.

      --
      My only political goal is to see to it that no political party achieves its goals.
  29. A more pressing fear by The+Man · · Score: 1

    If for some reason a system doesn't work properly, or an injury or natural change over time makes the system unable to identify you, how will you ever prove you're really you? If you lose your password and can't get it back, maybe you lose your email. If you lose your biometric identity and can't get it back, you lose everything you've done in life to that point!

    1. Re:A more pressing fear by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      thats when they delete you

  30. A third reason... by po8 · · Score: 1, Redundant

    A third main reason that biometrics haven't taken off is irrevocability. Bad guys can forge your fingerprints, and you can't counter this by changing fingers. DNA is particularly noxious in this regard: there's a lot one can do with stray hairs from a hat and some PCR.

    The oldest biometric still in widespread use is the signature. Ironically, we are moving away from signatures because of the problems with biometrics. IMHO it is unlikely that newer biometrics will be better. The best seems to be the intelligent combination of biometrics with other methods---as with signatures now.

  31. can't be stolen?-Short-changed. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    "Biometrics can be stolen, it's just a bit more gruesome."

    Whew! I sure hope they don't come up with the dick print.

    1. Re:can't be stolen?-Short-changed. by pangloss · · Score: 1

      note to self: don't put a drink to your lips just before clicking to view a comment below your threshold.

      thanks for the laugh ;)

    2. Re:can't be stolen?-Short-changed. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Yeah, just imagine having to ID yourself at the Slashdot Compound..

      Its not really a dick scanning machine but instead its a glory hole.. with Michael Sims on the other side waiting!

  32. body part security by 0111+1110 · · Score: 5, Interesting

    The problem with using body parts like fingers, retinas, or faces for access control security is that one's physical body can be coerced. No one can force me to reveal my secure password. I can choose to die rather than reveal it, and if I die, the protected data will die with me.

    A few scenarios come to mind. I'm walking in a city late at night near an ATM. A thief puts a gun to my head and tells me to go to my ATM and withdraw funds for him. I can refuse, but if he kills me he will get no money. With a fingerprint, retina, or facial scan, he can shoot me first and just drag my body to the ATM.

    Another scenario is private data on my computer that I want to be kept safe from everyone including governments. A government can physically coerce a citizen into using his fingerprint scanner to retrieve the data that they want. They can do nothing about a strong password, and, again, if they kill you they lose any chance of getting the data.

    Of course, this is where torture comes in, but I'd rather have the choice of being tortured or even dying to protect sensitive data. Biometrics take away that choice.

    Having said all this, voice print ID avoids many of these pitfalls. It seems the most promising since no one can physically force you to speak your password, and if you die the data remains protected.

    --
    Quite an experience to live in fear, isn't it? That's what it is to be a slave.
    1. Re:body part security by bersl2 · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Having said all this, voice print ID avoids many of these pitfalls. It seems the most promising since no one can physically force you to speak your password, and if you die the data remains protected.

      What about when one has a cold? or laryngitis? How does one then get normal access? The good thing about passwords and PIN numbers is that nothing prevents me from gaining my access. If I lose both of my arms, I can still type a password with my toes. Hell, if I lose my legs, I can type (alphanumerically) with my nose! I might look like the Black Knight, but I could still get to my pr0n collection (which, in retrospect, would be a bad idea).

    2. Re:body part security by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      A government can physically coerce a citizen into using his fingerprint scanner to retrieve the data that they want. They can do nothing about a strong password, and, again, if they kill you they lose any chance of getting the data.

      Are you implying that the government couldn't simply kill you and decipher the contents of your brain? Duh.

    3. Re:body part security by Nynaeve · · Score: 2, Interesting
      Of course, this is where torture comes in, but I'd rather have the choice of being tortured or even dying ... Biometrics take away that choice.

      Biometrics will not take away that choice. They will force it upon you.

      Very soon, you will be required to have either your fingerprints (right hand) or retinal scan (forehead) "on file" or in the form of a smartcard in order to make financial transactions of any sort. Common sense leads one to this conclusion: my state requires a fingerprint for a driver's license, and my local supermarket has a "discount club" promotion that requires one's fingerprints. Because electronic transactions are more economical, cash will gradually become inconvenient and impractical. Even today, how often does the average person use a check or credit card instead of cash? It will be a simple and seamless transition.

      Right now, if you refuse to submit biometrics, you will be unable to get a passport or maybe a driver's license in some states. The torture will come to those that rightly resist the future laws requiring it and cannot buy food, clothing, or a place to live as a result. That is why it is written: whoever wants to save his life will lose it, but whoever loses his life for me will find it.

      Even if you doubt this scenario, remember it. It will come to pass.

    4. Re:body part security by Woy · · Score: 2, Funny
      No one can force me to reveal my secure password. I can choose to die rather than reveal it, and if I die, the protected data will die with me.

      While i really dont think biometrics is a good idea, enough torture will break you like it breaks ppl trained to resist it. Everyone has a breaking point. Maybe you'd tell your password if it meant they wouldn't burn your children alive. Sometimes it's not as easy as "choosing to die".

      --
      "If God created us in his own image we have more than reciprocated." - Voltaire
    5. Re:body part security by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      This brings up another good feature of passwords security - a panic code. Good alarm systems allow you to seta panic code - a code that will stop the entry alert locally just like the real code, but sends a silent alert to the monitoring station. This protects people who are forced to enter their house under duress.

    6. Re:body part security by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Torture or kidnapping is where the coersion password comes in. This password dissables/deletes what it gives access to, or possibly sets off a silent alarm while giving access. You delete/dissable for stuff more important than your safety, and have the device call for help silently for thing that are less important. Most people would rather have their car stolen than be knifed by a robber for giving the wrong password.

    7. Re:body part security by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      But the example the parent gave about the mugger at the ATM is a good one. The mugger is not going to stand there and torture you - that would draw too much attention. If he needs your pin, he's eventually going to give up. However, with a finger-print scanner, he doesn't even have to ask. He can just kill you, and place your thumb on the scanner before the blood stops flowing. (Gruesome, I know. But it would almost certainly be enough to fool even the scanners that look for blood flow, and you could probably fake a "pulse" well enough to fool them too, if give it a bit more thought - which I don't want to.)

      So, yes, if you hold national secrets or something like that, then someone with proper "training" can still get what he wants either way. But replacing PINs with thumb scans *could* end up drastically increasing the death rate in your more mundane, "every-day" robberies.

    8. Re:body part security by Woy · · Score: 1

      Point taken. However i do not consider my cash withdraw daily limit worth dying for. But maybe that's just me.

      --
      "If God created us in his own image we have more than reciprocated." - Voltaire
  33. Your password will expire in 3 days... by jd_esguerra · · Score: 2, Funny

    would you like Windows to change your retinas now?

    Creepy.

  34. I would be willing by hookedup · · Score: 1

    to pay some sort of monthly fee to my bank for biometric identification at ATMs, especially in these days of fake atms, false fronts, and cameras seeing your PIN.

  35. The other reason by Coventry · · Score: 5, Interesting

    The economist article fails to mention the other major reason these systems have not taken off - comparability.

    Or, I should say, the Lack of it.

    Each fingerprint device on the market uses its own format for storing it's data - making each device incompatible. At first, this would seem to be an easily surmountable problem - but then you must realize that until recently, Every device on the market had its own API for development.

