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Windows Rootkit Wars Escalate

An anonymous reader writes "The rootkit wars have started to escalate with a rootkit named Rustock which is able to remain hidden from all the popular anti-rootkit tools. It uses some new techniques including not only putting itself in a ADS (NTFS alternate data stream) which isn't seen by normal file system enumeration tools, but even blocks ADS aware tools from seeing the stream. Works in Vista, too! Analysis in both Symantec and F-Secure blogs."

342 comments

  1. Enough is enough by Le+Marteau · · Score: 0, Troll

    Breaking into a computer should be considered as serious as breaking into one's home. Enough of the "kids will be kids" stuff, and lets have our government go after the zombie masters as the scum that they are: invaders into our lives and our stuff.

    --
    Mod down people who tell people how to mod in their sigs
    1. Re:Enough is enough by AssCork · · Score: 1, Funny

      The Government's resources are currently tied up chasing 'terrorists' and holding the world's oil supply hostage. Please wait your turn. Your post has been noted and the next available Government Agent will be dispatched as soon as they are free. Thanks.

      --
      The following replies are posted by unwashed nerds.
    2. Re:Enough is enough by SoCalChris · · Score: 4, Insightful

      From what I understand, the goverment does take computer crime seriously, and does go after virus & rootkit authors. Unless that author happens to be a corporation, in which case it's a-ok.

    3. Re:Enough is enough by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Insightful

      Since when does the government "go after" people who break in to homes? Even busting people who don't mow their lawns is a higher priority.

    4. Re:Enough is enough by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Insightful

      Why? Afriad someone will see your porn collection? Seriously, house breaking should be ignored by the law as much as computer cracking should. The police never "find" who done it when your house is robbed, 99% of the time they never even find your stuff. If you are lucky a cop sees the crime happening and stops it while it's in progress. It's a waste of time for them, that's how they feel about it. The government should force everyone to handle their own security.

      Poof! No more problem.

      Oh, wait, yes, the lame whiners who currently complain that they can't keep their computer secure will bitch because they can't seem to work a deadbolt and what is a lock anyway? Saying the government should handle computer security is like saying that an officer of the law should be stationed at your house to lock your doors for you and take the car keys out of your ignition.

      No, security should be intirely in the private realm.

    5. Re:Enough is enough by GlL · · Score: 1

      To put this in a different way... Security is an illusion, maybe even a delusion. There will never be a time when any of us is 100% secure. There is no OS that is 100% secure. Security is important, but if your expectation is for complete security, you will live a dissapointed life. The weak link in most computer networks is human. If it was programmed by humans, there will be a flaw that can be exploited. If there isn't a flaw in the programming, social engineering works fine to discover passwords that get you past the security.

      The government does not exist to prevent someone from making a dumb mistake. It should convict those who take advantage of someone's dumb mistake. Most rootkits/spyware are installed by the owner of the PC when visiting illegal or semi-legal sites, such as pr0n/gambling/file sharing. Whether or not these sites should exist is beside the point. If you go for a walk through a "bad" neighborhood with no protection at 3AM and get mugged, yes they should convict the mugger, but you chose to go through a dangerous area at a dangerous time.

      Because the government is made up of human beings, it is flawed. Legislation can fix some problems, but with the complex legalese that is used in most laws it is as easy to circumvent a poorly written law as it is to circumvent poorly written code. You just have to know what you are doing.

      So take reasonable precautions, but don't expect your precautions to amount to much if you are making poor decisions.

      --
      I'm a happy pessimist. I expect and prepare for the worst, when it doesn't happen I am pleasantly surprised.
    6. Re:Enough is enough by 99BottlesOfBeerInMyF · · Score: 1

      The weak link in most computer networks is human. If it was programmed by humans, there will be a flaw that can be exploited.

      Most compromises are the result of automated exploits with no user interaction. Sure a human made the OS being exploited, but that does not make it a human failing, just a failing in the OS.

      Most rootkits/spyware are installed by the owner of the PC when visiting illegal or semi-legal sites, such as pr0n/gambling/file sharing.

      Since when is porn semi-legal?

      If you go for a walk through a "bad" neighborhood with no protection at 3AM and get mugged, yes they should convict the mugger, but you chose to go through a dangerous area at a dangerous time.

      "Bad" neighborhood exist mostly because the police do not equitably enforce the law and the laws themselves are not equitable. The fact the some neighborhoods have more danger to the average pedestrian than others is often because police resources are improperly allocated by the wealthy. Whether I'm in a poor neighborhood because that is the only place I can afford to live, or a wealthy neighborhood, should not make any difference to the police or their behaviors and no more blame should be placed upon me.

      So take reasonable precautions, but don't expect your precautions to amount to much if you are making poor decisions.

      Most people who are infected with malware are infected without ever doing anything and don't even know it happened. That is not their fault nearly as much as it is the fault of the OS designers who touted their OS as "super secure" even though it is less secure than pretty much every other one out there. They were lied to and are still being lied to. Stop blaming the victims.

    7. Re:Enough is enough by JohnnyCannuk · · Score: 1

      "Most compromises are the result of automated exploits with no user interaction."

      Actually most malware are viruses that can only spread via human interaction - opening emails, running scripts, going to phishing sites or other means of social engineering. Worms are the only automated means of spreading malware and they are a fraction of the problem, much rarer than virus and script-based malware.

      --
      Never by hatred has hatred been appeased, only by kindness - the Buddha
    8. Re:Enough is enough by 99BottlesOfBeerInMyF · · Score: 1

      Actually most malware are viruses that can only spread via human interaction

      True.

      Worms are the only automated means of spreading malware and they are a fraction of the problem, much rarer than virus and script-based malware.

      False.

      Most malware is not automated, however, most infections are caused by automated malware. Worms are fewer in number, but spread much more quickly and widely. Counting the number of infections caused by worms and the number caused by malware involving human interaction yields the former as having a greater impact according to the majority of studies I've read.

    9. Re:Enough is enough by GlL · · Score: 1

      "Most compromises are the result of automated exploits with no user interaction. Sure a human made the OS being exploited, but that does not make it a human failing, just a failing in the OS."

      Exploits and security holes don't cause themselves. Any failing of the OS is caused by the person/persons who programmed it.

      "Since when is porn semi-legal?"
      There is some porn that is legal, and some that is not. Some that comes from human slavery and some that doesn't.

      ""Bad" neighborhood exist mostly because the police do not equitably enforce the law and the laws themselves are not equitable. The fact the some neighborhoods have more danger to the average pedestrian than others is often because police resources are improperly allocated by the wealthy. Whether I'm in a poor neighborhood because that is the only place I can afford to live, or a wealthy neighborhood, should not make any difference to the police or their behaviors and no more blame should be placed upon me."

      Not disagreeing with you on the cause, but I am not talking about living in a "bad" neighborhood and going home there. I am using an inadequate metaphor to point out that the end user has decisions to make, and that there are consequences to those decisions. If you go to sites that are notorius for containing spyware/viruses/malware without protection your machine will be infected. That's the way it is. If you don't go to those kinds of sites you have a much lower chance of getting seriously infected.

      "Most people who are infected with malware are infected without ever doing anything and don't even know it happened. That is not their fault nearly as much as it is the fault of the OS designers who touted their OS as "super secure" even though it is less secure than pretty much every other one out there. They were lied to and are still being lied to. Stop blaming the victims."

      The above does not meet with my experience in this. I run the tech bench at an ISP. I can tell what kind of sites people have been visiting based on the malware that is detected on their pc. It's that simple. I do not think that OS manufacturers are without blame, but I think that there is enough blame to go around. If you want to know how I would arrange blame, it would be in three tiers:
      1) The people who write malicious code.
      2) The companies that don't fix all their bugs as quickly as security holes are detected or are not forthright about the security implications of use of their product.
      3) The people who intentionally visit areas of the web that are KNOWN to contain more security risks than others.

      --
      I'm a happy pessimist. I expect and prepare for the worst, when it doesn't happen I am pleasantly surprised.
    10. Re:Enough is enough by 99BottlesOfBeerInMyF · · Score: 1

      Exploits and security holes don't cause themselves. Any failing of the OS is caused by the person/persons who programmed it.

      If you want to look at it that way, fine, but then all problems are caused by human error, if only the error of perceiving them as errors. The point is, the end user is not responsible for them, in most cases.

      There is some porn that is legal, and some that is not. Some that comes from human slavery and some that doesn't.

      Porn in the US is a fairly regulated industry. Asserting that a significant amount of it is illegal, without any evidence is empty rhetoric.

      Not disagreeing with you on the cause, but I am not talking about living in a "bad" neighborhood and going home there. I am using an inadequate metaphor to point out that the end user has decisions to make, and that there are consequences to those decisions.

      Perhaps you should be a little more conservative with your metaphors. Your metaphor was dangerously close to some arrogant, aristocratic racism I hear regularly. In any case, I've yet to see a correlation between people who merely visit sites and who become infected with malware and certainly nothing to demonstrate causality.

      The above does not meet with my experience in this. I run the tech bench at an ISP. I can tell what kind of sites people have been visiting based on the malware that is detected on their pc. It's that simple.

      Most malware (by infection number) does not spread through Websites at all. Of that which does, a good portion is posted on public forums and on cracked servers of all kinds. I'm looking at the infected host list for an entire class A right now as well as a list of the DNS request history for them. The vast majority has no correlation at all because most infections do not spread from a particular kind of Website. The only correlation I know of is particular sites that trick people into installing some sort of malware, often spyware.

      The people who intentionally visit areas of the web that are KNOWN to contain more security risks than others.

      It is this last group I disagree with. First, I'm not sure I believe there is such an "area of the Web." Second, I certainly haven't seen evidence of it. Third, assuming such a thing exists, it certainly is not common knowledge.

    11. Re:Enough is enough by GlL · · Score: 1

      "Porn in the US is a fairly regulated industry. Asserting that a significant amount of it is illegal, without any evidence is empty rhetoric."

      The first part of your statement is the key "Porn in the US" http://search.bbc.co.uk/cgi-bin/search/results.pl? scope=all&edition=i&q=Slavery+%2B+pornography
      are a list of articles from the BBC on slavery and pornography. Most of which occur outside of the US.

      "Perhaps you should be a little more conservative with your metaphors. Your metaphor was dangerously close to some arrogant, aristocratic racism I hear regularly. In any case, I've yet to see a correlation between people who merely visit sites and who become infected with malware and certainly nothing to demonstrate causality."

      I grew up in some of the worst neighborhoods of NY and Philly, you don't have to tell me about racism or as they say in Philly Zipcodeism where job apps from certain zipcodes get thrown out unlooked at.
      My experience with the malware issue is that of an ISP cleaning machines that are infected with malware. the correlations that I have seen are porn - spambots, gambling - trojans/keyloggers, gamecheat/filesharing - trojans/toolbars.

      "Most malware (by infection number) does not spread through Websites at all. Of that which does, a good portion is posted on public forums and on cracked servers of all kinds. I'm looking at the infected host list for an entire class A right now as well as a list of the DNS request history for them. The vast majority has no correlation at all because most infections do not spread from a particular kind of Website. The only correlation I know of is particular sites that trick people into installing some sort of malware, often spyware."

      The first thing I would like to know is where your data is coming from and which time period you are using for your data. According to a symantec white paper http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/refe rence/techniques.of.adware.and.spyware.pdf "Most adware and spyware programs are obtained initially by BROWSING THE WEB or along with some
      unrelated ad-supported software. The programs are rarely installed from a conspicuous website, but
      rather through social engineering banner ads, drive-by-downloads, and through peer-to-peer networks
      with misleading filenames. Some adware and spyware programs are even installed by exploiting software
      vulnerabilities." (Caps added) from p8 of the above whitepaper. Trojans, which now make up a vast majority of infected pc's do indeed come from risky surfing.

      --
      I'm a happy pessimist. I expect and prepare for the worst, when it doesn't happen I am pleasantly surprised.
    12. Re:Enough is enough by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Hey, defend script kiddies, and bash corporations, and get modded up on Slashdot! What a surprise!

    13. Re:Enough is enough by 99BottlesOfBeerInMyF · · Score: 1

      the correlations that I have seen are porn - spambots, gambling - trojans/keyloggers, gamecheat/filesharing - trojans/toolbars.

      Trojans and keyloggers are mostly the same thing. Spambots by number are almost completely installed by automated worms. In fact, I don't think I've ever seen a spamnet or botnet where anyone bothered to use trojans for anything, except perhaps grabbing a new control channel. Keyloggers and other data mining trojans are rarely spread by worms directly, but then again they still make up an insignificant portion of malware right now.

      The first thing I would like to know is where your data is coming from and which time period you are using for your data.

      The data I mentioned seeing myself, is coming from a class A network's malware and traffic monitoring system (I can't reveal which one due to my NDA). I'd like to throw in a disclaimer here. I read a lot of network security information, whitepapers, reports, etc. and work in the field, but I am not a professional security expert. I make my living in other ways and don't want you to get the mistaken impression that because I have this info I'm some sort of expert.

      As to the time period, this holds true for general trends. Looking at today, this month, or this year shows no real difference, although my DNS data does not go back an entire year.

      "Most adware and spyware programs are obtained initially by BROWSING THE WEB or along with some unrelated ad-supported software."

      This is probably true, but adware and spyware still do not account for the majority of malware, by infection number. Botnet armies tens of thousands of members strong used for DDoS and spamming are not uncommon. I don't think any type of malware that requires human interaction of any sort is likely to ever catch up to them for sheer numbers.

      The programs are rarely installed from a conspicuous website, but rather through social engineering banner ads, drive-by-downloads, and through peer-to-peer networks with misleading filenames.

      Even this subset of malware contains an significant exception. P2P networks are not the Web.

      Trojans, which now make up a vast majority of infected pc's do indeed come from risky surfing.

      Trojans do not make up the majority of infections. The comment you quote is somewhat misleading in the way it is phrased, but if you read carefully you'll see it does not say that they are. I get a security brief every day that lists the major infections and new threats. Trojans appear in the new threats, but I can only remember one that ever appeared as a major infection. I'm willing to believe that you can increase your risk by going to certain sites, sites that can be classified into distinct categories, but in general no matter where you surf, the majority of your malware infections will have no correlation. Whether or not you use your computer or just leave it sitting idle and connected to the internet will make no significant difference to the number of infections.

    14. Re:Enough is enough by SoCalChris · · Score: 1

      Where did I defend script kiddies?

  2. number 1 reason to hate sony by Data+Link+Layer · · Score: 1, Interesting

    I don't hate sony because they installed rootkits on some peoples computers, I hate them because of that incident the word rootkit became popular.

    1. Re:number 1 reason to hate sony by eln · · Score: 0

      "rootkit" has been a popular term to describe a package like this for decades. A rootkit is a tool that script kiddies use to break into systems, as opposed to someone with actual skill finding and exploiting weaknesses using their own brain.

    2. Re:number 1 reason to hate sony by ScentCone · · Score: 4, Funny

      I hate them because of that incident the word rootkit became popular.

      I know what you mean! Just the other day I was listening to two teenage girls yakking in the mall...

      "Oh no you did-uhnt! Girl, you can't be lettin' some loser root your kit like that!"

      --
      Don't disappoint your bird dog. Go to the range.
    3. Re:number 1 reason to hate sony by punkr0x · · Score: 1

      That's like saying you hate Osama Bin Ladin for making the word "terrorism" popular! Hate Sony/Osama for their actions, hate Slashdot/the NSA for popularizing the word.

    4. Re:number 1 reason to hate sony by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      it was popular way before that.
      I don't think sony made any difference.

    5. Re:number 1 reason to hate sony by Opportunist · · Score: 1

      Actually, that's something I like about them (as much as I hate Sony, for ... various reasons, let's not get there). They managed to get the term "rootkit" into everyone's head, even people who didn't even know what "root" meant when applied to a computer.

      If nothing else, it raised the awareness that there is a problem. Which also proves that nobody is useless, everyone can at least serve as a bad example.

      --
      We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
    6. Re:number 1 reason to hate sony by AcidLacedPenguiN · · Score: 1

      Personally, I'd much rather have a rootbeer. Or maybe just a regular beer.

      --
      disclaimer: I've been known to store numbers in my ass for which to dig out when quantities are required.
    7. Re:number 1 reason to hate sony by SomeoneGotMyNick · · Score: 1

      Gee, I would have thought rootkit would have been the term used for a hair dye touchup product.

    8. Re:number 1 reason to hate sony by djdavetrouble · · Score: 5, Informative

      A rootkit is a tool that script kiddies use to break into systems, as opposed to someone with actual skill finding and exploiting weaknesses using their own brain.

      No it isn't.
      A rootkit is what is installed to give the cracker unimpeded access (provides a backdoor, hides processes, replaces legitimate processes with trojaned ones, keep activity out of system logs) once they have gained entry to a system (usually throgh a known vulnerability.) THeir activity would be hidden from netstat ps, etc.

      At least look at Wikipedia.

      --
      music lover since 1969
    9. Re:number 1 reason to hate sony by eln · · Score: 1

      Actually, it's both.

    10. Re:number 1 reason to hate sony by mobby_6kl · · Score: 4, Informative
      I don't think I've heard anyone use the term to refer to automatic cracking tools, although it wouldn't be completely unreasonable (rootkit == a kit to get root). Actually, it looks like someone edited the entry and simply inserted "; an automated cracking tool" to completely change the definition ;)

      Even the ultimate authority on computer terminology, the Urban Dictionary, gets it right:

      A rootkit is a set of software tools frequently used by a third party (usually an intruder) after gaining access to a computer system. These tools are intended to conceal running processes, files or system data, which helps an intruder maintain access to a system without the user's knowledge. Rootkits are known to exist for a variety of operating systems such as Linux, Solaris and versions of Microsoft Windows.

      The rootkit concept is the dominant controversial aspect of the 2005 Sony CD copy protection controversy, which has made the previously obscure concept of a rootkit much more widely known in the technology community, and to the general public
    11. Re:number 1 reason to hate sony by eln · · Score: 1

      Interesting. I've heard it used many times that way. In my understanding of the word, a rootkit is a collection of scripts that will both crack root and install backdoors and other protections to help you maintain root once you're in. I don't know that I've ever heard it applied only to the tools you use once you're already in.

      Maybe the word isn't as universal as we thought ;).

    12. Re:number 1 reason to hate sony by treeves · · Score: 1

      Probably the P intended a different meaning - one that would be clear had he/she(yeah, right!) written two sentences instead a run-on sentence (i.e "I hate them. Because of that incident. . . )
      - Grammar Nazi sympathizer

      --
      ...the future crusty old bastards are already drinking the Kool-Aid.
    13. Re:number 1 reason to hate sony by djdavetrouble · · Score: 1

      Thats an auto-rooter.

      --
      music lover since 1969
    14. Re:number 1 reason to hate sony by ScottLindner · · Score: 4, Insightful

      A real cracker could write their own rootkit, and it would still be called a rootkit even though that particular rootkit wouldn't be available to anyone but himself.

      It's very common for people to write their own tools, and then use them. That doesn't make them a script kiddie.

      Let's separate the brainless script kiddies from what a rootkit is. It really doesn't matter who uses a rootkit, how the rootkit was developed, or even the motives of the user of the rootkit. A rootkit is a tool that provides unrestricted access to the system it is deployed on. Regardless of who, how, or why.

      --
      Slashdot.. where people join together in deliberate ignorance.
    15. Re:number 1 reason to hate sony by John+Bokma · · Score: 1

      Does it matter if "kiddies" are using it or extremely smart (h|cr)ackers?

    16. Re:number 1 reason to hate sony by yiantsbro · · Score: 1

      Then what was the roto-rooter again? Did it crack, install, patch/update, uninstall, and then uncrack? Or maybe that was the boomo-rooter.

    17. Re:number 1 reason to hate sony by JebusIsLord · · Score: 1

      No, an auto-rooter is that thing they use to clean drains... wait... no, that's a roto-rooter.

      --
      Jeremy
  3. Whats ADS for? by Viol8 · · Score: 1, Interesting

    Was this designed simply an easy way to hide (system?) files in the filesystem
    or was it for something different entirely? I remember there being a "chmod +/-h"
    in old (perhaps even current, I no longer use it) versions of HP-UX that would hide
    files , is this something similar?

    1. Re:Whats ADS for? by baywulf · · Score: 4, Informative

      It is like a generalized version of the resource and data fork on old MacOS files with similar uses.

    2. Re:Whats ADS for? by ben+there... · · Score: 1

      I'm guessing, but I think ADS could be used to store a thumbnail with a movie file, or a transcript, or other types of metadata.

      Not that it ever has been used for anything significant like that.

    3. Re:Whats ADS for? by staticdaze · · Score: 2, Informative

      ADS is used in Windows as part of everyday usage. The "Summary" tab that you see when you view any file's properties is stored in ADS. Also, I believe (vague memory here) that when you download something in Internet explorer and try to run the file, the flag for that annoying "You got this from the Internet, are you sure you want to run it?" is stored in ADS.

    4. Re:Whats ADS for? by MrNougat · · Score: 4, Informative

      "In essence they were created to provide compatibility with HFS, or the old Macintosh Hierarchical File System. The way that the Macintosh's file system works is that they will use both data and resource forks to store their contents. The data fork is for the contents of the document while the resource fork is to identify file type and other pertinent details."

      http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1822

      --
      Web 2.0 == Giant Blogspam Circle Jerk
    5. Re:Whats ADS for? by Control-Z · · Score: 3, Interesting

      It's much more than a "hidden" attribute on a file.

      I fought with the HackerDefender rootkit earlier this year. Best I can tell it got in through a vulnerability in the Finger port of my mail server. It installed itself as a legacy mode device driver. The device driver was set up to hide certain filenames from Windows. Once installed, you COULD NOT SEE the files the rootkit used. The files weren't files marked with the "hidden" attribute, they were simply hidden from Windows at all levels. You COULD NOT SEE the registry entries. You could not see the task in Task Manager. Very evil and took many hours of my time to fix.

    6. Re:Whats ADS for? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
    7. Re:Whats ADS for? by Pyrowolf · · Score: 1

      Silly question, but I ask in all honestly. If you couldn't see the files, processes, or registry entries - how did you know it was even on the box?

    8. Re:Whats ADS for? by WhiteWolf666 · · Score: 2, Informative

      It's only capable of hiding itself if it is in the running environment. One solution is to boot from known-good, read-only media. Then you can search from known rootkit signatures.

      In my opinion, however, once you get a system that badly infected, you should give up and wipe clean. You'll never know if you've succesfully closed all the holes, and not even an expensive forensic analysis could guarantee such a thing.

      --
      WhiteWolf666 an exBush supporter. All you new-school,compassionate,save the children Republicans can rot in hell
    9. Re:Whats ADS for? by gubbas · · Score: 1

      # chmod +h testfile123 chmod: invalid mode Not in 11i.

      --
      "What I need is an exact list of specific unknown problems we might encounter."
    10. Re:Whats ADS for? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Informative

      the resource fork is to identify file type and other pertinent details

      That's a tremendous over-simplification. (It's also wrong. File types aren't stored in the resource fork; some files don't even have resource forks.) The resource fork contains a database of objects, each of which has a type and an ID. The primary use for resource forks by applications is to store user interface elements. Windows are stored in resources of type WIND, icons were originally stored as type ICON, and dialog boxes are stored as type DLOG. In the Motorola 68k days, the application's executable was stored in CODE resources. Lists of strings are stored in STR# resources, which makes localization a snap--just use a different string list, no recompilation necessary.

    11. Re:Whats ADS for? by pedalman · · Score: 1
      fought with the HackerDefender rootkit earlier this year. Best I can tell it got in through a vulnerability in the Finger port of my mail server.
      Maybe your employer has reasons for this; but WHY in God's name is finger even open on this mail server? If this was mandated, then you were done no good deed in being required to keep finger open.
      --
      Friends don't let friends line-dance.
    12. Re:Whats ADS for? by Control-Z · · Score: 1

      Didn't know it was open, or it would have been closed.

    13. Re:Whats ADS for? by Control-Z · · Score: 1

      I can't remember exactly, I believe something was left (unhidden) in a temp directory. Apparently the rootkit was trying to install a FTP server, and the install process didn't go exactly right, and left some remnants behind that I found. Maybe my firewall or anti-virus interfered.

    14. Re:Whats ADS for? by pierreact · · Score: 1

      It was in HP-UX 9
      And this feature was removed afterwards because... the only persons using where people breaking into systems :P

    15. Re:Whats ADS for? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      "In essence they were created to provide compatibility with HFS, or the old Macintosh Hierarchical File System."
      This is grooss oversimplification, to put it mildly, ADS wer stock part of the VMS OS, and NT being a dicrect descendant
      inherited this feature too. Also, it is worth mentioning, that unlike HFS, VMS had an arbitrary number of data streams
      per file, and so does windows.

    16. Re:Whats ADS for? by Viol8 · · Score: 1

      Doesn't surprise me. This was back in the early 90s. Could even hide files from
      the sys admin which could lead to a whole heap of issue so I'm not surprised they've
      removed it.

  4. Forever War by Kream · · Score: 4, Insightful

    rootkit v. counter rootkit
    counter counter rootkit v. counter rootkit
    counter counter counter rootkit v. counter counter rootkit

    An endless cycle of patch, pray, patch, pray, reinstall awaits us.

    X|K|Ubuntu, anyone?

    1. Re:Forever War by rowama · · Score: 0

      Until the rootkit named "Roadblock" emerges, then the war is over ...
      Oh wait, this is not about Robot Wars. Sorry.

    2. Re:Forever War by 0xABADC0DA · · Score: 2, Funny

      Here let me codify that:

      while (!os_written_in_typesafe_language) {
            counter_rootkit(create_rootkit(true));
      }
      . . .
      catch (NoSuchRootkitPossibleException ex) {
      // what's that you say?
      }

    3. Re:Forever War by Tim+Browse · · Score: 1

      Is there any particular reason you believe that writing an OS in a typesafe language would make rootkits impossible? Or are you implying something else?

    4. Re:Forever War by GotenXiao · · Score: 1

      Slackware! The thinking man's Linux. :P

      --
      Goten Xiao
    5. Re:Forever War by caseih · · Score: 1

      Starting to sound like our missile defense system. First a missile, then an anti-missile missile. Then an anti-anti-missile missile, and so forth. I feel safer already. If Star Wars can keep the homeland safe, then surely a better rootkit from symantec (or sony!) can keep me safe from these rootkits!

    6. Re:Forever War by zootm · · Score: 1

      It's possible to write a system, using the features of a typesafe language, which would make rootkits impossible. It's not an automatic benefit that one gets from a typesafe language though, no.

      I always liked that Singularity project for "off the wall" thinking things like that. Not going to be more than a research project for some time, though, although I think that some of the concepts (Isolates in particular) have been adopted, at least in part, by the JNode project.

    7. Re:Forever War by Tim+Browse · · Score: 1

      I'm not sure how that would work. Rootkits are generally pieces of software that hide themselves to avoid detection of the intrusion. How would a typesafe language prevent that? Why would being typesafe even help? How will being typesafe prevent the installation of rootkits via social engineering methods, etc.?

      Can't see it myself. But then I tend to assume that when people use words like 'not possible' they mean it. Or is this the marketing definition of impossible? :-)

    8. Re:Forever War by zootm · · Score: 1

      You can prove more about what is possible with a language within an environment when it is typesafe. If you can verify the typesafety of a program before you run it, you know that these properties hold. If you use these properties to prove that no process can alter the code of the kernel or the drivers, rootkits have been stopped.

      Of course, at this point, one gets into the practicality issues of having a system where one cannot alter the filesystem drivers. ;)

    9. Re:Forever War by deadhammer · · Score: 1

      So what you're saying is that if you try to trace the rootkit, it runs Trace Buster? Well what if the good guys have Trace Buster Buster?

      --
      I'll be honest, we're throwing science against the wall to see what sticks. -Cave Johnson
    10. Re:Forever War by Beryllium+Sphere(tm) · · Score: 1

      It's only an endless cycle if
      o Good guys never figure out that they need to boot from trustable read-only media to scan or repair a system,
      or
      o Bad guys figure out how to rewrite BIOSes so that they can run their code even when the boot drive is a Knoppix disk.

    11. Re:Forever War by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      trace-busta-busta-busta, motherfucka!

    12. Re:Forever War by Lumpy · · Score: 5, Informative

      Nope your saviour is called BartPE. no virus,worm,rootkit on the planet can disable it.

      In fact I dont even bother running any Host OS scans when I fix someone's PC anymore, I boot from a BartPE disc, scan it with the antivir and antispyware and clean it up easier and faster than anything else.

      Takes me far less time I get it on the first try and it's back to a clean machine for 35 seconds until the owner clicks on things again to reinstall every bit of spyware.

      --
      Do not look at laser with remaining good eye.
    13. Re:Forever War by jandrese · · Score: 1

      Your description can't be correct. If it is, it sounds like it solves the halting problem.

      --

      I read the internet for the articles.
    14. Re:Forever War by zootm · · Score: 1

      Why? One only needs to prove that no instruction of the system can overwrite the important parts of the system?

    15. Re:Forever War by linvir · · Score: 1

      Okay, OS advocacy is par for the course on Slashdot, but if you're going to do it in terms of security, you might want to pick a better champion than Ubuntu

    16. Re:Forever War by Durandal64 · · Score: 2, Informative

      The halting problem has to do with a Turing machine running another Turing machine and deciding its output. What he's talking about is proving what algorithms can even run under certain conditions. That is a different problem entirely. One Turing machine most assuredly can run another one; it's just impossible to guarantee that it will return every time. This is what makes the halting problem impossible. You can run a Turing machine in another one, but there are two ways a Turing machine can reject an input. It can either decide it (return a NO) or it can enter an infinite loop. The parent machine has no way of knowing if the child machine is in such a loop or if it just happens to be a very long computation, so it just sits there and lets the child run. This is the difference between a Turing-decidable language and a Turing-recognizable one. In the parent poster's scenario, you only need to check recognizability, not decidability.

      Also, computers are not Turing machines; they are linearly-bounded automata. Turing machines have infinite memory. In fact, a Turing machine can decide the output of a LBA. In any case, you can of course check to see if an algorithm will work under certain constraints. That's why there's a "System Requirements" part on software boxes.

    17. Re:Forever War by nude-fox · · Score: 1

      counter rootkit defuses bomb counter rootkit wins

    18. Re:Forever War by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      > X|K|Ubuntu, anyone?

      Is this with or without the compromised Debian dev machines?

      -R

    19. Re:Forever War by jez9999 · · Score: 1

      Bad guys figure out how to rewrite BIOSes so that they can run their code even when the boot drive is a Knoppix disk.

      Ahem.

    20. Re:Forever War by bit01 · · Score: 1

      Type safety is only a partial fix.

      In theory normal OS' are perfectly safe from rootkits because of file protections. Doesn't stop it from happening though and that's because rootkit installers deliberately exploit bugs to break the OS' semantics, whether it be file protections, type safety or passwords.

      Type safety can help, but just like every other protection mechanism it's only a bugless abstraction of what's actually happening on the box.

      ---

      Don't be a programmer-bureaucrat; someone who substitutes marketing buzzwords and software bloat for verifiable improvements.

    21. Re:Forever War by zootm · · Score: 1

      Theoretically if one is rigorous enough, and keeps type-safety verified at every level, one could verify that the file protections could not be broken. As you point out, though, this does rely on the language implementation not having flaws allowing semantics to be broken. It's just a help, nothing more.

    22. Re:Forever War by sumdumass · · Score: 1

      You need to be carefull on what you pull out. I have remove malware that causes nothing but blue screens afterwards. It is because another process or even the registry has been configured to depend on some files installed by malware. You won't find these files or maybe even the registry by running bartPE

      If it hasn't bit you, it will. Of course at that stage, you about better off just wiping and reloading the machine. I used to and still do the exact same thing (with different tools sometimes). Make a copy of the disk first though. Also make an ERD before you have trouble with the system. I usualy make them on customers machines and place then instid the case in a ziplock baggy taped to the pannel or bottom of the case.

    23. Re:Forever War by 0xABADC0DA · · Score: 1

      Exploiting typesafe code is actually pretty much impossible in practice, although not in theory of course. Sure there are logic errors, like for example trusting unverified user input, but in general for something well reviewed like an OS these kinds of errors simply do not happen. A DoS or simple failure is the best you can expect.

      The interesting question then is how much safer are program written in typesafe languages. If I offer $10000 to hack any part of Eclipse (compiler, editor, syntax highlighter, etc) versus $1000 to hack Visual Studio which one do you focus on? I think pretty much anybody in their right mind would choose VS.

  5. So which... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    So which CD's does this one come on? When can I expect a class action suit to get me a few free downloads from it?

  6. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by tomstdenis · · Score: 2, Interesting

    Well it wouldn't happen in other OSes because NTFS is closed proprietary standard. :-)

    That and people, listen, stop running windows as root. Make yourself a less privileged user and learn to work in a non-root environment!!!

    Tom

    --
    Someday, I'll have a real sig.
  7. Undetectable? by PIPBoy3000 · · Score: 2, Insightful

    Since F-Secure detects it, does that imply it's not popular?

  8. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by failure-man · · Score: 1, Funny

    Yeah! We've had rootkits since . . . . . well, about as long as we've had root! Your retarded spawn of DOS and an art school is late to the party.
     
    Better late than never though I suppose . . . . .

  9. if only windows was closed source by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Funny

    If only Windows was closed source, then writing such tools would be difficult. Oh, wait...

    1. Re:if only windows was closed source by ate50eggs · · Score: 1

      The microsoft genuine advantage bubble told me some very positive sounding things and used the word 'security' a lot, so I'm sure I'm safe.

      --
      not everything is a science experiment!
    2. Re:if only windows was closed source by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Congratulations! Took exactly 9 minutes for someone to turn a relatively useful technical discussion into Microsoft bashing. Hence the reason I truly love Slashdot, all of the intelligent, open-minded discourse ...

  10. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by failure-man · · Score: 1

    There's something wrong with your statement. Look for it. Something about "no denying." ;)

  11. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Insightful

    >possible for a rootkit to go completely undetected on OSX

    If it's undetectable how would you know?

  12. Here's a nice FAQ on that. by khasim · · Score: 4, Informative

    http://www.heysoft.de/nt/ntfs-ads.htm

    There's a lot that can be done with it.

  13. Detection by kirkb · · Score: 4, Funny

    This Russian-created rootkit is smart enough to recognize known anti-rootkit tools and hide from them.

    Does this mean that in Soviet Russia, rootkits detect y... Bah, nevermind. Too easy. :P

    --
    Slashdot: come for the pedantry, stay for the condescension.
    1. Re:Detection by monopole · · Score: 4, Funny

      In Soviet Russia Vista Rootkits ship before Vista

    2. Re:Detection by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Not only in Soviet Russia...

    3. Re:Detection by kpaul · · Score: 1

      Now that's the first funny "Soviet Russia" joke I've seen around here in a long time.

    4. Re:Detection by inKubus · · Score: 1

      In Soviet Russia Vista Rootkits ship before Vista Uh, scratch that, reverse it. [HUMOR CAPTION]Because see, it's funny because in Soviet Russia everything is backwards. See.[/HUMOR CAPTION] "In Soviet Russia, Vista ships before the Vista Rootkits" HA!

      --
      Cool! Amazing Toys.
  14. Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by Opportunist · · Score: 5, Insightful

    People, please, stay sensible. First of all, a rootkit has to GET into a system. How it hides, how it vanishes, how it hooks certain parts of the system and how it defeats anti-rootkit tools is moot if it doesn't even GET that far.

    Whatever a program may want to do, first of all it has to be started. Now, there are currently no unpatched remote exploits or program-runs-crap-by-itself bugs I'm aware of. In other words: You have to start it!

    And that's what it comes down to. Keep your system updated! Don't click on every moronic spammail you get! Don't run everything you download from an unrelyable source without at least checking what it is!

    My prediction would be that you can eliminate about 95% of the most dangerous worms, trojans and spybots currently in the wild if we could just get people to abstain from running every single piece of junk they stumble upon. The best protection against infection is still a working brain.

    There is no technical solution for a social problem. I say it time and again. If it's been true ever, it is in the area of malware. Antimalware tools are akin to safety belts and airbags. You have them, and you use them, but that doesn't mean you drive 150 on an icy road, just 'cause, hey, you got safety belts and an airbag, what damage could happen, eh?

    --
    We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
    1. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by Bryansix · · Score: 0, Troll

      While you are correct about 99% of of infections about 1% come just connecting to the internet. Remember that there was a time when MS did not have a patch out and you could get a virus just by being online. In addition holes in IE allow machines to be infected simply by surfing onto legitimate websites that have been compromised on the backend.

    2. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by Opportunist · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Sorry to say it bluntly, but I do remember. It's over. It's patched. Currently, there are no unpatched bugs (at least none that I'm aware of) that let you deliver malware straight to a connected computer.

      Which does not mean that I'd connect to the 'net without a firewall.

      --
      We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
    3. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by Billosaur · · Score: 4, Insightful
      And that's what it comes down to. Keep your system updated! Don't click on every moronic spammail you get! Don't run everything you download from an unrelyable source without at least checking what it is!

      My prediction would be that you can eliminate about 95% of the most dangerous worms, trojans and spybots currently in the wild if we could just get people to abstain from running every single piece of junk they stumble upon. The best protection against infection is still a working brain.

      Normally I would agree, but what about the fact that there may be legitimate sites out there that have been infected by this rootkit, which will then in turn infect users who have no reason to fear infection? Not every work or trojan is spread via the incompetence of the user -- it only seems that way. Look at the way 180solutions is dumping spyware on unaware MySpace users who click on seemingly legitimate content, including an ad for software to protect children. ALl someone has to do is slip this sucker into some seemingly harmless content and WHAM!

      --
      GetOuttaMySpace - The Anti-Social Network
    4. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by Jaysu · · Score: 5, Insightful

      "My prediction would be that you can eliminate about 95% of the most dangerous worms, trojans and spybots currently in the wild if we could just get people to abstain from running every single piece of junk they stumble upon."

      oh, and uh, don't put a store bought Sony music CD in there either. Spam can come in forms besides bright flashing "click me" banners.

      --
      It has been said that 63% of all statistics are made up
    5. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      If you are onlien with windows without a
      1) Firewall
      2) AV program (up to date and all)
      3) Decently secure web browser (and securte/up to date remote accessing programs in general)

      Then it's your own damn fault.

    6. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by Opportunist · · Score: 1

      I'd put that under "clicking every kind of useless crap". :)

      --
      We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
    7. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by WhiteWolf666 · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Now, there are currently no unpatched remote exploits or program-runs-crap-by-itself bugs I'm aware of. In other words: You have to start it!

      Oh, really?

      Not to mention that if they have to implement double-digits worth of patches a month you have to suspect that there are, indeed, unknown (by the public) security holes to be found, and which may have already been found by blackhats.

      Antimalware tools are akin to snake oil and herbal remedies. No sane system should need that kind of overhead, and I've said it before: once you're infected, the only way of going back to a "known clean" configuration is a wipe and restore from "known good" media, or a complete checksum of binary signatures from a read-only known-good boot medium. The only thing antimalware does is make you feel safe, much like the Windows Security Center logo. Once your system is infected, a good root-kit is unremovable, and even garden variety uncommon malware may not be detected by the popular virus scanners; this is exactly what happened to Valve with the Half-Life 2 code theft. Someone designed a custom worm to penetrate their network and e-mail out important corporate files, and they got away with it.

      --
      WhiteWolf666 an exBush supporter. All you new-school,compassionate,save the children Republicans can rot in hell
    8. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by Opportunist · · Score: 3, Funny

      What do you mean, "buy music"?

      --
      We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
    9. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by fermion · · Score: 1
      Now, there are currently no unpatched remote exploits or program-runs-crap-by-itself bugs I'm aware of

      This is the situation we find ourselves in on most popular OS and broswers. There are no simple ways to remotely install software without at least the user indirectly knowing about it. This is an improvement. As you say, it is now a social problem where someone has to click a link on some spam email. So it is a socail problem. Note, however, that it might be better if the user had to click a link, accept a box that accepted the download, and then another that accepted the install. This seems to be what MS Vista does, and we will see how that goes.

      All that aside, the notion that there is not existing problem does not mean that there will no be a future problem. After all, the past problems have largely been caused by well meaning developers trying to gain a market advantage, often by making the user a more attractive target for advertisers or otherwise making it easier to extract money or time from the user. Though we have reached a reasonable medium at the moment, there is every reason to believe this stasis will be broken at some point in future, proabably in 6-12 months, and a significant opportunity will present itself. When that oppotunity does present itself, this rootkit will be ready.

      --
      "She's a scientist and a lesbian. She's not going to let it slide." Orphan Black
    10. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by Tim+C · · Score: 1

      ALl someone has to do is slip this sucker into some seemingly harmless content and WHAM!

      Well, that's the very definition of a trojan.

    11. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by 99BottlesOfBeerInMyF · · Score: 4, Informative

      People, please, stay sensible. First of all, a rootkit has to GET into a system.

      True, but there are many modes of infection.

      Whatever a program may want to do, first of all it has to be started. Now, there are currently no unpatched remote exploits or program-runs-crap-by-itself bugs I'm aware of. In other words: You have to start it!