    Let me give you an example to illustrate this issue: company X has 2000 employees, and it goes to look at biometric systems - they are either faced with the choice of paying for very expensive equipment from 'long time players' in the industry - who would be around in 2-5 years when the devices start failing due to wear and tear - or choose from some of the 'upstarts', and risk being out in the cold if the company they choose isn't around in several years. a hardware switch down the line not only would incur the cost of re scanning everyone, but the application itself would need to be modified to work with the API for the new device.

    Enter the BioAPI (www.bioapi.org) - which proposed a standard api - now widely adopted. You may notice that the Bioapi page mentions it was founded in 1998. It has taken several years for this standard to come to the foreground and there are still roadblocks - not all manufacturers participate freely.
    As an example: one rather large manufacturer, Identix (www.identix.com) seems to have been stonewalling for years. Why would a manufacturer do such a thing against what is good for the industry? Because they were leading the industry. When you have all of the high end government contracts coming your way, a standard the opens the doors for the little guy is a Bad Thing for your business - or so they thought.
    Take a look at the members list on the bioapi site - identix is listed - then take a look at the supported devices list... not a single identix product.

    In 1999 I witnessed this stonewalling firsthand at a meeting in washinton DC. This meeting had manufacturers and interested parties from all over the globe in attendance, including representatives from the US military. The whole agenda for the meeting was how to promote/define standards so that the industry could grow.
    I had the unfortunate luck to be seated next to the Identix representative. He had apparently flown in just so he could stonewall - every opportunity he got, he grabbed the microphone and ranted about how we should let the free market dictate standards - that they would come about naturally in the free market (he loved the term free market).
    Meanwhile the rest of the group was discussing issues about how to resolve device inter operability - even so far as to discuss how data could be shared between devices. No concrete decisions were made at the meeting, but it did get people talking.

    Anyway, my whole point is, one of the major reasons the biometric security industry hasn't grown (as fast as has been predicted for the past 8 years) is because without standards no one wanted to invest in writing applications. It was just too risky.

    Note: I am flipping a coin as to wether to post this anonymously or not, since Identix could decide to try and silence this sort of talk...

    --
    man is machine
    1. Re:The other reason by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      There was/is little or no Unix support available, though the vendors had loads of code for Windows. Specific bio vendors would not give up enough info, code, etc. for us to work with, as it seems the US Gov. was such a big possible contract they didn't want to lose any advantage, so instead of investing in application writing, they simply keep their info close to the vest, them being the only ones capable to write the code. Not surprising; the *nix vendors were mum on it as well as they had their own agenda as well, like building strategic partnerships with the bio companies.

      I felt it odd that they could create all the hardware, interface it with a smartcard, engineer and design all this, but not have a PAM module available, just a Windows demo.

    2. Re:The other reason by Coventry · · Score: 1

      AS someone who worked at a company that tried, pre-bapi, to write our own abstraction layer over multiple vendors' drivers, I feel your pain - our entire biz model was to write our own applications in such a way as to be used with different devices, and provide our sdk for other developers to do the same. The more applications, the more demand there would be for the devices - just like video cards with 3d acceleration and games.

      What we found was telling in several ways:
      - Device manufacturers saw their SDKs as profit center, and did not want to give them away - even though it would promote device sales.
      - The engineers at many firms were very, very intelligent about biometrics, but not about software - they would buy driver writing kits for windows and go from there. Sometimes they were very smart electrical engineers as well, designing not only the authentication schemes and putting cameras into little plastic boxes, but designing their own special circuitry to be used on a pci card to provide a high bandwidth interface to thier device, etc. But once again, after going to all that trouble, the firms used driver writing kits.

      Of course, what you seem to be missing, is that these vendors have (what appear to them) to be good reason to Not provide open source drivers - or binary drivers for an OS that is run by users who will just try and reverse engineer them.

      - often, the actual authentication mechnisms were performed in sofware, with the device just gathering data. Thus, by providing drivers they would open up the core of their product and simply become hardware makers.
      - there is no economic incentive - not only does the above point illustrate this, but the demand hasn't been there from the people who actually buy the systems.

      Having said all that, note that some closed-box systems that do not require an external computer are rumored to run embedded linux variants...

      --
      man is machine
    3. Re:The other reason by JaredBeck · · Score: 1

      I am sorry you had a bad experience back in 1999 with this Identix representative. Identix BioEngine IS BioAPI compatible as well as the related Identix fingerprint reader family. I don't know why they are not on the bioapi.org site and I will make sure that it is more clearly noted. Identix is very much involved with all standards groups worldwide and representatives from several organizations fly around the world to contribute to such standards meetings. Standards of biometrics within the industry are a must, and Identix believes wholeheartedly in these efforts. But to clarify... Your main complaint within this statement was for a meeting back in 1999 about wanting the ability to enrolling using one vendor's technology and working on another. BioAPI alone will not provide the solution you mention with templates that are compatible. BioAPI gives a standard set of APIs to use for each vendor to do the standard functions of biometric extraction and matching (and related functions). So currently it is good for integrators to easily integrate several different BioAPI compatible components, but you can't use the data from one to the other. So, if you always enroll on one and verify on the same and manage that accordingly then BioAPI will handle what you need. But the way I interperet your post is that won't solve your problems so I would follow closely the workings of M1. You are looking for template data interchange format standards. Please check out some current efforts going on where IDNX is actively involved: http://www.incits.org/tc_home/m1.htm Template data interchange format standards and interface standards such as BioAPI together will get you where it seems you would like to be. M1 seeks to address this. When you go to check out M1 and similar efforts, you will see an Identix representative at most of those meetings. Best regards, Jared Beck, CISSP

    4. Re:The other reason by Coventry · · Score: 1

      I appreciate the apology, and the correction on BioAPI compliance.

      I think the lack of documentation on the Identix website contributed greatly to this - a search for 'BioAPI' upon your website returns only a few documents, none of which are actually about BioAPI compatibility - except for one SEC filing referencing BioAPI modules, regarding Visionics technologies.

      I think you may have read to much into my post though - as for your clarification and interpretation. I never intended, nor implied, that the BioAPI provided a standard biometric template interface: my point was that it appeared (at the time, and not just to myself, mind you) that this sort of stonewalling was being done against any and all standardization efforts within the industry. Identix was not the only organization that seemed to be doing this, but it was one of the biggest. The points about template compatibility and proper BioAPI usage are wasted on me - but it is better to mention them for the good of the audience here on slashdot.

      Let us just say that before BioAPI there were other attempts at standards, and that I was (fortunately or unfortunately, depending upon your view) employed by an organization building one of these, and building applications based upon our system; hence my experiences.

      --
      man is machine
  36. from the article by saiha · · Score: 2, Funny
    Even John Siedlarz, who co-founded the International Biometrics Industry Association to promote the sale and use of the technology, says that "recent congressional requirements are premature in my view." Despite this concern from industry experts, politicians are keen to push onwards, and not only in America. Otto Schily, Germany's interior minister, recently declared his support for increased use of biometrics...

    So let me get this straight, an industry expert whose job is to sell these things, thinks its premature, and we (americans as a whole) and our political representatives want to make these requirements? What happens when we found out there are errors, or exploits, its not like you can just reissue 100,000 visas, or maybe you can?

  37. Las Vegas already uses something like this... by John+Seminal · · Score: 2, Funny
    You may not know it, but if you ever went to a casino in Las Vegas, they probably have you on tape. They have photos and images of well-known gamblers who like to cheat, and they have software which takes photo's of people inside the casino's and they attempt to match the photo to the database. The only differance is the casino's hire lots of security specalists that make the final decision.

    Having said that, if someone is taking my picture and storing it in a database, there should be a sign by the entrance warning people of that.