      So, just because you don't know of any unpatched, remote vulnerabilities being exploited, we should not worry about them? What about local escalations, there are plenty of those outstanding and some people admin multi-user boxes. Finally, it can come in as a trojan. No one has the time to exhaustively check every program they run, if the source is even available. That means you have to trust every program you install. This is asking users to sacrifice usability for security, and that is a classic security blunder.

      My prediction would be that you can eliminate about 95% of the most dangerous worms, trojans and spybots currently in the wild if we could just get people to abstain from running every single piece of junk they stumble upon.

      My prediction is we can stop 100% of worms, trojans, and spybots by no longer using computers... of course that kind of defeats the purpose.

      There is no technical solution for a social problem.

      Malware is mostly a technical problem and a computer/human interaction problem. It can be solved with education as a social problem, but only when the previous problems have been fixed. You can't expect users to learn a whole lot of really complex topics in order to perform simple tasks. It is not going to happen. When joe-sixpack runs their computer they expect it to conform to some basic, sensible characteristics and it is failing. This is not the user's fault. This is the fault of the people who designed the system first and then tried to teach the average person a long series of complex topics and ever changing rules. What they should have done was ask the users what the computer should do and then make the computer do that.

      It is unreasonable to expect that clicking on an icon that looks just like your picture files will install a program and let someone in Russia start using your computer to send spam. This is a failing of the computer, not the user. The computer should clearly indicate to the user what is a picture and what is a program. Then, it should not let the program do anything the user does not expect and want. If this rootkit arrives in a trojan, disguised as data or a beneficial program like a game, and the user runs it, they still should not have to worry about it because it should be running in a sandbox, by default. When it tries to do something unusual, like patch the core of the OS, the user should be warned in very strong language and given the option of letting the rootkit patch a VM's core OS instead, thereby stopping it from having any effect. It doesn't take a genius to do this, if only people would stop apologizing for how crappily most OS's, especially Windows, deal with this stuff. By blaming the users for this failing you're part of the problem. Stop it.

    12. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by geoff+lane · · Score: 1

          Do You Want To Install The Rootkit?
      (Your system will be unstable if you decline)

                    [YES] [NO]

    13. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by Phishcast · · Score: 1
      There is no technical solution for a social problem.

      I'm not so sure. While it isn't popular and would suck immensely, an OS or computer that was only allowed to run signed executables is a technical solution to this problem. Of course, this only works as long as the signing authority is secure and can be trusted.

    14. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by Opportunist · · Score: 1

      There is no 100% solution except to cease using the technology. That's a given. But that would be like saying we should stop using cars because accidents happen. 100% security does not exist. The only thing that's 100% secure about your life is that you will eventually die. But that's final.

      There is no technical solution to everything, though. You cannot "fool proof" everything. Would you go around fool-proofing cars or guns? I'd rather expect someone using either to have proper training and knows how to use it, so he is neither harm to himself nor others. Now, computers are not potentially lethal, but the same applies to them: First and foremost, you are responsible for what comes out of your computer. Not someone else, not the manufacturer, not the "hacker" that spams you down with a rootkit, you are. It's your machine.

      If someone is unfit to use a car, we don't let him use it. There's someone who has frequent seizures, we don't give him a driver's license, because if he had one while driving, he is a serious threat to his life and that of others. Likewise, if someone is unfit to use a computer because he cannot follow the most basic rules of common sense, he should not be on the 'net. Contrary to popular belief, using the Internet is not a god given right, it's a privilege. And someone who is unable to use it in a way that presents no harm to others should not be using it. Simple as that.

      Yes, operating systems still have a long way to go. The suggestions you make are valid and should definitly be implemented. The question is, though, whether this won't make them even more complicated and whether it cannot be defeated by malicious programs. Even today it is a given that any malware has anti-sandbox and anti-debugging mechanisms, it would be likely to be the same with the suggestions you made. Malware writers would simply create some "front end" application that shows the user some nice game in the sandbox and to get to the "real" game they'd have to install it on the "real" machine. No, they don't really need to, but they tell the user they do. So the user lets them. The OS will complain about something trying to install itself, and the user will say OK, after all the game told him that he has to. And given the history of some programs that dig quite deeply in system files for their sacred copy protection schemes, the user will be used to this.

      No technical solution for a social problem has worked. Ever. I doubt the computer will change that.

      --
      We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
    15. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by Evil+Shabazz · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Sony has clearly shown us that even "trusted" sources and "knowing" what you're running can result in unintentional rootkit installation without your knowledge. After all, isn't Sony a "trusted" source and we knew playing their CDs wouldn't be harmful, right?

      I bought that CD from a store legitimately. There's no way I'd get a rootkit problem from that, right?

      --
      Down with the career politician! SUPPORT TERM LIMITS
    16. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by AnyoneEB · · Score: 1

      Why does your computer executable arbitrary code on a newly inserted music CD without a prompt? Just curious.

      --
      Centralization breaks the internet.
    17. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by Lord+Ender · · Score: 4, Interesting
      Currently, there are no unpatched bugs (at least none that I'm aware of) that let you deliver malware straight to a connected computer.


      Before any of the hundreds of security holes in Windows XP were published, they were still there! If you have paid any attention to security, you would be very confident that there are many remote root, arbitrary code, no-interaction-required holes in Windows RIGHT NOW.

      They are no doubt being used. I can think of many ways to build a bot that connects home indetectably to all but the most paranoid and brilliant sysadmin.
      --
      A slashdotter who didn't build his own computer is like a Jedi who didn't build his own lightsaber.
    18. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by Beryllium+Sphere(tm) · · Score: 1

      >currently no unpatched remote exploits or program-runs-crap-by-itself bugs I'm aware of. I

      You'd be the last to know. First there would be the person who discovered the remote-execution bug, then depending on that person's honesty there would be either Microsoft or the underground zero-day market followed by botnet builders, and only then maybe the rest of us.

      But since we don't know for sure that the IE memory overwrite bug in fully patched systems is actually exploitable, the coast may be clear right now in terms of publicly disclosed critical vulnerabilities.

      >Don't run everything you download from an unrelyable source

      Absolutely sound advice but harder to follow than it sounds like, because you have to know who's reliable. That changes from year to year (download.com used to be OK) and from day to day (open source distribution points do get compromised, and backdoored programs uploaded).

    19. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by db32 · · Score: 1

      0 Day

      That's all I'm going to say.

      --
      The only change I can believe in is what I find in my couch cushions.
    20. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by Savior_on_a_Stick · · Score: 1

      There are vectors other than the core OS.
      There is a slew of apps and utes and extensions that have their own autoupdate functionality, but are not as scrutinized as Windows.

      There are sometimes very valid reasons for not autoupdating - especially when vendors attach egregious conditions to "security" updates. MS requiring users to accept Microsoft intrusion as a prerequisite for security updates is a laughable example.

      The java byte.verify hole existed for a long time. This was the one where properly executed, a user clicking the X to close a popup would be granting full remote access.

      It would be naive to presume that no other such exploits will ever again occur with a future combination of updates.

    21. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by Bryansix · · Score: 1
      Before any of the hundreds of security holes in Windows XP were published, they were still there! If you have paid any attention to security, you would be very confident that there are many remote root, arbitrary code, no-interaction-required holes in Windows RIGHT NOW.

      They are no doubt being used. I can think of many ways to build a bot that connects home indetectably to all but the most paranoid and brilliant sysadmin.


      Thanks for agreeing with me. I guess it didn't help sway the person who modded me as a troll just for pointing out the facts though. The point is that there were in the past known security holes that did not require user error and there probably are some still out there.
    22. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by Bryansix · · Score: 1

      How do you up-date the AV program without logging onto the Internet. I connected a new laptop to the net for a client once and it had been sitting around for so long that everything was out of date. I didn't surf anywhere and it got a virus. How is that my fault? I think that would be Microsoft's fault.

    23. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by inet50 · · Score: 1

      damn!!

      do u feel better now?? :)

    24. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by 99BottlesOfBeerInMyF · · Score: 4, Interesting

      There is no 100% solution except to cease using the technology. That's a given. But that would be like saying we should stop using cars because accidents happen.

      What you advocated, however, was users not running software or opening data they don't trust. For most users, that cuts the functionality of their machine in half. Trust is a sliding scale. And given the relatively mild punishment for trusting too much, most users will chose functionality over security. The job of the OS should be to make sure they never have to make that choice.

      There is no technical solution to everything, though. You cannot "fool proof" everything. Would you go around fool-proofing cars or guns? I'd rather expect someone using either to have proper training and knows how to use it, so he is neither harm to himself nor others.

      Well, if I can get a gun or car to do exactly what I want without any risk or decrease in functionality, I'm all for it. As for training, the point is that the usability and functionality of the system has to be up to snuff before it can be effective. To bring cars to the equivalent level of functionality as a Windows machine you'd have to have no windshield and the user would have to just be guessing where they are going. Right now users are given basically no information about what is happening. Is that a program or data? What is it doing when I'm running it? Is it sending spam, or running a game? Is it reading my tax returns? No idea.

      The analogy of guns is an interesting one. Anyone who has had a traditional education concerning guns has heard that they should always treat the gun as if it is loaded and point it away from anything they don't want to shoot. Why? Why not only point it in a safe direction when it is loaded? There is no danger if the action is open and it is obviously empty. The answer is "conditioning." Nobody can concentrate on one thing all the time. By always treating the gun as loaded users condition themselves through repetition. That way, when they're thinking about something else (like is that a bear in those trees) they unconsciously point their gun in a safe direction and don't accidentally shoot their hunting buddy when they stumble.

      The reason this is such an appropriate comparison is because Windows uses conditioning as well. Every time it brings up the same cryptic dialogue box with (OK/Cancel) it conditions users to click "OK" to get their computer to work again. It also conditions them to click "OK" when being warned of a potential threat. It is one of the worst UI choices, ever and a classic example of what not to do. In many cases even reading the dialogue you don't know what each of the buttons will do since "OK" and "Cancel" are not appropriate responses and are not actions. It is the result of programmers ignoring the human component of computer/human interactions when it comes to security.

      First and foremost, you are responsible for what comes out of your computer.

      I'll accept that I am responsible, but that does not mean no one else is as well. Picture this, the computer sales guy talks a grandmother into buying a computer. She knows nothing about them, but he tells her it is as easy to use as a TV and will let her send e-mail to her grandkids. They install it and hook it up for her. She never patches it and it is not set to do so automatically. It is compromised. It sends spam. Is it her fault she was lied to? Is it her fault she assumed it would behave reasonably instead of doing things all on its own? Yes, but even more than that it is the fault of the salesman and the system designers.

      If someone is unfit to use a car, we don't let him use it.

      If more than 70% of people are unfit to use most cars on the road, but do just fine with an Audi, maybe we need to rethink our car designs rather than sending everyone back to driver's education.

      Likewise, if someone is unfit to use a computer because he cannot follow the most basic rules of common sense, he should not be on t

    25. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by Secrity · · Score: 1

      That advice didn't work very well for a great many people who installed the Sony/BMG rootkit simply by following the instructions on what they thought was an Audio Compact Disk from a trusted vendor. The average computer user has NO concept about computer security, they are the same group of people that the safety warnings on common household appliances are written for. It is much easier to remind them not use a blow dryer while taking a shower that

    26. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by tringstad · · Score: 1

      There is no technical solution for a social problem.

      I'd take it a step further and say that attempting to solve the issue technically is what is causing the social problem. Users expect whatever antivirus package they install to protect them, and with their false sense of security they click away at whatever catches their eye.

      I don't run any anti-virus software on my system, I never have, can't see any reason why I ever will, and yet have never been infected with any kind of virus.

      -Tommy

      --
      "I got a half gallon of Jack, and 2 dozen Ant Traps. I'm about to get wild." -me
    27. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by Nogami_Saeko · · Score: 1

      How many of these rootkits and viruses could actually install themselves if people wouldn't run under administrative accounts though?

      N.

      --
      "Nothing strengthens authority so much as silence." - Charles de Gaulle
    28. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Another reason for never pointing a firearm at someone, whether loaded or unloaded, is that who the firearm is being pointed at can't know for certain whether or not it is loaded and will be rather unnerved (and may shoot you in what they would interpret as self defence).

    29. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by 99BottlesOfBeerInMyF · · Score: 1

      Another reason for never pointing a firearm at someone, whether loaded or unloaded, is that who the firearm is being pointed at can't know for certain whether or not it is loaded...

      This is sometimes true, but not always. Often everyone present knows one another and knows the state of the guns. With a bolt action, pump, or break action gun with the action open, it is often obvious the gun is unloaded. If I was hunting and my brother pointed his gun at me I'd be pissed, but I would not think he was planning on shooting me and retaliate. When you are alone with a gun, in your home, no one is going to retaliate if you point it at the TV, but you should still not do it.

      I understand you point and it is valid in some instances, but I really think conditioning yourself to behave safely even when you are not thinking about it at all is the most important reason.

    30. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by jafac · · Score: 2, Insightful

      There is no technical solution for a social problem.

      Condoms (a technical solution) MITIGATES a social problem (teen pregnancy, STD's). They don't SOLVE these problems, because a Condom is only something like 99% effective (the 1% being people who don't use them properly).

      So, assuming one's social problem is going out and seeking the services of a prostitute - use of condoms by said prostitute means that 99% of your prostitues won't have an STD (except crab lice - prefer those who shave). The world is better off with Condoms than without - and simply counting those who use it properly.

      Now to bring this analogy into the world of computing - I am much better off sharing an Internet with 9900 healthy computers and 100 bot-infested spam-sending computers, than I am on an Internet with 9900 bot-infested spam-sending computers and 100 healthy comptuers, no matter how secure my system is, and no matter how vituous my computing habits are.

      --

      These are my friends, See how they glisten. See this one shine, how he smiles in the light.
    31. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by Angostura · · Score: 1

      It depends on the design of the OS.

      I'm a Mac user, I don't run in admin. However, usually pieces of software demand my admin password when I install, so that they can go into /Applications, or more troublesomely, scatter bits of themselves around the system.

      This offers zero protection against trojans - I KNOW that I am installing software, I EXPECT it to ask for my admin password. However, it's a trojan, not the nice app I expected, so I am owned, nonetheless.

      It is a shame that Mac OS X gives you zero visibility by default of WHY an installer is demanding admin - WHAT does it want to put where?

    32. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by crabpeople · · Score: 1

      You arent smarter than viruses and spam. Thats why we have automated tools to help in detection and removal. You're basically saying that humans are infallible at detecting "bad" content. You are giving humans WAY too much credit. In alot of cases machines are far better at heuristics than humans. Especially non technical humans who are exactly the sort that need the most protection.

      --
      I'll just use my special getting high powers one more time...
    33. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by robotsrule · · Score: 2, Interesting

      Somebody PLEASE mod the comment I'm replying to, up to the top. The poster is exactly right and his post needs to be heard, LOUDLY. The problem is that the Windows core was never designed to be connected to other computers. LAN's and then the Internet came later and Microsoft injected the necessary code to handle either of those new networking technologies in a quick and (very) dirty fashion. Heck, Windows XP is finally using memory write protection (NX technology) to stop at least some programs from writing to executable memory. It is astounding how long it took them to do that when you consider that the 80386, a chip well more than a decade old, had write-protection features for executable memory. When saddens me the most is the statement in the original post that Vista can be subject to a rootkit attack. What did they really learn?

      --


      Robert Oschler - RobotsRule.com
    34. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by The_Wilschon · · Score: 1

      He did say he thought it would eliminate about 95%. I have this sneaking suspicion that Sony CDs count for significantly less than 5% of all malware.

      Convincing everyone to never click on the bright flashing click me banners would help a lot. It wouldn't eliminate the problem, but it would reduce it greatly.

      --
      SIGSEGV caught, terminating

      wait... not that kind of sig.
    35. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by SpaceLifeForm · · Score: 1
      Because it's not really a true music CD. It's an evil DRMed CD that has autorun capability under windows.

      And most people don't know how to disable autorun in windows.

      --
      You are being MICROattacked, from various angles, in a SOFT manner.
    36. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by FLEB · · Score: 1

      How do you up-date the AV program without logging onto the Internet.

      Off a CD from a clean machine.

      Just sayin'. :)

      --
      Information wants to be free.
      Entertainment wants to be paid.
      You just want to be cheap.
    37. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by AceyMan · · Score: 1

      abasdfsaf

      --
      -- Experience is a wonderful thing. It enables you to recognize a mistake when you make it again.
    38. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by AceyMan · · Score: 1

      Whooops! Couldn't remember my logon and hit preview to see if I typed it right the 2nd time. I did, but I hit submit instead.

      What I was going to say was: I've seen fully patched (Windows) servers, running firewall software and they've *still* been PWN3D.

      If you are on the public internet, and have much of an attack surface at all, you can be had. Sad, but true.

      (As for my previous post, where is the "recall post" feature when you need it!)

      --
      -- Experience is a wonderful thing. It enables you to recognize a mistake when you make it again.
    39. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Sure it doesn't. However, it ends there..

    40. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by drsmithy · · Score: 1
      The problem is that the Windows core was never designed to be connected to other computers.

      Yes, it was. Windows NT was designed from day one to be a multiuser, networked OS.

      LAN's and then the Internet came later and Microsoft injected the necessary code to handle either of those new networking technologies in a quick and (very) dirty fashion.

      Wrong.

      When saddens me the most is the statement in the original post that Vista can be subject to a rootkit attack. What did they really learn?

      All OSes can be subject to a rootkit attack. What point are you trying to make ?

    41. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by erexx23 · · Score: 1

      "You have to start it!

      I am not sure if this logic holds so well anymore.

      One example:
      A user goes to a site that he/she trusts time and time again.
      Then its compromised without anyone's immediate knowledge.

      The user goes clicking about her/his business feeling snug as a bug in rug.
      But what they don't know, and never will, is that they have been bitten.
      Then that machine carries the infection to every machine that machine touches.

      My point is that you can't blame users for turning the keys in the ignition
      if some assassin has come in the night and fused a bomb to the battery.

      Root kits are in a realm of their own.
      Do not compare them to any virus or malware.
      This is Pandora's box and even the most savvy tech is at great risk.

    42. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by petermgreen · · Score: 1

      MS came up with the idea of CD autorun in the days before CD burners so virus spread that way wasn't really feasible and presumablly they thought that those with the rescources to produce CDs would be professional enough not to do anything more than load a menu system or similar.

      CDs with both music and data are nothing new and record companies have been using them for videos for some time. They rely on the fact that audio players read the first session while CD rom drives (at least modern ones) look for the data index structures in the last session.

      many savvy users turn CD autorun off but its pretty much inevitable that sooner or later even they will leave a machine on the defaults by mistake.

      --
      note: i'm known as plugwash most places but i screwd up registering that here somehow in the past and now can't register
    43. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by Opportunist · · Score: 1

      By adding a signing mechanism, you make it harder but nowhere near impossible to execute malicious code on the machine. Worse yet, you might get people who remove that signing mechanism and then are more afraid of having some 'authority' question their unsigned machines than of the fallout around having malware on their PCs.

      Take consoles as the prime example. Now, they're nowhere near what PCs are currently, but they are a good example what happens when you have a "signed programs only" policy, since that's what they do today, essentially. The first thing that happens is that someone tries to find a way to get around the signing process. It happened so far with every console that uses this feature. A hacked version of the BIOS is injected to run unsigned software. And then you are essentially where you are today with PCs.

      With the difference that the user of the PC himself commited a crime. And thus has very little interest to cooperate with the authorities trying to catch the malware author.

      In short, signed executables won't be a big problem to malware writers. But they will raise the bars for those trying to find them.

      --
      We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
    44. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by Opportunist · · Score: 1

      If you don't initiate traffic, you'd have to run a compromised server to get a virus. If you do that, you should use a firewall. If you don't do that, you're the one to blame.

      Yes, MS systems are insecure. Connecting them directly to the net is about as careless as driving a car with 4 flat tires and no breaks.

      --
      We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
    45. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by Opportunist · · Score: 1

      Yes, there are security holes. But they have no meaning in the world of malware as long as they are not used by at least halfway decently spread implementations. As long as a trojan exists but is not spread, it is no threat to the general population.

      They're used. No questions. But not in widely spread attacks, they are used for very specific targetted attacks on carefully selected targets. They are no threats to Joe Average User out there who just wants to surf the 'net.

      --
      We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
    46. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by Opportunist · · Score: 1

      Well, there are sources that are inherently unreliable. P2P networks is one such source. By default, you have no idea where it comes from. Now, I don't say "don't use it", but I would definitly not run a program from a P2P source without first checking throughly what it does. It is by its very definition unreliable.