    Something else from the link that I find disturbing:
    In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, however, these objections have been swept aside. After all, if you are already being forced to remove your shoes at the airport, and submit your laptop for explosives testing, surely you will not object to having your fingers scanned too?

    I think this is really dangerous that every law that takes away civil liberties is linked to September 11th. And they give those laws such nice names, like "the patriot act".

    American citizens will also be affected, as new passports with a chip that contains biometric data are issued from next year.

    This is something that will be too easy to abuse. Remember, our government illegally bugged black panther offices, and did all sorts of illegal crap. I wonder if our government will use this kind of data to track private groups, such as those that protest the WTO. Could it be that if you show up to protest the WTO, then you will get audited by the IRS the next year?

    --

    Rosco: "If brains were gunpowder, Enos couldn't blow his nose."

  38. another false start by Doc+Ruby · · Score: 2, Funny

    Until there are social (legal and business) safeguards that require the verifier to discard my personal identity info once verified, this will be another false start to a real security model. A standard license that prohibits storage and transmission of my personal data beyond the limits of the verification transaction might be sufficient, if it had enforcement teeth. Where's a transactional security component whose documentation includes a license requiring interoperation with a law that protects the software user?

    --

    --
    make install -not war

  39. Sanitation by Gothmolly · · Score: 5, Interesting

    is a big problem, partially real and partially imagined. The real issue is transmission of viruses and bacteria through body fluids - what if I have an eye infection when I peer into the retina scanner? What if I pick my nose, then scan my fingerprint? The imagined issue is the 'cootie factor', where you wont want to touch something that 1,000,000 other people touched (think toilet seat).
    Lastly, our new biometric overlords (The US Govt) will undoubtedly put 1,000,001 policies and procedures in place creating a huge barrier to market entry, unless of course you're the gov't approved contractor. None of which will be followed by the unscrupulous, thus continuing the tradition of fucking the honest and awarding (by default) the sketchy.

    --
    I want to delete my account but Slashdot doesn't allow it.
  40. Identification: YES Authentication: NO by accident · · Score: 2, Funny

    As has been mentioned before at many places and on this site a few times, but not in this article, bio metrics are great for ID but lousy for trusting. If any security device is compromised for a given user, e.g fake finger, fake face, fake eyeball, stolen tissue with DNA, stolen biometric data, that user cannot be revoked without locking out that user for life!

    The article claims to address the authentication step, briefly mentioning "one-to-one comparison" but fails to define what that would mean for a given situation.

    Bruce Schneier said it back 1998, and updated with application to airports.

  41. Follow the money... by John+Seminal · · Score: 1
    Worse, spending the billions of dollars that the GAO estimates will be necessary to implement biometric systems at border-crossing points--$1.4 billion to $2.9 billion initially, and $700m to $1.5 billion annually thereafter

    Someone is getting rich, and I bet it is someone affiliated with a politician. Could it be politicians see this as the goose that laid the golden egg? We already know some of the ways George Bush is connected to the oil industry and how he helped his friends. We remember how he was given a controlling interest in the Texas Rangers when nobody else would have had that oppertunity, and they paid him out millions of dollars becuase he had political connections that the owners of the Rangers wanted to influance. We know how Senator Orin Hatch's kid is an influential lawyer getting millions with the music piracy legislation. Here is another way that they can make their friends rich.

    --

    Rosco: "If brains were gunpowder, Enos couldn't blow his nose."

  42. here's how to fool them by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Here are some good links about the security of fingerprint based systems:

  43. obvious downfull by geoff+lane · · Score: 2, Interesting

    Even if you can get the technology to the point where false positives occur less than 1% of the time
    airports etc will be made unusable because there will be more candidates for a intensive search and id check than can be dealt with in a day.

    But the real killer will be the problem of persistant false positives. How many times will someone who looks a bit like a known terrorist have to be taken out of queue and subjected to intensive questioning and searches before the lawyers and courts get involved?

  44. Retinal Scanners by rarose · · Score: 1

    I'll never use em. Sorry. I'm blind in my left eye (birth defect). I have no retina at all in that eye, so all a scanner will see is a flat white surface.
    And my good eye, my right eye, is very dear to me. I will not be letting anyones laser or scanner look into it other than my Dr. The risk of the laser power being out of spec, etc is just too great for me to risk.

    --
    --Rob
  45. bioemtrics != identity by cabazorro · · Score: 0

    You are not your eyes, or your fingers or the shape of your face. You are the conciousness that arises from a collection of memories that belong to you and the freedom you possess to create new ones out of your own free will. Without these two things, free will, and the impenetrable nature of memories, human identity cannot exist.

    --
    - these are not the droids you are looking for -
  46. If the data is stolen, get an eye transplant? by Scot+W.+Stevenson · · Score: 2, Insightful
    As Bruce Schneier pointed out in his book Secrets and Lies (which you should have read before turning on your computer for the first time), that "biometric" data has to be stored in digital form. Now, if somebody steals that digital data, what are you going to do? He now has the digital equivalent of your retina-picture, so you are going to need new eyes...

    If you haven't read this book, rush out and do so now. It explains a lot of things very clearly, though it does make you sick to your stomach when you hear the politicos talk...

  47. Perfect!!! by MarkJensen · · Score: 1

    Now, here is the perfect way to keep my wife away from my porn! :)

  48. what if you lose a finger? by fermion · · Score: 2, Insightful
    This is just scare tactics. The other day I heard an ad for a jewelry shop and one of the main benefits cited for shopping at this shop was that you would be less likely to get mugged. I find decisions based on fear are unreliable.

    Proponents have long argued that because biometrics cannot be forgotten, like a password, or lost or stolen, like a key or an identity card, they are an ideal way to control access

    From what I have read and understood about security, it is inherently insecure to rely on a single form of validation. In general a secure system, like an ATM, one should require a token and a secret, or perhaps, two tokens. So on tv you see the secret agents required to swipe a card, and speak a code word. This uses biometrics as the second token. The advantage to biometric, therefore, is that one could go to an ATM and use a fingerprint and card to access the account, thus saving the PIN.

    The disadvantage i have read the most is that once you lose control of the biometric, say your voice, or fingerprint, or whatever, security is forever compromised. You can't call you bank and ask for a new fingerprint.

    --
    "She's a scientist and a lesbian. She's not going to let it slide." Orphan Black
    1. Re:what if you lose a finger? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The disadvantage i have read the most is that once you lose control of the biometric, say your voice, or fingerprint, or whatever, security is forever compromised. You can't call you bank and ask for a new fingerprint.

      Of course you can. Once Windows 2008 has found that your hardware has changed, it computes a new hash value from your new, different body parts, you call Redmond to explain your case, and voila!

  49. Oh, great... by Phillip+Birmingham · · Score: 1

    ...now rather than just taking my ATM card and pistol-whipping me until they get my PIN, the muggers are going to have to lop off a finger or spoon out an eyeball!

    --
    Make me aerodynamic in the evening air
  50. New Criminals by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Interesting

    Will just cut off your hand instead of demanding your wallet.

    Or maybe head too- for facial scans.

    Would you want it raised to that level?

  51. A password I can't change? by Ossifer · · Score: 4, Insightful

    That is effectively what biometric security is. Consider then that the entire network must be physically secure or my (eye/finger/etc.) "password" will quickly be known and re-used. The "password" I used decades ago is still valid!
    Also, I'd rather give a mugger my wallet & pin, than my wallet & thumb...

  52. The end on anonymity by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Interesting

    Two big problems with biometrics are (1) the inability to change passwords, and (2) the inability to use a pseudonym.