      If you download something from a site, the question is how far you trust that site. Do you trust ATI to give you only the drivers for your graphics card? Do you trust Microsoft to only give you a patch for the latest security issue? Do you trust Linuxisos to only give you good, clean linux ISOs? It's a matter of trust. And as long as this trust is not abused by the company behind it, I will hand it to them.

      Companies that abuse my trust will be met with care. I wouldn't trust Sony, for example, any more than a P2P source.

      --
      We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
    47. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by Opportunist · · Score: 1

      That will be the step rootkits take as soon as people don't run as Admins by default anymore. They will come piggybacking on other applications. That way you will grant them admin privileges, because you expect them to need them to be installed.

      I am still convinced that no user space application, which constitutes about everything the average user will ever install on his system, needs admin privs. At the very least, there should be a separation between "core" admin privileges, which allow you to alter parts of the very system, and "user" admin privileges, that allow installation/configuration of user software.

      --
      We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
    48. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by 99BottlesOfBeerInMyF · · Score: 1

      Yes, it was. Windows NT was designed from day one to be a multiuser, networked OS.

      This is very true, but the previous poster also has a point. Most of the important architectural features of the NT core that can be used to provide a secure OS are ignored by the rest of the operating system. For a car analogy, it is like switching out the engine in a car for a larger one, but not upgrading the frame and mount points with something that will let you actually taker advantage of it without crashing. Windows XP and what I've seen of Windows Vista still functions a lot more like Windows 95 than Windows NT in many of the ways that matter.

      All OSes can be subject to a rootkit attack. What point are you trying to make ?

      In the posts this person replied to I've described a design that would mitigate rootkit and other attacks. It is not something I've invented on my own, but merely the direction many of the more secure OSs (designed from the ground up with security in mind) are taking. I don't think anyone with a clue would argue that Windows does not have a security problem and it has not been ongoing for quite some time. The average user cannot safely and easily use their computer and it falls down in many regards, as I documented, including letting rootkits run wild without letting the user know it is happening and giving them the opportunity to stop it.

      If MS cared what end users wanted, they would have implemented this or some other major security features years ago. There are hundreds of security experts who are at the top of their field and almost all of them could have outlined a system like this or that would have the same effects. I believe the point the poster was trying to make was that for all their talk of a more secure OS they haven't done this and are not interested or capable of so doing.

    49. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by 99BottlesOfBeerInMyF · · Score: 1

      You arent smarter than viruses and spam.

      Ummm, actually I am a lot smarter than any virus or spam.

      Thats why we have automated tools to help in detection and removal.

      Automated tools to detect and remove malware is largely an automated way to leverage the work of security researchers that discovered, fingerprinted, and build a removal script for a given malware. They also help to provide information needed to determine what is an isn't malware. This is making up for the failure of the OS to let us know what is going on. A smart OS would say, "Hey I notice you're sending a thousand e-mails a minute with a script. Are you sure that is a good idea?" Since it does not we install malware detection systems that perform some of those same tasks, in a limited way.

      You're basically saying that humans are infallible at detecting "bad" content.

      I understand you interpretation of his comment, but I think the major failing is on the automated side not the human side. Humans can't detect malware with current systems because the OS does not provide them with the information they need or the control to do anything about it. It is important to remember that only the user knows what they want the computer to do. It is not the computer's job to override their wishes, just to give them the options and information they need to make the right choice.

      In alot of cases machines are far better at heuristics than humans.

      This is true, but the human still has to be the decision maker. Maybe I want to run that script that mails millions of messages a day because I'm desperately trying to spread information on how to cure the deadly plague about to destroy humanity and the government won't believe me until it is too late. Sure its unlikely, but I just think it is important to stress that people are smarter and need to make the decisions. OSs should provide them the information they need and do what they are told.

    50. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by drsmithy · · Score: 1
      This is very true, but the previous poster also has a point. Most of the important architectural features of the NT core that can be used to provide a secure OS are ignored by the rest of the operating system.

      Which "important architectural features" do you think are being "ignored" ?

      In the posts this person replied to I've described a design that would mitigate rootkit and other attacks. It is not something I've invented on my own, but merely the direction many of the more secure OSs (designed from the ground up with security in mind) are taking.

      Is this the run-every-app-in-a-VM idea ? Who is doing this in a fashion remotely useful for application to desktop OSes ? Which OSes are you thinking of that fit your description ? Because I'm not aware of any other contemporary OSes which aren't either a) UNIX, or b) (faithful) reimplementations of UNIX - and UNIX sure as hell wasn't "designed from the ground up with security in mind".

      I don't think anyone with a clue would argue that Windows does not have a security problem and it has not been ongoing for quite some time.

      Well, that depends on whether you think Windows "security problems" - indeed, security problems in general - are primarily a social or technical problem.

      I certainly hope you have a better basis for your belief than the sheer volume of exploited Windows systems.

      The average user cannot safely and easily use their computer and it falls down in many regards, as I documented, including letting rootkits run wild without letting the user know it is happening and giving them the opportunity to stop it.

      You seem to be missing the point. One of the inherent features of a rootkit is that it can take over the system without the user knowing.

      So long as the end user is able to install arbitrary software, the system will be vulnerable to not only rootkits, but all other forms of malicious software as well. Most users are not capable of making appropriate decisions regarding what their computer should and shouldn't run and have little interest in gaining the requisite knowledge. To compound this problem, programmatically divining whether a given application is doing something "good" or "bad" and thus informing the user, is extremely difficult (if not impossible).

      If MS cared what end users wanted, they would have implemented this or some other major security features years ago.

      Seems to me they've had more important things on the menu and higher priorities - like making sure their system is still useful to users.

      There are hundreds of security experts who are at the top of their field and almost all of them could have outlined a system like this or that would have the same effects.

      Security "experts" are notorious for placing usability a far, far second to "security". Security and usability are, unfortunately, inversely related.

      Personally, I find the thought of using a system designed by "security experts" to be frightening, at best.

      I believe the point the poster was trying to make was that for all their talk of a more secure OS they haven't done this and are not interested or capable of so doing.

      No, they have the vastly more difficult task of finding a balance between security and *usefulness*. The most secure system in the world is useless if no-one will (or can) use it.

    51. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by 99BottlesOfBeerInMyF · · Score: 1

      Which "important architectural features" do you think are being "ignored" ?

      The SRM Access Control Lists could be used to mitigate many of the security issues that plague Windows, but are largely ignored. The userspace and administrative separations have been castrated by other design decisions, which may or may not be fixed in Vista. The hardware abstraction provides a perfect basis for leveraging VM or the like for integrated security, but is not applied to that purpose.

      Is this the run-every-app-in-a-VM idea ? Who is doing this in a fashion remotely useful for application to desktop OSes ? Which OSes are you thinking of that fit your description ?

      OpenBSD, FreeBSD, Solaris, SELinux, and I'm sure a number of other OS's have implemented features to provide this functionality.

      Because I'm not aware of any other contemporary OSes which aren't either a) UNIX, or b) (faithful) reimplementations of UNIX - and UNIX sure as hell wasn't "designed from the ground up with security in mind".

      I'd say both Solaris and OpenBSD were implemented from the ground up with security in mind. Just because you reuse existing parts does not mean your design does not take security into consideration for the fundamental architecture.

      Well, that depends on whether you think Windows "security problems" - indeed, security problems in general - are primarily a social or technical problem.

      No it doesn't.

      You seem to be missing the point. One of the inherent features of a rootkit is that it can take over the system without the user knowing.

      Which means the OS has failed. It is the job of the OS to let the user know what is going on and control it. If something takes over without telling the user and without letting them control it, the OS has fundamentally failed.

      So long as the end user is able to install arbitrary software, the system will be vulnerable to not only rootkits, but all other forms of malicious software as well. Most users are not capable of making appropriate decisions regarding what their computer should and shouldn't run and have little interest in gaining the requisite knowledge. To compound this problem, programmatically divining whether a given application is doing something "good" or "bad" and thus informing the user, is extremely difficult (if not impossible).

      You're wrong. It is the OS's job to tell the user what is happening and let them make choices. Blaming the users for failing to make good choices when the OS has both failed to provide them with the information they need and failed to provide them with the choices they want is idiotic. You assert that given the information they need and the choices they want they will still fail, but you have provided not a shred of evidence to support that, nor does it logically follow. Further, you assume all users will fail at the outset, regardless of what is done, thus claiming an unsolvable problem. At that point it does not matter if we implement something since whether we do or not suers will always fail.

      Personally, I think you are failing to see how people and machines work. Luckily, a whole lot of security experts agree with me.

      Seems to me they've had more important things on the menu and higher priorities - like making sure their system is still useful to users.

      HAHAHAHAHA! Have you read the feature set that has not been cut from Vista? Half the "features" are ways to make the system less useful to users and either lock them into a proprietary format or protocol to make later tasks harder or DRM to make it harder for them to do things they want, but content providers would like to stop them from doing. MS's priorities are very clear and they are certainly not to make their machines more useful to end users.

      No, they have the vastly more difficult task of finding a balance between security and *usefulness*. The most secure system in the world is useless if no-one will (or can) use it.

      This is

    52. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by drsmithy · · Score: 1
      The SRM Access Control Lists could be used to mitigate many of the security issues that plague Windows, but are largely ignored.

      How are they ignored ?

      (I certainly hope you have a better answer than "the default account for unmanaged installations is an Administrator").

      The userspace and administrative separations have been castrated by other design decisions, which may or may not be fixed in Vista.

      "Castrated" how ? What design decisions ?

      The hardware abstraction provides a perfect basis for leveraging VM or the like for integrated security, but is not applied to that purpose.

      The HAL primarily exists to maintain portability and modularity. I think any ideas about turning it into a hypervisor would be *extremely* ambitious.

      Not to mention the vast majority of security breaches happen at a [much] higher level.

      OpenBSD, FreeBSD, Solaris, SELinux, and I'm sure a number of other OS's have implemented features to provide this functionality.

      But none of them have done so in a way even remotely similar to the kind of use you are talking about. Added to that, none are doing it with *every* application - not even the ones that come by default, let alone automatically to new ones subsequently installed.

      By that measure, you can download VPC from Microsoft for free.

      (Not only that, but you completely ignore the fact that Microsoft almost certainly wouldn't be able to integrate any sort of decent virtualisation technology into Windows, due to anti-trust issues).

      I'd say both Solaris and OpenBSD were implemented from the ground up with security in mind.

      I wouldn't. Both of them were just reimplemtnations of UNIX with little (if any) major changes in design.

      Windows NT is *at least* as "designed and built from the ground up with security in mind" as both of them.

      Just because you reuse existing parts does not mean your design does not take security into consideration for the fundamental architecture.

      Which "security considerations" in the "fundamental architecture" are you thinking of ? Where does the fundamental security hole of the root user fit into your beliefs ?

      No it doesn't.

      Yes, it does, because by a technical measure, Windows has all the security features - more, in many cases - of its contemporaries.

      I certainly hope you aren't defining Windows's "security problem" by the number of infested machines, because market share *alone* makes that an invalid basis for any meaningful comparison.

      Which means the OS has failed.

      No, it doesn't.

      One of the single most important jobs of an Operating System is to hide information, from both end users and developers. It's called abstraction - without it we'd still be flipping switches on the front of a box with some LEDs on it.

      It is the job of the OS to let the user know what is going on and control it.

      So what should the OS do when the user *tells it* to install the rootkit ?

      If something takes over without telling the user and without letting them control it, the OS has fundamentally failed.

      So where do trojans fit into your worldview ?

      It is the OS's job to tell the user what is happening and let them make choices.

      This does not preclude them from making *bad* choices.

      Note that the OS has little chance of telling whether an end user has made a "good" choice or a "bad" choice (and apparently in your model, doesn't even make the attempt).

      Blaming the users for failing to make good choices when the OS has both failed to provide them with the information they need and failed to provide them with the choices they want is idiotic.

      Good thing I didn't do that, then.

      You assert that given the information they need and the choices they want they will still fail, but you have provided not a shred of evidence to support that, nor does it logically follow.

      Appa

  15. Re:Are you kidding? by failure-man · · Score: 1

    I think the criticism probably stems from the fact that they're so bad at catching them and cause so much "collateral damage" . . . . . .

  16. Re:Are you kidding? by kalirion · · Score: 1

    I think you misunderstood the GP. He is not saying we should pick up everyone who at some point had a drink with the third cousin, twice removed, of a hacker, and throw them on a CIA plane to be boiled in Uzbekistan without any semblance of due process.

    And as other people have said, the government is going after hackers.

  17. Yes, it works in Vista by ThinkFr33ly · · Score: 3, Informative

    I think it's somewhat disingenuous to specifically note this rootkit works in Vista. It implies that the security work done in Vista has somehow failed.

    Vista has numerous improvements security wise, and almost all of them have to do with prevent a machine from becoming infected to begin with.

    , UAC, Windows Defender, the improved software firewall, IE 7+ sandboxing/broker, etc... these are all meant to make it a lot harder for malware to get on the machine to begin with.

    As the old security adage goes, if untrusted software is run on your machine, it's not your machine anymore.

    1. Re:Yes, it works in Vista by ThinkFr33ly · · Score: 3, Informative

      Sorry, that first link should be:

      Address space randomization.

      Helps if you actually preview before posting. :(

    2. Re:Yes, it works in Vista by alexhs · · Score: 3, Insightful

      About your last link, #4 is wrong. Allowing to upload a program and allowing to run it is a very different thing.

      A bad guy can upload files on your web site, if he isn't allowed to run them, you've nothing to fear (except if YOU run them afterwards, of course, but it's covered by #1)

      --
      I have discovered a truly marvelous proof of killer sig, which this margin is too narrow to contain.
    3. Re:Yes, it works in Vista by figleaf · · Score: 1

      You forgot to mention the changes in x64 versions of Windows which have made them impervious to rootkits so far.

    4. Re:Yes, it works in Vista by ThinkFr33ly · · Score: 1

      I'm not sure that's true (I think I remember hearing about an x64 proof of concept root kit), but even if that is true it's just because the layout of OS components in memory has changed.

      Getting around this is simply a matter of coding for it.

      The Address Space Randomization, however, would make this very, very hard.

    5. Re:Yes, it works in Vista by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      it has nothing to do with layouts.

    6. Re:Yes, it works in Vista by 99BottlesOfBeerInMyF · · Score: 1

      As the old security adage goes, if untrusted software is run on your machine, it's not your machine anymore.

      Given the fact that most software used by the average person is closed source and most people don't have the time or skill to audit the open source software they run, it seems like this is a pretty ridiculous way to design an OS. The adage is true right now (for most systems) but that does not mean it should be if MS was listening to their users. People want to run random games form the internet and click indiscriminately on files they get via e-mail. Build jails or VMs into the OS already and let the users run them safely.

    7. Re:Yes, it works in Vista by gardyloo · · Score: 1

      As the old security adage goes, if untrusted software is run on your machine, it's not your machine anymore. [microsoft.com]

            Well, if that's true, then NONE of my computers have ever been mine. I was going to make a crack about the one which runs Debian being mine, but after yesterday's news...

    8. Re:Yes, it works in Vista by ThinkFr33ly · · Score: 1
      Since you obviously had no interest in reading the link that my paraphrase was refering to, here it is:


      Law #1: If a bad guy can persuade you to run his program on your computer, it's not your computer anymore

      It's an unfortunate fact of computer science: when a computer program runs, it will do what it's programmed to do, even if it's programmed to be harmful. When you choose to run a program, you are making a decision to turn over control of your computer to it. Once a program is running, it can do anything, up to the limits of what you yourself can do on the computer. It could monitor your keystrokes and send them to a website. It could open every document on the computer, and change the word "will" to "won't" in all of them. It could send rude emails to all your friends. It could install a virus. It could create a "back door" that lets someone remotely control your computer. It could dial up an ISP in Katmandu. Or it could just reformat your hard drive.

      That's why it's important to never run, or even download, a program from an untrusted source--and by "source," I mean the person who wrote it, not the person who gave it to you. There's a nice analogy between running a program and eating a sandwich. If a stranger walked up to you and handed you a sandwich, would you eat it? Probably not. How about if your best friend gave you a sandwich? Maybe you would, maybe you wouldn't--it depends on whether she made it or found it lying in the street. Apply the same critical thought to a program that you would to a sandwich, and you'll usually be safe.



      As you can see, the adage in question is perfectly reasonable and applies to everybody, not just Windows users.
    9. Re:Yes, it works in Vista by 99BottlesOfBeerInMyF · · Score: 1

      As you can see, the adage in question is perfectly reasonable and applies to everybody, not just Windows users.

      I disagree. Asking a person to give up functionality for security is a recipe for disaster for any security scheme. Most will choose functionality. If you're interested in making a more secure system, rather than assigning blame to someone else you have to rethink this.

      If I install a VM on a windows box I can run arbitrary untrusted software, but to do so sacrifices a great deal of usability. Heck, Even without install a VM I can make a separate user account with very limited privileges for running untrusted software and gain quite a bit of security. Again, this is very inconvenient. On OpenBSD or FreeBSD I can run untrusted software in jails, built into the OS fairly safely. On Solaris I can do this with zones. To paraphrase the sandwich analogy you linked to, I can feed the sandwich to a pig I don't really care about and then eat the bacon after he digests it and makes it into said bacon. I still get fed, but the risk of death via disease or poison is much less.

      Like it or not, most of us both want to and need to run software from sources we don't trust. It is a decade past the time Windows should have built in jails or VMs and started running software in them by default. Other vendors need to integrate them as well and do a better job of meshing them with the OS and UI, but since most of them don't have a serious malware problem yet, they can be forgiven.

    10. Re:Yes, it works in Vista by bit01 · · Score: 1

      As you can see, the adage in question is perfectly reasonable and applies to everybody, not just Windows users.

      No. Windows is the only OS that has users running as administrator by default.

      And with executable code in data areas. And with no warning when they do something that might compromise the system such as suspect dll's in system areas.

      Vista may fix some of that. Finally. After more than twenty years of fraudulent marketing bullshit trying to claim it wasn't a problem.

      ---

      It's wrong that an intellectual property creator should not be rewarded for their work.
      It's equally wrong that an IP creator should be rewarded too many times for the one piece of work, for exactly the same reasons.
      Reform IP law and stop the M$/RIAA abuse.

    11. Re:Yes, it works in Vista by ThinkFr33ly · · Score: 1
      I know it's hard sometimes, but please try and actually read the post you're responding to before ranting:

      Once a program is running, it can do anything, up to the limits of what you yourself can do on the computer.


      As far as Windows being the only OS where the user is admin by default, you're correct. Of all modern operating desktop systems, Windows XP is the only one to make the first user admin by default. But did you ever ask yourself why?

      You claim it's a simple matter of "twenty years of fraudulent marketing bullshit trying to claim it wasn't a problem". Find me a single example of this. You can't, because you just made it up.

      The fact of the matter is that Windows has a very long history on the desktop, and for a large percentage of that history they haven't even had memory isolation or a permissions system. (Read: Win X.XX, Win 9x, Win ME.) In Microsoft's defense, the Internet took them a bit by surprise. Until the Internet, desktop security wasn't an issue for anybody except businesses, and that's why they used NT.

      Over those years many, many, many applications were written for those flavors of Windows. These applications all assumed they were running as admin, and for good reason... they were! It wasn't until just 5 years ago that Microsoft finally made the push to get consumers on to the NT kernel, with all its nice security features and the new world of multiple users with varying permissions. Ut oh. There in lies the problem. Microsoft couldn't simply make users non-admin by default because now almost all existing desktop applications, the very thing people buy Windows for in the first place, would break.

      So Microsoft had to make a hard choice... break all existing applications and go out of business, or have the users run as admin by default. Tough choice.

      Admittedly, Microsoft should have done a MUCH better job over the past 5 years to get people to develop Windows applications the correct way. Aside from their "Logo Certification", they've done almost nothing.

      Vista's UAC is a huge step forward for Windows, and it solves a very difficult technical problem that is absolutely unique to Windows: a massive legacy software library dating back 20+ years that *must* run flawlessly on every new version of Windows. Microsoft does not have the luxury of breaking every existing application like Apple does (thanks to their extremely small, yet insanely loyal user base), nor do they have the pleasure of having a software library written with multi-user systems in mind from the get-go, like Unix/Linux.

      Cleary this isn't as simple as Microsoft being "fraudulent", nor is it "marketing bullshit", and they certainly have never claimed it wasn't a problem.
    12. Re:Yes, it works in Vista by drsmithy · · Score: 1
      These applications all assumed they were running as admin, and for good reason... they were! It wasn't until just 5 years ago that Microsoft finally made the push to get consumers on to the NT kernel, with all its nice security features and the new world of multiple users with varying permissions.

      It's important to remember that if developers had been writing their software *properly*, then pretty much any application written after about 1998 should work without a problem in a non-Administrator account.