    The first has been pretty well covered. The second less so. Whenever I register for something (NYT for example) that has no business knowing my personal information (name, address, phone number, email, etc.) I lie. I don't want their marketing junk. I don't trust what they'll do with my personal information. What they are offering is not so valuable that I'll overcome my reluctance. I am not giving anything to them.

    And, I can be a different person on Monday than I was on Tuesday.

    Eh, I am tried of writing...

  53. Biometric security should not store bio-signature. by NecrosisLabs · · Score: 1

    Think of your biometric signature as a private key. The when registering at the central database, what shoul be stored is a PIN/Password passed through the key. If the central database is compromised, all you need to do is re-register with a new PIN/Password. If the reader is compromised, the PIN is changed at the central database making it a bit more difficult.

    Not a great solution, but better than just holding the original biometric signature.

  54. Fooking with Biometrics by dolo666 · · Score: 0, Troll

    Biometrics could totally be messed with. I can think of a hundred ways to mess with them. Start with simple magnetic underwear and work your way up to skin-suits with other-peoples-DNA.

    Technology can always be worked around. When are you people going to get it through your sick heads that you can't and never will have a secure universe?

    One of the fundamental laws of this universe is that it is predatory in nature. So why are putting stock in anything that claims to be safe?

    Suppose Biometrics become a staple. Now imagine the spammers get a hold of your key.

    Add water.

    Stir.

    1. Re:Fooking with Biometrics by zcat_NZ · · Score: 1

      Reminds me of a case I once read about (Readers Digest iirc, although I should perhaps check snopes in case it's an UL) of a doctor who had raped a patient. The courts ordered him to give a blood sample to match the DNA with so he created an 'artificial' vein by inserting plastic tubing down his arm filled with another patient's blood.

      --
      455fe10422ca29c4933f95052b792ab2
    2. Re:Fooking with Biometrics by The+Troll+Catcher · · Score: 1

      Saw that on Law and Order: Special Victims Unit a few weeks ago - probably not something that really happened.

    3. Re:Fooking with Biometrics by Scrameustache · · Score: 1

      a doctor who had raped a patient. The courts ordered him to give a blood sample to match the DNA with so he created an 'artificial' vein by inserting plastic tubing down his arm filled with another patient's blood.

      Saw that on Law&Order:SVU...might have been one of those "ripped from the headlines" ep though...

      --

      You can't take the sky from me...

    4. Re:Fooking with Biometrics by Sven+The+Space+Monke · · Score: 1

      Actually, it happened in Saskatchewan, Canada. Dr John Schneeberger in 1992 was accused of sexual assult and beat DNA tests using exactly that method. He was caught (the mother of one of his victims hired a PI to get the DNA for private testing), but he only served 4 years (just finished his term). Since he's an immigrant, there's special rules that apply to him. Because he lied to get his citizenship (in 1993, he told a citizenship judge that he wasn't being investigated for sexual assault even though he was), his citizenship status has been stripped. Now he faces deportation. It's making HUGE news here. There's even going to be a made-forTV-movie called "I Accuse" about it.

      --
      A man who can't pronouce "nuclear arsenal" shouldn't have one -sig ends here.
  55. Forget Biometrics by Ignis+Flatus · · Score: 3, Interesting

    All who are familiar with the ATM scams know why it is inherently insecure. The more likely scenario is that eventually you will all be tagged like cattle. GPS tracking will ensure security by monitoring to make sure you are never in two places at the same time, or making quantum leaps through space-time.

  56. Biometrics != infallible by kid-noodle · · Score: 2, Interesting

    Funny that nobody else has pointed this out - its well known that fingerorint scanners are fairly easily foolable - in fact if one has the finger available, leaf gelatine and a paperclip are all you need.

    Shit, you can strip a print off a pint glass and use that to make a copy...

    Ben Elton indicated a perfectly feasible way to fool DNA testing in This Other Eden, one would imagine a variation on coloured contact lense could be used to dupe a retina scanner.

    Nevermind the obvious issue of chopping off body parts, and sticking pens in eyes, if I can forge a fingerprint right now and it can fool 80% of scanners, for under $5?

    Yeah. Sounds infallible to me.

    --
    fortune -o
  57. Finally... by dnight · · Score: 2, Funny

    I'll be able to pick up a free case of pinkeye from the eye scanner at the local Wal-Mart. My life is complete

  58. This is another case of... by slappyjack · · Score: 3, Interesting

    ...just becasue you HAVE the technology, and COULD use it... ...doesn't mean you necessarialy SHOULD.

    another creepy-ass thought
    Retinal scanners: Remember that Tom Cruise sci-fi flick where everyone was constantly getting retinally scanned wherever they went? You guys think DoubleClick are a bunch of scumbags now, just wait 'till they link up with RetinAll Marketing.

    Coming out of a big speaker in the near future:
    "Welcome to Blockbuster, Mr Slappyjack. You may be interested in the Jenna Jameson collection we have in the back room. We did notice you were looking at internet porn about her all day while your wife was out. We do not, however, have any Ass-Reaming-Mature-Tranny-Bukkake videos, which we know you enjoy. If you like we'd be glad to order one for you. Have a nice day."

    yeah. nice.

    Remember when we all thought RadioShack asking for our addresses just becasue we needed a couple of AA batteries was high annoyance? NOTHING compared to what the future holds.

  59. Nothing new by Uplore · · Score: 1

    I once had a Biometric, but it escaped.

    --
    I couldn't think of a sig.
  60. risks by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Who is going to be identifying me, and why should they be allowed to?

    there are risks associated with living, I hate this shitty society where 'safety' is the be-all-and-end-all.

    Taking reasonable safety measure is fine- this is not reasonable. I feel like a cow in a stock yard.

  61. UNIX login support lacked by awfar · · Score: 2, Interesting

    Several years ago login (PAM) support was seemingly unavailable under *nix. All the Biometric vendors did have a proprietary Windows implementation, but no *nix. The closest was a U. of Michigan project; it then trailed off. Sun, other *nix vendors either had no solution or were unwilling to make info available. It appeared that the US Gov. was such a huge potential customer, that giving info, code, etc. was not in their best interest.

    Strange; I never did figure it all out.

  62. heh by oohp · · Score: 1

    Now cutting other people's fingers, hands and taking out their eyes will be involved to steal their biometric "password". Great!

  63. Eek! by Angram · · Score: 3, Funny

    "So what happens when someone who has lost one or both eyes tries to withdraw money from their bank account?"

    Well, that gives the mob/bookies/dealers/etc a real way to get you back. "Pay up or we'll take your eyes/fingers." Not only do you experience major pain/permanent disability, but you lose your identity and they can clean out your bank account.

    --

    GL
  64. You can steal biometrics "keys" by blueworm · · Score: 1

    You can definately steal the "keys" with biometrics like you can steal passwords. You can cut off hands and remove eyes from sockets can't you? I think biometrics just makes it tougher for the "cleaner" criminals to steal your stuff/bypass security.

  65. All Together Now by Ringel · · Score: 5, Interesting

    Repeat after me....

    Biometrics are unique but not secret.

    1. Re:All Together Now by ElfKnight · · Score: 1
      Biometrics are unique but not secret.

      They aren't even necessarily unique - at least, not at the level of detail used in practice. There's only a statistical assurance that your fingerprint/iris/hand-shape etc doesn't come appear the same as someone else's. Real problems have been encountered with the use of fingerprints in criminal cases.

      --
      -- I would have got out of bed earlier...but I was asleep.
  66. Amish People by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I used to make fun of them. Not anymore.