      Microsoft have made life for developers "migrating" their software from DOS-based Windows to NT-based Windows about as easy as humanly possible. Multiuser Windows NT has been in the marketplace for *13 years*. The necessary APIs to handle per-user data stores have been present in every version since Windows 98. The blame for applications that needlessly require Administrator privileges lies 100% at the feet of the people that write such software.

    13. Re:Yes, it works in Vista by ThinkFr33ly · · Score: 1
      The blame for applications that needlessly require Administrator privileges lies 100% at the feet of the people that write such software.


      I would say that the blame is more like 70% developers, 30% Microsoft. Yes, it's been easy to write software for Windows that works properly in a multi-user, non admin scenario. But without any real guidelines (until the Windows Logo program, which didn't debut until long after the XP launch), and without any serious push from Microsoft, developers had little reason to do so.

      Microsoft has to take some of the blame. They're so good at getting developers to go with the flow in other areas, but not this one.
    14. Re:Yes, it works in Vista by bit01 · · Score: 1

      But did you ever ask yourself why?

      Of course I know why. Greed.

      Protected OS' were being sold before even the first version of Windows was written. It was and is a well understood problem with a well understood solution.

      M$ chose to ignore that, initially because it was easier and more profitable and because in the context of an isolated desktop machine running one app, basically a program loader, it was a reasonable approach. In addition they made no realistic attempt to isolate the code from the underlying hardware, again because it was easier, faster and more profitable at the time than to plan for the future. At the expense of the customers of course.

      That became less reasonable when they started running a windowing system and it became completely unreasonable the moment they connected it to the net, and also started supporting multiple app's and assorted services, triply so when they deliberately put un-sandboxed, executable code into the web browser and email client. I can remember the first time I heard about that.

      Isolating dodgy code in a virtual machine is a well understood problem, again with a well understood solution. Again, M$ could've solved the problem early on by gradually moving customer code to a virtual machine isolated from the hardware and tightened up the security as they went. That could've happened with the 80386. They chose not to. Again because they were greedy and were paying only lip service to security.

      They could've limited the problem almost trivially by having a visible popup, disable-able with some effort, if an application tried to perform an administrative action. M$ chose not to. M$ could've done numerous technical tricks to reduce and eventually eliminate the exposure of insecure system code. They chose not to.

      Clearly this isn't as simple as Microsoft being "fraudulent", nor is it "marketing bullshit", and they certainly have never claimed it wasn't a problem.

      Bullshit. They've been claiming since the year dot they're "enterprise ready", "internet ready" and "professional". Everything they've done in terms of security until the last few years has been almost the exact opposite.

      Their history, created almost entirely by them, has come back to bite them. The entire virus "industry" came into existence largely because of them. The current problems with security are largely M$' fault. Compounded by their lying spin about security and professionalism over the years.

      So please, enough with the marketing nonsense and attempts to revise history.

      ---

      Unregulated DRM = Total Customer Control = Ultimate Customer Lockin = Death of the free market.

    15. Re:Yes, it works in Vista by ThinkFr33ly · · Score: 1

      You do realize that every time you use "M$" fewer and fewer people could care any less about what you have to say, right?

      You attribute Microsoft's actions to greed... guess what, THEY ARE A FOR PROFIT COMPANY. Greed is another word for the desire for profits.

      The decisions Microsoft made were the correct ones AT THE TIME they made them. In 1992, when Microsoft began what would become Windows 95, they didn't see the Internet coming. By the time they realized that the net posed a security risk it was far too late to redesign Windows and have any hope of making real money on what was then one of the most expensive software projects in history.

      You speak of "virtual machines" and claim that these were feasible on 386 hardware. First of all, you really must be delusional. Virtual machines are becoming popular today because hardware is finally at a point where the performance is expectable. Do you honestly believe this was the case 12 or 15 years ago? Second, I think you are dramatically underestimating the scope of creating an embedded virtual machine in the OS to run legacy applications. Even if Microsoft were to accomplish this, it would be at the expense of new features and improvements that customers demand.

      You specifically said that Microsoft has claimed that users running as admin was never a problem, but your only support is the fact they use the terms "enterprise ready" or "internet ready". Give me a break. Next you'll claim that anybody who criticizes the President wants terrorists to destroy America. You and I both know that in no way means that Microsoft thinks it's not a problem, not to mention the fact that it is ENTIRELY possible to run XP without admin privs if you don't mind legacy apps often breaking. I run my home machines without admin privs once I've got them setup the way I want them. The only time I'm forced to elevate to admin is when I'm doing certain debugging tasks that require privs only available to admins.

      Lastly, you claim that I'm revising history... yet you offer not a single fact that discounts what I've said. You appear to see history through your warped anti-MS prism. It's time to take a step back and ask yourself what you're doing here. Do you so need to believe in the boogey man that you're willing to disregard fact to do so? Sounds and awful lot like religion to me... anti-MS religion.

    16. Re:Yes, it works in Vista by bit01 · · Score: 2, Insightful

      You do realize that every time you use "M$" fewer and fewer people could care any less about what you have to say, right?

      I'll be happy to stop using it when M$ stops putting their marketing keys on millions of general purpose PC keyboards.

      "M$" is just a handy reminder that Microsoft is still taxing the world $40,000,000,000+ per year for a dozen programs mostly written more than a decade ago with most of the most difficult bits, the device drivers, being written by third parties.

      You attribute Microsoft's actions to greed... guess what, THEY ARE A FOR PROFIT COMPANY. Greed is another word for the desire for profits.

      Yep, and being paid justifies any action. At least in M$' eyes. Some companies are more ethical.

      The decisions Microsoft made were the correct ones AT THE TIME they made them.

      I've already reminded you that both the problems and the solutions were well understood long before M$ came along. M$ chose not to implement them.

      In 1992, when Microsoft began what would become Windows 95, they didn't see the Internet coming.

      Floppy based computer viruses were widespread by 1988, 4 years before. Similar security problems with similar solutions. M$ chose not to implement them.

      By the time they realized that the net posed a security risk it was far too late to redesign Windows and have any hope of making real money on what was then one of the most expensive software projects in history.

      The expense would've been much the same whether or not they'd implemented security features, the security risks were well understood by everybody at that time. M$ chose to ignore them.

      You speak of "virtual machines" and claim that these were feasible on 386 hardware. First of all, you really must be delusional.

      No delusions. I was referring to virtual machines in the more general sense of virtual memory with a cooperating OS. Something well understood long before then with the 80386 designed to support it. The 80286 was supposed to support it too but because of a major design mistake it wasn't practical.

      Virtual machines are becoming popular today because hardware is finally at a point where the performance is expectable.

      So emm386 and unix V using virtual memory paging were just a figment of my imagination? Virtualisation can also be done at software level, redirecting file open's, block writes and the like.

      Do you honestly believe this was the case 12 or 15 years ago?

      Yes. Virtualisation is taking off again now (it was common on other boxes decades ago) because there is a market need for it. It's just another layer isolating OS services from the hardware.

      Second, I think you are dramatically underestimating the scope of creating an embedded virtual machine in the OS to run legacy applications. Even if Microsoft were to accomplish this, it would be at the expense of new features and improvements that customers demand.

      False dichotomy. This is not an all or nothing situation. There is much than M$ could've done to improve the situation without trying to emulate every bit of their own OS. They chose not to.

      You specifically said that Microsoft has claimed that users running as admin was never a problem, but your only support is the fact they use the terms "enterprise ready" or "internet ready".

      So what does "enterprise ready" or "internet ready" mean to you? That it comes with a Twinkie?

      Give me a break. Next you'll claim that anybody who criticizes the President wants terrorists to destroy America. You and I both know that in no way means that Microsoft thinks it's not a problem,

      M$' actions speak louder than words. They think admin by default is not a problem and have done so for decades.

      not to mention the fact that it is ENTIRELY possible to run XP without admin privs if you don't mind legacy apps often brea

    17. Re:Yes, it works in Vista by drsmithy · · Score: 1
      I would say that the blame is more like 70% developers, 30% Microsoft.

      I fail to see how Microsoft can be deserving of one iota of blame since least five years ago, let alone today.

      Yes, it's been easy to write software for Windows that works properly in a multi-user, non admin scenario. But without any real guidelines (until the Windows Logo program, which didn't debut until long after the XP launch), and without any serious push from Microsoft, developers had little reason to do so.

      Microsoft have been telling developers to write LUA-friendly apps - and how to do so - for *at least* five years (really, closer to ten). It only became a _requirement_ for the Windows Logo with the release of XP, but they'd been doing it long before then.

      Even if that weren't true, the lack of a "requirement" from Microsoft does not in any way justify or excuse lazy and/or incompetent development and testing practices.

      Microsoft has to take some of the blame. They're so good at getting developers to go with the flow in other areas, but not this one.

      Short of deliberately breaking non-LUA-friendly applications, there's little else Microsoft could (or can) do. Given the outrage that usually ensues when Microsoft inadvertently, and for good reason, breaks software, I'm sure you can imagine why they weren't very keen to do it deliberately.

  18. Ha, ha, ha by Opportunist · · Score: 3, Insightful

    If it wasn't so sad, it would be funny.

    tell me how, please. The things you know about him/her/them/whatever:

    A DNS-Server in San Jose.
    A host in Kiew.
    Code generated in Russia.
    Distributed by spambots from around the world.

    Now, where do you start looking? Have you ever tried getting some help from authorities in Russia? If not, it's a worthy adventure. At the very least, it gives you enough material to write a very interesting book.

    --
    We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
  19. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by alexhs · · Score: 4, Insightful

    That and people, listen, stop running windows as root. Make yourself a less privileged user and learn to work in a non-root environment!!!

    What about developers ? Lots of apps -- essentially games -- don't run well in unprivileged environments. I run as unprivileged user but usually need to use runas when I didn't took the time to adjust braindead defaults program settings. And you can't ask the average user to tweak file and register permissions. BTW I've seen apps opening data files rw when only ro was needed. How do you avoid security flaws then ? Editing binary to change call parameters isn't an option...

    --
    I have discovered a truly marvelous proof of killer sig, which this margin is too narrow to contain.
  20. Re:Undetectable? And old news too by tradeoph · · Score: 2, Insightful

    Since F-Secure detects it since June 21st, does it imply this is old news?

  21. Works in but did it install itself? by Shivetya · · Score: 2, Insightful

    or did they make sure it could install?

    --
    * Winners compare their achievements to their goals, losers compare theirs to that of others.
  22. Symantech vs F-Secure by Bill,+Shooter+of+Bul · · Score: 4, Informative

    FSecure's posting says that they released a version of their antirootkit software that can defeat this. Date June 21

    Symantec says that FSecure's product can't remove this. Date June 29.

    Any reason for this discrepency? You'd think they'd continue to moniter what other companies are doing to combat the problem and 8 days would be enough for them to find out about the new release.

    --
    Well.. maybe. Or Maybe not. But Definitely not sort of.
    1. Re:Symantech vs F-Secure by Fencepost · · Score: 1

      The Symantec article may be referring to some research they were doing over the course of a week or two, or the fact that they're looking at Rustock.B may mean that it's a new variant that again deals with F-Secure's detection.

      --
      fencepost
      just a little off
    2. Re:Symantech vs F-Secure by ALecs · · Score: 2, Informative

      F-Secure's blog says Blacklight can detect this kit - but can't remove it. The instructions for removing it involve booting from recovery console and using some arcance incantatio of the copy command to splat garbage over the ADS. I'd call that "cannot remove this virus".

    3. Re:Symantech vs F-Secure by DoctorDyna · · Score: 1

      It would be wonderful if anti-virus / rootkit / malware companies were in fact pro-consumer, but sadly, they are really all pro themselves / bottom line / corporation / shareholders. I don't find it strange at all that one company might accuse another of not being able to remove malware.

      --
      Windows has more viruses because linux has more virus coders.
  23. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by YU+Nicks+NE+Way · · Score: 1

    The parent is either the best troll I've ever read, or the stupidest piece of fanboy fiction ever propagated. I'm hoping it's a troll, because, if it is, it needs to be held up to all attempted trollers as the standard to which they should aspire.

    Oh, by the way -- if there were an undetectable rootkit on OS X, how would one go about finding it?

  24. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by tomstdenis · · Score: 1

    All valid points.

    I seem to recall Word [used to?] writing files in the \windows\system32 dir....

    Tom

    --
    Someday, I'll have a real sig.
  25. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    How did we find out about this undetectable windows rootkit?

  26. Could you thwart an undetectable rootkit anyway? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    To be useful to its creators, a rootkit has to do something. That something usually involves communication on the internet. So, could you find a rootkit by looking for tcp addresses by text searching the whole hard drive? Could you thwart it by detecting an attempt to communicate with certain addresses?

  27. Seems to effect by Utopia · · Score: 1, Interesting

    x86 versions only.

    Would be interesting to know if there will be or are 64-bit versions of rootkits.

    1. Re:Seems to effect by LordKaT · · Score: 1

      You mean 32-bit, right? The desktop 64-bit processors out now are x86 processors, unless I missed the memo that we were all to move to RISC.

    2. Re:Seems to effect by spinfire · · Score: 3, Informative

      The desktop 64-bit processors out now are x86 processors, unless I missed the memo that we were all to move to RISC.
      You did miss the memo. The AMD and Intel 64 bit processors use an instruction set architecture called "x86_64" (also x64 or AMD64 or EM64T, isn't marketing wonderful?). This instruction set extends the original 32 bit x86 instruction set. Wikipedia has some x86_64 architecture information.

    3. Re:Seems to effect by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      "Affect" not "Effect". Affect is an action. Effect is a thing.

  28. HYPE SELLS by majest!k · · Score: 1, Funny

    "Rootkit Wars" ??

    This isn't a war. This is merely an advance in the sophistication of one rootkit. This happens all the time.

    Why is this being called a "war" now?

    Maybe because if they called it what it is - "Another Lame Virus Advancement" - nobody would click the link and look at their ads.

    What a joke.

    By the way, does anyone else find it funny that Symantec and F-Secure have "blogs" now? WTF? Why not just go the whole 9 and create a MySpace profile too?

    --
    smattawichu
  29. Re:Are you kidding? by miskatonic+alumnus · · Score: 4, Insightful

    The US government can't even persue terrorists who kill American citizens without inviting substantial criticism.

    Aren't a lot of those terrorists dead? You know, the ones with bombs strapped to them, or the ones who forced planes into buildings. And as regards the living terrorists, the criticism isn't so much directed at their pursuit, but rather the collateral damage in terms of innocent civilian casualties abroad and loss of civil rights at home.

  30. Detect this.... by mdsc1 · · Score: 3, Informative

    Did the writers of the rootkit consider that...

    "The reason that there is no longer a command-line version is that malware authors have started targetting RootkitRevealer's scan by using its executable name. We've therefore updated RootkitRevealer to execute its scan from a randomly named copy of itself that runs as a Windows service. This type of execution is not conducive to a command-line interface. Note that you can use command-line options to execute an automatic scan with results logged to a file, which is the equivalent of the command-line version's behavior." http://www.sysinternals.com/Utilities/RootkitRevea ler.html

    Ooops... 1 step ahead of the hackers yet again.

    1. Re:Detect this.... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Yes, but the rootkit scans the exe file for strings within it. What you've quoted merely says that the executing thread is renamed randomly - it would still contain it's own name (i.e. "rootkit revealer" or similar) within the file/image, and will therefore be detected and hidden from.

    2. Re:Detect this.... by mdsc1 · · Score: 1

      Thus why if you follow the directions with older versions of the program, you rename the .exe as well.

  31. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by quantum+bit · · Score: 1

    This was definitely fixed in Word 2000, not sure about 97. Stupid MS org chart tool still tried to do that though.

  32. VM immunity? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Does a VM offer immunity to rootkits?

    If the VM'd instance is subverted, does the underlying OS become exposed?

    Thanks,
    -Alajando

    1. Re:VM immunity? by drsj · · Score: 1

      Alajandro, I'd think most rootkits would be contained within that virtual machine. They typically insert themselves into the core/kernel of the OS such that the OS cannot see it, its actions, its files, etc. Hope that helps. -dj

    2. Re:VM immunity? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It depends on how the VM works it's disk structure.

      For instance, in VMWare, yes you are protected becasue VMware disk images prohibit cross access without special tools.

      I can say for sure, maybe.

    3. Re:VM immunity? by scovetta · · Score: 1

      Read this paper: SubVirt: Implementing malware with virtual machines (and my blog if it won't print for you). VMWare/Virtual PC won't necessarily prevent rookits from infecting the host OS (though to date I haven't heard of any VM Rootkits).. just a matter of time, most likely.

      --
      Wer mit Ungeheuern kämpft, mag zusehn, dass er nicht dabei zum Ungeheuer wird. --Nietzsche
  33. Vista compatible? by tlhIngan · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Don't rootkits need to hook into the kernel in some way, and the "some way" in Vista is via signed binaries? Overriding kernel hooks seem to imply that yes, signed binaries are needed as well...

    Also, would it be able to hide from a tool like SysInternal's rootkit detector which compares API return values for the registry and filesystem with an actual analysis of the registry files themselves, and a scan of the raw blocks on the disk? (Understands NTFS and FAT, and the registry hive format).

    1. Re:Vista compatible? by j00r0m4nc3r · · Score: 2, Interesting

      Apparently it runs as a kernel-mode driver, and does not hook any API's or run any processes or threads...

    2. Re:Vista compatible? by Short+Circuit · · Score: 5, Interesting
      It doesn't hook any public APIs, but it does hook some internal ones. Quoth the Symantec link:
      Rootkit detectors also check for the integrity of some kernel structures like the Service Descriptor Table, but Rustock.A controls kernel functions by hooking MSR_SYSENTER and other special IRP functions. [2]


      If that's not functionality that should require Windows binaries to be signed, I don't know what is.
    3. Re:Vista compatible? by naveedi · · Score: 1

      They want the migration to 32bit Vista to be easy so they are requiring less stringent driver rules (among other things) for the 32bit O/S version.

      Microsoft Vista only requires signed kernel mode drivers for the x64 distribution. Also their PatchGuard technology requires on functionality that is only present in x64 and EMT64 chips.

    4. Re:Vista compatible? by Keeper · · Score: 1

      That being said, you can configure an x86 system to reject unsigned drivers.

    5. Re:Vista compatible? by d_jedi · · Score: 1

      I thought Vista would only run signed kernel mode drivers?

      --
      I am the maverick of Slashdot
    6. Re:Vista compatible? by Wesley+Felter · · Score: 1

      On x86-64. On 32-bit systems Vista will load anything to maintain backwards compatibiity.

  34. Howdy Hoo ! by Joebert · · Score: 2, Funny

    Theese things are like the neighbor that just walks in the house, takes a piss, grabs a beer out of the fridge, asks you if you're watching teh game after sitting on the couch next to you.

    If they'd put some fucking beer in there now & then it wouldn't be so damn aggrevating.

    --
    Wanna fight ? Bend over, stick your head up your ass, and fight for air.
    1. Re:Howdy Hoo ! by robophobe · · Score: 1

      Wow, you met my mother-in-law!

      --
      There was a time when movies had plots. So you knew who's ass it was, and why it was farting.
      -Not Sure
    2. Re:Howdy Hoo ! by Joebert · · Score: 1

      Your mother-in-law writes rootkits ?

      --
      Wanna fight ? Bend over, stick your head up your ass, and fight for air.
  35. Re:Are you kidding? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Please,

    Ass pyramids, paper bags, and barking dogs are not torture.

    Seeing Ms. England nude, however, you got me on that one.

  36. Good thing I still use Windows 95... by linebackn · · Score: 2, Funny

    NTFS alternate data stream? It's a good thing I still use Windows 95 that doesn't have any of those fancy shmancy features that can be exploited like that.

  37. Useful tool link by RebornData · · Score: 4, Informative

    If you're (like me) one of the, umm, fortunate souls who get to clean up rootkit-infested machines regularly, there's a tool you should know about: LADS, for "list alternative data streams"

    It can be found buried in this FAQ about the NTFS ADS feature: http://www.heysoft.de/nt/ntfs-ads.htm

    I haven't tried it yet, but it looks like it should work from a win32 bootdisk (like BARTPE). So you should be able to boot from a clean win32 environment and scan the computer's hard disk to find any files with ADSs. Fortunately, use of this feature within NTFS is not widespread, so malware should stand out pretty obviously.

    Have fun!

    -R

    1. Re:Useful tool link by grotgrot · · Score: 1
      Fortunately, use of this feature within NTFS is not widespread

      It is if you know where to look. For users of Internet Explorer, the zone a file was downloaded from is put in an ADS. That is why you can later click on a file and be told it came from the Internet Zone and do you really want to continue. It is also why you can copy the file around and get still get the warning - Explorer, copy etc all copy the ADS.

      The other use is for file summary information. For Office documents it is stored as part of the file itself (thanks to structured storage). For other file types it is stotred in an ADS. To do this, get properties on a file (eg right click) and go to the summary tab. This is why you can set those fields on a .txt file yet not have the contents of the file altered.

      The ADS is an extremely useful place to put information. For example this is a way to implement file indexing. You can put user entered information (eg importance) as well as other meta data into the ADS and then the indexing tool picks that up. On Linux these are being called extended attributes (aka xattr). They aren't particular different than ADS and no doubt similar issues will arise.

  38. Re:Could you thwart an undetectable rootkit anyway by Khyber · · Score: 1

    not easy as long as ADS exists.

    --
    Still waiting on Serviscope_minor to wake up to fucking reality and realize that Jessica Price isn't going to fuck him.
  39. ADS was also an IIS backdoor by goat_roperdillo · · Score: 4, Informative
    Some of the first info on ADS was revealed when IIS users were notified by Microsoft that the full source code of any ASP URL, e.g.
    http://www.mycode.asp
    could be downloaded to a browser by appending ":$DATA" to the URL, e.g.,
    http://www.mycode.asp:$DATA
    Little explanation of ADS or the special ADS keyword "$DATA" was revealed in the Microsoft Security Bulletin MS98-003. At the time I could not fine a full list of ADS keywords or an explanation of ADS on Microsoft's site, merely references to making a filename "canonical" (whatever that meant - no explanation was provided).

    Microsoft has been less than forthcoming about ADS, it's function and it's mechanism. ADS has been used in the past to hack into web servers and now appears to be useful for rooting any system with NTFS.

    Is ADS a Microsoft backdoor?

    1. Re:ADS was also an IIS backdoor by whitehatlurker · · Score: 2, Interesting
      Is ADS a Microsoft backdoor?

      Given that Microsoft has the keys to the front door (windows security update for example), why would they need a backdoor?

      I'm undecided as to whether alternative stream was a good idea with poor implementation (and bad documentation), or just a bad idea.

      --
      .. paranoid crackpot leftover from the days of Amiga.
    2. Re:ADS was also an IIS backdoor by cnettel · · Score: 2, Insightful
      There is no full list of "keywords" for the same reason there is no complete list of file name extensions, any program can choose their own. The only special thing about $DATA is that this is (generally) the default mapping. The IIS bug had little to do with ADS per se, but more to do with how you detect what file a reference goes to, and what you do by default. A possible similar bug would be using the case insensitiveness of the file system, if there was a bug not realizing this in the server. Other bugs that DID exist in IIS at one point were relative paths, including ../ in the path would enable to you to go above the virtual root in some situations. I remember reading some unofficial best practice of placing your virtual root on a separate partition, to add a minimal additional protection against any additional bugs of this type.


      As UN*X systems have a single file system root, one has to ask: are relative paths a UN*X backdoor?

    3. Re:ADS was also an IIS backdoor by KingMotley · · Score: 3, Interesting

      Actually, NTFS streams were pretty well discussed when they came out back in 1994. They have been there since Windows NT 3.1. They are similiar to the old macintosh's data and resource forks, and I believe Microsoft implemented it so that they could support Macintosh files when acting as a file server (or perhaps they were considering building a Macintosh compatability box on top of the NT kernel).

      I was actually suprised that Microsoft didn't take advantage of streams more often than they do. It would be a nice place to have put file meta-data (Like MP3 tags, creator, summary, etc), or image thumbnails (instead of thumbs.db). They probably wanted to support FAT32, and Windows 9x which is why they didn't.

      It's hardly a backdoor, it was a pretty big deal and a feature Microsoft made a pretty big deal of when it arrived. NTFS also supports another hardly used feature known as sparse files where you can allocate space within a file that doesn't actually take any disk space. Useful for some record/database applications. It also supports junction points as well, allowing you to map a drive into a folder (Similiar to linux's symbolic links).

    4. Re:ADS was also an IIS backdoor by pla · · Score: 1

      Little explanation of ADS or the special ADS keyword "$DATA" was revealed

      That exploit just worked by tricking IIS's extension parser - It would normally treat an ASP specially rather than as a plain file. Because the file would obviously have read permission set, specifying that name just returns the file itself the same way IIS would return any other not-special file.

      The DATA stream just specifies the basic unnamed default stream containing what we would normally think of as the file itself. All NTFS files will also have an unnamed "security" stream, and many will contain an unnamed "object identifiers" stream.

      So those don't really count as magic words that Microsoft has hidden from us (you can access them programmatically without any more trouble than opening any "normal" file), any more than an entry in the FAT "hid" data from us under DOS.

    5. Re:ADS was also an IIS backdoor by Foolhardy · · Score: 1

      Actually, alt. file streams ARE used for extra summary data. Right click on some file from the shell, open properties, and click on the Summary tab. Each of the data fileds you see are stored in their own alternate file stream.

      I remember that one of the promised features of Windows 2000 was a great increase in metadata; this is one of the few surviving remnants. Since 2000, Windows has shipped with a file indexing service with the same end goal of Spotlight in OSX. Some of the summary fields, i.e. the keywords field, were obviously meant to aid the indexer. I'm pretty sure it's possible to define your own tags as well, somehow.

    6. Re:ADS was also an IIS backdoor by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
      Is ADS a Microsoft backdoor?

      No, IIS is a Microsoft backdoor.

    7. Re:ADS was also an IIS backdoor by jandrese · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Is there any legitimate program that uses the ADS? I can see maybe some 68k Macintosh emulators using it, but most of the time those guys just create a virtual drive (a big single file that doesn't use the ADS) instead.

      I've known about it for a long time now, but have yet to ever use it myself. I really wish you could disable it entirely if nothing legitmate is going to bother. As it is now, it's just a poor security-by-obscurity mechanism that really has no place in the base OS.

      Wait, I take back what I said before. I did find one shareware program that hid it's "I've been installed for this long" counter file in the ADS. Deleting the file reset the counter. :)

      --

      I read the internet for the articles.
    8. Re:ADS was also an IIS backdoor by Kaenneth · · Score: 1

      I believe they were needed to implement POSIX, which if I recall correctly was the standard published by the U.S. Federal Government to define the mininum capabilities required for operating systems.

    9. Re:ADS was also an IIS backdoor by cnettel · · Score: 1

      In beta 2 of NT5/2000, OLE compound files (basically any Office file) could be saved in several streams, but it was removed. I think the main reason was that it didn't work too well with too many applications (like old network clients) assuming only a single stream.

    10. Re:ADS was also an IIS backdoor by TeknoHog · · Score: 1
      I was actually suprised (sic) that Microsoft didn't take advantage of streams more often than they do. It would be a nice place to have put file meta-data (Like MP3 tags, creator, summary, etc)
      No, it would not be nice because then you could only access the metadata with Windows. This is a general argument against fancy filesystems, not just Microsoft in particular.
      --
      Escher was the first MC and Giger invented the HR department.
    11. Re:ADS was also an IIS backdoor by inKubus · · Score: 2, Informative

      The OS uses it to store summary and author information. The content indexer would use it to store a thumbnail image. It's a little weird because if you don't know about it, you always assumed that one file was "one file".

      Fortunately, the ADS stream can only be non-critical data because transferring to a single stream filesystem (such as FAT32) would drop the additional stream. I'm not sure if ZIP stores them or not (built in ZIP in XP), but that would be interesting.

      Think of it as a named section of a file that can be treated as it's own independent file. It's only scary because Explorer, DIR, etc. do not show the named stream content of a file and therefore there's no way to see them without third-party tools. Not real smart of MS, but most people would get confused they think. They should give me a text box to click, like the box that let's me see extensions and "protected operating system files."

      That's not all though, if you want a real trip, go into $WINROOT and try to delete notepad.exe. Just click it and hit delete. Notepad.exe will magically reappear! ADS I can deal with. Of course, there are ways, so now I have the wonderful Notepad2 as my notepad.exe

      --
      Cool! Amazing Toys.
  40. Re:Are you kidding? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Really? Who was criticizing the US government for going into Afghanistan?

    Ohhh, you are talking about criticisms on the war in IRAQ. The place that didn't attack us. The place with no weapons of mass distruction.

    Idiot neocon.

  41. Re:Are you kidding? by Kylere · · Score: 1

    You must be kidding, our government since before Clinton wastes its resources handling trifling issues and ignoring the terrorist threats as much as possible.

  42. what about DOS by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    does it show in DOS ?

  43. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by dfghjk · · Score: 1

    the parent isn't an apology in any way, and how is anything related to OSX remotely relevant? As the parent said, any issue with Windows will be viewed as an opportunity to evangelize macs1. Nicely done.

  44. Re:Are you kidding? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
    The US government can't even persue terrorists who kill American citizens without inviting substantial criticism

    please correct me if i'm wrong, but i do not recall criticism of attacking the al qaeda training camps in afghanistan. the criticism started once we invaded a non-related, anti-al qaeda nation under the false pretense of an impending wmd attack.
  45. Re:Are you kidding? by plague3106 · · Score: 1

    Except that when Gore was VP one of his recommendations was a no-fly list that went ignored by the FAA. There's an article on CNN on TWA 800 today, which shows they were the first to think it was terrorism, and started looking into how to deal with it.

  46. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by Philip+K+Dickhead · · Score: 1
    How did we find out about this undetectable windows rootkit?
    Xray-glasses. They can see the invisible ink. Windows is anything-proof!

    You're foot touched the hot lava!
    --
    "Speaking the Truth in times of universal deceit is a revolutionary act." -- George Orwell
  47. Offline rootkit scanner? by dfloyd888 · · Score: 4, Interesting

    Long ago, in the days of MS-DOS, there was a program that was excellent at detecting unknown MS-DOS viruses. Called Integrity Master, for maximum security one ran it from a bootable floppy, scanned files on the hard disk, and stored the file with the scanned signatures on a floppy. It wasn't SHA or MD5 hashes, but at the time it was solid security.

    Then, one periodically (once or twice a week, as paranoia sees fit) ran the utility on their machine. If stuff in the MS-DOS directory was changed, it was immediately apparant. Integrity Master also was able to scan for some known viruses as well in addition to keeping a log of changed files.

    We need a utility like that for Windows XP and Vista. A bootable CD or DVD that not just can understand NTFS (and NTFS's file compression), but has the necessary software to mount hard disks which are encrypted with BitLocker, PGP, SafeBoot, PointSec, WinMagic, DriveCrypt Plus Pack. The utility should also allow for username/password entry so EFS-protected files can be checked too.

    This utility should use a CD or DVD to boot from, mount hard drive volumes, run checks for alternate data streams, system and nonsystem files, and finally the registry, perhaps including the encrypted parts like the SAM. It should not just save hashes of files, but perhaps have some ability to check file signatures as well (like sfc.exe and sigverif.exe do), so an update to Windows via a legitimate way doesn't set off a lot of false positives. Of course, the "manifest" file storing the file hashes on the file system would be stored on a removable USB drive, so the OS on the hard drive never has the ability to touch it.

    Because this checking is done offline, a rootkit would be a lot harder to hide (unless it uses a method that the integrity scanner wasn't programmed to detect, like perhaps pointing to unallocated disk space for executable code, or hiding in an EFS-protected file.)

    Of course, offline checking isn't perfect, because the machine being scanned has to be totally downed for a good amount of time which can't be done in a 24/7 environment.

    There are some hurdles though. Trying to reduce the amount of false positives is one, for example. A novice user presented with a notice that a lot of files were changed likely wouldn't know what was a bad change, and what was normal for system functioning. After that, its decoding files and registry keys. Finally, if a known rootkit database was used, keeping track of how rootkits encrypt their payload, and delivering timely program updates.

    1. Re:Offline rootkit scanner? by lm317t · · Score: 2, Informative

      I don't know if Knoppix sees ADS's, but thats wat I use to scan Windows Boxes. I like to use HijackThis (Windows exe file) to quicly find ADS and other rootkit nastiness.

      --
      EOF
    2. Re:Offline rootkit scanner? by tetrode · · Score: 1

      That looks find for a home, but except for geeks, how many average Joe's are going to do this frequently? Scanning the huge harddisks of today is taking a lot of time.

      In an office environment of let's say 100 - 500 PC's this idea is not going to make it, let alone at the server side.

      However, something along these lines could be implemented in the BIOS of a PC perhaps. Data could be stored at a device (USB or so), unseen by, and thus unreachable for the OS, and scanning can then be done in the background?

      Just a thought

      Mark

    3. Re:Offline rootkit scanner? by Sangui5 · · Score: 1

      You mean like Tripwire? http://www.tripwire.com/products/enterprise/server s_desktops.cfm

      Tripwire, btw, says that it "can monitor Windows alternative data streams to detect and log changes, additions, and deletions. FS and DT components help prevent negative impact from hidden, unknown, or malicious configuration data to improve baseline control." So it would be able to detect this.

    4. Re:Offline rootkit scanner? by TED+Vinson · · Score: 1
      The appropriate term is baselining.

      As mentioned before, Tripwire does this very well.

      The Knoppix Security Tools Distribution provides a free alternative. It includes FTimes [File Topography and Integrity Monitoring on an Enterprise Scale] to record and monitor file signatures. This is a cheap and fairly painless way to keep an eye on those critical files.

      SANS Reading Room has some good papers on system baselines. This one discusses using FTimes as part of a Windows box baseline.

    5. Re:Offline rootkit scanner? by initialE · · Score: 1

      I guess you can give winpooch a try. It's open source and all. http://winpooch.free.fr/

      --
      Starbucks, Harbuckle of Breath.
    6. Re:Offline rootkit scanner? by Devistater · · Score: 1

      Dont forget bootable cds like BartPE which can run a "pre-install" version of windows that boots on a cd. Throw a tool to check file sigs like you say, and you are set. Since its actually windows, it has no problem handling NTFS file systems. Since it boots from cd, you dont actually run anything on the infected machine.

  48. Hey! by Philip+K+Dickhead · · Score: 1
    That's like saying you hate Osama Bin Ladin for making the word "terrorism" popular! Hate Sony/Osama for their actions, hate Slashdot/the NSA for popularizing the word.


    Hey Hey! Hate the game! Not the playa'! 'Sama 'n Sony got serious game.
    --
    "Speaking the Truth in times of universal deceit is a revolutionary act." -- George Orwell
  49. i feel left out by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Funny

    i still use FAT32, you insensitive clod!

  50. curse you, resource fork! by jbeaupre · · Score: 1

    Back in grad school, someone accidentally erased every user file on our group's Mac. Including my thesis! Unerasing was a nightmare (our mac "guru" wasn't much help). We got the data back, but none of it had the correct data fork associated with it. Everything got treated as an ascii text file.

    I spit on your grave, OS7!

    --
    The world is made by those who show up for the job.
    1. Re:curse you, resource fork! by cloak42 · · Score: 1

      Actually, it wasn't called OS7. ;) Anything before OS8 was called "System ", so v7 was called "System 7," or "System 7.1", etc.

  51. Meanwhile, MS releases a rootkit of their own... by yeremein · · Score: 1, Offtopic

    Microsoft Private Folder 1.0 uses rootkit-like techniques to hide encrypted files from the Win32 API. I wrote a little about it in
    my blog a few days ago.

  52. Attack vector by SuperKendall · · Score: 1

    Sorry to say it bluntly, but I do remember. It's over. It's patched. Currently, there are no unpatched bugs (at least none that I'm aware of) that let you deliver malware straight to a connected computer.

    So what that means is that there are unpatched holes, and since we don't know where they are you don't know a likley attack vector that such a rootkit might try and be deployed by.

    Don't connect to the net without a firewall? Heck, given you can't know anything you are doing over the network is not an attack vector you might as well just shut down the network connection altogether.

    --
    "There is more worth loving than we have strength to love." - Brian Jay Stanley
  53. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by DamnStupidElf · · Score: 1

    That and people, listen, stop running windows as root. Make yourself a less privileged user and learn to work in a non-root environment!!!

    Too bad that Windows and most of the nixes have had at least one privilege escalation exploit present at any given time. Not to mention that to install software (for all users), one has to be root. A rootkit only needs to be embedded in an installer.

  54. Escaping from a chroot jail by rewt66 · · Score: 1

    I think this is the equivalent situation. When you chroot, it changes the root of the file system, "/", but IIRC it doesn't change any open directory handles. In particular, it doesn't change the current working directory. So you should always follow a chroot with "cd /" or equivalent. If you have other open directories, you also have to deal with those.

    Otherwise, a hacker could just "cd .." and they're out of your jail.

  55. Obligatory Star Wars reference by Shadowland · · Score: 5, Funny

    [Yoda]
    Begun, the Rootkit Wars have...
    [/Yoda]

    1. Re:Obligatory Star Wars reference by Phishcast · · Score: 1

      That was neither obligatory nor funny.

    2. Re:Obligatory Star Wars reference by chawly · · Score: 1

      Can't agree - a definite obligation and I'm still giggling. Wish I'd thought of it.

      --
      How many beans make five, anyhow ? ... Charles Walmsley
  56. Run As by Ahnteis · · Score: 1

    In *most* instances, you can use the built-in "Run As" feature to fun games/etc that need special permissions.

    But the real solution is to complain to your software vendors.

    1. Re:Run As by creepynut · · Score: 4, Insightful

      There's always a few people mention this.

      The problem when you do this, it essentially treats you as if you are that user, not just their privileges. It's a pain in the neck when you do this to install a program, and it installs it only to that (Say, the Administrator account) users start menu.

      Or if you want to save a document from a program that requires it, you save it to My Documents, right? Go to open it later, open up My Documents in Windows Explorer and wow! It's gone!

      (disclaimer: maybe it doesn't work this way in XP, but it certainly did in Win2k when I did take the effort to run as non-privileged user. XP Home doesn't make it that easy, what with the crippled security optons)

    2. Re:Run As by toadlife · · Score: 2, Informative

      "It's a pain in the neck when you do this to install a program, and it installs it only to that (Say, the Administrator account) users start menu.

      Or if you want to save a document from a program that requires it, you save it to My Documents, right? Go to open it later, open up My Documents in Windows Explorer and wow! It's gone!"


      1) Click on my sig

      2) Go to the useful tools section and grab one of the "sudo" type programs. Sudo WN is my favorite. The sudo tools solve the problems you mentioned above.

      --
      I don't always use unix-like operating systems; but when I do, I prefer FreeBSD.
    3. Re:Run As by Bill+Dog · · Score: 1

      Yup. It's best to use either MakeMeAdmin or DropMyRights, which add or remove privileges to the account you're already using.

      I personally find it easier, esp. as a developer, to take the latter approach -- log in as admin, but run net apps neutered.

      --
      Attention zealots and haters: 00100 00100
    4. Re:Run As by Mancat · · Score: 1

      Very cool. Had no idea that tool existed. Thanks!

      --
      hello dear sirs my name is jamesh i are india (bihar) can u guide me install red had linux 9?
  57. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by utopianfiat · · Score: 1
    Lots of apps -- essentially games -- don't run well in unprivileged environments.

    and from the mplayer docs:
    The new timer code uses the RTC (RealTime Clock) for this task, because it has precise 1ms timers. It is automagically enabled when available, but requires root privileges...
    and
    DVD support needs raw sector-based access to the device. Unfortunately you must (under Linux) be root to get the sector address of a file. That's why we don't use the kernel's filesystem driver at all, instead we reimplement it in userspace. libdvdread 0.9.x and libmpdvdkit do this. The kernel UDF filesystem driver is not needed as they already have their own builtin UDF filesystem driver. Also the DVD does not have to be mounted as only the raw sector-based access is used.
    and
    WHAT IS DGA. DGA is short for Direct Graphics Access and is a means for a program to bypass the X server and directly modifying the framebuffer memory. Technically spoken this happens by mapping the framebuffer memory into the memory range of your process. This is allowed by the kernel only if you have superuser privileges. You can get these either by logging in as root or by setting the SUID bit on the MPlayer executable (not recommended).


    This is just one app. Consider my 5c donated.
    --
    +5, Truth
  58. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by biendamon · · Score: 2, Informative
    What about developers ? Lots of apps -- essentially games -- don't run well in unprivileged environments.

    Odd... On Linux, I don't have any trouble running games or development applications as an unprivileged user. The only time I ever switch to a privileged user is when I'm installing something or reconfiguring the system in some way.

    Of course, that usually has more to do with the developers of said applications than the OS itself. Windows is perfectly capable of running applications well under unprivileged user accounts, but the developers of those applications have gotten into the nasty habit of relying on the fact that most Windows users run as Administrator.