    1. Re:Amish People by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Amish folk are really pretty cool. Last year I took my Spring break in Lancaster County. The wet bonnet contests were awesome. Amish girls gone wild. And I'm still trying to recover from those all-night buttermilk keggers.

  67. Faking fingerprints trivial by imnoteddy · · Score: 4, Informative
    This email talks about how easy faking fingerprints is. Key paragraph:

    The time it takes to make a perfect duplicate is about 15 minutes (with special material it can be reduced to less than 10 minutes). To make a duplicate of a lifted fingerprint took me several days in 1992 and I had to do a lot of experiments to find the right process/technique. Now it takes me half an hour and the material costs are $20 (also sufficient for about 20 duplicates), the only equipment you need is a digital camera and an UV lamp. Not only do I now make the duplicates in a fraction of the time, but also the quality is better.

    --
    No electrons were harmed creating this post, though some may have been subjected to electrical and/or magnetic fields.
  68. I wonder how I lived without it by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Interesting

    Israel has had it at its Airport for a few years now. As like everyone else who had to do the army, the Govt already has my fingerprints.

    Unlike everyone else who needs to wait up to 30 minutes to get through passport control to leave and sometimes even longer when arriving, its so nice to know that it only takes two minutes. (Two minutes bec you have to try so many times until it authenticates you, even though it knows ahead of time who you should be).

    The only thing is, now instead of worying about loosing your passport, you need to worry about loosing you credit card, otherwise its time to join the queue with everyone else. (2 factor authentication ?)

    Cost is not always measured in dollars and cents, and these days time is money.

    The funny thing is that when you live in a society where the Govt is supposed to know everything about you (but is so inept that it takes them 4 years to update your address), you end up realizing that its not what they have on you, but rather who is incharge of the information. When someone bad is incharge, a little is more then enough [think Southern Hemisphere].

    [This is not a troll, just a different perspective]

  69. biometrics is a joke by ShadowRage · · Score: 3, Insightful

    the key thing is.. to remember your password... because people cant steal your knowledge.. depending on how strong your will power is.. however.. they can steal your body parts.
    and your fingerprints CAN be duplicated.
    so biometrics is an expensive technology with too many vulnerabilities
    now.. for the common home user, who wants it for the hell of it... or medium level security.. yeah...
    but for bank vaults, and other things.. murder would be on the rise.. and theft would be more successful.

    1. Re:biometrics is a joke by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Where is the punch-line? That really doesn't sound all that humorous.

    2. Re:biometrics is a joke by ShadowRage · · Score: 1

      *punches the anonymous coward*

      there it is.

      oh ho ho ho.. I'm so lame.

  70. Sneakers by Colymbosathon+ecplec · · Score: 1
    Having said all this, voice print ID avoids many of these pitfalls. It seems the most promising since no one can physically force you to speak your password, and if you die the data remains protected.

    In the movie "Sneakers", the girl tricked the guy into saying his passphrase. Yes, I know it's just a movie, but I'm sure, in the intervening years, something better has come up.

    Fire marshal orders freeze on ice hotel

  71. Retina Scan Prank by Ranger · · Score: 1

    Go to your nearest retina scan ATM and smear rim of scanning eyepiece with indelible black ink. The next person who goes to use it they'll scan it will go away with a big black ring around their eye

    The problem I see with retina scan is that enterprising criminals may pop out your eyes with a grapefruit spoon.

    --
    "You'll get nothing, and you'll like it!"
  72. Real-world baloney by HangingChad · · Score: 2, Interesting
    Anything you put a finger on that produces anything, regardless how deep the encryption, is a compromise waiting to happen. Maybe not this year, maybe not next year, but put out a black box and give the opposition enough computing power and it's only a matter of when, not if. Every time I see the phrase "can't be spoofed" I look at the Sharpie on my desk and think about Sony's last disc encryption system.

    I don't care if it's fingerprints, voice print, retinal scan, or even DNA. What technology gives with one hand it takes away with the other. Before "big" ID systems are even fully deployed you can bet there's going to be a bit weenie somewhere thinking, "I wonder if...." Enough of them doing that and one of them will think of something you didn't.

    One of these days we'll wake up to the fact there is no magic technology we'll ever be able to trust. But we always seem to want push-button solutions.

    --
    That's our life, the big wheel of shit. - The Fat Man, Blue Tango Salvage
    1. Re:Real-world baloney by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      COCKSUCKER!

    2. Re:Real-world baloney by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      D0nt fux0r w1th me f00. I'll fuck j00 up. "CHad?" R3t4rd!

  73. There is a reason why.... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    ... the glasses of the president he drinks from in public are smashed.

  74. ROI by Safety+Cap · · Score: 2, Funny
    On the other hand, if you were a Biometric Security VENDOR, your ROI is astronomical.

    1. Drum up hysteria of how the 9/11 hijackers will come get YOU if you don't secure your ATM, car, house, bank account, pda, email, fax machine, house plant, etc. with all new Impermiable Security Utilizing Computer Keys (tm).
    2. Produce a grey shoebox complete with flashy lights, paper tape output, 9" reel-to-reel mag tape, punch cards, and eyepiece from Lil' Wonder Telescope (all plastic so the kids don't get their eyes poked out)
    3. ...?
    4. PROFIT!!!

    That'll be US$500k (with a US$50k/annum license fee), please.

    --
    Yeah, right.
  75. Can't be forgotten, but can't be changed either... by vidarh · · Score: 1
    My greatest fear with biometrics based authentication is that it can't be changed. What if someone find a way to trick the security system? What if they find a way of synthesising your voice? Of creating a mask that resembles your face closely enough? Of fooling the retinal scanner or fingerprint machine (possibly including the use of your own bodyparts)?

    And what if you yourself are no longer able to authenticate using the appropriate biometrics, because of accidents etc.?

    A cornerstone of safe authentication is that it needs to be safe even if any unalterable or hard to alter parts are compromised. Imagine a world where your username was your password - if someone found out your username on a system they had free access, and the only way to prevent it would be to get a new account and tell everyone you've changed.

    Now imagine that all or a significant part of the username was tattoed on you, and it could only be done once.

    That is in effect the security level of biometrics the moment someone finds a way to fool the machine.

    The second problem caused by this is that even if additional verification is required, such as a passphrase PLUS your fingerprint, it still now means that a potential violent person that wants access to something you have will either NEED or find it significantly easier to use force to get you to authenticate for him instead of "just" stealing your wallet.

    I for one would prefer that all my authentication tokens can be easily and quickly disposed of so that I could get away from a robber as quickly as possibly before something goes wrong.

  76. Temperature by scruffyMark · · Score: 3, Funny

    So stick the fake thumb in your pocket for five minutes to warm it up to body temperature first. Probably that's what you'd do anyway - it would look pretty weird if you walked up to a bank machine with a rubber thumb in your hand or the brim of your hat...

    --

    What is the robbing of a bank, compared to the founding of a bank? -- Bertolt Brecht

  77. Common misconception by Coventry · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Your idea has problems for several reasons:

    - biometric data is not stored as a simple image. It's not stored as a compressed image, or a md5 of the image. It is most often stored as a series one-way-hash values, each of which is derived from some characteristic inherint in the scan. Someone could steal this data, but creating the original image is near impossible, like breaking a 100 kilobyte rsa key.
    - biometric data is stored in a different format by every manufacturer. There is no standard - heck, they can barely get a standard API for how to interface with the hardware and drivers (www.bioapi.org), let alone agree on a standard format. Thus, if visa were to start using scanners, and your fingerprint scan were stolen, only visa systems would be affected.
    - most authentication systems (other than the implied example of logging onto a computer) use multiple pieces of information, usualy two or more of the following type:
    - something remembered ( a password or pin)
    - something kept (a security card, a credit card)
    - somethign intrinsic (a biometric)

    Now, how useful is that fingerprint scan if the visa card it's associated with is not in the theif's hands? How useful is it if you cancel your card and get a new one?