  59. Where do you go for the "alternate" news by xtracto · · Score: 1, Interesting

    I have a legitimate question. What site can you visit to get the rootkit or discuss information about it?, When I was in university I usually went to neworder.box.sk to all my hacker/cracker needs, also the russian password crackers sites and crackstore to name a few.

    There was also fravia and other nice pages where you cold get that information but now I am not "on the song" anymore, can anyone enlighten me please?

    --
    Ubuntu is an African word meaning 'I can't configure Debian'
    1. Re:Where do you go for the "alternate" news by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Hmm, well there a few hackery security portals like PacketStorm but rootDown is good for general info.

  60. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by utopianfiat · · Score: 1
    --
    +5, Truth
  61. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by OrangeTide · · Score: 1

    Well you used to have to run games as setuid root because of limitations of SVGAlib. But that was like 10 years ago.

    --
    “Common sense is not so common.” — Voltaire
  62. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by VertigoAce · · Score: 1

    This should change with Vista, since all users in Vista are limited users. If you belong to the Administrators group, your programs will not run with Administrative permissions unless you use runas. Programs that know they need higher permissions will cause a password prompt to appear asking for administrative permissions (no password needed if you are an admin, but you still get the prompt).

    So any developers who have been lazy about this will get a rude awakening with Vista. The typical application should only need admin privileges to install. Since the devs will be getting the prompts too, hopefully they fix all of the annoyances themselves.

  63. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by EndlessNameless · · Score: 1

    Actually, most older games will work under a limited account if you give all users read/write permissions to the directory "C:\Program Files\Game Directory". This is true of most older software.

    While there is naturally a security risk in giving all users the ability to write to files that will also be run by privileged users, there are so few viruses on the loose that attempt to infect old games and Win9x apps that I wouldn't worry about it.

    Every game I've seen released since mid-2001 has had no problem running on a limited account. The only possible exception I can think of is MMORPGs that require patching before connecting to the server. User preferences and savegames are now saved in the %userprofile%\My Documents\My Games\Name of Game folder.

    If you're playing 90s-era games and apps, you have to duplicate the environment they were assumed to run under. The simple measure of adjusting filesystem permissions and setting OS emulation for the executable accounts for the vast majority of older games that I've tried. You have to be an administrator to do it, but once it's done it works under any account.

    --

    ---
    According to the latest ruleset, this post should be modded as Vorpal Flamebait +5.
  64. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by lerxstz · · Score: 1

    ...just as any issue with a Mac not have game #x available is viewed as an opportunity to evangelize windows. Mac users have to listen to this drivel constantly from windows users. It's annoying coming from either direction. Use the tool that suits YOU and don't deride others for their choice of OS. btw, I think your 2nd last sentence should've read: "As the parent said, any issue with Windows will be viewed as an opportunity to evangelize linux"

    --
    I chose to end my comments, not with a rim shot, but a long decaying F#7sus4
  65. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    >What about developers?

    Stop going to porn and warez sites on you dev box.

  66. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by freedom_india · · Score: 1
    No no, you are confusing UNIX security rights and Windows Permissions.

    in UNIX, a root is only for adding users or changing special permissions globally. All others get a special copy of the same and the games that you run can change them at will.

    UNIX apps being statically bound come with their own libraries, and hence you do not need to share anything.

    Windows comes ONLY with shareware stuff (NOT shareware), so that all applications depend on that copy for everything.

    --
    "Doing what i can, with what i have." ~ Burt Gummer
  67. My personnal experience... by DrYak · · Score: 4, Informative

    My personnal experience this far with Linux is that most of the time, you won't need full root access, if :
    - your access rights are correctly set (as in using the GUID "video" to grand access to devices used for graphic acceleration. Most modern distro have this done auto-magically by the setup or have the plug-n-play daemon assign correct rights to newly plugged devices)
    - there are small piece of code that are used to communicate between priviledged acces and un privilidged access (in other words : once upon a time, you needed to have SETUID on SVGALib to have nice graphics in games under Linux. Nowadays, SDL communicates with drivers and architectures like DRI, which take car to pass messages to a more priviledged part which, in turn, will take care of the sensitive steps. (In other words : Old applications - use special extension and map framebuffer themeselfs, if enough access rights. New (unpriviledged) applications - ask the X Server (with modern extension) which itselfs has the right to access hardware to map what is needed.

    That means that, with a correctly setup system, I never needed to SUDO before playing anything with mplayer, xine, vlc or whatever else.
    I almost never run application as something different as my user account.
    In fact, even installing update is being slowly replaced with a less priviledged process in recent distro (instead of asking the users to star a process as root and installing updates himself under this identity, newer distro have a separate demon that runs with the minimal necessary privileges and the user only has a small application that passes messages to the update daemon to make the system install patches).

    On the other hand, Windows, with its "admin-by-default" accounts hasn't done anything to prevent misbehavioured software. I can understand that Windows 3.x and Windows 9x, with all their DOS tradition behind them had to be "admin-by-default". But since Microsoft moved to a new architecture, why don't they change the default user profile behaviour ? Old APPs are run thrue an emulated API, newer application break if they can't run in a non-priviledged environnement.

    Old usage needed admin rights. That's normal. What's not normal is that Microsoft perpatuated the bad habbit in newer versions of Windows.

    --
    "Sufficiently advanced satire is indistinguishable from reality." - [Tips: 1DrYakQDKCQ6y52z6QbnkxHXAocMZJE61o ]
    1. Re:My personnal experience... by petermgreen · · Score: 1

      I can understand that Windows 3.x and Windows 9x, with all their DOS tradition behind them had to be "admin-by-default".
      it wasn't just admin by default it was zero security infrastructure at all. Once a binary was running it could do whatever it liked the only security features were just UI lockdowns.

      But since Microsoft moved to a new architecture, why don't they change the default user profile behaviour ? Old APPs are run thrue an emulated API
      i belive this is what they plan to do in vista

      newer application break if they can't run in a non-priviledged environnement.
      can't really be done since from a binary point of view there is no real way to tell the difference between an app from the 9x days and one written yesterday. The fake admin sandbox will have to availible for for use with any app or not availible at all.

      --
      note: i'm known as plugwash most places but i screwd up registering that here somehow in the past and now can't register
    2. Re:My personnal experience... by CCFreak2K · · Score: 1

      On the other hand, Windows, with its "admin-by-default" accounts hasn't done anything to prevent misbehavioured software.

      IIRC, Windows 2000 Ceritified Programs were supposed to remedy this by being need-to-install-as-admin but can-be-run-by-anyone by design. Microsoft did everything right this time around EXCEPT the whole new-users-are-admin-users thing during the install phase. It was a mistake on thier part, replicated millions of times over now.

      --
      "Beware of he who would deny you access to information, for in his heart he dreams himself your master."
    3. Re:My personnal experience... by petermgreen · · Score: 1

      IIRC, Windows 2000 Ceritified Programs were supposed to remedy this by being need-to-install-as-admin but can-be-run-by-anyone by design
      but of course what proportion of software vendors actually enter for said certification programs?

      --
      note: i'm known as plugwash most places but i screwd up registering that here somehow in the past and now can't register
  68. What's a "Trojan?" by Rimbo · · Score: 2, Funny

    My boss was telling me how he'd spent all morning with the IT manager removing a trojan off of his Windows machine.

    I looked up from my iBook and FC5 workstation, looked him in the eye with a face full of innocence, and asked, "What's a 'Trojan?'"

    "Well, see, it's like... a 'trojan' is like the Trojan horse; it's a program that comes into your system and ..."

    wink

    "...why I oughtta slug you!"

    It's a good thing the guy's a consummate professional, because I probably deserve to be writing this from the hospital.

    1. Re:What's a "Trojan?" by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Do you work in Pleasantville?

    2. Re:What's a "Trojan?" by jdgeorge · · Score: 1

      My boss was telling me how he'd spent all morning with the IT manager removing a trojan off of his Windows machine.

      I can't imagine that the problem was removing Trojan from his machine. He probably spent much more time trying to get rid of the sticky residue, though I shudder to think what could have led to that situation....

  69. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by dfghjk · · Score: 1

    "...just as any issue with a Mac not have game #x available is viewed as an opportunity to evangelize windows."

    Irrelevant. Besides I'm not the original poster of this nor have I evangelized windows.

    "Use the tool that suits YOU and don't deride others for their choice of OS."

    Didn't deride anybody. That was the mac fanboy...

    "I think your 2nd last sentence should've read: "As the parent said, any issue with Windows will be viewed as an opportunity to evangelize linux""

    No, it was mac evangelism.

  70. Nitpicking by buck-yar · · Score: 2, Informative

    This is just nitpicking, but from my understanding a rootkit consists of tools implemented _once the system is comprimised_ to maintain root status and hide the comprimisation.

    I always thought the means to gain access through vulnerabilities were called 'exploits.'

  71. rootkit out before target OS by smellsofbikes · · Score: 1

    It makes you wonder about development cycles when people are producing malware for software that's not even been released yet. Is this a negative-day vulnerability? (and how does one quantify it when MS isn't yet saying when Vista's going to hit the market?)

    --
    Nostalgia's not what it used to be.
    1. Re:rootkit out before target OS by necro2607 · · Score: 1

      Yeah dude, this is officially the first -2year sploit. ;)

    2. Re:rootkit out before target OS by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      "Is this a negative-day vulnerability?"

      A rootkit is not a vulnerability.

    3. Re:rootkit out before target OS by smellsofbikes · · Score: 1

      That's kind of like saying multiple sclerosis isn't a vulnerability. If you have two OSes, and one can't be hacked by a rootkit and one can, I'd say that the latter is, y'know, more VULNERABLE to rootkits.

      --
      Nostalgia's not what it used to be.
    4. Re:rootkit out before target OS by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Rootkits are just software you tool. They can be written for and installed on any OS. Perhaps you need to take a refesher course on basic computer security concepts?

    5. Re:rootkit out before target OS by smellsofbikes · · Score: 1

      I'm saying that if an OS can be attacked by a rootkit, it is "vulnerable". Whether or not it is possible to make an OS that is "invulnerable" is completely irrelevant to the discussion.

      --
      Nostalgia's not what it used to be.
  72. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by tomstdenis · · Score: 2, Informative

    All bullshit. The RTC requires root to setup ... ONCE [ideally at startup]... then any user can use it.

    I routinely play DVDs as my user [you need read access to /dev/dvd] it's called group management.

    I routinely play full screen video games as my user not root, etc, etc, etc.

    Your information is out of date and just plain incorrect.

    Tom

    --
    Someday, I'll have a real sig.
  73. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by fa2k · · Score: 2, Insightful

    Every time a security issue is posted, we get this advice about using an unprivileged user. It is, however, far from the end-all of security issues - even running as a normal luser, a program can hide from that user. And it has access to all of that users data. One advance would be rigid separation between applications; Microsoft currently considers the desktop the "security boundary", and doesn't do much to isolate applications. Applications are also written carelessly with regards to buffer overflows in local input vectors, such as textboxes. Therefore, anything on the desktop has pretty much access to anything else running there, given some light hacking.

    Allowing per-application access control is kludgily achieved by running apps as another user; this is counter-intuitive in todays world, where there is an 1:1 relationship between logged in users and computers. Separating applications, and assigning access rights with some granularity, is really difficult. But if web-apps don't take over the world, one would need another leap in separation, like protected mode was to real mode.

  74. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by toadlife · · Score: 1

    "All others get a special copy of the same and the games that you run can change them at will.

    UNIX apps being statically bound come with their own libraries, and hence you do not need to share anything.

    Windows comes ONLY with shareware stuff (NOT shareware), so that all applications depend on that copy for everything."


    Wrong.

    --
    I don't always use unix-like operating systems; but when I do, I prefer FreeBSD.
  75. Make your own ADS by The+MAZZTer · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Go to the command prompt.

    echo Text! > text.txt:ADS

    Do a DIR and you'll see the size of text.txt is 0 bytes.

    The string "Text!" has ended up in an ADS stream called "ADS".

  76. Re:Detect this....CRC search and destroy- plz read by iamcf13 · · Score: 1

    1) Malware installs itself in a 'good oddball location' (you'll see why a bit later)

    2) Malware runs (on startup) and monitors the running processes as close to real time as possible

    3) Malware has built in it the CRCs (likely MD5s) of known AV filescanners

    THE RACE IS ON!!!

    The malware has to find the AV filescanner, CRC/MD5 it and if identified, kill the AV process (if able to) and delete/muckup the AV filescanner at its leisure(?) BEFORE the AV scanner can find it, kill it, and delete it in return.

    The only way around that would be to update/release the AV scanner faster than the malware authors can 'do their thing'. I don't think using some sort of 'runtime opcode munging' to change the EXE CRC at runtime will help as a mass-release software title (if possible).

    Nope, to stop this kind of malware calls for 'personalized' AV with CRCs unique to the machine it is installed on before the software is obtained to install in the first place. Provided the OS maker(s) is trustworthy, such AV software should be the first program obtained and installed on the computer after the operating system.

  77. Permissions/locations by phorm · · Score: 1

    Part of this also depends on where the attacker can upload/download files to or from. If he can upload a new file in a location that automatically runs (say a crontab entry on a 'nix system), or he can download your password info, then you're still in trouble.

    I've heard a few stories of sites being compromised because a script incorrectly allowed a variable that wasn't tainted as a filename.

  78. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by Millenniumman · · Score: 2, Interesting

    Cue the Mac OS-X / *Nix / *BSD zealotry.

    Psh, my graphing calculator is much more secure than any of those. No security exploits, ever.

    --
    Stupidity is like nuclear power, it can be used for good or evil. And you don't want to get any on you.
  79. More Anti-Microsoft FUD by Hercules+Peanut · · Score: 1

    Works in Vista, too!

    I know this cannot be true since Microsoft Says Vista Most Secure OS Ever.

    1. Re:More Anti-Microsoft FUD by chawly · · Score: 1

      You're right. I read your link. There is no way that this can be true. Its FUD for sure. Heh!

      --
      How many beans make five, anyhow ? ... Charles Walmsley
  80. mod by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Mod funny, you dumbshits!

  81. Working URL to paper: by eddy · · Score: 1
    --
    Belief is the currency of delusion.
  82. AV companies are dishonest by Sloppy · · Score: 4, Insightful

    I don't know how or when it changed, but the orthodox approach to virus scanning used to be that you booted a known clean (very likely read-only) system in order to diagnose the possibly-compromised system.

    Every time I hear about how some malware uses a rootkit to "hide", I know it simply means that people are using compromised systems to diagnose themselves. That approach is fundamentally flawed. No one should be surprised that it doesn't work, and it shouldn't be news that it doesn't work. We shouldn't be seeing this article on Slashdot in any category other than the humor section.

    But we do see it, because it is news (to somebody?) because this unreliable approach to scanning is mainstream. How the hell did that happen?

    It happened because the AV companies are selling their products as something that Windows users install rather than boot. But we know and they know that can't work. It's snakeoil and I think selling it is despicable.

    --
    As copyright owner of this comment, I authorize everyone to defeat any technological measure which limits access to it.
    1. Re:AV companies are dishonest by Reziac · · Score: 1

      You are so right... yet most AV products now are Windows-only and there really is no way to scan the system BEFORE the HD boot and OS load process... after which, it's too late for the AV app to detect malware that doesn't run as an ordinary application or service.

      Methinks the Progress-NOW! folks were a trifle premature about getting rid of some of the clean-boot options, frex, the venerable DOS boot floppy.

      --
      ~REZ~ #43301. Who'd fake being me anyway?
    2. Re:AV companies are dishonest by King_TJ · · Score: 2, Informative

      Sure.... but they also leave few real alternatives. So far, the most useful "boot from alternate OS to virus scan/clean" solutions are illegal, pirated boot CDs like "Hiren's" that make the rounds on the net.

      You could shell out the ridiculous price of $400+ for a copy of AVAST's B.A.R.T. CD, I suppose - but then you're stuck with their inferior virus scanning/removal technology. I've generally fared better running the latest AVG on a compromised system's own OS than relying on AVAST to get it clean running from the stripped-down XP that boots from a B.A.R.T. CD.

      Personally, I find it amazing that Symantec, of all people, hasn't re-used the "boot from virtual partition into PC-DOS" solution they've already integrated into Ghost Corporate as a way for their AV software to run full scans and cleans?

    3. Re:AV companies are dishonest by crabpeople · · Score: 1
      "But we do see it, because it is news (to somebody?) because this unreliable approach to scanning is mainstream. How the hell did that happen?"

      Malware became more prevelant so companies have convinced users they can remove it themselves, taking away the incentive to take your machine to a professional to do it right. As most people do not have a second "clean" pc at their homes, a feel good solution (which i would argue is pretty effective if you run multiple tools, in safe mode, etc...) was developed for the casual user. Most malware is pretty easy to diagnoise and fix on a single pc. Id imagine real rootkits would be completely undetectable and therefor the home user would not even know they had one. Most people dont check for bombs in their cars before they start the engine every day, so its unresonable to assume that they would pay possibly hundreds of dollars to have a professional check their computer in what probably is not a manifest problem.. untill its too late that is.

      --
      I'll just use my special getting high powers one more time...
    4. Re:AV companies are dishonest by bit01 · · Score: 1

      Having a separate boot disk dramatically increases costs because current OS licensing requirements means that the boot disk needs a separate OS license. That's why vendors don't do it now. Stupid but true.

      The anti-virus vendors should pay to finish the OSS NTFS driver. They can then use it to create their own boot disk that can fix compromised NTFS volumes with no separate license required. Everybody wins.

      ---

      Keep your options open!

  83. I for one by Lispy · · Score: 1

    welcome our first widely known Vista exploit!
    Lets fire up your windows update gentlemen! You didnt really believe the buzz this time round?

  84. Trace Bustah by SnailNobra · · Score: 0

    This is my Trace Bustah, Bustah... Bustah!!!

    Thank you The Big Hit
    --
    Nihilism means nothing to the dancing peasants
  85. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by Ash+Vince · · Score: 2, Interesting

    even running as a normal luser, a program can hide from that user.

    Yes, but the program cannot make itself run automatically at bootup as this would require changing files which are owned by root
    So basically it will die at next reboot. It might be able to start when that same user logs in, but this can be fixed by forcing all config changes to come from root (Admin or whatever)

    It also means that if I scan for this software as root there isnt a thing it can do to avoid detection.

    Although this is written with my linux hat on I also happen to develop software for windows and can see no reason that the same principles cannot be applied to windows.

    Apart from one, it would cost MS a fortune to rewrite office, and they would lose the edge which office has over the competition (all the private hooks into the OS it uses which they dont publicise to other developers)

    --
    I dont read /. to RTFA, I read /. to offend people in ignorance.
  86. Re:Could you thwart an undetectable rootkit anyway by gwayne · · Score: 2, Interesting

    TCP/IP addresses are often hex-encoded in compiled code, so doing a text search for xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx probably wouldn't be useful anyway...

  87. Step 1: STOP ASKING FOR IT. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
    If you don't have basic common sense, you're just asking for it.
    1. Don't use Windows. That goes without saying. Micro&oft has told its customers time and again to fuck off, no you're not getting any security.
    2. Don't run 8 year old distros. People, technology changes. Vulnerabilities are found and then patched, but this doesn't do you any good if you're running a defunct distro, where if anything is being "patched" it's in some Latvian fork you'd never heard of, and consists in getting the distro back down to six floppy disks. If your distro isn't being maintained, stop running it or you're just asking for it.
    3. Update your system with critical security patches. This is closely related to the last point, but it just doesn't matter if you're running "only" half a version behind current stable, if that half-version includes critical security flaws. The word "critical" means something, people, and what it means is update! Every major distro can automate this for you.
    4. Have sane, restricted user accounts, and USE THEM! It should go without saying that you don't run as root, and you check the logs of what root is doing, even if you think you're the only one dropping down to root. Good, but that's not enough. If you use a browser from a box that's also serving files, your permissions should be limited to what's necessary for browsing. Then, if you want to update some Apache config files, then put on your webmaster hat, and do it under the account for it. If you have a guest over and you don't have a guest account to let them log in under, you lose. I don't care what kind of rat you are, there are always other rats, and you could have a guest over at any time. Configure accordingly.
    5. Boot from appropriate media. I understand that there could be good reasons for booting from media any rootkit that can get to root can drop down to. There are also good reasons to have unwavering trust in the law and your elected politicians. Your security ain't one of 'em. If you're booting from read-write media, 1) you're asking for it, 2) don't ever expect to run any rootkit detection, anti-virus software, etc. In fact, just forget security, integrity, any kind of system administration software whatsoever, because "user-space" doesn't mean anything if your kernel's just sitting there as some files for anyone to write to. And once you're running compromised kernel-space it can report whatever it wants to your "auditing" software, anti-virus, rootkit-detector, whatever. People, this is what the article just mentioned. Once you're running compromised, forget about cleaning up. It's like asking your enemy if you're in any danger.
    6. Unplug that CAT5/Wifi shit. If you have a (bright-yellow or otherwise) RJ-45 cable running to the back of your computer you're asking for it. If your computer has a Wifi card (running or not) you're asking for it (quote from linked article: "The victim would not even need to connect to a network for the attack to work".) I'm sorry, if you're trusting your installation to a single device, running driver code on the same core running your security policy (key quote: "In May 2005 Colin Percival presented a paper, Cache Missing for Fun and Profit, demonstrating that a malicious thread operating with limited privileges permits monitoring of the execution of another thread, allowing for the possibility of theft of cryptographic keys"), I don't care how many eyes have looked at it, you're just asking for it. Okay, you're smart enough to understand "critical vulnerability" and to patch for it: if you're relying on herd mentality to "ensure" that you're not getting compromised between the day you update your system and the day you patch it, you're just asking for it. Security from the wild by de
    1. Re:Step 1: STOP ASKING FOR IT. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      They will wake up one day and realize that the "font police' was only once, just a joke
      They have no clue the shitstorm on the horizon

      http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TEMPEST

      Anonymous Coward

  88. undetectable rootkit on OS X by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    >Oh, by the way -- if there were an undetectable rootkit on OS X, how would one go about finding it?

    Yes, I know your being flip.
    The answer is by partitioning off "bad boot blocks" that are above the OS boot code and inserting load commands for network protocols that over-ride your soon to be loaded preferences, "Playmems" in Graphics card memory space, font worlds.
    That's all you get for now

    Anonymous Coward

  89. thanks by jbeaupre · · Score: 1

    It looked wrong even as I wrote it. now I remember.

    --
    The world is made by those who show up for the job.
  90. Re:Are you kidding? by JohnnyCannuk · · Score: 1

    It actually wasn't AQ but an Iranian backed group. No Al-Z either. But everything else yu say is true.

    --
    Never by hatred has hatred been appeased, only by kindness - the Buddha
  91. Actually a very applicable comment by Tran · · Score: 2

    As long as MS brings up and touts security, particulalry in the context of proprietary software, the comment is valid, even if humorous.

  92. Mplayer case by alexhs · · Score: 1

    I'm not sure what your point is... because it seems to me you're just giving me a good example of good programming. You just need to emphasize other parts of the text : ...when available... ...That's why we don't use the kernel's filesystem driver at all...
    For the last one you would need a larger excerpt with other video output methods.

    RTC : allows Real-Time synchronisation. Used when available because Linux isn't a realtime OS. Would be pointless on, say, QNX. Usage of "virtualized functionnality" like standard timers works fine for almost everybody, you usually don't need hacks accessing hardware directly.

    DVD : You don't get any benefit running as root because they aren't using kernel's filesystem driver. "Greping" for root in mplayer doc isn't an excuse to not read and understand what's written... There's probably a reason why you need to run as root to get the same functionnality directly from linux kernel, but I'm to lazy to search the thread talking about it at lkml.
    It wouldn't be portable anyway.

    DGA : Thanks, I didn't know about that -vo method. My unofficial debian mplayer package is compiled with 31 output methods, some work under X, some in a xterm, some on a console, some with files, some with particular hardware (like Matrox video cards). DGA works under X, but as mplayer doc states, you need root access. Why not use -vo xv then ? It works flawlessly on my Radeon card. It doesn't work on an older Mach64, in that case I need -vo x11 (-vo dga doesn't work either with that card).

    All limitions you're citing are because of attempts to talk directly to hardware, and each time you have other options that are working as well.
    Bad programming would have assumed that you were root and disallowing to run if RTC wouldn't have been available, for exemple.
    So ?

    --
    I have discovered a truly marvelous proof of killer sig, which this margin is too narrow to contain.
  93. Sysinternals Rootkit Revealer already scans ADS by Dirkyn · · Score: 2, Informative
  94. Green Hills by Nom+du+Keyboard · · Score: 1
    putting itself in a ADS (NTFS alternate data stream) which isn't seen by normal file system enumeration tools, but even blocks ADS aware tools from seeing the stream.

    How is it even found to be loaded in the first place?

    Works in Vista, too!

    Maybe Vista needs that new file system after all. Too many places to hide stuff in the current NTFS. FAT32 anyone?

    --
    "It's the height of ridiculousness to say for those 9 lines you get hundreds of millions."
  95. AV vendors looking for sales.. by jofi · · Score: 1

    I always hear about these new awesome r0x0r your s0x rootkits. That rootkit called HackDefender I believe it was that was all over the news wouldn't even install properly under a limited account..

    --
    Blame the user, not the software.
  96. Re:Could you thwart an undetectable rootkit anyway by jmcguire81 · · Score: 1

    Communication with the rootkit author does not necessarily need to be a straightforward matter. I have seen concepts of a rootkit sending data by querying DNS servers controlled by the author and piecing data together by taking the first character from the domain being looked up.

    dns -> google.com
    dns -> overture.com
    dns -> dnsstuff.com

    A password of god was just transmitted.
    A very crafty kit would build up this list by first by watching legitimate traffic on the network, so viewing raw traffic would not throw up any immediate red flags. Data can be hidden in many places. Just my 2 cents.

    --
    "Konnichiwa", said the boneless horror.
  97. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by Albert+Sandberg · · Score: 1

    he/she wrote it.

  98. Booting from a known clean system by 200_success · · Score: 1

    I think the practice of booting from a known clean system ended with Windows NT. In the DOS and Windows 9x days, it was easy to make your own boot floppy, copy a virus scanner onto it, and stash it away in case of emergencies. Also, back then, rebooting was an everyday occurrence anyway.

    With Windows NT and its successors, it became cumbersome to make an emergency boot disk -- you needed the original install CD to write to several floppies, and the emergency boot process took an eternity. The virus scanner would have to be burned onto a CD (not everyone had a CD burner) or written to a memory stick (which some BIOSes don't know how to boot from). Of course, the virus scanner could be distributed on pressed CDs, but there would still be a problem with keeping the virus definitions up to date.

    So basically, the practice of clean-booting died for the same reasons that the floppy did.

    1. Re:Booting from a known clean system by swb · · Score: 1

      Many IT problems would be solved by MS making Vista bootable from a USB device.

    2. Re:Booting from a known clean system by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Even more problems would be solved by making Vista not bootable at all ..

    3. Re:Booting from a known clean system by chawly · · Score: 1

      Must admit my whole-hearted support of your idea.

      --
      How many beans make five, anyhow ? ... Charles Walmsley
  99. There are secure OS's by raftpeople · · Score: 1

    There is no OS that is 100% secure. Security is important, but if your expectation is for complete security, you will live a dissapointed life. The weak link in most computer networks is human. If it was programmed by humans, there will be a flaw that can be exploited. If there isn't a flaw in the programming, social engineering works fine to discover passwords that get you past the security

    Maybe not 100% secure, but there are commercial OS's that are orders of magnitude more secure than Windows. Why do people like you continue to post statements that make it sound like the current situation with Windows is the best we can hope for and we should not expect MS to improve the security of their OS?

    1. Re:There are secure OS's by GlL · · Score: 1

      Instead of ad hominem attacks, lets try to actually have a dialogue. I am not evangelizing Windows, or saying that things as they happen to be right now are satisfactory. I am merely trying to describe my perception of the way things are. The problem with a lot of those secure os's is more around usability or availability of desired software then around security. I would love for MS to improve the security of their OS, but it looks like they can't do that and maintain backwards compatibility that a typical user could implement.

      What I am trying to point out is that even though there are secure OS's out there, there are insecure people using them.

      --
      I'm a happy pessimist. I expect and prepare for the worst, when it doesn't happen I am pleasantly surprised.
    2. Re:There are secure OS's by raftpeople · · Score: 1

      I wasn't trying to attack you personally but rather your message. It probably came off poorly due to frustration with the number of times I read posts from people that blame users instead of realizing that good secure operating systems don't have these same problems. Either way, I apologize for the wording.

      Back to the issue. I don't disagree that you can't remove the human and there will always be problems, but these can be reduced by an order of magnitude or 2. MS has a poor track record so far, but that doesn't mean we blame the human. If other companies can write secure OS's, MS can too, so let's put the blame where it should be. And just to qualify that, IBM's OS's have been secure for decades because they were in environments that required it, MS was in an environment that did not require it nearly as much until relatively recently, so while I think it's their problem to solve (not the users), I understand why they weren't secure from day 1.

    3. Re:There are secure OS's by GlL · · Score: 1

      Thank you, I do understand your perspective. I am coming at the idea from a different angle than most on here. I am more interested in end-user usability because I work for an ISP. Most of my customers can barely use the PC they have. I hope that someone can rival Windows for usability and have actual secure code. Sorry if I snapped back, I get a bit riled myself, as I clean these machines that have bearshare, limewire and kazaa on and have more trojans than legit files on them.

      --
      I'm a happy pessimist. I expect and prepare for the worst, when it doesn't happen I am pleasantly surprised.
    4. Re:There are secure OS's by mycall · · Score: 0

      IBM's OSs are only as good as the weakest link. Many social security numbers have been stolen through IBM's OSs because applications written for it are weak. In addition, the best hacks are never/rarely detected -- all it takes is one good hole. [que NSA theme song here]

  100. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by Bill+Dog · · Score: 1

    There was a time when MS told developers that the only guaranteed writable dir was the windows dir, since your app could be running on a network installation of windows (where everything was on a network drive, but a tiny secondary windows dir would be created on the local machine so that settings (i.e. INI files) could still be per user).

    But that was > 10 years ago, before they created the Windows registry and told developers to switch to using that. I'd hate to think how many components are not even looked at let alone updated with each "new version" of Office.

    --
    Attention zealots and haters: 00100 00100
  101. Patch available for current & future rootkits by necro2607 · · Score: 1

    "An endless cycle of patch, pray, patch, pray, reinstall awaits us."

    Patch available here for current & future rootkits: http://www.apple.com/macosx/

  102. Breaking News! by freeze128 · · Score: 1

    "Mac users pummelled by angry infectees. See the aftermath, tonight at 10:00."

  103. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by necro2607 · · Score: 1

    ...just as any issue with a Mac not have game #x available is viewed as an opportunity to evangelize windows.

    Exactly the first thing I thought as reading dfghjk's comment.

  104. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    The last of the retarded spawn of DOS was Windows ME. RIP.

    Windows NT and 2K are more like the retarded spawn of VMS. They rock.

    And XP and Vista are the retarded spawn of VMS and an art school.

  105. I'm more interested in the technology by Spikeles · · Score: 0

    You can all complain about the security issues and how evil it is all you want but you have to admire the technology and the thought that goes into advanced viruses/trojans/worms/rootkits. This particular one is polymorphic and stealthed. Those are two traits that can be very difficult to implement into a program of any type. The original write obviously put alot of effort into creating this program, testing it on different configurations and then releasing it.

    Yes i admire it for it's traits and i think they should teach virus writing etc in University, the algorithms for self-replication, stealth and polymorphism are very cool, and no self respecting programmer should NOT know how they work and at least how to implement them at a basic level.
    This reminds me of weapons of war like cruise missles, their only purpose is to destroy things, but the technology they implement to do it is pretty freaking awesome!

    And yes before you ask i once did write a virus. It was a DOS .com infector that was 800bytes or so long. I never released it into the wild, so why did i write you ask? I wrote it because i could, because i wanted to see if i could and when i'd finished i'd learned a hell of alot about x86 assembly. My point is, that we shouldn't all think rootkits/viruses are inheretly evil, they are like guns, they guns don't kill people, people do.

    Imagine if you will a virus that spreads like wildwire, but this virus was an anti-virus program that used peer-to-peer networking to download updates and eradicated all other virus/anti-virus programs out there. In the end you have one virus and it kills everything bad for you? Remind you of anything? Yep, the human body. We have benifical viruses/bacteria in our body. They are allowed to replicate and infect others so i believe the stigmata against these technological wonders needs to stop.

    PS. I have nothing for disdain for script kiddies and those who use automated virus generators, if you are going to infect someones computer and disrupt their work, at least have enough balls to write it yourself.

    /me dons flame proof armour!

    --
    I don't need to test my programs.. I have an error correcting modem.
  106. Re:Could you thwart an undetectable rootkit anyway by Brad+Eleven · · Score: 2, Interesting

    Short answer: yes.

    Anecdotal evidence: I once set up a Linux machine behind a firewall, couldn't get to the Internet, but it could be seen from the Internet. Turns out there wasn't any requirement for it to see the Internet, so I checked "done" and moved on. This was a one-off deal.

    Got a call a month later: "login isn't working". Of course the machine was for dozens of desktop machines that logged in to run custom Universe scripts, so no one could do his/her work. So I go out there and notice that the network cables have been rearranged to go around the firewall. And there were quite a few email messages spooled up and going nowhere.

    Asked about the cable. "Oh. I tried that because I couldn't get to the Internet."

    "From this machine?"

    "Yeah."

    "Why did you want to get to the Internet from the Universe server?"

    "I wanted to surf the net while I was waiting for this other install thing that I was doing to finish."

    OK, so the machine is naked on the Internet, and login's broken. It takes the password, then another login prompt. Found a rootkit. Reinstalled the O/S, restored Universe from backups, put the machine back behind the firewall.

    Oh, the spooled-up email messages? Email to the rootkit installer. Even if the machine was pwned, s/he never found out. After poking around for a while, I discovered that it was a poorly implemented rootkit, e.g., the replacement for /bin/login dumped core when it couldn't send the captured passwords back home.

    Further, even if the elaborate cloaking schemes are followed, there must be communication back to the new pwner of the machine.

    --
    "Press to test."
    (click)
    "Release to detonate."
  107. Re:Are you kidding? by DavidTC · · Score: 1

    What al Zaquari was running isn't an actual AQ-operated group either. It's a fucking PR stunt naming it the same thing.

    --
    If corporations are people, aren't stockholders guilty of slavery?
  108. Rootcanal by HermanAB · · Score: 1

    What I find troubling is how blaze Windoze users are about it all. They get upset that their machine won't work once it is totally bogged down with spyware, but they don't care about the fact that some asshats were monitoring their every move on their machines for many weeks/months/years even.

    --
    Oh well, what the hell...
    1. Re:Rootcanal by Devistater · · Score: 1

      blasé? :)

  109. That's not a hard mark to hit... by sean.peters · · Score: 1

    ... in capitalist America, even Duke Nukem Forever ships before Vista.

    Sean

  110. Are you serious? by sean.peters · · Score: 2, Insightful

    I was pretty much with you until #5. Don't boot from read/write media? What exactly do you want me to boot from? Telling people not to boot from their hard disk is pretty radical. And even my Deb CD is really a CD-R - which is, you know, writeable.

    #6 is even more out there. Unplug from the network? Being as how you're posting to Slashdot, obviously you're not taking your own advice. What am I missing here?

    I think you need to get your tinfoil hat adjusted.

    Sean

  111. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by Karellen · · Score: 1

    "What about developers?"

    That is the main cause of problems with windows. In order to develop on windows before .NET came along, you could pretty much guarantee you were doing COM programming of some kind.

    In order to develop and test COM components, you need to be able to install them so they can be picked up by CoCreateInstance() and its brethren.

    In order to install COM components, you need to write to the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/[something I can't remember]/Classes registry key, which rightly requires Administrator priveliges.

    Therefore, in order to develop COM components - i.e. in order to do any serious Windows development - you _needed_ to run as roo^H^H^HAdministrator.

    The trouble is, if you're running as Administrator, you don't notice if you end up doing other things that also require Administrator privs. Like writing to other parts of HKLM, or the Program Files (or even System32) folder. None of that fails on your system, as you're Admin, so you never pick up on it.

    Your code goes to testing. In order to install your COM components, the testers need to at least install as Administrator. If they forget to test as a limited user, they'll never notice that either.

    You ship. Now everyone who uses your program needs to run as Admin. Think they'll change which account they're logged into just to run your program? Nope - they'll just give themselves Admin privs all the time.

    In order to fix this, developers _need_ to be able to write, compile, install and run the programs they're developing as non-Administrators. Fortunately, .NET allows you to do this as you don't _have_ to install your stuff to the GAC, and you don't need to write to any privileged locations to be able to get stuff done. You should just be able to play in your hom^H^H^HDocuments and Settings folder and do everything from there.

    --
    Why doesn't the gene pool have a life guard?
  112. Another reason. by kahrytan · · Score: 1


    If you have to use Windows, Rootkits are another reason to zero the hard drive regularly. But if you don't have to, another reason to buy a mac or UPGRADE to Linux.

    --
    \
    1. Re:Another reason. by Spikeles · · Score: 0

      So you are saying Linux doesn't get root kits? Wow.. i guess that isn't where the word was first coined in the first place and why things like rkhunter don't exist.

      --
      I don't need to test my programs.. I have an error correcting modem.
  113. So what if.. by Snaller · · Score: 1

    ..you run XP from a FAT32 partition? (But might have NTFS partitions)

    --
    If Google really cared they would fix Android Chrome to reflow text, instead of discriminating
  114. Re:Are you kidding? by DarkDragonVKQ · · Score: 1

    dun dun dun the plot continues.

    --
    "I thought what I'd do was I'd pretend I was one of those deaf-mutes" ~ Laughing Man - GITS:SAC
  115. BartPE by dorath · · Score: 1

    Tangent, yes. But...

    At my previous position BartPE was a godsend. If you do physical Windows support, and you aren't aware of this, I strongly urge you to take a peek: http://www.nu2.nu/pebuilder/

    Think Win98 boot floppy on crack. Boots off CD/DVD, does PnP, has network support, the ability to add virus scanners & other nifty tools.

    There are Linux boot CDs that do more/less/theSame, but if you're like me and (/gasp) not familiar with Linux then this can be a powerful tool.

    /linux noob
    //working on that
    ///Farker

  116. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by petermgreen · · Score: 1

    i'm pretty sure on both windows and linux a normal user can make stuff run when they login pretty easilly and on many linux installs they can probablly even use cron to schedule it to happen soon after startup.

    --
    note: i'm known as plugwash most places but i screwd up registering that here somehow in the past and now can't register
  117. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by drsmithy · · Score: 1
    Yes, but the program cannot make itself run automatically at bootup as this would require changing files which are owned by root

    Most desktops are only used by one person. Starting from that users "Startup" folder (or equivalent) is effectively the same thing as starting at system boot.

    So basically it will die at next reboot. It might be able to start when that same user logs in, but this can be fixed by forcing all config changes to come from root (Admin or whatever)

    A solution completely unworkable for the majority of desktop PCs.

    Apart from one, it would cost MS a fortune to rewrite office, and they would lose the edge which office has over the competition (all the private hooks into the OS it uses which they dont publicise to other developers)

    I see the good old "hidden APIs" myth still exists, despite the complete and utter lack of any actual evidence supporting it.

    Tell us, just what "advantages" do you think these supposed "private hooks" engender to a *word processor* or *spreadsheet* program ?

  118. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by drsmithy · · Score: 1
    Therefore, in order to develop COM components - i.e. in order to do any serious Windows development - you _needed_ to run as roo^H^H^HAdministrator.

    Or you could just use "Run As" for those times you need to actually install a COM component.

    The trouble is, if you're running as Administrator, you don't notice if you end up doing other things that also require Administrator privs. Like writing to other parts of HKLM, or the Program Files (or even System32) folder. None of that fails on your system, as you're Admin, so you never pick up on it.

    This is not an excuse for fundamentally bad development practices. If you're storing run-time or per-user data in system areas, you're either lazy or incompentent. "But it works for me" is not justification for doing something even a first-year software engineering student should be able to tell you is the wrong way to do it.

    Your code goes to testing. In order to install your COM components, the testers need to at least install as Administrator. If they forget to test as a limited user, they'll never notice that either.

    Nor is it an excuse for poor testing procedures.

    No developer has had any reasonable excuse for not writing LUA-friendly Windows software for ~7-8 years. Arguably, it's more like ~10 years, since NT4 was released, but I'm prepared to cut some slack.

  119. Re:T-minus 3... 2... 1... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Bah, don't get me started on the security on my abacus.

  120. Possible solution to the boot disk license problem by Sloppy · · Score: 1
    Having a separate boot disk dramatically increases costs because current OS licensing requirements means that the boot disk needs a separate OS license.

    The first idea that pops into my head, is that users should use Windows under copyright (which allows Fair Use) instead of licensing it. Then they can legally make a clean boot disk.

    But I guess the idea of using software under copyright is controversial, and some people still want to license Windows. Ok, whatever. One thing these users could maybe do, is run Windows under virtualization (which MS has recently started to license for "free") and then scan the guest system from a well-protected host OS.

    --
    As copyright owner of this comment, I authorize everyone to defeat any technological measure which limits access to it.