    - if someone did manage to steal an image of your fingerprint or retina, it won't do much good: systems these days are able to tell the difference between a dead/living finger, a photo, and even a plastic mold (many systems look for temperature of what is scanned, and can even look for capilary blood flow).

    - if someone gets access to a computer system where they can use the information stolen and bypass the scanning device, well, you have much bigger problems: such a breakin would probably compromise things to the point where they can simulate a positive authentication from the driver/hardware, for any user.

    - (this one only applies to fingerprints): you have ten fingers, use a different one. For eyes, switch eyes.

    Having said all of that, please realize that biometrics are intended to enhance security by adding another layer to the authentication systems in place, not to replace them. A bankcard+pin+fingerprint is more secure than a bankcard+pin.

    Anytime you hear/read the mass media promoting the death fo passwords via biometrics, realize that either A) the reporter doesn't get it or B) they have talked to a marketing person at one of the manufacturers who is (most likely in my experience) pandering to the media in an attempt to grow the market and get sales, despite the falsehoods involved.

    By the same token, anyone who tells you a password by itself is secure, is also wrong.

    --
    man is machine
    1. Re:Common misconception by penguin7of9 · · Score: 1

      biometric data is not stored as a simple image. It's not stored as a compressed image, or a md5 of the image. It is most often stored as a series one-way-hash values, each of which is derived from some characteristic inherint in the scan. Someone could steal this data, but creating the original image is near impossible, like breaking a 100 kilobyte rsa key.

      You don't have to create the original image, you just have to create a physical token that regenerates the same key. And we know that that isn't very hard because biometric systems have significant rates of false positives.

    2. Re:Common misconception by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      (many systems look for temperature of what is scanned, and can even look for capilary blood flow).

      Many systems?? Yeah right. The most common (read: cheap) devices do not have such features. I'm sure at some point the more advanced devices will be easily and cheaply available but there is no way that's happening right now.

      Sure, as always there is some promising technology but we have yet to see widespread use of biometrics.

      Personally, I feel biometrics are too limiting. A password or secret key can be as long and complicated as you like and can be changed at any time.

      BTW, I work in the biometrics field (hence anonymous post; biometrics suck :).

    3. Re:Common misconception by JimBobJoe · · Score: 1

      systems these days are able to tell the difference between a dead/living finger

      Did they actually test that? Where did they get all the dead fingers from?

      Eww.

      Seriously though, it occurred to me that the worst case scenario of cutting someone's finger off is probably off the mark. More likely you can just tranquilize someone temporarily (and I would rather doubt that even the most sophisticated fingerprint readers can tell if the person is fully conscious vs. comatose.)

      A bankcard+pin+fingerprint is more secure than a bankcard+pin

      That's absolutely true. However, bankcard+pin is actually pretty secure as it is, and you won't be seeing the latter replaced because the former is expensive and doesn't really add all that much security anyway. The fact is...biometric companies aren't developing biometrics to supplant current security solutions (no one would buy them for this, except the government(who doesn't know better)) they are developing them to replace/create new security solutions.

    4. Re:Common misconception by mikerich · · Score: 1
      Can someone please send this to David Blunkett (UK's equivalent of John Ashcroft albeit without the same twinkling elfin charm)?

      He's decided (not mentioned in election manifesto, no vote in Parliament, no primary legislation, public consultation gave a big thumbs down) that everyone in the UK is going to have to pay to have biometric ID cards and that they will be completely secure because they use computers and the Internet and stuff...

      Somehow I think the government got the salespitch from one of the manufacturers, certainly they ignored the fact that the UK's bank and credit card issuers recently refused to implement biometrics because they considered them too unreliable.

      Doubtless Slashdot will carry the story about the biggest IT fiasco in history just as soon as Blunkettcards become a reality.

      Best wishes,
      Mike.

    5. Re:Common misconception by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I may be an anonymous coward but surely this post is important enough to merit a higher score than 1? The whole of the UK is going to be forced into using these cards.

      On a further note Blunket wants the biometric data to be stored on the card! Identi-ease anyone?

      As a protest against the total stupidity of this whole concept I'm changing my name by deed poll to Specimin Only when the cards are introduced.

    6. Re:Common misconception by Coventry · · Score: 1

      That is horrible, no pin or other source of id? Let me guess, it's a smartcard with the biometric key onboard as well? Ugh... smartcards are easy to hack, and I've never been one for any card that has the biometric key on it - it's silly and doesn't mean anything: you are trusting the card to do too much by asking it to match the data you hand it with a biometric key. The user (also read: "the potential threat") Brought the card with them...

      --
      man is machine
    7. Re:Common misconception by mikerich · · Score: 1
      That is horrible, no pin or other source of id?

      That's the idea. IIRC the government has come to the conclusion that putting personal data on the card is not a good idea (well done), but that the key will unlock a corresponding record in a centralised government database.

      Oh and how are we all going to be added to the database - well we go down to a police station with an existing form of ID, get our eyeballs scanned and then we get a CERTIFIED piece of ID - which the government GUARANTEES is 100% accurate.

      So all you need to do is go down to the police station with a FAKE piece of ID, go through the system and you have a GUARANTEED fake ID which has to be accepted.

      But I think one of the reasons they are being deliberately vague (apart from trying to introduce surveillance by stealth) is that they haven't got the faintest idea how to do it. They've had the nice people round with the sharp suits, they got some brochures in the post - but as for the actual implementation I suspect the Home Office is thinking 'it can't be that hard can it?'

      Our only hope is that this follows the recent run of UK government IT disasters (here, here and here for starters) and falls apart horribly. Either that or that when Blair finally takes a tumble, he'll take Blunkett and his cronies with him.

      Oh sorry, I forgot - you have to pay for it as well.

      Best wishes,
      Mike.

  78. Actual security of biometrics devices... by ktulu1115 · · Score: 2, Interesting

    While biometrics methods may help to increase security, they are certainly not foolproof by any means. Any determined hacker/criminal can fake actual results without too much difficulty (if they have the proper equipment/tools). However, by far the most secure (as in hardest to fool) biometrics device is the faceprint scanner (sorry, I can't seem to remember the actual real name). In any event, it does an infrared scan of the human face and maps the network of blood vessels under the surface of the skin. While it is quite secure, it is also probably ridiculously expensive (can someone verify that?)

    --
    # fuser -v /dev/attention | grep work
    #
  79. A Third Reason Against by blackbear · · Score: 1

    To paraphrase Bruce Schneier; Once your key is stolen, it stays stolen.

    Talk about identity theft. If your scan (the key) is compromised, it's not like you can get another eye ball, or finger tip from the government. And even it you could, your DNA would code for the exact same pattern (in theory anyway.)

    And then there's the whole:
    "Why did you change your identity citizen?"
    "My identity was stolen Mr. Beaurocratic Overlord."
    "And how do I know you're not the thief, citizen?"

    It gets harder to prove you're you, when the government defines who you are.

    1. Re:A Third Reason Against by BSDKaffee · · Score: 1

      First off, I would not trust the government to supply me a new body part. Second, hand transplants do actually happen, and the fingerprints do not change to that of the original hand of the patient. They also do corneal transplants of the eye...I don't see entire eye transplants too far off. In either case, your DNA will not change the appearance of the donated body part.

    2. Re:A Third Reason Against by blackbear · · Score: 1

      Perhaps I worded my original post poorly. I was speaking of cloned organs and body parts.

      Transplants would work, but I make the assumption that, like me, most people would not accept a used organ or body part unless theirs was failing and the technology or cost was prohibitive of cloned replacements. e.g. current technology. However, the advantages of cloned replacements extend beyond simple substitution to rejuvenation, and this would be desireable to many people. The problem is I don't know if I would get the same set of prints by regrowing my fingertips. How much of that is environmental, or would perhaps be an artifact of the cloning process? Even if twins have the same prints, is there any variation at all? And even it there isn't, it wouldn't be a valid test since the environmental conditions are identical for the gestation of each. I think it will take clones (or twins) gestated in different females to ever have that answer.

      Sorry to lead you to an erroneous assumption.

  80. The true shock of that Economist Issue by a!b!c! · · Score: 1
    Slashdot posting a story about retinal scanning instead of the story about Linux!

    This week's issue has a story about Linux becoming adopted as an OS in many parts of the world because it supports twice as many languages as one of its major competitors.
    Software: If the commercial sort does not speak your language, open-source software may well do so instead
    And not a peep about this one on slashdot. No, instead we have to resort to anecdotes about minority report.
  81. Prepare to be scanned by JFMulder · · Score: 1

    Beats probbing everyday of the week.

  82. Keystrokes: Cheap Biometric by cheesedog · · Score: 1

    Keystroke timings have been shown to be a reliable, cheap biometric, and was first proposed as early as 1980. The only problem is that NetNany owns the "patent portfolio" on these methods, and agressively threatens not only competitors, but academics who do research in this area.

  83. Did we forget about reverse biometrics? by utahjazz · · Score: 1

    Remember the system where you memorize faces and pick them out to authenticate yourself? That too cannot be taken from you -- even with torture, or a butcher knife. You could tell someone, "Well one of the faces is this little guy, kinda funny looking, in a general sort of way". But you could never truly pass on your 'passwords'. And you never forget them. The whole thing relies on the fact that a huge portion of our brain is decidated to memorizing and remembering faces.

    I think it's a great idea. It's sort of like biometrics that uses the software in our brain, instead of the hardware in our flesh.

  84. Standard South Park Quote by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Bring in the Anal Probe!

  85. Retina scanners aren't by xixax · · Score: 1

    Most (some?) of them read the iris. A bunch of German guys figured out that a digital picture of the iris held in the right spot would fool some scanners. This sort of picture would be easy to steal using a camera. I wish I still had the link...

    Biometrics can be used to improve security, but it's not a substitute for careful design.

    Xix.

    --
    "Everything is adjustable, provided you have the right tools"
  86. There Is A Difference Between Password & BioAu by tonyr60 · · Score: 1

    A password is really more than just authentication in real life. It is also effectively a signature indicating a degree of voluntary co-operation to validate a transaction. It needs active brain power.

    Biometrics (at least all the ones so far, except perhaps speech) need no such co-operation. So you may be able to authenticate the subject, but there is no record in any way that the subject is co-operating with the transaction.

    This does raise a subtle issue. While banks in theory disapprove of the sharing of pin numbers, ATM cards etc. it is now an established part of the financial system. How can you order your spouse/partner/etc. out to stock up on booze etc. when (s)he needs to take your thumb or retina? The faces may be similar though ;=)

  87. Hand Shape? by superdan2k · · Score: 1

    Oh yeah. Hand shape never changes. Right. Hi, my name is Dan. I have broken each of my fingers at least three times in the last ten years. My fingers have noticeably changed shape over that stretch of time.

    And what happens if I develop rheumatoid arthritis? Am I no longer myself?

    --
    blog |
  88. more fingers by chunkwhite86 · · Score: 1

    And what the hell am I supposed to do when someone steals one of my fingers?? It's not like the government can issue me a new fingerprint.

    --
    I'd rather be a conservative nutjob than a liberal with no nuts and no job.
  89. Jam the scanners - Opaque spray paint by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Don't like the bank's ATM that has a hand or eye scanner? Just use some opaque spray paint or something similar to "smudge" the scanner. That will help to keep the scanning costs down:)

  90. Safeway by POds · · Score: 1

    I used to work for one of Australias leading supermarkets, Safeway (aka Woolworths), which i may need to make a return too :( But to get back ontopic, i was working there 3+ years ago and to "log on" to "time" i would walk up stairs every shift, type my pin on the pad and place my left index finger on the screen to be scanned. I guess i didnt think about it that much but when itold people about this they were very surprised and though it was very "Star Treck" of them to be so "futuristic".

    Truth is, i reckon these have been in use for a long time, and im surprised to hear they're only starting to take off! Very Surprised!

    --


    Giving IE users a taste of their own medicine since 2005 - http://pods.-is-a-geek.net/
  91. keys by SanityInAnarchy · · Score: 1

    Here is my opinion on the subject. I haven't written a stylesheet yet (I hadn't even published it yet), maybe check here later once I've translated to xhtml.

    --
    Don't thank God, thank a doctor!
  92. MY EYES!!! by Knunov · · Score: 3, Funny

    "Many people would prefer not to have to submit their eyes for scanning in order to withdraw money from a cash dispenser."

    Pfffft whatever.

    The reason I don't want to press my baby blues up against a retinal scanner is because I'm relatively sure a needle will pop out and pierce my eyes.

    I don't think I'm alone in feeling this way.

    Knunov

    --
    Why do users with IDs under 100,000 or over 700,000 usually have the most worthwhile comments?
  93. Biometric passports -- old news by Christian · · Score: 2, Insightful

    The article talks about implementing passports incorporating biometric data.

    THIS IS TRUE OF EVERY SINGLE PASSPORT TODAY!

    Every passport contains a photo of the person to who it belongs. This photo is (supposedly) certified by the government who issues the passport. Incorproating additional biometric data won't make it more secure, it just increases the cost.

    Why don't these people actually get someone who knows something about security to check these ideas over before they get turned into laws?

  94. The id in me by Jon+Abbott · · Score: 1

    I recently saw someone in a computer lab working on face recognition software... Tons of faces were being scanned through, all in a grainy, crappy resolution. It reminds me of trying to make voice recognition software work with telephone-quality audio (~ 8kHz). I must honestly admit that I wanted to shove the guy out of his chair and reset the computer. Why, oh why, must we make 1984 a reality?! Because the facial recognition algorithms are interesting?

    Just because you can do something doesn't necessarily mean you should do it.

  95. Something known, something you have. That's all. by Nailer · · Score: 2, Interesting
    Something known, something you have. That's the way its always been in security theory and I've yet to see an argument for the addition of anything else.

    `Something instrinsic' is a biometric sellers way to tell you that that :
    • the something you have should be a biometric, preferably using the system they're selling you
    • due to issues with changing credentials, you'll need something you have which can be properly revoked in addition to their biometric
  96. We use Biometrics by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I have to scan my finger print go get into our datacenter and into our NOC because we work with and store very sensitive information and it has become an everyday thing for me. I did not occur to me however that it was just converted into one's and zero's but when you think about it, it makes perfect sence.

  97. This is similar to credit cards with pictures by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Most credit cards have the same problem. You may be able to get your picture on them, but it costs extra. You might think the banks would just pay for it anyway, since it works to their benefit that people are less capable of defrauding them. But as it turns out, the cost of adding everybody's picture to their cards is more than what they spend on fraud. So they say screw the pictures and security cause it's cheaper to continue being robbed.

  98. Identification vs. Authentication by localman · · Score: 1

    I really hope someone who knows the difference gets involved in this before it's integrated into our lives. How would you change your fingerprint if it were copied?

    I'm thinking a pervasive system where you:

    1. scan your fingerprints for identification
    2. enter a PIN for authentication
    3. enter an alert PIN if you're being forced to authenticate

    This would prevent people from chopping off fingers for authentication since they'd need the PIN, and even if they forced you to give them the PIN you could give them the alert PIN. Things would function normally (money dispensed, etc.) but the system would know something was wrong and would take some type of action.

    Just thinking off the top of my head.

    Cheers.

    1. Re:Identification vs. Authentication by SuiteSisterMary · · Score: 1

      I've been saying for years that ATM machines, Credit Cards, and so on, need a 'duress' code; something that means 'help help I've a gun/knife to my head/throat and I'm being forced to take money out of my account.'

      That would trigger a camera, a phone call to the cops, and a flag on the account. Maybe even dispence 'special' money that's trackable somehow...

      Or just flood the ATM booth with knockout gas...

      --
      Vintage computer games and RPG books available. Email me if you're interested.
  99. EEEEK! by Dr+Damage+I · · Score: 1
    • 51% of the population can't use it
    • More importantly, if you want people to have a reason to slice your old man off, for gods sake, just put a bounty on it.
    --
    "Cursed is he who rises early in the morning..." Isiah 5:11
  100. Worse than that - visas being outsourced by hughk · · Score: 2, Interesting
    We already know that biometrics are far from effective but there is a very real danger because many people assume that they are. An immigration officer may hold my passport up to the light or carry any number of checks. If the computer says you're ok, then you must be, right?

    Even worse than that is the fact that much of the process for obtaining a US visa is being outsourced. As with a lot of the post 9/11 measures, there is little real effect other than to reduce overall security and allow some more port to be distributed.

    --
    See my journal, I write things there
  101. Are we happy now. . ? by Fantastic+Lad · · Score: 1
    The world is seeming more and more like that scenario which could never happen, isn't it?

    I'd like to thank all the young souls who argued in favor of the police state.

    Thanks guys! Because you and millions like you were naive enough to get the wool pulled, life is going to suck hard for everybody. I hope you are paying strict attention to the lesson, because it's going to happen again and again until you wise up.

    Welcome to the Wisdom Engine.


    -FL

  102. Never trust a fingerprint reader by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Fingerprints are the absolutely least secure method of biometric authentication.

    You leave your fingerprints everywhere. It has been demonstrated a number of times by several individuals that there exist zero fingerprint readers that you can't fool with a fake finger manufactured from a fingerprint that you got somewhere, and manufacturing fake fingers is easy and cheap.

    Even if someone implements better liveness tests for fingerprint readers, it still will be just a matter of making the attacker go to a bit more trouble.

    Repeat after me - I will never trust a fingerprint reader as a method of authentication, the manufacturers of these devices should be convicted of fraud

    Fingerprint readers as authentication are as fundamentally flawed as software DRM.

    The closest you can get to real security using them is if you have a human guard who checks your finger (for any layer modifying your print) and watches you press your finger against the reader.

  103. What if someone "steals" your biometric datas ? by Krunch · · Score: 1

    You change it ?

    Link to a previous thread about that topic.

    --
    No GNU has been Hurd during the making of this comment.
  104. Fingerprint Scanners by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Again.. We have a problem with errors, even with these "perfect" fingerprint scanners... Both my gf and I have "healthy" body temperatures about 2 degrees C BELOW "normal." During winter, my hand is about as warm as that of a corpse, especially because I don't believe in gloves. Instant fuck to the scanners. Same w/ capilary blood sensors.. The margin of error would have to be set too high to accomidate abnormally high or low blood pressure. Even if only 10% of the population is affected by either of these issues, that 10% could easily file lawsuits from hell against the companies making/using these systems for invasive "extra scrutiny" their non-matches would give.
    The only thing I could possible trust biometrics for, is that if the information was in my user field on my *nix box... It'd be harder to figure out than "root," although not much.

  105. Symmetric authentication by SLOGEN · · Score: 1

    The problem with biometrics is, that they are symmetric in nature, this allows anyone you ever authenticated against to effectively take over your id.

    Of course, that's harder with biometrics than with passwords, but why take the chance?

    I'd much rather use challenge based authentication, and the use my own, bio-metric and password protected, device to store the information (usually private keys) for answering the challenges.

    --
    SLOGEN [ http://ungdomshus.nu : Sebastian cover music]
    1. Re:Symmetric authentication by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Match-on-Card from Precise Biometrics does just that. The biometrics never leave your smart card and thats where the matching takes place. Intelligent!

  106. Nothing New about Biometrics by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Two examples:

    You do it every time you recognize a face.

    Really good CW operators recognize other operator's "fists".

  107. Spite, dammit! Spite! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Weird how mangled idiom seems to come in waves. This is at least the third or fourth time I've seen this phrase mistyped the same way.

    The phrase is "cut off your nose TO SPITE your face". Not "despite".

    Think about what it means, grasshopper, and it will all become clear.

    Thank you.

  108. Re:There Is A Difference Between Password & Bi by SuiteSisterMary · · Score: 1

    How the hell is a password 'proof of voluntary cooperation?'

    Or do you think that nobody holds guns on people and says 'gimmie your pin number and your bank card?'

    --
    Vintage computer games and RPG books available. Email me if you're interested.
  109. The REAL problem by coinreturn · · Score: 1

    The real problem is that biometrics cannot be changed if they are compromised. This makes them the worst idea for security since hiding your key under your welcome mat. Fact: locks will always be compromised, no matter how good. If you can't re-key the lock you WILL be screwed over someday.

  110. the real question about wealthy vs. poor by my+sig+is+bigger+tha · · Score: 1

    is how is this any different (in quality) from the other ways that rich people get things that poor people have/need? how is it different (again, qualitatively) from women having kids for wealthy couples? okay, so the poor woman could have more kids, but it taxes her body (no pun intended). this is a capitalist society, folks. it isn't even necessary to say that rich people "prey on" anybody. it's just how the system works. poor people don't get what they need. rich people get more than they need.

  111. cranium, resonant by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
    Cranium Cra"ni*um (kr?"n?-?m), n.; pl. E. Craniums (-?mz),
    L. Crania (-?). NL., fr. Gr. ????; akin to ??? head.
    The skull of an animal; especially, that part of the skull,
    either cartilaginous or bony, which immediately incloses the
    brain; the brain case or brainpan. See Skull.



    Resonant Res"o*nant (-nant), a. L. resonans, p. pr. of
    resonare to resound: cf. F. r'e
    sonnant. See Resound.
    Returning, or capable of returning, sound; fitted to resound;
    resounding; echoing back.

    Through every hour of the golden morning, the streets
    were resonant with female parties of young and old.
    --De Quincey.

    Resonant Res"o*nant, a. (Elec.)
    Adjusted as to dimensions (as an electric circuit) so that
    currents or electric surgings are produced by the passage of
    electric waves of a given frequency.

  112. Biometrics Groups by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    If you are interested in biometrics, you can join http://groups.yahoo.com/group/biometrics/ which is an open, unmoderated yahoo group, or, goto
    www.biometrics.org, which is the US government-sponsored/moderated site and try to join their listserv